THE

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

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THE

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS
AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY

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VOLUME II
PREFATORY ESSAYS
BOOKS I AND II—TEXT AND NOTES

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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

A TREATISE on Politics in eight books, probably identical with that known to us as 'the Politics,' finds a place in all the three catalogues of Aristotle's works which have been handed down to us—that given by Diogenes Laertius in his life of Aristotle, that of the anonymous writer first published by Menage in his commentary on Diogenes Laertius, and that of 'Ptolemy the philosopher,' which exists only in an Arabic translation.

It is described in the first thus (No. 75)—πολιτικῆς ἀκροάσεως ὡς ὑΤεοφράστου αβγδεζη: in the second (No. 70)—πολιτικῆς ἀκροάσεως η: in the third (No. 32)—if we follow Steinschneider's Latin translation (Aristot. Fragm. 1469 sqq.)—liber de regimine civitatum et nominatur bulitikun (s. belitikun) tractatus viii.

The list of the Anonymus Menagianus is thought by Heitz not to be copied from that of Diogenes, but to be drawn from a common source. Some of its variations from the text of Diogenes, in fact, are too considerable to have arisen in the process of copying. It omits works named by Diogenes, but also names some which we do not find in his list. We see that the words ὡς η Θεοφράστου do not appear in its version of the title of the Politics. They may probably not have existed in the document copied. We cannot tell how they came...
to appear in the list of Diogenes. Did he find them in the source from which he copied his list, or did he add them himself? Or are they a gloss which has crept from the margin of Diogenes into his text? Their meaning is as doubtful as their origin. They may merely mean that the Political Teaching both of Theophrastus and of Aristotle was arranged in eight books: more probably they mean that the work was identical with one which was ascribed to Theophrastus as its author. Cicero sometimes cites, as from Theophrastus, statements the like of which we find in the Politics; but it does not follow that he may not owe them to Theophrastus, for Theophrastus may well have repeated remarks originally made by Aristotle, and we know that Cicero distinguishes between the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus on the best constitution, so that one part of the Politics at all events cannot have been ascribed by him to Theophrastus.

The term ἀκρόασις perhaps implies that the work was delivered in the form of oral lectures, and to associates, not to οἱ πολλοὶ, but Galen speaks of Aristotle "writing" his ἀκροασίς, and makes no distinction in this respect between them and the rest of his works. In the Rhetoric (1. 8. 1366 a 21)—a reference which may well have been inserted by some later hand—we find the Politics called

1 See on this subject Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 678. i.
2 De Fin. 5. 4. 11: cumque uterque corum doctissit qualem in re publica principem esse conveniret, pluribus præterea conscripsisset, qui esset optimus rei publicae status, hoc amplius Theophrastus, quae essent in re publica rerum inclinationes et momenta temporum, quibus esset moderandum, utcumque res postularet.
5 See the passage of Galen quoted in the last note. It seems to have been a common practice for the author of a book to read it aloud to an audience: cp. Cic. Brutus c. 51. 191: (Antimachus) cum, convocatis auditoribus, leget, eidem magnum illud quod novistis volumen suum, et cum legentem omnes praeter Platonem reliquisent, 'legam,' inquit, 'nihilo minus, Plató enim mihi unus instar est omnium.'
by the name by which we know it (t̓a ἀπολυτικὰ)¹. The Politics itself speaks of its inquiries as being περὶ πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἑκατερῶν καὶ ποίᾳ τις (Pol. 3. 1. 1274 b 32; cp. Pol. 6 (4. 129) 3 b 29, ἡμᾶς δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας), and refers at the close of the first book to succeeding portions of the work as τὰ περὶ τῶν πολιτείας (1. 13. 1260 b 12). It is also implied to be περὶ τῶν πολιτείων in 6 (4. 2. 1286 a 26².

References of any kind to the Politics, especially before the time of Cicero, are scarce, and therefore the question of the probable date and origin of the two first of these lists—the oldest, apparently, of the three—is an interesting one, for, as we have seen, they mention the work by name.

Diogenes Laerterius himself lived no earlier than the second century of our era and possibly much later, but, as is well-known, he derives much of his information from far more ancient authorities now lost, and his list of Aristotle's works has been thought by many to have come to him through some intermediate compiler or other from Hermippus of Smyrna, the disciple of Callimachus of Alexandria, or at all events to precede the rearrangement of Aristotle's works by Andronicus of Rhodes, who lived in the first century before Christ. A short review of the grounds for this opinion will perhaps not be out of place here.

1 So Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Aristot. Metaph. p. 15. 6 Βοιτία), ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς; Julian (Ep. ad Themist, p. 260 D), ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς συγγραμμασίοις. I take these references from Sus, p. xlv, note 85. The work of the Platonist Eubulus also was entitled Ἐπίσκεψις τῶν ἐπὶ Αριστοτέλους ἐν δεύτεροι τῶν Πολιτικῶν πρὸς τῷ Πλάτωνοι Πολιτικῶν ἀντιγράφων (Sus. p. xlv; Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 678. 11).

² Michael Ephesius, quoting from the Politics, uses the expression ἐν ταῖς ἀπολυτικαῖς (lege ἀπολυτικαί), and Eustathius, ἐν Πολιτικαῖς (Sus. p. xiv, note 85).

3 Hermippus lived till about the close of the third century before Christ.

⁴ See the story in Strabo, p. 608-9. Strabo speaks of 'the library of Theophrastus, which included that of Aristotle,' passing to Neleus, and forgets to make it clear whether Apellicon purchased the libraries as a whole, or only
with the rest of the library of Apellecon of Teos, Tyran-
nion (a contemporary of Lucullus and Cicero) put them in
order (ἐνσκευάσασθαι τὰ πολλὰ), and Andronicus, 'having
obtained from him the copies which had been made of
them' (cp. Strabo, p. 609), 'published them, and framed the
lists now current' (παρ' αὐτῷ τὸν 'Ῥώδιον Ἀνδρόνικον εὐπο-
ρήσατα τῶν ἀντιγράφων εἰς μέσον θείναι, καὶ ἀναγράψαι τούς
ὗν φερομένους πίνακας). We learn further from an equally
well-known passage of Porphyry's Life of Plotinus, that
Andronicus arranged the works of both writers on a new
principle. The passage is as follows:—'Επεὶ δὲ αὐτῶν
(Plotinus) τὴν διάταξιν καὶ τὴν διόρθωσιν τῶν βιβλίων ποιεῖσθαι
ήμιν ἐπέτρεψεν, ἐγὼ δὲ κάκεινώς ἔσωτε χρήσιμὴν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἐπηγεγειλόμην ποιῆσαι τούτο, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ βιβλία οὗ κατὰ
χρόνους ἔσωσα φύρην ἐκδοθομένα ἑδικαίωσα, μημηθαμένοις ὁ
'Ἀπόλλωνιος τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος τῶν περιπατητικῶν,
ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκαρμος τῶν κωμῳδογράφων εἰς δέκα τόμους φέρον
συνήγαγεν, ὁ δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλεως καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγμα-
τείας διείλε, τὰς οἰκείας ὑπόθεσεις εἰς ταῖτων συγγαγών, οὕτω
δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ πεντήκοντα τέσσαρα ὡντα ἐξων τὰ τοῦ Πλωτίου
βιβλία διείλοις μὲν εἰς εἰς εἰς ἐνέαδας, τῇ τελειώτητι τοῦ εἰς ἀριθμὸ
καὶ ταῖς ἐνεάδις ἀσμένως ἐπιτυχών, ἐκάστῳ δὴ ἐνεάδι τὰ οἰκεία
φέρων συνεφόρησα, δόυς καὶ ταῖς πρῶτην μὲν τοῖς ἑλαφροτέρους
προβλήμασιν (c. 24).
It would seem from this passage that before the time
of Andronicus the works of Aristotle were arranged in a
confused and merely chronological order—the order of
publication. apparently—and that he introduced the new
plan of grouping them by their subject-matter, following the
example of the grammarian Apollodorus of Athens, who

the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus included in them.
He says that Apellecon purchased 'the books of Aristotle and Theo-
phrastus,' and fails to notice the ambiguity of this expression. His
mind is, in fact, absorbed in the story which he is telling about the
fate of the writings of the two great Peripatetic teachers, and he
forgets that Aristotle and Theo-
phrastus must have possessed
many books in addition to their
own compositions. Athenaeus in
his account speaks more distinctly,
and tells us that Apellecon pur-
chased 'the Peripatetic writings'
(τὰ περιπατητικὰ) and the library
of Aristotle and many others'
(Deipn. 214 d).
had in the previous century arranged the Comedies of Epicharmus in ten great τόμου. The writings of Aristotle would include both dialogues and systematic works, and Andronicus would seem to have grouped them together, making, not form or date, but subject-matter the basis of his arrangement. We conclude that in his issue of the works the περὶ δικαστικῆς, for instance, would be grouped with other ethical writings ascribed to Aristotle. It is possible also that in some cases Andronicus took separate treatises and formed a new whole out of them under some general name. Heitz (p. 36) thinks it probable that he did this for the treatises which together make up the 'Physics' of our editions. He is not stated, however, to have constructed any new treatise out of fragments of Aristotle, any more than Apollodorus constructed a new comedy of Epicharmus. His work would seem to have been one of arrangement, not of manufacture.

As the dialogues and other exoteric writings were apparently comprised in his edition and interspersed among the rest of the works, it must have been very different from our own Aristotle. Many spurious works, again, are included in our Aristotle which can hardly have been ascribed to Aristotle in the time of Theophrastus, or have been republished by Andronicus as part of the Scepsis 'find,' though we can well understand that some works of Theophrastus may have been ascribed to Aristotle or vice versa, the writings of the two authors having been mixed up together.

Andronicus' issue of Aristotle's works was probably an event of great importance, though not quite as important as a hasty reader of Strabo might imagine. When Strabo asserts, rightly or wrongly, that the Lyceum library at Athens had come, after the withdrawal of Neleus to Scepsis, to possess only 'a few' of the works of Aris-

1 'Τόμοι here as everywhere else must mean a papyrus-roll' (Birt, Das antike Buchwesen, p. 496).
2 It is not easy to see where Andronicus can have placed the letters and poems; it is, however, hardly likely that they formed part of the Scepsis find.
tole, he makes this assertion with respect to that one library; he need not be taken to assert the same thing of other great libraries of the Hellenic world, such as those of Alexandria and Pergamon. Strabo's aim is, in fact, to give an explanation of the comparative torpor of the Peripatetic school at Athens during the interval between Nelleus and Andronicus, which was in all probability really due to other causes. His assertion is limited to Athens; the libraries of Alexandria and Pergamon were no doubt in far better case. But even for them the publication of Andronicus' texts may well have been an important event. Not a few spurious works may have found a place among the writings of Aristotle preserved in these two great libraries, and perhaps some of the genuine works were wanting. The Scepsis purchase, on the contrary, would include only those works of Aristotle which were ascribed to him by Theophrastus and Nelleus, and would probably include all of these. The publication of Andronicus' edition, and especially its publication at Rome, would serve to concentrate attention on the genuine works of these two writers, and to place them before the world in their entirety, at a moment when the really great philosophers, orators, and artists of Greece were being singled out from the crowd with an ardour which was altogether new. Copies of Aristotle's works acquired after this date would probably be copies of the edition of Andronicus.

The question now arises—Is the list of Aristotle's works given by Diogenes ordered after the fashion of Andronicus or not? The answer is not difficult. The list is not quite the chaos which it appears at first sight to be: on the contrary, it is to a certain extent in order; but its order is not the order of Andronicus. First we have the dialogues and other exoteric works, then two or three early abstracts of Platonic lectures or writings, then we come to a part of the list in which logical works seem to predominate; ethical, political, and rhetorical works predominate towards the middle; then come physical and zoological works; last in order we have works designed in all probability for Aris-
PROBABLE DATE AND ORIGIN OF THE LISTS. vii

totle's own use ("hypomnematic works"), letters, and poems. The arrangement can hardly be that of Andronicus. Diogenes' list of Theophrastus' works has been shewn by Usener to be derived from the catalogue of a library, and the same thing may probably be true of his list of Aristotle's works. As the former list is for the most part arranged on alphabetical principles, and the latter is not, it is doubtful whether they can have been derived from the same library-catalogue, for if they were, we should hardly expect to find the works of Theophrastus catalogued in one way and those of Aristotle in another. Be this, however, as it may, Diogenes' list of Aristotle's works is probably derived from the catalogue of some library which had purchased its copy of Aristotle's works before Andronicus issued his edition—very possibly an Alexandrian library, but about this we cannot be certain. The mention of the Politics in it may therefore date as far back as the formation of the libraries of Alexandria, or rather perhaps the adoption by their authorities of the practice of dividing large works into 'books,' which is implied throughout the list. Some believe that this change dates only from the time of Callimachus, who was chief librarian of the Museum from about 260 to 240 B.C., but the point is doubtful.

We are on surer ground in referring Diogenes' list of Aristotle's works to pre-Andronicus times than in attempting to fix its exact date, or the exact source from which it ultimately came. Diogenes may have copied it himself from some library-catalogue, or on the other hand

1 The list is said by Heitz (p. 234) to resemble most of those we find in Diogenes in placing the dialogues first, the letters and poems last, and last but one the hypomnematic writings.

2 For other reasons which make it unlikely that the list of Aristotle's works given by Diogenes is ultimately derived from Andronicus, see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 51 sq.

3 Analecta Theophrastea. p. 13 sqq.

4 Heitz' comment on the title ἰτακτα 63 (No. 127 in Diogenes' list of Aristotle's works) is as follows: 'one would conjecture that the substantive to be supplied is ἐπομενοντα. For the choice of the title the person who catalogued the papyrus-rolls is unquestionably responsible, and we must no doubt set it down to some Alexandrian librarian' (p. 236 7).

5 See on this subject Birt, Das antike Buchwesen. p. 482 sqq.
it may have come to him through intermediaries. The latter is perhaps the more probable supposition. Usener believes that Diogenes' list of the works of Theophrastus came to him ultimately from Hermippus of Smyrna, who was the author of a work entitled Βιοτ, which dealt, among other subjects, with the lives of philosophers and orators\(^1\). He admits that there are peculiarities in the structure of this list which at first sight make against his view. It is taken, as he has shewn, from the catalogue of a library, which apparently added from time to time, by purchase or otherwise, to the collection of the writings of Theophrastus which it originally possessed, and catalogued both its original stock and (for the most part at all events) its later acquisitions in alphabetical order. Thus the list consists of a long alphabetical list followed by a shorter alphabetical list, which is in its turn succeeded first by a group of books not arranged in any order, and next by a third alphabetical group. We know that Hermippus was an accomplished writer and scholar\(^2\), and it is natural to ask, would he have made his list a mere transcript of an ill-arranged library-catalogue? Usener replies that few of the early πανογράφοι did their work any better\(^3\). Ancient authorities speak of Hermippus and Andronicus as having drawn up lists of Theophrastus' works\(^4\), and mention no one else as having done so; and Diogenes' list of his works is clearly not by Andronicus. But if the Βιοτ of Hermippus is the ultimate source from which this list came, it does not follow that Diogenes' list of the works of Aristotle was also derived from it. We do not know

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1 See Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 35.

2 We owe to him the vivid sketch of Theophrastus in his lecture-room which Athenaeus has preserved for us (Deipn. 21 a).

3 'Meae sententiae' (the view that the list came through Hermippus) 'illa ipsa obicere possis unde ex bibliothecae usus ortam hanc tabulam esse studui ostendere. uerum haud scio an in-

merito: nam omnibus antiquorum πανογράφοι si librorum tabulas ab ipsis scriptoribus aut disce-
pulis familiarissimis confectas ut par est excipias—id proprium est, quod ea tantum quae in certis bibliothe
cis siue Alexandrina siue Pergamena siue aliis conlecta erant respeci solent volumina' (Usener, Analecta Theophrastea, p. 24).

4 Heitz, p. 47.
for certain that Hermippus drew up a list of Aristotle's works; and if we admit that it is highly probable that he did, we are still met by the difficulty of accounting for the entire contrast between the structure of the one list and that of the other. The list of Theophrastus' works is alphabetical; that of Aristotle's works is not.

Notwithstanding this difficulty, however, it is perhaps more than possible that both lists may have come from the work of Hermippus. They may even have come from a still earlier source. The Βιον of Hermippus was probably in part an expansion and revision\(^1\) of portions of the vast work of Callimachus (in 120 books), entitled Πάναξ παντο-δατῶν συγγραμμάτων, or πάναξ τῶν εἰς πάνη παιδεία διαλαμ-ψάιτων καὶ ὅν συνεγραφαρ, which gave lists of authors—orators, poets, lawgivers, philosophers—classified in separate groups according to the nature of their writings, and added in each case the full titles of these writings, the number of books, the initial words, and the number of lines. 'In the case of writers who were the authors of more works than one the total number of lines contained in their works was given\(^2\). We are at once reminded of the remark with which Diogenes concludes his list of Aristotle's writings, that they contain 445,270 lines. His enumeration of the writings of Theophrastus concludes with a similar mention of the number of lines contained in them. The work of Callimachus, who, as has been said, was chief librarian of the Alexandrian Museum, was probably based on the collection of books preserved in the Museum Library and the stores of other Alexandrian libraries, and this would explain some characteristics of the two lists to which reference has already been made.

The Politics, then, is included in a list of Aristotle's works which dates in all probability from an earlier epoch than that of Andronicus. Other indications of its existence

\(^1\) See Muller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 46; Hermipp. Callimach, fr. 46.
\(^2\) See Birt, Das antike Buchwesen, p. 164.

**TRACES OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE WORK.** ix
are derivable from works whose date is less doubtful and also probably earlier.


In the Magna Moralia the following—1. 25. 1192 a 16 sqq., cp. Pol. 1. 9. 1258 a 10 sq. and 10. 1258 a 21 sqq.: 1. 34. 1194 b 9, cp. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25: 1. 34. 1194 b 18, cp. Pol. 1. 4. 1254 a 12.

The so-called first book of the Oeconomics (which is ascribed by Philodemus to Theophrastus 2, though Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 944) is half inclined to ascribe it to Eudemus) is to a large extent a reproduction of the teaching of the Politics on this subject, though the writer also makes use of the Laws of Plato and the writings of Xenophon. The compiler of the so-called second book of the Oeconomics, which seems to be of a later date, is also apparently acquainted with the Politics (compare Oecon. 2. 1346 a 26 sqq. with Pol. 1. 11. 1259 a 3 sq.).

Indications of an acquaintance with the Politics appear also in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, which is wrongly included among the works of Aristotle: e.g. in 3. 1424 a 12 sqq., with which Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 78. 2) has compared Pol. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27–38 (cp. also Pol. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.): also in 3. 1424 b 3 sqq., cp. Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34

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1 Since the above was written, I find that Susemihl has drawn attention to one of these passages (Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1238 b 5 sqq.) in his third edition of the Politics (p. xix, note). He also thinks that in Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1248 b 26 sqq. the writer had Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 21 sqq. before him. Zeller (Hermes 15. 553 sqq.) holds that in Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1218 b 32 sqq. the writer had before him, not only Eth. Nic. 1. 8. 1008 b 9 sqq., but also Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 21 sqq.

An acquaintance with Pol. 7 (3). 4. 1303 b 28 sqq. on the part of the writer of the De Animalium Motione may possibly be indicated in c. 7. 791 b 24 sqq.

So again, in the passage from Theophrastus περὶ βασιλείας of which we have the substance and something more in Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 73–4, we seem to detect many reminiscences of the Politics, and especially a clear reminiscence of Pol. 3. 14. 1285 a 30 sqq. If Bernays is right (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 61 sqq.) in regarding Porphyry de Abstin. 2. 12 sqq. as an excerpt from Theophrastus, the disciple perhaps refers in the words εἶ δὲ λέγω τίνι κ.τ.λ. to his master's teaching in Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq.

In the Fragments of Aristoxenus, again, we seem to trace occasional echoes of the Politics: compare, for instance, Fragm. 19 from his Ποιησιαίκα ἀνοφάσεως (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278) with Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 14 sqq., and Fragm. 20 with Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 11 sqq.1

1 It is unfortunate that the loss of a few letters in the Herculanean papyri on which what remains of the work of Philodemus de Virtutibus et Vitiis is written makes it uncertain whether Metrodorus, the friend and disciple of Epicurus, had or had not seen the Politics. Philodemus says in the Ninth Book of this work (col. 21: I quote from the text of it appended to Götting's edition of the Oeconomica) ascribed to Aristotle — κατὰ τά δ... αὐτόν ὡς τοὺς τε πολλοὺς ἐξελέγα[ν][τις] ἐντὶ ἀν εὐριτῶς [τι αὖτως] κατηγοροῦσιν ὑπὲρ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῶν ἔρωτος πίστις ὑπὲρ τῶν οὐτῶν τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ πρᾶξαι πολιτικῶς ἅπασαν ὑπὲρ τῶν τοῦ[m] καὶ ἀναγαμορθήσασθαι καὶ χρηματιστῶσιν [θαυμάζων, ὡς ὁ Μητρόδωρος [ὁ] πε[τι]ς ἐκεῖνον. Götting (p. 206) supposes that the reference is to Eth. Nic. 4. 1, but the context (col. 17 sqq.) might equally well be taken to refer to the passage about Thales in Pol. 1. 11. 1259 a 6–18. It is, in fact, just possible that the word which Götting supplies as πολιτικὴς, or πολειτικής, was πολειτείας—Rose supplies πολειτείας and takes the reference to be to Pol. 1. 8 to — but it seems more probable that the reference is to a dialogue, in which case we may supply either πολειτείας (with Spengel, followed by Heitz, p. 195, and Zeiller, Gr. Ph. 2. 261. 1), or possibly πολιτείας. When Metrodorus is related (Plutarch adv. Colot. c. 33) to have found fault with philosophers, who
Hieronymus of Rhodes, who lived at the close of the fourth and in the first half of the third century B.C., seems from Diog. Laert. i. 26 to have told in his Σποράδην ὑπομνήματα the story about Thales which we read in Pol. 1. 11, and in a form which, though shortened, is very similar to that of the Aristotelian narrative 1. It is, however, possible that the two writers derived it from a common source.

In the dialogue entitled Erastae, which is included among Plato’s works, though it can hardly be his, there are things which remind us of Aristotle’s teaching: the distinction drawn (135 C sqq.) between δὲ τὴν τεχνὴν ἐξωθήσαντο καὶ τὴν πεπαιδευμένος is perhaps more emphasized than we expect to find it in a pre-Aristotelian work and recalls, among other passages of Aristotle, Pol. 3. 11. 1282 a 3 sqq.; we note also that the teaching of the first book of the Politics is contradicted, intentionally or otherwise, in 138 C. But we cannot say positively that the writer is acquainted with the Politics. Polybius has often been said to show no acquaintance with the Politics, and it must be confessed that though there are passages in his Sixth Book which remind us at once of the Politics 2, it is not clear that he had a first-hand knowledge of it. His account of the origin of society and his constitutional teaching seem rather to be based on the

1 Since the above was written, I find that Prinz (De Solonis Plutarchei fontibus, p. 24) and Susemihl (Sus. 1 p. xix) have already drawn attention to this.

2 Compare Polyb. 6. 57. 2, διότι δὲ τρίτων ἄντων καθ’ φρειδεσθαι πέρικε σὺν γίνοσ πολιτείας, τοῦ μὲν ἐξωθήκεν, τοῦ δ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς φησιν τινῖς with Aristot. Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 38 sq. and other passages: Polyb. 6. 18. 5 with Aristot. Pol. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 25 sqq.; Polyb. 6. 3. 7 with Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq. The account of βασιλεία in Polyb. 6. 6. 10 sqq. reminds us of that of Aristotle; Polybius’ fear of αὐξήσει ὑπὲρ τὸ διόω (6. 10. 7) reminds us of Aristotle’s warnings against αὐξήσει παρὰ τὸ ἀναλογοῦν (7 (5). 3. 1302 b 33 sqq., cp. 7 (5). 8.1308 b 10 sqq.); and the language of Polybius as to the Roman Constitution (6. 11. 11 sqq.) resembles that of Aristotle about the Lacedaemonian constitution (Pol. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 13 sqq.), no less than that of Plato (Laws 712 C sqq.).
views which were fashionable in the third century before Christ than on the teaching of the Politics.

Society originates, according to him, in the gregarious tendencies common to man and many other animals, not in the household relation, and just as a herd of bulls is led by the strongest, so the primitive form of Monarchy among men is the rule of the strongest and boldest. It is only after a time, in the view of Polybius, that the experience of social life develops in man an ἐννοια τοῦ δίκαιου καὶ τοῦ ἁδικου, τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰτχροῦ (Polyb. 6. 5. 10: 6. 6. 7, 9)\(^1\) —Aristotle, on the contrary, had held perceptions of this kind to be presupposed by human society (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 15 sqq.)—and that the Monarchy of the strongest gives place to Kingship, which Aristotle had said to be the primitive constitution. All unmixed constitutions, however, have, according to Polybius, a tendency to degenerate, and so Kingship passes into Tyranny. Aristocracy, the rule of the few good, succeeds, and in its turn passes into Oligarchy, the rule of a bad few. Then comes Democracy, the rule of a virtuous Many, followed by Ochlocracy, the rule of a vicious Many. Combine Kingship, Aristocracy, and Democracy in one constitution, and much will have been done to prevent constitutional decline and change. Thus Polybius recommends a mixture of these three constitutions; this is what mixed government means to him, something quite different from what it means to Aristotle.

We know that even in Aristotle's time there were those who commended the kind of mixed government which Polybius commends\(^2\). The Lacedaemonian constitution gave the hint of it. But in the century after Aristotle's death the union of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy rose more than ever into credit, vigorously preached by the Stoics, and also probably by the Peripatetic Dicaearchus. Polybius inherited this theory, and handed it on to Cicero and the eulogists of the English constitution in the last century.

\(^1\) Compare the similar view of the Epicureans (Porphy. de Abstin. 1. 10).

\(^2\) See Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.
A connexion has been ingeniously suggested between the constitutional views of Polybius and those of the Eighth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (c. 12. 1160 a 31 sqq.). Polybius may perhaps have been acquainted with this treatise, but it is more probable that the source from which he drew was the Τριπολιτικός of Dicacarchus or some other intermediate authority. His theory of constitutional change would be suggested or confirmed by the history of Rome, in which the μοναρχία of Romulus was succeeded by the kingship of Numa, and the tyranny of Tarquin by the aristocracy of the early Republic and the mixed constitution which Polybius commends.

Cicero inherited far more from the Politics than Polybius. He lived like Aristotle at a time which greatly needed moral reinvigoration, and, like Aristotle, he sought this at the hands of the State. He accepts Aristotle's account of the end of the State (de Rep. 4. 3: 5. 6. 8), as he accepts his account of its origin (de Rep. 1. 25. 39), rejecting that of Epicurus. It exists to promote 'good and happy life.' But if we ask what kind of State best fulfils this end, the answer is that a combination of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy does so. Here he returns to the views of Polybius. As to unmixed constitutions, kingship is the best of them, but they are all very liable to decline into forms not based on 'ius consensum et utilitatis communio'—into tyranny, the rule of a faction, and anarchy (de Rep. 1. 45. 69). Cicero goes far beyond Aristotle in his condemnation of the perverted forms and denies to the

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1 By the late Mr. R. Shute in an unpublished essay.
2 Polyb. 3. 4. 11 at any rate appears to echo Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 30 sq.
3 See Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 242.
4 It is worthy of notice that when Carneades wished to attack Aristotle's notion of justice, he would seem to have sought it in the Ποιή Δικαιοσύνης, not in the Nicomachean Ethics. See Cic. de Rep. 3. 6. 4: 3. 7. 10: 3. 8. 12. This, however, does not necessarily prove that the Nicomachean Ethics was not well-known at that time; the other work may have been still better known, or it may have contained in its four large books a fuller treatment of the subject.
communities in which they exist the name of ‘res publicae’
(de Rep. 1. 25. 39: Augustini argumentum libr. iii: de Rep. 3. 31. 43).

To devise a best State is, in Cicero’s view, beyond the power of any single inquirer. The only way to arrive at a true conception of the best State is to study the Roman constitution, which is the work of many generations and centuries, and hence of unsurpassed excellence (de Rep. 1. 46. 70: 2. 1. 2). It is to the experience of Rome, therefore, that Cicero has recourse, when he seeks to discover what institutions best promote a good and happy life. The institutions which do so are Roman institutions—the censorship, the patria potestas, and others. Cicero has too much national feeling to follow Greek guidance in politics implicitly, and there is a certain originality in the way in which he accepts the central principle of the Politics without accepting its application in detail. His main aim is a conservative aim—to recall his countrymen to a sense of the value of the triple constitution under which Rome had achieved greatness, and which was increasingly imperilled every day by the rising tendency to autocracy.

Cicero inherited much from the Politics, but it does not necessarily follow that he had a first-hand acquaintance with the book itself. There are passages in the De Republica which seem to indicate such an acquaintance. Thus it is possible that the procedure of Aristotle in the first and third books of the Politics is present to Cicero’s mind, when he announces his intention of departing from the practice of those learned inquirers on politics who begin with the union of male and female, the birth of offspring, and the formation of a body of kinsfolk, and frequently distinguish the various meanings in which this or that word is used (de Rep. 1. 24. 38: see vol. i. p. 34). His criticisms on Plato’s Communism (de Rep. 4. 4. 4) seem still more clearly to imply an acquaintance with the Politics. The following passages may also be compared: de Rep. 1. 34. 51 with Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 30 sq. and with 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sqq., 1294 b 17 sq. de Rep. 1. 35. 57 with Pol. 3. 16. 1287 b
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11 sqq.—de Rep. 2. 12. 24 with Pol. 2. 9. 1271 a 20 sq. and 2. 11. 1272 b 38 sqq.—de Rep. 3. 25. 37 sub fin. with Pol. 1. 4. 1254 a 14 sq.

One would suppose from the De Finibus that Cicero was at all events acquainted with the part of the Politics which treats of the 'optimus rei publicae status,' were it not that in the De Republica he makes Laelius contrast the method of Plato, who constructed a model State, with that of all other inquirers. All save Plato 'disseruerunt sineullo certo exemplari formaque reipublicae de generibus et de rationibus civitatum.' Cicero himself will in the De Republica so far follow Plato's example as to investigate 'non vaganti oratione, sed defixa in una re publica.' It certainly looks as if Cicero was not aware, when he wrote the De Republica, that both Aristotle and Theophrastus had sketched the best form of the State.

In reading the fragmentary remains of Philodemus de Musica (ed. Kemke), we often notice that Philodemus combats, or refers to, arguments which remind us of those used in the Fifth Book of the Politics. Thus Kemke (pp. xiii–xiv) compares lib. 3. fragm. 52 (in his edition) with Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 18 sqq.: fragm. 53 with 1340 a 14 sq.: fragm. 65, 66 with 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. One or two other passages of which the same thing may be said are noted by Gomperz, Zu Philodem's Büchern von der Musik, p. 18 sq. (lib. 3. fr. 24: cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 2) and p. 31 (lib. 3. fr. 54: cp. 1340 a 22). Perhaps the following passages may also be added to the list—lib. 1. fr. 16, cp. 5 (8). 3. 1338 b 1: fr. 17, cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 2–5: lib. 3. fr. 45 (where $d[\pi]o$-phi[i]eta[i] should probably be read in place of $d[\lambda\lambda']$ $d$ phi$[\sigma\kappa]eta[i]$, Kemke), cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 8–10: fr. 55 and lib. 4. col. 3. 23 sqq., cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 12 sqq.: lib. 4. col. 15. 5 sq., cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 16 sq.: col. 16. 17 sqq., cp. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 24 sqq. On these similarities the observations of Gomperz, pp. 28–29, are well worth reading. The language

1 See also Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 151. 6.
2 5. 4. 11.
3 2. 11. 22.
of these passages, as he remarks, differs sufficiently from that of the Politics to make it probable that Philodemus had not the Politics before him, but either some work of Aristotle's (a dialogue, Gomperz thinks) used by him in the composition of the Politics, or some work which reproduced the Politics. It is evident, however, that the subjects discussed in the Fifth Book had been much discussed before Aristotle dealt with them, and possibly some at any rate of the expressions which strike us as similar in the Politics and the De Musica may have been originally used by inquirers of an earlier date than Aristotle, and have come both to him and to Philodemus by inheritance.

If Meineke is right, and the short sketch of the political teaching of the Peripatetics contained in the Eclogae of Stobaeus (2. 6. 17) is taken from the work of Areius Didymus, the instructor of the Emperor Augustus, then we have clear evidence that the Politics was well known to this writer, for nearly everything in the sketch is derived from the Politics.²

The writer whom Plutarch follows in the latter part of the second chapter of his Life of Crassus was probably acquainted with the Politics, for the following passage contains several expressions familiar to readers of its first book. Plutarch here says of Crassus as an owner of slaves—τοισούτων ἕκεκτητο καὶ τοιουτῶν ... αὐτός ἐπιστατῶν μαθάνωσι καὶ προσέχων καὶ ὀδιάσχοι καὶ ὅλους νομίζων τῷ ὑπερύθρῳ προσήκειν μάλιστα τὴν περί τούς οἰκέτας ἐπιμέλειαν ὡς ὀργανά ἐμφύσχα τῆς οἰκονομικῆς. Καὶ τούτῳ μὲν ὀρθῶν ὁ Κράσσος, εἶπερ, ὃς ἔλεγεν, ἤγείτο τά μὲν ἄλλα ὡσ τῶν οἰκετῶν χρησά, τούς ὃς οἰκέτας ὃι' αὐτοῦ κυριερῶν τὴν γὰρ οἰκονομικὴν ἐν ἄφυκω χρηματιστικῇ οὕσαν ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτικήν γεγο-μένην ὀρθωμὲν;² ἐκείνῳ δὲ σὺν ἑν, τῷ μηδένα νομίζειν μηδ' ἐθνεῖν

² This is of course nowhere said by Aristotle, who would not allow the identity of any section of οἰκονομικῆ either with χρηματιστικῆ or πολιτικῆ, yet his teaching in the Politics perhaps underlies this modification of it.
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einai πλούτων δέ οὐ δύναται τρέφειν ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας στρατόπεδων (ὁ γὰρ πόλεμος οὐ τεταγμένα συνείται κατὰ τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον, ὥστε οἱ πρὸς πόλεμον πλοῦτος ἀρώστου). Crassus (c. 3) was interested in the teaching of Aristotle, and was instructed in his doctrines by a Peripatetic named Alexander, from whom these facts about him may ultimately be derived.

The writer, again, whom Plutarch followed in Agis c. 5 may possibly have sought to meet the criticisms which Aristotle passes in Pol. 2. 9. 1270 a 18 sqq. on the laws of the Lacedaemonian State, and to show that Lycurgus was not in fault. See my notes on 1270 a 4 and 19.

Those who are well versed in the Greek and Latin writers of the earlier Roman Empire will probably be able to add to the following scanty list of passages from writers of that epoch, which seem to indicate an acquaintance, direct or indirect, with the Politics or with some points of its teaching:—

Plin. Epist. 7. 17 (cp. Pol. 3. 11. 1281 a 42 sqq.)

Dio Chrysostom, Or. 3. 115 R sqq. (?): the reference in Or. 36. 83 R to the ἀγαθὴν εἶ ἀπάντων ἁγαθῶν πόλιν: Or. 7. 267 R, cp. Pol. 2. 6. 1264 b 39: Or. 14. 439 R, cp. Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 36:

Plutarch, De Monarchia Democratia et Oligarchia (if the work be his), c. 1, καθάπερ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων βίοι πλεονεκρίτες, ἐστι καὶ δήμου πολεῖα βίος (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40): several passages in the Reipublicae Gerendae Praecepta—c. 15. 812 B, where the προφέρει is spoken of as the ὄργανον of the κυβερνήτης (cp. Pol. 1. 4. 1253 b 29): c. 15. 812 D, ὁ γὰρ μόνον τῆς διυπάμεως κ.τ.λ. (cp. Pol. 2. 11. 1273 b 12 sqq.): c. 17 init. (cp. Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 37 sqq.): c. 24 init. (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 26 sq. and 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 34 sqq.): c. 32. 825 A, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις κ.τ.λ. (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 31 sqq.). In passages like these, however, Plutarch may well be

1 Some particulars respecting him will be found in Stahr, Aristoteles bei den Roemern, p. 18.
2 Plin. Epist. 1. 20 seems to contain a reminiscence of Poet. 7. 1450 b 34 sqq., rather than of Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 33 sq.
reproducing, not the Politics, but some work which the Politics reproduces—very possibly the Politics of Aristotle—for we find Plutarch in the last-named passage (c. 32. 825 A-C) relating stories similar to those told in Pol. 7 (7), 4. 1303 b 20 sqq., and 37 sqq., but with more fulness of detail, and these are stories which may well have found a place in the Politics. In Plutarch’s An Seni sit gerenda Republica, c. 7. 787 C-D, we are reminded of Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 38 sqq., but it would be quite unsafe to infer an acquaintance with the Politics from this passage. So again, in the De Cupiditate Divitiarum (c. 8. 527 A) the lovers of wealth are divided into two classes, just as they are in Pol. 1. 9—those who make no use of their wealth and those who squander it on pleasures—but Plutarch here quotes from Aristotle an expression which does not occur in the Politics, and he may well be making use of a dialogue of Aristotle in which similar views were put forth. In [Plutarch] de Liberis Educandis c. 13. 9 C, the saying πας ὁ βλός ἤμων εἰς ἀρεταῖ καὶ σπονδῆι δήψεις reminds us of Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 30, but there is so little in the rest of the treatise to point to an acquaintance with the Politics that it is doubtful whether the writer had the Politics before him.

We are reminded of the Politics, again, when we read in Arrian, Epictetus 2. 10, that ‘the whole is superior to the part and the State to the citizen,’ but doctrines such as this were the common property of the Peripatetic school, and a reference to them in no way implies a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics.

It is far otherwise when we find Alexander of Aphrodisias distinctly quoting the Politics (in Aristot. Metaph. p. c. 15. 6 Bonitz, τὸν γὰρ δοῦλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἴπαι εἰπερ ὅσιν ἀρθροποιον ἄν ἄλλον ἔστιν). Here we have a direct reference

It is uncertain when the spurious fragments of Hippodamus and other Pythagoreans (see as to these, Zeller, Gr. Ph. 3. 2. 85. 2, ed. 2) came into existence, but we often find in them what seem to be indications of an acquaintance with the Politics.

It should be added, however, that the Laurentian MS. of Alexander (1) has the reading—τὸν γὰρ δοῦλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἴπαι εἰπεν τὸν ἀρθροποιον τὸν ἄλλον ἄντα καὶ μὴ ἐστιν.
of an indubitable kind. Susemihl’s first edition of the Politics (p. xlv. note 85: cp. Sus. p. xviii. sq.) supplies a list of references and quotations subsequent to this date which need not be repeated here.

The passages which have been adduced will suffice to show that we are perhaps in possession of as many indications of the existence of the Politics between the time of Aristotle and that of Alexander of Aphrodisias as could well be expected, considering the extent of our literary losses and the entire change in matters political which resulted from the establishment of the Roman Empire.

It is not impossible that one or two large works had already appeared broken up by their authors into ‘books’—i.e. volumes, or rather papyrus-rolls, of a portable and handy size1—before the Politics came into existence. It would certainly seem that the historical work of Ephorus was published in this form, for it was divided into thirty books, each dealing with a separate subject.2 Aristotle himself had apparently divided his dialogues—if we may thus interpret the phrase ἔξωτερικοί λόγοι in Cic. ad Att. 4. 16. 2—into books, prefixing to each book a separate prooemium.3 But the Politics was not composed after this fashion, which was quite a new one in those days. It was divided by Aristotle into πρῶτοι λόγοι and other λόγοι, the first book having as its subject οἰκονομία καὶ δησποτεία (3. 6. 1278 b 17) and being thus distinguished from τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας (1. 13. 1260 b 12), but falling nevertheless within

1 As Blass points out (Hand- 
buch der klassischen Alterthums- 
wissenschaft, i. 313), large works were probably from the first often published in more rolls than one for convenience in perusal, but each scribe who copied them would divide them after a fashion of his own, according to the size of his rolls, without paying much attention to the nature of the con-
tents, and it was a decided step in advance when the sections into which a work was to be divided came to be authoritatively deter-
mined at the outset.

2 See Diod. 5. 1: 16. 1. Birt (Das antike Buchwesen, p. 471) does not feel absolutely certain (see his remarks on the subject, p. 466 sqq.), but the fact is highly probable, to say the least. See Blass ubi supra.

3 See Cic. ad Att. 4. 16. 2, and Blass ubi supra.
the πρῶτοι λόγοι (3. 6. 1278 b 17). Where these πρῶτοι λόγοι end, it is not easy to say, for we cannot infer from the use of the past tense in 3. 18. 1288 a 37, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρῶτοις ἑδείχθη λόγοι, that the πρῶτοι λόγοι are over before the beginning of this chapter, since we have εἰρήται ὅτι καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρῶτος λόγους in 3. 6. 1278 b 17—a chapter which certainly seems to form part of the πρῶτοι λόγοι, for in 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 26 sqq. the distinction of the ἄρθαὶ πολιτείαι and the παρεκκλάσεις (3. 7) is said to fall within the πρώτη μέθοδος. On the other hand, there is nothing to show that the Fourth and Fifth Books belong to the πρῶτοι λόγοι. But if the point at which the πρῶτοι λόγοι close is uncertain, there seems to be no doubt that the distinction between πρῶτοι and other λόγοι is due to Aristotle, while the division into books is probably not so. Still the eight books of the Politics are marked off from each other by clear differences of subject-matter, so that no great violence was done to the composition when it was broken up into books.

If we take the first three books first, and ask how far they hang together, we shall find on examination that there is some want of unity even here. The First Book, as has been already noticed, proves that the household exists by nature, yet the Second treats the question whether it should exist or not as one still open for discussion, and makes no reference to the arguments of the First Book. Perhaps, however, we should not attach too much importance to this, for in the First Book itself the slave is assumed as an element of the household, long before the naturalness of slavery is investigated and established. Then again, the closing sentence of the First Book, as has been noticed elsewhere 1, is not quite in accord with the opening paragraph of the Second, nor is there anything in the conclusion of the First (apart from this closing sentence) to lead us to expect that immediate transition to the subject of the best constitution which we note at the commencement of the Second. There is no clear indication, again, in the Second Book that the First has preceded it. The passage

1 See notes on 126 οδ. 20, 27.
2. 2. 1261 b 12 sqq., no doubt, reminds us of 1. 2. 1252 b 28 sq., as do 2. 5. 1263 b 37 sqq. and 2. 9. 1269 b 14 sqq. of 1. 13. 1266 b 13 sqq.; but we are not referred back in these passages to the First Book. The Second Book has one or two links with the Third (compare, for example, 2. 9. 1271 a 18 sq. with 3. 14. 1284 b 37 sqq.), and it stands in a close relation to the Fourth, for in constructing the best State in the Fourth, Aristotle avoids many of the rocks of which we are warned in the Second, and we find one or two subjects discussed in this Book which have been marked out for discussion in the Second (compare 2. 6. 1265 b 16 with 4 (7). 16). The Second Book, in fact, seems to be more closely related to the Third and Fourth Books than to the First. Yet we note that while at the beginning of the Second Book the best constitution is announced as the subject of inquiry, the Third Book, on the contrary, addresses itself (3. 1. 1274 b 32) to an inquiry respecting all constitutions (περὶ πολιτείας καὶ τίς ἐκάστη καὶ ποία τις). On the other hand, the Third Book, unlike the Second, distinctly refers to the First (3. 6. 1278 b 17 sqq.: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 1 sqq.), and its discussion of the virtue of the citizen reminds us of the discussion of the virtue of the woman, child, and slave in the First.

If we pass on to the Fourth and Fifth Books, and ask how far they form a satisfactory sequel to the first three, we raise a question which has given rise to much debate. Something has already been said on this subject. We have just seen that the Second Book prepares the way for the Fourth, and we observe also that the conclusions of the First and Third Books are made use of in more passages than one of the Fourth (compare, for example, 1. 3. 1253 b 18–1. 7. 1255 b 39. 1. 12. 1259 a 37–b 17, and 3. 6.

1 See vol. i. p. 292 sqq.
2 I incline on the whole to agree with those who take 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 34, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἣμεν τεθέωρηται πρῶτον, as referring to the contents of the Second Book (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 29, δέ ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολιτείας, and 2. 12. 1274 b 26, τῷ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν εἰσορμεῖα, ἐστο τεθεώρημα τῶν τρόπων τοῖτον). But the sentence is one which it would be easy to interpolate.
Compare 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 27-31, and 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 3 sqq.: compare also 3. 5. 1278 a 40 sqq. with 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11 sqq.)¹. The discrepancies, however, which have already been noted² between the Fourth and Fifth Books on the one hand and the first three on the other must not be lost sight of. It is possible that these two books, like the Seventh, were not originally written for insertion in the work of which they now form a part, at all events in its present form, and were incorporated with it by an afterthought ³. The close relation, however, in which they stand to the Second, must be admitted to make against this view, and the only safe course is to confess that we cannot penetrate the secrets of the workshop, or perhaps we should rather say, the Peripatetic school.

We are far more conscious of a break when we pass from the five books to the remaining three. There are indeed many links between the two groups of books. Not only are anticipations to be found in the earlier group of the teaching of the later (compare, for instance, 2. 6. 1265 b 26-30 with 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.), but we trace in both the same twofold aim—the aim of scientific truth and the aim of utility (1. 11. 1258 b 9: 2. 1. 1260 b 32: 3. 2. 1275 b 21: compare 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35).

But the emphatic announcement at the outset of the Sixth Book of the multiplicity of the problems of Political Science strikes us as something altogether new. We expect that Aristotle will pass quietly on from the best constitution (or in other words Kingship and Aristocracy) to Polity, the only δροθή πολιτεία still undiscovered, and if it is true that he gives good reasons (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 22 sqq.) for departing from this course and for studying oligarchy and democracy before he studies the polity, still we are conscious of a considerable change of tone.

¹ It should be noted, however, that the references to the πρώτα λόγα in 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 30 and 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 3 can easily be detached from the context in which they stand, and may well have been added by a later hand.

² Vol. i. p. 295 sqq.

³ A further question might be raised, whether they were incorporated with the Politics by the hand of Aristotle.
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when we pass to the Sixth Book. Aristotle here becomes suddenly aware that Political Science has a technical as well as an ethical side; he insists that the statesman, like the physician (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 25 sqq.) or the general (Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 3 sqq.), must be able to make the best of the material which happens to be at his disposal—nay, that he must understand how to construct any constitution that may be demanded of him, even if it is not the best that the circumstances permit. In the earlier books (1-5) πολιτική and the πόλεις seem to be regarded on the whole from a more ideal point of view, as the sources of good life: the keynote of these books is the exaltation of πολιτική ἀρχή over δεσποτική and οἰκονομική ἀρχή, of which we hear so much in the first book. The παρεκβάσεις are viewed throughout them as originating in an erroneous view of justice (as indeed they still are in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq.); in the Sixth Book, on the contrary, we discover for the first time that they are in some cases the only possible constitutions, the social conditions of the community permitting no other forms (6 (4). 12. 1296 b 24 sqq.). The Seventh Book goes so far as to advise a tyranny how to maintain itself in power. Another obvious difference between the two groups of books is that the one is far fuller of historical detail than the other.

A further peculiarity of the later group (6-8) is the emphasis with which these books dwell on a fact which finds no mention elsewhere—that of the existence of many forms of democracy and oligarchy. The Third Book, it is true, had distinguished various kinds of Kingship, so that there is nothing new in the recognition of sub-forms of this or that constitution; but still we nowhere learn outside these three books that democracy and oligarchy have many forms. No truth, however, is more insisted on in the three books, or rather in the Sixth and Eighth, for in the Seventh it is referred to only in the closing chapter¹, a

¹ The only subdivision of oligarchies and democracies recognized in the remainder of the book is that into ἵπποι and κύριοι (7 (5). 6. 1306 b 20).
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chapter which, though quite Aristotelian, may well be of later date than the rest of the book.

We might be tempted by the entire silence of the Fourth and Fifth Books with regard to much that comes before us in the Sixth and Eighth to regard the former pair of books as written before the latter. But then it is not by any means certain that the Fourth and Fifth Books were in existence when the Sixth and Eighth were penned. The Sixth Book no doubt refers to the inquiry respecting the best constitution as concluded, but it is not clear that the inquiry referred to is that contained in the Fourth and Fifth Books. It alludes to an inquiry respecting ἀριστοκρατία contained in the πρῶτοι λόγοι, but we cannot be sure that the Fourth and Fifth Books are intended to be referred to. The passage is as follows (6 (4). 7. 1293 1 sqq.):—

ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν  nomine kalώς ἔχει καλέων περὶ ἓς δείηδομεν ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ’ ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν των ἀγαθῶν ἀγορῶν, μόνην δίκαιον προσαγερεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν ἐν μόη γὰρ ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀνήρ καὶ πολιτῆς ἄγαθος ἑστὶν οἴ δ’ ἐν ταῖς ἀλλαίς ἄγαθοι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσι τὴν αὐτών.

The reference here may well be to the Third Book, in which we find all the characteristics of the best constitution here dwelt upon mentioned (cp. 3. 18); and the same thing perhaps holds of the reference in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 2 to τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν, where 3. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq. may possibly be the passage alluded to. It is true that there are two passages in the Sixth Book which remind us of the teaching of the Fourth and Fifth Books—c. 2. 1289 a 32, where both ἀριστοκρατία and βασιλεία are said to rest on ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη, and c. 11. 1295 a 25 sqq., where a πολιτεία κατ’ εὐχήν is spoken of, requiring a type of virtue above the ordinary type and an education presupposing not only high natural gifts, but also a χορηγία which only Fortune can give. These passages are quite in harmony with the teaching of the Fourth and Fifth Books, but they might have been written before these books were written. It is far more clear that both the Fourth and Fifth Books.
and the Sixth and Eighth, were written after the Third, than that either pair of books was written after the other. These two pairs of books seem to be to a considerable extent independent of each other. Both, we notice, are incomplete; there is no clear evidence that either group was ever finished, though the opening of the Sixth Book (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 30) speaks of the inquiry respecting the best constitution as complete, and the Eighth Book, as we possess it, appears to close in the middle of a sentence. It is possible that Aristotle went on with the Sixth Book after completing the Third, instead of proceeding with the sketch of the best State. If he did so, however, it is strange that we find in the Fourth and Fifth Books so few traces of the teaching of the Sixth and Eighth.

A noteworthy feature of the Sixth Book is the state in which we find its earlier portion. The programme given in its second chapter (1289 b 12–26), as has been pointed out elsewhere (vol. i. p. 492 sqq.), does not altogether correspond with the list of questions marked out for treatment in the first chapter. The repetitions of prior discussions which we remark in c. 4 are still more surprising; c. 4. 1290 a 30–b 20 goes over much the same ground as the eighth chapter of the Third Book, and c. 4. 1290 b 21–1291 b 13 not only repeats (with considerable variations of method and result) the investigations of the preceding chapter, but contains much that is similar to the contents of the eighth chapter of the Fourth Book. The first four chapters of the Sixth Book may perhaps not have received a final revision, or may have been tampered with by some later hand.

The Seventh Book was probably originally written as a separate treatise, and only inserted by an afterthought between the Sixth and Eighth Books. Not many references to other books of the Politics occur in its pages, and

1 8 (6), 8. 1323 a 9, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰρέτων, ὃς ἐν τῷ τοπίῳ, σχεδόν τῷ κλειδεύει τῷ παρατόν, where we have μὲν οὖν without any δὲ to follow.

2 Such references as those in

7 (5). 1. 1301 a 28 (ὁποτερα τίμηται καὶ προτέρον) and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 2 (ποία δὲ λέγουμεν τῶν πολιτειῶν σοφίσματα, προτέρον τίμηται) may easily have been added by a
QUESTION OF THE UNITY OF THE WORK. xxvii

it has some marked peculiarities. As has been already remarked, it systematically distinguishes between μοναρχία (including Kingships) and πολιτεία, and it takes no notice (till its last chapter) of the many sub-forms of oligarchy and democracy dwelt on in the Sixth and Eighth Books; it also advises in one passage (c. 1. 1302 a 2–8) the blending in constitutions of ἴσοτης ἁρμονική with ἴσοτης κατ’ ἀξίαν, as the best security for durability. It is perhaps by supposing that the Seventh Book has been inserted between two closely related books composed consecutively, that we shall best explain some difficulties occasioned by the references in the Eighth Book to the Sixth and Seventh Books. On the one hand, the Eighth Book refers more than once to the Seventh as preceding it, and one of these references at all events is too much interwoven with the context to be easily explained away as an addition by a later hand (c. 5. 1316 b 37 sqq.). On the other hand, the Sixth Book is referred to in 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 34 as ἡ μέθοδος ἡ πρὸ ταύτης, and in c. 4. 1318 b 7 as οἱ πρὸ τούτων λόγοι. If these references are from the hand of Aristotle—which is by no means certain, for they can readily be detached from the context—it may well be that they were inserted before the Seventh Book was intruded between the Sixth and the Eighth, and through an oversight escaped excision afterwards.

Some further light will be thrown on the subject which we have been considering, if we note down from the pages of the Politics some promises of future investigations which are not fulfilled in the work as we have it.

The earliest of these (1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq.) prepares us to

later hand, or by Aristotle himself, if he incorporated the Seventh Book with the Politics.

1 Vol. i. p. 521.

2 A similar distinction is implied in 3. 15. 1286 b 8–13. Μαναρχία and πολιτεία are often distinguished in the ordinary use of the Greek language (see Liddell and Scott s. v. πολιτεία), and the Seventh Book conforms to the common way of speaking. The Seventh Book also agrees with the Third in tracing the plurality of forms of constitution to varying views of what is just (7 (5). 1. 1301 a 25 sqq.; cp. 3. 9).

3 This recommendation, it may be noticed, is borrowed from Plato, Laws 757 E.
expect a full investigation of the virtue of husband and wife, father and child, and of the conduct they should observe to each other, and also of the various forms which each of these relations should assume under each constitution; we are to be told how every constitution will educate the women and children who fall under its authority. Perhaps these inquiries were to find a place in the discussions περὶ πατερομοίως to which the Fourth Book (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 2) bids us look forward; but at any rate the intimation of the First Book leads us to expect an interesting ethical investigation which we do not find in the Politics, though the necessity of adapting education to the constitution is often insisted on (e.g. in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 11 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 1 sqq.).

The announcement there made appears, in fact, to be completely forgotten. Then again, the intimation in the first chapter of the Sixth Book that the making of laws, as distinguished from constitutions, is a part of the province of πολιτικῆ, and that the whole province of πολιτική must be fully dealt with, leads us to look for an inquiry on the subject of laws in the Politics (cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 5, ἀφελές τὴν πρώτην). But, as has been noticed already, the programme given in the very next chapter (the second) omits all mention of this topic, and the opening paragraphs of the Eighth Book fail to include it among the subjects which still demand treatment, though it certainly is not dealt with in any part of the Politics which has come down to us.

Other intimations of future discussions which never actually occur will be found in 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 32 sqq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 4 and 1330 a 31 sqq.: 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 2 sqq.:
AN IMPERFECT UNITY, AND WHY.

These passages, however, only prove what we knew without them, that the inquiry as to the best State and its arrangements is incomplete, and also that the Eighth Book is incomplete. The fact that there are no references in the Politics to past discussions which cannot be explained as relating to existing passages in the treatise as we have it, seems to make it probable that no considerable part of the work has been lost, and that it was never finished.

We see then that though there is a certain amount of unity about the Politics, it is not a well-planned whole. Its component parts fit together more or less, but the fit is not perfect.

How is it that this is so? How is it that the Politics, though indisputably a whole, is yet a whole in which we trace these discrepancies of plan?

Beyond all doubt, we must not expect a Greek philosophical treatise to be arranged precisely in the order in which we expect a modern work of the same kind to be arranged. A modern work would not first prove that the household exists by nature, and then inquire whether it ought to exist. Yet this is what Aristotle does in the First and Second Books of the Politics. Cicero has already noticed in the Tuscan Disputations some peculiarities in the methods of investigation practised by Greek philosophers, as distinguished from Greek geometricians. "Veruntamen mathematicorum iste mos est, non est philosophorum. Nam geometrae cum aliquid docere volunt, si quid ad eam rem pertinent eorum quae ante docuerunt, id sumunt pro concessu et probato: illud modo explicant, de quo ante nihil scriptum est. Philosophi, quacunque rem habent in manibus, in eam quae conveniunt congerunt omnia, etsi alio loco disputata sunt. Quod ni ita esset, cur Stoicus, si esset quacstim, satissim ad beate vivendum virtus posset, multa diceret? cui satis esset respondere se ante doceuisse nihil bonum esse, nisi quod honestum esset; hoc probato, con-
sequens esse beatam vitam virtute esse contentam, et quo modo hoc sit consequens illi, sic illud huic, ut si beata vita virtute contenta sit, nisi honestum quod sit, nihil aliud sit bonum. Sed tamen non agunt sic. Nam et de honesto et de summo bono separatim libri sunt, et cum ex eo efficacetur satis magnum in virtute ad beate vivendum esse vim, nihilominus hoc agunt separatim. Propriis enim et suis argumentis et admonitionibus tractanda quaeque res est, tanta praesertim.

Seneca, again, in an interesting passage of his Fortieth Epistle, contrasts Greek and Roman oratory, and finds more deliberation, reflection, and system in the latter. ‘In Graecis hanc licentiam tuleris: nos, etiam cum scribimus, interpungere assevimus. Cicero quoque noster, a quo Romana eloquentia exsilivit, gradarius fuit. Romanus sermo magis se circumspicit et aestimat praebetque aestimandum.’

But differences of this kind do not suffice to explain the phenomena which need explanation in the Politics. What we remark is that, of the three or four parts of which the work is made up, those which precede and those which follow very nearly correspond to each other, but do not quite do so. In passing from one part to another, we are conscious that the two parts do not completely match: the part which we must place second in order is not quite what the part which precedes it leads us to expect it to be, though it is very nearly so. Some of the discrepancies which we notice in the Politics may be accounted for on the supposition that the work was never finished and never received a final revision at its author’s hands, but then it must be remembered that a similar, or even greater, want of unity has been traced in the Nicomachean Ethics, which can hardly have suffered from the same cause.

Whatever may be the case as to the Nicomachean Ethics, perhaps the state of the Politics becomes in general intelligible if we suppose that Aristotle, notwithstanding his turn for systematization, allowed himself some freedom in work-

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1 Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5. 7. 18-19.
ing successively at different parts of the treatise, permitted each part to forget to some extent its membership of a whole, and failed to force on his investigations that complete harmony, of form as well as of substance, which rigorous criticism would require. Very probably his views developed as he passed from one portion of the work to another; he seems throughout it to be feeling his way as a pioneer would, and we need not be surprised to find in the Sixth and Eighth Books ideas of which there is no trace in the earlier ones. Possibly some interval of time elapsed between the composition of the different parts. The Third Book is the centre round which the whole treatise is grouped: it is presupposed both in the inquiries of the Fourth Book and in those of the Sixth.

We notice that we have no such programme of future inquiries at the outset of the Politics as that which the first and second chapters of the Sixth Book set forth for the remainder of the work, and it may well be the case that Aristotle began the Politics without any definite scheme of it before him. He had evidently cast aside the programme which we find at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics, and yet he framed no fresh one to take its place. If he had done so, perhaps he would have prepared us by some intimation early in the work for the break of which we are sensible in passing from the first five books to the remaining three. Something might have been lost in freshness and freedom, if the structure of the Politics had been more rigorously systematic—if a definite programme had been announced at the outset and adhered to throughout, but the bisected aspect which the work wears at present would have been removed, and the gulf would have been

1 This will not, however, explain everything; it will not explain, for instance, the state in which we find the first four chapters of the Sixth Book.

2 It is also possible that some of the books were rewritten, and that the Politics, as we have it, is a mixture of two or more editions. For instance, a Second Book may once have existed with a commencement in fuller harmony with the conclusion of the First than that of the present Second Book, and a Fourth Book in fuller harmony with the Third than the present Fourth.
Apart from possible interpolations, the Politics would seem to be the work of one author, and that author Aristotle, not Theophrastus.

Some may be inclined to suspect that the Politics is the work of more authors than one. It is very possible that it is not free from interpolation, but there seems to be no reason to doubt that the bulk of the treatise is to be referred to one and the same author. The same peculiarities of style appear throughout it—peculiarities which are traceable more or less in other works ascribed to Aristotle, and which afford marked indications of character. We are sensible of a certain combativeness—of a fondness for tacitly contradicting other writers, especially Plato; we feel that we have to do with a writer who is at once eager in utterance and circumspect in drawing conclusions.

If we refuse to trust to the evidence of style, we may note that a work composed by more authors than one, and especially a work on Politics, would probably betray its origin by anachronisms, unless these authors were contemporaries. The works of Theophrastus on Plants, though far removed in subject from current events, mark their own date by referring to events long subsequent to the death of Aristotle.

Then again, each of the three or four parts into which the Politics falls seems to be the work of a writer who is thinking out the subject for himself—a pioneer, not a deft expositor and elaborator of another man’s system. Perhaps the very discrepancies and variations of view which we note in the Politics indicate this. The system is in making, not made. The earlier books of the treatise appear to be unfamiliar with doctrines which are insisted on with emphasis in the later ones. The writer is evidently one who has known Greece in the days of its freedom and greatness before the defeat of Chaeroneia—one who belongs perhaps rather to the age of Philip than to that of Alexander: the opinions he combats and corrects are those of that day; they are the opinions of Plato or Isocrates or the Socratic Schools, not those of a

1 See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 98 n.: 811 n.
THE WORK OF ONE AUTHOR, ARISTOTLE. xxxiii

later time. If the Politics, or any part of it, had been written even twenty years after Alexander's death, would not the fact be readily discoverable? Would a writer of that date have committed himself to the sanguine view that the Greek race, if united, would be able to rule the world? Would the passages recommending the constitution resting on the μέσοι have been expressed as they are, if they had been written after Antipater's introduction of a property-qualification for citizenship at Athens? The writer at any rate would not have needed to go back to οἱ πρῶτα ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γεγονότες to find a statesman of far-reaching authority who favoured a constitution resembling the polity.

Nothing surprises us more in the Politics than the fact that, though it was apparently written after Chaeroneia, it is almost entirely preoccupied with the petty States of Greece, and the constitutions prevailing in them. Macedon, it is true, might profit by the pages devoted to Kingship, but throughout the greater part of the work the writer evidently has the Greek City-State and its difficulties in view. He seems wholly unconscious that the sceptre had passed irrevocably from Greece to Macedon; he has not fully deciphered the meaning of Chaeroneia. We need not blame him for this: if Greece had been less exhausted and wiser, Chaeroneia might not have been 'finis Graeciae.' But his view of the situation probably shows that he wrote not long after the battle, and before the magnitude of the catastrophe had been fully realized.

The ὡς Ἡ Θεοφράστου in the list of Diogenes may suggest the question whether Theophrastus was not the writer of the Politics, or of a part of it. Theophrastus was only 12 or 15 years younger than Aristotle, though he survived him apparently 34 years or more. It is very possible that he wrote some of his books before the death of Aristotle: the Politics might belong to that epoch and yet be his. If this were so, we should still feel pretty sure that we possessed the gist of Aristotle's political
teaching, for the work of Theophrastus would certainly be based on the views of his master. But we feel in reading the Politics that we are in presence of the master, not of the disciple—of the originator of the system, not of its expositor. There is a difference, again, between the style of Aristotle and that of Theophrastus; the writings of the latter were probably far easier reading than those of the former—sweeter, more flowing, and less sinewy. Opinions also find expression in the Politics which Theophrastus seems not to have held. He would hardly have been willing to assert, as the First Book of the Politics asserts (c. 8. 1256 b 15 sq.), the naturalness of animal food.

He may perhaps also have rated the importance of external and bodily goods to happiness rather higher than we find it rated in the Fourth Book of the Politics.

Theophrastus was famed for the freshness with which he could treat a subject already treated by Aristotle, and it is probable that the treatise in six books entitled Politiká, which Diogenes Laertius ascribes to him, was different in many respects from the work which we know as Aristotle's Politics. Cicero distinctly implies that the work of Theo-

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1 Cic. Brutus 31. 121: quis Aristotelе nervosior, Theophrasto dulcior? Heylbut (de Theophrasti libris περὶ φιλανθ., p. 9) remarks: 'taceri quidem nequit nonnulla minus severe et magis ad communem sensum a Theophrasto tractata esse, qui longe suaviore et faciiliore quam Aristoteles scribendi genere utebatur.'

2 See Bernays, Theophrastos' Schrifft über Frommigkeit, passim. It is not quite clear that the so-called first book of the Oeconomics (c. 2), which Philodemus ascribes to Theophrastus, contemplates the use of animal food. If, again, as Bernays appears to think (Theophrastos über Frommigkeit, p.96 sq.), it is to Theophrastus, and not to Porphyry, that we are to ascribe the strong assertion of the identity of men and animals in desires and anger, and also in reasoning (λογισμός), and above all in perceptions, which we find in Porphyry de Abstin. 3. 25, Theophrastus can hardly be the writer of such a passage as Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 15 sqq.

3 Cicero at all events seems to have thought that he rated these goods higher than Aristotle (see Acad. Post. 1. 9. 33; 10. 35). Theophrastus appears in his Ethics to have thought the question worthy of discussion, whether πρὸς τὰς τιχας τρεπται τὰ ζῆν καὶ κινοῦμεν τοῖς τῶν σοφῶν πάθεσιν ἐξισταται τις ὁρετής (Plutarch, Pericr. c.38: Sertor. c.10). He appears to have speculated whether great calamities might not spoil even a good man's character.

4 Cic. de Fin. 1. 2. 6: quid? Theophrastus mediocreriem delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos?
phrastus 'De optimo statu reipublicae' was not identical with the work of Aristotle on the same subject, and if it should be suggested that the Fourth and Fifth Books of our 'Aristotle's Politics' are the treatise of Theophrastus or its remains, it may be replied that internal evidence points rather to Aristotle as their author.

Thus far we have assumed that the Politics is a composition committed to writing by its author or authors, but this is precisely what has been questioned by some. One or two critics have drawn attention to the accounts given of Aristotle's style by Cicero and others who were familiar with his dialogues—accounts which are borne out by some of the still existing fragments of those dialogues—and have asked whether the extant works of Aristotle, marked as they are by many roughnesses and peculiarities of style, can really have been composed by him—whether they are not, or most of them are not, mere notes of Aristotle's lectures taken down by his hearers and perhaps put in shape by some one disciple. To some of them, indeed, this theory would not apply. The History of Animals can hardly have had this origin, and the hypomnematic works of Aristotle—if they were intended for his own use—must also have been committed to writing by him. But setting these on one side, and setting on one side also works incorrectly connected with his name, it has been asked whether many, if not all, of the remaining works are anything more than reports of his lectures.

There is undoubtedly a colloquial air about them; some have more of it than others, and none more than the Politics. The Politics reads, even more than the Nichomachean Ethics, like the talk of an experienced inquirer engaged with others in a difficult investigation, and feeling his way through it. We know that notes were taken by

\[1\] See Zeller's note, Gr. Ph. 2. 111. 1, where some of them are collected. Among these is the well-known passage, Cic. Acad. 2. 38. 119: veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles.
pupils in the lecture-rooms of the great Greek teachers. Aristotle himself took notes of Plato's lectures περὶ τἀγαθῶν, and other disciples of Plato did the same. We are told that the Cynic Metrocles 'burnt the lectures of Theophrastus,' an expression which some have taken to mean notes taken by him of Theophrastus' lectures. But then we observe that the works which we associate with the name of Aristotle resemble each other in style more than we should expect, if they had come into existence in this way, unless indeed the report were verbatim or nearly so, or the whole of the lectures were reported by a single individual. If the reports were, as they probably would be, by different hands and not very close, it is natural to expect that the rendering of one reporter would differ a good deal from the rendering of another, and that in the result the works ascribed to Aristotle would differ from each other in style more than they actually do. It seems hardly likely that any mere 'redaction' by a single disciple would suffice to restore to them the degree of uniformity which they exhibit. The question then arises—is it likely that the reports would be verbatim or nearly so?

Aristotle's report of Plato's lectures περὶ τἀγαθῶν was, it would seem, pretty close, so far at all events as certain expressions of Plato were concerned, but it is perhaps hardly likely that a long course of lectures would be taken down in the close way in which we must suppose Aristotle's language to have been taken down, if most of what we call his works are in fact reports of his lectures. If his

1 Heitz, Verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 217 sq.
2 Diog. Laert. 6. 95, οὗτος τὰ τειμων συγγράμματα κατακαίω, ὡς φησίν 'Εκείνων ἐν πρώτῳ Χρείων, ἐπέλεγε, Τάδ' εἰσ' ὑπόνοιαν νεπτίρων φαινάσσα-ματα, οἰον λόγον: οἱ δ', ὃτι τὰς Θεοφράστου άκροάσεις καταβιβάζων ἐπέλεγε, "Ἠφοιτε, πρῶτον δὸς, θεῖος νῦ τι οἶον κατίζει.
3 Cp. Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. 362 a 12 (quoted by Heitz, p. 217), ἐν τοῖς περὶ τἀγαθῶν λόγοις, οἷς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ἡσαίας καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐταραύνοντο ἀνεγραφαντο τὰ ῥήτερα αἰνηματικῶς, ὡς εἴρηθη.
4 It would seem from Plutarch's treatise De recta ratione audiendi (c. 18) that the lecturers of his day were liable to be interrupted by questions put by some member of their audience, to which they were expected to reply. If this was so in Aristotle's time, a faithful report of a lecture would give
NOT A PUPIL’S RECORD OF HIS LECTURES.

lectures, however, were thus taken down, the reports would differ but little from compositions strictly so called, for ancient authors, like modern, may often have dictated their writings to an amanuensis.

But no ancient authority conceives the works of Aristotle to have come into being in this way. Galen, as we have seen, speaks of Aristotle as ‘writing’ the ἀκροάσεις for his pupils. Theophrastus, in a letter to the Peripatetic Phanias cited by Diogenes Laertius, seems to use the term ἀναγρώσεις of his own lectures. The peri τῶν θεσσαλῶν of Aristotle, which consisted of notes of Plato’s lectures, was never included among the works of Plato, and it would be equally easy to distinguish between reports of Aristotle’s lectures and works written by Aristotle. It seems, besides, only natural that Aristotle should write down a course of lectures which he probably intended to re-deliver. He was not, like Socrates or Carneades, one who systematically abstained from writing; he had been a writer from his youth; and is it likely that after composing his Dialogues and his History of Animals and his work on Constitutions, and even noting down the Problems which suggested themselves to him, and accumulating a mass of memoranda, he trusted his political and other teaching to the chapter of accidents? Even if, on the first occasion on which each course was delivered, he used no notes, and a pupil took down a report of the lectures, is it not likely that he would adopt this report, and use it, possibly in an amplified and revised form, on subsequent occasions?

The remark may be added that if the Politics is a pupil's record of Aristotle’s lectures, it is the record of a course of lectures singularly broken up into parts. We ask with some curiosity, why a continuous course of lectures should form so imperfect an unity. One would have expected that a single course delivered without notes would have been far

these replies, and probably record the interruption which elicited them.

1 Above, p. ii.

2 § 37. It would of course be unsafe to build too much on the testimony of an alleged letter, which may have been, like much of Greek epistolar literature, falsified or spurious.
more of an unity than the Politics seems to be. It is no doubt possible that the work is a pupil's record of three or four courses put together; but, on the whole, the supposition which involves fewest difficulties seems to be that the Politics was written by Aristotle for use in his lecture-room, or at all events for the use of his pupils. It is evident that Greek teachers had to study with some care how best to carry their pupils with them. Some hearers, we are told in the Metaphysics, would accept nothing but strict mathematical demonstration; others demanded a frequent use of examples, while others again expected the lecturer to adduce passages from the poets in confirmation of his teaching. Aristotle is careful to explain at the very outset of the Nicomachean Ethics, for the benefit of the first-named class of critics, that ethical and political problems do not lend themselves to mathematical demonstration, but he often illustrates his teaching by familiar examples and often also refers to the poets. These methods would be especially in place in an educational, or acroamatic, treatise. Unlike Plato, who seems for the most part to have written in one and the same way for the outside world and for his pupils, Aristotle made a distinction between the style of his published works and the style of those which he intended for use within his school. With his pupils he seems to have been less attentive to form, less rhetorical, and more colloquial.

His lecturing is not of an ex cathedra or formal type; on the contrary, he seems to regard himself rather as the pioneer of a body of investigators, and takes pains to select that path through the thicket along which they will find it most easy to follow him. He never forgets the traditional impressions, prepossessions, and prejudices of the better sort of Greek; he himself has inherited these traditions, which need only a certain amount of sifting and correction to become the basis of his own philosophical system. His tone is thus rather that of a comrade than a teacher. We can imagine how great would be the im-

1 Metaph. a. 3. 995 a 6 sqq.
pression produced on thoughtful Greeks by the Politics; its teaching would be the more effective, because it was so little *ex cathedra* and was conveyed in an unlaboured and conversational style.

It is not impossible that many of Aristotle's works are records of his teaching drawn up by him after the lectures had been delivered. Several of the treatises comprised in the 'Moralia' of Plutarch are thought to be based on lectures previously given; the treatise De Audiendis Poetis is expressly said by Plutarch to be so (c. 1). The orators had set the example of writing down their speeches before or after delivery. We need not suppose that all the works of Aristotle were designed for one and the same purpose, or that they all originated in exactly the same way. The extreme brevity and compression of his style in some of them (for instance, in parts of the Metaphysics and in the third book of the De Anima) would seem to render these writings more suitable for private perusal than for reading aloud. We do not often observe a similar degree of compression in the Politics.

The displacement of the Fourth and Fifth Books may be accounted for in many ways. It may be due to the unfinished state of the work: Aristotle may have left his manuscript in pieces, and the 'disiecta membra' may not have been put together aright. Or the particular MS. or MSS. of which the MSS. we possess are reproductions may have had this defect. Several MSS. of the Metaphysics of Aristotle (S, A, B, C, F)—among them one of the best (A)—place Books M and N before K and A. Bekker remarks at the close of the Sixth Book of the History of Animals (581 a 5), that several MSS. place the Eighth Book immediately after the Sixth: 'octavum et A subiungit et P Q C D E F G m n. septimo in noni locum depresso.' So again, according to Bekker's note at the close of the Seventh Book of the same treatise, P A C

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1 See Volkmann, Leben Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch, 1. 65.

2 Bonitz, Aristotelis Metaphysica, p. v sqq.
add after ἀρχονταί, the last word of this book, the words προολογημένη τῆς ἠλείας, 'quod est initium libri decimi': here apparently we have a trace of an arrangement of the books by which the spurious Tenth Book was inserted at the close of the Seventh 1.

Displacements of this kind are said to have frequently occurred, when codices of parchment took the place of papyrus-rolls and works were transcribed from papyrus to parchment 2.

Or again, the same thing may have happened to the Politics which some think has happened to the Facta et Dicta Memorabilia of Valerius Maximus 3. The Fourth and Fifth Books (i.e. the fourth and fifth volumes or papyrus-rolls) may have circulated as a separate work, and may have been wrongly placed, when restored to the work of which they originally formed a part. If, as may well be the case, the displacement of the two books occurred at a very early date, or at all events prior to the general disuse of papyrus-rolls, this may have been the way in which it came about. But indeed a mere mistake in numbering the eight papyrus-rolls of the archetype would suffice to account for it. It is, no doubt, possible that these two books belong to a different edition of the treatise from the Third Book, and that this circumstance has in some way or other led to their being placed at the end of it. It is not easy, however, to see how it can have done so; nor is the position in which we find them accounted for, if we take the view that they were not originally designed to form part of the work, for this may very probably be true of the Seventh Book, which nevertheless stands fifth in order in the MSS.

1 Some MSS. of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation of the Politics in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris (Fonds de Sorbonne, 928: Fonds de Saint-Victor, 356) are said by Jourdain (Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote, p. 181) 'n'annoncer que sept livres; et le dernier se termine cependant par ces mots: Palam quia tres hos faciendum ad discip-

linam: quod medium, quod pos-
sible, quod decens. La division des livres varie donc sans que l'ouvrage soit moins complet.'

2 See Birt, Antike Buchwesen, p. 374. The change came to be of common occurrence, according to this writer, in the fourth and fifth centuries of our era.

3 See Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, art. Valerius Maximus.
ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE POLITICS AND THE
LATIN TRANSLATION OF WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE.

The publication in 1872 of Suscmihl's critical edition of
the Politics will always be regarded as marking an epoch
in the study of the work. It comprises a complete collation
of all the more important MSS. then known to scholars and
a partial collation of the inferior ones; it also contains a
revised text of William of Moerbeke's Latin translation of
the Politics, based on a collation of a number of MSS. I
have not attempted to revise Suscmihl's collations. I have,
however, collated the first two books of the Politics in MS.
112 belonging to Corpus Christi College, Oxford (referred
to by Suscmihl in his edition of the Nicomachean Ethics
as O¹, but not, I believe, previously collated for the Poli-
tics)¹, and I have collated the first two books of William
of Moerbeke's Latin translation in MS. 891 of the Phillipps
Library, Cheltenham (referred to by me as z), and in MS.
112 belonging to Balliol College, Oxford, named o by
Suscmihl (Sus.¹ p. xxxviii), whose collation of this MS.,
made by Dr. M. Schanz, extends, however, only to the
First Book. I have also collated a number of passages in
the first two books of the same Latin Translation in a
Bodleian MS. (Canon. Class. Lat. 174), which I refer to as
y. This MS. and the Phillipps MS. have not, so far as I
am aware, been collated before. The latter MS. is of some
importance, for though it is neither copied from the a of
Suscmihl (MS. 19, sciences et arts, latin, of the Bibliothèque
de l'Arsenal at Paris) nor a from it, these two MSS. evi-
dently belong to the same family, a family of which a has

¹ See as to this MS., so far as
its text of the Politics is concerned,
the remarks prefixed to the Criti-
cal Notes (below, p. 58 sqq.).
hitherto been the sole representative, and Susemihl (with whom Busse concurs, de praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 11) says of a (Sus.\textsuperscript{1} p. xxxv)—‘omnium librorum mihi adhibitorum longe est optimus, quoniam, etsi ceteris non rarius peccat, tamen longe saepius quam alius quis verum retinuit solus.’ The words prefixed in a to the Translation of the Politics—\textit{incipit liber politicorum Aristotilis a fratre Guilielmo ordinis praedicatorum de greco in latinum translatus}—which enabled M. Barthélémy St. Hilaire in 1837 (Politique d’Aristote, tome i, p. lxxix) to establish the truth of Schneider’s conjecture and to designate William of Moerbeke as its author, and which have not hitherto been found in any other MS., are prefixed to this translation in z also, though z does not add at the end of it the words which are found at the end of it in a (St. Hilaire, \textit{ubi supra}: Sus.\textsuperscript{1} p. xxxiv); the closing words in z are, in fact, \textit{explicit liber politicorum Aristotilis}\textsuperscript{1}.

Still it is on Susemihl’s \textit{apparatus criticus} that the following remarks are mainly based, so far at least as the more important MSS. of the Politics are concerned, and my aim in them will be to derive as much instruction as possible from the copious data with which he has furnished the student of the Politics, and especially to throw light on the characteristics and comparative value of the two families into which his MSS. fall, and of the more important MSS. individually. I am all the more desirous to acknowledge my debt to Susemihl, because on questions relating to the text I have often been led to conclusions at variance with his. On these questions I shall be able to speak more definitively, when I have completed my commentary, but something must be said at once as to the principles on which I have framed my text.

Some Palimpsest Fragments of the Third and Sixth (Fourth) Books of the Politics ascribed to the tenth century

\textsuperscript{1} See below (p. 60\textsuperscript{eqq.}) about these MSS. of William of Moerbeke’s Latin Translation of the Politics. I will only add here as to z, that though its text often agrees with that of a, it does not by any means always do so; in fact, it occasionally offers readings peculiar to itself, some of them excellent.
have recently been discovered, or rediscovered, in the Vatican Library, but no complete MS. of the work is older than the fourteenth. Nor have we any Greek commentaries on the Politics, such as we possess in the case of some other works of Aristotle, which might aid us in the correction of the text. The extant complete MSS. fall, as has been said, into two families, the second of them including a superior and inferior variety. The chief representatives of the first family are the two manuscripts, M (B 105, 'ordinis superioris,' of the Ambrosian Library at Milan), belonging to the second half of the fifteenth century, and P (MS. 2023 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris), transcribed by Demetrius Chalcondylas, possibly at Milan (see Sus. p. vii), at the close of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century. A full account of these manuscripts will be found in Susenmühl's large critical edition of the Politics.

1 See the Preface.

2 They are not its only representatives, for we are furnished with many readings characteristic of this recension by the corrections and various readings found in P and in larger numbers in P, two MSS. of the second family. P, a manuscript of mixed type, being related to both families, would also be of much use, if it were not very late (it belongs to the sixteenth century), and both for this reason and for others, of very doubtful authority. It is also imperfect, for its earlier portion is lost, and it commences only at 1366 a 6. See on these sources Sus. prae. p. vii sqq.

3 Or rather Chalcondylas—'of the bronze pen' (Gardthausen, Gr. Palaeographie, p. 72). In studying the readings offered by P it is necessary to bear in mind that Demetrius Chalcondylas was no mere ordinary copyist; he was a learned scholar, and superintended editions of Homer (Florence, 1488), of Isocrates (Milan, 1493), and of Suidas (1499). Susenmül (Sus., p. xiv) is no doubt right in regarding as emendations of his several of the good readings which are found only in P. Here and there, however, as Busse has pointed out (de praesidibus, etc., p. 45), P appears to preserve the reading of the archetype more faithfully than any other MS. of the first family (e.g. in 3. 9. 1280 b 5).

4 P must be classed with the first family, though many of the corrections introduced into it by Demetrius belong to the second, just as P and P must be classed with the second family, though many of the corrections introduced into them by their writers belong to the first. It is singular that each of the writers of these three MSS., and perhaps also the writer of the MS. used by Leonardus Arctinus, should have corrected his MS. from the recension to which it does not belong. This may indicate that some doubt was even then felt as to the comparative value of the two recensions. Some of the corrections of this kind in P are in the same ink as the MS., and were therefore probably made either at the time of writing or not long after.
ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE POLITICS

(1872), pp. vii–xii. Bekker omitted to collate these two MSS. for his edition of Aristotle (1831). Some readings from them, however, had been communicated by Haase to Gottling and had been published by the latter in his edition of the Politics (1824), and M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (1837) carried the study of the Paris MSS. of the Politics much farther; but any one who compares the full collation of M's P1 made on behalf of Susemihl with previous accounts of the text of these MSS. will see that our knowledge of the readings they offer was greatly enlarged by the publication of his edition of 1872. So far then as extant manuscripts are concerned, the text of the first family has only recently come to be thoroughly known, but it must not be forgotten that students of the Politics have had at their disposal from the first an extremely literal Latin translation published probably about 1260 (Rhein. Mus. 39. p. 457) and based on a Greek text of the first family. This translation is the work of one of the earliest students of Greek in Western Europe—William of Moerbeke, a Flemish1 Dominican, who was Archbishop of Corinth at the close of his life (1280–1)2—and if we may judge by the number of copies of it which exist, was largely used in the middle ages, notwithstanding the censure passed by Roger Bacon on the class of translations to which it belongs3 and its occasional almost complete

1 Moerbeke, or Meerbeke, is a small town of Eastern Flanders, some miles from Ghent. It is not perhaps quite certain in what sense this translation was the work of William of Moerbeke. More hands than one may have been employed upon it; some parts of it (e.g. the last chapter of the Second Book) show much more ignorance of Greek than others. We cannot feel sure that William of Moerbeke translated the whole; indeed, his functions may have been confined to supervising the work of others and editing the book. The MSS. which mention his name are not the earliest. Some scribe or other, perhaps a Dominican, would appear to have added the name, when the work had become famous. We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that a great similarity of method is noticeable throughout the translation; this makes in favour of its being the work of a single author.

2 Oncken, Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles, p. 70.

3 Speaking of William of Moerbeke, Roger Bacon says—'Willelmus iste Flemingus, ut notum est omnibus Parisiis literatis, nulam novit scientiam in lingua graeca, de qua praesumit, et ideo
unintelligibility, which is mostly due to its extreme literalness, though not unfrequently it is the result of the translator's imperfect knowledge of Greek. As no known MS. of the Politics except the Vatican Fragments is older than the fourteenth century, this translation is based on a Greek text earlier than any complete text we possess. Not much earlier, however, it would seem, if Susemihl is right, for he says (Politica, ed. 1872, p. xii)—"Rudolphus Schoellius ex compendiorum natura libri M* archetypum saeculo xiii° aut xiv° antiquius non fuisset collegit, unde vel ipsum illum codicem quem vertendo expressit Guilelmus saeculum xii° exiens aut xiii° iniens actae non superasse ex magno vitiorum numero mirum in modum Guilemelo et Ambrosiano communium concludendum esse videtur."

Still the importance of the Latin translation is great, and here again Susemihl has done excellent service, for he has collated several manuscripts of it for his critical edition of the Politics (Sus., p. xxxiv). The value of this translation as an authority for the text of the Politics only gradually came to be perceived. The Aldine edition (1498) was based on a manuscript of the second family, and it was

omnia transfert falsa et corrupit sapientiam Latinorum' (quoted by Jourdain, Recherches critiques sur l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote, p. 67), and Sepulveda remarks in the preface to his translation of the Politics: 'vix enim eos in numero interpretem habendos puto, qui verbum verbo inepta quadam fidelitate reddant.' Yet it is impossible not to respect the feeling which led William of Moerbeke to adopt this mode of translating Aristotle. He followed the example of most of the translators of the Bible in antiquity (Blass, Handbuch der klassischen Alterthums-Wissenschaft 1, 223).

1 Thus πραξισσα is rendered by praecessare, 6(4). 14. 1298 b 29; ἀποφαν by domestici, 2. 10. 1271 b 27, and ἀποφαν by exprulso, 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 3, while ἀποφαν is vicinio in 1. 2. 1252 b 17, 21 and 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 14, but familiares in 2. 10. 1271 b 29. In 2. 3. 1264 a 35, τις παρ' ενδος ελευθερια τε και πνευματικι και δουλεια is rendered a quibusdam obsequiia et humilisationes et servitutes, and blunders equally portentous swarm in the translation of the last chapter of the Second Book. In 1. 6. 1255 a 6 the translation has promulgatitio for ἄφολος; and in 14 violenteram patri for μαίσθα, with ruinous results to the sense of the passage. In 1. 11. 1259 a 15, κριανθιστα is rendered by pretium laevus. The translator's rendering of ἡ by quam in 2. 3. 1261 b 35 seems to show an entire misapprehension of the meaning of the Greek. 'Ex των ἔν ροι in 2. 5. 1263 a 18 is ex his quae in potibus.
not till 1550, when the third Basle edition of Aristotle appeared, that any use was made of the Latin translation in correcting the text (see Sus.¹ p. xxxii: Sus.² p. xvii). Two years later, Victorius published his first edition of the Politics, and in 1576 a second edition with a commentary (Sus.² p. xviii). He seems to have used the Latin translation for the emendation of the text in both his editions (Schneider, Aristot. Pol. Praefat. p. xx), and he speaks of it thus in his preface to the second:—"quoscunque calamo exaratos codices indagare potui, cunctos deteriores mendosioresque inveni quam fuerit exemplar, quo illa uss est" (see also his commentary on 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13 sqq. Distribuui autem, and on 2. 5. 1264 a 17 sqq. Si namque codem pacto). Schneider bears equally strong testimony to its value for critical purposes in the preface to his edition of the Politics, published in 1809 (p. xxv). Susemihl, with manuscripts of the first family before him, takes a somewhat more measured view on the subject. He sees¹ that it is in some cases impossible² and in others difficult to say what the translator found in his text. The translator's rendering is not always equally literal³. He sometimes, as Susemihl points out, omits or adds small words, and where he finds that the meaning of

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¹ Sus.¹, p. xxxiii.
² E.g. where questions arise as to the insertion or omission of the article, or as to the spelling of Greek words (if the Greek word is not reproduced). Occasionally indeed, the article is expressed by the translator, as for instance in the important passage 1. 13. 1260 a 8, quare natura quae plura principiabu et subjicata.
³ This will be evident from the following examples. In 1. 6. 1255 a 8, γραμμον παραδοτον is rendered, literally enough, scribunt iniquorum; in 1. 8. 1256 b 10, αυστρικες is conguriant; in 1. 9. 1257 a 32, τω εορτηθα is per adduci. In 3. 15. 1286 a 9-10, again, the translator finds in his Greek a masculine plural nominative conjoined with a verb in the third person singular. His Latin reproduces this false concord. Literalness could certainly be carried no further. But in other passages the version is not equally exact: thus for instance in 1256 b 9, τελεωθενω is rendered secundum perfectionem (or perfectam — sc. generationem): in 1259 a 13, δλιγον μισθοφάτων modico pro pretio datur: in 1259 a 22, τοιω των ποιησιων hoc modo factunt divitiis (see also 1255 b 35, 1268 b 5). An exact 'ad verbum' rendering is, in fact, impracticable in Latin, and one or two of these passages seem to show that the translator does not always make his version as literal as he might.
a sentence will thus be made clearer, he does not scruple to add a Latin word or two, for which no equivalent existed in his Greek text (Sus.¹ pp. xxxiii–xxxiv). That Greek text, again, Susemihl allows to have been here and there deformed by chance corruptions, by arbitrary changes, and by the intrusion of glosses (Sus.¹ p. xxxi). Notwithstanding all this, however, Susemihl claimed, in his edition of 1872 at all events, that the Latin translation is ‘instar optimi codicis, qui quamvis non candem auctoritatem quam K in Physicis, Meteorologicis, Psychologicis, et A in Poeticis et Rhetoricis, tamen candem quam Kb in Ethicis et fortasse paulo maiorem habeat’ (p. xxxii). Dittenberger in his valuable review of Susemihl’s edition of 1872 (published in the Gott. gelehr. Anz. for Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1349 sqq.) expressed a doubt (p. 1363), whether Susemihl had in that edition ‘kept himself entirely free from the tendency, which he had noticed in Victorius and Schneider, to over-value the Vetus Interpres,’ and though in his two subsequent editions of 1879 and 1882, and especially in the latter, where he abandons (p. xii. n.) the comparison with Kb, Susemihl shows less confidence in the unsupported testimony of the Vetus Interpres, he perhaps still rates it somewhat too high. It is not, to begin with, absolutely clear that we have a right (with Susemihl) to take this translation as a reproduction of a single Greek manuscript. Obviously it renders with great literalness the Greek text which it adopts, but we must bear in mind that a translator, even if he does his work as literally as the author of this ancient translation, is not quite as mechanical a being as a copyist. He may not be invariably faithful to one manuscript¹, and if he is, he may now and then prefer to render some gloss or conjectural reading which he finds in its margin, rather than the reading which stands in its text². He may adopt con-

¹ Susemihl himself points out (Sus.¹ p. xxxv), relying on a marginal annotation in one MS. of the Vet. Int. on 3. 17. 1288 a 15, that ‘aut in F’ (the manuscript which the Vet. Int. is supposed to have used) ‘hie illic adscriptae crant variæ lectiones, aut praeter F hic illic etiam alium codicem vel plures alios (Guilelmus) inspexerat.’

² Roemer in the preface to his
ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE POLITICS

jectural emendations of his own or of others. We must, I think, allow for these possibilities in the case of this Latin translation of the Politics, and not rate its testimony quite so high as we should rate that of a Greek manuscript of the same date. We must also remember that William of Moerbeke, its probable author, was not a Greek by birth, and that he may have been as little infallible in deciphering Greek manuscripts as he certainly was in interpreting Greek words.

Nevertheless the readings offered by the thirteenth-century translator commonly deserve attention, and Bekker, who has here and there (for the most part in the wake of earlier editors), with manifest advantage to the text, adopted a reading based on his unsupported authority, might well have done something more than he did in his critical edition of the Politics (1831) to call attention to them. He also omitted, as we have already seen, to collate the manuscripts M and P, though he must have learnt their importance from the imperfect notes of their readings given in Göttling's edition (1824) on the authority of Haase. This omission has now been fully repaired by Susemihl, who has been in his turn, perhaps, in his first two editions at all events, a little inclined to overrate the value of the authorities which he was the first fully to turn to account. In his third and last edition, however, besides being generally more conservative in his


1 I have followed Susemihl in designating the Greek text which the Vetus Interpres appears to render by the symbol I, but I must not be understood to imply by this that I feel sure that it invariable represents the text of a single manuscript.

2 E.g. in 2. 1. 1260 b 41 he accepts εἰς θὲ τὴν on the authority of the Vet. Int. in place of ἵστασιν, the reading of all known MSS.: in 2. 7. 1266 b 2 he accepts δ' ἄδη on the same authority; in 3. 12. 1283 a 7 he gets ἐπερείξαι in place of ἐπερεῖξαι from the same source; in 4 (7). 17. 1336 a 6 he is probably right in reading ἐσώγειν (Vet. Int. inducer); in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 22 he adds παρ' before ἐκατέρως, which seems quite indispensable, but which only Vet. Int. gives (apud).
dealing with the text, Susemihl is, as we shall see, more cautious in his acceptance of the readings of the first family of manuscripts, and also in his acceptance of the unsupported testimony of the Vetus Interpres. He says himself of his third edition (praef. p. xii), that it is 'Bekkerianis multo similior quam duae priores.'

Besides, however, being the first to give a full record of the readings of the first family of manuscripts, Susemihl has done much to add to our knowledge of the second family also. This is considerably more numerous than the first; it includes, according to Susemihl, nearly a score of manuscripts. The most important of them are $P^2$, the $P^b$ of Bekker (MS. Coislin 161 in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris), a manuscript of the fourteenth century from one of the monasteries on Mount Athos, of which a full account will be found in the preface to Susemihl's edition of 1872 (pp. xvi–xx); and $P^g$ (MS. 2026 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris), the earliest complete MS. of the Politics known to scholars, for it belongs to the beginning of the fourteenth century (see pp. xx–xxi of the same preface). These two manuscripts have been collated throughout by Susemihl. Of the less good variety of this family, only $P^1$ (MS. 2025 of the Paris Bibliothèque Nationale) appears to have been collated from beginning to end, but Bekker used some of the manuscripts falling under this head for particular books, and Susemihl has had them collated for the passages indicated by him in his critical edition (1872), pp. xxviii–xxix, and in his explanatory edition (1879), pp. xvi xvii. $O^1$ belongs to this variety.

1 See on the MSS. composing it Sus., p. xxi sqq. Their text has often suffered from the intrusion of glosses (see critical note on 1253 a 12) and supplementary additions (see critical note on 1255 b 12). They also frequently omit words, especially the article. Yet here and there they have alone preserved the true reading (e.g. in 1320 a 16, $μη του γε$).

2 I add an explanation of the chief symbols which I have adopted from Susemihl. II stands for the consent of the Aldine edition and all extant MSS., so far as these sources have been consulted for Susemihl's editions: $P^1$ for the consent of the extant MSS. of the first family (in the first two books $M^a$ $P^1$ only) and the text followed by the Vetus Interpres: $P^2$ for the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS. of the second
If we except the Vatican Fragments, the manuscripts of the Politics are of a late date, later than the text translated by the Vetus Interpres, which was itself apparently not very early. They are evidently full of the faults which are commonly found in manuscripts. The scribes did their work mechanically for the most part—often without a thought of the meaning of what they were writing—though here and there we seem to detect efforts to emend the text, especially in the case of puzzling words or passages. The manuscripts often incorporate glosses with the text; they often omit whole clauses, especially clauses intervening between repetitions of the same word; still oftener they omit one or more words; they are often led astray by homocoteleuton; their errors are particularly frequent in relation to certain words; they repeat words from the preceding line; they are apt to place contiguous words in the same case; sometimes they seem to admit two alternative readings together into the text—sometimes we notice that clauses are transposed. To say that they have these defects is, however, only to say that they share the common lot of manuscripts. Their lateness has probably added to their imperfections. We note, for instance, that many of the variations which we observe in them are variations in the termination of words, and these may often have arisen from the misreading or miswriting of contractions, which were used with increasing frequency after the eleventh century. How easily they might thus arise will be seen from Gardthausen’s work on Greek Palaeography.

family, so far as these sources have been examined for Susemihl’s editions: II² for the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS, of the less good variety of the second family, subject to the same limitation. I need hardly explain that the abbreviation ‘pr.’ prefixed to the name of a MS. refers to its original state and is intended to distinguish an original reading from a correction.

§ See the Preface.

² See, for instance, the various readings in 1271 a 37 (αὐτῆς Η¹, αὐτῶν Ρ², αὐτὸν Ρ, αὐτοῖς Η²), 1280 a 24 (ἐλευθερία Μ¹, ἐλευθερίου Ρ², ἐλευθερία Ρ³—the true reading being doubtless ἐλευθερία), 1282 a 27, 1284 b 41, 1286 a 25, 1286 b 24, 33, 1287 b 30, 1288 a 23, 1292 b 30, 1297 a 1; and see Sus.¹, p. xii, note 21. Not many pages, however, of Susemihl’s apparatus critics are free from instances of error in terminations.
AND THE VETUS VERSIO.

(p. 246), where we find the remark that the same contraction may be used to represent θεότης, θεότης, θεότης, while another represents πόλις, πολύς, πόλεμος, πολέμος, πολύτης. and even πολιτεία (though the last word is more usually represented by a different contraction), and that a single contraction may be employed to express βάλλοντος, βάλλοντα, βάλλοντα, βάλλοντα.

Occasionally all the manuscripts, in addition to the text used by the Vetus Interpess, offer a reading almost or quite certainly wrong¹, but they seem on the whole to preserve with considerable fidelity the idiosyncrasies of Aristotle's peculiar and highly characteristic style. In a large number of passages earlier critics have condemned readings which a closer and more sympathetic study of Aristotle's use of language has proved to be undoubtedly correct². Often and often the manuscripts have retained little idiosyncrasies of style, which less mechanical copyists, or copyists more ready to insist on the ordinary rules of Greek writing, might well have smoothed away. Peculiarities in the order of words³, occasional omissions of a word or words⁴, constructiones ad sensum⁵, carelessnesses⁶.

¹ E.g. in 2. 12. 1274 b 7, ΓΗ (except perhaps pr. ¹²) have ἐσπᾶκεςν (instead of ἐσπᾶκησαν): in 3. 3. 1276 b 9, ΓΗ have λέγομεν for λέγομεν: in 3. 8. 1279 b 28, προσαγορεῖται or προσαγορεῖται, one or other of which appears in ΓΗ, must be wrong: in 3. 15. 1286 a 9, δοκεί...ονάν to ΓΗ: in 3. 16. 1287 a 29, ΓΗ seem to be wrong, and the Vossian codex of Julian alone right. Cases in which all the MSS. are wrong, and Γ alone is right also occur: see for example the passages referred to above, p. xlviii, note 2.

² Those who do not happen to be acquainted with the second of Vahlen's Aristotelische Aufsätze will thank me for referring to it in illustration of this remark.

³ E.g. 1. 6. 1255 b 2, ἢ δὲ φίλις Βοιλετα μὲν τούτο ποιεῖ πολλακις, οὗ μάτι τίνα διέλατι έσω ΓΗ, except that M⁸ Π¹ place τούτο after ποιεῖν: 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 27, τέλος δ᾽ αὐτῶν ὦστε μήδα μίνα ποιήσει φαίνεται: 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 23, τὰς αὐτῶν ἀρχαί δὲ νομίζων περί τε τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν μοναρχίας (except that Π⁶ erroneously place τῶν μεταβολῶν before αὐτῶν): 8 (6), 6. 1320 b 33, τα μὲν εὖ σωματα διακείμενα πρὸς ἑρέων: 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 4, περὶ δὲ τὴν ἑξον κτησιων τῶν ἀγάθων μετρούοντων.


⁵ E.g. 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 33, τῆς δ᾽ ἐξής οὖσας πολλαμεροῖς, ἐκατον αὐτῶν αὐτῶν γίνεται τῆς ἀρίστης.

⁶ E.g. 3. 13. 1283 b 16, δῆλον
or roughnesses\(^1\) of style, and even positively bad writing\(^2\) are faithfully reproduced\(^3\).

We have seen, however, that the complete MSS. fall into two families, and here the question arises—what is the origin and the extent of the distinction between them? We know that in parts of the de Anima and of some other writings of Aristotle two texts exist, which have been thought by some to represent two separate issues or editions, both from the hand of Aristotle, while others have held one of the texts to be a réchauffé due, not to Aristotle, but to some expositor who has rewritten the original with slight alterations in the language, not often affecting the meaning. Has the distinction between the two families of manuscripts in the case of the Politics originated in either of these ways? The question is an important one, for if the distinction between them had this origin, it would obviously be altogether improper to blend the readings of the two families together and to form a composite text out of them, as all editors have hitherto sought to do. There is no doubt that the differences existing between the two families are in part of a similar nature to those which exist between the two texts of the second book of the de Anima. As in the de Anima, so in the Politics, we note variations in the order of words, variations in the use of the article, variations in particles and the like. But these variations are far less frequent in the Politics than in the portions of the second book of the de Anima in which a second text exists. In one or two places of the de Anima, again, we trace some slight divergence of

\(^1\) γάρ ὡς εἴ τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιώτερος ἀπάντων ἐστὶ, δῆλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ.: 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33, ἐστὶ δ' ἐργον τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ τῶν βουλημένων συνεστάναι τινά τοιούτην πολιτείαν ὧν ὥστε καταστήσαι μέγιστον ἐργον ὧδε μόνον, ἅλλ' ὡς σοκαὶ μᾶλλον.

\(^2\) Ἐ. γ. 2. 6. 1264 b 39-40 (cp. de Gen. An. 2. 7. 746 b 7-9): 1. 10. 1238 a 24.

\(^3\) Some of their mistakes seem to be due to their ultimate derivation from an archetype in which words were neither separated nor accentuated: thus we have ἡ δῆ instead of ἢδη in 1252 b 28, ἀρσ-ταχεῖα instead of ἀρστ' ἀρχεῖα in 1273 b 5, ἅλλ' όιδ' ἐστιν instead of ἅλλον δ' ἐστιν in 1254 a 15, λάρμητι δῆ instead of λαμβιθη in 1258 b 40.
meaning\textsuperscript{1}, and this we hardly find in the Politics. And then again, we note that variations in the order of words occur even within the first family, the order followed by Ms P\textsuperscript{1} being often different from that followed by I', which is in these cases commonly the same as that of the second family. It seems, therefore, hardly necessary to have recourse to the supposition of a double text to account for variations of order\textsuperscript{2}. The same thing may be said as to variations in the use of the article and others of the same kind. Besides, many of the differences between the readings of the two families are of a sort which is not equally conspicuous in the two texts of the de Anima. One family uses one form of a word, the other another: the first has ὑφοποιητική, the second ὑφοποιική; the first commonly uses the form μονάρχης, the second μονάρχος\textsuperscript{3}, and so forth. The second family occasionally avoids hiatus where the first does not. Differences of this kind are probably due to grammarian revisers of the text; and if this is so, it seems probable that the differences which might be ascribed to a duality of text have also originated in the same way. Many of the differences, again, between the text of II\textsuperscript{1} and II\textsuperscript{2} appear to be due to a misreading of contractions, or to omissions on the part of one set of manuscripts or the other (most often of II\textsuperscript{1}), or to other accidental causes. It does not seem likely that the contrast of the two families runs back (at all events in its present proportions) to anything like so early a date as do the two

\textsuperscript{1} E.g. in de An. 2. 9. 421 a 9, where the received text has—ἀιτίων ὤ τιν αὐθέναν ταύτην αἰκ ἔχομεν ἀκρίβη, ἀλλὰ χείρω παλλὼν ζωών, and the second text—ἀτίων ὤ τιν αἰκ ἔχομεν ἀκρίβη ταύτην τὴν αὐθέναν, ἀλλὰ χείριστα ωσποτα ἀνθρώποι τῶν ζωῶν.

\textsuperscript{2} Ms here and there has an order of its own (e.g. in 1267 b 40). It is easy to see from Susenmilh's apparatus criticus on 1271 a 25, 36 (Sus.\textsuperscript{1}, pp. 127, 128), how easily these changes of order might arise, and, if they arose in an archetype, how widely they might be diffused.

\textsuperscript{3} The dependent compounds of the stem ὅρχω end in Attic not in ἀρχης, but throughout in ἀρχος (γυμνασίαρχος, δήμαρχος, ἐπίσκοπος, τριάρχος, ἄρχων, etc.): still in an Attic inscription of B.C. 324 we find certain finance officials of the deine Athenian named μεράρχων' (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, pp. 53–54).
texts of portions of the de Anima. Both families agree in the order in which they arrange the books. In both, the first four chapters of the Sixth Book are little better than a chaos. This last defect, it is true, may have existed in the work as Aristotle left it. All the manuscripts, and the νετος νερσιο also, have the obvious blunder ἐπισκεψιν in 2. 12. 1274 b 7: all read ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων in 2. 6. 1266 a 18. The text of the Vatican Fragments is a mixed text, and may possibly belong to a time prior to the rise of a marked contrast between the two families.

It would seem, then, that both families of manuscripts may safely be used in the construction of a text of the Politics. No editor, in fact, has attempted to base his text on one family only and dispensed altogether with the aid of the other. Bekker mainly relies on the second family, but he has adopted several readings from the Vetus Susemihl bases his text in the main on the first family, and especially on Γ, but he frequently adopts readings from the second. Editors of the Politics seem to have no option but to make their text more or less a composite text. Ours must be based partly on the first family of manuscripts, partly on the better variety of the second: occasionally perhaps it may be necessary to take a reading from the less good variety of the second. The question whether in a given passage we are to follow the reading given by the first family or the second, which is often a difficult one, must be decided partly by the proba-

1 E.g. in the following passages of the First and Second Books: 1255 a 5, 1259 b 2, 1260 a 39, 1262 a 30, 1264 a 1, 1264 b 3, 1265 a 30, 35 (χωρίαν), 1265 b 4, 21, 1266 a 20, 23, 1267 b 40, 1270 a 20, 21, 1271 a 27, 1273 a 10, 1273 b 3. It may be added that Susemihl recognizes in his third edition (praef. p. xvi), how prone the MSS. of the first family are to omit words, and how little they are to be depended on in cases of omission; hence we find him in this edition accepting from the second family not a few words which he had previously eliminated in reliance on the authority of the first family, and generally showing an increased confidence in the second family, though he still prefers the first. Instances of this will be found in the following passages of the first two books, as they stand in Susemihl's third edition—1253 a 25, 1257 b 24, 1260 b 17, 1261 a 22, 1263 b 1, 6, 1264 a 16, 1268 a 26, 1270 a 25, 34, 1273 a 9, b 2, 27, 1274 b 8.
bilities of the particular case, partly in reference to the known tendencies of either family.

The manuscripts of the second family, for instance, as has been said, avoid hiatus more frequently than those of the first: here in all probability the less polished version is the more genuine. In matters of spelling, again, the first family has perhaps occasionally preserved peculiarities which the second has smoothed away (e.g. the form συμφυιαν in 1262 b 13, which is all the more likely to be correct because it is found in K in Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 22). When the first family unanimously places words in one order which the second places in another, the order given by the first family is sometimes to my mind more unstudied and more Aristotelian than that given by the second. But in graver matters at any rate the advantage seems to me to rest with the second family. In some cases falling under this head, no doubt, the readings of the first family may well deserve our preference. Thus in 2. 11. 1273 a 41, II give us ταυτήν οὖχ οὗ τε βεβαιῶν ἁμιστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν, and II the softened and probably less genuine reading ταυτήν οὖχ οὗ τε εἶναι βεβαιῶν ἁμιστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν: and in 2. 1. 1260 b 28 τίς II seems preferable on similar grounds to ἥ, which is the reading of the manuscripts of the second family. So again in 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13 II have preserved

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1 E. g. in 1254 b 14: 1255 a 11, b 5, 21: 1256 a 33, b 18: 1258 a 31: 1259 b 7: 1261 b 17, 32: 1263 a 28: 1264 a 37, 38, etc. In these passages, however, the elisions by which hiatus is avoided are of a trivial and obvious kind: serious cases of hiatus are commonly left untouched in both families alike.

2 It is not, however, always the case that the spelling of II is to be preferred. For instance, the form φιλίαν (II) seems preferable to φιλίαν (II) see critical note on 1271 a 27. It is hardly likely that in matters of spelling complete reliance can safely be placed on either family. It should be noted that in questions as to hiatus and commonly also in questions of spelling we get no assistance from the Vetus Interpres, and are dependent on M* II, so far as the first family is concerned.

3 E. g. in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 20 II have ὁ δὲ αὕτο τοῦτο πρέπειν πολλάκις δὲ ἄλλως δηθικὸν καὶ δουλικὸν ἃν δίβει πρέπειν (where πολλάκις is to be taken with ἂν δίβει—compare the similar displacement of πολλάκις in 1. 6. 1255 b 31), while II place πολλάκις after δὲ ἄλλως (and also ἂν after δίβειν), thus arranging the words in a more regular and logical, but probably less genuine, order.

4 The Vatican Fragments agree far more often with the second family than with the first. See the Preface.
the true reading νενεμήσθαι (Π² almost without exception have μεμειμηθαι), and in 4 (7). 1336 b 2 ἀπελαύνειν Π² seems to be undoubtedly wrong. But on the whole it appears to me that Π² less often transmute a puzzling reading into an easier one than Π¹. Thus, for example, in

1. 2. 1252 b 15, ὑμοκάποι, the reading of most MSS. of the second family, is better than ὑμοκάποις, Π² Π¹ Ι.".

1. 4. 1253 b 27, τῶν ὁικονομικῶν, the reading of almost all the MSS. of the second family, is better than τῷ ὁικονομικῷ, the reading of the first.

1. 9. 1257 b 24, Π¹ seem to be wrong in omitting οἷς.

1. 11. 1258 b 27, Π¹ have corrected τρίτον into τέταρτον wrongly, though not unnaturally.

2. 2. 1261 b 7, οἷς Π² is probably more genuine than οὐ Π¹.

2. 7. 1267 a 40, Π¹ omit the second ἄν, though the repetition of ἄν is probably right.

2. 8. 1268 b 12, Π² retain the singular but quite Aristotelian (Bon. Ind. 454 a 20 sq.) displacement of μὲν, of which indeed there are many traces in the MSS. of the Latin Translation.

21. Π² add ἕνη probably rightly.

1269 a 18, Vet. Int. has qui mutaverit, and may perhaps have found ὅ added in his text before κυήσας, where MSS Π¹ add τις:

Π² are probably right in reading simply κυήσας.

2. 9. 1270 a 34, Π¹ omit an awkward but idiomatic μὲν.

3. 12. 1282 b 15, δὲ Π² is more probably Aristotelian than δὴ Π¹.

3. 14. 1285 b 12, P² and (on second thoughts) Π³ give ἐπανάτασις:

M⁸ Π¹ and possibly Π (Vet. Int. elevatio) wrongly ἐπανάτασις.

6 (4). 5. 1292 b 5, the difficult word εἰσαγ ("takes office") becomes εἰς εἰς in Π Μ⁸ pr. Π¹.

6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3, Π² rightly omit καὶ before εἰσαρίας.

6 (4). 12. 1296 b 33, an idiomatic δὲ is omitted by Π¹, but preserved by Π².

6 (4). 16. 1300 b 30, παρτὶ Π² seems to me to be right, not πα-

ρότῃ Π¹.

8 (6). 8. 1322 b 14, εἰσφοράν Π² is undoubtedly correct, though Π Μ⁸ Π¹ substitute the commoner word ἐφορεῖαν.

4 (7). 1. 1323 b 9, the idiomatic use of αὐτῶν is probably correct, but Π Μ⁸ Π¹ omit the word.

4 (7). 12. 1331 b 5, τὴν Π² is probably right, though its omission by Π Μ⁸ pr. Π¹ makes the passage easier. This omission, however, may well be accidental, as τὴν is followed by τῶν.
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5 (8). 1339 a 29, τε παρισιν Π², where the place of τε, though not that which we should expect, is justified by many parallel instances (see Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq.), whereas P¹ reads γε and Μ⁸ omits τε, and possibly r also, but of this we cannot be certain, for the Vet. Int. seldom renders τε.

5 (8). 6. 1341 a 13, καί, which Π² add, is probably right, though not easy to interpret.

5 (8). 6. 1341 b 1, Π¹ wrongly substitute ιαμώςα for σαμώςκα.

The manuscripts of the first family seem also, I think, to admit glosses into the text more frequently than the better ones of the second (see, for instance, Susemihl's apparatus criticus on 1. 8. 1256 b 26: 2. 6. 1265 a 21, 22: 2. 7. 1266 a 37: 2. 10. 1271 b 28: 3. 4. 1277 a 23: 3. 10. 1281 a 28, where σπωνδαία, which is probably a gloss, takes in Π¹ the place of οίκατα). Clearly, again, as Dittenberger has remarked, and Susemihl has now fully recognized (Sus. p. xvi), these manuscripts are apt to omit words, probably because their archetypewas somewhat carelessly written.

Take the following instances from the Third Book:—

1275 a 11, Π¹ om. καί γὰρ ταῦτα τούτους ὑπάρχει: 28, r: Μ⁸ pr. P¹ om. καίτω: ὑπάρχει: 1276 a 4, M⁸ P¹, and possibly r, om. τῆς: b 3. M⁸ P¹, and possibly r, om. ἄν: 36, r: M⁸ pr. P¹ om. ἀλλὰ: 1277 a 20, Π¹ om. ἀρετῆς after ἥ αὐτῆς: 24, r: M⁸ pr. P¹ om. ἵσως: 1278 b 2, om. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων: 20, om. ἐκ εἰσποτῶν: 1279 a 2, Π¹ om. ίσω, though M⁸ P¹ move ιναύ to its place: 34, M⁸ P¹, and possibly r, om. τῶν in τῆν δὲ τῶν ἀληγῶν: b 15, Π¹ om. τῆ: 1280 b 1, M⁸ P¹, and possibly r, om. τοῦ: 5, r: M⁸ pr. P¹ om. πολιτικῆς: 1282 a 7, Π¹ om. καί: 17. om. ἥ before βελτίως: 40, M⁸ P¹, and probably r, om. τὸ before τοῦτων: 1283 a 10, Π¹ om. καί, and in the next line in πᾶσαν ἀναστίνη' r: Μ⁸ pr. P¹ omit the second of the two syllables απ, making ἀναστίνη' into ἀστίνη or ἀστίνηα: 17, M⁸ P¹, and possibly r: 32,

1 Goll. gel. Anz., Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1359. If we examine the discrepancies between Π¹ and Π² in the first two books of the Politics, we shall find that in a large proportion of cases they arise from the omission of words in Π².

2 Omissions also occur in Π², and some of them are on a more extensive scale than those of Π¹ (see, for example, 1307 b 32-34, 1334 a 37-38, 1336 b 18, 1337 b 16, 19, 34, 35), but they fortunately occur less frequently, and they give rise to no critical doubts. They are often obviously due to homocoteleuton.

In his third edition, Susemihl adopts the reading of the first family in only four of the passages which I have just cited. A similar array of passages might be adduced from the Sixth Book, and a somewhat shorter one from the First and Second. I am far from saying that in every one of these passages the sin of omission can be positively brought home to Π—one on the contrary, in more than one of them it is not clear whether Π omit or Π² add—but I am inclined to think, as Susemihl now thinks (Sus. p. xvi), that Π² add a good deal less often than Π omit. At all events, it is evident that omissions in Π¹ must be carefully scrutinized before we can safely accept them.

It has already been said that most of the discrepancies between Π¹ and Π² seem to be due to errors of transcription or to have originated in some other easily intelligible way; but there is a certain percentage of which this cannot be said. In the First and Second Books the following variations may be cited under this head:—

A. 1. 7. 1255 b 26, τοῖτον Π¹ is replaced by τῶν τοιούτων in Π².
B. 2. 1. 1260 b 28, τίς Π¹, ἦ Π².
C. 2. 8. 1267 b 26, κόμης Γ M& pr. Π, κόμω πολυτελεί Π².
D. 2. 9. 1269 b 21, τοῖοτος ἐστιν Π¹ (so accentuated in M& P¹), φανερῶς ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος ὁν Π².

(Cp. 1269 b 26, where Γ M& pr. Π om. φανερῶς.)
E. 2. 10. 1271 b 28, κρήτης Γ M& pr. Π (all other MSS. Λύκτιοι).
F. 2. 11. 1273 a 41, ταύτην ὡς ὁν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν Π¹: ταύτην ὡς ὁν τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν Π².

In E there can be little doubt that a gloss explanatory of Λύκτιοι has taken the place of this word in Γ M& pr. Π. Of B and F something has already been said. A, C, D
remain, and these are less easy to classify or account for, but it is noticeable that in all these three passages Π¹ abbreviate, just as elsewhere they omit.

So far we have been considering cases in which Π¹ and Π² are at issue, and these are the most difficult and perplexing with which we have to deal. It often happens, however, that the three texts of the first family—three, if we include the original of the vetus versio—do not agree. M⁴ and P¹, and also Γ and M⁴, often stand apart by themselves, and Γ and P¹ occasionally do so². When M⁴ P¹ stand alone, we usually find that Γ agrees with the second family, and the same thing may be said of P¹ when Γ M⁴ stand alone. Against the union of Γ Π² not much weight commonly attaches, as it seems to me, to that of M⁴ P¹, and Γ M⁴ have also, I think, little weight when matched against P¹ Π².

The following passages from the Second Book will illustrate this in reference to M⁴ P¹, though some of the readings referred to are far better than others, and I would not pronounce positively against all:—

1260 b 32, M⁴ P¹ om. τ': 1261 a 6, M⁴ P¹ ev τη Πλατωνος πολιτεια: the other MSS. have ev τη πολιτεια τη (some του) Πλατωνος: 17, M⁴ P¹ των for τουν wrongly: 1261 b 25, M⁴ P¹ om. τους in τους γνωστης και τως τεκνως: 28, M⁴ P¹ om. τις: 1262 a 35, M⁴ pr. P¹ om. ειναι: 1262 b 6, M⁴ P¹ om. ουτος wrongly: 7, M⁴ P¹ om. πτε: 1263 b 32, M⁴ pr. Π¹ εσται wrongly: 1264 a 1, M⁴ pr. Π¹ εκουσωνεσ wrongly: 1264 b 20, M⁴ pr. P¹ óπερ wrongly: 39, M⁴ P¹ om. λόγοι: 1265 a 18, M⁴ P¹ μη for μηδεν wrongly: 36, M⁴ P¹ add μεν after πρως: 1265 b 27, M⁴ P¹ place μεν not after βουλευτα like the rest, but after ἀλη, not probably rightly: 1266 b 28, M⁴ P¹ ταξιν instead of ταξεων: 1268 a 14.

¹ It is possible that the contrast of the two families of MSS. would be less strongly marked, if we possessed a larger number of good MSS. of the Politics. We might probably in that case possess MSS. occupying an intermediate position between the two. This hardly any of our MSS. can be said to do. [My surmise has been verified by the discovery of the Vatican Fragments.]

² We find Γ and P¹ standing together alone far less often than Γ and M⁴, or M⁴ and P¹. The remarks in the text were written before I became acquainted with Susemihl's third edition, in which I find that they are to some extent anticipated.
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Ms pr. P1 om. kai eisukón: 37, Ms Pr 1 yewopoeín wrongly: 1268 b 23, Ms Pr 1 gevésána for yínešána: 1269 a 18, Ms Pr 1 add τις before κυνίσας (wrongly, I think): 1269 b 28, Ms Pr 1 prótwos in place of πρῶτος: 32, Ms Pr 1 διώκητο wrongly for διώκειτο: 1270 a 1, Ms pr. Pr 1 om. τῆς oikēias wrongly: 8, Ms Pr 1 yewopoeín wrongly for yewopoeín: 17, Ms Pr 1 om. λαύ before oušiān: τῶν Ms, τῶν P1 wrongly for τοῖς: 26, Ms Pr 1 om. ἦ before και wrongly: 1270 b 2, Ms Pr 1 om. τοῖς πολίτας wrongly: 8, Ms Pr 1 om. ἐστίν: 26, Ms Pr 1 ἦδη wrongly for ἔδει: 1271 a 16, Ms Pr 1 om. ἦν wrongly: 1271 b 22, Ms Pr 1 τε wrongly for δὲ: 1272 b 31, Ms Pr 1 om. ἕξουσιν (wrongly, as I think), and om. ἤν wrongly: 1273 b 25, Ms Pr 1 κρίτης wrongly for κριτικὸς: 37, Ms Pr 1 om. γὰρ wrongly.

Changes in the order of words peculiar to Ms P1 occur not unfrequently; the following instances may be adduced from the Second Book:

1260 b 41, 1261 b 7, 1263 a 22, b 16, 17, 1264 a 9, 1265 b 15, 1267 a 38, 1268 a 39, 1271 a 36, b 7, 1272 b 24.

It would be rash to alter the order of words on the authority of these two manuscripts unsupported by others.

As to the readings peculiar to Γ Ms, not many of them, I think, possess merit. Take the following list from the Second Book:

1261 a 21, Γ Ms om. kai before δυνατός (wrongly, I think): 33, Γ Ms read δὲ for γὰρ wrongly: 1264 a 19, Γ Ms παθώντες (P1 Π2 μαθώντες): b 9, Γ Ms εἰσελθεῖν δῆ wrongly for ἔπουσει δῆ: 1267 a 2, Γ pr. Ms om. kai wrongly: 1268 b 9, Γ Ms om. kai wrongly: 1269 a 25, Γ Ms om. kai before κυνητίων: 1270 c 12, Γ Ms om. τοικέων wrongly: b 8, Γ Ms om. αὔτη wrongly: 1271 a 18, Γ Ms om. διὰ: b 7, Γ Ms om. μὲν: 1272 b 1, Γ Ms have διαφημώτων wrongly for διαφημήστων: 1273 a 40, Γ Ms have πολτιῶν wrongly for πολτίων: b 4, Γ Ms have ἦν wrongly for ἦν: 1274 a 8, Γ Ms om. τὰ—Περικλῆς (homoeoteleuton): 28, Γ Ms om. μαντικῆν: b 20, Γ Ms om. γὰρ wrongly.

1 Ms Pr 1 perhaps diverge rather more frequently from the other texts in the Second Book than in the First and Third, but the readings peculiar to these two MSS. in the First, Third, and Sixth Books seem to me to be of even less value than in the Second.

2 The record of these two MSS. is no better in the First, Third, and Sixth Books.
Readings resting on the authority of only one of the manuscripts of the Politics possess, as a rule, but little weight. 'Such readings,' remarks Dittenberger (Gött. gel. Anz., Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1362), 'should only be adopted after convincing proof, (1) that the reading unanimously given by the other MSS. and probably inherited from the archetype is on internal grounds untenable, and (2) that the emendation offered by the single MS. in question is the easiest, simplest, and most satisfactory that can be offered.' 

M9 is a carelessly written manuscript, and very little importance can be attached to its unsupported testimony. We have already seen that not a few tempting readings peculiar to P1 are probably conjectural emendations of its learned transcriber, and we must beware of attaching too much importance to its unsupported testimony. The same thing may be said of P2, and also of P3.

When, however, we ask what value is to be attached to the unsupported testimony of the text followed by the Vetus Interpres, we are on more debatable ground. Suschmihl still attaches much importance to it, though, as has been said, considerably less in his third edition than in his previous ones. But even he accepts only a moderate proportion of the many readings which rest on its unsupported testimony. Dittenberger unhesitatingly applies to it the rule which we have just cited from him. 'From this rule,' he says (Gött. gel. Anz. p. 1363), 'no exception should be made even in favour of the translation of William of Moerbeke. No doubt it is quite true that it represents the best of all the manuscripts of the Politics, but even the testimony of the best single manuscript, as it is not the sole representative of a family, has from a diplomatic point of view no weight whatever in opposition to the concurrence of all other manuscripts of both families.'

The question, however, arises, as we have seen, how far the translation faithfully reproduces the Greek text (or texts).

1 Its value may be studied in the following passages from the Sixth Book: 1289 a 10, 15, b 1: 1290 a 1: 1291 b 31: 1292 a 1, b 13: 1293 a 30: 1294 a 3, 12, b 8, 23, 24: 1296 a 16, b 7, 10: 1297 b 16: 1298 a 7, 18: 1299 a 30: 1300 a 3, 5, b 13, 18.
used by the translator. Susemihl recognizes even in his first edition that in some matters it is not rigidly faithful to its original. 'Denique, quamvis omnia ad verbum vertere solet Guilelmus, cavendum tamen est, ne, ubicunque paulo liberiore ratione utatur, semper aliud quid in cius exemplo scriptum fuisset credamus atque in nostris hodie legitur. Nam non solum idem vocabulum Graecum non codem semper reddit Latino, verum sunt etiam parvulae voces, quas contra codicis sui auctoritatem aut addiderit aut omiserit, velut copulam saepissime adiecit, ubi deest in exemplaribus Graccis, praepositionem cum plurium nominum casibus copulatam ante unumquodque eorum repetere solet, τε et γε particulas plerumque non vertit, in δωπερ et aliis vocabulis cum περ compositis modo hoc περ quidem vocem exprimit, modo silento transit. Quae cum ita sint, etiam verba quaedam in omnibus aut paene omnibus codicibus omissa, quae Guilelmus auctoritate fretus Aristotelis reddidi, velut 2. 3. 1262 a 12 ῥη, 2. 5. 1263 a 35 ὄς, b 34 ἔσται, 2. 6. 1265 a 34 τῇ, 3. 3. 1276 a 25 τόπον, 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 7 εἶναι (cf. 2. 7. 1267 b 18 ὄς, 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 30 χρῶμω), in dubium posse vocari, utrum revera in exemplo suo invenerit an Latine tantum reddiderit sententia et sermonis Latini ratione permotus, eo libentius concedo, quo minus aliis locis tale quid factum esse potest negari, velut vix 1. 9. 1257 b 38 τέλος post αὐθηνας legisse censendus est, quamquam vertit huius autem augmentatio finis' (Sus.1, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv).

This list, however, is far from exhausting the laxities

1 I regret that Busse's excellent dissertation 'de praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi' (Berlin, 1881) did not come to my knowledge till some months after my remarks on the Vetus Interpres and my critical notes had been written. I find that he has anticipated several of the criticisms which I have ventured to make on the thirteenth-century translation as an authority for the text of the Politics. Perhaps however the fact that we have independently arrived at many similar results on this subject may lend some additional weight to our common conclusions.

2 He adds est in the following passages of the first two books —1253 a 16, 1255 b 7, 31, 1256 a 21, 1261 a 2, 1264 a 34, 1271 a 5, 1274 b 9: esse in 1260 b 37, 1264 a 9: erit in 1263 b 34, 1266 b 27.

3 See 1258 a 1, 1262 b 3, 1269 a 10, 1271 b 8. So too μυ, 1253 b 16 (in most MSS.)
which the worthy translator permits himself. He omits μὲν without support from any extant manuscript (so far as they have been examined) in twelve passages of the first two books, καὶ in sixteen, δὲ in eight, γὰρ in three, ἀν in four. He fails to render ὀφει in 1253 b 38, τὲ in 1253 b 32. He often reads γς (1254 a 9, 1266 b 34, 1269 b 9) or δὲ (1268 b 41, 1271 b 15) for τὲ, though sometimes τὲ for γς (1254 b 34, 1273 b 7, 1274 a 15) or for δὲ (1258 a 26), and γς for δὲ (1252 b 8, 1268 b 16). He renders ἤ by et in 1252 a 13, 1253 b 34, 1256 a 37, 1258 b 19, and καὶ by aut in 1262 a 8. He occasionally adds words—civitates in 1266 b 1, scilicet in 1274 a 1, corum in 1258 a 5. His voices, moods, and tenses often fail to reproduce the voices, moods, and tenses of the original. Thus we find him substituting the passive for the active, the active for the passive, the indicative for the subjunctive, the subjunctive for the indicative, the present for the past, the past for the present. He sometimes, though not very often, omits words of some length, or even two or three words together. This is probably the result of accident. He usually adheres to the order of the words.

1 1252 a 27, 1257 a 7, 1258 b 11, 1259 a 28, 1265 a 9, 1266 b 3, 1270 a 4, b 11, 37, 1273 a 26, 1274 a 26, b 15. The omissions noted in the text may be due in part to errors committed by copyists of the translation, but they appear in all Susemihl’s MSS. of it.
2 1252 a 29, 1253 a 31, 1258 a 2 (i adds et here), 1259 a 33, b 8, 29, 1260 a 31, 1262 a 18, 1263 b 34, 1264 a 15, 1266 b 28, 1267 b 24, 1269 a 38, 1270 a 26, 1274 a 25, b 17.
3 1252 a 13, b 23, 1254 b 24, 1256 b 33, 1262 a 38, 1266 a 11, b 2, 1269 a 19.
4 1264 a 30, 1268 b 13, 1274 b 21.
5 1254 b 1, 1256 a 4, 1265 a 30, 1266 b 26. I am far from saying that the Vet. Int. always makes these omissions without MSS. authority, but their frequency makes it probable that they are largely his own.
6 E.g. in 1256 b 41, 1259 a 3, 1262 b 25, 1264 b 14, 1265 b 7, 1266 b 20, 1267 a 38, b 5, 1268 b 21, 1271 b 5, 1274 a 7. Busse makes the same remark (p. 25).
7 E.g. in 1262 a 5, 1265 b 10, 1266 a 11, 1269 a 18, 1271 a 22.
8 E.g. in 1270 a 27.
9 E.g. in 1253 a 22, 1265 b 15, 1288 b 36.
10 E.g. in 1265 a 27, 1266 a 37, b 3, 7, 27, 1268 b 38, 1269 b 16, 1271 b 4, 23, 1272 b 32, 1273 b 17, 1274 a 3.
11 E.g. in 1262 b 6, 1273 b 39.
in the Greek, but not unfrequently he makes slight changes in it, which do not probably for the most part correspond to anything in the text before him. Here and there (e.g. in 1257 a 30–31) these changes are forced on him by the difference between Latin and Greek. We must remember that, however useful this translation may be to us for textual purposes, its author never dreamed of its being thus used. He never designed it to serve as a substitute for a manuscript.

In addition to the minute inaccuracies we have been noting, blunders in translation often occur, and also apparently blunders in the decipherment of the Greek text. Of the former class of blunders a few specimens have already been given; it would be easy to add to their number indefinitely. The last chapter of the Second Book offers some remarkable examples. It is hardly likely that so poor a Greek scholar can have been perfect as a decipherer of Greek writing; it is perhaps owing to this, that he renders ἀνέστιος as ἀνόσιος in 1253 a 5, τοῦ δεῖνος as τοῦ δείνοις in 1262 a 3, ἐθέλεων as μέλλεων or ὀφείλεων in 1267 a 34, ἀριστης as ἀριστής in 1269 a 32, ἐπίκειται as ὑπόκειται in 1271 b 34, and γέρας as γῆρας in 1272 a 37, unless indeed we suppose his Greek text to have been exceptionally defective in these passages. We can sometimes account for errors in the vetus versio by the supposition that the translator used a manuscript in which ambiguous contractions similar to those found in M* occasionally occurred, for in one or two places where M* has a contraction of this kind we find the translator going astray: thus in 1335 a 27, where instead of πληθυς M* has a contraction which might be taken to stand for πληθος, the rendering of the Vet. Int. is multum, and in 1337 a 28 under similar circumstances Vet. Int. has ipsorum where we expect ipsum. Here and there, again, as Busse has pointed out (pp. 14–28), the translator would seem to have sought to mend defects in his Greek text by conjectures of his own: one of the clearest cases of this is to

1 His plan is, according to sensu cohaerent etiam collocati-
Busse (p. 13), 'ea quae forma ac one arctius coniungere.'
be found in 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq., where the omission of some words in the translator's Greek text (and in M*) makes nonsense of the sentence, and he has sought to remedy this by rendering τάξην ὀρθῆν, as if it were τάξεως. So too in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 6, finding probably in his text the same meaningless fragment of βαρανσικόν (βανσικόν) which appears in M*, the translator renders it nautica to make sense, and in 1. 8. 1256 a 30 he has multis for the same reason, though the reading he found in his text was in all probability the blunder πολλοὶ.

It is evident that, however good the manuscript or manuscripts used by the Vetus Interpres may have been, we have only an imperfect reproduction of them in his translation. Before, therefore, we can accept a reading which rests on its unsupported authority, we must in the first place make sure that he has manuscript authority for it, and that it has not originated in some error or inaccuracy or conjecture of his own. It is only of a certain number of the readings peculiar to the Vetus Interpres that we can assert this with confidence. The following are instances of readings too remarkable to have originated with the translator:—

2. 1. 1260 b 41, εἰς ὑ τής in place of ἴσοτης II.
2. 7. 1260 b 2, ὑ ἴδη.
3. 12. 1283 a 7, ἱπερέχει.
4 (7). 17. 1336 a 6, εἰσάγειν.
1. 2. 1254 a 7, πετανοῖς for πεττοῖς.

In the first four of these passages I am inclined to think that the translator's Greek text preserved the true reading. In the fifth he may probably have translated a marginal

1 They seem to have suffered from the incorporation of glosses with the text (e.g. in 1254 b 1, φαιλὸς appears to be a gloss, μοιχ. θηρίος the true reading: glosses have found their way into the Greek text followed by the Vet. Int. in 1259 b 14 and 1287 a 10; and in 1291 b 29, ὅρων, which is probably a gloss intended to explain τὰ τούτων λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αἰτὴν διαφοράν, has been added to these words). We must also credit the text followed by the Vet. Int. with the many erroneous readings common to it with M*.
Correction, for the correction περευος appears in the margin of more than one extant manuscript.

So far as to varieties of reading; but manuscripts are liable to still graver defects—to interpolation, chasms in the text, displacement of words, clauses, and paragraphs, and the like. In the text of Aristotle's treatise de Generatione Animalium, for instance, a chasm is thought to be traceable in 2. 1. 735 a 11 (after θεωροντος), and whole paragraphs in more cases than one seem to be out of their true place. How has it fared with the Politics in respect of these matters?

As to interpolation, I have elsewhere pointed to more than one passage in which it may reasonably be suspected. Susemihl, as is well known, holds that chasms in the text of the Politics occur not unfrequently, and that in many cases the transposition of clauses and paragraphs is called for. There would be nothing surprising in this. We occasionally find sentences obviously displaced in manuscripts of the Politics, and here and there we seem to trace a minute but indubitable chasm (there is a chasm of this kind in the better manuscripts in 1285 a 19). The question is one on which I would rather not express a definitive opinion, till I have completed my commentary, but so far as I can judge at present, I doubt whether Susemihl has made out his case. Problems of this kind, however, are best discussed in notes on the particular passages in reference to which they arise.

The question whether double versions occur is also an interesting one. This, again, is one for discussion in detail. I will only say that they need to be very clearly established, and that I am inclined to doubt whether they are really traceable in many of the cases in which they have been supposed to be so. The double inquiry into the cause

1 So think Aubert and Wimmer: see their edition of the de Gen. An., p. 140.
2 De Gen. An. 1. 19. 726 b 24. 30: 2. 3. 737 a 34-737 b 7 (Aubert and Wimmer, pp. 98, 152).
3 E.g. in 1264 b 3, 1287 b 18, 1290 a 32.
of the existence of a multiplicity of constitutions contained in the first four chapters of the Sixth Book is, however, certainly suspicious, and, as I have said elsewhere, these four chapters are in a condition the origin of which it is difficult to penetrate.

But here we find ourselves in face of those broader problems in relation to the state of the text of the Politics, as to which something has already been said.

1 Attention has been called to this both by Susemihl and by Mr. J. C. Wilson.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α’.

'Επειδή πάσαν πόλιν όρόμεν κοινωνίαν τινά ούδαν καί 1252 α
πάσαν κοινωνίαν ἄγαθον τινὸς ἑνεκεν συνεστηκυίαν (τοῦ γὰρ
εἶναι δοκούντος ἄγαθον χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δῆ-
λον ὡς πάσαι μὲν ἄγαθοι τινὸς στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ
καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἡ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας 5
περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας" αὐτὴ δὲ ἔστιν ἡ καλομένη πόλις
2 καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική. ὅσι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικῶν
καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ οἰκονομικῶν καὶ δεσποτικῶν εἶναι τοὺς
ἀυτοὺς, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν: πληθεὶς γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομί-
ζουσι διαφέρειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδεί τούτων ἔκαστον, οἶον ἀν μὲν 10
ὁλίγων, δεσπότην, ἀν δὲ πλειόνων, οἰκονόμον, ἀν δ’ ἐτι
πλειόνων, πολιτικῶν ἡ βασιλικῶν, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν
μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἡ μικρὰν πόλιν, καὶ πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ
βασιλικῶν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκη, βασιλικῶν, ὅταν δὲ
κατὰ τούς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος 15
ἀρχῶν καὶ ἀρχόμενος, πολιτικῶν· ταῦτα δ’ οὖκ ἔστιν ἀληθής·
3 δὴ λοι π’ ἐσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὕφη-
γημένην μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθε-
tον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαιρέων (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλά-
χιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται 20
σκοποῦντες ὁψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τι τε διαφέ-
ρουσιν ἄλληλοι, καὶ εἰ τι τεχνικῶν ἐνδέχεται λαβέιν περὶ
ἔκαστον τῶν ρητέντων.

Εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φύομεν βλέ-2
ψει, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ’ ἄν 25
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οὐτώ θεωρήσειν. ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδύαζεσθαι τούς ἁνευ 2 ἀλλήλων µὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἰον θῆλυ µὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς
gενέσεως ἐνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὅσπερ
cαὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν ἥ ἐφίεσθαι,
30 οἰον αὐτό, τοιούτων καταλιπεῖν ἔτερον), ἄρχον δὲ ὕψει καὶ
ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν τὸ µὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ
dιανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ
dυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἄρχόμενον καὶ φύσει
dούλον. διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλῳ ταῦτα συμφέρει. φύσει µὲν 3
1252 b οὖν διάρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δούλου (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσεις
ποιεῖ τοιούτων οἰον χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικήν µάχαιραν
πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἐν οὐτῷ γὰρ ἄν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλ-
λιστα τῶν ὁργάνων ἐκαστον, µὴ πολλοίς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐν ἐνὶ
5 δουλεύον): ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ δούλου τὴν 4
αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν. αἰτίνω δὲ δὴ τοῖ δούλου οὐκ ἔχου-
σιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἢ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου. διὸ
φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ “βαρβάρων δ' Ἔλληνας ἀρχεῖν εἰκός,”
ὡς ταῦτα φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δούλου δν. ἐκ µὲν οὖν τού-
10 των τῶν δύο κοινωνίων οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὁρθῶς Ἡσίοδος
εἶπε ποιήσας “οἶκον µὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκα τε βοῦν τ' ἀρο-
τῆρα”· ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησις ἔστιν, ἡ µὲν
οὖν εἰς πάσαν ἡµέραν συνεστηκυία κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν
οἰκός ἔστιν, οὔχ Χαράνδας µὲν καλεῖ ὁµοσιτύους, Ἐπιμενίδης
15 δὲ ὁ Κρῆς ὁµόκαπτος· ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκίων κοινωνία
πρώτη χρήσεως ἐνεκεν µὴ ἐφηµέρου κόµη. µάλιστα δὲ 6
κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖν ἡ κόµη ἀποικία οἰκίας εἶναι· οὔσας
καλούσι τινες ὁµογάλακτας παῖδας τε καὶ παιδῶν παῖδας.
διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύωντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτι τὰ
20 ἐδήν. ἐκ βασιλευοµένων γὰρ συνήλθον· πάσα γὰρ οἰκία
βασιλεύεται ὕπο τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ωστε καὶ αἱ ἀποικίαι διὰ
tὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν δὲ λέγει Ἰωµηρος· ἐθεµιστεύει 7
dὲ ἐκαστὸς παιδὸς ἑδ' ἀλόχων· σποράδες γὰρ· καὶ οὕτω
τὸ ἀρχαῖον φύκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ
βασιλεύσεθαι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἱ δὲ τὸ 25 ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύσαντο, ὅσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰδὴ σαυτοῖς ἁφο-
8 μισοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. ἢ δ' ἐκ
πλείονῶν κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις ἦδη, πάσης ἔχουσα
πέρας τῆς αὐτάρκείας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ
ζην ἐνεκεν, οὕτα δὲ τοῦ εὗ ζῆν, διὸ πάσα πόλις φύσει ἐστὶν, 30
ἐσπέρ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι: τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκεῖνων,
ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἔστιν' οἴνον γὰρ ἑκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως
tελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὅσπερ
9 ἄνθρωπον ἱππὸν οἰκίας. ἐτι τὸ οὖν ἐνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλ-
τιστον' ἢ δ' αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. ἐκ τούτων 1253 a
οὖν φανερῶν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος
φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἀπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ
τόκην ἦτοι φαιλός ἐστιν ἡ κρείττων ἡ ἄνθρωπος, ὅσπερ
καὶ ὁ υφ' Ομήρου λοιδορθεὶς "ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιος". 5
10 ἀμα γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητῆς, ἄτε περ
ἀγίων ὅν ὅσπερ ἐν πεπτοῦ. διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου ζῷου μᾶλλον,
δήλων, οὐδὲν γὰρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ, λόγον
11 δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνή τοῦ 10
 λυπηροῦ καὶ ἱδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρ-
χει ζῴοις: μέχρι γὰρ τοῦτον ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε τοῦ
ἔχειν αἰσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἱδέος καὶ ταύτα σημαίνειν
ἀλλήλοις: ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ
12 τὸ βλαβερὸν, ὡστε καὶ τὸ δικαίου καὶ τὸ ἁδικὸν· τούτῳ γὰρ 15
πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἄνθρώποις ἱδίοιν, τὸ μένον ἁγαθὸν
καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἁδικοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθησιν
ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. καὶ
πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει πόλις ἡ οἰκία καὶ ἐκαστος ἡμῶν ἐστίν.
13 τὸ γὰρ ὄλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναγρουν-
20 μένου γὰρ τοῦ ὄλου οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χείρ, εἰ μὴ ὀμοφύμως,
ὅσπερ εἶ τις λέγει τὴν λιθῆν· διαφθαρείσα γὰρ ἔσται
tοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἐργῷ ὑρίσται καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ὡστε

1252 a 26—1253 a 23.
μηκέτι τοιαύτα ὄντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αυτὰ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὡμώνυμα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον ἡ ἐκα-14 στος, δὴ λοιπὸν ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἔκατοσ χωρισθεῖς, ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἐξει πρὸς τὸ ὄλον· ὅ δὲ μὴ δυνάμε-νος κοινωνεῖν, ἡ μηδὲν δέομεν δὲ αὐτάρκειαν, οὔδὲν μέρος πόλεως, ὡστε ἡ θηρίων ἡ θεός. φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὀρμή ἐν 15 τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν ὁ δὲ πρῶτος συντήρας μεγίστον ἀγαθῶν αἰτίος. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθέν βέλτι-στον τῶν ζῴων ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὖτω καὶ χωρισθέν νόμου καὶ δίκης χειριστοῦ πάντων. χαλεπώτατη γὰρ ἄδικα ἔχουσα 16 ὅπλα· ὁ δὲ ἀνθρωπός ὅπλα ἔχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ 35 ἀρετῇ, ο +% ἐπὶ τάναντια ἐστὶ χρήσασθαι μάλιστα. διὸ ἀνοσίω- τατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ ἑδωδὴν χειριστοῦ. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικῶν ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν· ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

1253 b Ὁ 'Επεὶ δὲ φανερὸν εξ ὧν μορίων ἡ πόλις συνεστηκεν, ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰςειν πάσα γὰρ σύγκειται πόλις εὖ οἰκίων. οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, εξ ὧν πάλιν οἰκία συνεστηκεν οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. ἔπει 5 δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἔκατον ζητητέον, πρῶτα δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσπότης καὶ δούλως καὶ πόσις καὶ ἄλοχος καὶ πατὴρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τριῶν ἄν τούτων σκεπτέον εἰς τί ἔκατον καὶ ποίον δὲ ἐνεῖ. ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς δὲ δετοποιητικὴ καὶ γαμικὴ (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀν-10 ὅρος σύζευξις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητική· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ οὐκ ὑψόμασται ἵδιο ὄνοματι. ἐστωσαν δὲ αὐτὶς τρεῖς ἀσ εἰπο- μεν. ἔστι δὲ τι μέρος δ δοκεῖ τοῖς μὲν εἶναι οἰκονομία, τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτής· ὅπως δὲ ἐξει, θεωρητεῖν. λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς καλουμένης χρηματιστικῆς· πρῶτον δὲ 15 περὶ δεσπότου καὶ δούλου εἰπωμεν, ἕνα τὰ τε πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν ἱδομεν, κἂν εἰ τι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν δυναίμεθα λαβεῖν βέλτιον τῶν νῦν ὑπολαμβανομέ-νων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τε τοῖς εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία,
καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ὦκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ βα-
σιλικὴ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀρχόμενοι τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν 20
tὸ δεσπόζειν. νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν δὲ ἑλεύ-
θερον, φύσει δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρειν. διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον· βίαιον
gὰρ. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ 4
μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας (ἀνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον
cαὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν), ὡςπερ δὲ ταῖς ϕρισμέναις τέχναις 25
ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει
2 ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν, τῶν
δ' ὦργανον τὰ μὲν ἀψυχα τὰ δ' ἐμψυχα, οἷον τῷ κυ-
βερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἰαξ ἀψυχον, ὁ δὲ προφερές ἐμψυχον (ὁ
gὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὦργανον εἰδε ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ 30
tὸ κτῆμα ὦργανον πρὸς ζωὴν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλήθος
ὄργανον ἐστὶ, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμα τὶ ἐμψυχον, καὶ ὡςπερ
3 ὦργανον πρὸ ὦργανον πᾶς ὁ υπηρέτης· εἰ γὰρ ἡδύνατο
ἐκαστοί τῶν ὦργανων κελευσθέν ἡ προαισθανόμενον ἀποτε-
λεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἔργον, ὡςπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φαςίν ἡ τοῦ τοῦ 35
Ἡφαίστου τρίποδας, οὕς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτομάτου θεοῦ
dύεσθαι ἀγώνα, οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες ἐκερκίζον αὐταὶ καὶ τὰ
πλῆκτρα ἐκιθάριζεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει οὕτε τοῖς ἀρχιτέκτοσιν
4 ὑπηρετῶν οὕτε τοῖς δεσπόταις δούλων. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα 1254 α
ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὦργανα ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα πρακτικῶν· ἀπὸ
μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἑτέρων τοι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν
αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθήτου καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἡ χρῆσις μο-
νον. ἐτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποιήσις εἰδε καὶ ἡ πράξις, 5
καὶ δεόνται ἀμφότεροι ὦργανον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τῆν
5 αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν· ὃ δὲ βιος πράξις, οὐ ποιήσις ἐστὶν·
διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πράξιν. τὸ δὲ
κτῆμα λέγεται ὡςπερ καὶ τὸ μόριον· τὸ τε γὰρ μόριον οὐ
μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἄλλου· ὥρμωσὶ δὲ 10
καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. διὸ ὃ μὲν δεσπότης τοῦ δοῦλου δεσπότης μο-
νον, ἐκείνου δ' οὐκ ἐστιν· ὃ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότην δοῦλος
6 ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δοῦλον
καὶ τὸς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύσις εἰς ἀλλὰ ἄλλου, ἀνθρώπος ὁν, οὐτος φύσει δοῦλος ἐστιν, ἄλλου δ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, διὸ ἂν κτήμα ἣ ἄνθρωπος ὁν, κτήμα δὲ ὁ ὅργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστὸν τούτων δ' ἐστὶν τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ὃ ὁ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιον τινι δούλευειν ὃ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ, μετὰ ταῦτα 20 σκεπτέον. οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ὅ τὸν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι 2 οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστὶ, καὶ εὕθυς ἐκ γενετῆς ένια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεσθαι τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχεῖν. καὶ εἴδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχόντων καὶ 25 ἀρχιμένων ἐστιν, καὶ ἄεὶ βελτίων ἡ ἀρχή ἡ τῶν βελτιῶν ἀρχιμένων, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἡ θερίου· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελοῦμεν 3 ἀπὸ τῶν βελτιῶν βέλτιον ἔργον, ὅποι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀρχεῖ τὸ δ' ἀρχεσθαι, ἐστὶ τί τοῦτων ἔργων. ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλείων συνέστηκε καὶ γίνεται εἰς τὶ κοινον, εἰτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἰτε ἐκ 30 διηρημένων, ἐν ἁπασιν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἀρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον. καὶ τούτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψυχοῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἐστὶ τὰς ἀρχῆς, οἷον ἀρμονίας, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἵσωσ εὔφορικοτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως, τὸ δὲ ζωον πρῶτον συνεστηκέν τῷ φυσικῷ 35 καὶ σώματος, ὃν τὸ μὲν ἀρχον ἐστὶ φύσαι τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον. δεὶ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἐξουσιάζεται καὶ τὸ φύσει, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλτιστα διακείμενον καὶ κατὰ σώμα καὶ κατὰ φυσικὴν ἀνθρωπον θεωρητέουν, ἐν γὰρ τούτῳ δῆλον· τῶν γάρ αὐτοῦ ἡ 1254 ἡ μοιχηρὸς ἐχόντων δύο ξείς ἀν ἀρχειν πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἐχεῖν. ἐστὶ δ' οὖν, ὡσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζωῆς θεωρήσαι καὶ δἐσποτικῆν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικῆν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ψυχῆ τοῦ σῶ- 5 ματος ἀρχεῖ δεσποτικῆν ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὁρέξεως πολιτικῆν καὶ βασιλικῆν· ἐν οἷς φανερὸν ἐστὶν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἀρχεσθαι τῷ σῶματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυ-
χήσ καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἑσοῦ ἡ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερὸν πᾶσιν.

7 πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἥλιοις ὡσάυτος· τὰ 10 μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρα τῶν ἁγίων βελτίω τὴν φύσιν, τούτοις δὲ πᾶσι βέλτιον ἀρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας οὕτως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἀρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρείττον τὸ δὲ χείρων, τὸ μὲν ἀρχὸν τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον. τοὺς αὐτοὺς δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. 15

8 πον. ὅσοι μὲν οὐν τοσοῦτον διεστάσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἀνθρώπου θηρίων (διάκεινται δὲ τοὐτὸν τὸν τρόπον, ὅσον ἐστίν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρήσις, καὶ τούτ' ἐστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μὲν εἰσὶ φύσει δούλοι, οἷς βέλτιον ἐστιν ἀρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἄρχην, εἰπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἐστὶ 20 γὰρ φύσει δούλοις ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἰναι (διδ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστὶν) καὶ ὁ κοινώνων λόγῳ τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα χωα οὐ λόγῳ αἰσθανόμενα, ἀλλὰ παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ, καὶ ἡ χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρῶν ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τάναγκαια τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ' 25 ἀμφοῖν, παρὰ τε τῶν δούλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ψών.

10 βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἱσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικῶν βίων (οὕτως δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικὴν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τουναντίων, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρον τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπεί τοιτό γε φανερών, ὡς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιτο δίαφοροι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπο-35 λειπομένους πάντες φαίειν ἄν ἄξιον εἰναι τούτοις δουλεύειν.

11 εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἄλλης, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὕς όμοιος βάδιον ἱδεῖν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος. ὡς μὲν τοῖς εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλευθεροὶ οἱ δὲ δούλοι, θα-1255 α.
νερόν, οίς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ δίκαιον ἐστίν. 6 ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τάναντία φάσκοντες τρόπον τινὰ λέγουσιν ὅρθως, οὐ χαλεπῶν ἰδεῖν. διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τὸ δουλεύειν 5 καὶ ὁ δοῦλος: ἐστὶ γὰρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ δουλεύων: ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὀμολογία τὶς ἐστίν, ἐν ὑπὸ τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατοῦμενα τῶν κρατοῦντων εἶναι φασίν. τούτῳ δὲ 2 τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡσπερ ῥήτορα γράφεται παρανόμων, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος ἐσται δούλος καὶ ἄρχομεν τὸ βιασθὲν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὕτω δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἐκεῖνοι, καὶ τῶν σοφῶν. αὐτίον δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ δ 3 ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴν τυχικάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζονται δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ 15 ἐστὶν αἰτὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς, ὡστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἀνεύ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβητήσειν· διὰ γὰρ τότῳ τοῖς μὲν εὐνοίᾳ δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῖς δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν, ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λό- 20 γον οὔτε ἵπποι διδέν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸ δέλτιον κατ’ ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν. δόλως 5 δ’ ἀντεχόμενοι τῖνες, ὃς οἴονται, δικαίου τινὸς (ὁ γὰρ νόμος δικαίου τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίαν, ἀμὰ δὲ οὐ φασὶν τὴν τε γὰρ ἄρχην ἐνδεχέσθαι μὴ δι- 25 καίαν εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τῶν ἀναξίων δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίε τὴν δοῦλον εἶναι εἰ δὲ μὴ, συμβῆσαι τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δούλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δούλων, ἐὰν συμβῇ πραθῆναι λῃσθῆναι. διὸπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλονται 6 λέγειν δοῦλος, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καίτοι ὅταν τοῦτο λέ- 30 γοσιν, οὐδέν ἀλλο ἄγοντιν ὡς τὸ φύσει δοῦλον, ὅπερ ἐξ ἄρχης εἰπομεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναι τινας φάναι τοὺς μὲν πανταχοῦ δοῦλους τοὺς δὲ οὐδαμοῦ. τῶν αὐτὸν ὃ τρόπον καὶ 7 περὶ εὐγενείας· αὐτοὺς μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρ’ αὐτοῖς εὐγε- νεῖς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ νομίζοντιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οίκοι ἕν-
νον, ὡς ὅν τι τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς εὐγενὲς ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δ′ οὐχ 35 ἀπλῶς, ὃσπερ καὶ ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἐλενή φησίν

θιῶν δ′ ἀπ′ ύμβοιν ἐκγονον ῥυφώματων
tις ἂν προσεπείν ἀξιώσειν λάτρειν;

8 ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐδεὶν ἀλλὰ ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διο-
ρίζουσι τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς 40
dυσγενεῖς, ἀξιοῦσι γάρ, ὃσπερ εξ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρώπων καὶ 1255 b
ἐκ θηρίων γίνεσθαι θηρίων, οὕτω καὶ εξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθον· ἢ
dὲ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι

9 δύναται· ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐχεῖ τινὰ λόγον ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις,
καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δούλοι οἱ δὲ ἐλεύθεροι, δήλων 5
καὶ ὅτι ἐν τισι διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὅν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ
δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ δει τὸ μὲν
ἀρχεθαι τὸ δ′ ἀρχεῖν, ἢν πεφύκασιν ἀρχὴν ἀρχεῖν, ὡστε

10 καὶ δεσπόζειν. τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἔστιν ἀμφοῖν· τὸ
γάρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ καὶ σῶματι καὶ 10
ψυχῇ, ὃ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οὗν ἐμψυχών τι
τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος. διὸ καὶ συμφέρον
ἔστι τι καὶ φιλία δούλῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς
φύσει τούτων ἡξιωμένους· τοῖς δὲ μὴ τούτον τὸν τρόπον,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθείσαι, τούναντιον.

15 Φανερῶν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἐστὶ δεσποτεία 7
καὶ πολιτική, οὐδὲ πάσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὃσπερ τινὲς
φασίν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθέρων φύσει ἢ δὲ δούλων ἔστιν, καὶ
ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ μοναρχία (μοναρχεῖσα γὰρ πάς οἶκος),
2 ή δὲ πολιτικὴ ἐλευθέρων καὶ ἰσοῦν ἀρχή· ὃ μὲν οὖν δεσπο-
της οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦδε εἶναι,
ὄμοιος δὲ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέρος· ἐπιστήμη δὲ ἂν
eιθ καὶ δεσποτική καὶ δουλική· δουλική μὲν οίκοι περ ὥν ὣν
Συρακούσαις ἐπαίδευεν ἤκει γὰρ λαμβάνων τις μισθῶν
3 ἐδίδασκε τὰ ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παιδας. εἰη δ′ 25
ἀν καὶ ἐπὶ πλείον τῶν τοιούτων μάθησις, οἶνον ὄψοιοική
καὶ τάλλω τὰ τοιαῦτα γένη τῆς διακονίας· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐτερα
πολιτικών A'. 7–8.

ετέρων τά μὲν ἐντιμότερα ἔργα τά δ' ἀναγκαίότερα, καὶ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν δοῦλος πρὸ δοῦλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δε- 30 σπότου. αἱ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτα πᾶσαι δουλικά ἐπιστήμαι εἰσι, τῇ δεσποτικῇ δ' ἐπιστήμῃ ἐστὶν ἡ χρηστική δοῦλων· ὁ γὰρ δε- 35 σπότης οὖκ εἰς τῷ κτάσθαι τοὺς δούλους, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ χρήσθαι δοῦλοις. ἔστι δ' αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὔδὲ σημεῖον· ἀ γὰρ τὸν δοῦλον ἐπίστασθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκείνου δεῖ 35 ταῦτα ἐπιστασθαί ἐπιτάττειν. διὸ οὐσία ἐξουσία μὴ αὐτοῦ 5 κακοπαθεῖν, ἐπίπτομος λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν τιμήν, αὐτοὶ δὲ πολιτεύονται ἡ φιλοσοφούσιν. ἡ δ' κτησική ἐτέρα ἀμ- φοτέρων τούτων, οὖν ἡ δικαία, πολεμική τις οὖσα ἡ θηρευ- 40 τική. περὶ μὲν οὖν δοῦλου καὶ δεσπότου τούτου διωρίσθων τὸν τρόπον·

1256 a. 8 "Ολως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεω- ρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦ- λος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειν ἀν τις πότερον ἡ χρηματιστική ἡ αὐτῇ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστὶν 5 ἡ μέρος τι ἡ ὑπηρετική, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετική, πότερον ὡς ἡ κερκιδοποιική τῇ υφαντικῇ ἢ ός ἡ χαλκουργική τῇ ἀν- δριαντοποιίᾳ· οὐ γὰρ ὡσάντως ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ὃρ- γανα παρέχει, ἢ δὲ τὴν ἑλπὶ· λέγω δὲ ἑλπὶ τὸ ὑποκεί-2 μενον, ἐξ' οὐ τι ἀποτελεῖται ἔργον, οἶνον ψάντη μὲν ἔρια, 10 ἀνδριαντοποιὸ δὲ χαλκών. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ ἀυτῇ οἰκο- νομικῇ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ, δῆλον· τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσα- 15 σθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασθαι τὸς γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρησμομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν; πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τι ἡ ἐτερον εἴδος, ἔσχε διαμφισβήτησιν. 20 ἐγὼ ἐστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρήσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ 3 κτήσεις ἔσται, ἡ δ' κτήσεις πολλὰ περιελήφη μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος, ὡστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργική πότερον μέρος τι τῆς χρη- 25 ματιστικῆς ἢ ἐτερόν τι γένος, καὶ καθόλου ἡ περὶ τὴν τρο- φὴν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτήσεις; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴδη γε πολλὰ τρο- 4 20 φῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζώον καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
1255 b 28—1256 b 12.

εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ οἶνον τε ζῆν ἀνευ τροφῆς, ὡστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ζῴων.

5 τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀγελαία τὰ δὲ σποραδικὰ ἐστὶν, ὁποτέρος συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ζωοφάγα τὰ δὲ καρποφάγα τὰ δὲ παμφάγα αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὡστε 25 πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν τὴν τοῦτων ἡ φύσις τοὺς βίους αὐτῶν διώρισεν, ἐπεὶ δ' οὗ ταῦτ' ἐκάστῳ ἥδυ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλὰ ἐτερὰ ἐτεροῖς, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ζωοφάγων καὶ τῶν 6 καρποφάγων οἱ βίοι πρὸς ἀλληλα διεστάσεις ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρουσιν οἱ τοῦτων βίοι. 30 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄργοτατοι νομάδες εἰσίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμέρων τροφῆς ζῴων ἀνευ πόνου γίνεται σχολάζουσιν, ἀναγκαίον δὲ ὅτους μεταβάλλειν τοῖς κτήμεσι διὰ τὰς νομάς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναγκάζονται συνακολουθεῖν, ὡσπερ γεωργίαν ζῶσαν 7 γεωργοῦντες· οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἐτεροὶ ἐτεροὶ—35 ρας, οἶνον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας, οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἀλλοίως, ὡςοι λι- μνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἢ θάλατταν τοιαύτην προσοι- κούσιν, οἱ δ' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ἢ θηρίων ἁγρίων· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῇ καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καρ- 
8 πῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν βίοι τοσοῦτοι σχεδὸν εἰσίν, ὡςοι γε αὐτὸ- 40 φυτὸν ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ δι' ἀλλαγής καὶ κα- πηλείας πορίζονται τὴν τροφὴν, νομαδικὸς γεωργικὸς λη- στρικὸς ἀλευτικὸς ἠθετικὸς· οἱ δὲ καὶ μιγνύτες ἐκ τοῦ- των ἥδεος ζῶσι, προσαναπληροῦτες τῶν ἐνδεεστατῶν βίων, ἡ τυχάνει ἐλλείπον πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι, οἶνον οἱ μὲν νομαδικῶν ἁμα καὶ ληστρικῶν, οἱ δὲ γεωργικῶν καὶ θηρευ- 
9 τικῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἂν ἡ χρεία συναναγκᾶζη, τοῦτον τῶν τρόπων διάγοισιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κτήσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πάσιν, ὡσπερ κατά τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ τελειω- 
10 θείσιν, καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἥξ αρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκ- 10 τίκτει τῶν ζῷων τοιαύτην τροφὴν ὡς ἱκανήν εἶναι μέχρις ὡς ἂν δύνηται αὐτῷ αὐτῶν πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθέν, οἶνον οἴσα
σκωληκοτοκεὶ ἡ φωτοκεὶ· ὅσα δὲ ἦσον ἀυτὸις μέχρι τινός, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γά-15 λακτος φύσιν. ὡστε ὁμώοις δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οἰη-11 τένα τα τε φυτὰ τῶν ᾑγών ἐνεκεν εἰναι καὶ τὰ ἀλλα ᾑγά τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τα μὲν ἦμερα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρήσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφὴν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ γε πλείστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἀλλῆς βοηθείας ἐνεκεν, ὡν20 καὶ ἑσθὶς καὶ ἀλλα ὀργανα γίνηται ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ22 φύσις μηδὲν μήτε ἄτελες ποιεῖ μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαίων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα πεποιηκέναι τῆν φύσιν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πως ἐσται, ἡ γὰρ θη-25 ρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἤ δει χρῆσαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ25 τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσοι πεφυκότες ἀρχεσθαι μὴ θέλουσι, ὡς φύσει δίκαιον τούτον ὄντα τῶν πόλεμον. ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος13 κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν· ὁ δει ἦτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ, δὲν ἐστὶ θη-ςαυρισμός χρημάτων πρὸς ζωῆν ἀναγκαίος καὶ χρησίμων30 εἰς κραυνωνίαν πόλεως ἡ οἰκίας. καὶ ἔσοικεν ὃ γὰρ ἀληθινὸς14 πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἀπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σό-λων φησι ποιήσας “πλοῦτον ὧν οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀν-δράσι κεῖται.” κείται γὰρ ὡσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἀλλαῖς τέχναις·15 35 οὐδὲν γὰρ ὀργανον ἀπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλῆθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος ὀργῶν πληθὸς ἐστιν οἰκονο-μικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν ἐστὶ τῆς κτητικῆ17 κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δ’ ἦν αἰτίαν, δῆλον·

9 Ἑστὶ δὲ γένος ἀλλο κτητικῆς, ἢ μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικῆν, δ’ ἦν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ 1257 α πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως* ἢν ὡς μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειτνιασιν· ἐστὶ δ’ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἐστὶ δ’ ἢ μὲν φύσει ἢ δ’ οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δ’ ἐμπειρίας
2 τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μάλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς 5 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεύθεν. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος ὁτιτῇ ἡ χρῆσις ἐστιν, ἀμφότεραι δὲ καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν ἄλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ’ αὐτὸ, ἄλλ’ ἢ μὲν οἰκεία ἢ δ’ οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος, οἰον ὑποδήματος ἢ τε ὑπόδεισις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. ἀμ-
3 φότεραι γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρῆσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττό-10 μενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἡ τροφὴ χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἡ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἐνεκεν γέγονεν. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ
4 τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ 15 κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δ’ ἐλάττω τῶν ἰκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἦ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἡ κατηλλική· ὦσον γὰρ ἰκανῶν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγ-
5 καίον ἂν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγήν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ 20 κοινωνίᾳ (τούτῳ δ’ ἐστίν οἰκία) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐργὸν αὐτῆς, ἄλλ’ ἢδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὕσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνουσαν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἐτέρων· ὃν κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖ-
σθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἐτί πολλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν
6 βαρβαρικῶν ἑθῶν, κατά τὴν ἀλλαγήν. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ 25 χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλείω δ’ οὐδέν, οἶνον οἶνον πρὸς σίτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἐκαστον. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλη-
τικὴ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν εἰδὸς οὐδέν, 7 εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἢν· ἐκ 30 μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετ’ ἐκεῖνῃ κατὰ λόγον. ἔνικατέρας γὰρ γινόμενης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι δὲν ἐνδείκει καὶ ἐκ-
πέμπει δὲν ἐπιλεύναζον, εὖ ἀνάγκης ἢ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπο-
8 ρίσθῃ χρῆσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἐκαστὸν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίον· διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιούτων τι συνέδεντο 35 πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, δ’ τῶν χρησίμων
αὐτὸ δὲν εἰχε τὴν χρείαν εὐμεταχειρίστων πρὸς τὸ ᾅν, οἶον
σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος καὶ εἰ τι τοιοῦτον ἔτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ὀρισθὲν μεγέθει καὶ στάθμῳ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον 40 καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλλόντων, ἐν ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρήσεως αυτοῦ· οἶ γὰρ χαρακτῆρ ἐτέθη τοῦ ποσοῦ σημείουν. πο-9 1257 b ρισθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἴδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικὸν, τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἰσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δὲ ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον 5 ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ 10 νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι πώς θεοῦσιν τῆς ἁλθητῆς· ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ πλοῦτον καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλούτον πολλάκις τιθέσαι νομίσματος πλήθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν 10 καὶ τὴν καπηλικὴν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λήρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ 11 νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὖδέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων των χρωμένων οὖδεν ἄξιον οὖτε χρήσιμον πρὸς οὖδεν τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ἑστι, καὶ νομίσματος πλοῦτων πολλάκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄτοποι τοιοῦτον 15 εἶναι πλοῦτον οὐ εὑρόπον λεμφὸ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν ἐκείνων μυθολογοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς πάντων αὐτῷ γιγνομένων τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. διὸ 12 ζητοῦσιν ἔτερον τι τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, ὅρθος ζητοῦντες. ἔστι γὰρ ἐτέρα ἡ χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ 20 κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὐτὴ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ, ἡ δὲ καπηλικὴ, ποιητικὴ χρημάτων οὐ πάντως, ἀλλὰ ἡ διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολὴς. καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἑστίν. καὶ ἀπει-13 ρος δὴ οὖτος ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς· 25 ὡσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἱατρικὴ τοῦ υγιαίνειν εἰς ἀπειρόν ἑστὶ καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρον (ὦτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκείνο βουλόνται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπειρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἑστὶ τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος
14 πλούτος καὶ χρημάτων κτήσις· τῆς δ’ οἰκονομικῆς, οὐ χρηματιστικῆς, ἐστὶν πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἐργον.

15 αἰτίων δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρησίς 35 τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὖσα ἐκατέρα τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ χρήσεως κτήσις, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ ταύτων, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἐτέρων τέλος, τῆς δ’ οὐ αὐξήσις. ὥστε δοκεῖ τίσι τούτ’ εἶναι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἔργον, καὶ διατελουσίν ἡ σῶξειν οἰόμενοι

16 δεῖν οὖν ἡ αὐξήσιν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὐσίαν εἰς ἀπειρον, αἰτίων 40 δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλὰ μή τὸ εὐ ζῆν εἰς ἀπειρον οὖν ἐκείνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὐσίας, 1258 α καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπείρων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. ὡσι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὐ ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικάς ζητοῦσιν, ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτ’ ἐν τῇ κτήσις φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν, πάσα ἡ διατριβή περὶ τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἔστι, καὶ τὸ 5

17 ἔτερον εἴδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τούτ’ ἐλήλυθεν. ἐν υπερβολῇ γὰρ οὐσίας τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τὴν τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικῆς ζητοῦσι· καὶ μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς δύναται πορίζειν, δι’ ἀλλὰ αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρώνται, έκάστη χρώμενοι τῶν δυνάμεων οὐ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνδρίας 10 γάρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστίν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικῆς

18 καὶ ιατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ’ ὑγίειαν· οἱ δὲ πάσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ὥς τοῦτο τέλος ὃν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ τέλος ἀπαντᾷ δέον ἀπαντάν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τε μὴ ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τῆς, καὶ δ’ αἰτίαιν τῖνα ἐν 15 χρεία ἐσμὲν αὐτῆς, εἰρηταί· καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἐτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικῆ δε κατὰ φύσιν ἡ περὶ τῆς τροφῆς, οὐχ ὕσπερ αὐτῇ ἀπειρος, ἀλλὰ ἔχουσα ὅρον· ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον εἰς ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ 10 οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἔστιν ἡ χρηματιστικῆ· οὐ, ἀλλὰ 20 δεῖ τούτῳ μὲν ὑπάρχειν· ὕσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ

1257 a 38—1258 a 21.
Η πολιτική, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρήται αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ τροφῆν τὴν φύσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τι: ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὡς δεὶ ταῦτα διαθεί-ναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον. οὐ γὰρ τῆς ύπαντικῆς ἔρια 2 ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ χρῆσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γνώναι δὲ τὸ ποίον χρηστὸν καὶ ἐπιτήδειον ἢ φαύλον καὶ ἀνεπιτήδειον. καὶ γὰρ ἀπορήσειν ἃν τις διὰ τί ἢ μὲν χρηματιστικὴ μόριον τῆς οἰκονομίας, ἢ δ' ἱατρικὴ οὐ μόριον καίτοι δεὶ υγιαίνειν τοὺς 25 κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, ὥσπερ ἥν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ περὶ 3 ύπιείας ἱδεῖν, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ, οὐτω καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἐστὶ δὲ ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ τῆς υπνηρετικῆς μᾶλιστα δὲ, καθάπερ εἰρητὶ πρότερον, δεὶ 30 φύσει τούτῳ ύπάρχειν· φύσεως γὰρ ἐστίν ἔργον τροφῆν τῷ γεννηθέντι παρέχειν· παντὶ γὰρ, ἣν οὖ γίνεται, τροφῆ τὸ λειτουργεῖν ἐστίν. διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστική 4 πάσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ψών. διπλῆς δ' οἷας αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν καπηλικῆς τῆς δ' οἰκο-νομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπανομένης, τῆς 35 δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψευγομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἄλληλων ἐστίν), εὐλογώτατα μισεῖται ἡ ὅβολο-στατικὴ διὰ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτῆσιν καὶ οὐκ ἡφ' ὥσπερ ἐπορίσθη· μεταβολής γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν, 5 ὥστε καὶ τοῦνομα τοῦτ' εἰληφέων ὁμοία γὰρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς γεννώσιν αὐτὰ ἐστίν, ὥστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν οὕτως τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν. 10 'Επεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν διωρικαμεν ἰκανῶς, τὰ 11 πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεὶ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δ' ἐμπερίαν ἀναγκαίαν. ἐστὶ δὲ χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα ἐμπειρὸν εἶναι, ποία λυσιτελέστατα καὶ τοῦ καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἔπων κτῆσις ποία τις ἣ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
2 τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων (δεῖ γὰρ ἐμπειρὸν εἶναι πρὸς ἀλληλά 15
tε τοῦτον τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποία ἐν ποίοις τόποις· ἀλλα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὐθυνεὶ χώραις), εἶτα περὶ γεωργίας, καὶ ταύτης ἦδη ψυλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελιτ-
tουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἀλλών ζώων τῶν πλοτῶν ἢ πτηνῶν, ἢφι
3 ὅσων ἑστὶνοιURRENTιβεῖας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρη-20
ματιστικῆς ταύτα μόρια καὶ πρώτα, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς
μέγιστον μὲν ἐμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία
φορτηγία παράστασις· διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἑτερα ἑτέρων τῷ
τά μὲν ἁσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλεῖον πορίζει τήν ἐπί-
4 καρπίαν), δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμὸς, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρνία· ταῦ-25
της δ᾽ ἡ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καὶ
tῷ σώματι μόνῳ χρησίμῳ· τρίτον δὲ εἴδος χρημα-
tιστικῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἐχεῖ γὰρ καὶ τῆς
κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς
καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γυνομένων ἁκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δὲ, 30
5 οἷον υλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλά
ἥδη περιείληφε γένη· πολλὰ γὰρ εἶδη τῶν ἐκ γῆς μετα-
λευκών ἐστὶν. περὶ ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἰρηται καὶ
νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖθαι χρήσιμον μὲν
6 πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικῶν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. εἰσὶ δὲ 35
τεχνικῶταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τύχης,
βαναυσόταται δ᾽ ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα,
δουλικῶταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλείστα χρήσεις, ἀγενεν-
7 σταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεί ἀρετῆς. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐνίοις
γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, ὅσον Χαρητίδη τῷ Παρὶς καὶ 40
Ἀπολλοδόρῳ τῷ Αἰμινίῳ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψυλῆς καὶ 1259 a
πεφυτευμένης, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις· περὶ ἄλλων, ταύτα
μὲν ἐκ τοῦτον θεωρεῖτό ὅτω ἐπιμελέσ· ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λε-
γόμενα σποράδμα, δὲ ὅν ἐπιστευχήκασιν ἐνιοχρηματικο-
8 μένοι, δὲιςυνλέγεις πάντα γὰρ ὑφέλιμα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τοίς 5
τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικήν, ὅσον καὶ τῷ Ἐάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίων
τούτο γὰρ ἑστὶ κατανόημα τι χρηματιστικῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνῳ

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μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι
δν. ὅνειδιζόντων γὰρ αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦς
10 τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὐσίας, κατανοησαντά λαῖσαν αὐτῶν ἐλαίων
φοράν ἐσομένην ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας, ἐτὶ χειμῶνος ὑπὸς
εὐπορήσαντα χρημάτων ὀλίγων ἀρράβωνα διαδοοῦν τῶν
ἐλαιουργείων τῶν τ' ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὀλίγου μι-
σθωσάμενον ἀτ' οὔδενός ἐπιβάλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ καιρὸς ἦκε,
15 πολλῶν ἄνθρωπών ἀμα καὶ ἐξαιρείς, ἐκμισθοῦντα σὲ τρόπον
ἡβούλετο, πολλὰ χρήματα συλλέγαντα ἐπιδείξαι ὅτι βασίν
ἔστι πλούτευν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνταί, ἀλλ' ὃς τούτ' ἔστιν
περὶ τὸ σπουδάζουσιν. Θαλής μὲν ὁνὶ λέγεται τοῦτων 10
τῶν τρόπων ἐπιδείξειν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας· ἐστὶ δ', ὣσπερ
20 εἴπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιούτον χρηματιστικόν, ἐὰν τις δύνηται
μονοπωλιῶν αὐτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πόλεων ἔνια
τοῦτο ποιοῦντα τὸν πόρον, ἄταν ἀπορωθεὶς χρημάτων· μονο-
πωλίαν γὰρ τῶν ὲνών ποιοῦσιν. ἐν Σικελίᾳ δὲ τις τεθέντος 11
παρ' αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνεπράτο πάντα τῶν σίδηρων ἐκ
25 τῶν σιδηρείων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὡς ἄφικοντο ἐκ τῶν ἐμπο-
ρίων οἱ ἐμπόροι, ἐπώλει μόνον, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσασ ὑπερβο-
λήν τῆς τιμῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα τελάντων
ἐπέλαβεν ἑκατόν. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν ὁ Διονύσιος αἰσθόμενος τὰ 12
μὲν χρήματα ἐκέλευσεν ἑκκομίσασθαι, μή μέντοι γε ἐτὶ
30 μένειν ἐν Συρακοῦσαις, ὡς πόρους εὐρίσκοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ
πράγμασιν ἀσυμφόρους· τὸ μέντοι ὄραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο
ταύτων ἔστιν· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς ἑτέχνασαν γενέσθαι
μονοπωλίαν. χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολι-
13 τικοῖς· πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιούτων
35 πόρων, ὡσπερ οἰκία, μάλλον δὲ, διόπερ τινὲς καὶ πολι-
τεύονται τῶν πολιτευμένων ταῦτα μόνον.
12 'Επεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἐν μὲν δε-
σποτικῆ, περὶ ἦς εἶρηται πρότερον, ἐν δὲ πατρικῆ, τρίτον δὲ
γαμικῆ· καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχει καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθε-
40 ρων μὲν ἀμφότεροι, οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἄρχης, ἀλλὰ
1259 a 8—1259 b 33.

γυναίκος μὲν πολιτικῶς, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς· τὸ τε γὰρ 1259 b ἀρρεν φύσει τοῦ βῆλεος ἡγεμονικῶτερον, εἰ μὴ ποινε- στήκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεώ- 2 τέρου καὶ ἀτέλειος. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαίς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἁρχόν καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον (ἐξ ἵστον 5 γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τῆν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδείν), ὃμως δὲ, όταν τοῦ μὲν ἁρχήτι τὸ δὲ ἁρχητά, ζητεὶ διαφοράν εἶναι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὡσπέρ καὶ Ἀμασις

3 εἶπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτήρος λόγον· τὸ δὲ ἀρρεν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἢ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἁρχῇ ἢ
βασιλικῇ· τὸ γὰρ γεννήθηκαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἁρχον καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἔστω, ὡσεὶ ἄστι βασιλικῆς ἐδός ἁρχής. διὸ καλῶς "Ομηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν "πατήρ ἀν-
δρών τε θεόν τε," τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάντων. φύσει γὰρ
tὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν 15 ὡσεὶ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεώτερον καὶ ὁ γεν-
νήθας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.

Φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκνομίας 13
περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἁψύχων κτήσιν, καὶ
περὶ τὴν ἁρετὴν τούτων ἡ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, ὁν καλοῦμεν 20
2 πλοῦτον, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἡ δοῦλων. πρῶτον μὲν
οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειν ἄν τις, πότερον ἐστὶν ἁρετῇ τις
δοῦλων παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἀλλή τιμωτέρα
tούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν
ἀλλῶν τῶν τοιούτων ἔξων, ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς 25
3 σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας. ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρων· εἴτε
gὰρ ἐστὶ, τί διοίκουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἐστὶν, ὡσεὶ
ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον. σχέδων δὲ
tαυτῶν ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδὸς,
pότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἁρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τὴν γυναικά εἶναι 30
σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παις ἐστὶ καὶ ἄκο-
4 λαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὐ; καὶ καθόλου δὴ τούτ' ἐστὶν ἐπισκε-
pτέον περὶ ἁρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἁρχοντός, πότερον ἡ αὐτῇ
ἀρετή ἥ ἐτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεὶ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλο-κάγαθιάς, διὰ τὶ τῶν μὲν ἂρχειν δεόει ἂν τὸν δὲ ἂρχεσθαι καθάπαξ; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον οἷον τε διαφέρειν τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἂρχεσθαι καὶ ἂρχειν εἴδει διαφέρει τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον οὐδέν. εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν δεὶ τὸν δὲ μῆ, 5 θαυμαστῶν. εἰτε γὰρ ὁ ἂρχων μη ἔσται σῶφρων καὶ δι-40 καιο, πῶς ἂρξει καλὸς; εἰθ’ ὁ ἂρχόμενος, πῶς ἂρχά-1260 ος; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ ὃν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρου ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δ’ εἶναι διαφοράς, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἂρχομένων. καὶ τούτο εὐθὺς υφίγηται περὶ τὴν 6 5 ψυχῆν ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἂρχον τὸ δ’ ἂρχόμενον, ὅν ἐτέραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἂρετήν, οἷον τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἄλογου. δὴ λοιπὸν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε φύσει τὰ πλείω ἂρχοντα καὶ ἂρχόμενα· ἄλλοι γὰρ τρὸπον τὸ ἑλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου 7 τὸ ἂρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ βήλεος καὶ ἀνήρ παιδὸς· καὶ πάσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ’ ἐνυπάρχει δια-φέροντος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θήλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ’ ἄκυρουν, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ’ ἀτελές. ὁμοίως τοῖνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς 8 15 ἡθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ’ ὅσον ἔκαστο πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸν ἔργον. διὸ τῶν μὲν ἂρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεὶ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετήν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἂρχιτέκτων, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἂρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἔκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει 20 αὐτοῖς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡθικὴ ἂρετή τῶν εἰρημένων 9 πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ σοφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ’ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾠτο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ’ ἢ μὲν ἂρχικὴ ἀνδρία, ἢ δ’ υπηρετική. ὁμοίως δ’ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δὴ λοιπὸν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον 10 25 ἐπισκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατώσιν ἑαυτούς, ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἂρετή, τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι
τῶν τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ ἀμείων λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες
11 τᾶς ἁρετᾶς, ὡσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὀριζομένων. διδ δὲι, ὡσπερ ὁ ποιητὴς εἰρήκε περὶ γυναικὸς, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων, "γυναικὴ κόσμον ἢ σιγὴ φέρει," ἀλλ’ ἁνδρὶ 30 οὐκέτι τοῦτο. ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ παῖς ἀτελής, δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτον μὲν καὶ ἡ ἁρετὴ οὐκ αὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος
12 καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δούλου πρὸς δεσπότην. ἐθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τάναγκαια χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δούλου, ὡστε δηλον δητ’ καὶ ἁρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὁπως μιτὲ 35 δι’ ἀκολασίαν μῆτε διὰ δειλιὰν ἐλλείψη τῶν ἐργῶν: ἀπορησεὶ δ’ ἄν τις, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἀληθὲς, ἀρα καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας δεῖσει ἔχειν ἁρετῆν· πολλάκις γὰρ δ’ ἀκολασίαν
13 ἐλλείπουσι τῶν ἐργῶν. ἦ διαφέρει τοῦτο πλείστου; ὁ μὲν γὰρ δούλος κοινῶνος ᾑωῆς, ὁ δὲ πορρότερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπὶ- 40 βάλλει ἁρετῆς ὅσον περ καὶ δουλείας. ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχνίτης ἀφορισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν· καὶ ὁ μὲν δούλος 1260 b τῶν φύσει, σκυτοτόμος δ’ οὕδεις, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν.
14 φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἁρετῆς αἴτιον εἶναι δεὶ τὸ δούλο τῶν δεσπότην, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἐργῶν δεσποτικὴν. διδ λέγουσιν ὁυ καλῶν οἱ λόγου τοὺς δοῦ- 5 λους ἀποστεροῦντες καὶ φᾶσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρήσια μόνων νουθετητέον γὰρ μάλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παίδας.
15 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσαθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· περὶ δ’ ἁνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρός, τῆς τε περὶ ἐκαστον αὐτῶν ἁρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφάς αὐτῶς ὀμιλίας, 10 τὶ τὸ καλὸς καὶ μὴ καλῶς εἶστι, καὶ πῶς δεὶ τὸ μὲν εὐ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαίον ἐπελθεῖν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πᾶσα μέρος πόλεως, ταῦτα δ’ οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλον δεὶ βλέπειν ἁρετῆν, ἀναγκαίον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παι- 15 δεῦειν καὶ τοὺς παίδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, εἰπερ τι διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαίαν καὶ τοὺς παίδας εἶναι σπουδαίους
16 καὶ τὰς γυναίκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαίον δὲ διαφέρειν· αἱ μὲν
γάρ γυναίκες ἤμισυ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παίδων οἱ
κοινωνοὶ γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ἀφ' ἐπεὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων
διώκονται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἄλλοις λεκτέων, ἀφέντες ὡς
tέλος ἐχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἀλλὰν ἀρχήν ποιησάμενοι
λέγομεν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφημαμένων
περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης.

'Επεὶ δὲ προαιρούμεθα θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς
πολιτικῆς, τῆς κρατιστῆς πασῶν τοῖς δυναμένοις ζῆν ὅτι μάλι-
στα καὶ εὐχήν, δεὶ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψεως πολι-
τείας, αἱ τε χρώνται τινὲς τῶν πόλεων τῶν εὐνομεῖσθαι
λεγομένων, κἂν εἰ τινὲς ἔτεραι τυγχάνωσιν ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρη-
μέναι καὶ δοκοῦσαι καλῶς ἔχειν, ἵνα τὸ τ' ὀρθῶς ἔχων ὀρθὴ
cαὶ τὸ χρήσιμον, ἐτὶ δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτάς ἔτερον μὴ
dοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφότερος βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ
καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχοῦσας, διὰ τούτο ταύτην
dοκῶμεν ἐπιβαλεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον. ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιη-
tέον ἣπερ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη
gάρ ἦτοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας, ἢ μηδενός,
ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ μὴ. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδενὸς κοινωνεῖν φα-
νερον ὡς ἄδυνατον. ἢ γάρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τίς ἑστι, καὶ
πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν' ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἰς ὁ τῆς
καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχοῦσας, διὰ τούτο ταύτην
dοκῶμεν ἐπιβαλεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον. ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιη-
tέον ἦπερ πέφυκεν ἀρχὴ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη
gάρ ἦτοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας, ἢ μηδενός,
ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυ-
νακῶν καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλοις, ὡς-
pερ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος: ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ Ἰωκράτης
φησὶ δεῖν κοινὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας εἶναι καὶ τὰς
κτήσεις. τούτῳ δὲ πότερον ὡς νῦν οὕτω βέλτιον ἔχειν, ἢ κατὰ
2 τοῖς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ γεγραμμένον νῦμον; ἐκεῖ δὲ δυσχερεῖσα...
άλλας τε πολλᾶς τὸ πάντων εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας κοινᾶς, ἵκαι δὲ ἡ αἰτία φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετήσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ φαίνεται συμβαίνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων· ἐτὶ δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ὁ φησί τῇ πόλει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὡς μὲν εἰρή- 
2 ταῖς νῦν, ἄδυνατον, πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελεῖν, οὐδὲν διώρισται. Λέγω
δὲ τὸ μίαν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὡς ἀριστον ὅν ὅτι μάλιστα πάσαν· 15
λαμβάνει γὰρ ταῦταν ὑπόθεσιν ὁ Σωκράτης. καίτοι φανε-
ρῶν ἐστιν ὡς προϊόσα καὶ γινομένη μία μᾶλλον οὐδὲ πόλις
ἔσται· πλῆθος γὰρ τὶ τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, γινομένη τε
μία μᾶλλον οἰκία μὲν ἐκ πόλεως, ἀνθρώποι δὲ ἐξ οἰκίας
ἔσται· μᾶλλον γὰρ μίαν τὴν οἰκίαν τῆς πόλεως φαίημεν ἃν, 20
καὶ τὸν ἐνα τῆς οἰκίας· ὡστ' εἰ καὶ δυνατός τις εἰπὲ τοῦτο
3 δράν, οὐ ποιητέον' ἀναρίθησε γὰρ τὴν πόλιν. οὐ μόνον δ' ἐκ
πλειώνον ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ εἰδεὶ δια-
φερόντων· οὐ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὀμοίων. ἔτερον γὰρ συμ-
μαχία καὶ πόλις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῷ ποσῷ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἃ
tὸ αὐτὸ τῷ εἰδεί (βοσθείας γὰρ χάριν ἡ συμμαχία πέφυ-
κεν), ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ σταθμὸς πλειών ἡ ἐλκύση· διοίσει δὲ τῷ
tοιότῳ καὶ πόλις ἔθνους, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κάμας ὤσει κεχωρί-
σμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οἷον Ἀρκάδες· ἐξ ὃν δὲ δεῖ ἐν
4 γενέσθαι, εἰδεὶ διαφέρει. διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς 30
σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡδικοῖς εἰρήται πρότερον·
ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλευθεροῖς καὶ ἐσοφανείᾳ τούτῳ εἶναι· ἁμα
gὰρ οὐχ οἶον τε πάντας ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἡ κατ' ἐναυτὸν ἡ
5 κατὰ τινα ἄλλην τάξιν ἡ χρόνον. καὶ συμβάινει δὴ τὸν
tρόπον τοῦτον ὅστε πάντας ἄρχειν, ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ μετέβαλλον 35
οἱ σκυτείς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ σκυτοτόμοι
καὶ τέκτονες ἰσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ βέλτιον οὖν ἐχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ
tὴν κοινωνίαν τὴν πολιτικὴν, δὴ λοιπὸν ὡς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπα
βέλη
tιον ἄρχειν, εἰ δυνάτων· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνάτων διὰ τὸ τὴν
φύσιν ἴσους εἶναι πάντας,(ἀμα δὲ καὶ δίκαιον, ἐτὶ ἀγαθὸν 1261 b
εἴτε φαιλοῦν τὸ ἄρχειν, πάντας αὐτοῦ μετέχειν, ἃ τοῦτο δὲ
μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἴσους εἰκεῖν τὸ δ' ὡς ὀμοίως εἶναι εἰ.
ἀρχής ἢ: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχουσιν οἱ δὲ ἀρχονταὶ κατὰ μέρος, 7 ὥσπερ ἄν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι. καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων ἑτέρου ἐτέρας ἀρχουσιν ἀρχάς. φανερὸν τούνν ἐκ τούτων ὡς οὐτε πέφυκε μιᾶν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὥσπερ λέγουσι τινες, καὶ τὸ λεγένθ' ὥς μέγιστον ἄγαθον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅτι τὰς πόλεις ἀναρεῖ· καίτοι τὸ γε ἐκάστου ἄγαθον σώζει ἐκαστον. 10 ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ λίαν ἐνοῦν ἥ- 8 τεῖν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἁμείνον. οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκήστερ- ρον ἐνός, πόλος δ’ οἰκίας καὶ βουλεταὶ γ’ ἡδὶ τὸν’ εἶναι πό- λις, ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίνῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους. εἰτερ οὖν αἱρετῶτερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἢπτον ἐν τοῦ 15 μᾶλλον ἀἱρετῶτερον.

3 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὖθ’ εἰ τοῦτο ἀριστῶν ἔστι, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μά- λιστ’ εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὐδ’ τοῦτο ἀποδείκνυσθαι φαίνεται κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πάντες ἀμα λέγωσι τὸ ἔμω καὶ τὸ μή ἐμὸν. τοῦτο γὰρ οἴεται ὁ Σωκράτης σημείου εἶναι τοῦ τῆν 20 πόλιν τελέως εἶναι μίαν. τὸ γὰρ πάντες διττὸν. εἰ μὲν οὖν 2 ὡς ἐκαστος, τάχ’ ἀν εἰ σ’ μᾶλλον δ’ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σω- κράτης, ἐκαστος γὰρ ὑδ’ ἐαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυ- ναίκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου δὴ τῶν συμβαίνοντων ωσάυτως. νῦν δ’ οὐχ οὕτω φῆσονσιν οἱ 25 κοιναὶς χρώμενοι ταῖς γυναιξί καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάν- τες μὲν, οὐχ’ ὡς ἐκαστος δ’ αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δ’ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν 3 πάντες μὲν, οὐχ’ ὡς ἐκαστος δ’ αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοῖν παρα- λογισμὸς τίς ἔστι τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερὸν· τὸ γὰρ πάν- τες καὶ ἀμφότερα καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διττὸν καὶ 30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐρωτικοὺς ποιεῖ συναλλογισμοῦ. διό εἶστι τὸ πάν- τας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὡδ’ μὲν καλὸν, ἀλλ’ οὐ δυνατὸν, ὡδ’ δ’ ὀυδὲν ὁμονοιτικὸν πρὸς δὲ τοῦτος ἐτέραν ἔχει βλάβην τὸ 4 λεγόμενον. ἥκιστα, γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυγχάνει τὸ πλεῖστον κοινὸν· τῶν γὰρ ἰδίων· μάλιστα φροντίζουσι, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν 35 ἢπτον, ὡς ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει: πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς ἑτέρον φροντίζουσι οἶκωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκε-
τικαίς διακοινιαίσ ὑπολοιθέντες ἔνιστε χεῖρον ὑπηρε-
5 τοὺς τῶν ἑλληνῶν. γίνονται δ' ἐκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν
υἱόι, καὶ οὕτωι οὐχ ὡς ἐκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχῶν
ὄμοιος ἑστὶν υἱός: ὥστε πάντες ὁμοίως ὁλιγορήσουσιν. ἐτὶ 1262 α
οὕτως ἐκαστῶς ἔμοι λέγει τὸν εὗ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ
κακῶς, ὅποστος τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμόν, οὖν ἐμὸς ἡ τοῦ δεῖνος,
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγον καθ’ ἐκαστῶν τῶν χιλίων, ἡ ὀσων
ἡ πόλις ἑστὶ, καὶ τούτῳ διατάξων ἀδὴλω γὰρ ὁ συνεβῆ γενέ-
6 οὗ τέκνῳ καὶ σωθήναι γενόμενον. καίτοι πότερον οὕτω
κρείττον τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν ἐκαστὸ τὸν αὐτὸ μὲν προσαγορεύον-
tας δισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων, ἡ μᾶλλον ὡς νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
7 τὸ ἐμὸν λέγουσιν; ὁ μὲν γὰρ υἱόν αὐτοῦ ὁ δ’ ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ
προσαγορεύει τὸν αὐτὸν, ὁ δ’ ἀνεψιός, ἡ κατ’ ἄλλην τινὰ 10
συγγένειαν, ἡ πρὸς αὐτόν, ἡ κατ’ οἰκείοτητα καὶ κηδείαν
αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἡ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτερον φράτορα
φυλέτην κρείττον γὰρ ἰδίον ἀνεψιόν εἶναι ἡ τὸν ἐκαστὸν
τοῦ υἱόν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλα οὔδε διαφυγεῖν δυνατὸν τὸ μὴ τινὰ
ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐαυτῶν ἀδελφοὺς τε καὶ παιδὰς καὶ πατέρας 15
καὶ μητέρας, κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὀμοιότητας αἱ γίνονται τοῖς
tέκνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας, ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ
9 ἄλληλῶν τὰς πίστεις. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν
tῶν τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων εἶναι γὰρ τοῖς
tῶν ἀνὸς Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα 20
τέκνα διαφερέσθαι κατὰ τὰς ὀμοιότητας. εἰς δὲ τίνες καὶ
gυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γῆς, οἱνὸν ὕπποι καὶ βόης, αἱ
σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὁμοία ἀποδίδοναι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῖσιν,
ὡσπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ κληθείσα Δικαία ὑπόσ. ἐτὶ δὲ 4
καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσχερείας οὐ ράδιον εὐλαβηθῆναι τοῖς 25
tαύτην κατασκευάζουσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἱνὸν αἰκίας καὶ φόνους
ἀκόουσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἐκοινόσιν, καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιδορίας. ὃν
οὐδὲν οἰσίν ἐστὶ γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς
μὴ πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὄντας, ὡσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπόθεν
ἀλλὰ καὶ πλεῖὸν συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀγνοοῦντων ἡ γνω- 30
πρόσοντων, καὶ γενομένων τῶν μὲν γνωριζόντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς
νομιζομένας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν. ἀτοπον δὲ 2
καὶ τὸ κοινὸς ποιήσαντα τοὺς υἱοὺς τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον ἀφε-
λεῖν τῶν ἐρωτῶν, τὸ δ’ ἐράν μὴ κωλύσαι, μηδὲ τὰς χρή-
35 σεις τὰς ἄλλας, ὅσ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν εἶναι πάντων ἔστιν
ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς ἀδελφὸν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐράν
μοὺν. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὴν συνυσιάν ἀφελεῖν δι’ ἄλλην 3
μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν, ὡς λιῶν δὲ ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ἱδονῆς γνω-
μένης· ὅτι δ’ ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἦ υἱὸς, οἱ δ’ ἀδελφοὶ ἀλλήλων,
40 μηδὲν οἴεσθαι διαφέρειν. ἐνοικε δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς 4
εἶναι χρῆσιμον τὸ κοινὸς εἶναι τὰς γνυαίκας καὶ τοὺς παῖ-
1262 b
dας ἢ τοῖς φίλαξιν· θητον γὰρ ἐσται φιλία κοινών ὄντων
τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, δει δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρ-
χιμένους πρὸς τὸ πείδαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτέριζειν. ὅλως δὲ 5
συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τούνατιν διὰ τὸν τοιούτον νόμον ὅν
5 προσήκει τοὺς ὤρθους κειμένους νόμους αἰτίους γίνεσθαι, καὶ
dι’ ἥν αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἴετα δειν τάττειν τὰ περὶ
tὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας· φιλίαν τε γὰρ οἰόμεθα μέγιστον 6
εἶναι τῶν ἁγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οὕτω γὰρ ἄν ἡκιστα στασιά-
ζοιεν), καὶ τὸ μέν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἑπαίνει μάλιστ’ ὁ Σω-
10 κράτης· δ’ καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεινος εἶναι φησὶ τῆς φιλίας ἐργοῦ,
καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἠσμέν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀρι-
στοφάνην ὡς τῶν ἐρωτῶν διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμοῦν-
tων συμφθηῖναι καὶ γενεῖσθαι ἐκ δῶν ὅτι ἀμφιτεροὺς ἕνα,
ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφιτερός ἐφθάσαι ἦ τὸν ἔνα’ ἐν
7
15 δὲ τῇ πόλει τὴν φιλίαν ἀναγκαίον ὑδάρη γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν
κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἡκιστα λέγειν τὸν ἐμὸν ἦ νοῦν
πατέρα ἦ πατέρα νοῦν. ὡσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν γλυκὸ εἰς πολὺ 8
ὕδωρ μιχθὲν ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τὴν κράσιν, οὕτω συμβαίνει
καὶ τὴν οἰκείοτητα τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄνομά-
20 τῶν τούτων, διαφοροῦσιν ἡκιστὰ ἀναγκαίον ὅν ἐν τῇ πολι-
teίᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ, ἦ πατέρα ὡς νοῦν ἦ νοῦν ὡς πατρός, ἦ ὡς
ἀδελφοὺς ἀλλήλων. δύο γὰρ ἐστίν ἡ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι ἦ
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τό τε ἰδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητὸν. ὁν
οὐδέτερον οίον τε ὑπάρχειν τοῖς οὕτω πολιτευομένοις. ἀλλὰ
μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γινόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν
γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δ’ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκεῖνος, πολλὴν ἐχει ταραχὴν, τίνα ἐσται τρόπον
καὶ γινώσκειν ἀναγκαίον τοὺς διδόντας καὶ μεταφέροντας

10 τίσι τίνας διδάσκειν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα μᾶλλον
ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖον συμβαῖνειν, οἶον αἰκίας ἑρωτας φόνους. 30
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσαγορεύονσιν ἄδειφοι καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας
καὶ μητέρας τοὺς φύλακας οἱ τε εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας δο-
θέντες καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξι τοὺς ἄλλους πο-
λίτας, ὡστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν
συγγενείαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς 35
γυναίκας κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τῶν τρόπων τούτων.

'Εχόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτή-

5 σεως, τίνα τρόπον δὲν κατασκευάζεσθαι τοῖς μέλλουσι πολι-
τευθεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινῆς ἢ μη κοινῆς

2 εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν. τούτῳ δ’ ἂν τις καὶ χωρίς σκέψασθαι ἀπὸ 40

τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας νενομοθετημένων, λέγω

δὲ τα περὶ τὴν κτήσιν πότερον κἂν ἢ ἐκείνα χωρίς, καθ’

ἐν νῦν τρόπον ἐξεῖ πάσι, τὰς τε κτήσεις κοινὲς εἶναι βέλ-

τιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις, οἶον τὰ μὲν γῆπεδα χωρίς, τοὺς δὲ

καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκειν (ὅπερ ἐνια ποιεῖ

τῶν ἐθνῶν), ἢ τονυντίον τὴν μὲν γῆν κοινῆν εἶναι καὶ γεωρ-

γεῖν κοινῆ, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς διαρείσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἱδίας χρή-

σεις (λέγονται δὲ τῖνες καὶ τούτων τῶν τρόπων κοινωνίων τῶν

3 βαρβάρων), ἢ καὶ τὰ γῆπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινοὺς. ἐτέ-

ρων μὲν οὖν οὖν τῶν γεωργοῦντων, ἄλλος ἄν εἰ τρόπος καὶ

ῥάων, αὐτῶν δ’ αὐτῶς διαπονοῦντων τα περὶ τὰς κτήσεις 10

πλείους ἄν παρέξοι δυσκολίας καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεις

καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις μὴ γινομένων ἵπτον ἀναγκαῖον ἐγκλή-

ματα γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύοντας μὲν [ἢ λαμβάνοντας]

πολλά, ὅλιγα δὲ ποιοῦντας, τοῖς ἐλάττῳ μὲν λαμβάνονσι,
15 πλείω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ συζήν καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀν-4 
θρωπικῶν πάντων χαλεπῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων. 
δηλοῦσι δ’ αἱ τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωνίας σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ 
πλείστοι διαφερόμενοι ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ καὶ ἐκ μικρῶν προσ-
κρούντως ἀλλήλως. ἐτί δὲ τῶν θεραπότων τούτως μάλιστα 
20 προσκρούμεν, οἷς πλείστα προσχρόμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακοινίας 
τὰς ἐγκυκλίους. τὸ μὲν οὖν κοινᾶς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταῦτα 5 
te καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας ἔχει δυσχερείας, ὅν δὲ νῦν τρόπων 
ἔχει καὶ ἐπικοσμηθὲν ἥθες καὶ τάξις νόμων ὀρθῶν, οὐ μι-
kρόν ἀν διενέγκαι: ἔξει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀγαθῶν. 
25 λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινᾶς εἶναι τὰς κτή-
σεις καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἱδίας. δεῖ γὰρ πῶς μὲν εἶναι κοινᾶς, ὅλως 
d’ ἱδίας· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἑπιμέλειαι διηρημέναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα 
6 πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιησοῦσιν, μάλλον δὲ ἐπιδίωσον ὡς πρὸς 
ἱδίον ἐκάστου προσδερεύοντος· δὲ ἀρετὴν δ’ ἐσταὶ πρὸς τὸ χρῆ-
30 σθαι κατὰ τὴν παρομοίαν κοινὰ τὰ φιλῶν. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν 
tὸν τρόπον τούτον ἐν ἑνίας πόλεσιν οὕτως ὑπογεγραμμένοι 
ὡς οὐκ ὃν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλῶς οἰκομέναι 
tὰ μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ γένοιτ’ ἀν’ ἱδίαι γὰρ ἐκάστος τὴν κτήσιν 7 
ἐχον τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φιλοῖς, τοῖς δὲ χρήσι 
35 κοινοῖς, οἷον καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδαιμίοι τοῖς τε δούλοις χρῶνται 
tois ἀλλήλων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἰδίοις, ἔτι δ’ ἐπιποιεῖ καὶ κυσίν, καὶ 
δεηθῆσαι ἑφοδιῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερῶν 8 
tοῦν ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἱδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρῆ-
σει ποιεῖν κοινάς· ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου 
40 τοῦτ’ ἔργον ἱδίον ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονῆν ἀμύθητον ὅσον 
diaφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἱδίον τι’ μὴ γὰρ οὐ μάτην τὴν πρὸς 
1263 b αὐτῶν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἐκάστος, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ τοῦτο φυσικῶν, 
tὸ δὲ φιλαυτὸν εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ 9 
φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ 
καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσί γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν 
5 ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ 
βοηθῆσαι φίλοις ἢ ἐνοῖς ἢ ἐταίροις ἴδιστον· δ’ γίνεται τῆς
10 κτήσεως ἵδιας οὕτης. ταυτά τε δή οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς λίαν ἐν ποιούσι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναιροῦσιν ἐργα δυοῖν ἀρεταῖν φανερῶς, σωφροσύνης μὲν τὸ περὶ τᾶς γυναίκας (ἐργον γάρ καλὸν ἀλλοτρία οὕτης ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ σωφρο-
σύνης), ἐλευθερίτητος δὲ τὸ περὶ τᾶς κτήσεις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐστιν φανερὸς ἐλευθερίος ὁν, οὔτε πράξει πράξιν ἐλευθερίου οὐδε-
μιαν. ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίτη-
τος ἐργὸν ἐστίν.

11 Ἐνπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάν-15 ἥρωπος ἀν εἶναι δόξειν· ὁ γὰρ ἀκροώμενος ἀσμένος ἀποδέ-
χεται, νομίζων ἐσεσθαί φιλίαν τινα θαυμαστὴν πάσι πρὸς ἀπαντᾶς, ἄλλα τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορῇ τις τῶν νῦν ὑπαρ-
χόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γινομένων διὰ τὸ μή κοινῆν εἶναι τῷ οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκας τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους 20 
περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυρίων κρίσεις καὶ πλούσιων

12 κολακείας· ὅν οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνίαν ἀλλὰ 
διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοι-

13 μένους ἵδια τὰς κτήσεις. ἐτὶ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ μόνον λέγειν 
ὁσον στερήσονται κακῶν κοινωνίσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσον ἁγαθῶν 
φαίνεται δ' εἶναι πάμπαν ἀδύνατος ὁ βίος, αἴτιον 

14 σιν οὐκ οὕταν ὀρθὴν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πως μίαν καὶ τὴν 
οἰκίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὔ πάντως. ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ὡς οὐκ 

15 ἀλλὰ δεῖ πλῆθος ὁν, ὡσπέρ εἰρηται πρότερον, διὰ τὴν παι-

16 δείαν κοινῆν καὶ μίαν ποιεῖν· καὶ τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν 

17 καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἐσεσθαί τὴν πόλιν σπου-

18 δαίαν, ἄτοπον τοῖς τοιούτοις οἰεσθαί διορθοῦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς
40 ἐθεσὶ καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὡσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συσσιτίοις ὁ
1264 α νομοθέτης ἐκοίμωσεν. δεί δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἄγνοειν, ὅτι χρῆ 16
προοέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν, ἐν οἷς
οὐκ ἄν ἐλαθεν εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς εἶχεν· πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν
ἔρχηται μέν, ἄλλα τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοῖς δὲ οὐ χρῶνται
5 γινώσκοντες. μάλιστα δ΄ ἂν γένοιτο φανερῶν, εἰ τις τοῖς ἑρ-17
γοις ἱδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην· οὐ γὰρ
δυνήσεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιήσα τὴν πό-
λιν, τὰ μὲν εἰς συσσίτια, τὰ δὲ εἰς φρατρίας καὶ φυλάς,
ὅστε οὐδὲν ἄλλο συμβῆσαι νενομοθετημένον πλῆν μὴ γεωρ-
10 γεῖν τοὺς φύλακας· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπι-
χειροῦσιν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλῳ οὔδε ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὁλῆς πολιτείας τίς 18
ἔσται τοῖς κοινονοῦσιν, οὔτ' εἶρηκεν ὁ Σωκράτης οὔτε ῥάδιον
eiπείν. καίτοι σχεδὸν τὸ γε πλήθος τῆς πόλεως τὸ τῶν ἄλ-
λων πολιτῶν γίνεται πλῆθος, περὶ δὲ οὐδὲν διώρισται, πότε-15
ρον καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς κοινὰς εἰναι δεὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἦ καὶ
καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἰδίας, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ γυναίκας καὶ παιδας ἰδίωσ
ἡ κοινούς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κοινὰ πάντα πάν-19
των, τί διοίσουσιν οὗτοι ἐκείνων τῶν φύλακῶν· ἡ τί πλείων
τοῖς ὑπομένουσι τὴν ἄρχην αὐτῶν· ἡ τί μαθῶντες ὑπομένουσι
20 τὴν ἄρχην, εἰάν μη τι σοφίζωνται τοιουτὸν οἴον Ἐρητῆς;
ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ τάλλα ταύτα τοῖς δούλοις ἐφέντες μόνον ἀπει-
ρήκασι τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὁπλών κτήσιν. εἰ δὲ, κα-20
θάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι, καὶ παρ' ἐκείνοις ἔσται τὰ
τοιαύτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς κοινωνίας; ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πό-
25 λεί δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι, καὶ ταύτας ὑπεναντίας
ἄλληλαις· ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἴον φρουροὺς, τοὺς δὲ
γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. ἐγκλη-21
ματὰ δὲ καὶ δίκαια, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν
φησὶ κακά, πάνθ᾽ ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις. καίτοι λέγει ὁ Ὁω-
30 κράτης ὡς οὐ πολλῶν δεῖσονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παιδείαν,
οἶν ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορανομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
22 τοιούτων, ἀποδιδόν μόνον τὴν παιδείαν τοῖς φιλάξιν. ἐτὶ δὲ κυρίους ποιεῖ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς γεωργούς ἀποφοράν ἕρεσις. ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι χαλεποὺς καὶ φρονημάτων πλήρεις ἢ τὰς παρ' ἐνίοις εἰλικτείας τε καὶ πενετείας 35

23 καὶ δουλείας. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἴτ' ἀναγκαία ταύτ' ὁμοίως εἰτε μή, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διάφρασται, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων, τίς ἢ τούτων τε πολιτείᾳ καὶ παιδείᾳ καὶ νόμοι τίνες. ἐστι δ' οὕτε εὑρεῖν ῥάδιον, οὕτε τὸ διαφέρον μικρόν, τὸ ποιοῦσι τινὰς εἶναι

21 τούτων πρὸς τὸ σώζεσθαι τὴν τῶν φιλάκων κοινωνίαν. ἀλλὰ 40 μὴν εἰ γε τὰς μὲν γυναίκας ποιήσεις κοινὰς τὰς δὲ κτήσεις ἱδίας, τίς οἰκονομήσει ὡσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτῶν, κἂν εἰ κοινὰς αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναίκες; ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιήσεις τὴν παραβολὴν, ὡς δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηθεὶνες τὰς γυναίκας τοῖς ἄνδρασιν, οὶς οἰκονομίας οὐδέν μέσετιν. ἐπίσφαλες δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ὡς καθίστησιν ὁ Σωκράτης: ἀεὶ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀρχοντας, τότε δὲ στάσεως αἰτίων γίνεται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μηδὲν ἄξιωμα κεκτημέοις, ἠποθεῖν δὴ παρὰ γε θυ- 26 μοιεῖται καὶ πολεμικὸς ἀνδράσις. ὅτι δ' ἀναγκαίον αὐτῷ τοῖς ποιεῖται καὶ ἀναγκαίον, φανερόν οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἄλλοις ὀτὲ δὲ ἄλλοισ μέμικται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυσός, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. φησί δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὔθυς γινομένοις μιξαὶ χρυσῶν, τοῖς δ' ἀργυροῖς, χαλκῶν δὲ καὶ σίδηρον

27 τοῖς τεχνίταις μέλλουσι ἐσεσθαι καὶ γεωργοῖς. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ 15 τὴν εὐθαμονίαν ἀφαιρούμενοι τῶν φιλάκων, ὅλην φησὶ δεῖν εὐθαμονίαν ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τῶν νομοθέτην. ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐθαμονίαν ὅλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἢ τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐθαμονίαν. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐθαμονίαν δώσει τὸ ἀρτιόν· τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ ἐνδεχέσθαι τῷ ὀλίγῳ ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν ἑπτάετερῳ, τὸ δὲ εὐθαμονίαν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φιλάκες μὴ εὐθαμονίους, τίνες ἐτεροί; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἱ γε τεχνίται καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν βαναύσων. ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτείᾳ περὶ ἢς ὁ Σωκράτης εἰρηκεν,
25 ταύτας τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τούτων ὡς ἐλάττους ἐτέρας·

6 Σχεδον δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ περὶ τοὺς "νόμους" ἔχει τοὺς ὑστερον γραφέντας· διὸ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι μικρὰ βέλτιον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ ὀλίγων πάμπαν διάωρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, περὶ τε γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἔχειν δεὶ, καὶ περὶ κτήσεως, καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὴν τάξιν· διαιρεῖται γὰρ εἰς δύο μέρη τὸ 2 πλῆθος τῶν οἰκούντων, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργοὺς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ προπολεμοῦν μέρος, τρίτον δὲ ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ κύριον τῆς πόλεως· περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν, 3

35 πότερον οὐδεμιὰς ἡ μετέχουσι τίνος ἁρχῆς, καὶ πότερον ὅπλα δεὶ κεκτήσαται καὶ τούτως καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἡ μῆ, περὶ τούτων οὐδὲν διάωρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γυναικάς οἴεται δεῦν συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς τοῖς φύλαξιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τοῖς ἐξόθεν λόγοις πεπλήρωκεν

40 τὸν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, ποίαν τινὰ δεὶ γίνεσθαι 1265 α τῶν φυλάκων. τῶν δὲ "νόμων" τὸ μὲν πλείστον μέρος νόμοι 4 ὅπλα τυγχάνουσιν δυτες, ὅλιγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἰρηκέν, καὶ ταύτῃ βουλόμενος κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεις, κατὰ μικρῶν περιάγει πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἐτέραν πολιτείαν· ἔξω γὰρ 5 τῆς τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τὰ ἄλλα ταύτα ἀποδίδοσθαι ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς πολιτείασ· καὶ γὰρ παιδείαν τὴν αὐτῆς, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπεχωμένους ζῇ, καὶ περὶ συσσίτων ὡσαύτως· πλήν ἐν ταύτῃ φησὶ δεῖν εἶναι συσσίτια καὶ γυναικών, καὶ τὴν μὲν χιλίων τῶν ὅπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτην δὲ πεντακυσχιλίων. τὸ μὲν 6 ὅπλον περιττών ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν, καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἵσως χαλεπῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλῆθος δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι χῶρας δεῖσε τοῖς τοσοῦτοις Βασιλείαις ἡ τινος ἀλλης ἀπεράντου τὸ πλῆθος, εἰς ἕς ἀργοὶ πεντακυσχιλίων, δεῖ ποιεῖν ταύτας κοινωνίας καὶ ταύτας κτήσεας.
Ἀπεστάλημεν ἡμεῖς πολλαπλάσιοι, δει μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ’ εὐχήν, μηδὲν μέντοι αὐτοῦν. Λέγεται δ’ ὡς δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην πρὸς δύο βλέποντα τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς τῇ τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἔτι δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖ- 20 ναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιώτατας τόπους, εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν ζῆν βίον πολιτικόν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν αὐτὴν τοιούτως χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὅπλος· ἡ χρήσιμαι κατὰ τὴν 8 ὁικείαν χώραν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξω τόπους, εἰ δὲ τὶς μὴ τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μῆτε τὸν ἔδοξον μῆτε τὸν 25 κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ὁμοι οὐδὲν ἤττον δεῖ φοβερὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολεμίοις, μὴ μῶνων ἠθηοῦσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπελθοῦσιν, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὁρὰν δεῖ, μῆποτε ἔνα βέλτιον ἑτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον, τοσαύτην γὰρ εἰναι φησί δεῖν ὡστε ζῆν σωφρόνως ὡσπερ ἀν εἰ τὸς εἶπεν 30 ὡςτε ζῆν εὗ (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστι καθόλου μᾶλλον· ἔτι δ’ ἐστὶ σω- φρόνως μὲν ταλαιπώρως δε ζῆν). ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὅρος τὸ σωφρόνως καὶ ἑλευθερίως (χωρίς γὰρ ἐκάτερον τὸ μὲν τῷ τρυφῶν ἀκολουθήσει, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἐπιτόνως), ἐπεὶ μόναι γ’ εἰσὶν ἐξεῖς αἱρεται περὶ τὴν τῆς ὦσίας χρῆσιν αὐται, ὅτι τοῖς 35 ὦσίαι πρῶτα ἡ ἀνδρείας χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἐστίν, σωφρόνως δὲ καὶ ἑλευθερίως ἐστίν, ὡστε καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαίως περὶ αὐτὴν 10 εἰναι ταύτας. ἀτοπὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἱσάζοντα τὸ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ’ ἀφεῖναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀφίστον ὡς ικανῶς ἄν ὀμαλισθησομένην ἐφ’ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὀσωροῖν γενομένων, 11 ὅτι δοκεῖ τούτῳ καὶ νῦν συμβαίνειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις. δει δὲ 1265 β 1264 b 25—1265 b 8. 12 τοῦτ’ οὐχ ὀμοίως ἀκριβῶς ἔχειν περὶ τὰς πόλεις τότε καὶ νῦν· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὔτε ἀπορεῖ δίᾳ τὸ μερίζεσθαι τὰς ὦσίας εἰς ὀποσοσοῦν πλῆθος, τότε δὲ|(αδιαίρετων οὐσῶν) ἀνάγκη τοὺς πα- ράξυνας μηδὲν ἔχειν, εάν τε ἐλάττους ὡσὶ τὸ πλῆθος εάν τε 5 12 πλείους. μᾶλλον δὲ δεῖν ὑπολάβοι τις ἄν ὀρίζειν τῆς ὦσίας τὴν τεκνοποιίαν, ὡστε ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς μὴ πλείονα γεννάν· τούτῳ δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἃν 

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συμβαίνη τελευτάν τινὰς τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τήν
10 τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν. τὸ δ' ἀφείσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς 13
πλείσταις πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαῖον αἰτίων γίνεσθαι τοῖς πο-
λίταις, ἢ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργιάν. Φείδων
μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὅν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς
φῶθος ἔσουσ φήθη δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν,
15 καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνύσουσ εἴχον πάντες κατὰ μέ-
γεθος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις τούναντιόν ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ περὶ 14
μὲν τούτων πῶς οἴμηθα βέλτιον ἄν ἔχειν, λεκτέων ὑπερών
ἐλλείποιται δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀρχο-
τας, ὥπως ἐσονται διαφόρουτες τῶν ἀρχομένων· φησὶ γὰρ
20 δεῖν, ὅσπερ εἴτ' ἐπερ ή στημόνων ἑρίων γῆνεται τῆς κράτης,
οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοτας ἐχειν δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. ἐπεὶ 15
δὲ τὴν πάσαν ὀσίαν ἐφίσι γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πεντα-
πλασίας, διὰ τί τοῦτ' οὐκ ἂν εἶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς μέχρι τεῖνος;
καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκισμῶν δὲ διαιρετίαν δεὶ σκοπεῖν, μὴ ποτ' οὐ
25 συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· δῦο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἑκάστορ ἐνεμί-
διέλθων χωρίς, χαλεπὸν δὲ οἰκίας δῦο οἰκεῖν. ἢ δὲ σύνταξις 16
ὅλη βούλεται μὲν εἶναι μῆτε δημοκρατία μῆτε ὀλιγαρχία,
μέση δὲ τούτων, ἢν καλούσι πολιτείαν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὁπλι-
τεύοντων ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευά-
30 ζεῖ ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν, καλὸς εἰρήκεν ἰσὼς,
εἰ δ' ὡς ἀρίστην μετὰ τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, οὐ καλὸς· τάχα
γὰρ τὴν τῶν Δακώνων ἂν τις ἐπαινεσίες μᾶλλον, ἢ κἀν
ἀλλὴν τινὰ ἀριστοκρατικοτέραν. ἔνοικοι μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν ὡς δὲ ι7
tὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐξ ἀπασῶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτείων μεμ-
35 γέμενην, διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων ἐπαινοῦσιν· εἶναι
gὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημο-
κρατίας φασίν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν βασιλεῖαν μοναρχίαν, τὴν
dὲ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ
cατὰ τὴν τῶν ἑφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι τοὺς
40 ἑφόρους· οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἑφορείαν εἶναι τυραννίδα, δημοκρα-
teίσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὰ συσσίτια καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τῶν
1265 b 9—1266 a 33.

18 καθ’ ἡμέραν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἰρήται τούτοις ὡς δέον συν- 1266 a 

κεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννί-

δος, ὡς ἦ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν τις θείη πολιτείας ἢ χειρίστας πασῶν. βέλτιον οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους μιγνύντες· ἡ γὰρ ἐκ πλείους συγκειμένη πολιτεία βέλτιων. ἐπειτα οὐδ’ ἔχουσα 5 

φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐθέν, ἀλλ’ ὀλιγαρχικά καὶ δημοκρα-

τικά· μᾶλλον δ’ ἐγκλίνειν βοῦλεται πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.

19 δὴν δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχόντων καταστάσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχόντων κληρονομοὸν κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν, τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐπορο-

τέροις ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιαζεὶν εἰναι καὶ φέρειν ἀρχοντας 10 

ἡ τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δ’ ἁφεῖσθαι, τούτο τ’ ὀλιγαρχικῷ, καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι πλείους ἐκ τῶν εὐπόρων εἴναι 

τοὺς ἀρχοντας, καὶ τάς μεγίστας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμήμα-

των. ὀλιγαρχικὴν δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἱρεσιν αἱροῦ-

ται μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ πρῶτου τιμή-

ματος, εἰτα πάλιν ἰσοῦς ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἰτ’ ἐκ τῶν τρίτων 

πλὴν οὐ πάσιν ἐπάναγκες ἢν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων, 

ἐκ δὲ [τού τετάρτου] τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρῶ-

15 τοῖς καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις. εἰτ’ ἐκ τούτων ἰσοῦν ἀφ’ ἐκάστου τιμῆ-

ματος ἀποδείξαι φησι δεῖν ἄριθμον. ἐσονται δ’ πλείους οἱ 20 

ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίως διὰ τὸ ἐνίους μὴ 

21 αἱρεῖσθαι τῶν δημοτικῶν διὰ τὸ μή ἐπάναγκες. ὡς μὲν οὖν σὲ 

οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστᾶναι τὴν τοιαύ-

τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φαινέων καὶ τῶν ὑπερόν ῥήθησομέ-

νον, όταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἡ σκέψις. 25 

ἐξει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀἱρεσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἐξ αἱρετῶν 

ἀἱρετοὺς ἐπικινδύνουν· εἰ γὰρ τινες συστήναι θέλουσι καὶ μέτριοι 

τὸ πλῆθος, αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἱρεθήσονται βούλησιν, τὰ 

μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τούτων ἐξει 

τὸν τρόπον· 30 

Ἠλατὶ δὲ τινες πολιτείαι καὶ ἄλλαι, αἱ μὲν ἴδιωτῶν αἱ 7 

dὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν, πάσαι δὲ τῶν καθοστηκυίων 

cαὶ καθ’ ἂς πολιτεύονται ὡς ἐγγύτερον εἰς τούτων ἀμφο-

D 2
τέρων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὐτε τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς
35 γυναικας ἄλλος κεκαινοτόμηκεν, οὐτε περὶ τὰ συνστία τῶν
gυναικῶν, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀρχονταὶ μᾶλλον.
δοκεῖ γὰρ τισὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι μέγιστον τετάχθαι 2
καλῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι φασί τὰς στάσεις πάν-
tας. διὸ Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδόνιος τούτ’ εἰσήνεγκε πρῶτος·
40 φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἵσας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν. τοῦτο 3
1266 b δὲ κατοικιζομέναις μὲν εὐθὺς οὐ χαλεπῶν φέτο ποιεῖν, τὰς
8’ ἤδη κατακοινομένας ἐργωδέστερον μὲν, ὅμοι δὲ τάχιστ’ ἃν
ὁμαλισθῆναι τῷ τὰς προικὰς τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν
λαμβάνειν δὲ μή, τούς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβά-
5 νειν δὲ. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς νόμους γράφων μέχρι μὲν τῖνος 4
φέτο δεῖν ἑαν, πλείον δὲ τοῦ πενταπλασίαν εἶναι τῆς ἐλα-
χίστης μηδενὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξουσίαν εἶναι κτήσασθαι, καθά-
περ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. δεὶ δὲ μὴδὲ τοῦτο λανθάνειν τοὺς 5
οὕτω νομοθετοῦντας, ὁ λανθάνει νῦν, ὅτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάττον-
10 τὰς πλῆθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν τέκνων τὸ πλῆθος τάττειν·
ἐὰν γὰρ ύπεραίρῃ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγεθος ὁ τῶν τέκνων ἀριθ-
μός, ἀνάγκη τὸν γε νόμον λύσθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς λύσεως
φαύλον τὸ πολλοὺς ἐκ πλουσίων γίνεσθαι πένητας· ἔρχον
γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιοῦσ εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. διάτι μὲν οὖν ἔχει 6
15 τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἡ τῆς οὐσίας ὁμα-
λότης, καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινὲς φαίνονται διεγνωκότες, οἶνοι καὶ
Σόλονον ἐνομοθέτησεν, καὶ παρ’ ἄλλοις ἑστὶ νόμος ὅσ κωλύει
κτάσθαι γῆν ὁπόσην ἄν βούληται τις’ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν
οὐσίαν πολεῖν οἱ νόμοι κωλύουσιν, ὡσπερ ἐν Δοκροίς νόμοσ
20 ἑστὶ μὴ πολεῖν, ἑὰν μὴ φανερῶν ἀτυχίαν δειξῇ συμβεβη-
κυίαν· ἐτὶ δὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασώζειν· τούτῳ δὲ λυθὲν 7
καὶ περὶ Δευκάδα δημοτικὴν ἐποίησε λίαν τὴν πολιτείαν
αὐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ ἐτι συνέβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρισμένων τιμημα-
tῶν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν. ἀλλ’ ἑστὶ τὴν ἱσότητα μὲν
25 ὑπάρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταύτῃ δὲ η λίαν εἶναι πολλὴν, ὡστε
τρυφᾶν, ἡ λίαν ὀλέγην, ὡστε ζῆν γλίσχως. δῆλον οὖν ὡς
οὐχ ἰκανὸν τὸ τὰς οὐσίας ἰσας ποιῆσαι τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ 8 τοῦ μέσου στοχαστέον. ἔτε δ’ εἴ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειν οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, οὐδὲν ὄφελος· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας, τούτο δ’ οὐκ ἦστι μὴ παιδευμένοις 30 ἰκανοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ἀλλ’ ἦσως ἄν εἰσειν οἱ Φαλέας ὅτι ταῦτα τυνχάνει λέγων αὐτὸς: οἶτε τὰ δύο τούτων ἱσό- τητα δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, κτήσεως καὶ παιδείας. 9 ἀλλὰ τὴν τε παιδείαν ὅτις ἦσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὕδεν ὄφελος’ εἴτε γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν 35 εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἢ ἣς ἦσονται προαιρετικοὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμ- φοτέρων. ἔτε στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν· τούναντίον δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἄνι- 40 σον, οἱ δὲ χαριέντες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἦν ἦσαι: οἴθεν καὶ “ἐν 1267 α’ 11 δὲ ἡ τιμὴ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἢ δὲ καὶ ἐσθλὸς.” οὐ μόνον δ’ οἱ ἀνθρώποι διὰ τάναγκαία ἀδικοῦσιν, οὕν ἄκος εἶναι νομίζει τὴν ἰσότητα τῆς οὐσίας, ὡστε μὴ λοιποῦτείν διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν ἢ πεινήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ όπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν ἢ αὐτὸς γὰρ μεῖξο ἐξωσιν ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν 12 ταύτης ἐστρέιαν ἀδικήσουσιν’ οὐ τοινῦν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν ἐπιθυμοῦει, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἀνεί λυπῶν ἰδοναις. τί οὐν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὐσία βρα- χεία καὶ ἐργασία, τοῖς δὲ σωφροσύνης· τρίτον δ’, εἴ τινες 10 βούλουσιεν δ’ αὐτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἄν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ 13 φιλοσοφίας ἄκος, αἰ γὰρ ἀλλαί ἀνθρώπων δέονται· ἐπεὶ ἀδικοῦσι γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπέρβολας, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαία, οὐν τυραννοῦσιν οὐχ ἢν μὴ ῥιγῶσιν. διὸ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ μεγάλαι, ἂν ἀποκτείην τις οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ 15 τύραννον. ὡστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοθητικὸς μόνον 14 ὁ τρόπος τής Φαλέου πολιτείας. ἐτί τὰ πολλὰ βούλεται κατασκευάζειν ἢ δὲν τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολιτεύσονται καλῶς, δεὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιώτας καὶ τοὺς ἐξωθεν πάντας.
20 ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν πολιτείαν συντετάχθαι πρὸς τὴν πολεμικὴν ἰσχύν, περὶ ἣς ἐκείνοις οὐδὲν εἰρήκην. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 15 περὶ τῆς κτήσεως: δει γὰρ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς χρήσεις ἰκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἑξωθεὶν κινδύνους. διόπερ οὔτε τοσοῦτον δει πλῆθος ὑπάρχειν ὡς οἱ 25 πληθυντὰς καὶ κρείττους ἐπιθυμήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἔχοντες ἀμύνειν οὐ δυνήσονται τοὺς ἐπιτύνας, οὐθ᾽ οὕτος ὄλγην ὡστε μὴ δύνα- σθαι πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν μηδὲ τῶν ἰσων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. ἐκείνοις μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν διώρικεν, δει δὲ τούτῳ μὴ λανθάνειν, ὅτι 16 συμφέρει πλῆθος οὐσίας. ἦσος οὖν ἀριστὸς ὅρος τὸ μὴ λυσι- 30 τελεῖν τοῖς κρείττοσι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν πολεμεῖν, ἀλλὰ οὔτος ὡς ἀν καὶ μὴ ἔχοντων τοσαύτην οὐσίαν. οὖν Εὐβοι- 17 λος Αἰτωφραδάτου μέλλοντος Ἀταρνέα πολιορκεῖν ἐκέλευ- σεν αὐτὸν, σκεψάμενον ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ λήψεται τὸ χρόνιον, λογίσασθαι τοῦ χρόνου τούτου τὴν διάταξιν ἔθελεν γὰρ 35 ἐλαττὸν τούτου λαβὼν ἐκλειπεῖν ἢδὲ τὸν Ἀταρνέας ταῦτα δ᾽ εἰπὼν ἐποίησε τὸν Ἀὐτωφραδάτην σύννυν γενόμενον παύσασ- θαι τῆς πολιορκίας. ἔστι μὲν οὖν τι τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ 18 τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι ἵσας τοῖς πολίταις πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὖν ὡς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν οἱ 40 χαρίεντες ἀγανακτοῦεν ἃν ὡς οὐκ ἰσων οὔτε ἄξιοι, διὸ καὶ φαίνονται πολλάκις ἐπιτίθεμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες· ἔτι δ᾽ 19 1267 b ἡ ποιηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἅπληστον, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἱκα- νὸν διωβολὴ μόνον, ὅταν δ᾽ ἵδη τοῦτ᾽ ἕν πάτριον, ἀεὶ δὲνται τῶν πλείονος, ἔως εἰς ἀπειρὸν ἐλθοῦσι· ἀπείρους γὰρ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας φύσις, ἢς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ 5 ἤσιν. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἀρχῆς, μάλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὁμα- 20 λίγειν, τὸ τοῦτο μὲν ἐπιτεικεῖς τῇ φύσει τοιοῦτος παρασκευά- ἐσθε ὡστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαίλους ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστιν, ἂν ἦττος τε ὡς καὶ μὴ ἀδικών- ται. οὐ καλῶς δὲ οὔδε τὴν ἀνάστητα τῆς οὐσίας εἰρήκεν· περὶ 21 10 γὰρ τὴν τῆς γῆς κτῆσιν ἵσαζει μόνον, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δοῦλων καὶ βοσκημάτων πλοῦτος καὶ νομίσματος, καὶ κατασκευῇ
τοις καλουμένων ἐπίπλω. ἢ πάντων οὐν τούτων ἴσῳ
22 τητα ζητητέον ἢ τάξιν τινα μετριάν, ἢ πάντα ἐκατέον. φαί
νεται δ' ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζων τήν πόλιν μικράν, εἰ γ' οἱ τεχνίται πάντες δημόσιοι ἐσονται καὶ μὴ ἱ
23 πλήρωμα τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλ' εἰπερ δεὶ δημοσίους εἰναι τοὺς τα κοινα ἐργαζομένους, δεὶ καθαπερ ἐν Ἐπιδάμμω τε, καὶ Διόφαντος ποτε κατεσκευάζεν Ἀθή
νης, τοῦτον ἔχει του τρόπον... περὶ μὲν οὖν τής Φαλέου πολιτείας σχεδὸν ἐκ τούτων ἀν τις θεωρῆσειν, εἰ τι τυγχάνει 20
καλῶς εἴρηκὼς ἡ μὴ καλῶς:

Ἰππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφώντος Μιλήσιος, δὲ καὶ τῆς τῶν 8
πόλεων διαίρεσιν εὑρε καὶ τὸν Πειραιὰ κατέτεμεν, γενόμενος
καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίων περιττότερος διὰ φιλοτιμίαν οὐτῶς ὡστε δοκεῖν ἐνίοις ἡν περιεργοτέρων τριχῶν τε πλήθει καὶ 25
κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ. ἐτι δὲ ἐσθήτοις εὐτελοῖς μὲν ἀλεεινής δὲ
οὐκ ἐν τῷ χειμών μόνον ἅλλα καὶ περὶ τοὺς θερινοὺς χρό
νους, λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὄλην φύσιν εἰναι βουλόμενος, τοῖς
πρῶτοι τῶν μη πολιτευμένων ἐνεχείρησε τι περὶ πολιτείας
2 εἰπειν τῆς ἄριστης. κατεσκευάζε δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῷ πλήθει 30
μὲν μυριάνδρον, εἰς τρία δὲ μέρη διηρημένην ἐποίει γὰρ
ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἐν δὲ γεωργοὺς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προ-
3 πολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὀπλα ἔχον. διήρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη τῆν
χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱερὰν, τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν, τὴν δ' ἱδιὰν ὑδε
μὲν τὰ νομιζόμενα ποιήσουσι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἱεράν, ἅφ' ὑπ' 35
δ' οἱ προπολεμοῦντες βιώσονται, κοινῆν, τήν δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν
4 ἱδιάν. ὥστε δ' εἰδὴ καὶ τῶν νόμον εἰναι τρία μόνον· περὶ
ὁ γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ' εἰναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν,
ὑβριν βλάβην θάνατον. ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν τῷ
κύριον, εἰς δ' πάσας ἀνάγεσθαι δείν τὰς μὴ καλῶς κεκρί-
40 σθαι δοκούσας δίκασ· τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκευάζεν ἐκ τίνων γε-
5 ρώτων αἵρετῶν. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ διὰ 1268 ἀ
ψηφοφορίας ὥστε γίνεσθαι δείν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἐκαστὸν πι-
nάκιον, ἐν δ' γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἀπλῶς τὴν δίκην, εἰ
δ' ἀπολύοι ἀπλῶς, κενὸν· εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μῆ, τούτῳ
5 διορίζειν. νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ὕπεγε νενομοθετησθαι καλὸς· ἀναγκά-
ζειν γὰρ ἐπιορκεῖν ἢ ταῦτα ἢ ταῦτα δικάζοντας. εἴθει δὲ 6
νόμον περὶ τῶν εὐρισκόντων τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον, ὡς
τυγχάνωσι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τε-
λευτῶντων ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τῇ τροφῆν, ὡς οὗτοι τούτο
10 παρ' ἀλλοις νενομοθετημένον' ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθήναις οὕτος
ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέραις τῶν πόλεως. τοὺς δ' ἀρχοντας 7
ἀἱρετοὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου εἶναι πάντας· δήμου δ' ἔποιει τὰ
τρία μέρη τῆς πόλεως· τοὺς δ' ἀἱρεθέντας ἐπιμελείσθαι κοι-
νῶν καὶ ἔξενικών καὶ ὀρφανικών. ἄτα μὲν οὕν πλείστα καὶ
15 τὰ μάλιστα ἄξιόλογα τῆς Ἰσποδάμου τάξεως ταῦτ' ἔστιν,
ἀπορρήσει δ' ἂν τίς πρῶτον μὲν τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ πλῆθους
tῶν πολιτῶν. οὐ τέ γὰρ τεχνίται καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ 8
τὰ ὅπλα ἐχόντες κοινοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες, οἱ μὲν
γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχουσι ὅπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνίται οὔτε γῆν οὔτε ὅπλα,
20 ὡστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὅπλα κεκτημένων. μετ' 9
ἐχεῖν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἀδύνατον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ
τῶν τὰ ὅπλα ἐχώντων καθίστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πο-
λιστοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἀρχὰς ὡς εἰπεῖν· μὴ
μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας πῶς οὖν τε φιλικὸς ἔχειν
25 πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν; ἀλλὰ δὲ κρεῖττος εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὅπλα
γε κεκτημένους ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν· τούτῳ δ' οὐ ρᾷδιον μὴ
πολλοῦς οὖνται· εἰ δὲ τούτ' ἐσται, τί δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους μετέχειν 10
τῆς πολιτείας καὶ κυρίους εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἀρχῶντων καταστά-
σεως· ἔτι οἱ γεωργοὶ τί χρήσιμοι τῇ πόλει· τεχνίται μὲν
30 γὰρ ἀναγκαίοι εἶναι (πάσα γὰρ δεῖται πόλις τεχνιτῶν),
kαὶ δύνανται διαγιγνοσθαι καθαρέρ εἰς ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλε-
σιν ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης· οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζοντες μὲν τοῖς τὰ
ὅπλα κεκτημένοι τῇ τροφῇ εὐλόγως ἃν ἤσαν τι τῆς
πόλεως μέρος, νῦν δ' ἰδίαν ἐχούσιν, καὶ ταύτην ἵδια γεωρ-
35 γήσουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τὴν κοινήν, ἀφ' ὃς οἱ προπολεμοῦντες ἐξουσι 11
τῇ τροφῇ, εἰ μὲν αὐτοῖ γεωργήσουσιν, οὐκ ἂν εἰ ἦ τὸ μᾶ-
χιμων ἔτερον καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν, βούλεται δ' ὁ νομοθέτης· εἰ δ' ἔτεροι τινες ἔσονται τῶν τε ἐδια γεωργοῦντων καὶ τῶν μαχίμων, τέταρτον αὐ μόριον ἔσται τούτο τῆς πόλεως, οὔδε-

καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἴσα ἐστίνας καὶ τους τῆς κοινῆς γεωργοῦντας, τὸ τε πλῆθος ἀπορον ἔσται τῶν καρπῶν ἐξ ὧν ἐκαστός γεωργῆσαι δύο οἰκίας, καὶ τίνος ἐνεκεν οὐκ εὐθὺς 1268 ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων αὐτοῖς τε τῆς τροφῆς λήψεσθαι καὶ τοῖς μαχίμοις παρέδοσιν; ταῦτα δὴ πάντα

13 πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχὴν. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἄξιοι διαιροῦντα τῆς δίκης ἀπλῶς 5 γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τοῦ δικαστῆς διαιτητής. τοῦτο δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείστων ἐνδέχεται (κοινολογοῦνταί· ὁ δὲ
gὰρ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων τούτων τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ παρασκεύαζοντι ὅτως οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ κοινολογοῦντι πρὸς 10

14 ἀλλήλους. ἔσεσται πῶς οὐκ ἔσται ταραχώδης ἡ κρίσις, ὅταν ὀφείλειν οὐκ ἐν δικαστῆς οἴηται, μὴ τοσοῦτον δ' ὡς οὐκ ὁ δι-
kαζόμενος· οὐκ ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰκοσὶ μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρυεὶ δέκα μνᾶς, ἢ οὐκ ἐν μὲν πλέον, ὁ δ' ἔλασσον, ἄλλος δὲ πέντε, ὁ δὲ τέτταρα· καὶ τούτων δὴ τὸν τρόπον δήλου ὅτι μεριοῦ-

15 σιν· οἱ δὲ πάντα καταδικάσουσιν, οἱ δ' οὐδέν. τίς οὖν ὁ τρό-

πος ἔσται τῆς διαλογίης τῶν ψήφων· ἐτὶ δ' οὐδεὶς ἐπιρκεῖν ἀναγκάζει τὸν ἀπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἡ καταδικάσαντα, εἰ-

περ ἀπλῶς τὸ ἐγκλήμα γέγραπται δικαίως; οὐ γὰρ μη-

δὲν ὀφείλειν ὁ ἀποδικάσας κρίνει, ἀλλὰ τὰς εἰκοσὶ μνᾶς· 20 ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἢδη ἐπιρκεῖ ὁ καταδικάσας μὴ νομίζων ὀφεί-

16 λειν τὰς εἰκοσὶ μνᾶς. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὐρύσκουσι τῇ πό-

λεί συμφέρον ὡς δὲι γίνεσθαι τίνα τιμῆν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφα-

λεῖς τὸ νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐφίλαμον ἀκούσαι μόνον· ἔχει
gὰρ συνοικονομία καὶ κυνῆσεις, ἀν τύχῃ, πολιτείας. ἐμ· 25 πίπτει δ' εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἐτέραν ἀποροῦσι
gὰρ τινὲς πότερον βλαβερὸν ἡ συμφέρον ταίς πόλεσι τὸ
κινείν τοὺς πατρίδος νόμους, ἀν ἂν τις ἄλλοι βέλτιον. διόσπερ 17
οὐ ράδιον τῷ λεχθεῖτι ταχὺ συγχωρεῖν, εἴπερ μὴ συμφέ-
30 ρει κινείν. ἐνδέχεται δ' εἰσηγεῖθαι τινας νόμον λύσιν ἡ
πολιτείας ὡς κοινῷ ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποίημεθα μνείαν,
ἐτι μικρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστελλαθαι βέλτιον. ἔχει γάρ, 18
ὡςπερ εἰπομεν, ἀπορίαν, καὶ δόξειν ἄν βέλτιον εἶναι τὸ
κινεῖν' ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τούτῳ συνενήγοχεν,
35 οὖν ιατρικὴ κινηθείσα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστική
cαὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὡστε ἐπεὶ μιὰν
τούτων θετέων καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύτην
ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν,. σημεῖον δ' ἂν γεγονέναι φαίν τις 19
ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἐργῶν' τοὺς γὰρ ἄρχαῖον νόμους λιὰν ἀπλοὺς
40 εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικοῦς' ἐσιδήροφοροῦστο τε γὰρ οἱ Ἑλλη-
νες, καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἑωνοῦντο παρ' ἀλλήλων, ὡσα τε 20
λοιπὰ τῶν ἄρχαίων ἑστὶ πον νομίμων, εὐθής πάμπαν ἑστίν,
1269 α οὖν ἐν Κύμῃ περὶ τὰ φωνικὰ νόμος ἑστίν, ἀν πλῆθος τι
παράσχεται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τὸν φύσιν τῶν αὐτῶν συγ-
γενῶν, ἐνοχὸν εἶναι τὸ φόνῳ τῶν φεύγοντα. ζητοῦσί δὲ 21
ὁλως οὐ τὸ πάτριον ἄλλα τάγαθον πάντες' εἰκὸς τε τοὺς
πρῶτους, εἴτε γγενεῖς ἤσαν εἰτ' ἐκ φθοράς τίνος ἐσώθησαν,
ὁμοίως εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἄνοιτους, ὡςπερ καὶ
λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν, ὡστε ἀτοπον τὸ μένειν ἐν τοῖς
τούτων δόγμασιν. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους εάν
ἀκινήτους βέλτιον. ὡςπερ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, 22
5 καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατον ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφῆ-
ναι καθόλου γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον γραφῆναι, αἱ δὲ πράξεις περὶ
tῶν καθ' ἐκαστὸν εἰσίν. ἐκ μεν οὖν τούτων φανερὸν ὦτι κινη-
tέυοι καὶ τινες καὶ ποτε τῶν νόμων εἰσίν, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον
ἔπισκοποῦν εὐλαβεῖας ἄν δόξειν εἶναι πολλῆς. ὅταν γὰρ 23
15 ἂν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον μικρὸν, τὸ δ' ἐθίζειν εὑχὲρως λύειν τοὺς
νόμους φαίλου, φανερὸν ὡς ἑατέον ἐνίας ἀμαρτίας καὶ τῶν
νομοθετῶν καὶ τῶν ἄρχωντων· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ῥήματα αἰνήσεται
κινήσας, ὥσπερ βλαβῆσεται τοῖς ἀρχουσιν ἀπειθεῖν εὕσεθεις.
24 ψεύδος δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίον τὸ κινεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον, ὁ γὰρ νόμος ἵσχυν 20 οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τούτο δ' οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὡστε τὸ βαθίως με- 
tαβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους
25 καίνοις ἀσθενή ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν. ἔτι δὲ εἰ καὶ κινητεῖος, πότερον πάντες καὶ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἡ 25
οὐ· καὶ πότερον τῷ τυχόντι ή τισίν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἐξεῖ με-
gάλην διαφοράν. διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφώμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν' ἄλλων γὰρ ἐστὶ καιρῶν.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς Δακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας καὶ τῆς Κρη-9 
tικῆς, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείων, δύο εἰσὶν 30 αἱ σκέψεις, μία μὲν εἰ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην νευμονητήτητα τάξιν, ἔτερα δ' εἰ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπό-
θεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς
2 πολιτείας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τῇ μελλοῦσῃ καλῶς πολιτεύ-
εσθαι τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολήν, ὁμολογούμενον 35 ἑστὶν τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ βάθιον λαβεῖν. ἡ τε 
γὰρ Θετταλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θετταλοῖς,
όμοιως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Δάκωσιν οἱ εἶλωτες (ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδ-
3 ρέοντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσιν)· περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρῆτας
οὐδὲν πω τοιούτων συμβεβήκεν· αἰτίων δ' ἵσως τὸ τὰς γειτνίω-40
νας πόλεις, καίπερ πολεμοῦσας ἀλλήλαις, μηδεμίαν εἶναι 1269 b 
σύμμαχον τοῖς ἀφίσταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ
αὐταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους· τοὺς δὲ Δάκωσιν οἱ γειτνίων-
tες ἔχθροι πάντες ἦσαν, Ἀργείοι καὶ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Ἀρ-
kάδες· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς Θετταλοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀφίσταντο διὰ 5
τὸ πολεμεῖν ἔτι τοῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ Περραιβόηι
4 καὶ Μάγνησιν. ἔσοκε δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἔτερον, ἄλλα τὸ γε 
tῆς ἐπιμελείας ἐργαθεῖ εἶναι, τίνα δὲ καὶ πρὸς αὐτῶς ὁμιλή-
sαι τρόπον· ἀνιέμενοι τε γὰρ ύβρίζονται καὶ τῶν ὑσῶν ἀξιού-
sιν ἐαυτοῦς τοῖς κυρίοις, καὶ κακοπαθῶς σώντες ἐπιβουλεύουσι 10
καὶ μισοῦσιν. δὴλον οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐξευρίσκουσι τὸν βέλτιστον
τρόπον, οίς τούτο συμβαίνει περὶ τὴν εἰλιστείαν. ἐτὶ δὲ ἡ 5
περὶ τὰς γυναίκας ἀνεσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πο-
λιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. ὥσπερ γὰρ
15 οἰκίας μέρος ἀνήρ καὶ γυνὴ, δήλον ὅτι καὶ πόλιν ἐγγὺς
τοῦ δίκαι διηρήσθαι δεῖ νομίζειν εἰς τε τὸ τῶν ἄνδρων πλῆ-
θος καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὡστε ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις φαίλως
ἐχεῖ τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναίκας, τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεὶ
νομίζειν ἀνομοθέτητον. ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ συμβέβηκεν· ὅλην γὰρ 6
20 τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι βουλόμενος καρτερικῆς, κατὰ
μὲν τοὺς ἄνδρας φανερός ἐστιν τοιοῦτος ὦν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναι-
κῶν ἔξημέληκεν· ἦλα χαρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἄπασαν ἀκο-
λασίαν καὶ τρυφέρος. ὡστε ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολι—
7 τείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι τὸν πλοῦτον, ἀλλὰς τε κἂν τύχωσι γυναι-
25 κοκρατούμενοι, καθάπερ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ
πολεμικῶν γενῶν, ἐξο Κελτῶν ἢ κἂν εἴ τινες έτεροι φα-
νερὸς τετιμήκασι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας συνουσίαν. ἔοικε 8
γὰρ ὁ μυθολογησάς πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλώγως συζεύξει τοῦ Ἀρη
πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄρρενων ὁμιλίαν
30 ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνοντας κατακώχιμοι πάντες οἱ
τοιοῦτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Δάκωι τοῦθ' ὑπήρχεν, καὶ πολλὰ
διφκείτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν. καίτοι 9
τί διαφέρει γυναίκας ἀρχεῖν ἢ τοὺς ἀρχιντας ὑπὸ τῶν
γυναικῶν ἀρχεσθαί; ταύτῳ γὰρ συμβαίνει. χρήσιμος δ' 10
35 ύποθης τῆς θρασύτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλλ' εἴπερ,
πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλαβερῶταται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθ' αἱ τῶν
Δακώνων ἤσαν. ἐδήλωσαν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς· 10
χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἤσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἑτέραις πόλεσιν,
δόρυβον δὲ παρεῖχον πλεῖον τῶν πολεμίων. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν
40 οὖν ἑοικε συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς Δάκωισι εὐλόγως ἡ τῶν γυ-
1270 ναικῶν ἀνεσις· ἐξω γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας 11
ἀπεξενοῦντο πολὴν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τὸν τε πρὸς Ἀργείων
πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσσηνίων·
σχολάσαντες δὲ αὐτοὺς μὲν παρεῖχον τῷ νομοθέτῃ προω—
δοσεποιημένους διὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν βίων (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει 5 μέρη τῆς ἀρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας φασὶ μὲν ἄγειν ἐπι-
χειρῆσαι τῶν Λυκοῦργον ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὥς δ’ αὐτέκρονον,
12 ἀποστήναι πάλιν. ἀιτία μὲν ὦν εἰσὶν αὐταὶ τῶν γενομέ-
νων, ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμαρτίας. ἀλλ’ ἥμεις
οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τίνι δὲι συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἡ μὴ ἔχειν, 10
13 ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυ-
ναῖκας ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς ἐοικέν, ὡσπερ ἔλεχθη καὶ πρό-
tερον, οὐ μόνον ἀπρόεπιάν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς
καθ’ αὐτήν, ἄλλα συμβάλλεσθαι τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρη-
ματίαν. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ῥήθεντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμα-
14 λίαν τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμήσειεν ἃν τις τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν
συμβέβηκε κεκτησθαι πολλὴν λίαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ πάμ-
παν μικρὰν διόπερ εἰς ὁλέγους ἤκεν ἡ χώρα. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ
dιὰ τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως· ὄνεισθαι μὲν γὰρ ἡ
πωλεῖν τὴν υπάρχουσαν ἐποίησεν οὐ καλῶν, ὀρθῶς ποιήσας, 20
dιδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ἐξοίσῃον ἐδοκεῖ τοῖς βουλομένοις,
καίτοι ταύτῳ συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκεῖνος τε καὶ οὕτως.
15 ἑστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδὸν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν
πέντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ’ ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν γινομένων,
cαὶ διὰ τὸ προίκας διδόναι μεγάλας. καίτοι βέλτιον ἢν 25
μηδεμιὰν ἡ ὁλέγην ἡ καὶ μετρίαν τετάχθαι νῦν δ’ ἐξετὶ
dούναι τε τὴν ἐπίκληρον ὅτῳ ἁν βούληται· κἀν ἀποθάνη
μὴ διαδέμενος, ὅν ἀν καταλίθη κληρονόμοι, οὐτὸς ὦ ἂν
16 θέλῃ διδωσιν. τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίους ἰπ-
πεῖς τρέφειν καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ ὀπλίτας τρισμυρίους, οὐδὲ 30
χίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἤσαν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν
δῆλον ὅτι φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἶχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταυτήν-
μίαν γὰρ πληγήν οὐχ ὑπήνεγκεν ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ’ ἀπώλετο
17 διὰ τὴν ὀλυγανθρωπίαν. λέγουσι δ’ ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέ-
ρων βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας, ὡστ’ οὐ γίνεσθαι 35
τάτο ὀλυγανθρωπίαν πολεμούντων πολύν χρόνων· καὶ φασιν
ἐλναὶ ποτε τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις καὶ μυρίους· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἶτ’
ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ ταῦτα εἶτε μῆ, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως ὁμαλισμένης πληθύνειν ἄνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν. ὑπενάντιος δὲ 18 40 καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δἰόρθωσιν. βουλόμενος γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ὅπλειστοι εἶναι τοὺς Ἀρχαῖους, προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας ὡς πλείστους ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας. ἐστὶ γὰρ αὐτοῖς νόμος τὸν μὲν γεννησάντα τρεῖς ὁ πόλις ἄφρουρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τέτταρας ἀτελῆ πάντων. καὶ τοι 19 5 φανερὸν ὅτι πολλῶν γυνομένων, τῆς δὲ χώρας ὀὕτω διηρημένης, ἀναγκαῖον πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πένητας. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορεῖαν ἔχει φαύλως· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχῆ κυρία μὲν αὐτῇ τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστίν, γίνονται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ δήμου πάντων, ὥστε πολλάκις ἐμπίπτουσιν ἀνδροποιοφόρα σφόδρα 10 πένητες εἰς τὸ ἄρχειον, οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅνοι ἤσαν. ἐδήλωσαν δὲ πολλάκις μὲν καὶ πρότερον, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐν 20 τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις διαφθείραντες γὰρ ἀργυρῷ τινὲς, ὅσον ἐφ' ἐαυτοῖς, ὁλὴν τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν. καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἄρ- χήν εἶναι λίαν μεγάλην καὶ ἱσοτύρανον δημαρχεῖν 15 αὐτοῦς ἡναγκάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὡστε καὶ ταύτη συνεπιβλάπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν· δημοκρατία γὰρ ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας συνέβαινεν. συνέχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ ἄρ- 21 χεῖον τούτο, ἢ συνάξει γὰρ ὁ δήμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς μεγίστης ἄρχης, ὡστ' εἴτε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἴτε διὰ τύ- 20 χην τούτο συμπέπτωκεν, συμφερόντως ἔχει τοὺς πράγμασιν, δεῖ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σῶζεσθαι πάντα βοῦ- 22 λεῖθαι τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν [ταὐτά]. οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οἱ δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοι διὰ τὴν γερουσίαν (ἀθικὸν γὰρ ἡ ἄρχη) 25 αὐτὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν), δ ὃ δὲ δήμος διὰ τὴν ἐφορείαν (καθ- ἱσταται γὰρ ἐξ ἀπάντων). ἀλλ' αἱρετὴν ἔδει τὴν ἄρχην 23 εἶναι ταύτην ἐξ ἀπάντων μὲν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ τούτων ἐν νῦν παιδαριώδης γὰρ ἐστὶ λίαν. ἢτι δὲ καὶ κρίσεως εἰσὶ μεγάλων κύριοι, διότι οἱ τυχόντες, διόπερ οὐκ αὐτογνώμο- 30 νας βέλτιον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς
οὖςιν ἱκανῶς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν· διότερ έξέπεμπτον συμπρεσ-
25 ἐντὰς τοὺς ἐχθρούς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνομίζων τῇ πόλει εἶναι
τὸ στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς. οὐ καλῶς δ’ οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ συν-
σίτια τὰ καλοῦμενα φιδίτια νεομοβέθηται τῷ καταστήσαντι
πρῶτον’ ἐδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνοδον, 31
καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Δάκωσιν ἐκαστὸν δεῖ
30 φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἐνίων ὄντων καὶ τούτῳ τὸ ἀνά-
λώμα οὐ δυναμένων διατανᾶν, ὡστε συμβάινει τοῦναντίον
τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρα-
τικῶν εἶναι τὸ κατασκέυασμα τῶν συνστιτῶν, γίνεται δ’
ήκοστα δημοκρατικῶν οὕτω νεομοβεθημένου· μετέχει μὲν
35 γὰρ οὐ βάθιον τοῖς λίαν πένησιν, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας
οὕτος ἐστιν αὐτοῖς· τὸ πάτριος, τοῦ μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ
τέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῆς. τῶ δὲ περὶ τοῦς ναυάρ-33
χους νόμον καὶ ἑτεροὶ τίνες ἐπιτετμήκασιν, ὁρθῶς ἐπιτιμῶ-
ντες, στάσεως γὰρ γίνεται αἰτίος. ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλείσιν
40 οὕσι στρατηγοῖς ἄδιδος ἢ ναυαρχία σχεδὸν ἑτέρα βασιλεία
καθέτηκεν, καὶ ὁδὶ δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμή-
4271 b σειεν ἀν τις, ὁπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἐπιτετίμηκεν·
πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἀρετῆς ἢ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἔστι,
τὴν πολεμικήν’ αὐτή γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοι-
γαρούν ἐσώοντο μὲν πολεμοῦντες, ἀπόλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες
5 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἠσκηκέναι μηδε-
μίαιν ἁσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τούτου δὲ 35
ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἑλλάττων νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τα-
γαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα δι’ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἡ κακίας, καὶ
τοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρεῖττο τῆς ἀρετῆς
10 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. φαύλως δὲ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ 36
κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις· οὕτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ
tῆς πόλεως ἐστὶν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους
πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσι τε κακῶς· διὰ γὰρ τῶν Σπαρ-
tιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείστην γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλήλων τὰς
15 εἰσφοράς. ἀποβεβηκε τε τοῦναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμ-
φέροντοι τὴν μὲν γὰρ πόλιν πεποίηκεν ἀρχήματον, τοὺς δ' ιδιώτας φιλοχρημάτους. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Δακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστιν ἃ μάλιστ' ἂν τις ἐπιτιμήσειν

10 Ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεγγυς μὲν ἔστι ταύτης, ἐχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὖν χείρον, τὸ δὲ πλείον ἡπτου γλαφυρός. καὶ γὰρ ἐοικε καὶ λέγεται δὲ τὰ πλείστα μεμιμήσαται τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἢ τῶν Δακώνων, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα στὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἡπτου διήρθρωται τῶν νεώτερον, φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Δυκούργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπεῖαν τὴν Χαρίλλου τοῦ 25 βασιλέως καταλιπὼν ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλείστον διατίμησε χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ἂποικοί γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιοι τῶν Δακώνων ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δ' οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀποκίαν ἐλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχουσαν 3 σαι ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τῶν ἀυτῶν τρόπων χρώνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω πρώτου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων, δοκεῖ δ' ἢ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν περὶκέναι καὶ κείσθαι καλῶς πάση γὰρ ἐπίκειται τῇ θαλάσσῃ, σχεδὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἰδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν πάντων ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρῶν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τρώπιον 4 τόπου καὶ Ρόδου, διὸ καὶ τὴν τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχὴν κατέσχεν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νῆσους τὰς μὲν ἐξειρώσατο τὰς δ' ὁκίσεν, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τῶν βίων ἐτελεύτησεν ἐκεῖ περὶ Κάμικου. ἐχει δ' ἀνάλογον ἡ Κρητικὴ τά-

5 ξίς πρὸς τὴν Δακωνικὴν γεωργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἰληφεῖ τοῖς δὲ Κρησίν οἱ περίοικοι, καὶ συσσίτια παρ' ἀμφο-1272 a τέροις ἔστιν καὶ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ Δάκωνες οὐ φιδίτια ἀλλὰ ἀνδρεία, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἦ καὶ δήλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκείθεν ἐλήλυθεν. ήτι δε τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοροὶ τὴν αὐτήν ἐχουσί δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ 5 καλουμένως κόσμοις, πλὴν οἱ μὲν ἐφοροὶ πέντε τῶν ἀριθμῶν οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσίν οἱ δὲ γέρουτες τοῖς γέρουσιν,
οὐσ καλούσιν οἱ Κρήτες Βουλήν, ἵσοι βασιλεία δὲ πρότερον μὲν ἢν, εἶτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρήτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οἱ
10 κόσμοι τῇν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν· ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέχουσιν 7 πάντες, κυρία δὲ οὐδενὸς ἐστιν ἀλλ' ἢ συνεπιστήμησι λατὰ δό-
ξαντα τοῖς γέρουσι καὶ τοῖς κόσμοισ. τὰ μὲν οὐν τῶν συν-
σιτίων ἔχει βέλτιον τοῖς Κρήσιν ἢ τοῖς Δάκωσιν· ἐν μὲν
γὰρ Δακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἐκαστὸς ὑποτείχε τὸ τε-
15 ταγμένον, εἰ δὲ μῆ, μετέχειν νόμοις κωλύει τῆς πολιτείας,
καθαπέρ εἰρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἐν δὲ Κρήτη κοινοτέρως, 8 ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γυνομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημά-
tων ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ φόρων οὐς φέρουσιν οἱ περι-
οικοι, τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοι-
20 νὰς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ τοῖς συσσίτιοι, ὡστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρε-
φεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παιδὰς καὶ ἄνδρας·
πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὁλιγοστίαν ὡς ωφέλιμον πολλὰ πεφίλοιο· 9 σόφηκεν ὁ νομοθέτης, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάζευξιν τῶν γυναι-
κῶν, ὡν μὴ πολυτεκνώσῃ, τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσας
25 ὀμιλίαν, περὶ ἢς εἰ φαύλως ἢ μὴ φαύλως, ἐτερος ἐσται
tοῦ διασκέψασθαι καυρός. ὅτι δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰ συσσίτια βέλ-
tιον τέτακται τοῖς Κρήσιν ἢ τοῖς Δάκωσι, φανερὸν. τὰ
de περὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἐτὶ χείρων τῶν ἐφόρων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ 10
ἐχει κακῶν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἄρχειον, ὑπάρχῃ καὶ τοῦτοι· γι-
30 νονται γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες· ὁ δ' ἐκεῖ συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν πολι-
teίαν, ἑναῦθα οὔποτε ἐστιν. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ, διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀἱρε-
sιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, μετέχουν ὁ δὴμος τῆς μεγίστης ἄρχης
βούλεται μὲνει τὴν πολιτείαν· ἑναῦθα δ' οὔκ ἐξ ἀπάντω
ἀρροῦται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ' ἐκ τινῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς γέρων-
35 τας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων. περὶ δὲν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀν τὸς εἰς
πεῖρα λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Δακεδαίμονι γυνομένων· τὸ
γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μείζον ἐστὶ γέρας τῆς
ἀξίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἄρχειν ἀλλ'
αὐτογνώμονας ἑπισφάλες. τὸ δ' ἤσυχαζεν μὴ μετέχοντα 12
40 τὸν δὴμον οὐδὲν σημείον τοῦ τετάχθαι καλῶς· οὐδὲν γὰρ
λήμματός τι τοὺς κόσμους ὄσπερ τοῖς ἑφόροις, τὸρρω γ’

13 ἀποκουσίνεν ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθεροῦντων. ἢν δὲ ποιοῦντα τῆς 1272 b ἀμαρτίαν ταύτης ἰατρείαν, ἄτοπος καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἄλλα
dυναστευτική: πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινὲς τούς
cόσμους ή τῶν συναρχόντων αὕτων ή τῶν ἱδιώτων, ἐξεστὶ
de καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμους ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. ταύτα, δὴ
πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἡ κατ’ ἀνθρώπων

14 βούλησιν οὐ γὰρ ἄσφαλῆς ὁ κανών. πάντων δὲ φανότα-
tον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνάτων, ἡν καθιστάσι πολλάκις
ὅταν μὴ δίκας βούλωνται δούναι: ἡ καὶ δήλον ὡς ἔχει τι
πολιτείας ή τάξις, ἀλλ’ οὐ πολιτεία ἐστὶν ἄλλα
dυναστεία 10

μᾶλλον. εἰσέθησει δὲ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δήμον καὶ τοὺς
φίλους μοναρχίαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς

15 ἄλληλοις. καίτοι τί διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διά τινος χρόνου
µηκέτι πόλιν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἄλλα λύσθαι τὴν πο-

λιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπικινδύνους οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις, 15
tῶν βουλομένων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμεῖν. ἄλλα καθά-
pερ εἰρήνη, σώζεται διὰ τὸν τόπον ξενηλασίας γὰρ τὸ

16 πόρρω πεποίηκεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει τοῖς Κρη-
sίν, οἱ δ’ εἴλωτες ἀφίστανται πολλάκισ’ οὕτε γὰρ ἐξωτερ-

κής ἀρχῆς κοινωνοῦσιν οἱ Κρῆτες, νεωστὶ τε πόλεμος ξενικὸς 20
diabébèken eis tén vēson, òs pepeòhnke faueran tēn aśthê-
neian tōn èkei nómon. peri mén oûn táutēs eírhēsthō tosaub’

ημῖν τῆς πολιτείας.

Πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι καλῶς καὶ 11

πολλά περίττως πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δ’ ἔνια παρα-25

πλησίως τοῖς Δάκωσιν αὕτα γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι τρεῖς ἄλ-

ληλαις τε σύνεγγυς πάς εἰσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ δια-

φέρουσι, ἡ τε Κρητικὴ καὶ ἡ Λακωνικὴ καὶ τρίτῃ τούτων
η Καρχηδόνων καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει παρ’

2 αὐτῶς καλῶς. σημεῖον δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης τὸ τῶν 30

δήμου ἔχουσαν διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ

µήτε στάσιν, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν, γεγενήθησαί µήτε τυ-
πολιτικῶν Β’. 11.

ρανον. ἔχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Δακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ 3 μὲν συστία τῶν ἐταιρίων τοῖς φιδίτιοις, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκα-
35τῶν καὶ τεσσάρων ἀρχηγῶν τοῖς ἑφόροις (πλὴν οὐ χεῖρον· οἱ
μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσί, ταύτην δὲ αἱροῦνται τὴν ἀρχηγὴν
ἀριστίνδην), τοὺς δὲ βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον
toῖς ἐκεῖ βασιλεύσει καὶ γέρουσιν· καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βα-
σιλεῖς μήτε κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος, μηδὲ τούτο τὸ τυ-
40χόν, εἰ τε διαφέρον, ἐκ τούτων ἀιρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ καθ’ ἡλι-
kίαν μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστώτες, ἂν εὐτελεῖς ὤσι, 1273
μεγάλα βλάπτουσι καὶ ἐβλαψαν ἥδη τὴν πόλιν τῶν
Δακεδαίμονίων. τὰ μὲν οὐν πλείστα τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν 5
dιὰ τὰς παρεκβάσεις κοινὰ τυχάναι πάσαι δυτα ταῖς
eἰρημέναις πολιτείαις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀρι-
5 στοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὰ μὲν εἰς δήμον ἐκκλίνει
μᾶλλον, τὰ δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν προσ-
άγειν τὰ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δήμον οἱ βασιλεῖς
cύριοι μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἃν ὀργογνωμονώσι πάντες· εἰ
dὲ μὴ, καὶ τούτων ὁ δήμος· ἢ δ’ ἄν εἰσφέρωσιν οὕτω, οὗ
6 διακούσαι μόνον ἀποδιδόσαι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἀρ-
χοσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσί καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς
eἰσφερομένοις ἀντειπεῖν ἔξεστιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολι-
teίαις οὐκ ἔστιν. τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κυρίας οὕτωσι πολλῶν 7
cαὶ μεγάλων ὑφ’ αὐτῶν ἀιρετάς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑκα-
15τὸν ταῦτας αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν μεγίστην ἀρχηγὴν, ἔτι δὲ ταῦτας
πλείονα ἀρχεῖν χρόνων τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξεληλυθότες
ἀρχοῦσι καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχίκων· τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ
μὴ κληροτᾶς ἀριστοκρατίκους θετέον, καὶ εἰ τι τοιούτον ἔτε-
ρον, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων δικάξεσθαι πά-
σας, καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ’ ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Δακεδαίμονι.
παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἡ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδο-
νίων μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατά τινα διάνοιαν ἢ
συνδοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστίνδην ἄλλα καὶ
πλούτινδην οἴονται δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀρχοῦσας· ἀδύνατον
9 γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν. εἰπερ οὖν 25 τὸ μὲν αἱρεῖσθαι πλουτιῶδην ὀλεγαρχικὸν, τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀρε- τὴν ἀριστοκρατικὸν, αὕτη τις ἄν εἰς τάξις τρίτη, καθ’ ἤν- περ συντετάκται καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τὰ περὶ τὴν πο- λιτείαν αἱροῦνται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταύτα βλέποντες, καὶ μά- λιστα τὰς μεγίστας, τοὺς τε βασιλείς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς. 30
dei δὲ νομίζειν ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρέκβασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην· ἓξ ἄρχις γὰρ τοῦθ’ ὡρὰν ἔστι τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνονται σχολάζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἄσχημον, μὴ μόνον ἄρχοντες ἀλλὰ μηδ’ ἰδιωτεύοντες. εἶ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν 35 σχολῆς, φαύλον τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ὄνημα εἶναι τῶν ἄρχων,
11 τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν· ἐντιμον γὰρ οὐκ ὁ νόμος οὕτως ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον μάλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὄλην φιλοχρήματον· ὅτι δ’ ἂν ὑπολάβῃ τίμιον εἶναι τὸ κύριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἄκο- 40 λουθεῖν τούτοις· ὅπου δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρέτη τιμᾶται, ταύτην
12 οὐχ οὖν τε βεβαιῶς ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. θὸνε- 1273 b
1272 b
σθαί δ’ εὐλογον κερδαίνειν τοὺς ὁνομένους, ὅταν δαπανή- σαντες ἄρχοσιν· ἀτοπον γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὄν ἐπιεικῆς δὲ βουλήσεται κερδαίνειν, φαυλότερος δ’ ὄν οὐ βουλήσεται δαπα- νήσας. διὸ δεὶ τοὺς δυναμένους ἄριστ’ ἄρχειν, τούτους ἄρχειν. 5 βέλτιον δ’, εἰ καὶ προείστρε τὴν εὐπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ο νο- μοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἄρχοντων γε ἑπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.
13 φαύλον δ’ ἂν δόξειν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλείον ἄρχας τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρχειν· ὀπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἐν γὰρ ὑψ’ ἐνὸς ἐργον ἄριστ’ ἀποτελεῖται. δεὶ δ’ ὅπως γίνηται τοῦτο 10 ὀραὶ τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ προστάτευε τὸν αὐτὸν αὐλείν
14 καὶ σκυπτομεῖν. ὀσθ’ ὅπου μὴ μικρὰ πόλεις, πολιτικῶτερον πλείονας μετέχειν τῶν ἄρχων, καὶ δημοτικῶτερον κοινό- τερον τε γὰρ, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἐκαστὸν ἀπο- τελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάττον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν 15 πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν· εἰν τούτοις γὰρ ἀμφότεροι
διὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν διελήλυθε τὸ ἀρχεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀρχεσθαι. ὁλιγαρχίκης ὡς ὁυσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀριστα ἐκφεύ-15 γουσι τῷ πλουτεῖν, αἰεὶ τῷ δήμου μέρος ἐκπέμποντες ἐπὶ 20 τὰς πόλεις, τοῦτῳ γὰρ ἦνταί καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τήν πολιτείαν. ἀλλὰ τουτὶ ἐστὶ τύχης ἔργον, δεὶ δὲ ἀστασιάστους εἶναι διὰ τῶν νομοθέτην. νῦν δὲ, ἂν ἄτυχία γένηται τῖς 16 καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποστῇ τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲν ἔστι φάρμακον διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἱσυχίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Δακεδαιμονίων 25 πολιτείας καὶ Κρητικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων, αἴτερ δικαίως εὐδοκιμοῦσι, τούτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

12 Τῶν δὲ ἀποφημαμένων τι περὶ πολιτείας ἐνιοῦ μὲν οὖν ἐκουφώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ' ὄντινουνόν, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἑιδωτεύοντες τῶν βίων, περὶ δὲ τῖς ἀξίων, εὐρε-30 ταὶ σχεδόν περὶ πάντων, ἐνιοῦ δὲ νομοθέται γεγόναυσιν, οἱ μὲν ταῖς οἰκείαις πόλεσιν, οἱ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὅθεν τοις, πολιτευθέντες αὐτοῖς καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν νόμων ἐγένοντο δημοτροχοὶ, οἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οὗν καὶ Δυκώργος καὶ Ἑλλάνων οὐτοί γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν. 35 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Δακεδαιμονίων εἰρηται, Ἑλλάνων δὲ ἐνιοῦ 2 μὲν οὖνται γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπουδαίον ὁλιγαρχίαν τῇ γὰρ καταλῦσαν λίαν ἀκρατον οὗσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντας τοῦ δήμου παύσατ, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστήσασι τὴν πάτριον, μήγαντα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ 40 πάγῳ βουλήν ὁλιγαρχίκων, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἵρετας ἀριστοκρατικῶν, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια δημοτικῶν. ἔοικε δὲ Ἑλλάνων 3 εἴκεινα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλῦσα, τὴν τε βουλήν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν αἵρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δήμου καταστῆσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσασι ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφονται τινες αὐτῷ λύσαι γὰρ θάτερον, κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικα-5 στήριον πάντων, κληροτὸν δε. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τούτῳ ἐσχυσεν, ὀσπὲρ 4 τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλήν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια
μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν τρόπων ἐκαστῶν τῶν δημαγωγῶν προήγαγεν αὐξῶν εἰς τὴν νῦν δὴ· 10 5 μοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δὲ οὗ κατὰ τὴν Σῶλωνος γενέσθαι τούτῳ προαιρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (τῆς ναυαρχίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δήμος αἰτίος γενόμενος ἐφρονηματίσθη, καὶ δημαγωγοὺς ἐλαβεὶ φαύλους ἀντιπολιτευο-μένους τῶν ἐπιεικῶν), ἐπεὶ Σῶλων γε ἔσχε τὴν ἀναγκαιο-15 τάτην ἀποδίδοναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τάς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖ-σθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τούτων κύριος ὁ δήμος 6 δοῦλος ἀν εἰ ἦ καὶ πολέμιος), τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γυνώρ-μων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίμνων καὶ ξενιτῶν καὶ τρίτου τέλους τῆς καλουμένης 20 ἰσπάδος· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικὸν, οἷς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχῆς μετήν. νομοθετᾶται δὲ ἐγένετο Ζάλευκος τε Λοκρόις τοῖς ἐπιζευγ-ρίοις, καὶ Χαρώνδας ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλίαν 7 καὶ Σικελίαν. πειρόνται δὲ τινες καὶ συνάγειν ὦς Ὀυνό-25 μακρίτου μὲν γενόμενον πρώτον δεινοὶ περὶ νομοθεσίαν, γυμνασθήναι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν Κρήτῃ Λοκρῶν ὄντα καὶ ἐπιδημούντα κατὰ τέχνην μαντικῆν τούτοις δὲ γενέσθαι Ὁλητῆ έταίρων, Ὁλητής δὲ ἀκροατὴν Λυκούργου καὶ Ζαλεύκου, Ζαλεύκου 8 δὲ Χαρώνδας. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγοντις ἀσκεπτότερον τῷ 30 χρόνῳ λέγοντες, ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος νο-μοθέτης Θήβαιος. ἦν δὲ ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν Βακχιαδῶν, ἔραστής δὲ γενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νικήσαντος Ὁλυμπίασιν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος τὴν πόλιν ἔλπη διαμισθήσας τὸν ἐρωτα τῶν τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκυώνης, ἀπήλθεν εἰς Θήβας, κάκει 35 9 τῶν Βίων ἐπελεύσθησαν ἀμφότεροι. καὶ νῦν ἦτι δεικνύουσα τοὺς τάφους αὐτῶν ἄλληλοις μὲν εὐσυνόπτους ὄντας, πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν τοῦ μὲν συνόπτου τοῦ δ' οὐ συνόπτου· μυθολογούσι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὕτω τάξασθαι τὴν ταφήν, τὸν μὲν Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους, ὅπως μὴ ἄποστατος 40 ἔσται ἡ Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλόλαον, ὅπως

[Φαλέου δ’ ἤδιον ἢ τῶν οὐσίων ἀνυμάλωσις, Πλάτωνος δ’ ἤ 12 ἕ τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδών καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ τὰ συστήματά τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔτι δ’ ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθυν νόμος, τὸ τοὺς νήφοιτας συμποσιαρχεῖ, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμι- κοῖς ἀσκήσει ὅπως ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνονται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην, ὃς δέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι τῶν χερῶν τὴν δὲ 13 ἥχρηστον]. Ἀράκοντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσιν, πολιτείας δ’ ὑπαρ- 13 χοῦσθε τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν· ἵδιον δ’ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὖδέν ἔστιν ὃ τι καὶ μνείας ἄξιουν, πλὴν ἡ χαλεπότητις διὰ τὸ τῆς ἕκκλησιας μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακός νόμων ὅμοιοργός ἄλλ’ οὐ πολιτείας· νόμος δ’ ἵδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας, ἀν 20 τε πταίσωσιν, πλεῶς ἐκαίνην ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφῶντων’ διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους υβρίζεσθαι μεθύοντας νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγ- γνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὡς δεῖ μεθύοντι έχειν μᾶλλον, ἄλλὰ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας Ἡνύνοις 14 νομοθέτης Χαλκιδεύσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης, οὐ περὶ τῇ ταῖς φο- 25 νίκα καὶ ταῖς ἐπικλήρους ἔστιν’ οὐ μὲν ἄλλα ἤδιον γε οὐδέν αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἔχοι τις ἀν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, τάς τε κυρίας καὶ τάς ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρημένας, ἔστω τεθεωρη- μένα τὸν τρόπον τούτον.
CRITICAL NOTES.

The following notes are intended to be used in conjunction with the apparatus criticus of Susemihl's editions, and especially that of 1872. It is in these editions alone that the MSS. and their readings, and also the version of the Vetus Interpres, can be fully studied. In those cases, indeed, in which I have been obliged to choose between a reading supported by the whole of one family of MSS. and one supported by the whole of the other, and the choice was attended with doubt, I have commonly noted the reading which I have not adopted, and I have taken some pains, in dealing with the readings offered by the first family of MSS., to point out the passages in which we are unable to affirm with certainty that \( \Gamma \) agreed with \( M^s P^1 \), for perhaps even the third and last of Susemihl's editions hardly makes it clear how numerous they are. The student of Susemihl's apparatus criticus, in fact, occasionally finds in it readings which Susemihl does not accept ascribed to \( \Pi^2 \), and may naturally infer that \( \Pi^1 \) (i.e. \( \Gamma \) as well as \( M^s P^1 \)) support the reading adopted by him. This is, no doubt, frequently the case, but on the other hand it frequently happens that the reading of \( \Gamma \) is not ascertainable, and of course, when this is so, Susemihl's reading rests only on the authority of \( M^s P^2 \), for we cannot assume without proof that \( \Gamma \) agreed with \( M^s P^1 \) and not with \( \Pi^2 \); on the contrary, \( \Gamma \) often agrees with \( \Pi^2 \) against \( M^s P^1 \). Thus the indubitable discrepancies between \( \Pi^1 \) and \( \Pi^2 \) prove on examination to be considerably less numerous than might be supposed \(^1\). I have seldom

\(^1\) Susemihl would seem in the following notes of his third edition, for instance, tacitly or otherwise to attribute to \( \Pi^1 \) a reading which can only be attributed with certainty to \( M^s \) \( \Pi^1 \): -1252 b 2, of om. \( \Pi^2 \): 5, \( \tau \) \( \varphi \) post \( \kappa \alpha i \) om. \( \Pi^2 \): 1253 a 32, \( \delta \) om. \( \Pi^2 \): 1255 b 23, \( \tau \alpha i s \) post \( \i \) \( \nu \) add. \( \Pi^1 \): 126, \( \psi \) \( \phi s o n i c e \) \( \Pi^1 \): 1256 b 8, \( \delta \) \( \delta o m i n \) \( \Pi^2 \): 13, \( \gamma e n o m \) \( \gamma i o s \) \( \Pi^2 \): 1258 b 1, \( \mu e t a b a l \) \( \eta \) \( \tau i k e i s \) \( \Pi^2 \): 1260 a 31, \( \delta \) \( a n t e \) \( \tau \alpha i s \) \( a d d . \) \( \Pi^1 \). In 1260 a 21, the reading \( \delta \) \( \pi a v t a w \) is ascribed to \( \Pi^1 \), but we cannot tell from Vet. Int. \( o m i n i u m \) whether he found \( \delta \) \( \pi a v t a w \) or \( \pi a v t a w \) in his Greek text (see his rendering of 1263 b 17 sq.). These references need not be carried farther than the First Book.
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noted variants clearly not supported by the whole of a family, except when I hoped to be able to throw some fresh light on their value. The readings which I have given from O will at any rate serve to illustrate the character of a manuscript which, though belonging to a well-known variety, does not always agree with P, the MS. to which it is most nearly allied. I have drawn more largely on the Vetus Interpres, noting freely any renderings which seemed to call for remark. I have sought by a study of his method of translation to contribute to the solution of the important question, in what cases we can safely infer from his renderings a variation in the Greek text used by him. Here and there, but not often, I have noted renderings to which Susemihl has omitted to call attention. I have also occasionally indicated passages in which the text of the translation appears to be by no means certain, and recorded any readings found in the MSS. of it consulted by me which seemed to deserve mention. But my main object in these notes has been to discuss the copious data furnished by Susemihl, and especially to throw light on the characteristics of the MSS. and the Latin translation, in the hope of contributing to the ascertainment of the correct text of the Politics.

My quotations from the Latin translation of Leonardus Arétinus (Leonardo Bruni of Arezzo) are based on a comparison of the beautiful MS. of this translation in the possession of New College, Oxford (MS. 228), which belongs to the middle of the fifteenth century, with a Bodleian MS. (Canon. Class. Lat. 195). I have drawn attention in the following notes to one or two passages in which these MSS. do not support readings ascribed by Susemihl to Arétinus; I do not know what is the cause of this discrepancy, but I may refer to Susemihl’s remarks in his first edition of the Politics, p. xxix sq., as to the supposed existence of two versions of Arétinus’ translation, for it is possible that the discrepancy is thus to be accounted for.

The conjectures by which scholars have sought to emend the text will be found fully recorded in Susemihl’s editions.

I have already (above, p. xlviii, note 1, and p. xlix, note 2) explained the symbols which I have adopted from Susemihl. A full account of the MSS. of the Politics and the Vetus Interpres consulted by Susemihl will be found in the Prolegomena to his first edition (that of 1872), and also a full account of the corrections in P, P, and P. As to the Vatican Fragments, see the Preface.

I add some remarks on the MSS. consulted by me.

MS. 112 belonging to Corpus Christi College, Oxford (O) is a
fifteenth century manuscript containing the Politics together with other writings of Aristotle, or ascribed to him (see for its contents Mr. J. A. Stewart, The English Manuscripts of the Nicomachean Ethics. Anecdota Oxoniensia, vol. i, part i, p. 5), and bearing at the foot of its first page the following inscription:—Orate pro anima Ioannis Claimundi colletii corporis Christi primi presidis, qui hunc librum eidem condonavit. (Mr. Stewart mentions, p. 6, that Claimond was President of Corpus from 1517 to 1537.) Its text of the Politics is written in a very legible hand, but there are not a few corrections both between the lines and in the margin, and these corrections are made partly by the writer of the MS. himself, partly by a corrector (corr.1), whose handwriting is in many cases easily distinguishable from that of the writer of the MS., but in some not so, and especially in those in which the correction is between the lines and consists of a single letter only, or two or three. The ink used by this corrector is often very similar to that of the MS. One or two corrections in the first two books are apparently due to a second corrector. The text of the Politics in O1 is nearly akin to that of the P4 of Susemill (MS. 2025 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris; see as to P4 Sus.1, p. xxiii), though neither of these MSS. is copied from the other, but the corrections from a MS. of the first family which lend a special interest and importance to P4 are wanting in O1; the corrections in O1 which are due to corr.1 are mostly derived from a MS. of the second family, though a few of them (for instance, the expunged addition of ἀρχιτρών καὶ in 1260 a 4) may be derived from the Vetus Interpres or possibly from some gloss. The following passages (to which it would be easy to add indefinitely) will suffice to establish its close kinship with P4:—

1255 a 24, ἀμα—ἐδικαιών om. pr. P4 pr. O1: 1256 a 14, μῆνος om. P4 pr. O1: 1257 a 13, γέων P4 O1: 32, εἰθείοκαθι pr. P4 pr. O1: 1257 b 27, άυκ—28, τίλος om. P4 pr. O1: 1258 a 14, ἀπαστα δεν om. P4 pr. O1: 16, χρια P4 O1. On the other hand, O1 often differs from P4: thus in 1253 a 7 O1 omits ἀκε ῥη, P4 only ῥη: in 1253 b 35 O1 has τοῖς, which P4 omits: its reading differs from that of P4 in 1254 a 15 sq.: in 1257 a 33—34 it is free from the blunders found in P4: in 1258 a 38 pr. O1 omits καρπῶν καὶ τῶν, pr. P4 only καὶ τῶν: in 1259 a 12 pr. O1 has λόγων, P4 δλίγων: in 1261 a 1 pr. P4 omits several words, not so O1: in 1262 b 13 O1 has συμφέναι, not so P4. Here and there we find O1 agreeing with P2,3 (thus in 1257 a 16 it has δι εἰδίπτω, in 1263 b 31 πῶς, in 1264 b 14 μήζιν, in 1271 b 12 ἀναγκαζομένου), or with P2,3 Tb (1264 a 35, πενετιλε: 1267 b 28, λόγος); more rarely with Ms P4 (as in 1264 b 13, εἴθες: 1266 a 5.
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ἐπείτα: 1268 b 15, δηλονύτη), or with Μ (as in 1252 b 3, ἀποτελεῖτο: 1263 a 24, ἀγαθῶν).

I pass on to MSS. of the Vetus Interpres. MS. Phillipps 891 (z) is a parchment MS. in quarto form, containing the translation of the Politics together with that of the Oeconomics and an unfinished fragment of the commencement of the translation of the Rhetoric, and written at Zara in Dalmatia in the year 1393. This appears from the following inscription on a blank page at its commencement, which is in the same handwriting as the MS.:—Liber politicorum et yconomicorum Aristotelis in hoc volumine deputatur (deo volente) ad usum mei Jacobini quondam [9=condam] Alberti de maynitis (=de maynentibus=dei Maynenti) de Vic. [Vincentia or Vicentia=Vicenza] quem scripsi in civitate Jadre 1393 cum ibi forem ab illsi civitatis communitate pro fisico opere medicine salariatus et habitus. Laus et honor deo. (For the interpretation of Vic. and of the contraction for quem scripsi I am indebted to the kind aid of Mr. F. Madan, Sub-Librarian of the Bodleian Library. The interpretation which I have given above of the symbol 9 is that of Mr. E. Maunde Thompson, Keeper of the MSS. in the British Museum, to whom, no less than to Mr. Madan, my best thanks are due for valuable and ready help. Mr. Maunde Thompson explains the meaning of quondam Alberti to be 'formerly son of Albertus' or 'son of the late Albertus.' Having found the form Patricii de Piccolominiibus in the title of a book published in 1485 ('Pontificale A. Patricii de Piccolominiibus, Romae, 1485'), I thought it likely that maynitus was a family-name, but the word remained a puzzle, till Mr. Maunde Thompson solved the problem by discovering the name Mainenti in a list of families belonging to Vicenza contained in the 'Historia di Vicenza, by G. Marzari, Venice, 1691.' I shall be glad if the publication of this inscription should lead to the communication of further particulars respecting the writer, Jacobino dei Maynenti.) At the commencement of the MS., prefixed to the translation of the Politics, are the words to which attention has already been called (above, p. xlii); they are in red letters but in the hand of the writer of the MS.:—Incipit liber politicorum Aristotelis a fratre Gualielmo ordinis praedicatorum de greco in latinum translatus. At the close of the translation, the words quod decens (answering to τὸ πρέπον, 5 (8), 7. 1342 b 34) are not followed by the sentence—reliqua huius

1 For other MSS. transcribed at Zara, see Schenkl, Ausonius, pp. xxiii, xxvii. I owe this reference to Mr. Robinson Ellis, whom I have also to thank for informing me some years ago of the existence of a MS. of the Vetus Interpres in the Phillipps Library.
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opéris in greco nondum inventi—which succeeds them in all the MSS. but a, or by the sentences which are here found in a and rec. a (see Sus.1 ad loc.), but simply by the words—Explicit liber politiorum Aristotilis. At the top of the pages of this MS. and in the margins and in a large blank space purposely left at the foot copious annotations are inserted, and the text itself is interspersed with corrections and explanatory additions. Here and there we meet with corrections which are in the same hand and ink as the MS. and have obviously been made by the writer of it, but most of them and all the annotations are in a far smaller hand than that of the MS., and one which, perhaps for this reason, differs a good deal from it. Some, however, of these annotations and corrections are apparently in the same ink as the MS., and as these are in the same handwriting as others which are in a darker ink, it seems probable that all the annotations and corrections were added by the writer of the MS.1 If so, he was evidently a diligent student of the Politics in William of Moerbeke’s Latin Translation. I have given in the following Critical Notes those of the various readings of z in the first two books which seemed to possess most importance, and have added in Appendix C a complete list of its variations in these books from the text printed by Susemihl, with the exception of unimportant errors of spelling. It will be seen that its omissions and blunders are many, and that here and there the original reading has been erased and an incorrect one substituted; nevertheless, it has in not a few passages either alone or in conjunction with a preserved the true reading. It has no doubt likewise done so in the books which I have not as yet collated, for in glancing at a passage in its text of the Seventh (4 (7). 13. 1331 b 31) I found the word ékkësdr”, which is rendered in the other MSS. latet, rendered (rightly in all probability) lacet. It is worthy of notice that as z was written at Zara in Dalmatia, so the allied MS. a was ‘written in Italy’ (Sus.1, p. xxxiv). It is possible that a search among Venetian MSS. of the Vetus Interpres, if such exist, might bring to light other MSS. belonging to the same family and superior to a and z. We might then be less in the dark than we are at present as to the origin of the marked difference between the two families.

MS. 112 belonging to Balliol College, Oxford (o) is ascribed by Susemihl (Sus.1, p. xxxviii) to the earlier part of the fourteenth century, and is the oldest of the MSS. of the Vetus Interpres yet collated. Its text of the translation of the Politics is evidently

1 I might be able to speak more positively as to this, if I had read more of these annotations than I have as yet found time to do.
nearly allied to that of Susemihl's c, a far later manuscript, but c is not copied from o.

MS. Bodl. Canon. Class. Lat. 174 (y) is a beautifully written Italian manuscript, belonging to the fourteenth century, and, in Mr. Madan's opinion, to the latter half of it. Each page contains two columns. The text of the translation of the Politics contained in it has been tampered with in places by an ingenious corrector, who has here and there contrived with the aid of a penknife to convert the original reading into an entirely new one: thus in the rendering of 1256 b 13 we find *parientes* over an erasure, the original reading having probably been *pro genitis*, and in 1258 a 7 again we find *iam* over an erasure, the original reading having probably been *non*. These erasures, however, are readily discernible, and they do not seem to occur very often. This MS. is allied, not to a or z, but to the bulk of the MSS. of the translation.

BOOK 1.

1252 a 2. *ένεκεν*] 'Only the forms ending in -α are Attic (*ένεκα, *ένεκα, *ούνεκα) ... the form *ένεκεν* does not occur in Attic Inscriptions till after about 300 B.C.' (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 103). Aristotle's frequent use of *ένεκεν* deserves notice. 8. *εἶναι* om. Π *πρ.* M*γ*; a later hand adds it in M*γ* after τῶν. Sus. brackets it, and refers (ed. 1) to 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 2, οὗ δίκαιον οὗται εἶναι ὧν μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κεκτημένους μηδὲν τῶν κεκτημένων, where Π*π* II*δ* read *εἶναι* and Π M*γ* omit it (probably wrongly, as they stand alone), and to 2. 7. 1266 b 1, οὗ χαλέπιν *οὗτο ποιεῖν*, where Π II om. *εἶναι*; he also gives a reference to Schanz, Nov. quaest. Platon. p. 33 sqq. The question whether *εἶναι* should be retained here is a difficult one, for though Π*δ* are somewhat prone to omit, and more than once omit *εἶναι* where it seems to be required (e.g. in 1257 b 7), yet they occasionally omit it where it can be dispensed with (e.g. in 1298 b 36), and Aristotle is well known to be sparing in his use of *εἶναι* (see Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 330, and his edition of the Poetics, p. 243 sqq.; see also Bon. Ind. 239 a 9 sqq.). On the other hand, its omission causes a harshness here, which it does not cause in 1266 b 1. In 1. 9. 1257 a 1, again, the verb is *νομίζειν*, not *οἴσεθαι*, and the construction is softened by the use of ὥς. Meteor. 1. 14. 352 a 25, ἀλλὰ τούτου τὴν αἰτίαν οὐ τῆν τοῦ κόσμου γίνεσθαι οἴσθαι χρή, however, is a nearer parallel. τῶν αὐτῶν] Vet. Int. *idem* (τὸ αὐτὸ ἕ;)? 15. τοὺς om.
pr. O¹ (with Π²): it is added in the margin by a corrector. But Π² often omit the article—e.g. in 1269 a 7, 1291 a 1, b 3, 1297 a 35. 24. δῇ] enim Vet. Int., but we often find enim in Vet. Int. where we expect another word—e.g. in 1253 a 23, 1256 a 31, 1272 a 41. Enam does not always stand for γίρ in Vet. Int. (see critical note on 1271 a 23). 25. ὅστερ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις] Vet. Int. quamadmodum et in aliiis, but he probably did not find καί in his Greek text any more than he found it there in 1335 b 30, where he translates καθάπερ τὰ τῶν νοστηρὼν σιεύτ et innitum (see Busse, p. 30). See also below on 1262 a 29. 26. συνδιείσεθαι] γφ z have combinare: I read obviare or obinare in o, not (with Sus.) obinari.

1252 b 2. Ms P¹ add οἱ before χαλκοτύπου: we cannot tell from aoris figuraores what Vet. Int. found in his Greek text: Π² omit it, and they may well be right in doing so: see Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 340 sqq., and Bon. Ind. 109 b 36 sqq. 5. Ms P¹ add τὸ before δοῖλον: about the reading of Γ we cannot be certain: a similar difference of reading occurs in 1261 b 25. See on the subject Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq.: Vahlen, Beitr. 4. 409. The reading of Γ being doubtful, it seems better to follow Π². 8. βαρπαρῶν δ'] Vet. Int. barbaris quidem. But the Vet. Int. occasionally substitutes γφ for δε (e.g. in 1268 b 16). 14. Χαρώνδας μέν] Ms Π¹ ὁ μέν Χαρώνδας: Vet. Int. Charondas quidem, which may represent Χαρώνδας μέν, the reading of Π². Charondas is nowhere else in the Politics honoured with the prefixed article by any MS. 15. όμοκάτων] όμοκάπως 'Π¹ Π⁴ L. corr. Μb' (Sus.), also O¹: as to Ms, however, see Sus.' p. xii. note 20. The New College MS. of Ar. has homolapros, but Bodl. homocapnos. 17. Vet. Int. dominum for oikias, but he probably found oikias, not οἰκιῶν, in his Greek text, for in 1259 a 35 he has dominus for οἰκία. 20. συνηλθον om. Γ Π² pr. P¹: not so Ar., who has nam ex hiiis qui suberant regno accederent. 28. ἦδη] ἦ δῇ is the reading of O¹ and of all known MSS. except Π¹, which has ἦδη, and two others which have ἦ δε (Ar. quae quidem): Vet. Int. iam. 29. μεν οὖν] οὖν om. Ms Π¹, and perhaps Ar. (constituta quidem gratia vivendi), but μὲν οὖν is undoubtedly right: it is a common fault in the MSS. to drop out οὖν after μέν (see 1257 b 3, 1294 b 1, 1300 b 24, 1303 b 15, 1314 a 25). 31. αὐτὴ] Vet. Int. ἐπά (αὐτῆ γ').

1253 a 1. I follow Π² in adding καί before τέλος (so O¹): Π² omit it, but the presumption is against this family of MSS. in cases of omission. 2. Ms P¹ add ὥ before ἀνθρωπος (Sus.'), just as they do in the corresponding passage, 1278 b 19, and in 1253 a 32: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found the article in
his Greek text or not: Π² omit it in all these passages, probably rightly: see above on 1252 b 2 and the authorities there referred to. 5. Susemihl omits to call attention to the fact that Vet. Int. has scelestatus for anvistos: Vet. Int. would seem to have misread anvistos as anovos—cp. 1253 a 35, where he translates anvostaton by scelestissimum. 6. âte pep âçvâ òov òostep en pettotis] See Susemihl’s apparatus criticus for the various readings of the MSS. in this passage. O¹ omits âçvâ òov, leaving however a lacuna where these words should stand. O¹ here differs from P¹, for pr. P⁴ omits only òov. Vet. Int. sine inugo existens, which is no doubt a translation of anev ôyov òovânoi (for òovânoi is often rendered by existere in Vet. Int.—e.g. in 1260 b 31, 1269 b 24), and this is probably a gloss explanatory of âçvâ òov. Ar. does not render âte pep—pettotis, but this does not prove that the clause was wanting in his Greek text; it may well have been imperfect and incomprehensible. All the MSS. may be said to have pettòis (pettòis Mb), though pettòis appears in the margin of Pr P⁴ and Sb. Vet. Int. sicut in volatilibus, but he may possibly be here translating a conjecture added in the margin of the MS. used by him. There can be little doubt that pettòis is the right reading. 10. òov êçwov] Vet. Int. supra animalia, but he seems now and then to add prepositions without finding an equivalent for them in his Greek text—thus in 1263 a 37 he renders êfobâw pro viaticis, in 1263 b 41 tois svastis pro commivis, in 1316 b 2 tis pollow per civilatem, and in 1273 a 28 tois Karpbouwos apud Calchedontos. See also below on 1273 b 15. 12. For elîlvê tov êçweî aivasthavn luptroî kai hèdov, the Aldine text has elîlvêv, P⁴ Mb Ub L⁵ (and O¹) proîlvêv, followed in all these MSS. (which belong to the less good variety of the second family) by òoste aivasthavthav tov luptroî kai hèdov. Compare the deviation of P⁴ Q Mb Ub L⁵ Ald. from the text of other MSS. in 1253 b 2-4, and of P⁴ Q L⁵ in 1258 a 32 sqq., and of P⁴ Ub L⁵ Ce in 1286 b 25, where they read all’ ou katalîpsie tov nêis diaðóxou Ô basilew ev’ êçwov tovto poihsai (an evident gloss), and of P⁴ L⁵ Ald. in 1260 a 32, where tov têleovn takes the place of to toû telos in these MSS. O¹ agrees with P⁴ in all these passages. In the passage before us, as in some of the others referred to, a gloss seems to be substituted for the text, for it is not likely that we have to do with traces of a double version. See also the readings offered by P⁴ L⁵ Ce in 1301 b 33 and 1309 b 2, and by P⁴ Ub V⁵ L⁵ in 1302 a 28. 22. ei’ tis lêgei] Vet. Int. si quis dicat, but this is no proof that he found lêgei (which P² alone has) in his Greek text, for in 1288 b 36 he trans-
lates καὶ εἶ ῥᾶλλα λέγοντα καλῶς et sì alia dicant bene. 23. πάντα
δέ] All MSS. of Vet. Int. but k have omittit enim. 25. Π¹ omit καὶ
before φύσει: Π² omits καὶ before πρῶτον, and most MSS. of Vet.
Int. (but not a or z) omit et here. Vet. Int. has prior, and several
of the less good MSS. of the Politics have προτείμα. O¹ (like Π¹) has
καὶ φύσι καὶ πρῶτα. 28. μηδεν δέομεν] Vet. Int. has nihil
indestin, but he probably found μηδεν in his Greek text. 30.
πρῶτον] O¹ has πρῶτον, with ε however superscribed above the
final ν— I think by the writer of the MS., though it is difficult to
be certain. 32. Μ¹ Π¹ add η before άνθρωπος: we cannot tell
whether Vet. Int. found it in his text: see above on 1253 a 2. 36.
πρῶτον άνθρωπος καὶ είδωλον] Sus.¹: 'ad post venera et add. η,' but this
ad is expunged in η by dots placed beneath it. η adds ad here.
'Praespositionem cum plurium nominum casibus copulatam ante
unumquodque corum repetera solet Guilelmus' (Sus.¹, p. xxxiii).

1253 b 2-4. The reading followed in the text is that of
the first family of MSS. and the better variety of the second,
except that Μ¹ Π¹ read η οἰκία πάλιν in place of πάλιν οἰκία (Vet.
Int. rarissim domus), and that Γ in 3 had οἰκία in place of οἰκο-
νομία, unless indeed domus is a conjecture due to the translator.
The reading of Π¹ Κ Μ¹ Β Λ¹ (and also of Ο¹), on the other
hand, is as follows:—ονομακοιον for ονομακοιος περι οἰκονομιας ειτε
πρωτε ρασα γερ πολε ει οικια ον γειτοιοι. οικια δε μερη, ει δων
αιθις οικια συνισταται. Bekker follows the reading of these
MSS., substituting however αναγκαιουν for αναγκη, and in his second
edition περι οικιας for περι οικονομιας. But see above on 1253 a 12.
Οικονομιας δε μερη (not οικιας δε μερη) appears to be the true
reading, for οικονομιας here corresponds to οικονομιας 2 (which
is the reading of all extant MSS. and of Γ) and is confirmed by
τοιτε δε τι μερος (sc. οικονομιας) 12. Besides, if οικιας δε μερη
be read, the tautology in 3 seems excessive. 
Cp. also 1. 12. 1259 a 37, οτει δε τρια μερη της οικονομικης
ην. 17. δυναμεθα] δυναμεθα Μ¹ Π¹ Τ¹; Vet. Int. et utique . . .
politica, which represents καν . . . δυναμεθα (the reading of almost all
the MSS. of the second family), for in 1252 a 26 Vet. Int. renders
θεωρησαιν in utique contemplatitur, in 1253 b 8 aequitatem in
υν ει considerandum utique erit, in 1253 b 26 αναγκαιον in
υν ει necessarium utique erit, and so generally. 
In 1253 b 38 οιθαν in έθει is nihil utique or/us esset, in
1264 a 3 οικ in διαιθεν non utique latet. 19. o y z render politi
ych by politica (z politica), which is preferable to politia, the reading
adopted by Susemihl. 23. z adds manifestum quod after pars
dominus est, perhaps introducing into the text a conjectural emenda-
tion in the margin of its archetype, the object evidently being to

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obtain an apodosis. 24. ùdýwpatov kai ἵπτε] est after impossibile om. z, perhaps rightly. 25. ὀσπερ δὲ ταῖς [ὁσπερ ταῖς pr. O1 (corr.1 in marg. yr. ὀσπερ δὲ εὖ), but neither of these readings is probably the correct one, for the former is that of P 6 Ub L 4 Ald. (see as to these MSS. above on 1253 a 12 and 1253 b 2-4), and the latter, though adopted by Bekker, is found only in MSS. of little authority: Ar. (who translates ut vero in artibus) perhaps found it in his text. The best MSS. have ὀσπερ δὲ ταῖς. 26. μέλλει] Vet. Int. debeat, but this is no proof that he found μέλλει in his Greek text (see above on 1253 a 22). 27. τῶν οἰκονομικῶν] Π1 τῷ οἰκονομικῷ, but in 1256 b 36 Vet. Int. has yeconomico et politico (οἰκονομικοί καὶ πολιτικοί Π) wrongly beyond a doubt, and perhaps here the three texts of the first family are affected by a similar error. Ο1 τῶν οἰκονομικῶν: Ar. sic eliām in re familiari (τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ?). 33. 'ό om. M 4 del. P1' (Sus.). We cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found it in his text. O1 has ὡ, ἱδύνατο] 'Eta as syllabic augment in βούλωμα, δύναμι, μέλλω does not appear [in Attic Inscriptions] till after 284 B.C.' (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 78). All the MSS. have ἱδύνατο here and ἱδοὺλετο in 1259 a 16, but in 1307 a 31 M 4 P1 have ἱδύνατο, the reading of Π is uncertain, and Π2 have ἱδύνατο. 37. δύσεθαι] ὕποδύσεθαι ι Μ 4, possibly rightly, for Aristotle may not have preserved the metre in his quotation (compare the various readings in 1328 a 15 and 1338 a 25): O1 δύσεθαι: Ar. prodisse (δύσεθαι?). οὐκοι ai κερκίδες κέρκιζου] Vet. Int. sic si pectines pectinarent, but it is hardly likely that he found ei in his Greek text after οὐκοι.

1254 a 5. δ'] z om. autem (so M 4). 6. Here again Bekker in reading δεύτας δ' follows the less good MSS.: the better MSS. of both families have καὶ δεύτας. O1 has δεύτας δ', but καὶ has been added above the line with a caret before δεύτας, and then crossed out. τὴν αὐτὴν] hanc before candem om. z (with a g n), perhaps rightly.

9. τὸ τε γαρ μόριον] quod quidem enim pars, the reading of o as well as of several other MSS. of the Vet. Int., may perhaps be correct, and not quae quidem enim pars (Sus.), for in 1257 b 28 quod finis stands for τὸ τέλος.

10. ἀλως] Vet. Int. simpliciter (i.e. ἀπλῶς, cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 29-33): ἀπλῶς ἀλως Μ 4 Π1. See Susemihl’s apparatus criticus. Susemihl holds in his third edition, in opposition to a marginal remark in Π 2, that ἀλως is a gloss on ἀπλῶς and not ἀπλῶς on ἀλως, and that ἀπλῶς is the true reading. It seems strange, however, if that is so, that all the authorities for the text should read ἀλως in 13.

14. αὐτοῦ] So O1. 15. The reading ἀνθρωπος ὡν Π 4 pr. Π 1 etc. is supported by Alex. Aphrodis. in
Aristot. Metaph. p. 15, 6 (Bonitz), τὸν γὰρ δοῦλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἶναι ἐπίνει δὲ ἄνθρωπον ὡν ἄλλου ἐστίν, where, however, the Laurentian MS. of Alexander (L) has τὸν γὰρ δοῦλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν ἄλλου ὡστα καὶ μὴ ἕαυτοι: ἄνθρωπος δὲ P² and probably P¹ (for there is an erasure here in P¹), and also most of the less good MSS. O¹ has ἄνθρωπος, followed by δὲ expunged by dots placed beneath it, but whether these dots were placed under δὲ by the writer of the MS. or by a corrector, it is impossible to say. Ar., as Sus. notes, probably read δὲ, not ὡς, but this is not quite clear, for his rendering is—qui enim sui ipsius non est secundum naturam, sed (ἄλλα;) alterius homo, hic natura est servus. 'Lectio ἄνθρωπος ὡς unice vera videtur, si quidem est natura servus non is, qui quamquam natura alius hominis tamen ipse homo, sed is, qui quamquam homo tamen natura alius hominis est' (Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 341). Passing on to ἄλλου δὲ ἐστίν κ.τ.λ., we find in Vet. Int. alterius aulēm est homo, quia quinque res possessa aut servus est. He would therefore appear to have found in his text ὡς ὄν κτήμα ἡ δοῦλος ἡ, or perhaps ὡς ὄν κτήμα ἡ δοῦλος ὃς, which is the reading of M¹: the better MSS. have δοῦλος ὃς, those of less authority ἄνθρωπος ὃς. O¹ has ἄλλ' οἷος ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ὃς ὄν κτήμα ἡ (i.e. ἡ, for O¹ is without iota subscript) δοῦλος ὃς, and in the margin, added by the writer of the MS., ἃρι ἄνθρωπος ὃς. Ar. has—alterius aulēm est qui possidetur homo existens instrumentum ad acquirendum actum et separabile. He probably read ἄνθρωπος ὃς. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus for the various readings: he adds in his second or explanatory edition—'we must regard either δοῦλος ἐστίν or (which is less probable) ἄνθρωπος ὃς as the reading from which the other readings have arisen, but in either case this reading has proceeded from a mere dittography' (i.e. a repetition of ἄνθρωπος ὃς or δοῦλος ἐστίν in 15). Hence Susemihl reads [δοῦλος ἐστίν]. Busse, however (De praesidis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 22), attaches little importance to the est of the Vet. Int., who, he thinks, found, not δοῦλος ἐστίν, but δοῦλος ὃς (which can hardly be a dittography) in his Greek text, and rendered it freely by servus est (compare the renderings noticed above, p. lxv): he holds δοῦλος ὃς, however, to be 'hoc loco omni sensu destitutum,' and falls back on the reading ἄνθρωπος ὃς. This is, as has been said, the reading of the less good MSS., but by adopting it we escape the difficulty of supposing Aristotle to have used the word δοῦλος in his definition of the φύσει δοῦλος. Susemihl's latest remarks on this passage will be found in Qu. Crit. p. 340 sq. (1886). 39. τὸν γὰρ μοχθημὸν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. pestilentium enim et prave (the equivalent for φάὐλος in 1254 b 2)
se habentium. I know not what pestilentium stands for in Vet. Int., but μορθεία is rendered in 1303 b 15 by malitia, and in 1314 a 14 by malignitas. Vet. Int. omits to render ἀν, but this he occasionally seems to do (e. g. in 1256 a 4, 1265 a 39).

1254 b 14. Π1 add καὶ after χεῖρον, in which they are probably wrong: see below on 1260 a 26. 18. O1 (like P4) has καὶ τούτῳ ἕστιν ἐπὶ αὐτῶν. 23. λόγῳ Π1. Ar. nam cetera quidem animalia rationem non sentiunt: he would seem therefore to have read λόγου, as does O1. 34. γένουσι is rendered in most MSS. of Vet. Int. by fiunt. The reading of o is not sint (as Sus. with a query), but fiunt.

1255 a 5. καὶ before κατὰ om. Π1 pr. P3, etc., and Pseudo-Plutarch De Nobilitate. As to the De Nobilitate, if Volkmann's account of it (Leben Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch, 1. 118) is correct, no weight can be attached to its testimony. See also Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 14, 140, and Wyttenbach's notes (Plutarch, Moralia, tom. 5, pars 2, p. 915 sqq.). But in fact the passages quoted from Aristotle were not given in the MS., and were inserted by J. C. Wolf, the first editor of the work (see Volkmann and Wyttenbach), so that the text of them in the De Nobilitate possesses no sort of authority. 14. ζ adds et before violentiam pati, thus giving an equivalent for καὶ βιαζεταί, which none of the MSS. of the Vet. Int. known to Sus. appear to do. 16. Susemihl gives violentia as the equivalent in Vet. Int. for τὴν βλαν, but he notes that violentiam is found in a: it is also found in o y z and may probably be the correct reading. 29. ὅταν τούτῳ λέγουσιν] Vet. Int., according to Susemihl's text, cum hos dicunt, but o y z have cum hoc dicunt. Is hos a misprint? 35. I follow Π2 (and O1), which omit καὶ before ἐλεθερον: cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 15, ὅτι ἀσωτευόμενοι κατασκευάζομεν γίνονται πένθες (so Π1), and other passages collected by Vahlen, Poet. p. 216 sq. Et before liberum is omitted in z, but probably through an oversight. 37. No MS. gives ἐκγυνον, except Π1, which removes the iota of ἐκγυνον (sic) by placing a point under it, nor was ἐκγυνον found by Vet. Int. in his Greek text. This reading, like some other good ones peculiar to Π1, may well be due, as Susemihl points out (Sus. 3 pp. xiii-xiv), to the emending hand of Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of the MS.

1255 b 2. γενεσθαι] γενέσθαι Μs P14 O1, etc.: Vet. Int. fieri, which may represent either γενεσθαι or γενεσθαι (or indeed other forms, as it stands for γεγενενα in 1268 b 38, and for γεγενεσθαι in 1272 b 32). 12. Γ Μs pr. Π1 add τοῦ σώματος after μέρος: Sus. thinks that
1254 b 14—1255 b 26.

this may have been the original position of these two words, but it is possible that they may have been added in the margin to explain κεχωρισμένον δέ μέρος, and then have found their way into the text. Additions which may thus be accounted for occur occasionally in P46 Ls (see Susemihl's apparatus criticus in 1309 b 2, 1313 b 32, 1316 a 1), and also, though less often, in the first family of MSS. (e.g. in the passage before us, in 1259 b 14, in 1268 a 37, and possibly in 1335 a 37: see also below on 1263 a 12). 14. τούτων ἡ διαμερισμός II: qui natura tales dignificaretur Vet. Int., but it is doubtful whether he found τούτων in his text, for, as Busse remarks (p. 42), he translates τινες by quales in 1264 a 38: nevertheless, it is true that in 1284 a 9 he renders ἥξινωμεν τῶν ἱτων dignificati aequalibus, and that this is his usual way of rendering phrases of this kind, so that we expect his here rather than tales. Ar. quaequīer aliquid est quod simul proset et amicitia servit et domino invicem secundum naturam ita dispositis. 18. ἥ μὲν γὰρ . . . ἥ δὲ] 2 have quidem enim . . . hic (or hoc) autem (not hic quidem enim . . . hic autem, like almost all the other MSS.). 24. Ms P1 add ταῖς before Σεμικοίσισι: whether Vet. Int. found ταῖς in his text, we cannot tell from in Syracuse. ἐπαιδευέν] So O1: Ms P1 ἐπαιδευέν: Vet. Int. crucivit, which might represent either ἐπαιδευέν or ἐπαιδευειν, for in 1267 b 18 κατεσκεύαζε is constituit, in 1267 b 30 constituit: in 1267 b 31 ἐποίει is fecit, though in 33 δύναει is divi-debat. 20. πλεῖων II: see Bon. Ind. 618 b 13 sqq., and Liddell and Scott, s. v. Meisterhans (Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 68) observes—before long vowels we find throughout in Attic Inscriptions -ei (πλεῖων, πλείω, πλείους): before short vowels in the classical period (till 300 B.C.) -e (πλεῖον, πλεῖον, πλεῖον): in the post-classical period, on the other hand, -ei (πλεῖον, πλεῖον, πλεῖον): the neuter singular, however, even after 300 B.C. usually retains the simple vowel. τῶν τοιούτων] so II2 (and O1): 111 τούτων. ὄψωπηκή] ὄψωπητήκη rests only on the authority of Ms P1, for it is of course impossible to say whether Vet. Int. found ὄψωπητήκη in his text or ὄψωπητήκη. O1 (like P1) has ὄψωπηκή (or rather ὄψωπηκή), which probably points to ὄψωπηκή, for in 1258 a 37 pr. O1 has χρηματιστήκη. The same MSS. which here read ὄψωπηκή, read (if we allow for clerical errors) κεχωρισμένη in 1256 a 6, where Ms P1 (about Γ we cannot be certain) read κεχωρισμένη. All MSS. have τεκνοποιητήκη in 1253 b 10. 'In Plato ὄψωπηκή is now restored from MSS.' (Liddell and Scott). In Eth. Nic. 7. 13. 1153 a 26 and Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 4 ὄψωπητήκη is the form used, but in the latter passage the MSS. are not quite unanimous. In Metaph. K. 8.

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CRITICAL NOTES.

1064 b 21, Bekker, Bonitz, and Christ read ὑψοποική, but two MSS. (one of them A[b]) have ὑψοποιτική. In Eth. Nic. i. i. 1094 a 11 pr. K[b] (the best MS.) has χαλινοποικῆ. 35. μή αὐτοῦς κακοναθέων] Vet. Int. quod non ipsis malum patientur.

1256a 6. κερκιδοποικῆ] See above on 1255 b 26. 10. χαλκῶν] So π² (and O¹): χαλκῶς Γ P¹ and possibly M⁸. See explanatory note on this passage. Corr.² P² (i.e. the writer of P² in darker ink than that of the MS.), followed by Bekk., adds ἡ before ὑκονομικῆ, but Sus.¹ (p. xviii.) says of the corrections thus classed ---'maximam partem coniecturas sapiunt, etsi vix eas ex ipsius librari ingenio haustas esse crediderim,' and the erroneous additions of ἡ before ὑκονομικῆ in 1257 b 20, and σκοπεῖων before προσέκει in 1258 a 25, rest on the same authority. 12. τίς γὰρ? Most MSS. of Vet. Int. quod enim (ο quid enim), but z, like a, has quae enim. 16. πολλὰ] o multas rightly: is multae (Sus.) a misprint? 23. z, like a, has bestarum et enim, answering to τὸν τε γὰρ θαρύων. 30. πολὺ] πολλοὶ pr. O¹ (with P⁴, etc.), πολὺ corr.¹: M⁸ π² have the same blander in 1316 b 1. Vet. Int. multis, but he probably found πολλοῖ in his text. 31. οί μὲν οὖν] Vet. Int. qui guidem enim: he seems, therefore, to have read οί μὲν γὰρ, unless enim is a blunder, which is very possible. Three MSS. of Vet. Int. om. enim. 40. τοσοῦτοι σχεδόν] z tot ferre, retaining the order of the Greek text, and quae include for δοκεὶ γε, not quicunque, like the MSS. examined by Susemihl.

1256 b 1. πορίζονται] κομιζονται M⁸ P¹, and Γ if ferunt (Vet. Int.) represents κομιζονται, not πορίζονται, which perhaps is the case, for acquirere stands for πορίζουν in 1256 b 28, 1268 a 32, etc., though we have emergent for πορίζα in 1285 b 7. Πορίζεσθαι, however, seems the more probable reading, for we have πορίζοντες τὴν τροφὴν in 1268 a 32, and πορίζεσθαι τὴν τροφὴν occurs in De Gen. An. 3. i. 749 b 24 and Hist. An. i. i. 487 b 1. No instance of κομιζονται τὴν τροφήν is given in the Index Aristotelicus of Bonitz. O¹ πορίζονται. Ar. sibi praeparant (昳 πορίζονται?). 6. ὡς ἀν ἡ χρεία συναναγκαζή | quocunque modo et oportunitas compellat (where ετ and may possibly be intended to represent συν- in συναναγκαζή). 8. διδομένη] δεδομένη M⁸ P¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. data), but data is just as likely to stand for διδομένη, for facta represents γνωρίσθης in 1262 a 38 (cp. 1263 a 12, b 19, 1270 a 24, 1272 a 17), laudata ἐπαυγομένης in 1258 a 40, transmulatum metaβαλλόμενον in 1257 b 4, vocatam καλομένου in 1256 b 14. O¹ διδομένη. 9. τελειωθείσης] Vet. Int. secundum perfectionem or secundum perfectam (sc. generationem), for the reading is doubtful (yz secundum perfectam, and if I am right,
71 and but Ar. still yvvr) and I see rol 28. 36. :
P but **

o also, not secundum perfectionem, as Sus. with a query). Ar. sic etiam ad perfectionem deductis. 13. τοίς γενομένωις] τοῖς γενομένωις II (O) Bekk. : τοῖς γενομένωις M* P1 Bekk. Sus. Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. have genitis (so 2), or what probably stands for genitis, but Sus. finds generatis in two of them (k o): I must confess that after looking at o I feel doubtful whether the contraction found in it stands for generatis; still k remains. Genitis, however, is probably the true reading; but this may just as well stand for τοῖς γενομένωις (cp. 1258 a 35, where genito stands for τῷ γεννηθέντι) as for τοῖς γενομένωις or τοῖς γενομένωις. It is not impossible that Ar. found the last-named reading in his Greek text, for his translation is ad natorum educationem, and he renders τῶν γενομένων in 1335 b 22 and τὰ γενόμενα in 1336 a 16 by natos; but no MS. of the Politics has τοῖς γενομένωις. If we read τοῖς γενομένωις (=τοῖς τέκνοις, as in 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 18), there is a good deal of harshness in the use of γενομένωις in two different senses in 13 and 15, and γενομένωις 15 loses something of its point; it seems probable also that in 1335 b 18 the true reading is τὰ γενόμενα Π, not τὰ γενόμενα Π (so in De Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 24 τῷ γενομένῳ has apparently in some MSS. taken the place of the true reading τῷ γενομένῳ, which is found in Z and accepted by Aubert and Wimmer). I incline on the whole to adopt the reading which may well be that of Π, and to read τοῖς γενομένωις. Cp. Menex. 237 E, πάν γὰρ τὸ τεκὼν τροφῆν ἔχει ἐπιστηδείαν ὥσ ἄν τέκνη ὥς καὶ γυνὴ δὴ λαλεῖ τεκοῦσα τε ἀληθοῦς καὶ μή, ἄλλ' ὑποβαλλομένη, ἕαν μὴ ἥξῃ ποτὲ τροφῆς τῷ γενομένῳ. In Plato, Laws 930 D τὸ γενόμενον, τὸ γεννηθέν, τὸ γενομέννων are all used close together. 14. τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γυάλακτος φύσιν] Vet. Int. vocatam lactis naturam (τὴν καλουμένην?). 15. γενομένωις τελειωθείσαι Ar. Sus,12 forsitan recte, Sus, 3, who now places [γενο- μένωις] in his text; but I find in the New College MS. of Ar., and also in Bodl., quare similliter est genitis quomque existimandum plantasque animalium esse gratia et cetera animalium hominum causa. O1 γενομένωις: Vet. Int. genitis. 20. γίνοντας γένηται M* P1 and possibly also r (Vet. Int. fiani). 26. The text of Π and especially of G M* has suffered here from the intrusion of glosses: see Susemihl's apparatus criticus. Vet. Int. hoc praedatum bellum et primum (z however omits et with M* P1). Ar. ut natura id bellum iustum existit. 28. o y z have quarum est for ὧν ἐστὶ (in agreement with rerum). 32. ῥαγῇ pr. O1, but dots are placed under -ήν and ὧν is written above, probably by corr.1 36. οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ Γ: see note on 1253 b 27. Ar. multitudo instrumentorum rei familiaris et rei publicae.
1257 a 3. Vet. Int. either misread ἐκεῖνης as κειμένη or found κειμένη in his text, for he states postea. Ar. sed neque est idem neque valde remotum. He fails to render ἐκεῖνης, but then he also fails to render τῷ εἴρημένη. 6. κτήματος] χρήματος Μ8 and probably also Γ, for Vet. Int. has reи, not reи possessae (reи, however, stands for πράγματος in 8). 10. Sus.2 by a misprint omits γάρ after καί. 17. ἥ] qua o rightly: y z quare (with most MSS. of Vet. Int.). 38. καί τι] καί τι P1, and possibly Γ also (Vet. Int. et sl); Vet. Int., however, occasionally fails to render àν (see above on 1254 a 39). 40. ἐπιθελλόντων] ἐπιθελόντων P1, Bekk.2, Sus. (Vet. Int. imprimentibus might stand for either reading). For ἀπολύση the MSS. of Vet. Int. have absolvent: so y z, and also O, though Susenhiel gives its reading (with a query) as absolvol.

1257 b 7. εναι om. Π1: see note on 1252 a 8. Here it can hardly be spared. 11. καί νόμος] Ο1 καί εἰς νόμον, but the breathing over εἰς has been struck through, and corr.1 has written something ending in -ος (probably καί νόμος) in the inner margin, where the binding partly conceals the correction. See Susenhiel’s apparatus criticus on this passage. 12. οὔτε] So O4 (with Π): οὐδὲ Bekk. Sus.: but cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 8, ὥστε πολλάκις οὐ κοινωνοῦσι τῆς ἐκκλησίας οὔτε (so Π: οὐδὲ Bekk. Sus.) τοῦ δικάζειν: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 7, εἶν μή (so Π2 Bekk.: μήτε Π1 Sus.) ζυβρίζῃ τις αὐτοὺς μήτε ἀφαιρήται μηδὲν τῆς οὐσίας. 15. ἀπολέσαι] Vet. Int. perit, cp. 1263 b 28, where he renders στερηθονται by pricantur, and see below on 1262 a 2. 20. ἡ δὲ κατάλεικη, ποιητική κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. campsporia autem factiva pecuniarum, etc., which shews how he interpreted the passage and punctuated it. 21. ἀλλ’ ἥ] Vet. Int. sed, not sed aut, as in 1305 b 15, or nisi, as in 1272 a 11 and 1286 a 37. 24. οὕτως om. Π1: compare, however, 2. 11. 1273 a 9, where Π1 om. οὕτως, 3. 17. 1288 a 29, where Π1 om. τούτων, and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 11, where Π1 omit τούτω. It is of course possible that Π2 are wrong in adding these words in the four passages, but the use of οὕτως in the passage before us at any rate, followed by the explanation ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, is characteristically Aristotelian (cp. 5 (8)). 5. 1340 a 32–34: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 23). See also 1258 b 8. We must bear in mind that Π1 are prone to omit words. Ο1 has οὕτως. 33. ὁρῶ ΓΠ, and so Ο1: z has videmus, but the symbol for -mus is over an erasure; γ, however, has videre (the first two letters of this word in γ project slightly into the margin and may have been tampered with), and though ὁ has video, the last two letters are over an erasure, the original reading having apparently occupied less space than video, for the last letter of this word is in actual
contact with the first letter of *accidens*, a perpendicular line being drawn to separate the two words. Possibly therefore the original reading of o was *vide* (= *videmus*). "Or científico not is perhaps impossible, for we find λίγο, Pol. 3. 13. 1283 b 1: 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 19: *rithµa*, Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 23: ῥάθµον, Phys. 8. 5. 257 b 22: *μοι δοκεῖ σηµαινεῖν*, Meteor. 1. 3. 339 b 23 (where, however, Blass—*Rhein. Mus.* 30. 500—suspects that Aristotle is quoting from one of his own Dialogues): *διεσκάτων* MS. P² Qb Vb Ls Ald. (*divinitus* Vet. Int.: *διεσκάτωσα* P¹ Bekk.) in Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 2, but perhaps Göttling and Sus. (following corr. P¹) are right in reading *διεσκάτων* in this passage, for in 1290 a 24 the MSS. and Vet. Int. agree in reading *διεσκάτων*. The emendation *διεσκάτων* dates as far back as Sepulveda and Victorius, and indeed earlier, for it appears, as we have just seen, in one or two MSS. of Vet. Int.: Bekker adopts it in both his editions, as does also Susemißl, though he brackets the termination. 35. *ἐπαλλάττει]* _variari_ z (not _variari_) probably rightly, for _variari_, not _variare_, is the equivalent for *ἐπαλλάττειν* in the _teus versio_ (cp. 1255 a 13. 1317 a 2). 36. _ἐκατέρα_ | _ἐκاτέρα_ *vetusta et emendatoria exemplaria* mentioned by Sepulveda (see p. 19 of his translation); three MSS. also of the Vet. Int. (b g h) have _uterique pecuniature* and _ἐκατέρα_ is the reading translated by Leonardus Arctinus (*variari enim usus eiusdem existens uteriusque acquisitionis, eiusdem enim est usus acquisitio, sed non secundum idem*); but all known MSS. of the Politics have _ἐκατέρα_, and most of the MSS. of the Vet. Int. have _uterque_ (agreeing with _usus_). z has _uterque_, altered into _uterique_, not, I think, _uterique_ altered into _uterque_. If we read _ἐκατέρα_, two uses of _χρηµατιστική_ are referred to, and this seems to suit better with _ἐπαλλάττει_ than ῥ _χρησις_ _ἐκατέρα_ τῆς _χρηµατιστικῆς_; if _ἐκατέρας_, two kinds of _χρηµατιστική_ are referred to, whose ‘use’ (not ‘uses’) ‘overlaps’ (ἐπαλλάττει). Perhaps we rather expect to hear of two uses than of one use. Hence on the whole _ἐκατέρα_ seems preferable, but _ἐκατέρα_ might so easily take the place of _ἐκατέρας_ that the true reading is doubtful. 39. *tῆς ὧν αὐξησις*] Vet. Int. adds *πῦris* after _augumentatio_, but probably without any equivalent in his Greek, as Sus. remarks (Sus.¹ p. xxxiv).

1258 a 2. z adds _et_ before _ipsius_ (answering to _kai_ before _τοῦ_ _ἔως_. Sus.¹: ‘ _et_ post _autem_ librariorum culpa excidisse quam a Guilielmo omission esse verisimilium duco.’ As to _ipsius_, it should be noted that, as Dittmeier has shown (‘ _Quae ratio inter vetustam Aristotelis Rhetoricorum translationem et Graecos codices intercedat,’ p. 34), William of Moerbecke in his translation of the Rhetoric often renders the article by _ipse_—e. g. in Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 16,
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where for ἓδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ἔπν we find de lectationis et ipsius vivere. 7. οὕσης] z rightly omits non before existente: all the MSS. known to Sus. add it: y probably had non before existente originally, though iam occupies its place now over an erasure. 32-34. Pr. O¹ has here—ἀλλὰ τῆς ἱατρικῆς, οὕτω καὶ περὶ χρηματιστικῆς ἔστι μὲν δὲ τοῦ οἰκονόμου ἔστι β΄ ὡς οὐ, ἀλλὰ τῆς κέρδου ὑποπρετίκης, but corr. adds in the margin γρ. ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, and κέρδους is expunged by dots placed beneath. For the various readings offered by P⁴ 6 Q Ls in this passage, see Susemihl’s appara tus criticus. See also above on 1253 a 12. These MSS. perhaps follow some gloss or paraphrase.

1258 b 1. μεταβλητικῆς] μεταβολικῆς M⁵ P¹, here alone, for in 1257 a 9, 15, 28, 1258 b 21, 29 these MSS. (like P²) have the form μεταβλητικῆ, nor is the word used elsewhere by Aristotle apparently. We cannot tell from translatavis whether Vet. Int. found μεταβολικῆς or μεταβλητικῆς in his Greek text, for he translates τῆς μεταβλητικῆς in 1258 b 21, 29 by translativae. 4. ἐφ’ ὑπὲρ ἐπορισθη] So P² (and O¹) with Ar. (et non ad quod inductus est): ἐφ’ ὑπὲρ ἐπορισμέθα P¹ (Vet. Int. super quo quidem acquisivimus). 7. P¹ add ἐκ before νομίσματος, which P² (and O¹) omit. 10. τοῖς] Vet. Int. quibus, but he has quales for τίνες in 1264 a 38. 27. τρίτον] τέταρτον γ M⁵ pr. P¹, apparently a mistaken attempt at emendation. 30. τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γυνομένων] ο ὑ ἐκ a terra genitus, ζ ex altera genitis. 33. περὶ ἐκάστου] Here, as Sus. has already noted, o alone among the MSS. of the Vet. Int. has preserved the true reading—de uxorique. 36. O¹ (with P⁴ and some other MSS. which Bekker follows) adds τῆς before τίχης: see below on 1270 b 19. 40. Χαρπητηθὴν] Χάρπητε (χάρτι M⁵) δὴ P Bekk. Many of the MSS. of the Vet. Int., however, and z among them, have caritide. Ar. a carile (Bodl. charite) pario.

1259 a 10. In the fourth century B.C. the forms ἐλαῖοι, ἐλαῖας, ἐλαῖον take the place of ἐλαῖα, etc., in Attic inscriptions (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 14), but here all the MSS. seem to have ἐλαῖω, as all have Πειραιᾶ in 1303 b 11, though some have πειρεᾶ in 1267 b 23. 13. Most of the MSS. have ἐλαιοφρύγων, though some spell or accentuate it wrongly: P¹ has ἐλαιοφρύγεων: P⁴ has ἐλαιοφρύγων, O¹ ἐλαιοφρύγων, and so G apparently, for Vet. Int. has olivarum cultoribus. Ἐλαιοφρύεια is the word used in the citation from Hieronymus Rhodius in Diog. Laert. 1. 26, which may possibly be a reproduction of the passage before us, and Liddell and Scott adopt this form of the word (not ἐλαιοφρύγων). In 1295 b 17 P² has ἰδασκαλίωις, P³ 4 Ald. ἰδασκαλεῖοις, P¹ (probably
wrongly) διδασκάλων. 16. ἡζούλετο] See above on 1253 b 33. 
28. ἐπιλαθεῖν] O\(^1\) has ἐπιλαθεῖν with ò superscribed over ò, apparently by the writer of the MS.: no other MS. gives this reading, which is no doubt wrong: see, however, Schneider ad loc. τοῖτον] τοῖτο (Bekk.) is found only in one MS. and that an inferior one. ò Διωνύσιος\(^\circ\) ò om. Ms P\(^1\): whether ò omitted it also, it is of course impossible to say. In 1252 b 14 Ms P\(^1\) give the ò to Charondas, which here they deny to Dionysius. 31. τὸ μίντοι ὅραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῖτο] Vet. Int. quod vero visum fuít Thali et huic (ò quod vero iussum fuerit Thali et huic). Sus. suspects that the translator found τὸ μίντοι ὅραμα Θάλη καὶ τοῖτο in his text: more probably he found τὸ μίντοι ὅραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῖτον (unless he misread τοῖτο as τοῖτον). This is a possible reading, but all MSS. have τοῖτο. See note in Sus.\(^3\), who now reads Θάλεω καὶ τοῖτο. "Ὅραμα has been variously emended, but Mitchell (Indices Graecitatis in Orat. Att. 2. 581) gives it as occurring, apparently in a similar sense to that which it bears here, in [Demosth.] Procm. 55. p. 1460, 26, ὅραμα τοῖτο ἐποιεῖτο ὃ δῆμος αὐτοῖ τοῦ καλῶν, ὃ ἀνδρεὶς Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ λαυτελές τῇ πόλει, and it suits well with κατανόημα 7 and κατανόησαντα 10. 37. μήρη om. P\(^3\)\(^3\)\(^4\), etc. (also O\(^1\)). It is not perhaps quite certain that P\(^1\) are right in adding it. 39. Almost all MSS. of Vet. Int. (including o y) have præest, but ἄρχειν is undoubtedly right: z has præesse, which appears to be found in only one of the MSS. known to Sus. (b).
1259 b 16. τὸ νεώτερον] ζ has iuvenius rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. iuvenem. 28. σχεδὸν δὲ] The weight of manuscript authority is in favour of δὴ in place of δὲ, for of the better MSS. only pr. P\(^1\) has δὲ: Vet. Int., however, has autem. Δὲ seems to be right, answering to μὲν ὄνω 21. 31. καὶ before ἀκλαστος om. P\(^1\). 35. δὲιν ἢν] o oportet utique, but oportebat utique, the reading of the other MSS., is probably right (see above on 1253 b 17).
1260 a 3. διαφοράς] διαφοράς Γ (Vet. Int. huius autem esse differentiae), and so probably pr. O\(^1\), for the accent of διαφοράς is over an erasure: y z have huius autem differentiae, omitting esse (in z, however, differentiae is over an erasure). ἀδὲπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἄρχομενοι] Susenihl's text of the Vet. Int. here runs, quemadmodum et natura principiantium et subiectorum, and he thinks that the Vet. Int. found ἄρχοντων καὶ added in his Greek text between φύσει and ἄρχομενον. But it would seem from the apparatus criticus to his text of the Vet. Int. (Sus.\(^1\) p. 53), that of the nine MSS. used by him (a b c g h k l m o), one (o) omits et natura principiantium, making the passage run quemadmodum et subiectorum, and seven (b c g h k l m) read quemadmodum natura et subiec-
torum (so y), except that later hands add principantium after natura in b and the margin of l. Thus the reading adopted by Susemihl was apparently found by him only in a. I have found it, however, in z, which gives the passage thus—sit autem (esse om. z) differentiæ, quemadmodum et natura principantium et subjunctorum. Whether Vet. Int. found ἀρχώτων καὶ in his Greek text is, however, quite another question. Ar. quemadmodum in his quae natura obediet. O¹ has ὁσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἄρχομενων, but corr.¹ has inserted a caret after φύσει and adds in the margin ἀρχώτων καὶ (a dot, however, has been placed under each of these words to expunge it—by whom, it is impossible to say). It is conceivable that Vet. Int. found a similar correction in the margin of the Greek text used by him, and translated it. 4. ὑφηγηται ὑφηγεῖται Π¹ (Vet. Int. exemplificatur : exemplificabitur a z). 15. Ar. is said by Sus.¹ ² to add δὲ after ὑπολυπτέαν, but his translation runs in the New College MS. and in Bodl.—codem modo se habere necesse est circa morales virtutes, putandum est omnes participes esse oportere sed non codem modo, sed quantum cuique opus est. 20. ἔστιν o z have est, in place of et, before moralis rightly (Susemihl reads et and does not mention that o has est). 21. πάντων] M⁸ P¹ have ὅπαντων: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. omnium, which reading he found in his text. 22. φέτο Σωκράτης] O¹ ὑέτω Σωκράτης (P⁴ φέτο ὁ Σωκράτης). 26. ἀρετῇ] Vet. Int. has virtute (= ἀρετῇ, which is the reading of pr. M⁸). τό ὀρθοποιαγείν] I follow P² ³ S⁷ b T⁷ (z has est in place of aut after virtute, but over an erasure) in omitting ἥ before τό ὀρθοποιαγείν: see Vahlen, Poet. p. 136 and Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 1, p. 52, where among other passages the following are referred to—Poet. 8. 1451 a 20, Ἦρακληδια Ἰσηνίδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήματα: Rhet. 2. 12. 1388 b 33, ὅργην ἑπτάμων καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα (in the passage before us we have ἥ instead of καὶ). Cp. also 2. 3. 1262 a 12, φράταρα φιλεῖν, where Π om. ἥ (see Vahlen, Poet. p. 216): Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 b 34, οἶνον ἰατροὶ γραφεῖσι (M⁵ b O¹): Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 23, ὀδοὺς θρίξ ὀτιοῦ K⁰ O¹ ³ (θρίξ ὀδοὺς ὀτιοῦ L⁰ b O¹), where other MSS. have ὀδοὺς ἡ θρίξ ἡ ὀτιοῦ: Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 10, οἶνον ἰππαρχεῖν ἵππαρ- χηδέα, στρατηγεῖν στρατηγηθέατα καὶ ταξιαρχῆσαι καὶ λαχαγῆσαι (where no MS. has καὶ before στρατηγεῖν, though Vet. Int. has et before his equivalent for it): 6 (4). 1291 b 23–25, where δὲ is absent after πορθμικῶν, though Vet. Int. has autem : 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 1, where ἡ M⁵ Π² om. ὅτι: 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 27, λέγω δ' ἀντικείσαθα τοὺς ἐπικείσαι τῷ πλῆθος, τοὺς ἀπόρους τοῖς εὐπόροις M¹ P¹ (other MSS. add καὶ before τοὺς ἀπόρους). 31. ὁ παῖς] ὁ om. M⁸ P¹: we have no means of knowing whether Vet. Int. found it in his text. 32.
tων τέλειων καὶ (in place of τοῦ τέλος καὶ) P46 L. Ald. Ar. (sed ad perfectum et ducentum) Bekk. O1 has τῶν τέλειων καὶ, but in the margin, probably added by corr.1, τοῦ τέλους καὶ. See above on 1258. a 32 and 1253 a 12. Here also perhaps these MSS. follow a gloss or paraphrase: Aristotle's language in 1. 12. 1259 b 3 may well have suggested it. 36. ἀλλείψη] O1 ἀλλείψηι (or rather ἀλλείψει), and so too pr. P3: all other MSS. apparently have ἀλλείψη: Vet. Int. deficiat, which may possibly represent ἀλλείψη, but we cannot be sure of this, for after lantat ut he could use nothing but the subjunctive. Bekk.1 ἀλλείψη: Bekk.2 Sus. ἀλλείψει. 37. ἀρα] ἀρά pr. O1, changed into ἀρά probably by a corrector, for the circumflex is in darker ink than that used in the MS.

1260 b 17. O1 adds καὶ before τοῖς παῖδας (with Π2). 18. corr.1 O1 adds εἶναι in darker ink after γιναίκας: a m z add esse after μαζές. 19. οἱ κοινωνοὶ] Vet. Int. has dispensatores: Sus. thinks he found οἰκονόμοι in his text in place of οἱ κοινωνοί, and adopts this reading. All MSS., however, have οἱ κοινωνοὶ, and is it not, to say the least, possible that Vet. Int. here as elsewhere has misread the Greek?

BOOK II.

1260 b 27. 'Επει δὲ] Π1 om. δὲ, but omissions in Π1 are not infrequent, and δὲ, which hardly suits the present ending of Book I., may possibly be a survival from some earlier state of the text. 28. τίς] ἤ P23 pr. P4, etc. (so O1): τίς M8 P1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. quae). Perhaps ἤ is more likely to have been substituted for τίς here than τίς for ἤ. Cp. Metaph. Z. 1. 1028 b 6, διὸ καὶ ἢμιν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μόνον ὡς εἰπεῖν περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ὄντος θεωρητέον τί ἐστιν. 31. κἂν εἰ τινες ἐπεραί τυγχάνοντι] καὶ εἰ M*: about Γ we cannot be certain, though Vet. Int. has et si quae aliae existant, for he occasionally fails to render ἄν (see above on 1254 a 39). Nor does existant in Vet. Int. enable us to pronounce with certainty that he found τυγχάνοντι in his Greek text, for in 1270 a 27 he renders κἂν ἀποθανεῖ et si moriatur. As to τυγχάνοντι, see explanatory note. 36. εἰσιδιασθαί] So O1: εἰσιδιάλειςθαι M8 P1: inserere (Vet. Int.) may represent either. 40. πολιτεία Π: 2 civilitas (with g h l o, y civilitas with dots under ἤ): most MSS. of Vet. Int. civitas (and so Ar.). The same contraction ‘may stand for πόλις, πόλις, πόλεως, πόλεως, πόλεως, and even πολιτεία, though the last word is most often expressed by another contraction’ (Gardthausen, Gr.
Palaeographie, pp. 246, 256). This perhaps explains the occasional interchange of politeia, polithe, and pole: thus politeias takes the place of pudoeis in P1 1294 b 39, politeion of polieion in P4 etc. 1292 a 9, and politeion of politeion in T 3b 1265 b 34, while in 1318 a 9 P1 have polei, P2 politeia. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus in 1326 b 5, 1333 a 11 also. I retain politeia here, though not without hesitation. See explanatory note. Sus.12 πώλεις, Sus.3 politeia. 41. Here Vet. Int. alone has preserved the true reading eis o της (unus qui unius): Ἰσότης π (Ar. parilas). Only a fraction, however, of the MSS. of Vet. Int. give this reading. Of those used by Sus. only one (g) has unus as its original reading (in four, a b k l, a later hand has substituted unus): nullus pr. a b, alius c h and pr. k l, illius m. Qui again is quod in c g h m and pr. k l. Hence it is important to note that z has unus qui unius as its original and only reading. The reading of o is alius quod unius: in y eius quid unius has been first written, but eius has been erased by dots placed beneath it and unus written above, apparently in the same ink and handwriting as the MS.

1261 a 2. Vet. Int. fails to render πάντων, but see above, p. lxiii, note 12, for other cases in which he omits words or phrases. 6. εν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος] So O1, but τῇ after politia is added above the line with a caret—whether by the writer of the MS., is uncertain. Vet. Int. in politia Platonis. P234 have the reading adopted in the text. 11. δι’ ἥν αὐτῶν] z perhaps rightly has causa, not causam. 15. ὃς ἄριστον ἐν ὧτι μάλιστα πᾶσαν] So P1: the order is different in P2 (and O1), which read πάσαν ὃς ἄριστον ὧτι μάλιστα in place of ὃς ἄριστον ἐν ὧτι μάλιστα πᾶσαν: the latter order, however, though more rugged, is perhaps more Aristotelian. These MSS. also, as will be noticed, omit ἐν, probably because ἄριστον precedes it, just as Ms P1 omit ἐν after δούλον in 1252 b 9. 18. ἐστίν ἡ πώλεω] ἐστὶ πώλεω Ms P1: whether Vet. Int. found the article in his text, we cannot say. All MSS., however, have ἡ πώλεως in 23. 27. ἐλκύσθη] ἐλκύσει P1: Vet. Int. quemadmodum utique si pondus amplius traheb, but it is not by any means certain that traheb represents elkuses. It may represent elkases or elkases (cp. 1253 b 16, where κἂν εἰ τι δυναμένα is rendered in Vet. Int. by ei utique si quid poterimus): on the other hand, in 1263 b 34 ὅπερ κἂν εἰ τις ποιήσας is rendered quemadmodum utique si quis faciat. With the exception of P1 and the possible exception of Γ, all the MSS. here read elkuses, and I have retained it, marking it however as strange, for we look rather for the optative. There is some harshness about elkuses. Ar. ceu si pondus magis allrahat. 30. γενέσθαι] O1
γίνεσθαι (Sus., in note, γίνεσθαι?). 35. μετέβαλλον] μετέβαλλον Ms P1: quemadmodum utique si transmutarentur (Vet. Int.) leaves the reading of γ uncertain.

1261 b 2 sq. Here Π² read: ἐν τούτῳ δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τούς ἴσους εἰκών (so O¹: οἶκὼν two or three MSS.) ὁμοίους (so P3: ὁμοίους Π² C⁴ Bekk., also O¹) τοῖς ἐξ ἄρχης. Ms P1: τοῦτο δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοῖς ἴσους εἰκών τὸ δ’ ὡς ὁμοίους εἶναι ἐξ ἄρχης. Vet. Int. hoc autem imitatur scilicet in parte aequales cedere hoc (tōδ’ Ἕ) lanquam similis sint a principio: scilicet here probably represents τὸ, as in 1261 b 16, 1274 a 16, b 12, and it is also probable, though not absolutely certain, that lanquam similis sint stands for ὡς ὁμοίους εἶναι. Ar. et in eo imitari vicissim equivalent eadem invicem alios aliis. See explanatory note. 4. κατὰ μέρος om. Π¹, but these MSS. are somewhat prone to omit. 5. καὶ om. Π² Bekk. So O¹, which adds τὸν before ἄρχηνων with P¹. Ar. codem modo illorum qui regunt alii alios gerunt (so New Coll. MS.: regunt Bodl.) magistratus. 7. οὐ for οὖν Π¹: οὖν followed by καὶ occurs, though rarely, in Aristotle—e.g. in De Part. An. 4. 14. 697 b 16 οὖν is followed by καὶ οὐ. Cp. also Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 18 sq. Π¹, it must be remembered, are prone to omit, and in 1264 a 1 they have μῆ γι γι for μήδε, just as in 1265 a 18 Ms P¹ have μῆ γι for μηδὲν and in 1268 b 16 γ Ms pr. P¹ have οὐ for οὖν. 10. οὐ om. Ms P¹ (about γ we cannot be certain), but wrongly. In addition to this passage Socrates is not referred to in the Second Book as one of the interlocutors in the "Republic" of Plato 13 times (1261 a 6, 12, 16: b 21: 1262 b 6, 9: 1263 b 30: 1264 a 12, 29: b 7, 24, 37: 1265 a 11), and in not one of these passages is the article absent; its authenticity in 1261 b 19 is thus placed beyond doubt, especially as the reason why it is added is not far to seek; the reference, in fact, is not to the historical Socrates, but to Socrates as one of the dramatis personae of the "dialogue" (Dittenberger, Gött. gel. Anz. Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1359). It is, however, true that all MSS. omit the article in 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 23, where the Platonic Socrates is apparently referred to. 25. τοῖς om. Ms P¹ about γ we cannot be certain. 35. πρὸς ... τοῖς ἀλλοις] Vet. Int. apud alios (πρὸς misread παρὰ?). 1262 a 2. λέγει] Vet. Int. dicet (and Ar., following as he often does in his wake, dicent), but in 1281 a 19 he has corruptet for φθείρει, and in 1257 b 15 perl for ἀπολείτα, in 1263 b 28 prívātur for στρήσουσαι. It is very doubtful whether these variations of tense in Vet. Int. represent variations in γ (see above, p. lxiii, notes 10 and 11). 3. τῶν ἀριθμῶν | After τῶν ἀριθμῶν Π¹ add ἄν (Bekker and St. Hilaire, but not Sus., also find ἄν in pr. P²):
perhaps, however, it may well be dispensed with in the passage before us (compare such phrases as ὧτῳι τῶν ἔτυχον 3. 15. 1286 b 24, and see Bon. Ind. 778 b 4 sqq.). "Οὐ additum ab aliquo qui Phrynichi praecipita sectabatur: sed vide Lobeck. ad Phryn. p. 277, ad Soph. Aj. 9' (Göttl. p. 311). τοῦ δείσος] Vet. Int. hiitis filius, possibly misreading τοῦ δείσος as τοῦτο ιόν. 12. ἕτερον] See explanatory note. As to φράτορα, see Liddell and Scott s. v.: the form used in Attic Inscriptions is φράτηρ, not φράτωρ (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 63). Vet. Int. has aut before contribuunt, but see above on 1260 a 26. 20. γενόμενα] Ό1 γενόμενα. 21. καὶ γυναῖκες] et (not etiam) femellae o z. om. P3, probably owing to homoeoteleon, and o omits haec autem voluntaria, probably from the same cause. 28. γυναῖκα is altered to γυνίσχα in O1 (by whom, I cannot say). 29. ὥσπερ πρὸς τὸν ἀποθετ恶 Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. have quemadmodum et eos qui longe, but a z substitute et ad for et. For the addition of et by Vet. Int., see above on 1252 a 25. ἀποθεν MS P14 L'Ald.: cp. 1280 b 9, ἀποθεν MS P134 Qb Tb Ald., and 1280 b 18, ἀποθεν P (the Vatican Palimpsest has ἀποθε in 9 and ἀποθεν in 18). "Ἀποθεν seems to be the reading commonly found in the MSS. of Aristotle, but ἀποθετεν is the Attic, or at least the old Attic, form (Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 60: Liddell and Scott, s. v. ἀποθετεν). 30. ἀλλά] ἀ τί MS pr. P1.

1262 b 7. τε om MS P1: Vet. Int. guidem, which probably represents γε. Ar. has enim only, but may well have found τε γιὰρ in his Greek text. 8. ταῖς πόλεσι] z adds in before civitatisbus (in 1261 b 8 we have μέγιστον ἁγάθων ἐν ταις πόλεσι). 13. συμφύναι] συμφύνα P23 etc. Bekk. (also O1), but συμφύναι MS P1 (συμφύναι pr. P4, συμφύναι corrig. P4) may not impossibly be what Aristotle wrote (though Plato in the passage referred to, Symp. 191 Α, has of course συμφύνα), for in Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 22 Kβ has συμφύνα. Peculiar verbal forms are occasionally used by Aristotle; we have, for instance, προῳδοποιοῦμενοις in 1270 a 4, πυεῖσθαι in Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 b 18. 21. νιῶν] So O1, though P4 (with Π1) has νιῶν: Ar. vel patrem ut filii. 32. τῶν φιλάκας] om. MS P1 (so Sus.22: P1 only according to Sus.1). Vet. Int. places his equivalent for these words (custodes) after δοθέντες: custodes may of course represent either τῶν φιλάκας or οἱ φιλάκας, but it is hardly likely that Vet. Int. found the latter reading in his text. 33. In reading φιλάκαν I follow Π1: φιλάκαν εἰς Π2 Bekk. (and O1). Almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int., however, have for καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τῶν φιλάκαι τῶν ἠλλοις πολίτας et rursum qui advers alios civēs: Sus. follows a,
which adds custodes after apud, probably rightly (so too z). Ar. translates 31 sqq., o.V yap ev κ.τ.λ., nam non amplius appellant custodes fratres et filios et patres et matres qui (here the New College MS., but not Bodl., adds ab) aliis civibus deduntur et rursus qui ex custodibus aliis civibus. 40. χωφὶς κ.τ.λ.] seorsum ex légum statuto o, but the last letter of statatum is over an erasure.

1263 a 2. πάι] Vet. Int. omnes: M8 παισον. This variation, like that in 1266 a 4, was probably occasioned by an ambiguous contraction. 12. Π1 add ἄλλ' αὖνὸς after ἵνων, and these authorities may possibly be right, for cases of 'abundantia contraria copulandi' are not rare in Aristotle (Vahlen, Aristot. Poet. p. 88), and ἄλλ' αὖνὸς might easily drop out after ἵνων through homoeoteleuton, but perhaps it is more likely that ἄλλ' αὖνὸς is a marginal remark which has crept into the text: see above on 1255 b 12 and cp. 1268 a 37, where Γ M8 add ἐτερον εἶναι after βούλειται ὦ ὁ νομοθέτης. 13. πρὸς τοῖς ἀπολαίοντας μὲν [ἡ λαμψιώνος] πολλὰ] Vet. Int. ad fruentes quidem, si (ἰ for ἡ) accipiantes quidem multa: λαμψιώνοις or λαμψιώνος μὲν may possibly be an alternative reading which has crept from the margin into the text, together with the ἡ introducing the suggestion (see Vahlen on ἡ ναι, Poet. 4. 1449 a 7). 23. καὶ before ἐπικοσμηθέν om. Π1. ἔθετο] So Π1 (with Π2), rightly in all probability (see explanatory note): ἔθει Π1. 29. ἐκάστῳ προσεδρέυοντες Γ M8 Sus. 34. χρήται κοινῶς] Vet. Int. ultra tanquam communibus. 36. κῶν δηθόων κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. si indigent pro viaticis in agris per regionem (a z rec. b per regionem: the other MSS. peregrinationem, except κ which has peregrinationum). As to the addition of pro, see above on 1253 a 10 and below on 1263 b 41. Vet. Int. appears to read ἀν instead of κῶ, but then he often omits to render καὶ.

1263 b 4. καὶ τῶν] 'καὶ τὸ Π1 Ar.' (Sus.)—very possibly only a conjectural emendation, like some other readings peculiar to Π1 Ar. (see Sus.3, p. xiv). The rendering in Ar. is quemadmodum et amatio pecuniaria, which probably represents καθάπερ καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματα, or possibly τὸ φιλοχρήματον εἶναι, for τὸ φιλοχρήματον εἶναι is rendered a line or two above by amatio sui. 6. τῆς κτήσεως . . . ἀβαγη] a z omit in before possessiones perhaps rightly. 7. o.V om. Π1. 9. and 11. τὸ om. Μ1 Π1: Vet. Int. temperantiae quidem circa mulieres (so in 11 liberalitatis autem circa possessiones), but we cannot tell from this what he found in his text, for he sometimes renders the article and sometimes does not. 18. ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν] z aliterque et cum, answering to the Greek more closely than the reading of Susemihl's MSS. aliterque cum (cp. 1269 b 24, where aliterque et si}

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stands for ἄλλος τε κάν].  21. ψευδομαρτυρίων] So all MSS. here, though in 1274 b 6 all have ψευδομαρτυρίων: even here, however, two MSS. of Vet. Int. (a z) have falsorum testium, not falsorum testimoniorum.  28. στερήσονται] Vet. Int. pridantur: see above on 1262 a 2.  32. πάντως] Ms pr. P1 πάντι: Vet. Int. omnino, which represents πάντως in 1257 b 21, πάντι in 1302 a 3.  34. χείρων πῶλος] Vet. Int. adds ertia before deterior civitas, and it is perhaps on his authority that Vict. and Bekker read ἔσται χείρων πῶλος, but ἔσται is omitted in all the MSS., and, as we have seen (above, p. lxii, note 2), Vet. Int. occasionally adds the auxiliary verb without support from MSS. Aristotle is sparing in its use.  41. τοῖς συστήσεις] Vet. Int. pro convívibus: see above on 1253 a 10 and 1263 a 36.

1264 a 1. μηδὲν] μηδὲν Π1: but see above on 1261 b 7.  8. Susemihl has apparently adopted the form fauria throughout his third edition, and it is true that in 1300 a 25 and 1309 a 12 all the MSS. examined by him, and in the passage before us nearly all of them, and in 1280 b 37 the best MSS., have this form. So again, in 1319 b 24 all the better MSS. except P3 have fauria. See however Liddell and Scott s. v.  9. Vet. Int. adds et after his equivalent for ὡστε, but, as Busse points out (p. 29 sq.), he does this in 6 (4).  4. 1292 a 17 also, in both cases probably without warrant.  15. καὶ before καθ ἐκαστὸν is not rendered either by Vet. Int. or by Ar., who translates—vel proprias singulorum.  21. ἐφέντες] Vet. Int. dimittentes, which may perhaps stand for ἐφέντες, the reading of some of the less good MSS. ἀπερήκασι] ἀφηρήκασι Ms P1: Vet. Int. negant, which perhaps represents ἀπερήκασι, for ἀπετείνω in 1272 b 5 is abnegare, and the Vet. Int. occasionally renders the perfect by the present—e. g. in 1273 b 17, 1268 b 38, 1272 b 32, 1266 a 37. If this is so, ἀφηρήκασι has only the authority of Ms P1 in its favour. Perhaps also ἀπερήκασι corresponds better to ἐφέντες.  26. τοιεὶ] Vet. Int. faciunt.  38. τίνες] Vet. Int. quales, just as in 1258 b 16 he has quibus for ποιος.  39. ποιοὺς τινα] ποιοὺς τινάς Ο1 (so Ms P1 apparently): Sus.3 ποιοὺς τινας.

1264 b 7. αἰὲ Π, not αἰὲ: so too in 1254 a 25 and 1264 b 13, but αἰὲ in 1296 a 24, 1299 a 1, 1333 a 21 etc. See Bon. Ind. 11 a 47 sqq. ‘The form αἰὲ prevails in Attic inscriptions from 361 b.c. onwards’ (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, pp. 14, 64).  9. ἐπονοεῖν δὴ] ἐπονοεῖν δὴ Ο1. See explanatory note.  13. εἰδὼς] So O1, with Ms pr. P1: about r we cannot be certain: the rest εἰδὼ. ‘Εἰδὼς is properly used of Time, εἰδὼ of Place’ (Liddell and Scott).  14. μείζων] So O1: ‘μείζω Ms P1 Π Bekk., at v. Classen ad Thuc. 2. 84. 5’ Sus.1 Classen’s note
will be found among his critical notes, Bd. 2, p. 192. 19. τῶν αὐτῶν] All Susemihl's MSS. of Vet. Int. have eorum, not corundem: z, however, has corundem (τῶν αὐτῶν Π). 20. τὰ is added in Π before περὶ (Vet. Int. here translates the article—quae circa leges). 31. τὴν τάξιν] z (with a and pr. k) has ordinem rightly. γάρ] δὲ Π. 40. τὸν λόγον is not rendered by Vet. Int., but this may well be an oversight, similar to those pointed out above, p. lxiii, note 12. Ar. also gives no equivalent for it—celer a vero extraneis perpetu sermonibus. See note in Sus.3.

1265 a 4. eis] So MSs Π1: πρὸς ο1 (with Π2): Vet. Int. ad, which may represent eis as in 1265 a 41, b 3, 1270 a 18, but may also represent πρὸς, as in 1254 b 13, etc. Perhaps πρὸς is more likely to have been substituted for eis than for πρὸς. 12. τὸ is omitted before ζητητικῶν in MS Π1: whether it was omitted in Π also, we cannot tell. 14. Vet. Int. translates as if he found the words arranged in the following order—χώρας Βασιλείων ἢ τινος ἄλλης ἀπεράντου δεῖσει τοῖς τοσοῦτοις τὸ πλήθος, but his intention probably is to make it clear that he (wrongly) takes τὸ πλήθος with τοῖς τοσοῦτοις: see Busse, p. 14 n. He might have remembered χώρας πλήθος, 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28. 16. περὶ] Vet. Int. almost alone seems to have found παρὰ in his text, for he has praecl. For περὶ with the acc. in the sense in which it is used here, cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 25. 21-22. For the glosses which deform the text of Π here, see Susemihl's apparatus criticus. 24. Almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int. fail to render καὶ before πρὸς: a z alone have el ad. 29. διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον] Vet. Int. determinetur plane magis, but, as has been pointed out elsewhere, he occasionally substitutes the passive for the active. 30. ὥσπερ ἦν εἰ τίς εἶπεν] Sus. is apparently in error when he says that Π omit εἰ. Vet. Int. has quemadmodum si quis dicat. What he omits is ἦν, but this he is rather apt to omit (see above on 1254 a 39). He did not probably find εἶπεν in his text, but εἶπεν, for non utique lateat (1264 a 3) stands for οὐκ ἦν ἔλελεν. 33-34. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus for the various readings here. Π are not quite unanimous in favour of τῷ μὲν τὸ and τῷ δὲ τῶ, nor indeed are Π in favour of the reading adopted in the text, for Π etc. (and Π1) have τὸ δὲ τὸ in 34 in place of τὸ δὲ τῶ, but Π agrees in reading ἐκάτερον: hence it seems probable that the reading in the text is the correct one, as otherwise ἐκάτερον has to be altered without MS. authority to ἐκατέρω. τῶ ἐπιστών] Vet. Int. adds vivere after laboriose, but it is very doubtful whether he found an equivalent for it in his Greek text. 36. ἔξεις αἰρέται] ἔξεις ἀρέται Π (Ar. virtutes habitus): Vet. Int. quoniam
soli hi habitus sunt virtutes circa habitudinem (ἐξω—so Π') substan-
tiae. Probably Victorius' conjecture is right and ἀπεραι should be
ἀπεραὶ: cp. 1285 a 16, where M's Ald. have ἀπεραὶ for ἀπεραὶ. 40. ὁμαλωθησομένην] Vet. Int. respondentem. ὁμαλιζέων is usually repre-
sented by regulare in Vet. Int. (e. g. in 1266 b 3, 16, 1274 b 9).

1265 b 3. ἀπορεῖ] Vet. Int. dubitat (probably only a mistrans-
lation, in which, however, he is followed by Ar.). 4. παράζυγας] περὶζυγας Μ's Π' and according to Sus. r also, but almost all his
MSS. of Vet. Int. have detectos (so o y), and we cannot be certain
what Greek word this represents: a z have ιγγωρίος (z in marg. al-
liter detectos), and this again is hardly a correct rendering either of
περιζυγας or παράζυγας. Ar. has disparēs. 13. τῶν ἀρχαιστά-
tων] Vet. Int. antiquorum, but degrees of comparison are often
inexactly rendered by Vet. Int. (see below on 1270 b 1, 1271 b 6,
21, 1272 a 8). 19. δῆων] πῶς Μ's Π': Vet. Int. quomodo, which
may represent either πῶς or δῆως. 20. All Susemilh's MSS.
of the Vet. Int. but one (l) have sīl for γίνεται (so o y): z sīl. 21.
δῆω] om. pr. Ο', but it is added above the line with a caret, in
darker ink than the MS. but probably by the writer of it. 25.
συμφέρει] For the various readings see Susemilh's apparatus cri-
icus. Vet. Int. expedit: Ο', with some of the less good MSS.,
συμφέρη. See explanatory note. Ar. has videndum est . . . ne non
prosit. 30. πολετεὶαν] πολετεῖων Π', possibly rightly. 35. Sus.
τῶν om. Π': Π', however, would seem to be a misprint for Π'
(see Sus.1 2). 39. ἐφόρων] Vet. Int. plebeiorum. In the next
line he has εφόρος for εφόρους. Dittmeyer (op. cit. p. 36) observes
of William of Moerbeke's translation of the Rhetoric—'hic quoque
universus interpretis usus respiiciendum est: ut verbum Graecum
saecne non mutatum versioni inserit, ita idem verbum hic illic
sive apto sive inepto vocabulo Latino interpretari conatur.'

1266 a 3. χειρότατας πασῶν] Vet. Int. pessimas omnibus. See above
on 1263 a 2. 5. ἐπείτα] So Ο' (with M's Π'). 18. On τοῦ
tetártou τῶν τετάρτων, see explanatory note. Here probably two
alternative readings have both been admitted into the text, as in
some MSS. in 1266 a 37, 1273 a 35, 1254 a 10. In Ο', after έκ
dὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων, the words έκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων
are added, but they are crossed through and dots placed beneath
them, probably by the writer of the MS. 23. συνιστάται] So
Ο': συνιστάται Π' (Vet. Int. constare), and also pr. Πα.

1266 b 1. τῶς δ' ῥήτη] Vet. Int. eam autem quae iam habitabantur
(δ' ῥήτη γ'), which Schneider adopts, rightly followed by Bekker and
Susemilh), 'δ' Π' Π', δὲ M's Ar.' (Sus.), but it is not perhaps very clear
what Ar. found in his text, for his translation is—postquam vero
condita foret, difficilium quidem. O¹ originally had τὰς δῆς, but δῆ
has been altered into δὶ—by whom, is uncertain.

3. τὰς om. M² P¹; as to Γ we cannot be certain.


18. ὀπώρην] ὀπώρην P²³ and some of the less good
MSS. (so O¹): ὀπώρην M² P¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. quantumcueque, which
leaves it uncertain whether he found ὀπώρην or ὀπώρη in his text:
ὀπώρην Ald. Bekk.

26. δῆλον οὖν] All the MSS. of Vet. Int. used by
Sus. except a have palam igitur, quod non sufficiens substantias
aequales facere erit legislator (so o y): a z, however, have legi-
salbori.

28. τάξεων] τάξει M² P¹: Vet. Int. ordinaverit, which
probably stands for τάξει, for in 3. 4. 1277 b 22 ἐὰν ὁμοί ἀνδρεῖος
ἐὰν is rendered by the Vet. Int. si sic fortius fuerit, and in 1. 2. 1252 a
24 ἐὰν βλέπειν is rendered si quis viderit.

31. ἐπίσεων is probably the true reading here, as in 1270 b 38, 1272 a 35, 1339 a 14.
See Susemihl’s apparatus criticus on these four passages and Bon.
Ind. 222 a 4 sqq.

1267 a 5. ἀλλὰ καὶ] a z sed etiam (n sed et): the rest wrongly
sed.

8. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃν ἐπιθυμοὺν] Vet. Int. sed et si desiderent,
probably a mistranslation of these words. So Ar. verum etiam si
concupiscant ut molestia carcant et voluptas fuerit. See expan-
datory note on 1267 a 5.


17. βοϊντα κατασκευάζων] Vet. Int. ὁποῖς est constitu-
unt, where constitui may well stand for κατασκευάζων, but it is less easy
to account for ὁποῖς est.

24. ἄν] Vet. Int. quam, referring to
multitudinem (πλῆθος).

25. ἐπιθυμῆσωσιν] See Susemihl’s ap-
paratus criticus for the reading of M² P¹; it finds support in two
MSS. of Vet. Int. only (c y), which read concupiscant: most have
concupiscant, one or two concupiscunt (so z), either of which, however,
may stand for ἐπιθυμῆσωσιν—cp. 1268 a 41, where θύσιν is rendered by
ψοιν, and see below on 1270 b 35. ἀμώνειν] Vet. Int. suffere
(Ξἰτεγεκέιν?).

28. ὅτι ἰη Αr. Bekk.’ (so Sus.²); but Ar. has
oforti autem neque id latere quantas faculatas habere condueat.
Stahr ϊ τ: Sus.³ [τ] τί.

29. τὸ μὴ λισσελεῖν] Vet. Int. ut non pro levi
habeat (so z and most MSS. of Vet. Int.: o ut non praec levi habeat:
Sus., however, reads, with g (so also y), ut non prolem habeat): in
1279 b 9, on the other hand, τὸ λισσελεῖν is rendered id quod expedit.
Should ut non prolem habeat be read (cp. 1258 b 16, where λισσελε-
σταρα is praetiosissima)?

34. ἐβελέν] Vet. Int. debere (=μέλλειν or ὀφείλειν? cp. 1253 b 26, 1268 b 12).

35. τὰῖτα] z has hsec (hec): Susemihl finds hsec in his MSS.

40. ἄν om. H¹; probably wrongly,
just as they are probably wrong in adding ἄν in 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 33
(cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 15, where Π om. αν, and see Bon. Ind. 41 b 6 sqq.).

1287 b 1. ἀπληστον] Vet. Int. irreplebilis. Sus.1 'nonne irreple bile?', and it is true that in 1253 a 37 we find ἥ δὲ δικαιοτὴν πολετικῶν translated by the Vet. Int. iustitia autem civilis; but see Dittmeyer, op. cit. p. 34, who shows that the practice of William of Moerbeke in his translation of the Rhetoric is to make the predicate agree in gender with the subject—thus in Rhet. 1. 3. 1359 a 5 τοῦτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος δύνατος κάλλιον is rendered hic autem talis mors pulchrior. 14. κατασκευάζων] constituentes 0, perhaps rightly: the other MSS. constructus. 23. Πειραία] πειρᾶ Ο1. 26. κώμη (in place of κόμῳ πολιτείᾳ) Π1. Ar. ornatu simplici. 'Quibusdam exemplaribus' (i.e. probably MSS., not printed editions: see above on 1257 b 36) 'illum ἔτη δὲ, quod in ceteris habetur, abest, ut prolixitas ad capillos, sumptus ad vestem duntaxat referatur' (Sepulveda, p. 51). 'Ἐτη δὲ is, in fact, omitted in Tb. 33. All the better MSS. and some of the inferior ones have here τὸ ἄπλα ἔχον (so Ο1): only one MS., and that of little authority, has τὰ in place of τὸ as its original reading. The phrase commonly is οἱ τὰ ἄπλα ἔχοντες, κεκτημένου (see e.g. 1268 a 18, 22: 1297 b 2: 1268 a 20, 25), though not quite invariably (see 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 36: 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 29), and here the τὸ seems better away. See explanatory note. 35. ποιήσον] Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. have faciant, and in 36. for βιώσονται vivant, but this does not imply that the translator did not find the future in his Greek text: see above on 1267 a 25. 37. εἴδη καὶ τῶν νόμων] Vet. Int. et species legum: Busse (p. 27) notes a similar change of order in the version given by Vet. Int. of 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 22.

1268 a 3. καταδικάζει] See Susemihl's apparatus criticus here and in the next line. The MSS. which have καταδικάζει seem mostly to have ἀπολύοι in 4. Ο1 has καταδικάζει and ἀπολύθη, the last two letters of ἀπολύθη being however expunged and οἱ superscribed, probably by the writer of the MS. All the MSS. of Vet. Int. known to Sus. have condemnetur for καταδικάζει (so ο y): z, however, has condemnnet—rightly in all probability, for absolvt, not absolvtur, follows in all the MSS. Ar. si condemnaret . . . sin absolvéret. There seems to be little doubt that καταδικάζει and ἀπολύοι are correct (see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 77). τὴν δίκην om. Π1, possibly rightly, for the words may be only a gloss, but Π1 are somewhat given to omitting words. Ar. si condemnaret simpliciter sententiam. 12. αἵρετος εἶπαι] Vet. Int. eligi. 17. οἱ before ψεφροῖ om. M8 P1 and possibly of course ι (Vet. Int.
agricola). 25. P\textsuperscript{1} add καὶ before κρείττων. 26. M\textsuperscript{s} P\textsuperscript{1} om. γε: about Γ we cannot be certain, for Vet. Int. often fails to render γε. 34. γεωργητοισιν Bekker's reading γεωργητοισιν rests only on the authority of Ar., who has colunt. 39. αὐτοὶ P\textsuperscript{3} αὐτοί, O\textsuperscript{1} αὐτοί with αὐ superscribed, whether by corr.\textsuperscript{1} or by the writer of the MS., is not certain, but very possibly by the latter, for the ink is quite that of the MS., and αὐτοί is neither expunged by dots placed beneath nor crossed through. οὐτοί, though probably not the true reading here, is used in a similar way in Magn. Mor. 2. 9. 1207 b 31 and 2. 11. 1208 b 37, and even in writings of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. 540 b 32 sqq.).

1268 b 1. γεωργητοι δὲοι οἰκίας] Vet. Int. ministrabilis duas domos: hence some have thought that he found ἐπιγραφητοι δὲοι οἰκίας in his Greek text, but ministrare in Vet. Int. answers to διακοινών (cp. 1280 b 5, 1333 a 8). He may here render a marginal gloss. Διαπονήσει would be better than διακοινώσει, but see explanatory note. 5. See explanatory note. διαμονής P\textsuperscript{3} etc. (so O\textsuperscript{1}) seems better than δια-
po\nuτας P\textsuperscript{1} (cp. τὸν δικάστηριν 6). On δῖκης, see explanatory note. 9. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦναυντον τοῦτον] Vet. Int. sed contrarium huius: hence it is probable, though not certain, that Γ omitted καὶ with M\textsuperscript{s} and read τοῦτον with M\textsuperscript{s} P\textsuperscript{1}. 12. ὦ μὲν] μὲν ὦ M\textsuperscript{s} P\textsuperscript{1}: about Γ we cannot be certain, for some MSS. of Vet. Int. have quidem index (so z), and others (so o y) index quidem. See explanatory note. 13. κρινεῖ (Bekk.\textsuperscript{2} Sus.) is probably right (cp. 16 καταδικάσουσιν), though Γ II have κρίνει (so O\textsuperscript{1}). 15. δὴ] O\textsuperscript{1} has δὲ with δὴ superscribed, probably, but not certainly, by the writer of the MS. See explanatory note. 19. Ar. does not render δικαίως (si simpliciter petitur). 21. For the omission of ἥδη here by P\textsuperscript{1}, cp. 1288 a 6 and 1336 b 36, where they omit it also. Ar. does not render it. 32. μικρά] μικρῶν P\textsuperscript{1}. 35. ἵστρυκ] εὸ medicinalis rightly: the rest medicinali (for the reading of z, however, see Appendix C, 112. 3). 40. ἵστηροφοροφώτω τέ γὰρ] Vet. Int. ferrum enim portabant tunc Graeci (ἵστηροφορόφων τότε γὰρ;).

1269 a 11. γραφήματα] γράφεσιν P\textsuperscript{2}, possibly rightly. 12. ψαρε-
ρῶν] Vet. Int. videtur. 16. καὶ τῶν νομοθέτων καὶ τῶν ἄρχωντων] Vet. Int. et legislabri-refus et principibus (apparently after sinendum). Busse (p. 27 note) compares voluntatis for πρωπισσως in 1271 a 32. 18. τις is added in M\textsuperscript{s} P\textsuperscript{1} before κινήσας: Vet. Int. qui multaverit (perhaps = οὐ κινήσας: see however his version of 1340 b 24): Ar. qui corrigerre perget (οὐ κινήσας?). See explanatory note. 19. ψεύδος δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. mendax quoque exemplum quod ab artibus (ab probably stands for παρά): ψεύδος, here mendax, is falsum in
CRITICAL NOTES.

1287 a 33. 21. πλήν, which is written in P^2^3 over παρά, is probably intended as an alternative reading for παρά: see 1274 b 9, where φαλίον is written above φαλάλιον in P^2^3. Bekker, however, reads πλήν παρά in both his editions. 25. καί, which Bekker adds before πάντες, is found in O^1 and in P^4 etc., but not in the best MSS. 38. οἱ before εἰλικτες is omitted in M^8^ P^1^ L^8^: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found it in his Greek text or not. 40. πω] Vet. Int. τηκεηαμ.

1269 b 5. τοῖς Θετολοίς] c o om. a before Thessalís in Vet. Int. 11. ὃς] quasi instead of quod o, perhaps rightly, for Vet. Int. takes ἐξευρίσκωσιν as a participle. 19. ἀνωμοβοίτητον] inordinatum in lege o. 21. φανερός ἐστι τοιχῶτος ὧν:] I follow here the reading of Π^2^ (which is, except in matters of accent, that of O^1, and also of Ar., who translates—in viris quidem id fecisse constat): τοιχῶτος ἐστιν Π^1^.

The reading of Π^2^ appears to me to be probably the true one, especially as in 26 Γ Μ^8^ pr. Π^1^ omit φανερός, wrongly, it would seem, cp. 1263 b 9, 1311 a 16. 26. See note on 21. 28. "Ἀρη] O^1^ has ἄρη with Μ^8^ P^1^, etc.: we cannot tell which form Vet. Int. found in his text, for he has Μαρτεμ. "Ἀρη is the Attic form according to Liddell and Scott. Vahlen reads "Ἀρη in Poet. 21. 1457 b 21, where Bekker had read "Ἀρην. 30. κατακώχυσι] Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 8. ‘Forma κατακώχυσιν in duobus Politicorum locis [also in Hist. An. 6. 18. 572 a 32] exhibetur sine varia lectione, Eth. Nic. io. io. 1179 b 9 κατακώχυσιν [K^b^ Ald.] Bekk., sed κατακώχυσιν codd. L^b^ M^b^ O^b^’ (Bon. Ind. 371 a 8). I retain the reading of the MSS.: Liddell and Scott, however, remark (s. v. κατακώχυσι):—‘the corrupt forms κατακώχυσις, κατακώχυσιος, must be corrected, except perhaps in late writers: cf. ἀνόκωχυσις, συνοκωχυσις.’ 35. άλλον ἐπίστημον, πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον] Vet. Int. nisi ad bellum. 36. ταύτῃ] All Susemihl’s MSS. of Vet. Int. have hoc, but y has huc (= hæc).

1270 a 11. καὶ μὴ ὤρθος] Almost all MSS. of Vet. Int. (including z) have aut before non recte, but aut appears to represent καί in 1262 a 8. 13. See Susemihl’s apparatus criticus for the various readings here: I follow him in reading αἵτης καθ’ αὐτήν. O^1^ has αὐτήν καθ’ αὐτήν. 21. καταλείπεσι] καταλείπεσι M^8^ P^1^: Vet. Int. derelinguere, which may represent either καταλείπεσιν, as in 1252 a 30, or καταλείπεσιν. 22. ταύτω] So Π^1^ (tauτo P^1^): O^1^ (with Π^2^) and Bekk. τοῦτο less well (cp. 1269 b 34). 27. τε om. M^8^ P^1^: about Γ we cannot be certain, for the Vet. Int. hardly ever renders τε. καύν ἀποθάνῃ] Here o agrees with pr. a in omitting (no doubt erroneously) et si moritur—voluerit. 28. ὡν ὁν καταλείπει] z quem utique derelinguat, perhaps rightly. 37. Vet. Int. here renders οὐ μὴν ἄλλα by at-
laman, as in 1274 b 25: he often renders it by quin immo sed (e.g. in 1262 a 14, 1264 a 11), and of μὴν by attestamen (e.g. in 1267 a 39).

1270 b 1. θηλυκόνως γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. volens enim legislator ut plures sint Spartanis, provocat cives quod plures faciant pueros: but though plures is his rendering, he probably found πλεῖστος in his text in both places, for he is not always exact in rendering degrees of comparison: see above on 1265 b 13. 3. ἔστιν γὰρ] The MSS. of Vet. Int. have est autem, not est enim. 8. αὐτή [αὐτή] Λτ. (hic enim magistratus): om. ι Μς (so Sus.): Sus. by a misprint apparently, Μς Π\(^ι\)). 12. Ἀνδρίον] See Susemihl's apparatus criticus for the various readings. As to the substitution of τ for δ here in Π, it should be noted that this was an error to which Egyptian scribes were especially liable: see Blass, Hyperidis orationes quatuor, praef. p. xvii. I know not whether there are any other indications in Π that the archetype of these MSS. was of Egyptian origin. 14. δημαγωγεῖν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. regere populum (i.e. δημαγωγεῖν, cp. 1274 a 10) se ipsos cogebant reges: he evidently does not understand δημαγωγεῖν, and he is quite capable of construing ἄργακάζοντο cogebant (cp. 1269 a 18, where θάλαθετα is rendered nocedit, and 1271 a 22, where κρίνονται is rendered indicare). Perhaps, as Busse remarks (p. 25), ι had αὐτοῦς in place of αὐτοῖς. All the MSS. read αὐτοίς ἄργακάζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς. 15. ταύτη] Ο\(^ι\) ταύτα: ταύτη, however, is added in the margin, probably by corr. On διὰ τύχην see explanatory note. Μς Π\(^ι\) add τήν before τύχην, just as in 1332 a 32 they add τής before τύχης: as to the reading in ι we cannot of course be certain. In 1323 b 29 all the MSS. have ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τήν τύχην. 21. On this passage see explanatory note. 32. αὐτή] αὐτή Π\(^ι\), but see explanatory note. 33. μᾶλ- λον ὑπερβάλλει] magis superexcedit ο (perhaps rightly): other MSS. magis excedit. 38. ἕπειδέ] Susemihl reads ἕποι, which is, however, apparently only found in Π\(^ι\), for Μς has η, and the reading of ι is unknown. See his apparatus criticus for the varieties of reading.

1271 a 15. τοῦτοι] τοῦτοι Ο\(^ι\) (with Π\(^ι\)). Ar. illis utitur. 17. τῶν after ἀδίκημάτων om. Π\(^ι\) Ο\(^ι\) Bekk.: Bekk. adds it in brackets. Whether Vet. Int. found this τῶν in his text, it is of course impossible to say; but after ἀδίκημάτων it might easily be omitted: cp. 1283 a 11, where in πάσαν ἀνωτότητα ι Μς pr. Π\(^ι\) make ἀνωτότητα into ἀπότητα, and 1284 a 3, where in τῶν βιῶν τῶν κατ' ἀρτέν two or three MSS. omit the second τῶν. 18. φιλοτιμῶν] o y ι have amorem honorum: Susemihl's MSS. amorem honoris. διὰ] Neither Vet. Int. nor Ar. (per ambitiōnem et avaritiam) renders διὰ before φιλοχρη-
ματίαν, and M* omits it. But compare for the repetition of διά, 7 (5), IO. 1311 a. 25. 19. In Π1 μή is omitted here and placed between ἦ and βελτίων (20). 20. διὰλα μὴν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. sed et si melius, non sicut nunc, sed per ipsius viram unumqueque (o here adds nunc est) indicare regum (ο ζ regium). Hence Sus.3 reads διὰλα καν βελτίων, * * γε μη καβάτερ νῦν, ἄλλα κ.τ.λ. and supposes a second βελτίων to have dropped out before γε, or else δει or something similar; but μήν may easily have been corrupted into καν in Π or misread by the translator. Ar. attamen melius non ut nunc quidem, sed pro vita cuiusque regis indicare. 23. Enim here as elsewhere in the vetus versio (1268 b 34, 1280 a 38) represents γον. 27. φίδιτα] In this passage, probably, as in others, we may ascribe the reading φίδιτα to Π1, for though almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int. omit the word, two of them (a ζ) have amicabilia. Compare Susemihl’s apparatus criticus on 1272 a 2, b 34. The form φιδίτειος occurs in the Herculaneum papyri on which the fragmentary remains of the work of Philodemus de Musica are preserved (fragm. 30: p. 18 Kemke). Plutarch, however, it is evident, used the form φίδιτα (see Lycurg. c. 12 inil.). Dicaearchus, Phylarchus, and Antiphanes (ap. Athen. Deipn. pp. 141, 143) also use either this form or that of φειδίτα (see Meineke on Athen. Deipn. 143 a). Bekker reads φίδιτα both in the Politics and in Rhet. 3. IO. 1411 a 25, though in the latter passage (see Roemer ad loc.) no MS. has preserved the true reading, nor yet the Vetus Interpres. So too C. F. Hermann (see Gr. Ant. 1. § 28. i) and Schömmer (Gr. Alterth. 1. 280 n.). 31. συμβαινεῖ] So Ο1: Bekker reads συμβαινειν, but without support from the better MSS. Quare accidit in Vet. Int. leaves it uncertain what reading he found in his text. 32. τὸ νομοθετῆ τῆς προαριστεως] Almost all MSS. of Vet. Int. have legislatoris voluntati (a m z have legislatori voluntati, y legislaatorī voluntati). See above on 1269 a 16. 37. αὐτοῖς Π1 Bekk. Sus. seems to be correct (cp. 1272 a 15, τῆς πολειτίας): for the readings of other MSS. see Susemihl’s apparatus criticus. Ω1 αὐτοῖς. 40. αὐδιοίς] αὐδος Π2 Ar. (praefectura illa perpetua) Bekk. (αὐδος Ω1). 41. Vet. Int. does not render καθέστηκεν, but see above, p. lxiii, note 12, for other instances in which he fails to render words. Ar. fer alarum est imperium. ὧν] Vet. Int. hoc.

1271 b 5. Vet. Int. adds ad virtutem after his equivalent for μηδε. Similar additions appear in his version in 1254 b 20 and 1287 a 30. Ar. omits these words—neq quicquam alius exercere sciebant praestabilitius quam rem militarem. 6. τούτοι] So Ω1, though Π1 with some other MSS. has τούτο. Vet. Int. would seem to have
found τοῦτο in his Greek text, for he has—hoe autem peccatum non modicum. He probably found ἀλαττον in his text, though his translation is modicum, for he is often inexact in rendering degrees of comparison (see above on 1265 b 13). Ar. illud quoque erratum non sane minus, quod pulant (om. μὲν with Γ Μξ?) bona illa quae ad bellum pertinent (he blindly follows Vet. bona quae circa res bellicas) ex virtute magis quam ex vito fieri. To omit μὲν with Γ Μξ would be a mistake: ‘interdum oppositio per particularum μὲν indicata et inchoata non accurate continuatur’ (Bon. Ind. 454 a 17 sqq.). See Vahlen on Aristot. Poet. 6. 1450 a 3 sqq. and b 16 sqq. (Poet. pp. 118, 127). 21. τὸ δὲ πλέιον [Vet. Int. plurimum autem, but see above on 1265 b 13, 1271 b 6. 22. καὶ λέγεται δὲ] Vet. Int. et dicitur quidem (καὶ λέγεται γε?), τε Μξ Π1. 25. Ἀριδέλθων II, but in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 Π have Ἀριδέλθων.

This variation may possibly date back to an uncial archetype. See Sus., p. xiv on the confusion of οἴνων and οἶνοι in 3. 14. 1285 b 10, 16. 27. ἄποικοι is here rendered by Vet. Int. domestici: see above, p. xlv, note 1, for other renderings of the word in Vet. Int. 28. καταλαβὼν] Vet. Int. suscepientur. οἱ ... ἀλθῆτε] o qui venerunt; other MSS. qui venerant. 31. ὁς κατασκευάζων] Vet. Int. ut institut. 34. ἐπίκειται] Vet. Int. surpressitur (ὑπόκειται?). 35. ἀπέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Ο1 ὀλίγων τῆς πελοποννήσου (Π1 ἀλόγων τῆς πελοποννήσου). Vet. Int. distal enim quidem a Polopo insula modicum, versus Asiam autem ab eo loco qui circa Triopium et a Rhodo (ρόδων Π1, perhaps rightly). Ar. read Ῥόδων. 39. ἐπιβέμνοι τῇ Σικελίᾳ] Vet. Int. appositus Siciliae: cp. 1305 a 14, where εἰσεἰδοντα is translated superponitur. 40. Κάμων is the reading of all the better MSS. (so Ο1) and of Γ (καμίνων without accent Π1): Vict. substituted Καμίνων, and either this or Καμίπον (the true accentuation of the word is, according to Sus., a disputed point) seems to be the correct reading. It is easy to understand how the commoner word took the place of the less common one. 41. τε ομ. Μξ Π1: Vet. Int. agriculturae enim opus faciunt, but Vet. Int. hardly ever renders τε, hence the reading in Γ is uncertain.

1271 a 19—1272 a 16.
Thus Ar. omits, with all the better MSS., the καί which Bekker adds before ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων. Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. omit et before ex publicis, but a adds it, and so does z. 24. τούτοια] a z have fecit: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. facit. 28. χείρων τῶν ἑφόρων] Vet. Int. determinam quam quae ephororum, but whether he found χείρων ἢ τὰ τῶν ἑφόρων in his Greek text, may well be doubted. ὅ μὲν γὰρ] Here pr. O1 (cp. P1) has ὅ μὲν γὰρ τὰ περὶ τῶν κόσμων οὐ καλῶς ἔχει κακῶν τὸ τῶν ἑφόρων ἀρχείου ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῦτον, but corr.1 adds in the margin—γρ. ὅ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει κακῶν τὸ τῶν ἑφόρων ἀρχείου ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῦτον. Evidently a marginal remark τὰ περὶ τῶν κόσμων οὐ καλῶς has found its way into the text of these two MSS. 29. τοῦτοι] τοῦτον Π2 Ο1 Bekker., but the genitive seems doubtful (cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 29). Ar. id est et in illis, which probably implies that he found τοῦτον in his text: cp. 1253 b 27, where sic eliam in re familiarit in Ar. probably stands for οὐτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν. 36. τῶν] ὅν Π, evidently repeated from περὶ ὅν 35. Vet. Int. de hii quae in Lacedaemonia sintt. 40. οὐδέν γὰρ] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἠ (Vet. Int. necque enim) is adopted by Bekker, but probably wrongly. All the MSS. have οὐδέν. ‘Τι scelendum esse ci. Buecheler, μέτεωτι Coraes, sufficeret ἐστι, sed nihil mutandum est’ Sus.1. οὐδὲν τι is common enough used adverbially, but it does not seem to be often used as it is here. 41. πάρρῳ γ' ἀποκοινών] Vet. Int. longe enim peregrinamur, but, as Susemihl sees in his third edition, this is no proof that Vet. Int. found γὰρ in his Greek text.

1272 b 5. καὶ μεταξὺ] ο eliam (not et) intermedie. 8–9. See explanatory note. δίκας] Vet. Int. sententias, as in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 24. 16. τοῖς βουλομένωι επίτιθεται καὶ δυνάμενοι Π1: Sus. adopts this reading in all his editions, but holds in his third that some word is wanting before τοῖς βουλομένωι. Ar. est autem periculosus hic reipublicae status, si qui velit possintque invadere. 28. ἢ before Λακωνικὴ is omitted, not surely by Ms Π1 only (as Sus.3 holds), but by Π1, for Vet. Int. translates—quae Cretensium et Lacedaemonia et tertia ab hii quae Calchedoniorum. 30. ημεῖοι δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Ar. signum est reipublicae bene institutae quod (so Bodl.: New Coll. MS. wrongly quo) populus in suo permaneat (so Bodl.: New Coll. MS. permanet) loco. Thus he does not render ἐχουσαν, which Ms Π1 omit, but probably wrongly. 36. γὰρ after μὲν om. Π2 3 etc., followed by Bekker, but the reading of Π4 (and Ο1), which is adopted by Susemihl, seems preferable. Ar. praeterquam quod non dekrior: nam illi ex contingentibus sunt. The same doubt as to the exclusion or insertion of γὰρ recurs.
in 1291 a 29 and 1331 b 34, but in 1291 a 29 Π¹ are supported by the Vatican Palimpsest in adding it. 37. *άρσετι[νδὴν] Ven. Int. *virtuosum: so again in 1273 a 23, and *πλουτι[νδὴν] in 1273 a 24 divitem. 38. τοῖς ἐκεῖ *βασιλείωσι] Susemihl's MSS. of Vet. Int. have *his quae *ibi *regibus: z rightly *his qui *ibi *regibus. 39. See explanatory note on 1272 b 38. 40. *εἰ τε] *εἰ τι Sus., who takes *si *quid *to be the true reading in Vet. Int., but a alone has *si *quod (*z *si *quod)—the rest of Susemihl's MSS. having *sed *quod, *sed *quae (so o), or *se *que—and probably we should read *sique in Vet. Int., the reading adopted by Susemihl in 5 (iii). 4. 1338 b 16: *εἰτε O¹, *εἰτε M¹ II² Bekk.: Ar. *melius *autem *quod *imperatorem *non *secundum *genus *nque *ex *vili *aut *precellenti *magnis *eligitur *quam *secundum *virtutem: *εἰ *τε *is probably right, cp. 1338 b 16.

1273 a 7. τὰ δὲ] τὸ δὲ P²34 etc. Bekk. (so O¹), but the same MSS. have τὰ *μὲν *in 6, where Bekker's reading τὸ *μὲν rests only on a conjecture of Morel's. 9. *οὗτοι om. H¹, but see above on 1257 b 24. 15. ταύτας *αἵρεσι[νθα] τούτους *αἵρεσι[νθα] pr. O¹ (so P¹), but corr. adds ταύτας in the margin. Both O¹ and P¹ have ταύτας at the end of the line. Vet. Int. has *hos *in both places. 16. See the various readings for *πλιόνα in Susemihl, and see above on 1255 b 26. 19. *ὑπὸ *τῶν *ἀρχείων] Vet. Int. a *principibus (ὑπὸ *τῶν *ἀρχώντων?). 22. ἡ *συνθοκεί *τοῖς *πολλοῖς] Vet. Int. *ut (ἢ?) *videtur *multis. 39. *οὗτος *δ'] Here z alone among the MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined has enim (quicunque enim instead of *quodcumque *autem), but it has enim instead of *igitur for *οὗ in 1273 a 25, and not a few other blunders are to be found in it in this part of the Second Book (δ') ΠΠ. Ar. *nam quicquid *apud *civitatis *principes *habetur *in *pretio, *necessarium *est *et *aliorum *civium *opinionem *subsequi: but Ar. has enim in 1268 b 6 also, where Π Π have δ'. It is not likely that Ar. found anything but δ' in his Greek text in either passage: Sus., however, follows him against Π Π in both.

1273 b 1. *οὐχ *οἷῶν *τε *κ.τ.λ.] *οὐχ *οἷῶν *τ' *ἐίναι *βιβλιάως *αἵρετοκρατικήν *πολιτείαν Π² Bekk. See on this reading the explanatory note on 1273 b 1. 5. *ἀρσετ' *ἀρχει' *ἀρσαταρχεῖν ΠΠ Bekk. (a word which occurs nowhere else in Aristotle or perhaps anywhere), *ἀρσετ' *ἀρχει' Spengel, Sus. 6. *προειτο] Vet. Int. *praeferrit, but *πρω[ικθα]is no better translated in 1307 b 4, 1314 a 37 sq. *εὑροίαν] *εὑροίαν Π M*, but this kind of mistake often occurs—so in 1278 a 32 Π Π have *ὑπορεύσει wrongly for *εὑροφύτει, in 1288 a 15 Π Π pr. P² have *ὑποφόραι wrongly for *εὑροφύτει: see also the readings in 1300 a 2, 1302 a 2, 1303 a 12. 7. *ἄλλα *ἀρχώντων γε] Vet. Int.
sed et principantium. Did he read τε for γε, as he seems to have done in 1274 a 15?  15. τῶν αὐτῶν] Vet. Int. ab eisdem, but we have already seen (above on 1253 a 10) that he occasionally inserts prepositions without authority, and here he had a special motive for doing so, for, as Busse (p. 21) points out, he seems to have taken τῶν αὐτῶν with ἀποτελέσατι.  18. καί is added before τῆς πολιτείας in O¹, as in P¹ etc.  25. Κρητικῶς] Ms P¹ κρῖτης: Vet. Int. Cretensium.  27. τι om. P¹. Ar. eorum autem qui de republica aliquid tradiderunt. τι is absent in 1. 13. 1260 b 23, in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35, and in 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 14 (see Bon. Ind. 88 a 36 sq.), but we have εἰπεῖν τι in 2. 8. 1267 b 29.  28. οὐδὲ ὄντωνον] Vet. Int. nullis. ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν κ.τ.λ. Vet. Int. sed perseverarunt singulari vita viventes.  32. οἱ μὲν—μῶν] οἱ μὲν ἔγνωντο δημοσίουργοι νόμων P¹.  39. μίζανα] Vet. Int. miscusisseμε, but this does not prove that he read μίζα τε: see his rendering of 1259 a 10 sq. εἰναι] Vet. Int. fuisse.  41. τὰ δὲ δικαστῆρια] τὸ δὲ δικαστῆριον P¹, which Sus. prefers, comparing 1274 a 4, but we have τὰ δικαστῆρια in 1274 a 3.

1274 a 2. τῶν ἄρχων] O¹ τῶν ἄρχωνον.  4. διέτερον O¹, with P² Ar. (alterum).  5. ἵσχασεν Ms P¹: we cannot tell from invaluit which reading Vet. Int. found in his text, for he often renders the imperfect by the perfect (e.g. in 1267 b 18, 30, 31). ἵσχασεν, however, which Sus. adopts, seems preferable to ἵσχασεν P² O¹ Bekk.: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 23.  13. Μηδεκαίος] ο meditiis. See Susemihl’s critical note on Medit (Sus¹ p. 145). ἐφρονηματίσθη] Vet. Int. astute concepit (the same misapprehension of the meaning of the word appears in his renderings of it in 1284 b 2, 1306 b 28, 1341 a 30).  15. ἐπεὶ Σολών γέ] Vet. Int. quontum et Solon: see above on 1273 b 7.  19. O¹ εὐφόρων, but εῦ is written over the first syllable, probably by the writer of the MS.  21. P¹ add τὸ before θυτικῶν, perhaps rightly (Vet. Int. quartum autem quod mercenarium). But I incline to think it is better away: cp. Aristot. Fragm. 350. 1537 a 36 sq. and Pol. 6. (4). 4. 1291 a 4.  24. ταῖς Ἀλκι-δικαίαι] Vet. Int. Chalcidiae (τῆς Ἀλκιδικῆς Γ?).  25. δὲ τινὲς] δὲ καὶ τινὲς O¹, but καὶ has been expunged by a dot placed beneath it —by whom, is uncertain. P² add καὶ before τινὲς.  27. ἐπίθε-μοῦντα] Vet. Int. praefectum populo (perhaps, however, praefectus populo, which I find in o, may be the true reading).  29. In O¹ δ’ is expunged by a dot placed beneath it, and δ’ ad superscribed— I do not feel certain by whom.  34. ολιμπίασω] The true reading of the equivalent for this word in Vet. Int. is probably (as Busse points out, p. 9) that of a and pr. b (also pr. z) ολιμπίασω.
'Guilelrum 'Olympiaion pro nomine a verbo mehsumatos apto accepisse suspicandum est' (Busse, ibid.).

40. antiqtheia [Vet. Int. recordarius.]

41. apud non χαματον [Vet. Int. a pulvere.

1274 b 5. Vet. Int. has Charondi autem nihil est proprium, and this is the order of the words in P1 (and M?). 6. μεν om. O1 with Π1 P1. ψευδομαρτυρών ΓΠ Λτ. ( falsorum lestium), ψευδομαρτυρών Scaliger, Bentley, Bekk., Sus.: cp., however, Rhet. ad Alex. 16. 1432 a 6, in apotomais ψευδομαρτυροις ψευδομαρτυρωι δικην oех υφεξει. In 2. 5. 1263 b 21, where the MSS. of the Politics have ψευδομαρτυρωιν, two MSS. of the Vet. Int. (a z) have falsorum lestium, not falsorum testimoniorum. 7. επισκηψιν Scaliger and Bentley, episkèpsin GΠ (Vet. Int. considerationem). 9. On the passage bracketed see explanatory note. All the MSS. (and Vet. Int.) read φαλάδων: P23, however, have the alternative reading φαλίων superscribed in the same ink, it would seem, as the MS. (Sus., 1, p. xviii). υμαμαλωσις Bekk., υμαμαλωσις Π (Vet. Int. irregularitas, which represents υμαμαλία in 1270 a 15, and here probably υμαμαλωσις).

13. γίνωσαι] So Π1: pr. O1 had, I think, γίνονται (with Π2), but it has been dexterously altered into γίνωσαι. 14. την μεν κ.τ.λ.] Susemihl’s MSS. of Vet. Int. have hae quidem manuum utile esse, hae autem inutile, but ι has hanc quidem manuum utilem (utile pr. manus?) esse, hanc autem inutilem. τωι] So O1 with P23 etc.: P14 ταίν. 20. τι πταίσωι, though found only in Lκ—a manuscript known to Camerarius, however, had τι πταίσωι (Politicorum Interpretationes, p. 109)—is probably right. See Susemihl’s apparatus criticus for the readings of the other MSS.: most of them read τυπτήσωι (so O1). The word used in the law seems to have been ἀμαρτάνειν, which τι πταίσωι approaches much more nearly than τυπτήσωι. Camerarius refers to [Plut.] Sept. Sap. Conv. 13, νόμον, ἐν φέργυρας, ἕαν τις όποτε μεθύων ἀμάρτη, διαλυόνιν ἥ το πήρωται τήν χρήμαν: to which reference may be added Aristot. Rhet. 2. 25. 1402 b 9 sqq. and Diog. Laert. 1. 76 (ἀμαρτάνειν is the word used in both these passages). Schol. τι πταίσωι (see his note): Bern. Sus. τι πταίσωι: Bekk. τυπτήσωι, πλέω χρήμαν amplitius damnum (not damnii) c ο ζ, perhaps rightly, ἀποτίνειν] ἀποτίνειν probably pr. O1, for after τ there is an erasure leaving a blank, in which ε may once have stood (ἀποτίνειν P2, the rest ἀποτίνειν): Vet. Int. ferre. ‘In the older [Attic] inscriptions τίνω always forms τείω, έτεισα, ἐτείσθην’ (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 88). Here the ε finds its
way into the infinitive ἀποτελεῖν. 25. τὰς ἐπικληρον] Vet. Int. *heredationes*: his rendering of the word is no better in 1304a 4, 10, where he translates it *hereditatibus* and *hereditatione*. He certainly does not shine in his version of this twelfth chapter.
NOTES.

BOOK I.

1. The view that the πόλις is a κουνωνία had an important bearing on Greek political speculation; Plato already asserts it by implication (Rep. 371 B: 462 C: 369 C), but Aristotle seems to have been the first to fix the conception of κουνωνία and to define its meaning. See vol. i. p. 41 sqq.

2. ἀγαθὸς τινὸς. Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 2, and Pol. 1. 6. 1255 a 15, where the expression recurs, and also Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 b 15, τέλος τι. In Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 15 we have—ἐπεί δ’ εὖ πάσαι μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις ἰγαθῶν (μὴ ἰγαθῶν τι) τὸ τέλος. The ends which the various κουνωνία seek to attain are described in Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 8 sqq. In the passage before us, however, ἰγαθῶν τι is explained by τοῦ εἶναι δοκοῖτος ἰγαθοῦ, though in strictness this need not be a good at all. On ‘seeming good’ as the aim in action, see Eth. Nic. 3. 6 and the commentators. Sepulveda (p. 3) refers to de An. 3. 10. 433 a 27, ἐὰν ὡς καὶ καὶ μὲν τὸ όρκτων, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἰγαθῶν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἰγαθῶν· οὐ πάν δὲ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἰγαθῶν. Τὸ εἶναι δοκοῖν ἰγαθῶν = τὸ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι δοκοῖν ἰγαθῶν, or τὸ φαινόμενον ἰγαθῶν (Eth. Nic. 3. 6. 1113 a 20–24).

3. πάσαι μὲν κ.τ.λ. These words repeat the second of the two premisses (1252 a 2); they do not contain the conclusion. Μέν is ‘while,’ as in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 15 and 5. 1340 a 1. Bonitz remarks on Metaph. O. 2. 1046 b 15: ‘in apodosi duo quidem membra, τὸ μὲν ἐγείρων—ψυχρότητα et ὁ δ’ ἐπιστήμων ἄμφω, quasi codem ordine iuxta se posita sunt, sed ipsa apodosis unice in posteriore membro continetur; prius grammaticum coordinatum, re vera subiectum est alteri membro. Cf. de hoc abusu partt. μέν—δὲ Χεν. Τυχ. 1. 1. 4 et Bornem. ad h. l.’

Aristotle omits to prove that the aim of κουνωνία is not the avoidance or mitigation of evil, which is according to some modern inquirers the end of the State.

Cp. also Eth. Nic. 10. 4. 1174 b 21-23 and 5. 1175 a 30 sq., referring to which latter passages Teichmüller (Aristoteles Philosopbie der Kunst, p. 177) says: 'der Eifer geht immer parallel mit den erstrebten Gütern: je höher das Gut, desto grösser die Bemühung darum.' It is not certain, however, that μαθητα here means more than 'above all' (Sus. 'ganz vorzugsweise').

5. κυριωτάτη, 'most sovereign.' Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 6.

πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 8, αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσα μορίας έδικας τῆς πολιτικῆς, and 21, πᾶσαι δ' αὐταί (αἱ κοινωνίαι) ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν έδικας εἶναι, οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρῶντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἑφίσται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἅπαντα τῶν βίων, and also Plato, Parm. 145 B, πάντα δὲ τα μέρη ὑπό τοῦ άλον περιέχεται. These passages explain the sense in which the words of the text are used. Aristotle is not thinking of the size of the κοινωνία here compared, for there were κοινωνίαι in Greece, especially of a religious kind—festival-unions, for instance—which extended, as our Churches often do, beyond the limits of the State, but of the more comprehensive end pursued by the πόλις—an end as wide as human life—which makes it stand to all other κοινωνίαι as a whole stands to its parts. Thus the end of the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη is said in Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 6 περιέχειν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. See other references given in Bon. Ind. 581 a 41 sqq.

7. The addition of ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτικὴ serves to facilitate the transition to the subject discussed in the next sentence.

ὁσοι μὲν οὖν. Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3. 4. 12: 3. 6. 14): Plato (Politicus 259). Aristotle himself had dropped one or two expressions in the last chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics (1180 b 1-2: 1180 b 24), which might be interpreted as lending some countenance to the view that the contrast of household and πόλις is a contrast of numbers. Common opinion is said in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 32 to identify δεσποτικὴ and πολιτικὴ. It appears to be implied that if the difference lay only in the numbers of those ruled, the four characters would be the same: cp. de Part. An. 1. 4. 644 a 16 sqq., Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 34, 38 (referred to by Eucken, Methode der Aristotelischen Forschung, p. 50. 4), where a numerical difference is treated as an insufficient basis for a distinction of species, and also Pol. 1. 13. 1259 b 36. "Ὅσοι 'acerbius dictum est, ut fere nous: 'wie gewisse Leute sagen'" (Ideler, Aristot. Meteor. vol. i. p. 363). Μὲν οὖν here introduces an inference from what precedes (which is not always the case: see Bon. Ind. 540 b 58 sqq.)—'the πολιτικὴ κοινωνία is the supreme κοινωνία, and makes the supremest of goods its aim; hence it is a mistake to hold that the πολιτικὸς,


basilikös, oikonomikös, and diastatikös are the same.' The μὲν seems to be taken up, if at all, by δ' 17, but, owing to the long parenthesis which begins in 9 with πλὴθει γὰρ, the paragraph is perhaps not completed quite as Aristotle originally intended to complete it.

politeikón . . . εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν. The Vet. Int., Sepulv., and Lamb. (unlike Vict.) rightly make πολιτικόν κ.τ.λ. the subject and τὸν αὐτόν the predicate. The article is omitted before πολιτικῶν, as in Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 16, τὸ πολιτικός, to give the word an abstract meaning: cp. also 1. 2. 1252 b 9, ὃς ταύτῳ φύσι βιαρζαρων καὶ δοῖλων ὤν.

11. ὀλίγων, sc. ἄρχη, νομίζουσιν εἶναι. The omission of ἄρχη is quite in the Aristotelian manner. See Bon. Ind. 239 a 52 sqq.

12. ὃς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν. On this construction with ὃς, cp. Poet. 20. 1457 a 12 and Vahlen's note, p. 214 of his edition. Plato (Polit. 259 B) limits his assertion by adding the words πρὸς ἄρχην, 'in the matter of rule.'

13. καὶ πολιτικόν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν κ.τ.λ. Giph. 'et de politico quidem atque rege,' and so Bern. ('und bezüglich des Verhältnisses zwischen dem verfassungsmässigen Staatsmann und dem Könige')—an interpretation in support of which Eth. Nic. 7. 4. 1146 b 11, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατή καὶ τὸν καρτερικόν, πότερον ὁ αὐτός ἢ ἄλλος ἤ ἄλλος ἢ τινι might be quoted; but perhaps it is more likely that the sentence is framed on the model of that which precedes it (πλὴθει γὰρ 9—βασιλικῶν 12), and would run, if completed, καὶ πολιτικόν δὲ καὶ βασιλικόν [οὐκ εἶδει (οὐ οὔτω]? νομίζουσι διαφέρειν· οἶν] ὅταν μὲν αὐτός ἐφεστήκει, [νομίζουσιν εἶναι] βασιλικῶν. The insertion of διαφέρειν νομίζουσι (Schm.), or of οὕτω διαφέρειν οἶοντι (Götli.), or even of οὐκ εἶδει νομίζουσι διαφέρειν (Rassow, Bemerkungen über einige Stellen der Politik, p. 4, followed by Sus.), does not suffice to complete the sentence. The distinction drawn by the inquirers here referred to between the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός fell short, in Aristotle's opinion, of the truth. They rested the distinction between them on the extent and duration of the authority possessed by them respectively, regarding the βασιλικός as a permanent autocratic ruler and the πολιτικός as one who exchanged his authority from time to time for subjection to rule, and exercised it in subordination to the precepts of the kingly or political science. This distinction between the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός is not, so far as I am aware, to be found tōtidem verbis in the Politicus of Plato, but Aristotle probably gathers it from Polit. 294. Α, 300 E sqq., though Plato seems to draw it rather between the ideal βασιλικός and the actual πολιτικός, than between the ideal βασιλικός and the ideal πολιτικός.

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whom he does not appear to distinguish (300 C). Plato, however, declines in the Politicus (292 E) to refuse the character of βασιλικός to one who, without actually ruling, possesses the kingly science, so that, if the Politicus is referred to here, the reference would seem to be not altogether exact. Aristotle, as has been said, holds that those who distinguished in the way he describes between the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός underrated the difference between them. The βασιλεύς, according to him, differs in nature from those he rules (Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 14: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3 sqq.); he is not their equal like the πολιτικός (Pol. 1. 7. 1255 b 18 sqq.). Nor is it the case, in Aristotle's view, that an interchange of ruling and being ruled occurs in all forms of πολιτική ἀρχή (cp. Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 4, εν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαίς ταῖς πλείονται μεταβάλλει τὸ ἀρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχύμενον).

14. αὐτός (cp. Plato, Rep. 557 E, ἐὰν αὐτῷ σοι ἐπίγει) here seems to unite the meanings of ‘alone’ (cp. 5 (8), 4. 1338 b 25) and ‘uncontrolled’ (cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 8), and to stand in opposition both to κατὰ τούς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιούτης καὶ το κατὰ μέρος ἀρχον καὶ ἀρχύμενον. So Schn., who however translates ‘solus et semper,’ which hardly brings out the complete meaning.

οὕτων δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Εφεστήκη should probably be supplied here.

15. κατὰ τοὺς λόγους κ.τ.λ. The ideal king, and indeed the ὁντός πολιτικός (300 C), of the Politicus of Plato rules μετὰ τέχνης (300 E), not in subordination to (κατὰ) the written precepts of his art (compare the contrast of μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου in Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 26 sqq. and Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 a 17 sqq.), just as a training-master who happened to return to his pupils from abroad sooner than he expected, would not feel himself bound by the written directions given them by him for their guidance during his absence (294 D, τῶν τῶν τέχνης γυμναζόντων ἐπιστάεις). The ideal ruler, like the captain of a ship or a physician, should rule over those committed to his charge, ‘not in subordination to the laws, but with plenary authority’ (299 C, μη κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτοκράτορας). Cp. 301 E, θαυμάζομεν ὅτα ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ὅσα ξυμβαίνει γέγενεθι κακὰ καὶ ὅσα ξυμβήσεται, τοιαύτης τῆς κριτικῆς ὑποκειμένης αὐταίς τῆς κατὰ γράμματα καὶ ἔθη, μη μετὰ ἐπιστήμης, πραγμάτωσι τὰς πράξεις; For the expression τούς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιούτης, cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 18, τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης: Polyb. 1. 32. 7, καὶ τι καὶ κἀκεῖνοι τῶν μερῶν εἶν τάξει καὶ παραγγέλλει κατὰ νόμους ('ex artis legibus iussa dare,' Schweighäuser) ἡκέτοτε. Cp. also Marc. Antonin. Comment. 6. 35, οὐχ ὅρως, πῶς οἱ βάναυσοι τεχνίται . . . ἀντέχονται τοῦ λόγου τῆς τέχνης, καὶ τοῦτο ἀπο-
στῆραι οἷς ὑπομένουσιν; In de Gen. An. 2. 1. 735 a 1 we have ἡ κίνησις ἡ τῶν ὄργίων ἔχουσα λόγον τὸν τῆς τέχνης, but the expression perhaps bears a somewhat different meaning in this passage, and also in that last quoted.

τῆς τοιαύτης, i.e. τῆς βασιλικῆς. Rassow (Bemerkungen, p. 3) and Susemihl (Sus. 2, note 3) are probably right in thus explaining τῆς τοιαύτης, which must apparently refer back here as elsewhere to something already mentioned. Plato, as Rassow points out, identifies the βασιλικὴ ἐπιστήμη with the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη (Polit. 259 C).

16. ταύτα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθή. These words refer to the whole series of opinions described in 9–16, and especially to that which sums them up, that the πολιτικὸς, βασιλικὸς, οἰκονομικὸς, and δεσποτικὸς do not differ in kind. Compare the still blunter expression used in criticising the Platonic Socrates (7 (5), 12. 1316 b 17), τοῖτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεύδος.

17. τὸ λεγόμενον, i.e. Aristotle's assertion in 9 (repeated in 16), that the doctrine criticised is erroneous. Mr. Congreve, however, and Prof. Tyrrell (Hermathena, 12. 22) take the reference to be to 1252 a 3–7. Against this view it may be urged, that (1) it seems more natural to refer τὸ λεγόμενον to that which immediately precedes, especially as otherwise ὅσοι 7—ἀληθῆ 16 becomes a long parenthesis, introduced, strangely enough, by μὲν οὖν, and without any δὲ to answer to μὲν οὖν: (2) the word δῆλον has already been applied to the conclusion arrived at in 3–7: (3) if we take τὸ λεγόμενον to refer to the assertion that the πόλις aims at the supreme good, we expect to be told in 21 sqq. that fresh light will be thrown on this subject, not that we shall better understand the nature of the differences existing between the parts of which the πόλις is composed, and it is thus that these scholars explain τούτων 21.

τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. Cp. de Gen. An. 3. 9. 758 a 28. ' Camerarius viam et rationem quasi praeceuntem et ducentem ad certam cognitionem interpretatur' (Schm.); we find, however, κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον in Pol. 1. 8. 1256 a 2, where the metaphor seems to fall into the background. Still ὑφηγεῖται is probably used in both passages in a middle, and not, as Bonitz takes it (Ind. 807 b 46 sqq.), in a passive sense. The same plan of inquiry—that of dividing a compound whole into its simplest elements and examining these—had been followed in the Nicomachean Ethics in the case of εἰδαιμονία, and so again in the Third Book of the Politics, the πόλις being πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος, the πολιτῆς is first studied. Cp. de Part. An. 1. 4. 644 a 29, ἦ μὲν γὰρ οὐσία τὸ τῷ εἴδει ἰτομον,
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κράτιστον, εἰ τις δύνατον περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν καὶ ἀτόμων τῷ εἰδει θεωρεῖν χωρίς, ὄσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, οὕτω καὶ περὶ ἄρνους, where the best method is said to be to examine the ultimate species separately, but the remark is added that it is better not to apply this method to fishes and birds, for the species under these genera are not far apart (οὐ πολὺ διεστῶτα), and much repetition would result if it were employed in relation to them. So in the de Anima (see de An. 2. 3) it is through studying the ἰδιώμεισις of the soul successively—τὸ θρεπτικὸν, τὸ ἀιώνιτικόν, and so forth—that we obtain a real knowledge of the soul. And so again in the History of Animals Aristotle’s first step is to study the parts of which animals are made up, and in the treatise on the Parts of Animals to study the homogeneous parts, which are simpler, before the heterogeneous, which are more complex. The method of rising from the parts to the whole was a tradition from Socrates: see Grote, Plato i. 384 sqq., who refers to Hipp. Maj. 301 B, and notes the objection of Isocrates to it (ad Nicocl. § 52). Cp. also ad Nicoclem, § 9, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον τί τῶν βασιλευόντων ἔργων ἐστὶν ἐὰν γὰρ εἰ κεφαλαίως τὴν δύναμιν ἅνω τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς περιλαβώμεν, ἐνταῦθ’ ἀποβλέποντες ἄμεινον καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν ἐρόμεν. In de Anima i. 1. 402 b 9 sqq. we find Aristotle discussing whether it is better to begin with ἡ ἄλη ψυχή οὐ τὰ μάρια οὐ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν. His review of the parts of the State in the Politics, indeed, quickly reveals to him its ἔργον.

20 sqq. καὶ πόλιν answers to ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, 18. By arriving at the simple elements of the πόλις, which are, as the State consists of households (c. 3. 1253 b 2), the simple elements of the household—husband and wife, father and child, master and slave—we shall not only come to understand the nature of the πόλις, but shall also learn what is the difference between the δεσποτικός, οἰκουμικός, πολιτικός, and βασιλικός, and also how far it is possible to arrive at a scientific account of each of these personages. Some take both τοῖτοι and ἐκαστὸν τῶν ῥηθέντων to mean ‘the parts of which the πόλις is composed,’ but if τὸ λεγόμενον 17 refers, as seems probable, to 7–16, we look rather for an inquiry with regard to the δεσποτικός, οἰκουμικός, etc. than for one respecting the parts of which the πόλις is composed. Besides, ἐκαστὸν τῶν ῥηθέντων reminds us of τοῖτοι ἐκαστὸν 10, words clearly referring to the δεσποτικός, etc. Sepulveda, on the other hand, takes τοῖτοι to mean ‘the parts of which the πόλις is composed,’ though he explains ἐκαστὸν τῶν ῥηθέντων as ‘quaer pertinent ad regem, ad civilem hominem, ad dominum et patrem familiaris.’ Our attention, however, has been specially
drawn in 7-16 to the question as to the nature of the difference existing between the δεσποτικός, οἰκονομικός, and the rest, and it seems likely that διαφέρουσι 21 takes up διαφέρειν 10; perhaps, therefore, on the whole it is most probable that both τοῦτων and ἕκαστον τῶν ῥήματων refer to the δεσποτικός, οἰκονομικός, πολιτικός, and βασιλικός. Cp. 1. 7. 1255 b 16, ψαντήρων δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐ ταύτιν ἐστὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτική, οὐδὲ πάσαι ἄλλαισις αἱ ἀρχαί, ὅσπερ τινές φασιν. We shall find that the analysis of the πόλει into its simple elements (which is described in c. 3. 1253 b 1 sq. as completed) does throw light on the difference between the δεσποτικός, the οἰκονομικός, and the ruler of a State, and ultimately to some extent also on the difference between the πολιτικός and the βασιλικός, for we learn to distinguish the rule exercised by the head of the household over his wife, which is a πολιτική ἀρχή, from that which he exercises over his child, which is a βασιλική ἀρχή. As to τεχνικόν, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 1108 b 20, οὔτε δὲ ἦττον ἰσως τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῷ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῷ ἐπί τὸ καθόλου βαδιστεῖν εἶναι δύσειν ἢ, κάκεινο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδεχεται εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τούθ' αἱ ἐπιστήμαι, and also Pol. 1. 11. 1258 b 33 sqq.: 1259 a 8, 20. For εἰ δὲν δοὺν (not εἰ τίνων), cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 1, εἰπε δὲ ψαντήρων εἰ δὲν μορίον ἡ πόλεις συνιστήκεν, and see Jell, Gr. Gr. 2. § 877. a. Obs. 3. 4.

24. Εἴ δὲν τις κ.τ.λ. Δὴ introduces the first step in the inquiry C. 2. just announced: cp. de An. 1. 2. 403 b 26: Pol. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 14: 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 37. The first question as to this sentence is, does ὅσπερ εν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ εν τοῖς form part of the protasis or the apodosis? Bernays connects the words with the protasis. Sepulveda, Vict., and Lamb. take them with the apodosis, and, it would seem, more naturally: cp. above 18-21. Proposals to transfer ὁτα 26 to before καὶ 25 are negatived by the usage of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. 546 b 18 sqq., who refers among other passages to Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1110 b 9. ἐ πεὶ τις τὰ ἡδεία καὶ τὰ καλά φαίνη βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἐξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν ἐν ὑπὸ ὁτα βίαια), no less than by the intrinsic objections to taking this liberty with the MS. text. The meaning of ὁτα seems to be not 'as follows' (Bern.), but 'by watching the process of growth from the beginning.' Andrew Schott, in some notes appended to D. Heinsius' Paraphrase of the Politics (p. 1042), takes εἰ ἀρχής with φωνήμα νος, and there is, no doubt, some strangeness in the expression εἰ ἀρχής Βλέψεις: still these words are probably to be taken together. 'Εἰ ἀρχής means, 'beginning at the beginning': see Waitz on Anal. Post. 2. 8. 93 a 16. For the genetic method here employed, cp. Meteor. 4. 12. 389 b 24 sqq., and Isocr. De Antid. § 180. In
tracing the growth of the πόλις from its earliest moments, Aristotle follows Plato's example both in the Republic (369 a) and in the Laws (678 sqq.). Plato's object, however, is different from Aristotle's. In the Republic his object, or nominal object, is to find justice—in the Laws it is to discover τι καλὸς ἢ μὴ κατωκίασθη κ.τ.λ. (Laws 683 b); whereas Aristotle's object is to distinguish the δεσποτικός, οἰκονομικός, βασιλικός, and πολιτικός, and still more to prove that the πόλις is by nature and prior to the individual, and the source of αὐτάρκεια to the latter. His substitution of this method of watching the growth of the πόλις from its smallest elements is not a desertion of the method of division (διαρρέων, 19) announced just previously; it is, on the contrary, its best application. The same plan is followed in c. 9 to distinguish the sound and the unsound χρηματιστική. The growth of χρηματιστική both within and beyond the limits prescribed by Nature is carefully traced. For τὰ πράγματα, cp. Rhet. 1. 7. 1364 b 8.

26. ἀνάγκη δὴ κ.τ.λ. Society begins in Necessity (that which is necessary always comes first, that which is for well-being afterwards, 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27), and its earliest form is συνδυασμός, the union in pairs of human beings who are indispensable to each other. Aristotle lays stress on the origin of the household in Necessity and the needs of every day, partly in order to differentiate the οἰκονομικός and the πολιτικός, partly because by tracing the household to Necessity, or in other words Nature, he obtains the means of proving that its outgrowth the πόλις is by Nature. He finds the origin of the Household and the πόλις in Necessity and Nature, not προϊστασία (for this contrast Bonitz, Ind. 837 a 46, compares de Part. An. 2. 13. 657 a 37, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προϊστασιῶν, ἀλλ’ ἡ φύσις ἐποίησε). Plato had seemed in the Republic (369 b : cp. 371) to regard the πόλις as originating in the exchange of products and labour. Even in the Laws, where the household is treated as the germ of the πόλις (680), no such attempt is made to trace its origin and to resolve it into its constituent elements, as is here made by Aristotle. In the view of the latter, human society originates not in the ἀλλαικτικὴ κοινωνία (which begins only in the κώμη or Village, c. 9. 1257 a 19 sqq.), but in the relations of husband and wife, and master and slave. The starting-point of the process that gives birth to the πόλις is to be sought in a pair of powerful instinctive desires—that of reproduction, which brings male and female together, and that of self-preservation, which draws the slave to his master, the master also gaining in completeness by having the slave's physical strength placed at his disposal. Else-
where, however, we are told that human society originates in the aim to live (τοῦ ζῆν ἐνεκεν, c. 2. 1252 b 29: 3. 6. 1278 b 24: cp. Plato, Rep. 369 D) and ultimately to live nobly and well (1252 b 30: 1278 b 21 sqq.), for which purposes men stand in need of ή παρ’ ἀλλήλων βοήθεια (1278 b 20). This account of the origin of society is set by the side of that which traces it back to the instincts which lead to the formation of the household; we are not taught how to weave them together. There is, besides, a further source of human society—simple ὅρεξις τοῦ συζύγου (3. 6. 1278 b 21): man is so endowed by nature—endowed with speech and perceptions of the good and bad, the just and unjust, the advantageous and disadvantageous—as to seek society irrespective of all needs of βοήθεια: he is, in fact, a πολιτικὸς ζῶν in an especial degree. Without these endowments the instincts of reproduction and self-preservation would not suffice to give birth to the household and the πόλις, for these instincts are possessed by the lower animals, which nevertheless do not form households or πόλεις.

tοὺς ἀνευ ἀλλήλων κ.τ.λ. Cp. de Gen. An. 2. 4. 741 a 3 sq., 2. 5. 741 b 2 sqq., and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 101:

Οἶκεῖον οὗτος οὐδὲν ἑστὶν, ὥς Λάχης,
ἐὰν σκοτῇ τις, ὡς ἀνήρ τε καὶ γυνὴ.

Perhaps τὸς γενέσεως ἐνεκεν 27 is intended to qualify not only συνδιαζέσθαι, but also τοῖς ἀνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι. For this purpose they cannot dispense with each other, and for this purpose they must pair.

27. θὴλυ μὲν καὶ ἀρρεν. It would seem from ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ζῴων 29, that in this passage, as occasionally elsewhere (e.g. 1. 13. 1260 a 10, 13), these words are used of the male and female human being.

τῆς γενέσεως ἐνεκεν, the origin, but not, in Aristotle’s view, the end of wedlock: see Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 19 sqq. The household, like the πόλις, comes into existence for one end, but subsists for another. Γένεσις is a wider term than γέννησις: ‘et ipsum τὸ γίγνεσθαι et γεννᾶσθαι significat, et universam cam seriem mutatio-
num complectitur quibus concitatur generatio’ (Bon. Ind. 148 b 4).

28. ἄλλ’ ὀσπερ ... ἔτερον. Cp. Democrit. Fragm. 184 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 1. 351: Stob. Floril. 76. 17), referred to by Lasaulx (Ehe, p. 91): Aristotle. de Anima, 2. 4. 415 a 26, φυσικότα-
τον γὰρ τῶν ζῴων τὸς ζῴων (all things that partake of life, whether animals or not—de An. 3. 12. 434 a 27), ὡς τὰ πλεῖα καὶ μὴ πηρώματα, ἢ τὴν γένεων αὐτομίσταν ἔχει, τὸ παρῆλα ἔτερον οἶνον αὐτῷ, ζῷων μὲν ζῷων, φυτῶν δὲ φυτῶν, ἵνα τοῦ ἄει καὶ τοῦ θείου μετίχωσιν ἡ δύναμις πάντα γὰρ.
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ēkeivōν ὥργεται, κακείνου ἕνεκα πρῶτελ ὀσα πρῶτελ κατὰ φίλον: and the following passages in the de Generatione Animalium—2. 1. 735 a 17 sqq.: 2. 1. 731 b 24 sqq.: 1. 23. 731 a 24—b 8: 3. 10. 760 a 35 sqq. (where Nature is said to design that species shall be perpetual). Plato had already pointed to marriage as a mode of attaining immortality (Laws 721 B—C: see Lasaulx, Ehe, p. 93), and the writer of the so-called First Book of the Oeconomics, who is fond of blending the teaching of Aristotle with that of Plato's Laws and the writings of Xenophon, reproduces the view (c. 3. 1343 b 23 sqq.). Eth. Eud. 2. 6. 1222 b 15 sqq. should also be compared with this passage. This impulse of reproduction can hardly be an ὄρεξις, for it is shared by plants, and plants have not τὸ ὀρεκτικοῦ (de An. 2. 3. 414 a 31 sqq.): it may, however, possibly be an ὄρωμα (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 29). It seems scarcely to find a place in the enumeration of τὰ ἐν τῇ ΨΥΧῊ γενόμενα (Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1105 b 19 sqq.) as πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις, probably because it belongs to τὸ ὀρεκτικοῦ, with which an ethical treatise has nothing to do. Aristotle does not enter into the question why the union of man and wife is more than a momentary union, or why it is more lasting than that of male and female among other animals; but his answer may probably be inferred from Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 19 sqq., which may be contrasted with Locke on Civil Government, 2. §§ 79, 80.

29. φύτοις. There is no assertion in this passage (as Schn. thinks) of a sex in plants. Aristotle, in fact, holds that though plants share in the male and female principle (otherwise they could not be said to live)—de Gen. An. 2. 1. 732 a 11—yet these powers are mingled in them and not separated the one from the other (de Gen. An. 1. 23. 731 a 1). All he says is that plants, like animals, are actuated by an impulse to produce a being like themselves: how this is done, is not here noticed.

30. ἀρχον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Sc. ἀνάγκη συνενάζεσθαι. Aristotle is probably speaking here only of that form of the relation of ruler and ruled which is exemplified in master and slave. Wherever on one side there is intelligence and on the other brute force only, it is to the interest of both parties to combine, the master supplying what the slave needs and the slave what the master needs. Euripides (Herc. Furens 1235) makes his hero refuse to believe that one god can ever have made a slave of another, as some assert:

Δεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεός, ἐίπερ ἐστὶ ὁτώς θεός, οὐδενός.

Aristotle's theory of natural slavery is already indicated here.
For the thought that it is διάνωμα which makes the master, cp. de An. 1. 5. 410 b 12 sq., τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναι τι κριτήν καὶ ἀρχὸν ἀδύνατον ἀναπτώτερον ὥς ἐτι τοῦ νοῦ εὐλογον γὰρ τοῦτον εἶναι προγενεῖτατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν. In 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 6 we read—καὶ τὸ ἀρχὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ εὐειδέρων ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως τοιτῇ ἐπάρχει πάσιν, ἀρχικὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀὐτήτων ὁ θυμός, but yet θυμός by itself and severed from διάνωμα confers freedom rather than the capacity to rule others (4 (7). 7. 1327 b 23–33). The slave is throughout regarded by Aristotle as in the main a creature of their and sinew and nothing more. His function is the use of his body, and this is the best to be got from him, 1. 5. 1254 b 17 sq.: he shares in reason sufficiently to apprehend it, but has it not (1. 5. 1254 b 22): he is wholly without the deliberative faculty (τὸ βουλευτικόν, 1. 13. 1260 a 12), and hence is no partaker in life according to moral choice or happiness (3. 9. 1280 a 33). Plato, on the other hand, had described men possessed of muscular strength and little intelligence as born to be hired labourers (Rep. 371 E).


33. ταύτα, 'that which the other has designed.' For a similar roughness in the use of the word, cp. ταύτα, de Gen. An. 1. 22. 730 b 11.

34. διό, because the one completes the other. Cp. Stob. Ecl. Eith. 2. 6. 17 (tom. 2. p. 92 Meineke), νωθή δὲ καὶ καθ’ έατόν ἀδύνατον διαζημ, φ’ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι συμφέρειν. The sketch of the political teaching of the Peripatetics here given (tom. 2. p. 91 sqq. Meineke) deserves study, as being in the main a résumé, though a brief one, of the teaching of the Politics.

ταύτο συμφέρει. In the Third Book, on the other hand, the rule of the master is said only accidentally to aim at the advantage of the slave, οὐ γὰρ ἐνδεχεται φθειρομενον τοῦ δοῦλου σωζεσθαι τὴν δεσποτείαν (3. 6. 1278 b 32). Thus it would seem that even in becoming, as the First Book (c. 13. 1260 b 3) requires him to become, a
source of ethical virtue to his slave, the master will have his own interest in view. We are not told this in the First Book.

34-b 9. In mentioning two kouvouniai and not one, Aristotle has implied that a distinction exists between them, and he now draws attention to the fact, in order that he may remove a difficulty in the way of the acceptance of his view. By nature, then—he in effect says—the female is marked off from the slave (for Nature designed them to serve different purposes), and if this is not so among barbarians, the reason is that among them the element destined by nature for rule is not forthcoming. Mēn oūv here, as often elsewhere, introduces a renewed reference to a subject on which increased precision is desirable. Cp. 1253 a 10, where, after the fact has been mentioned that language is peculiar to man, mēn oūv introduces an admission that this is not true of voice, and an explanation of the difference between voice and language. The existence of a distinction between women and slaves is implied in Poet. 15. 1454 a 20 sqq. (a reference given in Bon. Ind. 204 b 45). The practice of buying wives, which seems to be referred to in Pol. 2. 8. 1268 b 39 sq. as common among the barbarians, may have often tended to reduce wives to the level of slaves (see Prof. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, p. 76 sq.). Plato had remarked already on the treatment of women as slaves in barbarian communities (Laws 805 D–E). Their toils were in some degree compensated by easier child-bearing (Aristot. de Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 32 sqq.). Even among the poor of a Hellenic State the true form of the household cannot be quite realized: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5, τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις ἀνάγκη χρήσθαι καὶ γυναῖκι καὶ παισίν ὀψερ ἀκολούθει διὰ τὴν ἀδούλιαν. The fact noted by Plato and Aristotle as to barbarians has been often remarked upon by later writers: so Darwin (Voyage of the Beagle, p. 216) says of the Fuegians, ‘the husband is to the wife a brutal master to a laborious slave’; and even as to Montenegro we read—‘How can you expect beauty from women who are used as beasts of burden by the men?... The well-grown handsome men who are playing at ball before the palace of the Prince are the husbands and brothers of the poor creatures who are carrying wood and water to their homes’ (Letter from Montenegro in the Times, Oct. 11, 1882). On the other hand, Aristotle elsewhere notes the frequency of γυναικοκρατία among barbarians (2. 9. 1269 b 24 sq.). Both observations are probably true, however we may choose to reconcile them. It should be added that though Aristotle here contrasts that which prevails among the barbarians with that which
is natural, he is well aware that legislators may learn much from them (Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 33 sqq.); in fact, he occasionally mentions with approval in the Politics practices prevailing among them (for instance, their way of rearing infants, 4 (7). 17. 1336 a 5 sqq.), and often draws attention to their customs (in relation to communism, for example, 2. 5. 1263 a 3 sqq.). Plato had spoken in the passage of the Laws to which reference has been made (805 D–F) of 'the Thracians and many other races,' but Aristotle speaks as if the wife were virtually a slave among the barbarians generally.

1. οὐδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The limits within which this holds good 1252 b, are more fully expressed in de Part. An. 4. 6. 683 a 22, ὅσον γὰρ ένδίκεται χρῆσθαι δυσίν ἐπὶ δυ' ἔργα καὶ μή ἐμποδίζειν πρὸς ἔτερον, οὐδὲν ἢ φύσις εἰσθεμεῖν ὀσπὴρ ἡ χαλκευτικὴ πρὸς εὐτελεῖαν ὦξεικολύχων ἀλλ' ὅσον μὴ ἐνδίκεται, καταχρῆσαι τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ πλεῖω ἔργα. Thus Aristotle says of magistrates in small States, Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 7, διόπερ οὐδὲν κωλνεῖ πολλὰς ἐπιμελεῖας ἀμα προστάτευτες, οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδίζοινς ἀλλήλαις, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀλγανθρωπίαν ἀναγκαίον τὰ ἀρχεία οἰον ὧξεικολύχων ποιεῖν. For instances in which Nature uses an organ designed for one purpose for certain other side-purposes, see de Part. An. 2. 16. 659 a 20: 3. 1. 662 a 18. There were some conspicuous exceptions in the human economy to the rule of ἐν πρὸς ἐν: cp. de Gen. An. 5. 8. 789 b 9, οἶον γὰρ ἐνα πολείχρηστα ἐστὶ τῶν περὶ τάς τεχνάς, ὡσπερ ἐν τῇ χαλκευτικῇ ἡ σφέρα καὶ ὁ ἄκμων, oὕτω καὶ τὸ πνεῖμα ἐν τοῖς φύσει συναστάσει, and de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 19, ἡ δὲ χείρ ἐκεῖν εἶναι οὐ χὶ ἐν ὄργανον ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἑστὶ γὰρ ὡστερει ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργανον: τῷ οὖν πλεῖστα δυναμένον δεξιεῖσθαι τεχνὰς τὸ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τῶν ὄργανον χρησίμου τὴν χεῖρα ὑποδέδεκεν ἢ φύσις ... ἡ γὰρ χείρ καὶ δονύ καὶ χηλή καὶ κέρας γίνεται καὶ δόμυ καὶ ξίφος καὶ ἀλλο ὀστοιον ὅπλο καὶ ὄργανον. Whether the various uses of the hand interfere with each other, must be left to physiologists to determine.

2. τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν. See Sus.2, Notes 8 and 1353. Vict. appears to have been the first to draw attention to de Part. An. 4. 6. 683 a 22 sqq. (quoted in the last note) and to the important passage from the comic poet Theopompos quoted by Julius Pollux 10. 118, τὸ δὲ ὦξεικολύχων στρατιωτικῶν μέντοι (aliter μὲν τι) χρῆμα, εἴρηται δὲ ὑπὸ Θεοτόκου τοῦ κομικοῦ ἐν Εἰρήνῃ— Ἦμας δ' ἀπαλλαχθίνας ἐπ' ἀγαθάς τεχναὶ ὦξεικολυχνῖον καὶ ἔφορομαχαίρας πκράιας. Vict. says in his note on 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 9 sq., 'Pollux quoque mentionem ipsius fecit, qui narrat militare instrumentum id fuisset. Hoc autem, ut opinor, ex cogitatum fuerat, ne milites
nimirum prerentur duobus gravibus instrumentis serendis, cum ex uno ita conformato valerent eundem fructum capere. The proverb *Δελφικὴ μάχαρα* (Leutsch and Schneiderin, Paroem. Gr. 1. p. 393) seems to throw no light on the passage before us. We see from Athen. Deipn. 173 c sqq. that the Delphians were famous for their knives and their turn for sacrificial feasting and cookery, and they may very well have used and sold to pilgrims nothing loth to avoid expense (683 a 23 sqq.) a knife which might be used not only for killing the victim but also for flaying it and cutting it up. Contrast Eurip. Electr. 743–769 (Bothe), where Agisthus first kills the victim (a kid) with a *σφαγίς*, and then Orestes after flaying it with a Dorian *κοπίς* asks for a large Phthian *κοπίς* to cut it up. We need not suppose with Götting (de Machaera Delphica, p. 10) that the Delphic knife was a combination of a knife and a spoon. The passage he quotes from Hesychius—*Δελφικὴ μάχαρα ἀπὸ κατασκευῆς λαμβάνουσα ἐμπροσθεν μέρος σίδηρον, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης—deserves notice, but leaves us much in the dark.

3. *πενίχρωσ*. Vict. ‘aptē ad usus pauperum’—a rendering probably suggested by *πρὸς εὐτέλειαν* in the parallel passage from the De Partibus Animalium quoted above (note on 1252 b 1)—but the meaning apparently is ‘in a spirit of stint’ (Lamb. ‘parce tenuiter et anguste’).

οὐτω. Cp. 1252 a 24 sqq., though here the clause which explains it, μὴ πολλοὶς ἐργοὶς ἄλλ᾽ ἐνὶ δοῦλευν, follows and does not precede it. The use of *δοῦλευν* in the passage before us seems to be a somewhat uncommon one.


6. τὰξιν. Cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 34. 1194 b 15, ἄραν ἢδη λάβῃ (ὁ νῦσ) τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρός τάξιν. Vict. compares Virg. Aen. 2. 102:

Si omnes uno ordine habetis Achivos.

tὸ φύσει ἄρχον. What this is appears from 1252 a 31 sq. and 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 23–33. According to Aristotle, the relation between the barbarian husband and wife assumes an unnatural form, because that which is naturally the ruling element is wanting. If the wife is a slave, it is because everybody is so. She is no worse off than her husband. Cp. Eurip. Hel. 246, where Helen says—

Τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλῆν ἐνὸς,

and see Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 60. When in 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 25 Aristotle speaks of the barbarians of cold
climates as tending to be free, he must be referring to political independence.

7. γίνεται, 'comes to be.' See notes on 1264 a 14: 1254 b 31.

η κοινωνία αὐτῶν refers probably to the conjugal union among the barbarians (so Bern. and Sus.).

8. οἱ ποιηταί. Euripides, Iph. Aul. 1266:

Barbároν δ' Ἐλλήνας ἄρχειν εἰκός, ἄλλι' οὐ βαρβάρους,

μήτερ, 'Ελλήνων τὸ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλον, οἶ δ' ἐλεύθεροι.

Lecturers, we are told in Metaph. a. 3. 995 a 7, were often expected by their audience to produce a poet as a witness to the truth of their statements.

9. ἐκ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The two κοινωνία are those of husband and wife, master and slave (the latter being here implied to be a κοινω-νία, though the name κοινωνία is apparently denied to master and slave in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.). That of father and child arises after the foundation of the household. Translate: 'from these two unions, then, proceeds first the household.' Πρώτη is by no means meaningless or pleonastic, for the further societies of the village and State consist of men and women, masters and slaves, but only mediately (mittelbar), inasmuch as they consist of households and households consist of these members. The next paragraph offers a striking analogy (1252 b 15, η δ' ἐκ πλειονῶν οἰκίων κοινωνία πρώτη χρῆσεως ἑνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρων κόμη): the State also, it is implied, consists of a plurality of households, but only mediately, inasmuch as it is composed of a number of villages which are themselves made up of households' (Dittenberger, Gött. Gel. Anz., Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1373). Some have been tempted to explain οἰκία πρώτη as 'the simplest form of the household' (cp. πρώτη πῶλις, 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 17: 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7), considering the complete form to be realized when children have come into being. But, as Dittenberger observes (p. 1373), there is no confirmatory trace elsewhere in Aristotle's treatment of the household of this distinction between the οἰκία πρώτη and δεύτερα. An οἰκία τέλειος is indeed mentioned in 1. 3. 1253 b 4, but as consisting of slave and free, both of which classes find a place in the household from the first. No doubt, in the third chapter Aristotle adds to the two κοινωνίαι spoken of in 1252 b 10 a third (that which exists between father and child), but the τέλειος οἰκία does not seem to be connected with the appearance of this relation. The parallel of 1252 b 15 also points to the other interpretation, and the absence of any δὲ to answer to μὲν οὖν 9 (if indeed the second δὲ in 15 does not answer both to μὲν οὖν 12 and to μὲν

1. 2. 1252 b 3—9. 111
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οὖν 9) is not uncommon in the Politics (see Sus.1, Ind. Gramm. μὲν), and affords no ground for the surmise of a lacuna after ἑστὶν 12.

10. καὶ ὁρθώς κ.τ.λ. The word πρώτη suggests the quotation from Hesiod, which Aristotle seems to interpret as making the wife and the ox the elements of the household, and thus supporting his own view, for the ox, he says, is the poor man’s slave (cp. Aelian, Var. Hist. 5. 14). If the line which follows (Hes. Op. et Dies 406), ἐναντίον, οὗ γαμετήν, ἥτις καὶ βουσίν ἐποιεῖ, is genuine, the meaning which Aristotle attributes to Hesiod is even further from his real meaning than in the contrary case.

13. εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκόντα κατά φύσιν, ‘existing by nature for the satisfaction of daily recurring needs,’ (compare the phrase which stands in contrast to this, χρήσεως ἑνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρον, 16). So we have κατά τε τὰ συσώτια καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον τῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν (2. 6. 1265 b 41), πρὸς τῷ καθ’ ἡμέραν ὄντες (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 20); and τὰ ἐφημέρα are conjoined with τὰ ἀναγκαία τοῦ βίου in Strabo 7. p. 311. The κόμη (or γένος), on the contrary, exists to satisfy necessities less incessantly recurring, and as to the πόλις, cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 21, οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέρουσα ἡ πολιτικὴ (κοινωνία) ἑφίτεια, ἄλλ’ εἰς ἀπαντά τῶν βίων. The view implied here of the aim of the household seems somewhat to differ from that of 1252 a 26–34, where reproduction and self-preservation are said to bring it into being.

14. οἶκος . . . οὗς. Cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 33, τὸ πλῆθος . . . αὐχ ὡς καθ’ ἐκα- στῶν ἄλλ’ ὡς αθρώους. Aristotle takes up the word οἶκος from Hesiod in place of the more usual οἰκία. As to the ordinary difference in meaning between οἶκος and οἰκία, see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, E. T. p. 142, note 680, and Shilleto on Demosth. de Falsa Legatione, § 279. It is in order to show that the household originates in the needs of daily life that Aristotle adduces the names given to its members by Charondas and Epimenides.

ὁμοσπόνδους. The σιπή was a bread-chest: Vict. refers to Aristoph. Plut. 802.

15. ὁμοκάποις. Κάπη is ‘a manger.’ Götling’s argument that as Epimenides belonged to Crete, where syssitia prevailed, he would not be likely thus to designate the household, seems of the least possible weight. As Dittenberger says (ubi supra, p. 1357), we do not know for certain that the work of Epimenides which Aristotle here quotes was authentic, or that, if it was, he was speaking of Crete. ὁμοκάποις (with the penult short, at any rate), as Sus.2 (Note 17) says, would not fit into an hexameter verse, and Epimenides wrote in hexameters, but we learn from Diog. Laer. 1. 112 that a prose treatise on the Cretan Constitution passed under his
name, and the term may have occurred in this work. The words κύμματα, κύπτειν, καμματίδες seem to be old-fashioned words used in connexion with the common meals at Sparta (Nicocl. ap. Athen. Deipn. 140 d). For ζεῖς καπίασι, see Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3, p. 58: cp. ζεῖς ἐταρίεσι, ibid. 4, p. 384. "Ομοκάπτων is more likely to be a corruption from the less familiar ὀμοκάπτων than ὀμοκάπτοις from it," observes Mr. Ridgeway (Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc. vol. 2, p. 125), who however suggests ὀμοκάπτοις with the penult long, Dor. for ὀμοκάπτοις. "those who have a common plot of ground." Giphanius, who prefers ὀμοκάπτοις, explains ὀμοκάπτοις in this way (p. 21: Schneider, Pol. vol. 2, p. 9). But perhaps ὀμοκάπτοις with the penult short better expresses that community in sustenance and in the satisfaction of daily recurring needs to which Aristotle, as Dittenberger remarks (ubi supra, p. 1378), points as the characteristic feature of the household. Ὀμέστιος is used in the sense of 'a member of the household' (Polyb. 2, 57, 7, referred to by Vict.), but not ὀμόκαπτος. The word ὀμοκάπτοις does not necessarily imply that the free and slave members of the household took their meals together, but the practice would be quite in harmony with the simplicity of early Greek life (cp. Theopomp. fragm. 243: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1, 319).

ἡ δ’ ἐκ κ.τ.λ. Πρώτη agrees with καυνωῖα: for its position in the sentence, cp. Metaph. 1, 3, 1054 b 1, αἱ ἵσαι γραμμαί εἰθείαι αἱ αἰταί ('are the same'): de Part. An. 2, 14, 658 a 28, καθ’ ὄλον τὸ σῶμα προνί: Phys. 4, 5, 212 b 19: Pol. 2, 8, 1269 a 23: and still nearer, Phys. 4, 4, 212 a 20, τὸ τοῦ περίκομος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τούτ’ ἔστεν ὅ τότος, where the post-position of the adjectives seems to be for emphasis on the point desired to be pressed, and also to secure the juxtaposition of ἀκίνητον and πρῶτον. Πρώτη in the passage before us qualifies ἐκ πλειώνων ὁικών, and perhaps also χρήσεως ἐνεκε μὴ ἐφημερον. 'The first society to be formed out of more households than one, and to exist for the satisfaction of needs not daily recurring, is the village.' See note on 1252 b 9.

16. μάλιστα κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'nee tamen omnem pagum talem esse affirmat, usu namque venire potest, et sane contingit aliquando, ut e varii locis homines non coniuncti inter se sanguine veniant in eandem sedem, atque illic domicilia sibi construant tot numero iam ut pagum ex ipsis conficiant.' For the relation of the κώμη to the deme, see Pict. 3, 1448 a 35 sq. Perhaps the κώμη and the rural deme continued to feel as a gens, and to obey a gentle authority, longer than is often supposed, and hence in part the preference of oligarchs and of the Lacedaemonians for village-residence and their VOL. II.
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dislike of large cities, which had a natural tendency to democracy. The purchaser of land in an Athenian deme to which he did not belong paid something for ἐγκήσις (Boeckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens, E. T. p. 297 n.: Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, pp. 68, 78): hence the land probably tended, in rural demes at all events, to continue in the hands of the members of the deme. The villages founded by the Teutonic conquerors of Britain were to some extent peopled by kinsmen. ‘Harling abode by Harling and Billing by Billing, and each “wick” and “ham” and “stead” and “tun” took its name from the kinsmen who dwelt together in it. In this way the house or “ham” of the Billings was Billingham, and the “tun” or township of the Harlings was Harlington’ (Green, The Making of England, p. 188).

17. ἀποικία οἰκίας. A similar expression is used by Plato, Laws 776 A. Cp. also Laws 680 A sqq., a passage which was probably present to Aristotle’s mind throughout this part of the second chapter (see vol. 1. p. 37, note 1). Plato appeals to the same passage of Homer as is cited in 22, and for the same purpose, to prove the early prevalence of Patriarchal Kingship, or, as he terms it, ἀναστεία. Both Plato and Aristotle regard kingly rule as characteristic of early society and trace it to the government of the household by the father.

οὖς . . . παῖδας. Aristotle’s object in mentioning these names for members of the same village is to show by an appeal to the use of language that the village is an extension of the household. He has proved that the household is necessary and natural, and if he can prove that the village is an outgrowth of the household and the πόλις of the village, then the πόλις will be shown to be natural. Cp. Photius, Lexicon (quoted by Schn.), ὁμογενὴσεις, οἱ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γάλακτος, οὐς καὶ γεννήταις ἕκαλουν, and see Liddell and Scott, s. v. Plato had used the expression τῶν παίδων παῖδας καὶ παῖδων παῖδας ὑ λίγους in the passage of the Laws referred to in the last note (681 B), and Homer before him (Il. 20. 308). Had Cicero the First Book of the Politics in his mind when he wrote (de Offic. 1. 17. 54)—nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium ut habeant lubidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est; proxima in liberis (in Aristotle master and slave); deinde una domus, communia omnia (cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 21). Id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium republicae. Sequuntur fratrum coniunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinarumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint in alias domos tanquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur connubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui.
Quae propagatio et soboles origo est rerum publicarum? There is no express mention of the village, however, here, though a reference to it may be intended in the words 'alias domos.' Compare Demosth. in Macart. c. 19, καὶ παῖδες ἐγένοντο αὐτῶι ἄνασαι καὶ παῖδων παῖδες, καὶ ἐγένοντο πέντε οἶκοι ἐκ τοῦ Βουσίδου ὅικον ἐνώ ὄστος.

10. Διό . . . ψκου. The fact that the village is an offshoot of the household enables Aristotle to account for the early prevalence of Kingship. Compare with the passage before us a quotation from Theophrastus περὶ βασιλείας in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 73, καὶ ἄρχας μὲν γὰρ ἄπασα πόλις 'Ελλης ἐξασιλεύετο, πλὴν οἷς ὀστέρ τὰ μέσα ἐπὶ ἑθνίκως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμους τινάς καὶ ἔθνοις πατρίως (cp. Pol. 3. 14. 1285 a 16—b 12).

τὰ ἐθνη (opp. αἱ Ἑλληνες, Bon. Ind. 216 b 51) are here regarded as preserving the traditions of the village (cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 24 : 2. 8. 1268 b 39). The customs of the early Hellenes are thought both by Thucydides (1. 5—6) and by Aristotle (Pol. 2. 8. 1268 b 39) to have had much in common with those of the barbarians of their own day.

20. εἴ βασιλειομένων γὰρ συνήλθον, 'for they were formed of persons governed by a king,' i.e. of members of households. Cp. Plato, Laws 680 D, μοῖν οἷν οἴκ ἐκ τούτων τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἶκησιν καὶ κατὰ γέιαν διασπραμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς (sc. τουαίται πολιτείαι γέγοντει), ἐν αἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχη τι ἀκά τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶς ἐκ πατρίως καὶ μητρίως γεγονότα, οἷς ἐπιμένει καθάπερ ὁμώς ἄγελθη μίας ποιήσεως, πατροπομονίμοιοι καὶ βασιλείαις ποιῶς δικαιοσύνην βασιλεύειμοιν ; If συνήλθον is here said of the ἐθνη as well as the πόλεις, both ἐθνος and πόλις are implied to owe their origin to the household. 'It is worth noting that Aristotle gives us three distinct reasons for the prevalence of kingly rule in early times—here, 3. 15. 1286 b 8 sqq., and '7. 13. 11' (is 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq. meant?)—without hinting in any one of the passages that he knew of those specified in the others' (Mr. Postgate, Notes, p. 1). The second of these passages, however, is apparently aporetic; Aristotle is seeing whether the argument in favour of Kingship derivable from the prevalence of it among the men of a former day (οἱ πρῶτοι) may not be met; may they not have rested content with it, because they had no choice, not many men of high excellence being then forthcoming? We observe, moreover, that almost every discussion in the Politics takes less account of preceding ones, and makes less use of their results, than one might have expected, so that we are not much surprised if Aristotle seems in this passage of the Third Book to forget that he has already accounted otherwise for the preva-
lence of Kingship in early times. Locke remarks (Civil Government, 2. § 106)—'It is plain that the reason that continued the form of government in a single person was not any regard or respect to paternal authority, since all petty monarchies—that is, almost all monarchies near their original—have been commonly, at least upon occasion, elective.' The etymology of the word 'King,' however, appears to make in favour of Aristotle's view. 'It corresponds with the Sanscrit ganaka... It simply meant father of a family' (Prof. Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, 2. 282, 284, quoted by Dr. Stubbs, Const. Hist. of England, i. 140).

πάσα γάρ οἰκία κ.τ.λ. Camerarius (Politicorum et Oeconomicorum Aristotelis Interpretationes et Explicationes, p. 25) aptly quotes Hom. Od. i. 397, where Telemachus says,

Λυτάρ ἐγών οἰκίοι ἄναξ ἔσομι ἡμετέρῳ καὶ δμόων, οὔ μοι ληίσθατο δῖος ὀθωσεῖς.

21. ηῆ τὴν συγγένειαν recurs in 2. 10. 1271 b 24 sq., there also in reference to a colony—φασί γάρ τῶν Λυκώρων... τότε τῶν πλείστον διαμίσσαν χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ἄποικωι γὰρ οἱ Λύκτιος τῶν Λακώνων ἔστων. Just as in that passage the relationship of the Lyctians to the Laconians is referred to, so here the reference probably is to the relationship of the ἄποικαι to the οἰκία. So Sus. (Qu. Crit. p. 333): 'propter propinquitatem, id est quia nihil nisi colonia domus sive familia dilatata vicus est.' The words, however, are often explained to refer to the mutual relationship of the members of the ἄποικαι, Kingship being especially in place among relatives (cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 14 sq.), and this is a possible interpretation.

22. καὶ τοῦτ ἐστὶν δ λέγει ὁμήρος. What is the meaning of τοῦτο? What is the quotation from Homer held by Aristotle to prove? The commentators are not agreed. Giph. 'Homeri versiculus eo pertinere videtur, ut doceat Aristoteles domesticum imperium esse velut regium' (p. 24); he would seem therefore to refer τοῦτο to πάσα γάρ οἰκία βασιλεύειν ὕπό τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου 20 exclusively, as does also Susemihl (Qu. Crit. p. 333). But it is not altogether easy to refer τοῦτο to this particular clause only, and we hardly expect Aristotle to appeal to the practice of the Cyclopes in order to justify a general statement respecting the household of all times. The explanation of Vict. is—'utuitur etiam auctoritate summī poētœ, qui idem ostendit, priscos scilicet, ut ipsis commodum erat, solitos regere suam familia'm, and perhaps it is in some such way as this that we should understand the quotation. Aristotle has been
saying that πόλεις and έδραν had their origin in the coming together of human beings who had been previously ruled by kings, and he uses Homer's account of the Cyclopes to prove the existence in the earliest times of a household form of Kingship—a form in which the king was the husband and father, and the subjects were the wives and children. To Plato (cp. Laws 680 D), τό αρχαίον αιτίων ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγρότητα διὰ μεθοδογιας ἐπαινεγκυκών, and Strabo, p. 592, ταίτας ἣν τῶς εἰσαφορᾶς ὑπογράφειν φησι τῶν ποιητῶν ὁ Πλάτων, τῆς μὲν πρῶτης πολιτείας παράδειγμα τιθέντα τῶν Κικλώπων βίου), and probably also to Aristotle (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 23, σποράδες γάρ, καὶ οὕτω τό αρχαίον φέκνων), the Homeric picture of the Cyclopes is a mythical picture of the rude beginnings of human society. Plato had already used the same quotation from Homer in Laws 680 A sqq. to prove that Patriarchal Kingship (which he terms δυναστεία) existed in early times, and the fact that the words with which he prefaces his quotation seem to find an echo in those with which Aristotle prefaces his makes it all the more likely that they quote it for a similar purpose. The passage in the Laws is as follows—Δο. Πολιστείως δ' γε ἦδη καὶ τρώπος ἐστὶ τις σύστατος. ΚΛ. Τίς; ΑΘ. Δοκούντ' μοι πάντες τὴν ἐν τοιῷ τῷ χρόνῳ πολιστείαν δυναστείαν καλεῖν, ἢ καὶ νῦν ἂτι πολλαχῶν καὶ ἐν Ἑλληνικῷ καὶ κατὰ βασιλείας ἐστὶ λέγει δ' αἰτήν ποι ὁ Ομηρός γεγονέναι περὶ τῶν Κικλώπων οἰκησιν, εἰπὼν τοίχων δ' οὗτ' ἄγοραι βουληθήραι, οὔτε θέμιστες, ἀλλ' οὗτ' ἴσηλθον ἵρεος νιόσαι κάφινη ἐν σπέσιι γλαφρῶσθαι, θεμιστείως δε ἐκαστος παιδῶν ἂδ' ἀλίγων, οὗτ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν.

θεμιστείως δ' κ.τ.λ. Odys. 9. 114. Θεσσαλίαν implies kingship: it is used of Minos in Hom. Odys. 11. 569, quoted by Plato, Gorgias 526 D. The society of the Cyclopes is referred to in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 28, as a typical case of the household standing by itself, not supported or directed by a State. It is in order to account for the independence of the Cyclopic household and its head that Aristotle adds σποράδες γάρ: this would have been clearer, if he had quoted the concluding words of the second line, οὗτ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν, but the passage was evidently well-known. Plato also mentions the scattered way in which the habitations were distributed in these early days of human society, and is bold enough to give as the reason for it the difficulty of finding subsistence just after the deluge (ἐκ τούτων τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἰκησιν καὶ κατὰ γένος—cp. the κώμη of Aristotle—διεσπαρμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς, Laws 680 D), but on this Aristotle is judiciously silent. This 'sporadic' existence of primitive man is also recognized in
the myth of Protagoras (Plato, Protag. 322 A) and by Philochorus (Fr. 4: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 384): cp. also Plutarch, Theseus c. 24, and Paus. 2. 15. 5. Some savage races still live thus: "the Abors, as they themselves say, are like tigers, two cannot dwell in one den," writes Mr. Dalton, "and the houses are scattered singly or in groups of two or three." (Mr. Herbert Spencer, Fortn. Rev. Jan. 1881, p. 5).

24. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Nay, the fact that men were at the outset ruled by kings has led them universally to assert that the gods also are so ruled.' Διὰ τούτου is explained by ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

26. ἀφομοιωτὰ. Cp. Metaph. B. 2. 997 b 10: Α. 8. 1074 b 3 sqq. (where it is said that the gods are sometimes assimilated in form to men, sometimes to certain of the lower animals): Poet. 25. 1460 b 35.

27 sqq. η 8' ἐκ ... εὐ ξήρ. Bonitz (Ind. 751 b 21) and apparently Bernays take τελείως with πῶλις, and a πρῶτη πῶλις is no doubt mentioned in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 17 and 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7, but not in the First Book, unless indeed the village is to be viewed as an imperfect and inchoate πῶλις, which is nowhere stated. Nor would the mere union of more villages than one be enough of itself, in Aristotle's view, to constitute a τελείως πῶλις. Τελείως seems to qualify κοινωνία, not πῶλις, and its place in the sentence is explained (see note on 1252 b 15) by the fact that κοινωνία is qualified both by ἐκ πελευθεροῦ κωμῶν and by τελείως. The fem. form is more often τελεία or τελεία in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 751 b 56 sqq.).

On μὲν οὖν occurring as it does here in the middle of a sentence, see Vahlen's note on Poet. 22. 1458 a 24 (p. 226 sq. of his edition). He compares (among other passages) the following from the Politics — 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 9: 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 2 sqq.: 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 6 sqq.: to which 1. 9. 1257 b 2 sqq. (μὲν οὖν, Π') may be added. See also Bon. Ind. 540 b 42 sqq., 'μὲν οὖν saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronunciatam amplius explicatur': of this, besides the present passage and 1. 9. 1257 b 2 sq., Poet. 22. 1458 a 23 sqq. is a good instance. Μὲν οὖν thus used seems to introduce a comment on what has just been said, whether by way of modification or confirmation or otherwise. So here, after attributing to the πῶλις complete αὐτάρκεια, Aristotle remembers that there is an epoch in its history at which this is not its aim; he therefore slightly corrects what he had just said, but only to confirm it subject to that correction. In de Part. An. 4. 11. 691 a 28, however, μὲν οὖν in the middle of a sentence seems merely intended (in the sense of 'while,' cp. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a
17) to prepare the way for the sentence introduced by the δέ which follows, and to impart greater emphasis to the latter.

γινομένη τοῦ ζην ἑνεκεν. Cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 24: Plato had said the same thing (Rep. 369 D: 371 B). In Aristotle's view the necessary is first sought and then higher things (Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27). In Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sq., however, the πολις is said to be commonly thought both to be formed and to exist τοῦ συμφέρων τοῦκμόν, and in Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 21 sqq. it seems to be implied that bare existence is not always the aim with which men form it.


ἡδῆ, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 16, ἔστι γὰρ ὅσπερ ἐδήμου ἡδῆ οἱ ὄμοιοι: Eth. Nic. 6. 10. 1142 b 13, ἡ ἔδη οὐ ζήσης ἄλλα φῶς τῆς ἡθοπ (has, as it were, 'reached the level' of assertion): and cp. also Pol. 2. 1. 1261 b 12, καὶ μοιάται γ' ἡδῆ τότε ἐκεῖ πολίς, ὁταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίνῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλῆθους.

For the attainment of the πέρας by the πολις (the third κοινωνία in the order of genesis), cp. de Part. An. 2. 1. 646 b 8, ταῖτα γὰρ ἡθὸν τὸ τέλος ἑκεῖ καὶ τὸ πέρας, ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου λαβόντα τὴν στεναχρόνον ἀριθμόν, καθώς ἐπὶ πολλῶν συμβαίνει τελειούσθαι τὰς γενέσεις: de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 a 34, ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ ἀριθμῷ πέρας ἐσχεν ἡ γένεσις: Probl. 26. 9. 941 a 24, τελειῶτα δ' ἐν τριαί πώτα: de Caelo, 1. 1. 268 a 1 sqq.

30. διό, 'because it is the completion of societies existing by nature.'

πάσα πόλις. Cp. οίκια πάσα, 1. 13. 1260 b 13. Aristotle does not, however, mean that the deviation-forms of State are by nature: they are, indeed, expressly declared to be παρὰ φύσιν, 3. 17. 1287 b 39.

αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι, i.e. πρῶται γενέσεις.

34. ἀνδρώτου ἤπτου οἰκίας. For the asyndeton, cp. 2. 4. 1262 b 30, αἰκίας ἐρωτας φύσιν, and see Vahlen's note on Ποετ. 20. 1457 a 22.

ἐτι ... 1253 a 1, βελτιστον. 'Further, that for which things exist and the end is best, and self-completeness, the end of the State, is both the end and best'; hence the State brings that which is best; hence it exists by nature, for nature brings the best. Cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 7. 1218 b 10, τὸ δ' οὔ εὐκοι ὡς τέλος ἄριστον καὶ αἰτίων τῶν ὑφ' αἰτί καὶ πρῶτον πᾶσων ὡστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἰπεν αὕτω τὸ ἄγαθον τὸ τέλος τῶν ἀνδρώτων πρακτῶν: 2. 1. 1219 a 9, φανερῶν τοίνυν ἐκ τοῦτον ὅτι βελτιστὸν τὸ ἐργον τῆς ἐξιως: τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἄριστον ὡς τέλος ἵππεσται γὰρ τέλος το
A new proof is here adduced of the naturalness of the State, drawn not from the fact that it is the completion of natural societies like the household and village, but from the fact that its end is the best, the end which Nature pursues: cp. de An. Incessu 2. 704 b 15, "pery nòs òdèn poiv miòtn, all' wèi èk twòn ènðeòmònòv òf ouòia péri èkastòn génòs 'èftov to ðría'sàv' dìwper ei béldtòv òdè, ouètòs kai éxei kata' fúsìw.

1253 a. 3. ο ἀπολις δία φύσιν και ου δία τύχην. Aristotle perhaps has in his mind the Μονότροπος of the comic poet Phrynichus. "Nomen fabulae inditum ab homine tristi et moroso, qui Timonis instar solitaryam vitam sequeretur et lucem adspectumque hominum fugeret. . . Sed quidnì ipsum audiamus in loco apud Grammat. Seguer. p. 344 haecce dicentem:

"Θονμα δε μοουτι Μονότροπος * * *
* * * òf de Τίμωνος βιών,
ἀπρόσωδον, ὀξέθυμον, ἀγαμον, ἀζυγον,
ἀγέλαστον, ἀδωλεκτον, ἰδαγρώμονα.

(Meineke, Historia Critica Comicorum Graecorum, p. 156, who however emends the third line otherwise in Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 587 sq.: the MSS. have ἀγαμον, ἀζυγον, ὀξέθυμον, ἀπρόσωδον.)

There were, however, Cynics who took for their motto the lines—

"Ἀπολις, ἀοκος, πατρίδος ἐστηρμείνος,
πτωχός, πλανήτης, βιών ἔχων τούτ' ἡμέραν

(Diog. Laer. 6. 38: Bernays, Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit, p. 162: compare Athen. Deipn. 611 C): these men were ἀπολιδες by choice, and this saying of Aristotle's would, therefore, reflect on them, whether it was intended to do so or not. Aristotle, again, had said (Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 13, referred to by Camerarius, Interpretationes p. 28)—ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοι . . . ουδ' εις πολιτείαν ἐμαυτῶν κατακλύω, ἀλλὰ ξένος πολιταχου εἰμί. Philoctetes, on the other hand (Soph. Philoct. 1018), was an ἀπολις δία τύχην, and so were Themistocles, when Adeimantus applied the epithet to him (Hdt. 8. 61), and Aristotle himself, when Stageira was in ruins. Vict. compares with the passage before us Cic. Philipp. 13. 1: nam nec privatos focos nec publicas leges videtur nec libertatis iura cara habere, quem discordiae, quem caedes civium, quem bellum civile delectat, cumque ex numero hominum eiicendium, ex finibus humanae naturae exterminandum puto . . . Nihil igitur hoc cive, nihil hoc homine taetius, si aut civis aut homo habendus est, qui civile bellum concupiscit.
4. ὡσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ. II. 9. 63—

'Aφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιτος, ἀνέστως ἐστιν ἐκίνος,

ὡς πολέμων ἐραται ἐπιθημίων ἀκρίμιος.

The lover of civil war is said by Homer to be 'clanless, lawless, heartless'; Aristotle, however, seems to conceive him to say that the 'clanless, lawless, heartless' man is a lover of civil war. But to say of a man that he is a lover of war for the sake of war was, in Aristotle's view, to say that he is either φαίλος or, like Ares, more than man: compare Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 9, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀφρήτως τὸ πολέμεων τοῦ πολέμεων ἕνεκα οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πολέμον δόξαι γὰρ ἃν παντελῶς μοιηφόρος τις εἰναι, εἰ τοῖς φίλοις πολέμους παιότο, ινα μάχας καὶ φίλοις γέγονα, and the indignant words addressed by Zeus to Ares in Hom. II. 3. 890 (cp. Polyb. 12. 26). For Mr. Jackson's view of this passage, see Journ. of Philology, 7. 1877, p. 236 sqq. I translate ὡσπερ κ.τ.λ. 'like the clanless, lawless, heartless man reviled by Homer.' It is perfectly true that it is the lover of civil war whom Homer reviles, but Aristotle is often inexact in his use of quotations. Mr. Jackson's proposal to place ὡσπερ—ἐπιθημίτης in a parenthesis and to connect ἀτε περ κ.τ.λ. 6 with the words which precede the parenthesis seems to me to involve an awkward severance of ἀτε περ κ.τ.λ. from the words which this clause is conceived to illustrate, and to be also unnecessary (see below on 6).

6. ἀμα γάρ κ.τ.λ. Sepulv, 'nam simul ac talis quisque natura est, bellandi cupidus est': Lamb, 'non enim potest quisquam talis esse, quin uno eodemque tempore sit et belli cupidus.' Prof. Tyrrell (Hermautha, 12. 26)—'no sooner is he such (clanless, lawless, heartless) by nature than his hand is against every man': but is not φύσις τοιοῦτος—φύσις ἄπολις? For the construction, cp. Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 7. 30 (p. 60 Blass), ἀμα γάρ εἰς τ[ῶν το]·πον ἀθρωπότητον καὶ τ[ῆς το]·το[ν ἀρετῆς μησθήσατο[ν αὐ].

ἀτε περ ἀξοξ ὧν ὡσπερ ἐν πετιοῖς. The term ἀξοξ is used in the well-known epigram of Agathias (Anthol. Pal. 9. 482), where the game described is evidently that which the Romans called 'ludus duodecim scriptorum' (resembling our 'backgammon'): Plato, according to M. Becq de Fouquières (Jeux des Anciens, p. 358), refers to this game in Rep. 604 C. The epigram has been ingeniously explained both by Mr. H. Jackson (Journ. of Philology, loc. cit.) and by M. Becq de Fouquières (p. 372 sqq.), but until more light has been thrown on the meaning of line 26, which has been variously emended, we cannot be quite sure that we know the meaning of the term ἀξοξ even in this game, though it would seem to be 'a solitary, unprotected piece'; it is, however, by no means certain that
Aristotle here refers to this particular game. The term πεττοι in its wider signification included a variety of games—all games, in fact, in which πεττοι were used (Becq de Fouquières, p. 303, 385)—but it was especially applied, in a narrower sense, to a game resembling our 'draughts' (ibid. p. 391), which was played on five lines instead of twelve, and in which each player sought to surround and cut off his antagonist or to reduce him to inactivity (Polyb. i. 84. 7: Plato, Rep. 487 B—both passages referred to by Becq de Fouquières, p. 397-8). In this game the term ζυξ may well have borne a different meaning from that which it bore in backgammon, and one more in harmony with its use in the passage before us, but what this meaning was, we can only vaguely conjecture from the connexion in which it is here used. Is ζυξ an isolated piece pushed by itself far in advance from the 'sacred line' (see Becq de Fouquières, p. 402 sqq.), and therefore alone in the midst of foes? There seems to be no reason for supposing with Becq de Fouquières (p. 398-9) that some game other than the ordinary πεττείω is here referred to.

7. διώτι. Vict. 'quare,' with many other translators, but as the fact that man is a political animal in a fuller sense than bees or other gregarious animals has not yet been mentioned, it is perhaps better (with Lamb. Bern. and others) to translate it here by 'that.'

8. ἀγελαίοι ζύου. 'His in verbis Platonis ἀγελαίοστροφική vel ἀγελαίοσκομική, quam legitimus in Politico, p. 267 B sq., 276 A, signifi- cari videtur' (Engelhardt, Loci Platonici, p. 3). The connexion conceived by Plato to exist between this art and πολιτική may possibly be here glanced at. In Hist. An. i. 1. 487 b 34 sqq. man is spoken of as both ἀγελαίοι and μοναδικός, and we have the following account of πολιτικά ζώα in 488 a 7—πολιτικά δ' εστίν ὅν ἐν τι καὶ κοινῶν γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἐργον' ἐπερ οὐ πάντα ποιεί τὰ ἀγελαία' ἔστιν ἐς τοιούτων ἄνθρωπως, μελίττα, σφήξ, μύρμηξ, γέρανος· καὶ τοιῶν τὰ μὲν ὕψ τῆς ἡγεμόνα ἐστὶ τὰ δ' ἄναρχα, οἷον γέρανα μὲν καὶ τὸ τῶν μελιστῶν γένος ὕψ' ἡγεμόνα, μύρμικες δὲ καὶ μυρία ἄλλα ἄναρχα.

μᾶλλον. For higher faculties are brought by man into the common stock—the power of perceiving that which is good and evil, just and unjust, advantageous and disadvantageous, and of expressing those perceptions—and the higher the faculties brought into the common stock, the fuller the union: cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 11, τοῖς δὲ γί- νοις ὅν ἐν τῷ συνήπαι καὶ κοινοῖν λόγου καὶ διανοίας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξει τῷ συνῆπαι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. On language as special to man, cp. Isocr. de Antid.
§§ 253-7 and Nicocl. § 5 sqq., passages which Aristotle perhaps had in view here. Socrates had anticipated Isocrates in speaking of language as the condition of political life (Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 12, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἑρμηνείαν δοῦναι, δὲ ἡ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν μεταδόθημεν τοῖς ἀλλήλοις διδασκομένων καὶ κοινωνοσκόμενοι καὶ νῦνοι τεθυμέθαι καὶ πολιτευμέθαι: ). According to Plato, Tim. 47 C, λόγος (which he fails to mark off from φωνή) is given us ἐνεκα ἀρμονίας and to regulate the disorderly movements of the soul. It may be questioned whether, as Aristotle seems to imply, language would be useless to a solitary animal.

10. ἀνθρώπος. 'Articulus ubi genus aliiquid universum significatur non raro omittitur,' Bon. Ind. 109 b 36: cp. 1253 a 31, ὁσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελειωθὲν βιολιστῶν τῶν ζῴων ἀνθρώπος (so Π ') ἐστιν: on the other hand, all MSS. have ὁ ἀνθρώπος in 1253 a 7, 34.

ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ κ.τ.λ. Language has just been said to be peculiar to man, and μὲν οὖν ('it is true') introduces an admission that this does not hold of voice, in order that an account of the nature of language may be added. It implies a capacity to form households and πόλεις. As to φωνή, see de Gen. An. 5. 7. 786 b 21, where it is said to be τοῦ λόγου ἐλη, and de An. 2. 8. 420 b 32, σημαντικός γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψφος ἐστιν ἡ φωνή, καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἀναπνευμονῶν ἡφασ, ὁσπερ ἡ φυς (contrast Plutarch, de Animae Procreatione in Timaeo, c. 27. p. 1026.Α, ὡς δὲ φωνῆ τις ἐστιν ἀλογος καὶ ἀσήμαντος, λόγος δὲ λίες ἐν φωνῆ σημαντικῇ διανοίᾳ): so the words σημεῖον and σημαίνει are used in 11 and 13 in contrast to δῆλον 14 (Vic. 'signa dant, hae enim notio est verbi σημαίνει : homines autem oratione declarant aperintique, hoc enim valet verbum δῆλον'). The full force of δῆλον appears in Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 15: σημεία are distinguished from ὁμοιώματα in 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 33. As to the limitation to τὸ λυπηρὸν καὶ ἡδίς, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 30 sqq. and de An. 2. 9. 421 a 10, φιλῶς γὰρ ἀνθρώπωσ συμάτι καὶ οὐδενὸς ὑφαινόμεν τῶν υστρατῶν ἀνεῖ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἡ τοῦ ἡδίς, ὃς οἶκ ὤν τοὺς ἀκριμάτους τοῦ αἰσθητήριον. Aristotle implies here that animals can only indicate to each other feelings of pleasure and pain (cp. Lucr. 5. 1059 sqq., referred to by Giph.), but in de Part. An. 2. 17. 660 a 35—b 2 and Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 a 17 sqq. he speaks of some of them as receiving μάθησιν καὶ διδασκαλία from their likes. See on this subject Dr. Ogle's note 5 on Aristotle's Parts of Animals, 2. 17. Not all animals possess φωνή (Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 a 32).

14. ἐπὶ τοῦ δῆλον. See Bon. Ind. 268 b 13. τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν. Giph. (p. 31) draws attention to the fact that Aristotle denies to the lower animals a sense of the advantageous and the harmful.
15. ὡστε καὶ τὸ δῖκαιον. Cp. 3. 12. 1282 b 16, ἐστι δὲ πολιτικῶν ἁγαθῶν τὸ δῖκαιον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κοινῆς συμφέρων. Epicurus went farther and traced the just back to utility: cp. Diog. Laert. 10. 150 and the well-known line of Horace (Sat. 1. 3. 98) to which Giph. refers:

Atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi.

16. μόνον is pleonastic, as in 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 11. For the change of number from τοῖς ἀνθρώποις to μόνον, Vahlen (Poet. p. 103) compares τούτω διαφέρουσιν (οἱ ἀνθρώποι) τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μυθικώτατον ἐστί (οἱ τῶν ζῴων), Poet. 4. 1448 b 6. Φράσεις, however, is allowed by Aristotle to some animals (Hist. An. 9. 1. 668 a 15: Gen. An. 3. 2. 753 a 12: Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 a 26), but in a sense other than that in which it is ascribed to man, as appears from the last-named passage—διὸ καὶ τῶν ἄνδρων ἐνα φρονίμα φαίνει, ὅσα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν βλέπων ἐχουσα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν.

17. αὐσθησιν. 'Latior sensu ἐξείν αὐσθησιν τινος idem quod usum habere aliquis rei, novisse aliquid' (Bonitz, Ind. 21 a 1, who compares Eth. Nic. 6. 12. 1143 b 5 and Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 35, and refers to Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 504. 2, ed. 2, =650. 2, ed. 3). See also Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 238. 2 (ed. 3), who explains αὐσθησιν in the passage before us by the word 'Bewusstsein,' adding that an immediate kind of knowledge is meant, in contradistinction to ἐπιστήμη. According to Polybius (see above, p. xiii), the ἐννοια τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἄδικου, τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ is the fruit of human society, not that which is prior to human society and makes it possible.

18. ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία. Some translate 'the association of beings possessing these perceptions,' but it seems more natural to take τούτων here as neuter than as masculine, and besides an association of this kind would hardly be said to produce, but rather to be, the household and πόλις. Giph. and Bern. are probably right in translating these words 'community in these things'—i.e. in the good and the bad, the just and the unjust—cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 5, περὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ κοινῆς πολιτικῆς διακοπότατον ὅσα προνικότοις εὐφορίας et sqq.: 1. 2. 1253 a 37 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 31, ἡ γὰρ δική κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἄδικου: Plato, Rep. 484 D, τὰ ἐνδιάβα νόμιμα καλῶν τε περὶ καὶ δικαιῶν καὶ ἁγαθῶν: Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2, πολιτεία δὲ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνωια ... περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ ἐστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βλέπου ἄνθρωπος. Some societies are formed for pleasure (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 19), not so the household or the πόλις. These are ethical unities. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 4 sqq.: Plato, Politicus 309 C–E: and the myth of Protagoras (Protag. 322 C), in which in answer to the inquiry of Hermes—καὶ
The argument in 18–29 seems to be as follows:—The πόλις is prior to the individual, for the whole is prior to its part. And the whole is prior to its part, because, when severed from the whole, the part loses its capacity to discharge its function, or (which is the same thing) loses its identity. Here Aristotle sums up—we see then, that the πόλις exists by nature and is prior to the individual, for if the individual is not self-complete when severed from the πόλις, he will be posterior to it just as any other part is posterior to its whole, and the individual, if a man and not a god or a brute, is not self-complete when severed from the πόλις. Aristotle might have stopped at the words ‘prior to the individual’ without adding the words which follow, but he adds these words in order to prove what he assumed in 20, that the individual stands to the πόλις in the same relation of posteriority in which other parts stand to their wholes. In strictness, γάρ 26 only introduces a proof that the πόλις is prior in nature to the individual, not that it is by nature, but of course, if it is prior by nature to the individual, it exists by nature itself. No proof is given that the πόλις is prior to the household, probably because the same reasoning is applicable both to the household
and to the individual. It is possible that here Aristotle has in his mind the verse of Sophocles (Philoct. 1018), in which Philoctetes calls himself

ἀφιλον ἔρημον ἄπολιν ἐν ξόσιν νεκρόν.

As to the validity of the argument, the fact that the individual is not ἀυτάρκης without the πώλις does not prove that he stands to it in the relation of a part to its whole. Man is not ἀυτάρκης, for example, without the aid of other communities besides his own; yet he is not necessarily a part of those other communities. And even if we accept the conclusion, it does not follow that all parts of all wholes stand in the same relation to those wholes. A limb stands in a far more intimate relation to the body of which it is a part than a wheel does to a cart, or a portion of a rock does to that rock. The Stoics, in fact, recognized this distinction, for they went on to say that the individual is a limb (μέλος, not μέρος) of the whole to which he belongs. This whole they commonly (cp. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 14. 37 sq.) found in the Universe, but not always, for Epictetus (Arrian 2. 10) speaks of the individual as part of the πώλις. Plato also sometimes found it in the Universe (e.g. in Laws 903). We observe that in the Timaeus (68 E: 69 C) he applies to the Universe similar epithets to those applied by Aristotle to the πώλις (τέλειος, ἀυτάρκης, πώσας περιέχουσα τάς ἀλλάς κοινωνίας). The Republic, on the other hand, recognizes the πώλις as the whole of which the individual, or rather perhaps the class, is a part (Rep. 552 A). As to the sense in which a human being is a member of a community, see a letter of Shelley’s (dated August 12, 1812), which is published in the Academy for July 31, 1886. ‘A human being,’ he says, ‘is a member of the community, not as a limb is a member of the body, or as what is a part of a machine, intended only to contribute to some general joint result.... He is an ultimate being, made for his own perfection as his highest end, made to maintain an individual existence, and to serve others only as far as consists with his own virtue and progress.’ Aristotle, however, would say that he asks nothing from the individual that would not redound to his own perfection and the perfection of his life.

20. τὸ γὰρ ἅλον κ.τ.λ. No notice is here taken of the principle laid down in Metaph. z. 10. 1035 b 4 sqq., where some parts—parts of the Essence or Form—are said to be prior to τὸ σύνολον—a principle which, applied to the πώλις, might have suggested a different theory of the relation of some at all events of the individuals composing the πώλις to it—but in other respects there is a close resemblance between the two passages: cp. especially 1035 b
14-25. See also Metaph. Z. 11. 1036 b 30 sqq. and 16. 1040 b 5 sqq. For the account of το πρότερον implied in the passage before us, cp. Phys. 8. 7. 260 b 17. λέγεται δὲ πρότερον, οὐ τε μὴ δυστος οίκ ἐστι τὰλλα, έκείνο δ' ἀνευ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὸ τὸ χρώμα, καὶ τὸ κατ' οἷσιν: Metaph. Δ. 11. 1019 a 1, τὰ μὲν δὴ οὖσα λέγεται πρότερα καὶ ὑστερα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οἷσιν, ὥσα ενδίχεται εἶναι ἀνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἀνευ ἐκείνων μή' ἢ διαπερίεσε εἰρήματο Πλάτων. Much the same account is given by Aristotle of the ἀρχή (Metaph. K. 1. 1060 a 1, ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὐκωμαρδον) or the οἷσια of a thing (de An. 2. 1. 412 b 18 sqq.: cp. Alex. Aphrod. on Metaph. Z. 16. 1040 b 5, οἷσια εἰκώι φαινει ὡσα καθ' αὐτὰ ὡστα δύναται το οἴκειον ἐργον αποτελεῖν οἷσια γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ὁφ' οὗ τὸ ἐκάστοτο ἐργον ἐκπληρωταί). Severance from the Whole, in fact, involves the loss of the Form or οἷσια, and the loss of this involves 'destruction' (cp. διαφθραίσα 22, and φθαρίστα, de Gen. An. 2. 1. 734 b 24 sqq.: 735 a 7 sqq.: 1. 19. 726 b 22 sqq.), but a hand destroyed is a hand unfitted to discharge the functions of a hand, or in other words is not a hand at all. Thus we may almost say that in Aristotle's view the πᾶλις is the οἷσια or ἀρχὴ of the individual. In the Topics, however, a question is raised (6. 13. 150 a 33), εἰ τὸν ὅλον συμφθαίρεται τὲ μὴν' ἀνάπαλεν γὰρ δὲ συμβαίνει, τῶν μερῶν φθαρίστων, φθείρεσθαι τὸ ἄλλον τ' ὀλον φθαρίστων οὐκ ἀναγκαιον καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐφθάρβαι. But here the object seems merely to be to arm a disputant with a tenable objection.

22. διαφθραίσα γὰρ ἐστι τοιαῦτη, 'for a hand when destroyed' (by being severed from the soul, which is its οἷσια) 'will be no better than a stone hand.' Giph. ('hace enim interiit') and others make διαφθραίσα the predicate, but it is clear that τοιαῦτη (≈ probably λάθος, not ὁμοίως λαγχαίσα) is the predicate, if we compare de Gen. An. 2. 1. 734 b 24, οὐ γὰρ ἐστι πρώτον μὴ έχον ψυχήν, οὐδὲ σώφρ., άλλα φθαρίσταν ὁμοίως λαγχήσεται τὸ μὲν εάν πρώτον τὸ δὲ σώφρ., ωσπερ καὶ εἰ εγύνετο λίθινα η χέλινα: cp. also Meteor. 4. 12. 389 b 31, μίλλον γὰρ δέλον δι' τὸ νεκρὸς ἀνθρώπου ὁμοίως, αὐτῶ τῶν καὶ χείρ τελευτήσας ὁμοίως, καθισταί καὶ καλοὶ λίθων λαγχήσαι. Dr. R. Schöll (Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 334) has anticipated me in calling attention to the above passage of the De Generatione Animalium.

the same thing, Soph. 247 D, λέγω δή το καί ὁποιανὸν κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἰτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἔτερον ὤτιον περιεκτικόν εἰτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαύλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰσύσαξ, πᾶν τούτο ὄντως εἶναι τίθεια γίνη ὄριον ὄριζεν τὰ ὄντα, ός ἐστιν οὐκ ἀλλο τι πλὴν δύναμιν. On the other hand, Aristotle seems in Pol. 3. 3. 1276 b 7 to view τὸ εἴδος τῆς συνθέσεως as constituting the identity of an object, and in de Gen. An. 1. 18. 722 b 30 we read—τὰ μέρη τὰ μὲν δυνάμει τὰ δὲ πάθεις διώρισται, τὰ μὲν ἀναμοιρημέ τῷ δύναθαι τι ποιεῖν, οἷον γλώττα καὶ χεῖρ, τὰ δ' ἀναμοιρημέ σκληρότητι καὶ μαλακότητι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τοιούτοις πάθεσιν.

24. μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα, if no longer fit for performing their destined work: cp. θαλασταὶ τοιαῦτα, fit for fishing, 1. 8. 1256 a 37, and ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, 2. 5. 1263 a 39.

25. Μὲν οὖν is here again, as in 1252 b 9, caught up by a second μὲν οὖν before any δὲ appears.

26. One would expect here ὃ δὲ αὐτάρκης χωρισθεῖς, but Aristotle substitutes ὃ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖ ὡς μήδεν δεόμενος δὲ αὐτάρκειοι, as the case of the former, who cannot be called αὐτάρκης and yet does not want the State, occurs to him and, characteristically enough, is kept in view at whatever cost of trimness. Μηδὲν δεόμενος, sc. κοινωνίας or possibly κοινωνεῖν.

29. ἐν πᾶσιν, in all human beings.

30. ὃ δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the turn of the sentence, compare a fragment from the Κναφεῖς of Antiphanes (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 66)—

"Οστὶς τέχνην κατέδειξε πρῶτος τῶν θεῶν,
οὕτως μεγίστον εἶρεν ἀνθρώπωι κακῶι.

Cp. also ibid. 4. 75. At Argos men looked back to Phoroneus as having been the first to found a city (Paus. 2. 15. 5). Cicero (De Inventione 1. 2) looks back to some 'magnus vir et sapiens.' Camerarius (p. 31) quotes these two passages, and adds—Epicurus hoc fortuito factum, ut alia quoque, censet, quemadmodum Lucretius exposuit libro quinto.' The comic poet Athenio makes one of his characters claim the credit for the art of cookery (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 558).

31. On ὁσπερ καὶ . . . οὐτω καὶ, see Sus. 1, Ind. Gramm. ὁσπερ. τελεωθέν. Aristotle uses both τελεωθέν and τελεωθέν (de Gen. An. 1. 1. 715 a 21), and both τέλεος and τέλεος (see Bon. Ind.). We find both forms together (τελεωθέρα, τέλεοι) in de Gen. An. 2. 1. 733 b 1 (Bekker). The meaning of τελεωθέν, which is here used in contrast to χωρισθεῖν νόμον καὶ δίκης, may be illustrated by Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 23, ὅτε ὧρα φύσει οὕτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται.
ai áretai, ἀλλὰ πειθώσι μὲν ἥμιν διέσαθαι αὐτός, τελειομένους δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἑδώ καὶ Ὁμήρους, and Phys. 7. 3. 246 a 13 sqq. For the gender of τελειοθεν and χωρισθείσ, cp. 4 (7). 13. 132 b 4, ἀνθρώπως δὲ καὶ λόγῳ, μόνον γὰρ ἕχει λόγω.

33. χειριστῶν πάντων. Cp. Hesiod, Op. et Dies 275 sqq. : Hdt. 4. 100, Ἀνδροφάγος δὲ ἀγρόεστι πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἔχουσι ηθελ. οὕτε δίκην νομίζοντες οὕτε νάρω φεovere νομίζον: Plato, Laws 705 E, ἀνθρώπος δὲ ὃς φαμέν ἡμέρων, ἄμως μὴ πανείως μὲν ὑφῆς τυχῶν καὶ φισεως ἐιτεχοις ἔσωταν ἡμερώτατον τε φῶς γίγνεσθαι φιλεί, μη ἰκανῶς δὲ ἕκαλως τραφεῖν ἀγρώτατων ὁποια γφίς γη: Protag. 327 D-E. See also Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1150 a 1-5. Plutarch demurs to the saying in the mouth of the Epicurean Colotes (adv. Colot. c. 30), on the ground that in the absence of law men would still be left the teaching of such philosophers as Parmenides, Socrates, Plato, and Herachius, and that this would save them from living like beasts.

ἂνδικα ἔχουσα ὁπλα. Cp. Rhet. 2. 5. 1382 a 34, καὶ ἂνδικα δύναμιν ἔχουσα (is to be dreaded) τῷ προκείμενῳ γὰρ ὁ ἂνδικος ἂδικος. Giph. (p. 37) compares Plutarch, Cicero c. 46, οὕτως εξίσεσον ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ λέσης τῶν ἀνθρωπῶν λογισμῶν, μᾶλλον ὃν ἀπέδειξε τὸν ἄνθρωπον θηρίων εἰτε ἀγρώτατον ἐξουσίαν πάθει προσλαβόστως, which seems to echo Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1150 a 7, μυροπλάσα γὰρ ἄν κακὰ πονηέσεν ἀνθρώπως κακός θηρίων.

34. ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπος κ.τ.λ. Vict. with others explains φρόνησις and ἀριτή as the ὁπλα here referred to, but in that case why have we the dat. φρονήσει καὶ ἀριτῇ and not the acc.? and how can it be said of φρόνησις and ἀριτῆ that they can be used for opposite purposes? Cp. Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 2, ἰ δὲ οὖν μεγαλὰ ἐμάψεις ἂν ὁ χρόνως ἂδικος τῇ τοιαίτη δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τούτο γε κοινὸν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἁγιῶν πλὴρ ἀριτῆς, καὶ μιᾶς κατὰ τῶν χρησιμοτάτων, ὅπως ἐγείπει πλοῦτον στρατηγιώς, and Pol. 3. 10. 1281 a 19. And if it be said that virtue is here used in a lower sense than in these passages, it seems strange that in the very next line (36) it should be used in its ordinary sense. Besides, as Holm (de ethicus Politicorum Aristotelis principiis, p. 39 n.) remarks, usitata apud Aristotelem dicendi formula ἀριτῆ καὶ φρόνησις virtutes semper significat ipsas, ethicas et dianoeticas: exempla haece sint—Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 4 : 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 22, 33.' The phrase was known even to the comic poets as one current among philosophers (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 22). Montecatinus (quoted by Schm.) seems to come much nearer to the truth in rendering these words ' arma homini data sunt ad prudentiam et virtutem'; and s0 Bern, 'geschaffen VOL. II. K
mit einer Rüstung zu Einsicht und Tugend,' and Holm (ibid.) 'ad virtutes exercendas.' There is, however, some strangeness in the use of the dative in this sense, and Aristotle does not seem to regard the ὑπάλα as means for the attainment of φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετή, or as instruments for their exercise, but rather as powers on which they are to impress a right direction (cp. ἢςεν ἀρετῆς, 36). May not the words mean 'having arms for prudence and virtue to use' (or 'guide in use')? We have had just before ἐδικία ἐχοννα ὑπάλα, and it is not surprising to find Prudence and Virtue also spoken of as using arms or guiding their use. As to the dative, cp. Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praec. c. 28, δεύτερον δε, ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς βασικάνως καὶ ποιηρῶς ὑπάλον ἡ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν εὔνοια τοὺς ἀγαθοῖς ἑστιν. 'Organon, which resembles ὑπάλον in meaning and is sometimes conjoined with it (cp. Part. An. 4. 10. 687 b 2–4), often takes this dative (cp. de Gen. An. 4. 1. 765 b 36: Pol. 1. 4. 1253 b 28). Holm refers to Cic. de Orat. 3. 14. 55 sub fin. as supporting his interpretation, but this passage perhaps makes quite as much in favour of that just suggested. The next question is, what are the ὑπάλα referred to? Bernays (Wirkung der Tragödie, note 16) quotes Seneca de Ira, 1. 17 (1. 16 Didot): Aristoteles ait affectus quosdam, si quis illis bene utatur, pro armis esse, quod verum foret, si, velut bellica instrumenta, sumi deponunt possent induentes arbitrio. Haec arma, quae Aristoteles virtuti dat, ipsa per se pugnant, non exspectant manum, et habent, non habentur. Hence he explains the ὑπάλα here mentioned as 'die Affecte' (the emotions). Aristotle, however, only speaks of 'affectus quosdam' (he is thinking no doubt especially of anger), and there is nothing to show that these 'affectus' are viewed by him as the only ὑπάλα at the disposal of φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετή. Language, for instance, may well be another. The words 'haec arma quae Aristoteles virtuti dat' (compare those a little lower down, 'rationem ab iracundia petere prae sidium') seem to support the view taken in this note of the dative φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετή. If, as is probable, the 'affectus quidam' of the de Ira are among the ὑπάλα referred to in this passage, Aristotle, like Seneca himself (de Ira, 1. 3), would appear to have regarded them as peculiar to man.


37. εἰσωμήν. Plutarch, ibid. c. 8. Philemon (Fragm. 'Λγύρτης, p. 107 Didot) does not go quite so far as Aristotle, and the good Pheraulas (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 3. 49) is of the opposite opinion.

ἡ δὲ δικαιωσύνη . . . δικαίου κρίσις. Here ἡ δὲ δικαιωσύνη takes up
The ellipse to some extent is a necessary condition precedent of the 

"political community," which is perhaps the one which is most likely to be correct, yet another may be mentioned as possible. These words may mean 'an institution of political society' (cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 5, τῶν συνστιτίων ἡ τάξις). Plato had already said (Laws 937 D)—καὶ δὴ καὶ δίκη ἐν ἀνθρώποι πῶς ὦ καλῶς, οἱ πίστα ἡμείςκε τὰ ἀνθρώπινα; But perhaps Aristotle had a saying of Pindar in his mind: cp. Plutarch, Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 13. 807 C, ὃ δὲ πολιτικά, ἀριστοτέχνας τις ἦν κατὰ Πίνδαρον, καὶ δημιουργός εἰσορίας καὶ δίκης. The words ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσεων seem to be a necessary link in the reasoning, though some would omit them: similar expressions occur in Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 31 and Rhet. 2. 1. 1377 b 22 (cp. Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 56). An ἀνθρώπινας τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου is a condition precedent of the πόλις (1253 a 15 sqq.), but this is not the same thing as justice.

2. πρώτον, i.e. before going on to speak of πολιτεία. Thus we are referred back in 3. 6. 1278 b 17 to the πρῶτον λόγοι, εν όις περὶ 1253 b. οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ διεσποταίες, and the First Book itself refers forward at its close to τὰ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν (1. 13. 1260 b 12).

3. οἰκονομίας κ.t.l. 'The departments into which household management falls are concerned with' (or possibly 'correspond to') 'the parts of which the household is composed.' The ellipse is no doubt considerable, but not more so than that in 1. 11. 1258 b 27, τρίτον δὲ εἶδος χρηματιστικῆς μεταχείρισις καὶ τῆς πρῶτης (ἐξει γὰρ καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὥσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γενομένων . . . οἱν ἑλεσμα τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτικὴ. See as to constructions of this kind Bon. Ind. 533 b 6–13, and Waitz on Anal. Pr. 1. 46. 52 a 29, to whom Bonitz refers.

4. οἰκία δὲ τέλειος. Lasaulx (Ehe bei den Griechen, p. 7 n.), after referring to δόμοις ἢμμετλης (II. 2. 701), quotes Antipater ap. Stob. Flor. 67. 25, τέλειος οἰκίας καὶ βίος οὐκ ἄλλως δύναται γενέσθαι ἡ μετά.
NOTES.

γνωικός καὶ τέκνων, and a similar saying of Hierocles, Stob. Flor. 67. 21. Aristotle holds the household to be incomplete without slaves. Contrast Locke, Civil Government, 2. § 86: 'the family is as much a family, and the power of the paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his family or no.' In 3. 4. 1277 a 7 we find the somewhat careless expression—οίκια εξ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γνωικός καὶ κτήσει εἰκ διεστότον καὶ διόυλον—in, it is true, an aporetic passage: a similar looseness of statement is observable in Eth. Nic. i. 1. 1094 a 9, where wealth is said to be the end of οἰκονομική, teaching which rather resembles that of the first book (so-called) of the Oeconomics (cp. Oecon. i. 1. 1343 a 8) than that of the Politics.

7. περὶ τριῶν τούτων, 'de his tribus copulis' (Vici.).

8. τι ἕκαστον καὶ ποίον δει εἶναι, 'what each is and how each ought to be constituted.'

9. δεσποτικὴ, sc. κοινωνία or some such word.

ἄνώνυμον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The word ἄνωνυμος is especially used by Aristotle, 'ubi generis alius non exstat unum quo continetur nomen' (Bon. Ind. 69 b 3): hence we read in de An. 2. 7. 418 a 27, ὁ λόγοι μὲν ἐστὶν εἰπέν, ἄνωνυμον δὲ τυχάνει ὁδ. Cp. also 10, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ ὀικ ὄνοματα ἰδίῳ ὄνοματι, i.e. with a name which exactly fits it: see Rhet. 3. 5. 1407 a 31, where τὰ ἑδὶ ὄνοματα are contrasted with τὰ περιέχοντα. The words γαμικὴ and τεκνοποιητικὴ are probably felt by Aristotle not to describe the nature of the ἄρχη in the same clear way in which the word δεσποτικὴ describes the ἄρχη of the master over his slave. We are told in the de Anima (2. 4. 416 b 23) that 'everything should be named in reference to the end it realizes.' The words γαμικὴ and τεκνοποιητικὴ certainly do not give us this information. Πατρικὴ is substituted for τεκνοποιητικὴ in 1. 12. 1259 a 38.

11. ἐστισαν δ' αὐταί κ.τ.λ. 'Let the three relations of which we spoke' as needing to be investigated 'be these' (for the absence of αἱ before τρεῖς, see Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq.): 'but there is a part of Household Management which seems to some to be the whole, and to others the most important part of it, and we must inquire what is the truth about this.' For the imperative ἐστισαν, which closes the business of naming the three relations and asks content with such terms as are forthcoming, cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 29: Eth. Nic. 2. 7. 1108 a 5 sq.: Metaph. Z. 8. 1033 a 25 sq.: Plato, Soph. 231 A. Aristotle does not at this early point of the discussion think it necessary to mention that the claims of χρηματιστικὴ to be a part of οἰκονομία are open to much question, but, as is often his practice, provisionally adopts a view which he will hereafter reconsider and correct.
12. τοῖς μὲν . . . τοῖς δὲ. Who these were, is not known. Xenophon goes some way in this direction (cp. Oecon. 6. 4, οἴκων, ἕφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμης μὲν τινος ἐδοξεν ἥμων ὁμόμεν εἶναι ἡ οἰκονομία ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὴ ἐφαίνετο ἡ οἰκονομία δύναται αἴξειν ἀνθρώποι· οίκοι δὲ ἥμων ἐφαίνετο ὅπερ κτήσει ἡ σύμπασι: also Oecon. 7. 15 and 11. 9). He has, however, as great a dislike as Aristotle for most branches of ἡ καλομένη χρηματιστικῆ and he thinks throughout of husbandry as the vocation of his οἰκονομικός.

14. πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου κ.τ.λ. Aristotle investigates the relation of master and slave before he examines χρηματιστικῆ, probably because he started with the aim of determining whether the δεσποτικὸς is the same as the οἰκονομικός, πολιτικός, and βιολικός, but also perhaps because the slave is a part of κτήσει (c. 8. 1256 a 2), and the part should be studied before the whole. The two aims which he proposes to keep in view in studying this subject reappear in c. 11. 1258 b 9, ὡσπὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γρώσιν διωρίκασιν ἱκανῷ, τὰ πρὶς τὴν χρήσιν δεὶ διελθεῖν, and in 3. 8. 1279 b 12, τὸ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστηρι μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποβλέποντι πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. So again in 2. 1. 1260 b 32 the aim is ἢνα τὰ τῆς ὀρθῆς ἔργον ὑβῆ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35 sqq. The aim of the Politics is from the first twofold—partly scientific accuracy, partly utility. The eleventh chapter of the First Book is intended to be useful, not only to the χρηματιστικῆς and to the οἰκονομικῶς, but also to the πολιτικῆς (1259 a 33).

15. τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν. Cp. c. 5. 1254 b 29, τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν.

16. κἂν εἰ κ.τ.λ. See Bon. Ind. 41 a 4 sqq. Carry on ἔδομεν.

18. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Some rate δεσποτεία too high, counting it as a science, and identifying the rule of the δεσπότης with household management and political and kingly rule (for with πολιτικῆ and βιολικῆ—as Bonitz points out, Ind. 614 b 31—ἄρχη must be supplied, as in 1. 7. 1255 b 17): language to this effect is put into the mouth of Socrates both by Xenophon in the Oeconomicus and by Plato in the Politicus. This was one extreme. Others go to the other extreme, and regard the distinction of master and slave as resting only on convention, not on nature, and therefore as based on compulsion and consequently unjust. Aristotle here as elsewhere first sets before his reader two or more opposite views, and then seeks a view which will harmonize their contrariety (ἀλλ' ἄτις ἐναντιώσεις) and make either of them seem to possess a basis of plausibility (εἰληφόμεν δοκοῦντα) by showing that each is in a sense true and in a sense not true: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1235 b 13, ληπτός.
NOTES.

δὴ τρόπος ὡς ἔμιν ἀμα τὰ τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει ('plenè explicare, explicando exprimere,' Bon. Ind. 80 b 18 sqq.), καὶ τὰ ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντίωσεις τοῦτο δ' ἔσται ἐὰν εἰλόγος φαίνηται τὰ ἐναντία δοκοῦντα μάλιστα γὰρ ὑμολογοῦμεν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τῶν φαινομένων συμβαίνει δὲ μένει τὰς ἐναντίωσεις, ἐὰν ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀληθεῖ ὡς τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐστι δ' ὡς οὗ. ΘUS we learn, as the discussion goes on, that there is a διεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη (c. 7. 1255 b 22—39), though it has nothing great or impressive about it (1255 b 33), but that the master is not a master by virtue of science but by virtue of character (1255 b 20); he can, in fact, do without the διεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη (1255 b 35); it is no part of his essence and therefore no part of his definition. So again, the other side are only partially right (c. 6. 1255 a 3); their objection to slavery holds of one kind of slavery only.

Something has been said already (vol. i. p. 139 sqq.) as to the question who these objectors to slavery were, who stigmatized it as not based on nature but only on convention, and therefore the offspring of force and consequently unjust. The notions 'conventional,' 'based on force,' and 'unjust' hang together in their contention significantly enough. The connexion which Aristotle traces (Phys. 4. 8. 215 a 3, and often elsewhere) between τὸ βίαν and τὸ παρὰ φύσιν is inherited by him from Plato (Tim. 64 D) and from still earlier inquirers (cp. Plato, Protag. 337 D, ὁ νόμος, τύραννος ὃν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, σολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιοῖται—the words of the sophist Hippias). So Glaucon in his statement (Rep. 359 C) of the view of Thrasymachus and others about Justice contrasts φύσις with νόμος καὶ βία (ὁ πᾶσα φύσις διώκει πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγάθων, νόμω ἢ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἱσοῦ τιμῆν). On the other hand, we trace the notion of a connexion between force and injustice in a well-known line of Hesiod, Op. et Dies 275—

καὶ νῦ δίκης ἐπάκοις, βίης δ' ἐπιλάθει σὺμπαν,

and in a view referred to by Aristotle, Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324a 35—νομίζοντι δ' οἱ μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν, διεσποτικῶς μὲν γινόμενον μὲν ἄδικας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον οὐκ ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.: cp. 3. 3. 1276a 12, where we find that some constitutions (e.g. tyranny) were popularly contrasted with others (democracy is probably meant) as founded on force, not on the common advantage. So again in 3. 16. 1287a 10 sqq. that which is by nature and that which is just are tacitly identified. We hear later on (c. 6. 1255 a 8 sq.) that 'many of those versed in laws' impeached enslavement resulting from war, at any rate when based on a bare superiority of Might, but the persons referred to in the passage
before us seem to have regarded slavery of all kinds and under all circumstances—even, it would seem, when imposed by Greeks on barbarians—as contrary to nature and unjust. This sweeping protest against slavery is certainly remarkable. We see from Plato, Laws 777 B sqq., how much difficulty was experienced in the practical maintenance and working of the institution.

23. ἐπει οὔν κ.τ.λ. The object of the long sentence which C. 4. begins here, and which, like many other long sentences in Aristotle introduced by ἐπεί, is ill-constructed enough, is (as we see from 1254 a 13) to commence an investigation into the nature and function of the slave. It is evident that if Aristotle can show that the slave fills a necessary place in the household as an instrument of household science, raised above and somewhat dissimilar to instruments commonly so called, yet, like them, an instrument and an article of property, he will have gone far to solve the twofold question just raised, whether rule over the slave is the same thing as οἰκονομική, πολιτική, and βασιλική ἀρχή, and whether the slave exists by nature, for the naturalness of the slave will result from his necessity, and rule over the slave will be clearly seen to be a less noble thing than rule over those who are not ὀργανά. Socrates (Xen. Mcm. 3. 4. 12), in asserting a close similarity between the management of private and public concerns, had used the following argument—οὐ γὰρ ἅλλοις ταύτιν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελῆμεν χρώνται ἢ οἰκονομοῖντες. Aristotle, on the contrary, holds that to rule over slaves is one thing and to rule over freemen is another (c. 7), for slaves, unlike freemen, are mere animate instruments.

ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας κ.τ.λ. As often happens at the outset of an inquiry, Aristotle accepts propositions which he will afterwards correct (see note on 1253 b 11). His definitive view is that property is rather a sine qua non (οὐ οἰκ ἄνευ) of the household than a part of it, and that the same is true of the relation of κτήτικη or χρηματιστική (of the sound sort) to οἰκονομία: cp. c. 10 (which, it would seem, must be taken to correct the passage before us and also c. 8. 1256 b 26-27), and see 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., where property is denied to be part of the πόλις, though necessary to it (1328 a 33 sq.). Not a few translators and commentators—among them, one MS. of the Vet. Int. (2, which inserts 'manifestum quod' before its equivalent for καὶ ἡ κτήτικη) and Leonardus Aretinus—make καὶ ἡ κτήτικη κ.τ.λ. an apodosis, but Aristotle often introduces with ἐπεί a long string of protases, and perhaps it is better to begin the apodosis at οὐτω 30 and to avoid interrupting the continuity of the argument, which seems to me to be as follows:—Without necessaries
men can neither live nor live well, hence property is essential to the household, and the science of acquiring it is a part of the science of household management, the end of which is life or good life; but instruments, whether animate or inanimate, are also essential to this science: hence an article of property is an instrument for the purpose of living, and property is a mass of instruments, and the slave is an animate article of property [and therefore an animate instrument for the purpose of living]. The proof, however, that articles of property are instruments for the purpose of living seems unsatisfactory, and Aristotle omits to show that the animate instruments of which Household Science stands in need must be, if human beings, slaves and not free. Sus. brackets the words καὶ ἡ κτητική μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας as having no bearing on the conclusion drawn in 30 sqq., but Aristotle’s object seems to be to show, first the necessity of Property, and next the necessity of instruments, to Household Science. I am not convinced by Susemihl’s arguments (Qu. Crit. p. 339 sqq.), that a rearrangement of the paragraph is called for.

25. ταῖς ὀρισμέναις τέχναις. 'arts with a definite end': Bonitz (Ind. 524 a 29) compares Metaph. M. 10. 1087 a 16, ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ὡς ὑπή τοῦ καθόλου οὕσα καὶ ἀόρατος τοῦ καθόλου καὶ ἀόριστον ἐστίν, ἡ δ’ εὐεργεία ὀρισμένη καὶ ὀρισμένου τάδε τι οὕσα τούτοις, but Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 5, τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἐνίοτε δυνάμεις εἰσίν αἱ ποιητικαὶ, τῶν δ’ οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ δύναμις ὀρισμένη· τῶν γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὤντων ἡ γνωμένων καὶ τὸ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς comes still nearer, and here the opposition is between a cause which works for a definite end and one which works κατὰ συμβεβηκός—cp. Rhet. i. 10. 1369 a 32, ἢστι δ’ ἀπὸ τύχης μὲν τὰ τοιαύτα γεγράμενα, ὡσπον ἡ τε αὐτία ἀόρατος καὶ μὴ ἐνεκά τοῦ γίγνεται καὶ μήτε ἀπὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μήτε τεταγμένος, and Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 19, ὡς δ’ ἔπιστήμη ὀυκ ἐστὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, φανερὸν ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πάσα ἡ τοῦ ἀπὶ ἡ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· τῶν γὰρ ἡ μαθήσεται ἡ διδάξει ἄλλον; ὥστε γὰρ ὀρίσθω ἡ τῷ ἀπὶ ἡ τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ὡσπον ὃτι ὀφθαλμόν τὸ μελίκρατον τῷ πυρήνουν ὃς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. It is not clear whether Aristotle regards οἰκονομικὴ as ὀρισμένη: at any rate it is hardly a τέχνη—rather a πρακτική ἐπιστήμη, or part of one. For the thought, cp. Plutarch, Ἀν Βιτιοσιάς ad infelicitam sufficiat c. 2, ἡ κακία . . . αὐτοσελεί τις οὕσα τῆς κακοδαμομονίας δημιουργός οὔτε γὰρ ὀργάνων οὔτε ὑπηρετῶν ἔχει χρείαν.

26. ἀναγκαῖον ἄν εἰη . . . εἰ μέλλει. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 853. 2. b.

27. οὗτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν. Not to be completed by τέχνων, nor is τῶν οἰκονομικῶν masc., as Gottling, who supplies τὰ οἰκεῖα ὀργάνα, would make it; the word to be supplied is probably ὀργάνων. It comes to the surface, as it were, immediately after in τῶν δ’ ὀργάνων,
and the translation 'the same thing will hold good of the instruments of household science' seems to be justified by the use of the gen. in Phys. 8. 8. 263 a 1, καὶ τῶν κυβερνητῶν ἀρα ὡσταίτως: Pol. i. 8. 1256 a 29, ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ('ebenso ist es nun auch bei den Menenchen,' Bern.: cp. 1256 b 6, ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τούτο ἄλλου).

Riddell (Plato, Apology p. 126) apparently interprets the passage before us thus, though he does not explain what substantive he would supply.

29. πρωρεύς. Cp. Plutarch, Agis i. 3, καθίστερ γὰρ οἱ πρωρεύει τὰ ἐμπροσθεν προσώπων κυβερνητῶν ἀφορῶσι πρὸς ἔκεινον καὶ τὸ προσ-

τασσόμενον ύπ' ἐκείνων παραιτεῖ, οὕτως οἱ πολιτευόμενοι καὶ πρὸς δόξαν ὀρκώντες ὑπηρέτα μὲν τῶν πολλῶν εἰσίν, ὄνομα δὲ ὀρχύντων ἔχουσιν: Reipubl. Gerend. Pracecepta, c. 15, ὥσ οἱ κυβερνηταὶ τὰ μὲν ταῖς χερσὶ δὲ

αὐτῶν πρίστιτοι, τὰ δὲ ὀργάνωι ἐτέρους δὲ ἐτέρων ἀπώθεν καθήμενοι περια-

γονεῖ καὶ στρίφοντες, χρώονται δὲ καὶ καυταῖς καὶ πρωρεύσει καὶ κελευσταῖς...

οὕτω τῷ πολιτικῷ προσηκει κ.τ.λ.

30. ἐν ὀργάνω εἰδεῖ. See Liddell and Scott s. v. εἴδος.

ταῖς τέχναις. Vict. 'in omni arte, quaccounque illa sit,' and so Bern. Sus. 'für die Künste,' but cp. ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, 1256 b 34.

οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτήμα. Here at length begins the apodosis. For οὕτω introducing the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἐπεὶ, Eucken (de l'artic. usu. p. 30) compares 1. 10. 1258 a 31-34.

31. τὸ κτήμα... ὀργάνων ἐστὶ. Contrast Xenophon's account of κτήσεως in Oecon. 6. 4, κτήσιν δὲ ταύτω ἐσμένει ὅ τι ἐκάστῳ ὑφθέλμου ἐίς ἐις τῶν βλον, ὑφθέλμα δὲ ὅτα τὰ εὔρισκετο πάντα ὁπόσον τις ἐπίστατο χρη-

σθαι—so that friends, for instance (c. 1. 14), come under the head of property, and enemies too, if a man knows how to use friends and enemies. Xenophon's definition seems far too wide. Aristotle avoids this fault by treating property as an appendage of the household and as consisting of ὀργάνα, but then there is such a thing as State-property, and his final definition of a κτήμα in 1254 a 16 as an ὀργάνων πρακτικῶν καὶ χωριστῶν seems to imply that an ὀργάνων ποιητῶν (a shuttle, for example) is not an article of property, so that his definition of κτήσις appears to be as much too narrow as Xenophon's is too wide. His definition of wealth, however (c. 8. 1256 b 27 sqq.), is not open to these objections.

32. ὅσπερ ὀργάνων πρὸ ὀργάνων. For this term cp. de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 19 sq., ἡ δὲ χείρ ὑποκείν εἶναι ὅποι ἐν ὀργάνων ἄλλα πολλαί, ἐστι γὰρ ὅσπερ ὅσπερ ὁ ὀργάνων πρὸ ὀργάνων (the expression is somewhat unusual, and is therefore introduced by ὅσπερί, ὅσπερ) τῷ οὖν πλείστους δυναμείν διέσχεθαι τέχνας τῷ ἐπὶ πλείστου τῶν ὀργάνων χρῆσιμον
Many have taken ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων in this passage of the De Partibus Animalium as being equivalent in meaning to ὠν ἐν ὄργανον ἀλλὰ πολλά, but this is not apparently its meaning in the passage before us. In Probl. 30. 5. 955 b 23 sqq. we read ἢ οτι ο θεὸς ἄργανα ἐν οὐνοὶ ἢμῖν δέδωκε δῶ, ἐν ὑσ χρησομεθα τὸν ἔκτον ὀργάνονοι, σώματι μὲν χεῖρα, νυχὶ δὲ νοῦν, and in de An. 3. 8. 432 a 1 sq. the soul is said to be like the hand, καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεῖρ ὀργάνον ἐστὶν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἷδος εἴδων καὶ ἡ ἀισθήσεις εἷδος αἰσθητῶν, where TRENdelenburg explains 'manus, qua tanquam instrumento reliqua instrumenta adhibentur, instrumentum instrumentorum dici potest; eodem fortasse sensu νοῦς εἰδὸς εἴδων, i.e. ea species et forma quae reliquas suscipit, iisque, velut manus instrumentis, utitur.' Cp. also for the relation of the hand to other ὀργανα, de Gen. An. 1. 22. 730 b 15 sqq. Bonitz collects the uses of πρὸ in Aristotle (Ind. 633 a 34 sqq.), and, like Vict. before him, compares Pol. 1. 7. 1255 b 29, δοῦλος πρὸ δοῦλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου, interpreting πρὸ both here and in the De Partibus Animalium as meaning 'praefers tert alterum.' (So Vict. 'instrumentum quod praestat et antecellit ceteris instrumentibus': Lamb. 'instrumentum instrumenta antecedens.') Perhaps, however, something more than this may be meant—'an instrument which is prior to other instruments and without which they are useless.'

33. πᾶς ὁ ὑπηρέτης. Sus. brackets ὁ, following M and corr. P, and πᾶς ὑπηρέτης (like πᾶς ὁικος, 1. 7. 1255 b 19) is a commoner expression, but the meaning is 'the class of assistants as a whole'—cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 9. 1150 b 30, ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς: Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 28, πᾶσας τῆς αὐταρκείας: 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 21, πᾶσαν τῆν ἄρχην. The slave is included under the wider term ὑπηρέτης (1254 a 8: Plato, Politicus 289 C, τὸ δὲ δὴ δοῦλων καὶ πάντων ὑπηρετῶν λοιπῶν).

35. τὰ Δαϊδάλου... ἦ τὸς τοῦ Ἡφαιστοῦ τρίποδας. The article is used before Ἡφαιστοῦ, but not before Δαϊδάλου. Should we compare the examples collected by Vahlen (Poet. p. 105) in his note on Ἰλίας καὶ Ἡ Ὀδύσσεια, Poet. 4. 1449 a 1? As to these works of Daedalus, cp. de An. 1. 3. 406 b 18: Plato, Meno 97 D: Euthyphro 11 B: Eurip. Fragm. 373 (Nach.). The poets of the Old Comedy delighted to imagine the utensils of the kitchen and the household themselves doing what they were bidden, the fish cooking himself and so forth, and slaves thus becoming unnecessary. See the lively lines of Crates and others, Athen. Deipn. 267 c. The Greeks, in fact, as appears from these verses, looked back to a golden age when there were no slaves.

36. ὁ ποιητῆς. Homer (II. 18. 376). The term, however, is
used by Aristotle of others than Homer—Sophocles (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 29); an unknown poet (Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 30). Homer refers to them as 'of their own accord entering the assembly of the gods.'

35-37. ὀσπερ . . . οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες. For the construction of this sentence Rassow (Bemerkungen, p. 5) compares 3. 4. 1277 a 5, ἵπποι ἵπποι ἕως ἕως ἔτσι, ὀσπερ ὀσπερ εἴθης εἴθης ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆ ἐκ λόγου καὶ ὀρέξεως . . . τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ποιλεῖς ἐξ ἀπάντων τε τούτων κ.τ.λ., and Sus. adds 3. 15. 1286 a 31, ἓτε μᾶλλον ἄδιδθορον τὸ πολὺ, καθάπερ ὑδρό τὸ πλέιον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν ὄλγων ἀδιαφθορώτερον. In all these passages, after a similar case or cases have been adduced, the original proposition is reverted to and reasserted, perhaps in more distinct and vigorous language—the whole forming, however cumbersomely, an undivided sentence. Neither καὶ before ὀσπερ nor ἐὰν before αἱ κερκίδες is correct.

37. αὐταί, 'of themselves': cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 8.

38. οὐδὲν ἄν ἔδει. This is in the main true, but slaves might even then be needed as ἀκάλουθοι (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sq.), a purpose for which they were largely used.

1. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has been speaking of the slave as 1254 a. an ὀργανον πρὸ ὀργανον made necessary by the inability of shuttles or combs to do their work by themselves, but now he remembers that the word ὀργανον was commonly used of instruments of production; he feels, therefore, that what he has just said may be misleading and may suggest the idea that the slave is a mere instrument of the textile art, a mere complement of the comb, whereas in fact he is a humble auxiliary in life and action, which are higher things than weaving; hence he guards himself by pointing out that the slave is not an ὀργανον in the usual sense of the word—i.e. a ποιητικόν ὀργανον (cp. Plato, Polit. 287 E, ό γὰρ ἐπι γενεσις αὐτίκα πήγνυται, καθάπερ ὄργανον)—but a πρακτικόν ὀργανον, for (1) he is a κτήμα, (2) he is an ὀργανον πρὸς ζωῆν, and life is πράξεις, not ποίησις. When he has added the further trait that the slave is, like any other κτήμα, wholly another's, we know exactly what the slave is, and are prepared to deal with the further question whether a natural slave exists. The slave is a πρακτικόν and ἐμψυχον ὄργανον, and, though a human being, wholly another's. As to the use of μὲν οὖν here, see note on 1253 a 10.


5. ἢ ἓπει κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now points out, further, that the difference between ὀργανα of ποίησις and πράξεις (and the slave is an ὀργανον of πράξεις) is a difference of kind.
8. καὶ ὁ δοῦλος. Cp. καὶ ταῦτα 6: life (βίος) is action, and the slave is an ἄργανον πρῶς ζωῆς, 1253 b 31, therefore the slave also (as well as life) has to do with action. Mr. Postgate (Notes on the Politics, p. 1) notices the substitution here of βίος for ζωῆ.

tὸ δὲ κτῆμα κ.τ.λ. Cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 27, ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτῶν αὐτὸν τινὰ εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόρον γὰρ ἔκαστος τῆς πόλεως, and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b. 10 sq. The slave is also a part of his master (c. 6. 1255 b 11 sq.: Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 23).

9. τῆς γὰρ ‘apud Aristot. saepe ita usurpatur, ut particula τε manifesto praeparativam vim habeat, eamque sequatur καὶ’ (Bon. Ind. 750 a 2). Here ὅμως δὲ follows.

10. δῶς, i.e. without the limiting addition of μόρον. ‘Opponitur δῶς ipsis formulis, quibus praedicatum aliquod ad angustiorem ambitum restringitur’ (Bon. Ind. 506 a 10).

14. φῶς. Vict. ‘hoc autem addidit, quia usu venit aliquando ingenuum hominem amittere libertatem, nec suae potestatis esse, cum scilicet capitur ab hostibus: is enim quoque eo tempore non est sui iuris, sed instituto quodam hominum, non natura.’ For the definition of the slave here given, cp. Metaph. Λ. 2. 982 b 25, ὡσπέρ ἀνθρωπός φαμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ ἀυτὸν ἑνεκα καὶ μὴ δᾶλων ὁν, οὔτω καὶ αὕτη μόνη ἐλεύθερα οὕτα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν: μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ἑνεκὲν ἑστιν. The popular use of language implied quite a different view of freedom and slavery: see Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 2–13, and contrast the well-known passage, Metaph. Λ. 10. 1075 a 18 sqq.

15. See critical note.

C. 5. 17. πότερον δ’ ἐστὶ τὸς κ.τ.λ. Aristotle passes from the question τί ἐστι to the question εἰ ἐστι: cp. Metaph. E. 1. 1025 b 16 sqq. He has discovered that there is a niche in the household needing to be filled, but he has not yet discovered whether there are any human beings in existence who are gainers by filling it, and whom it is consequently just and in accordance with nature to employ as slaves.

20. οὐ χαλεπῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. It is not easy to disentangle in what follows the two modes of inquiry, or to mark the point at which the one closes and the other begins. We see that the relation of ruling and being ruled satisfies all tests of that which is natural; it is necessary, and therefore natural (de Gen. An. 1. 4. 717 a 15)—it is for the common advantage, and therefore natural (Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 34: 1. 5. 1254 b 6, 12: 1. 6. 1255 b 12–14)—the distinction of ruler and ruled, again, appears in some cases immediately after birth (εἶθεν ἐκ γενετῆς), and this is a further evidence of naturalness (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 4–6: Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 7 sq.: Eth. Eud.
Aristotle continues—"and there are many kinds of ruling and ruled elements, and if one kind of rule is better than another, this is because one kind of ruled element is better than another, for ruler and ruled unite to discharge a function, and the function discharged rises as the level of that which is ruled rises." Aristotle is careful to point out that the lowness of the rule exercised by the master over the slave is due to the lowness of the person ruled, and that the rule of a natural master over a natural slave no more involves an infraction of nature or justice or the common advantage than the rule of the soul over the body.

21. καταμαθεῖν is used of things perceived at a glance without any necessity for reasoning: cp. 3. 14. 1285 a 1. So ὅραν is occasionally opposed to λόγος (e.g. in Meteor. 6. 343 b 30-33).

22. ἔνα. Soul and body, man and brute, male and female.


24. οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἡ θηρίου, 'as for instance over a man than over a brute.'

25. ἀπό is probably used in preference to ὑπό, because its signification is more comprehensive—the 'source' (cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 19) rather than the 'agency'—and covers the contribution of the ruled to the common work as well as that of the ruler. 'In the genuine works of Aristotle ἀπό is never found in the sense of ὑπό with the passive, but all cases in which we find it conjoined with a passive verb may easily be explained by attaching to it its ordinary meaning; in many of the spurious writings, on the other hand, we find passages in which ἀπό is used in the sense of ὑπό—e.g. Probl. 7. 8. 887 a 22: Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 15, 27' (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 9). See also Bon. Ind. 78 a 9 sqq.


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28. ὅσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Camerarius (Interp. p. 35) quotes Cic. De Nat. Deor. 2. 11. 29. Γὰρ introduces a proof of the statement in 24 that there are many sorts of ruling elements, and also of ruled, and many kinds of rule. Given the fact of the existence of many compound wholes, each compounded of many constituents, it is not likely that all those constituents will be similarly related to each other and will deserve to be ruled in the same way. Sus. (following Dittenberger, ubi supra p. 1376) places καὶ ἀδεὶ βελτίων... ἔργον 28 in a parenthesis, but perhaps ὅσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. is intended to
support this assertion as well as that which precedes it, and out of which it grows.

29. ἐν τῷ κοινῷ. See Bon. Ind. 399 a 28 sqq., where Metaph. H. 3. 1043 a 31 is referred to, in which passage τὸ κοινὸν is used as equivalent to ἡ σύνθετος οὐσία ἐκ ὅλης καὶ εἴδους, and such a σύνθετος οὐσία may be composed not only of συνχρῆ, but also of διηρμένα, like τὸ ὀλον in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq. For a definition of τὸ συνεχὲς Bonitz (Ind. 728 a 33) refers to Phys. 5. 3. 227 a 10—b 2. Vict.: 'sive, inquit, ipsae illae partes continentes sunt, ut contingit in corpore hominis, quod constituant membra quae sibi haerent, sive seunctae, partibus non concretis, ut fieri videmus in civitate, quae constat e civibus distinctis, cohorte militum,' etc.

31. καὶ τοῦτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 225 b 10) seems inclined to explain ἐκ in this passage as used 'pro genetivo partitivo,' but cp. de Part. An. 1. 1. 641 b 14, αἰτία τοιαύτη ἢν ἔχομεν καθάπερ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν ἐκ τοῦ παντός: 'and this (i.e. ruling and being ruled) comes to things possessed of life from nature as a whole' (ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως, cp. peri τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, 2. 8. 1267 b 28). Cp. also de An. 3. 5. 430 a 10, εἰπεὶ δ' ὁσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὅλη ἐκάστο χένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πίνατα ἑννάμεις ἑκέινα), ἔτερον δὲ τὸ αὖτιν καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, ὁ οἷς ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὅλην πέπονθε, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχει τοιάς τις διάφορας: Plato, Phileb. 30 A: Phaedrus 270 C: Meno 81 C, ἀτε τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὐσιῶν. Τὸ ᾧψυχον is prior geneiœ, though not οὐσία, to τὸ ὑψυχον (Metaph. M. 2. 1077 a 19). Inanimate nature shades off almost imperceptibly into animate (Hist. An. 8. 1. 588 b 4 sqq.).

33. ὁ οἷον ἄρμονίας. Bern. 'z. B. in der musikalischen Harmonie'—Sus.2 'wie z. B. (die des Grundtons) in einer Tonart': the latter suggests that ἐν ἄρμονίᾳ should be read instead of ἄρμονίας, and certainly, if the word is used in this sense, the genitive seems strange and in need of confirmation from parallel passages. Bonitz, on the other hand (Ind. 106 b 37 sq.), groups this passage with Phys. 1. 5. 188 b 12—16, where ἄρμονία appears to be used in a sense opposed to ἀναμοστία—διαφέρει οἷον ἐπὶ ἄρμονίας εἰσέων ἢ τύχεως ἢ συνβεβουσ'. ψανέρων γὰρ ὅ αὐτὸς λύγος (15—16)—cp. Fragm. Aristot. 41. 1481 b 42: the meaning would thus be 'a rule as of order and system.' But Aristotle may possibly have in his mind the Pythagorean tenet referred to in Metaph. Α. 5. 986 a 2, τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἄρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀριθμόν: cp. Strabo 10. p. 468, καθ' ἄρμονίαν τῶν κόσμων συνεστάναι φασὶ': Plutarch, Phocion c. 2 sub fin.: Plato, Tim. 37 A: Philolaus, Fragm. 3 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2.
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1): Plutarch, de Procreatione Animae in Timaeo c. 7. 1015 F, c. 28. 1027 A, c. 33. 1029 E sqq.: Stob. Floril. 103. 26 (p. 555-27 sqq.). Compare also the famous saying of Heraclitus (Fr. 45, ed. Bywater) as to the παλιντροπος ἄρμον [κόσμου] ἠκοιστήρ τῶν καὶ λύρων. If the Pythagorean views are present to Aristotle’s mind, some notion of musical harmony may be included in his meaning.

ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Compare the similar dismissal of a physical parallel in Eth. Nic. 8. 10. 1159 b 23.

34. πρῶτον, ‘in the first place.’ Cp. 1254 b 2, ἐστὶ δ’ οὖν, ἠκοιστήρ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν ζωῷ θεωρήσαι καὶ διαστοιχίαν ἀρχήν καὶ πολιτικήν, and 10, πάλιν.


36. δεὶ δὲ σκοπεῖν. Sus. (Qu. Crit. p. 342): ‘orationem interrumpendo refellit quae quis de hac re contradicere possit.’ For the rule here laid down, cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 a 22 sqq. In the next line καὶ before τῶν βιβλίων διακείμενον seems to assert it not only of other things but also of man.

39. τοῦτο, the rule of the soul over the body.

τῶν γὰρ μοιχηρῶν ἡ μοιχηρῶς ἐχώντων. Cp. de An. 3. 4. 429 b 13, ἡ ἀλλὰ ἡ ἀλλὰς ἕχοντι: de An. 3. 4. 429 b 20 sq.: de Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 a 8, τοῖς κάκιστα διακείμενοι δι’ ἡλικίαν ἢ νόσον ἢ ἐξιν (ἡ ἐξεν: Æm. Bekk.)—ἐξιν being a more permanent and διάθεσις a less permanent state (see Mr. Wallace on de An. 2. 5. 417 b 15, who refers to Categ. 8. 8 b 28). Μοιχηρῶς ἐχώντων includes both, and relates to individuals who, though not μοιχηροί, are, more or less temporarily, in an unsatisfactory state.

3. δ’ οὖν seems to be especially used by Aristotle when a tran-1254 b. sition is made from a disputable assertion to one which cannot be disputed: cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 11. 1171 a 33 (quoted by Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 1. 46), εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταύτα ἢ δι’ ἄλλο τι κανοικίζονται, ἀφείδων συμβαίνειν δ’ οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεγθεῖν. See also Meteor. 1. 13. 350 b 9: Poet. 4. 1449 a 9. ‘Be that as it may, at any rate.’

4. ή μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. It will be noticed that Aristotle conceives the soul to exercise διαστοιχίαν ἀρχή over the body even in the case of the lower animals, at any rate when they are healthily and naturally constituted. Plato (Phaedo 80 A) had already spoken of the soul as ruling the body despotically, and Aristotle follows in his track. We might ask whether Aristotle holds that the soul rules the body primarily for its own advantage, and only accidentally for that of the body (cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 32 sqq.), or whether the disparity which he conceives as existing between a natural master and a natural slave
exists between the soul of an insect and its body. Aristotle's meaning, however, is that the body should be the ὀργανον and κτήμα of the soul. But he does not always draw this sharp line of demarcation between the soul and the body: in Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 14, for instance, he relates the body rather closely to the emotions.

5. πολιτικὴ και βασιλικὴ. Καὶ perhaps here means 'or,' as in the passages referred to by Bonitz (Ind. 357 b 20). Πολιτικὴ and βασιλικὴ ἀφχή have this in common, that they are exercised over free and willing subjects (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 7-9: and see notes on 1259 a 39-b 1). Perhaps the word βασιλικὴ is added to enforce the inequality of νοῦς and ὀρεξίς, and to exclude the notion that an alternation of rule between νοῦς and ὀρεξίς is ever in place, such as is found in most πολιτικαί ἀφχεῖ (1. 12. 1259 b 4: 1. 1. 1252 a 15). For the relation of νοῦς (i.e. ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς) and ὀρεξίς in moral action, see Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 17 sqq. Ὀρεξίς does not stand to νοῦς in the relation of a mere ὀργανον—the relation described in Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.—but is to a certain extent akin to it; see Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 30 sqq., and esp. 1103 a 1, εἶ δὲ χρῆ καὶ τοῦτο (sc. τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν) φάναι λόγου ἐχειν, διττῶν ἑσται καὶ τὸ λόγου ἐχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ’ ὀσπέρ του πατρὸς ἀκουστικώς τι, where the relation of ὀρεξίς to full reason is conceived as that of a child to its father, and a father, we know (Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 10 sqq.), is not far from a king. On the other hand, in Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 b 5 sqq., the relation of the rational to the irrational part of the soul is apparently construed differently, and compared to the relation of a master to his slave or to that of a head of a household to his household; we do not learn how it can be comparable to each of these two dissimilar relations. When Cicero (de Rep. 3. 25. 37) says—nam ut animus corpori dicitur imperare, dicitur etiam libidini, sed corpori ut rex civilis sui aut parens liberis, libidini autem ut servis dominus, quod eam coercet et frangit—he probably means by 'libido' something different from ὀρεξίς. His notion of the relation of soul and body contrasts, we see, with Aristotle's.

6. ἐν οἷς. Cp. 1254 a 39, ἐν ὧν τοῖς δήλοις: 1254 b 3, ἐν ᾠδῷ θεωρήσατο: 1254 a 36, σκόπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι: and Plato, Soph. 256 C, περὶ ὧν καὶ ἐν οἷς προϊθεμέθα σκοπεῖν. Ἐν introduces the objects (ψυχῇ, σώμα, νοῦς, ὀρεξίς) in which the relations are exemplified. Ἐν is sometimes used in the sense of 'as to': see Vahlen, Poet. p. 188 (note on 17. 1455 b 14), who compares (among other passages) Plato, Rep. 2. 376 B, διαρροώτες τιθῶμεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ . . . φύσει φιλόσοφον αὐτόν δεῖν εἶναι, but this does not seem to be its meaning here.
8. τὸ παθητικὸς μορίω ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. That which is usually called τὸ ὀρκτικὸν is here termed τὸ παθητικὸν μόριον, and the term recurs in 3. 15. 1286 a 17, κρείττον θ' ὡς μὴ πρόσετι τὸ παθητικὸν ὅλως ἡ ὡς συμφερές τῷ μὲν οὐν νόμῳ τούτῳ ὡς ὑπάρχει—cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 32, ἀνεν ὀρκύων νοῦς ὁ νόμος εἰσίν. In the passage before us τὸ ὀρκτικὸν is distinguished from τὸ λόγον ἔχον, though Aristotle is sometimes not unwilling to treat it as part of τὸ λόγον ἔχον (see Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 1 sq., quoted in the last note but one), and in the de Anima (3. 9. 432 a 24 sqq.) he speaks of the division of the soul into τὸ λόγον and τὸ λόγον ἔχον as not his own and not satisfactory. He evidently, however, accepts this division in the Politics; this appears still more distinctly in Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 6 and 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 17 sq. An accurate treatment of psychological questions would in fact be out of place in a political treatise: see Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 23 sq. It is not clear whether in the passage before us Aristotle regards νοῦς as the ἔχον of τὸ λόγον ἔχον, as in Pol. 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 17 sqq.

10. ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοίς ἕως, ‘in man taken in conjunction with the other animals.’ It is because the relation of ruling and being ruled appears elsewhere than περὶ ἀνθρώπων, that Aristotle expressly limits his inquiries in 3. 6. 1278 b 16 to the question, τῆς ἀρχῆς εἰδή πῶς τῆς περὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς ἕως.

11. ἐκλάτω. Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 3 sq.: Probl. 10. 45. 895 b 23 sqq.: Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 15. Being better, their example is to be studied as illustrating the true relation of animals to man (cp. 1254 a 37).


13. ἐτε δὲ κτλ. Ψάχει is added because this is not always the case (cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 1). Κρεῖττον is probably not ‘stronger’ (as Sus. and Bern.), but ‘better,’ as in 3. 15. 1286 a 17: compare as to the relative excellence of male and female de Gen. An. 2. 1. 732 a 5 sqq.: Metaph. A. 6. 988 a 2–7. Aristotle is apparently speaking here, as in 1259 b 1, 1260 a 10, of the male and female human being.

15. ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. Cp. 3. 10. 1281 a 17, πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων, where the meaning seems to be ‘taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty’; so here ‘in the case of human beings as a whole, irrespective of sex.’

16. ψυχῆ σώματος καὶ ἀνθρώπως θηρίου. One would expect ψυχῆς σώμα καὶ ἀνθρώπων θηρίων, and Thuot (see Sus.) is inclined to alter the text thus, but the inversion is characteristic: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 27, VOL. 11.
18. ή τού σώματος χρήσις. The same criterion of a slave is indicated in 1. 2. 1252 a 31 sqq.: 1.11. 1258 b 38: 1254 b 25. The slave is here defined by his ἐφηγοῦν, and in 21 by his δύναμις (like the citizen of the best State, 3. 13. 1284 a 2): cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 23. And the end of a thing is the best to which it can attain (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 29, αἱκί ἐκάστῳ τοῦθ' αἱματῶτατον οὗ τυχεῖν ἐστιν ἀκροτάτου).

19. Μέν seems (as Thurot remarks: see Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 343) to be followed by no δέ. But this often occurs in the Politics (Sus., Ind. Gramm. μέν), and here, as Susemihl observes, 'μέν praeparat quodammodo quaestione d e ceteris servis, qui non item natura sed lege tantum servi sint, sequente demum in capite instituentam.' It is taken up by μέν τῶνν, 1254 b 39, and then the δέ which introduces c. 6 answers this μέν, and consequently in effect μέν 19 also.

οὗς introduces the reason why these are slaves by nature; they are so because it is better for them to be slaves, unlike some who will be mentioned presently. For this pregnant use of the relative, cp. de Part. An. 1. 1. 641 b 22.

20. ταῦτην τήν ἄρχην, sc. διεσποτικὴν ἄρχην, for τά εἰρημένα seem to be σώμα and θηρίου (mentioned in 16–17). For (Aristotle in effect continues) the natural slave is very near to a brute in capacity, use, and bodily make, though there is a certain difference between them.

γάρ (21) justifies what precedes: the slave has just been mentioned as on a level with the brute, and now facts are adduced which show how nearly they approach each other. The natural slave is a being who can be another's, just as any article of property can, but who differs from brutes in this, that he shares in reason to the extent of apprehending it, though he has it not. The slave seems to resemble in this τό ὀρκετικῶν μέρισι τῆς ἰσχύς (cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1103 a 1 sq.), rather than the body, and we are inclined to ask why the rule exercised over him is not to be a kingly rule, like that of νοών over ὀρέξεις. It is because the slave can apprehend reason that he should be addressed with νουβλήθησις (1. 13. 1260 b 5), and not with commands alone, as Plato suggested.

23. τά ἄλλα ζώα. Usually used where ἄνθρωπος has gone before (as in 1254 b 10), but here apparently in contradistinction to δοῦλος, as in 3. 9. 1280 a 32.

αἰσθανόμενα. For the part, in place of the finite verb, cp. 2. 5. 1263 a 18 and 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 18, though it is possible that here
some verb should be supplied from ὑπηρετεῖ. Cp. also ὅσοι μήτε πλοῦσιοι μήτε ἄξιῶμα ἔχουσιν ἄρτης μηδεν, 3. 11. 1281 b 24, and see Vahlen's note on Psech. 24. 1459 b 7 (p. 243).

24. παθήμασιν. ' Usus Aristotelicus vocis πάθημα ita exponetur, ut appareat inter πάθημα et πάθος non esse certum significationis discriminem, sed eadem fere vi et sensus variatate utrumque nomen, saepius alterum, alterum rarius usurpari' (Bon. Ind. 554 a 56 sqq.). For the expression παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 30, τοῖς βυθοῖς ἀκολαθεῖν, and for the thought 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 3, τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ἤφων μάλιστα μὲν τῇ φύσει ζῆ, μικρὰ δ' ἐνια καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν, ἄνθρωποι δὲ καὶ λόγοι, μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγον.

καὶ ἡ χρεία. The use made of the slave, no less than his capacity. ' The use made of tame animals for food is not taken into account: cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 17, καὶ διὰ τὴν χρήσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφὴν.

παραλλάττει, 'diverges': cp. de Part. An. 2. 9. 655 a 18: de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 a 16: Probl. 11. 58. 905 b 8. For the thought, cp. Σοφία Σμύρης 30. 24, χρησίματα καὶ σφιδίων καὶ φορτίων ἰνν, ἄρτος καὶ παιδεία καὶ ἔργον αὐτήτη: Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 12, ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' αὐτίκα τούτου πινησθεῖσαν: and Aeschyl. Fragm. 188 (Nauck).

25. τὸ σώματι, 'with the body,' is to be taken with βοθεία and not made dependent on τὰναγκαία, as Vict. makes it; cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 33; 1. 11. 1258 b 38.

27. βούλεται μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has implied in what he has just been saying that there is a difference between the souls of the free and the slave, and now he continues—' Nature's wish, indeed, is to make the bodies also of freemen and slaves different, no less than their souls, but' etc. He evidently feels that he may be asked why the bodies of slaves are not more like those of the domestic animals than they are. He hints in ὀρθά 29 that the crouching carriage of slaves marks them off from man, and allies them to the horse or ox. Aristotle attached much importance to the erect attitude of man: cp. de Part. An. 2. 10. 656 a 10, εἶδες γὰρ καὶ τὰ φύσει μόρα κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει τοῦτο μόνον, καὶ τὸ τοῦτο ἄνω πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ἅλον ἔχει ἄνω, μόνον γὰρ ὁρθῶν ἔστι τῶν ἤφων ἀνθρώπων: 4. 10. 686 a 27, ὁρθῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ μόνον τῶν ἤφων διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν εἶναι βιαίαν ἔργον δὲ τοῦ θεοτάτου τὸ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν τοῦτο δὲ οὖ ῥάδιων πυλητὸν τοῦ ἄνωθεν ἐπικεφαλέως σώματος τὸ γὰρ βάρος ἐνακισθέντος πολεῖ τὴν εὐκίνησιν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἰατρίαν. As to the failure of nature to give effect to her purposes, perhaps she was thought by Aristotle to miss her mark more often in respect of the body than the soul: cp. de Gen. An. 4. 10. 778 a 4, βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῖς τοῦτων ἀνθρώπων ἀμφοῖς τῶν γενέσεως καὶ τὰς τελείταις, οὐκ ἄκριβοι δὲ ἐκα τῇ τῆς ἑλισ.
31. If this parenthesis is more than a marginal remark which has crept into the text, it is probably intended to draw out the contrast between πολιτικός βίος and ἄναγκαιος ἐργασίαι: the mere mention of all that is implied in the former will suffice to show the unfitness, physical no less than mental, of the slave for it. For γίνεται διηρημένος (‘comes to be divided’), see Top. 7. 5. 154 b 11, 22: 155 a 9: Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 24, and notes on 1252 b 7, 1264 a 14. The contrast of πολεμικὰί and εἰρημικὰί πράξεις, as constituting the work of the citizen, is familiar enough to us from 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 30 sq., though πολεμικὰί ἀσκήσεις are distinguished from πολιτικὰί in 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 8. Cp. [Plutarch] De Liberiis Educandis c. 13. 9 c, διτένων οὐ τοῖς παῖσιν ἀναπόνητων τῶν συνεχῶν πόνων, εὔθυμοι-μένοις ὅτι τὰς ὅ βιος ἡμῶν εἰς ἀνεσίν καὶ σπουδὴν διήρησαι, καὶ διὰ τούτο οὐ μόνον ἐγρήγοραις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸς εὐφραῖθ, οὐδὲ πόλεμος, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰρήμη.

33. τοὺς μὲν...ψυχάσ. Vict. explains, ‘ut servi scilicet natura corpora habeant liberorum hominum, liberi autem animos servorum.’ But we can hardly supply ‘of slaves’ after τὰς ψυχάς, and besides, if a freeman had the soul of a slave, that would be no illustration of the failure of Nature to give effect to her purpose in respect of the bodies of freemen and slaves, and this alone is in question. Nor would such a freeman be a freeman by nature; yet, as Giphanius says (p. 63), ‘de natura et servis et liberis agimus, non de ipsis qui lege et instituto.’ These two latter objections also apply to the translation of τοὺς μὲν—τοὺς δὲ as ‘some slaves’ and ‘other slaves.’ If a slave had the soul of a freeman, the failure of Nature would be in respect of his soul, not his body, and he would not be a natural slave. Two interpretations seem open to us. 1. We may refer τοὺς μὲν to slaves, like τὰ μὲν 28, and τοὺς δὲ to freemen, like τὰ δὲ 29, and translate, ‘but the very contrary often comes to pass’ (cp. 1. 9. 1257 b 33), ‘that (the body does not match the soul, but that) slaves have the bodies of freemen and freemen the souls.’ Aristotle might have said ‘and freemen the bodies of slaves,’ but what he wishes to draw attention to is the occasional disjunction of a freeman’s body from a freeman’s soul. This resembles the interpretation of Bernays. Or 2. we may adopt the rendering of Sepulveda—‘saepè tamen accidit oppositum, ut alii corpora, alii animos ingenuorum habeant’—that one set of people have the bodies of freemen and another the souls, or, in other words, that bodily excellence is parted from
excellence of soul. I incline on the whole to the former interpretation. It should be noted that Antisthenes had said that souls are shaped in the likeness of the bodies they dwell in (fr. 33. Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 279, ἐπειδὴ Ἀντισθένης ὁμοσχήμων φημι τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς περιέχοντα σώμασιν εἶναι): his remark, however, seems to have referred, primarily at any rate, to the souls of the dead.

34. έπει ... οὐν justifies what precedes by pointing out what would result if the contrary were the case (cp. 1255 a 19: Meteor. 1. 4. 342 a 15—if the γένεσις of lightning-bolts were not ἔκκρισις but ἔκκαυσις, they would ascend instead of descending as they do). So here, to prove that Nature sometimes fails to make the bodies of slaves and freemen different, the argument is that 'if it were not so—if all freemen were far superior in physical aspect to slaves—no one would be found to dispute the justice of slavery.' The argument shows how keenly the Greeks appreciated physical excellence and beauty: here the same thing is said of physical excellence as is said of excellence of body and soul together in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq. and Plato, Polit. 301 D–E. We also note that the Greek statues of gods were evidently in respect of physical beauty much above the Greek average: compare Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. 28. 79, quotus enim quisque formosus est? Athenis cum esset, e gregibus epheborum vix singuli reperiebantur, and see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 4, who also refers to Dio Chrys. Or. 21. 500 R.

35. τοὺς ὑπολειπόμενους, 'inferiores': so Bonitz (Ind. 800 a 35), who traces this signification to the simpler one, 'tardius aliis moveri, remanere in via.'

37. έι δ' έπι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle wins an unexpected argument in favour of his doctrine of slavery from the appeal which he has just made to Greek sentiment. 'But if this holds good of a difference of body'—i.e. if a vast physical superiority confers the right to hold as slaves those who are less well endowed in this respect—'with much more justice may it be laid down in the case of a difference of soul,' on which Aristotle has rested the distinction of master and slave.

38. For the thought, cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 21 sq., and (with Giph.) Plato, Symp. 216 D–217 A: Cic. de Offic. 1. 5. 15. Aristotle hints that as it is not easy to discern superiority of soul, we need not wonder that the right of the natural master should be disputed.

39. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν εἰσὶ φύσει τινές οἱ μὲν ἐλευθεροί οἱ δὲ δουλοί. Cp. c. 6. 1255 b 6, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τισὶ διώμεται τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἐν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεῖν, τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν, a passage which seems to make
in favour of the view according to which οἱ μὲν and οἱ δὲ (1255 a 1) are subdivisions of a class designated by τινές. Οἰς, 1255 a 2, is carelessly made to refer to οἱ δὲ only (cp. βαρβάροις in 1255 b 15).

3 sqq. The following summary will explain the way in which I incline to interpret the much-disputed passage which follows. The view that slavery is contrary to nature is true τρόπον τινά—i.e. if limited to the enslavement of those who are slaves only by convention. For in fact there are such slaves: the law by which captives of war are accounted the slaves of the victors is nothing but a convention. (Aristotle does not necessarily imply that this was the only way in which slaves by convention came into being. They might evidently come into being in other ways—through descent, through debt, through sale by parents and the like. Into these minutiae he does not enter.) This provision (he proceeds) is dealt with by many who concern themselves with the study of laws, just as any peccant public adviser might be dealt with—they impeach it for unconstitutionality; they exclaim against the idea that anyone who may be overpowered by superior force is to be the slave of the person who happens to possess that superior force. Some are against the law, others are for it, and even accomplished men take different sides. (It appears to me that the πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις who are here represented as objecting to slavery based on a mere superiority in might must be distinguished from the authorities mentioned in 1253 b 20 as holding that all slavery is conventional and contrary to nature. The πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις do not seem to have objected to slavery based on a superiority of excellence as distinguished from a mere superiority of might. Hence they probably did not object to the enslavement of barbarians in war by Greeks: we see, indeed, that not all the defenders of the law were prepared to defend its application to Greeks. In c. 2. 1252 b 9 the barbarian and the slave, not the conquered person and the slave, are said to be identified by the poets.) Now what is it that alone makes this conflict of view possible? It is that the two contentions ‘overlap’ in a common principle accepted by both, which affords them a common standing-ground, relates them to each other, and limits their antagonism. They both in fact appeal to the common principle that ‘Force is not without Virtue.’ Thus they differ only on the question what is just in this matter, not as to the relation between Force and Virtue. The one side pleads that, as Force implies Virtue, Force has a right to enslave: the other side pleads that as Virtue goes with Force and Virtue conciliates good-will, good-will will exist between those who are right-
fully masters and slaves. Thus the one side rests just slavery on
good-will between master and slave, and condemns slavery resulting
from war, when good-will is absent, while the other side rests just
slavery simply on the presence of superior Force. (We are not
told that those who held slavery resulting from war to be unjust
in the absence of good-will between the enslaver and the enslaved
also held that good-will must necessarily be absent in all cases of
enslavement through war. Their contention rather was that it was
not safe to make Force of one, unaccompanied by good-will, the
test of just slavery.)

This conflict of opinion is, as has been said, evidently due to the
fact that both parties make an appeal to the common principle that
'Force is not without Virtue,' for suppose that they gave up this
common standing-ground, ceased to shelter their claims under those
of Virtue, and thus came to stand apart in unqualified antagonism,
then the other line of argument (ἀρετοῦ λόγος) on which they must
necessarily fall back—the contention that superiority in virtue
confers no claim to rule—is so wholly devoid of weight and plausi-
ability, that no conflict would arise. (Those who connect the right
to enslave with superior force, and those who connect it with the
existence of mutual good-will between master and slave, are regarded
as having two lines of argument open to them: either they may
derive the claims of force and good-will to be the justifying ground
of slavery from the claims of virtue, and thus shelter themselves
under the latter, or they may impugn the claims of virtue; but if
they impugn them, their own contentions lose all weight and cease
to produce any serious debate.)

We see then that the solid element in this pair of contending
views, if we take them in the form which they assume when they
possess any weight at all, is to be found in the principle that
superiority in virtue confers the right to rule and to rule as a
master rules. We shall arrive at exactly the same result if we
examine another view on the subject.

We have hitherto had to do with those who discuss the law in
question on its merits; but there are those who support slavery
arising through war on the broad ground that it is authorized by a
law and that that which is so authorized is ipso facto just. But a
law, though a justifying ground, is not everything in this matter.
For the war may be an unjust one, and either on this ground or on
grounds personal to himself, the man enslaved through war may
be undeserving of his fate: injustices of this kind the law will not
avail to make just. In fact, these inquirers admit as much them-
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selves, and contradict their own plea. For they say that Greeks are not to be enslaved, but only barbarians, since barbarians are slaves everywhere (πανταχοῦ δοῦλοι) and Greeks nowhere slaves. They make the same distinction in reference to nobility. They say that Greek nobility is nobility everywhere and in an absolute sense, but barbarian nobility is only local. Thus they hold that there are such beings as πανταχοῦ, ἀπλῶς δοῦλοι—πανταχοῦ, ἀπλῶς ὑπερέτου and εἰγενεῖς: Theodectes, in fact, connects the latter quality with descent from the gods. What else then do they do but mark off slave and free by a reference to virtue and its opposite? For descent from the good is, they imply, equivalent to goodness, and so it generally is, though not invariably, since Nature sometimes misses her aim.

3. οἱ τὰναντία φάσκοντες. For φάσκειν used of philosophers or others laying down a dogma, cp. c. 13. 1260 b 6.

6. οὐ γὰρ νόμος κ.τ.λ. As I understand the passage, it is only this particular law that is here said to be an ὁμολογία. The law enacting the slavery of captives taken in war, ὅταν πολεμοῦτοι πόλεως ἄλω, is said to be a νόμος ἀδίος by Xenophon (Cyrop. 7. 5. 73: cp. Thuc. i. 76. 2, quoted by Camerarius). Aristotle does not notice the limits commonly imposed on the exercise of this right in wars between Greek States: see as to this C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 12, who notes that, as a rule, captives taken in war were enslaved only when the cities to which they belonged were razed, and that they were commonly reserved by the State which captured them for exchange or ransom. The reference of law to an ὁμολογία seems to have been a commonplace: see Plato, Rep. 359 A: Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 42 (where it is put in the mouth of Pericles): Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 13 (where Socrates adopts the view). Aristotle himself not only reproduces the popular view in Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 9, but speaks in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 14 of friendships which rest on ὁμολογία (πολιτικαί, φιλετικαί, συμπλεγμαί) as appearing to be of a κοινωνικός type. In Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 10, however, we find an emphatic assertion that those theories of the πόλεως which reduce it to an alliance, and the law to a συνθήκη, are wrong (cp. Rhet. 1. 13. 1373 b 8, where κοινωνία is tacitly distinguished from συνθήκη). This does not prevent particular laws being based on convention, e.g. that which constitutes a medium of exchange (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 29). The object, it may be added, with which the law enacting enslavement through war is here stated to be an ὁμολογία is to justify the assertion ἢτα γὰρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον (convention) δοῦλος καὶ δουλεύων, which immediately precedes. For ἐν δὲ . . . φασιν,
13. philosophers (Meincke, 15$ cp. adv.)
even distinguished rovro rovs those commonly iv
we by to to dikaiov, ékpoloqikhsas yáρ
those úμáś meń ékbalóntas, étó Lakedaimóníων dt kataiκthántas, élaxw to
xaráv: Demoθsth. adv. Androt. c. 70, oúçi prosφγαγε ταιτό dikaiov
to: adv. Conon. c. 27, epístevon to dikaió̃ toútω, and c. 29, kai
toitó to dikaiov éxwv.

(é dialecticians, Grote, Aristotle 2. 366): Rhet. 2. 24. 1401 b 32, ōv
430, aútō τ' éisìn ε̄v moústais aēi. We see from Plato, Gorgias 484
C–D, with how much favour those who studied the laws were
commonly regarded, and how much was thought to be lost by
persons who continued to study philosophy after they had attained
a certain age, and were thus led to neglect the study of the laws.

ωσπερ ῥήτορα. Cp. Antiphanes, Σαπφω Fragm. 1 (Meineke, Fr.
Com. Gr. 3. 112)—

πώς γάρ γίνουν 'άν, ō pατέρ, ῥήτωρ * *
δόφωνος, ἢν μή ἄλφ τρίς παρανύμων;

10. κατά δύναμιν κρείττονος. Contrast to βεβλιον κατ' ἄρετήν, 21.
Katá dúnāmiv is added because kréttov is sometimes (e. g. in c. 5.
1254 b 14) used in the sense of better. It is, on the other hand,
distinguished from βεβλιον in 3. 13. 1283 a 41.

11. καὶ τῶν σοφῶν. As Sus. points out (Qu. Crit. p. 344), not all of
those included under the designation oί ε̄v tois nó̄mows (8) would deserve
to be called soφoi. Soφoi are constantly contrasted with oί πολλοί
by Aristotle: philosophers are not perhaps exclusively referred to
here, but rather 'accomplished men' generally; even poets would
be soφoi, and it is just possible that there is a reference to Pindar
(see note on 1255 a 18). It is still more likely that Aristotle
remembers the saying of Heraclitus (Fragm. 44, ed. Bywater)—
πίλεμοι πάντων μέν πατήρ ἐστὶ πάντων δὲ βασιλεὺς, καὶ τοὺς μέν θεοὺς
ἐδείξε τούς δὲ ἀνθρώποις, τοὺς μέν δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους.
So we learn (Plato, Laws 776 C), that there were those who pro-
nounced the Helot slavery of the Lacedaemonian State (ἡ Lakedai-
móniων εἰλοτεία), which confessedly originated in conquest, to be ε̄v
γεγονόν.

13. ἐπαλλάττειν. The following are some of the more promi-
inent uses of this word in the writings of Aristotle. It is used by
him (1) of things adjusted to each other, fitting into each other,
dove-tailing—e. g. of teeth that fill each other’s intervals, de Part. An. 3. 1. 661 b 21, ἐπαλλάττειν (οἱ ὄδοντες), ὃποι ἦν ἄμφιλουντα τριζόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, or of two bodies adjusted to one another, de Gen. An. 1. 14. 720 b 10: (2) of two things joined so as to be one, e.g. of hybrid constitutions, Pol. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 2, where ἐπαλλάττειν is used in connexion with συναγωγαί, συνδεισθαι (so in Plato, Soph. 240 C, ἐπαλλαξιοί seems used in a similar sense to συμπλοκή): (3) of two or more things united not by joining, but by the possession of a common feature or a common standing-ground, and yet different—things which overlap, or shade off into each other, or are σύνεγγυς to each other. So of a thing which unites attributes of two genera, and in which accordingly these two genera overlap—e. g. the pig, which is both πολυτόκων and yet τελειοτοκῶν (de Gen. An. 4. 6. 774 b 17, μόνον δὲ πολυτόκον ὃν ἦς τελειοτοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπαλλάττει τοῦτο μόνον)—or of a thing which possesses many of the attributes of a genus to which it does not belong, as the seal does of fishes (Hist. An. 2. 1. 501 a 21, ἢ δὲ φώκη κυρχαρίδουν ἐκτί πάσα τοῖς ὦδοισιν ὅς ἐπαλλάττουσα τῷ γένει τῶν ἤχουν). So here the arguments of those who plead that good-will is a test of just rule and of those who plead that Force by itself without the presence of good-will confers the right to rule are said ἐπαλλάττειν—i. e. to overlap each other (Mr. Heitland, Notes p. 11) and to approach each other—because both start from a common principle though they draw contrary deductions from it. The antithesis to ἐπαλλάττειν comes in διαστάσων χωρίς τοῦτων τῶν λόγων 19, where the λόγοι are supposed to draw apart, and no longer to overlap or occupy common ground: cf. κεχώριστα in Περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος, 1. 464 b 27, ἢ κεχώριστα καὶ τὸ βραχύβιον καὶ τὸ νοσώδες, ἢ κατ’ ἐνίας μὲν νύσσων ἐπαλλάττεται τὰ νοσώδη τὴν φύσιν σώματα τῶν βραχυβίων, κατ’ ἐνίας δὲ οἶδεν καλύτερα νοσώδεις εἶναι μακροβίοις δύτες. With the use of ἐπαλλάττειν in the passage before us compare its use in Pol. 1. 9. 1257 b 35, where differing uses of the same thing are said ἐπαλλάττειν, or to be σύνεγγυς, because they differ only in not being κατὰ ταύτων, and are otherwise identical and of the same thing.

τρόπον τινὰ is used in opposition to κυρίος in de Gen. et Corr. 1. 4. 320 a 2 sqq. (Bon. Ind. 772 b 22) and to ἄπλος in Metaph. Θ. 6. 1048 a 29. Is the meaning this, that it is the tendency of Virtue to win willing compliance (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 10), but that incidentally, when provided with the requisite external means, it has the power of using force with surpassing effect? Cf. Plato, Polit. 294 A, τρόπον μέντοι των δῆλων ὧτε τῆς βασιλικῆς ἔστιν ἡ νομοθετική· τὸ δ’ ἁρματον
1. 6. 1255 a 14—16.

οἱ τοὺς νόμους ἑστὶν ἴσχυες, ἀλλ` ἄνθρα τῶν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικόν, and Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 23, διό καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πῶς ἐσται. Whatever may be the exact meaning of τρόπον ταῦτα here, it seems, like our phrase 'in a way,' to soften and limit the assertion made, as in de An. 3. 5. 430 a 16, τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεὶ τὰ διώμεν ὅστα χρώματα ἑνεργεία χρώματα. For the thought conveyed in this sentence, cp. Solon, Fragm. 36 (Bergk)—

ταύτα μὲν κρίτει,

ὁμοὶ βίου τε καὶ δικήν συναρμόσας,

ἔριξα:

Aeschyl. Fragm. 372 (Nauck)—

ὅπου γὰρ ἴσχις συνιγοῦσε καὶ δίκη,

ποία ἐπιφορὰ τῶν καιρεοτέρα; Aristot. Rhet. 2. 5. 1382 a 35, καὶ ἄρετή ὑβρίσκειν δύναμιν ἔχουσα (is to be dreaded): δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι προαιρεῖται μὲν, ὅταν ὑδρίζεται, οὐ, διόνυσοι δὲ νῦν: Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 32: Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 17, μᾶλλον δὲ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἐγχειροῦσαν οἱ τὴν φύσιν μὲν βρα-

σιες, τιμὴν δὲ ἔχουσε πολεμικὴν παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις: ἄνδρα γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα θράσος ἐστιν, δὲ ἂν ἀμφιστέρας, ἄσι βαρύων κρατήσουσε, ποιούσι τάς ἐπιθέσεις. Perhaps also Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 21, ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὧν ἀπὸ τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ should be compared. Giph. (p. 68) compares Plutarch, Dion c. 1, δεὶ φρονήσει καὶ ἐκκαστούν δύναμιν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τύχην συνελθεῖν, ἢν κάλλος ἡμμα καὶ μεγέθος αἱ πολιτικαὶ πραξεῖς λάβωσιν.

14. καὶ βιαξεῖσθαι, 'to compel by force as well as to conciliate': cp. Isocr. Philip, § 15, καὶ πλατοῦν καὶ δέναμα κεκτήμην ώσπερ οὐδές τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ταῦτα τῶν ὑπών καὶ πείθειν καὶ βιαξεῖσθαι πέφυκεν—a passage which exhibits the contrast of πείθειν and βιαξεῖσθαι, and one which Aristotle may possibly intend here tacitly, as is his wont, to correct.

15. ἄγαθον τινὸς. Cp. 1. 1. 1252 a 2, and 3. 9. 1280 a 9, where δικαίων τι is contrasted with τὸ πυρὸς δίκαιον. As the ἄγαθῶν τι which Force implies may be quite other than ἄρετή (cp. Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 4 sq., where τὰ χρησιμωτάτα τῶν ἄγαθῶν, such as physical strength, health, etc., are contrasted with ἄρετή), the inference that Force is not without Virtue is incorrect. This appears also from Pol. 3. 10. 1281 a 21—28, where Force is conceived separate from Virtue: cp. 3. 12. 1282 b 23 sqq. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20—31, again, throws light on the passage before us: men claim respect from others on the strength of any good, καὶ ἄλληθεν δ` ὁ ἄγαθος μίνος τιμητός.

16. μὴ ἄνευ ἄρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βιαν. It will be observed that the inference drawn is that Force is not without Virtue, which does not
necessarily imply that the possessor of superior force is superior in virtue.

Δαλα περι του δικαιου κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 b 27, έτι δε ουδε περι του γενεσθαι η μη αρμασβηται, Δαλα περι του δικαιου, and 31, ομολογοντες περι των πραγματος, περι του ποτερω δικαιον αρμ- ρασβητουσιν: also Pol. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 26, οσα ομολογειται μεν, αρμασβηται δε περι του δικαιου. Here it is conceded on both sides that 'force is not without virtue,' and the only subject of dispute is, whether it is just for force to enslave not only the willing but also the unwilling.

17. δα γαρ τουτο κ.τ.λ. Δα γαρ τουτο appears to refer to δε 13—βιαν 16, and especially to ουστε δοκειν μη ανει αρετης ειναι την βιαν. One side argues from this, that, force being accompanied by virtue, and virtue attracting good-will, slavery is just only where there is good-will between master and slave, and that consequently the indiscriminate enslavement of those conquered in war is unjust; the other side argues that as force implies virtue, wherever there is the force to enslave, there is the right to enslave. For the power which virtue has of attracting good-will, cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 5. 1167 a 18, ολως δν' η ειναι δι' αρετην και επιεκειαν τυα γινεται, οταν τω φανει καλος τω η αν- δρειος η του τουτον, καθαπερ και οπι των αγωνιστων οι κορυφαν: Eth. End. 7. 1. 1234 b 22, τη σε γαρ πολιτικης εργον ειναι δοκει μαλλοτα ποιειναι φιλων, και την αρετην δει τουτο φασιν ειναι χρησιμον ου γαρ ενδεχεσθαι φιλους εαυτοις ειναι τους δικουμενους ηπ' αλληλων: Xen. Mem. 3. 3. 9, εν παντι πραγματι οι άνθρωποι τουτοι μαλλοτα εθελουν πειθεσθαι, ου εν ηγονται βελ- τιστοις ειναι. Those who argued against slavery unaccompanied by good-will between master and slave were probably among those who glorified rule over willing subjects, in contradistinction to rule over unwilling subjects. We trace the idea in Gorgias' praise of rhetoric as the best of all arts—παντα γαρ υφ' αυτη δουλα δε' εκωνων άλλ' ου δα βιας ποιοτο (Plato, Phileb. 58 A–B). The doctrine was perhaps originally Pythagorean: cp. Aristox. Fragm. 18 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), περι δε αρχωντων και αρχομενων ουτω εφρονων τους μεν γαρ άρχοντας έφασκουν ου μονων επιστημων, Δαλα και φιλανθρω- πους δει ειναι, και τους αρχομενους ου μονον πειθηνιους, Δαλα και φιλαρ- χοντας, and Cic. de Legibus 3. 2. 5, nec vero solum ut obtem- perent oboedienti que magistratibus, sed etiam ut eos colant dili- gantque praecribimus, ut Charondas in suis facit legibus (which shows that what passed for the laws of Charondas in Cicero's day or in that of the authority he here follows had a Pythagorean tinge). Compare also an oracle quoted by Porphyry, de Abstinentia 2. 9 (Bernays, Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 59):—
Plutarch, yup cp. 8. 1. and EiricKoTTf, cp. as Xenophon and in One /WT* npus f^fiv seem, the slave but ruler ccppata, master of tary, has Mr. (p. veda, escaped TO T)VToirat, to stronger Plato 484 and 1278 implied 18. tvvoia tvavriovs, their existence TV 12 kings, their consent to ruled) in accordance with nature, but is reproved for this by Plato (Laws 690 C). A confusion or identification of the stronger and the better, as Socrates remarks (Gorg. 488 B-D), pervades...
the address of Callicles in that dialogue (see esp. Gorg. 483 D). It is, in Aristotle’s view, from a confusion of this very kind that the doctrines of the advocates of Force derive whatever plausibility they possess. Athens had already, according to Isocrates, learnt that Might is not Right: cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 69, óti mén oiv ou dikaión ésti toûs kreiéitous tónn hētiónw árchewn, én ékeínav te teis chrónous tughánomev énwoctes, kai vín épi tis politeías tís par’ hwm kathésthenkías.

19. ἐπεῖ . . . γε, as in 1254 b 34 (see note), confirms what has been said by introducing a supposition of the contrary: here it confirms diá toúto: ‘it is owing to the fact that the disputants start from a common principle—the principle that Force is conjoined with Virtue—that a contention between them is possible; for suppose Force and Good-will claimed respectively to be the basis of just slavery, without resting their claims on Virtue, no conflict of opinion would arise; the two claimants would neither of them have a case.’ ἄτεροι λόγοι, 20, I take to be the line of argument which the two contending parties would have to adopt, if they ceased to shelter their claims under the claims of virtue, and argued in effect that not superiority in virtue, but something else (force or good-will) confers the right to rule. If these words meant ‘the one of the two views,’ one would rather expect ἄτεροι λόγοι.

διαστάτων . . . χωρίς τούτων τών λόγων, ‘severed from the ground which they occupy in common and set opposite the one to the other’ (for χωρίς seems to mean ‘apart from each other,’ not ‘apart from other arguments’), or, in other words, no longer ‘overlapping’ (ἐπαλλαττόνων): cp. περὶ μακροβιότητος, 1. 464 b 27, where κεκιρωσται is used in opposition to ἐπαλλάττει, and Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 15, where διαστώσει is opposed to συνδιαίσθαι, a word used to explain ἐπαλλάττειν in Pol. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 1.

21. ὅλως seems to qualify δικαίων in contrast to δικαίων τινῶν: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 21, ἐπείτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τῶν ἐκατέρως δικαίων τι νομίζουσι δικαίων λέγειν ἀπλῶς’ οἱ μὲν γὰρ, ἐν κατὰ τι ἀναστὰ ὅσιν, οἰον χρῆμασιν, ὅλως οἴονται ἀναστὰ ἐνα, and 3. 9. 1280 a 9, where δικαίων τι is contrasted with τὸ κυρίως δικαίων. Resting on a ground of right (for such the law in question is: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 12, and Findar, Fragram. 146 (Bergk), quoted by Plato, Gorg. 484 B, Laws 714 E), not on τὸ ὅλως δικαίων, they argue that slavery in war is universally just, but they contradict themselves in the same breath. ὅλως seems to be placed where it is for the sake of emphasis: for the distance at which it stands from δικαίων, cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 15, where τῶν πῶν is similarly severed from πάσαν, if we adopt the reading of Π, and see below on 1265 b 15.
26. τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους. *Εὐγενεία was commonly viewed as akin to ἀληθεία and a kind of superlative degree of it (3. 13. 1283 a 33 sqq.). Hence the transition here and in 32 from the one to the other.

28. αὐτοῖς. i.e. Greeks. It is the way with people to do to others what they would not think of allowing to be done to themselves (7. 2. 1324 b 32 sqq.).

32. τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπων κ.τ.λ. It is interesting to learn from Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 a 10 sqq., that the sophist Lycophron had challenged the reality of the distinction between the noble and the ill-born, for the ideas of freedom and nobility lay so close together in the Greek mind, that he or some other sophist may well have gone on to challenge the justifiability of slavery.

34. τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οίκοι μόνον. Cp. Theophrast. Charact. 31 (Tauchnitz). ἣ μείται μήτηρ εὐγενῆς Ὀράττα ἐστι: τὰς δὲ τουαίτας φασίν ἐν τῇ πατρίδαι εὐγενεῖς εἶναι, and contrast the saying which Menander puts in the mouth of one of his characters (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 4: Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 229):—

δέ ἰν αὖ γεγονὼς ἄ τῇ φύσει πρῶς τῷ γαβά, καί Ἀλκισύφ ἵ, μήτερ, ἐστίν εὐγενῆς.

Σκύθης τίς ἔλθησ; ὁ δ’ Ἀνάχαρις οὐ Σκύθης;

See also Dio Chrysost. Or. 15. 451 R. Isocrates, on the other hand, bluntly refers to the δυσγένεια of the Triballi (De Pace, § 50). The contrast between τὸ ἀπλῶς εὐγενεῖς and τὸ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις which the view mentioned by Aristotle implies reminds us of the contrast between natural society and society among the barbarians, which is implied in 1. 2. 1252 a 34—b 6. In 3. 13. 1283 a 35, however, we have ἥ δ’ εὐγενεία παρ’ ἑκάστοις οἴκοι τίμιος, where no difference is made between barbarians and Greeks.

36. καὶ is commonly used when an example is adduced: cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 8, ἰδίπερ καὶ Ἄμασις.

39. ὁμετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ. A remark of the great Eratosthenes is referred to by Strabo (p. 66) thus: ἐπὶ τέλει δὲ τοῦ ὑπομήνυτος (ὁ Ἐρατοσθένης) ἀλκ ἐπαινεῖσα τοὺς δίχα διαιροῦντας ἅπαν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλῆθος εἰς τε Ἑλλήνως καὶ βαρβάρους, καὶ τοὺς Ἀλεξίνδρον παραμοῦντας τοὺς μὲν Ἑλλήνην ὡς φίλους χρησιμοῖ, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις ὡς πολεμίους, βλατοῖν ἐναὶ φησιν ὁμετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διαιρεῖν ταύτα. This may possibly be a comment on some communication of Aristotle's to Alexander (cp. Plutarch, de Fort. Alexandri 1. 6); but Isocrates had said much the same thing in his address to Philip (§ 154: cp. Panath. § 163). Plato had already (Polit. 262 D) found fault with the division of mankind into Greeks and barbarians, and the passage of the Politics
before us shows that Aristotle is really quite at one with Erato-
stenes. The fragment of Menander quoted above is in the same
Gr. 4. 128),

"Εξηον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ καλὸν εὐγενέστατον,
tουλεύθερον δὲ πανταχοῦ φρονεῖν μέγα.

1255 b. 2. ἡ δὲ φύσις κ.τ.λ. Πολλάκις appears to qualify βούλευται, οὗ μέντοι
dένυται, which words hang together and mean 'wishes without
succeeding.' See Dittenberger, Gött. Gel. Anz. Oct. 28, 1874,
p. 1371. We find πολλάκις, however, out of its place in 5 (8). 2.
1337 b 20, if we adopt the reading of Π', which is probably the
correct one, and it may possibly be simply out of its place here.
For the thought, cp. de Gen. An. 4. 4. 770 b 3 sqq. : 4. 3.
767 b 5 sqq.: Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 22–31: Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 28
sqq.: 2. 3. 1262 a 21 sqq.: 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 28–30: also Eurip.
Fragm. 76, 160, 167 (Nauck), and Plato, Rep. 415 Α, ἀτε οὖν
ἐγγενεῖς ὄντες πάντες τὸ μὲν πολὺ ὁμοῖος οὐ ψήν αὐτοῖς γενότε.


5. καὶ οὖκ εἶσιν κ.τ.λ. These words have been interpreted in
many different ways. Bern. (followed by Sus. and others) takes
the meaning to be that 'not all actual slaves and freemen are so
by nature': Mr. Congreve translates— it is true that some are not
by nature slaves, others by nature free, if you interpret aright the
same and the others (οἱ μὲν, οἱ δὲ). But does not οἱ μὲν mean 'οἱ
ήστους, as such' (τὸ βιασθὲν, 1255 a 11: cp. 1255 b 15, τῶν κατὰ
νόμον καὶ βιασθέναι), and οἱ δὲ 'οἱ κρείττονος, as such' (cp. τοῦ
βιασάσθαι δυναμένου καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν κρείττονος, 1255 a 9)—unless indeed we
prefer to explain οἱ μὲν as meaning 'those who are enslaved by
force without deserving it,' and οἱ δὲ 'those who enslave others
without possessing the superiority of virtue which makes the
natural master'?

6. τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ, neut. (as appears from τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ, 7–8).

9. τὸ δὲ κακῶς, sc. δεσποτίζειν: 'but a wrongful exercise of this
form of rule is disadvantageous to both,' and then follows (τὸ γὰρ
ἀυτὸ κ.τ.λ.) the reason why both suffer together from a wrongful
exercise of it. This is that master and slave stand to each other
as whole and part.

11. μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 10 sq.

12. διὸ καὶ συμφέρον κ.τ.λ. 'There is something advantageous
both to common,' there is a community of interest': cp. 1. 2.
1252 a 34, διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλο ταύτο συμφέρει, and Isocr. Epist.
6. 3, μὴ κοινοῦ δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὄντος, οὗκ αὖ ὡς ἀν ἀμφισβήτησ
áticaς δηνηθεῖν. The test of τὸ κοινὴ συμβέμεν (.widget circuit, 3. 12. 1282 b 17), which is here applied to slavery, is the proper test to apply to any political institution, for τὸ κοινὴ συμβέμεν is a condition of πολιτική φίλα (Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2 sqq.), and the end of the political union (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11). Cp. Plato, Rep. 412 D, καὶ μὴ τοῦτο γ' ἂν μάλιστα φιλαι, ὃ ξυμβέμεν ηρεῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ὅταν μάλιστα ἐκείνου μὲν εὐ πράττεντο ὄντα εὐμβαίνεν καὶ ἑαυτῷ εὐ πράττεν, μὴ δὲ, τοιναντίων. Plato is perhaps thinking of political rule of a despotic kind, rather than of the private relation of master and slave, when he says (Laws 756 E), δοῦλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ διεστάται αὐξ ἂν ποτε γένουστο φίλαι. Aristotle himself, however, finds some difficulty in explaining in Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32 sqq., how friendship is possible between an animate instrument like the slave and his master, there being no κοινωνία between them (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.), but here, in the First Book of the Politics, no notice is taken of this difficulty: on the contrary, in Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 39 the slave is termed κοινωνίας ἔφη (where perhaps ἔφη and βίος should be distinguished). Compare with the passage before us Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 13, τοῖς πιστοῖς τίθεναι δι' ἐκαστῷ εαυτῷ; ἢ δὲ κτῆσις αὐτῶν ἔστων οὐδημῶς σὲν τῇ βία, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον σὲν τῇ εἰργασίᾳ.

14. τούτων. i.e. διεστοσεία καὶ δοιλείος. Busse (De praesidii Aristotelis Poltica emendandi, p. 42) compares such phrases as ἄξιοστιθὰ τῶν ὁμών, τῶν ἰσων (2. 9. 1269 b 9, etc.).

15. βισσείοις. Aristotle has by this time forgotten that his dative plural agrees with δοῦλο καὶ διεστότης, and that βισσείοις, which suits only with δοῦλος, should have been replaced by a word which would have applied to διεστότη also.

16. καὶ ἐκ τῶν τούτων. The fact had been already proved (cp. 1252 a C. 7. 17) by tracing the development of κοινωνία; it had already been shown that διεστοσεία and πολιτικὴ ἀρχὴ belong to different κοινωνίαι; now it is shown that both the ruled and the mode of rule differ in the two cases.

17. ἂλληλας, sc. τατῶν. With his usual economy of words, Aristotle makes τατῶν do here, though it fits in somewhat roughly.

19. ἂ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ, sc. ἀρχῆ. The household seems to be here viewed as under a μοναρχία (the three forms of which are βασιλεία, τυραννία, αἰσιμηρτεία, 3. 14. 1285 a 17, 30: 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 18), because, though the rule of the husband over the wife is a πολιτική ἀρχή (1. 12. 1259 b 1), the rule of the father over the child is a βασιλική ἀρχή (ibid.), and that of the master over the slave is

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δεσποτικῆς. Perhaps, however (cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 37 sq., where ὀικονομική ἀρχή is distinguished from δεσποτεία), the relation of master and slave may not be included under ὀικονομικὴ ἀρχή. In that case ὀικονομικὴ ἀρχὴ will be a rule over free persons, but not over free and equal persons, like πολιτικὴ ἀρχὴ. It must be remembered that the equals over whom πολιτικὴ ἀρχὴ is said to be exercised are not necessarily ἵσοι κατ᾿ ἀμβηθῶν, for they may be only ἵσοι κατ᾿ ἀναλογίαν (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 27).

20. ὥ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Φανερὸν δὲ, 16 . . . ἀρχῆ, 20, is parenthetical, and μὲν οὖν introduces a reaffirmation of what had been already implied in the definition of master and slave (1255 b 6 sqq.)—that a master is a master by virtue of his nature—in order that a transition may be made to δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη and δουλικὴ ἐπιστήμη, and that these sciences, and especially the former, which Plato and Xenophon and Socrates had set on the level of βασιλικῆς, πολιτικῆς, and ὀικονομικῆς, may be replaced on the humble level which is really theirs. Xenophon had said (Oecon. c. 13. 5), ὅστις γὰρ τοι ἀρχικῶν ἀνθρώπων δύναται ποιεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι οὗτος καὶ δεσποτικῶς ἀνθρώπων δύναται διδάσκειν: ὅστις δὲ δεσποτικῶς, δύναται ποιεῖν καὶ βασιλικῶς, and again (Oecon. c. 21. 10), ὅν ἢν ἴδιας [οἱ ἐργάται] κυνηγοῦσι, καὶ μὲνος ἐκάστορ ἐμπέσει τῶν ἐργατῶν καὶ φιλοσοφικὰ πρὸς ἄλλην καὶ φιλοσοφικὰ κρατήσῃ οὔτα ἐκάστορ, τούτον ἐγὼ φαίνω ἂν ἐχειν τι ἠθέους βασιλικοῦ. This is just what Aristotle wishes to contest here and elsewhere in the First Book of the Politics. His way is to trace everywhere in Nature the contrast of the conditionally necessary (τὸ εἷς ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον) and the noble (τὸ καλὸν), and he makes it his business to distinguish carefully between the two. His work on the Parts of Animals is largely taken up with the inquiry, 'what share Necessity and the Final Cause respectively have in their formation' (see Dr. Ogle's translation, p. xxxv). To mix up the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη with πολιτικῆς or βασιλικῆς is to lose sight of this contrast. The management of slaves has for him nothing of τὸ καλὸν (4 (7). 3. 1325 a 25, οὐδεν γὰρ τὸ γε δουλῷ, ἐν δουλῷ, χρήσθω σεμνῶν· ἤ γὰρ ἐπίταξιν ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαῖων ὀφεινὸν μετέχει τῶν καλῶν). Α(credentials) δοῦν τὸ τούσδε εἶναι, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 13. 1127 b 15, κατὰ τὴν ἐξὼν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τούσδε εἶναι ἄλλων ἐστὶν, and 6. 13. 1143 b 24–28. Aristotle's object is to correct Plato, who had said (Polit. 259 B), ταύτην δὲ (sc. τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐπιστήμην) ὁ κεκτημένος οὐκ, ἢν τε ἁρχὸν ἢν τε Ἰδιότης ἢν τυχαῖαν, πάντως κατὰ γε τὴν τέχνην αὐτὴν βασιλικὸν ἁρμὸν προσφημῆται; Δικαιον γοῦν. Καὶ μὴν ὀικονόμοι γε καὶ δεσποτὴς ταύτων. The possession of the science of directing slaves in their work is not of the essence of the master (cp. c. 13. 1260 b 3 sq.), and
therefore he is not defined by it. The master may dispense with such knowledge by employing a steward (35).

25. τοὺς παιδὰς, ‘the slaves.’ Camerarius (Interp. p. 45) aptly refers to the Δούλωνδιάσκαλος of the comic poet Phercerates. ‘Ex ea fabulæ parte, in qua ministrandi præcepta servo dabantur, petita suspicor quae leguntur apud Athenæum, xi. p. 408 b—

μνη δ’ ἀποιζων τὸν κυλικα δὸς ἐμπιν

ἐγχε τ’ ἐπιθείς τὸν ἡμῶν,

cnt xv. p. 699 l—

ἀνυσίων τοὶ’ ἐξελθὼν, σκότως γὰρ γίγνεται,

καὶ τὸν λυχνιέχον ἵκθερ’ ἐνθεῖς τὸν λέχνον’


εἰτ δ’ ἄν κ.τ.λ. We rather expect ὁφοσιωκὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων γενὸς τῆς διακοινίας, but this slight looseness is characteristic. Perhaps with ὁφοσιωκὴ we should supply ‘might be taught.’ The example introduced by ὅνων is sometimes put in the nom.—e.g. in 7 (5). 11. 1313 b 12, ἄλλ’ εἶναι κατασκόπους, ὅνων περὶ Συμακώσας αἱ ποταγωγίδες καλοῦμενα. It would seem that the teacher at Syracuse confined his instructions to a portion only of the services needful to the household; Aristotle suggests that other and higher kinds of service should also be taught, such as cooking. For εἰτ πλείον, see Ast, Lexicon Platon. 3. 113: ‘cum v. εἶναι et δύνασθαι est plus valere vel latius patere’—the latter here. Socrates had recognized a right and a wrong in ὁφοσιωκὴ (Xen. Mem. 3. 14. 5), but Plato counts ὁφοσιωκὸς καὶ μάγειρα among the accompaniments of a φλεγμαϊνουσα πόλις (Rep. 373 C): Aristotle’s not unfriendly reference to the art in the passage before us illustrates his substitution (4 (7). 5. 1326 b 31: 2. 6. 1205 a 31 sqq.) of σωφρίνος καὶ ἐλευθερίως as the ideal standard of living for the Platonic σωφρίνος. He was himself charged by Timaeus the historian and others with being an epicure (see Polyb. 12. 24. 2, where Timaeus is quoted as saying that writers disclose by the matters on which they dwell frequently, what their favourite inclinations are—τῶν δ’ Ἀρατοτοδήπερ, ὑφαστάσεα πλεονίκες ἐν τοῖς συνγεγραμματίσιν, ὁφοφαγὸν ἐἶπαι καὶ λέχνον: see also Grote’s note, Aristotle 1. 24). Rational ways of living needed to be upheld against the savagery of the Cynics and the asceticism of some other schools. Besides, if the household slave could be taught to cook better, there would be all the less need to have recourse, in accordance with a common Greek practice, to the services of outside professionals. ‘With the Macedonian times came in the fashion, continued by the Romans, of having cooks among the slaves of their
household, a custom apparently unknown to the earlier Athenians. . . The reader will here again notice the curious analogy to the history of medicine, for among the late Greeks, and among the Romans, the household physician was always a slave attached to the family’ (Mahaffy, Social Life in Greece, p. 287, ed. i).

27. γάρ introduces the reason why instruction on these subjects should be extended, as Aristotle suggests.

29. πρό, according to Suidas (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 17) properly meant ἀντί in this proverb, but Aristotle quotes it in a different sense. Another proverb may be compared (Strabo 8. p. 339):

ἐστι Πύλος πρὸ Πύλου· Πύλος γε μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλος,

or in a slightly varied form (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroemiogr. Gr. 2. 423):

ἐστι τόκως πρὸ τόκου· τόκος γε μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλος.

32. τοὺς δούλους, yet in 33 δούλους: see below on 1259 b 21.

33. οὐδέν μέγα οὐδὲ σεμνόν. Cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 25 sqq.: 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq.: and contrast the tone of the Oeconomics of Xenophon, who, as we have already seen (above on 1253 b 20), finds in the direction of farm-work, and the winning of cheerful and vigorous service from slaves, a good school of political and even kingly rule (cc. 13, 21).

36. ἐπιτρόπος. For the absence of the article, see Bon. Ind. 109 b 36, and cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1007 a 8, ἀπορον δὲ καὶ τι ὕφελη-

θήσεται ὑφάντης ἥ τέκτων κ.τ.λ. Vict. compares Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 b 12 sqq., where φρόνησις is described as ἐπιτρόπος τις τής σο-

φίας, for the ἐπιτρόπος, though managing everything, οὐπο ἀρχεί πάντων, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζῃ τῷ δεσπότῃ αὐχολὴν, ὅπως ἀν ἐκεῖνος μὴ καλυφόμενος ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκκελείται τοῦ τῶν καλῶν τι καὶ προσηκῶστων πράττειν: cp. also the story of Pheraulas and Sacas (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 3. 39-50). The ἐπιτρόπος would be himself a slave ([Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 a 25 sq.), though one would think that it would not be easy to find a φύσει δούλος fit for the position. Contrast the tone of this passage with that of Oecon. 1. 6. 1345 a 5, ἐπισκεπτέον οὖν τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν (τῶν δεσπότην), τὰ δὲ τὴν γνώσα, ὅσο ἐκατέρως διαιρεῖται τὰ ἑργα τῆς οἰκονομίας· καὶ τούτῳ ποιητέον ἐν μικρᾷ οἰκονομίᾳ ὁλιγάκις, ἐν δὲ ἐπιτροποεμέναις πολλάκις κ.τ.λ. This is more in Xenophon's tone. For a similar contrast between the teaching of this book of the Polities and the so-called First Book of the Oeconomics, see note on 1256 a 11.

37. ἡ δὲ κτητικῇ, sc. δούλων, takes up ἐν τῷ κτάσθαι, 32. ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, i.e. δεσποτικῇ and δουλικῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.
38. οἶον here, as Bonitz points out (Ind. 502 a 7 sqq.), is explanatory (\(\equiv\) \nempe, nimirum, scilicet\), as in 3. 13. 1283 b 1 and other passages, rather than illustrative by instance or comparison.

ή δικαία. Cp. 1. 8, 1256 b 23 sq. and Isocr. Panath. § 163: also 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 38–1334 a 2. The just and natural way of acquiring slaves is by raids of a hunting or campaigning type on φυσιν δούλον. Πολεμική τις οὖσα ἡ θερετικὴ is added in explanation of ἑτέρα ἀμφιστέρων τοιτών, and to show that this science is neither identical with δουλική nor with διεποιητική ἐπίστημη. Being allied to war and the chase, it is more worthy of a freeman than the other two.

1. χρηματιστικὴς. This word is of frequent occurrence in cc. 8–10, and also in c. 11, and the sense in which it is used varies greatly. Taking cc. 8–10 first, we shall find that, apart from passages in which the word is used in an indeterminate sense (such as 1256 a 11, 1257 b 5, 9, 18), it is used

(1) like κτητική (1256 b 27, 40), in a sense inclusive of both the sound and the unsound form (1257 a 17, b 2, 36, 1258 a 6, 37):

(2) of the unsound form (1257 a 29, 1258 a 8), which is also designated ἡ μάλιστα χρηματιστικὴ (1256 b 40 sq.), ἡ κατηκλή χρηματιστική (1257 b 20), ἡ μη ἀναγκαία χρηματιστική (1258 a 14), ἡ μεταβλητικὴ χρηματιστική (1258 b 1):

(3) of the sound form (1258 a 20, 28), which is also designated χρηματιστικὴ κατὰ φύσιν (1257 b 19), οἰκονομική χρηματιστική (1257 b 20), ἡ ἀναγκαία χρηματιστικὴ (1258 a 16).

In c. 11, on the other hand, ἡ χρηματιστικὴ is made to include not two forms, but three (1258 b 12 sqq.), and these three forms are—A. ἡ οἰκειοτάτη χρηματιστική (1258 b 20), referred to as ἡ κατὰ φύσιν in 1258 b 28: B. ἡ μεταβλητικὴ χρηματιστική (1258 b 21): C. a kind midway between the two (1258 b 27 sq.). In τοῖς τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν (c. 11. 1259 a 5) the word seems to be used in an unfavourable sense.

2. κατά τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον. Cp. c. 1, 1252 a 17, τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. Either the transition from the slave (the part) to κτητικής (the whole) is here said to be in conformity with Aristotle’s accustomed mode of inquiry, or the plan is foreshadowed by which the nature of κτητικής and χρηματιστική is ascertained through an analysis of them into their parts (cp. 1256 b 16, ἢ δὲ κτητικῆς πολλὰ περιείληψε μέρη καὶ ὅ πλοιτος), or again the meaning may be that Aristotle will continue to follow τὰ πράγματα φυσικά, as he in fact does in the sequel. Probably the first of these interpretations is the correct one.
NOTES.


10. χαλκός. Some MSS. have χαλκός (for the nom. in sentences introduced by αὐτόν, see above on 1255 b 25).

11. τῆς μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Contrast Οἰκον. 1. 1. 1343 a 8, ὡστε δὴλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς οἰκονομίας ἂν εἴη καὶ κτῆσισθαι οἰκών καὶ χρήσισθαι αὐτῷ: Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 9, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ (τέλος) πλοῦτος: and indeed Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 24, ἐτέρων καὶ οἰκονομίας ἐτέρων ἀνδρῶς καὶ γυναικῶς τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτάσθαι, τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἐργών ἑαυτῶν, which agrees with Oecon. 1. 3. 1344 a 2. Probably in these passages of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics οἰκονομία as it actually is, not as it ought to be, is in view. For Aristotle seems not only here but elsewhere to make 'using' the proper business of οἰκονομία (see c. 7. 1255 b 31 sq.: c. 10. 1258 a 21 sq.: 3. 4. 1277 a 35: Sus.3, Note 68).


14. ἔστι, sc. ἡ χρηματιστική. The change of subject strikes us as strange, but a similar one occurs in Metaph. Γ. 2. 1004 b 22-25, περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἡ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τῶν βιων τῇ προσφέρει. Aristotle reverts to the nominative with which he started (3-4) on his inquiry.

15. εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Vahlen, in his note on Poet. 6. 1450 b 18, holds that εἰ γὰρ is here used in the same sense as in Rhet. 3. 17. 1418 a 35, where he reads with the best MS. λέγων (not λέγει, as Bekker). The meaning will then be—'for this is so' (i.e. 'a dispute may arise on this subject'), 'if, for example,' etc. He therefore places a comma only after διαμφισβήτησιν. (For Susemihl's view see Sus.3 and Qu. Crit. p. 350 sq.) But the passage resembles so closely other passages in Aristotle introduced by εἰ, in which a kind of apodosis begins with ὡστε, that it seems better to interpret εἰ γὰρ as commencing a new sentence, and to place a colon or full stop after διαμφισβήτησιν.
The following passages will serve as illustrations—Metaph. i. 4. 1055 a 22, ὅλως τε εἰ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐναπτύσσετι διαφορά, ἢ δὲ διαφορὰ δυνών, ὡστέ καὶ ἡ τέλεια: Phys. 6. 1. 232 a 12, εἰ οὖν αἰνάγη ς ἢ ἤρεμειν ἡ κεντρική πάν, ἤρεμει δὲ καθ ἐκαστὸν τῶν ΛΒΓ, ὡστέ ἐσται τι συνεχῶς ἤρεμοι ὁμοί καὶ κινοέμενοι. (See Vahlen's note on Poet. 9. 1452 a 10: Bon. Ind. 873 a 31 sqq.: Bonitz, Aristotel. Studien, 3. 106—124. This use of ὡστε may have been common in conversational Greek.) Whichever view we take of the passage, the doubt whether χρηματιστική is a part of οἰκονομική, or something quite different, will be said to arise from the multifariousness of the forms of acquisition falling under χρηματιστική. (This is no doubt more neatly expressed, if with Vahlen we take εἰ γάρ as = εἰπερ.) It is implied to be easier to imagine χρηματιστική a part of οἰκονομική, if it comprises agriculture and sound modes of acquisition of the same kind, than if it has to do with less natural modes, exclusively or otherwise. This is quite in harmony with the subsequent course of the inquiry, which results in the two-fold conclusion that agriculture and other similar ways of acquiring necessaries do form a part of χρηματιστική, and that this part of χρηματιστική is a part of οἰκονομική (cp. c. 8. 1250 b 26 and 37). To mark off the sound section of χρηματιστική from the unsound is, in fact, the first step towards relating χρηματιστική to οἰκονομική.

17. πρῶτον. Σκέπτων, or some such word, is dropped. The omission of words which will readily be supplied is characteristic of Aristotle's style.

19. καὶ κτίσις is added, it would seem, because ἐπιμέλεια does not clearly convey what is meant by κτίσις τροφῆς. What this is, appears from Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1120 a 8, χρῆσις δ' εἰναι δοκεῖ χρηματιστοῖς διάπάνη καὶ δώσις· ἢ δὲ λήψει καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτίσις μᾶλλον. We find χρηματιστόν κτίσις mentioned in Pol. 1. 9. 1257 b 30.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, 'but further there are many kinds of nutriment'—not only many kinds of property (16), but many kinds of nutriment, and articles of subsistence are only one sort of property.


23. τε γὰρ is here taken up by ὅμως δὲ καί, 29, as in 1254 a 9, 2. 9. 1269 a 36 sqq., Hist. An. 8. 1. 588 b 24, etc. See Eucken de Partic. usu, 17—20. The classification here adopted (ζωοφάγα, καρποφάγα, παρμαχία) is not probably offered as absolutely exhaustive, for in Hist. An. 8. 6. 595 a 13—17 we find ποιηταὶ and μεσοφάγα ἐξα distinguished in addition to καρποφάγα, and in Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 a
14, in addition to σαρκοφάγα, καρποφάγα, and παμφάγα, we hear of ιδιότροφα, οίνον τό τῶν μελιτών γένος καί τό τῶν ἀραχνῶν. Bernays understands Aristotle to connect gregariousness with an exclusively vegetable diet, and it certainly is not quite clear how he intends to class omnivorous animals. So far as they are carnivorous, we must suppose that they will be solitary. As to carnivorous animals, cp. Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 a 5, γαμφώνυχον δ' οίιδέν ἀγελάδον. Vict. remarks—'nam aquilae, si gregatim volarent, longe viserentur, quare aves quibus aluntur se abderent; nunc autem solae, idecoque non conspectae, inopinantes illas capiunt: neque etiam invenire simul tantos ipsarum greges, ut possent ipsi vesci.' I am informed that 'true as what Aristotle says is upon the whole, still there are many exceptions: e.g. nearly all Canidae, some seals, sand-martins, and some vultures are gregarious and yet carnivorous. Hares and some other rodents are grain-eating but not gregarious.' Fish are often gregarious, yet piscivorous. The carrion-eating condor is 'in a certain degree gregarious' (Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle, p. 183). As to the bearing of the food of animals on the duration of pairing, see Locke, Civil Government, 2. § 79.

26. πρός τὰς ῥαστώνας, 'ad commoditatem victus' (Bon. Ind. s. v.).

αἱρεσίν is perhaps used here and nowhere else by Aristotle in its simplest sense of 'taking' or 'getting'; it is thus that Bonitz would seem to interpret the word here (Ind. 18 b 38), for he marks off this passage from others in which it bears its usual meaning of 'choice.' Aristotle needed a word applicable at once to ζῷα, καρποί, etc., and he finds it in αἱρεσίς. So Vict.: 'Natura tribuit singulis rationem eam, qua commode copiosoque vivant, et sumant non magno labore quibus pascantur.' Sepulveda, however, translates—'itaque Natura, prout ratio postulat facile parandi cibum quem genus quoque animantium consectatur,itas eorum distinxit,' and I do not feel certain that he is wrong (Lamb. 'harum rerum electionem': Giph. 'delectu earum').

tούτων, 'the different kinds of food.'

27. ἐκάστῳ, not 'each individual member of the three classes of animals,' but 'each of the species contained in a class' is probably meant.


29. ὁμοιώς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. These words apparently answer
to τῶν τε γάρ θηρίων (see above on 23). If so, we have here a further illustration of the remark made in 21–22, αἱ διαφοραί τῆς τροφῆς τῶν ἁλληλον διαφέρουσα τῶν ζῴων. It would indeed be easy to supply οἱ διὰ πρῶτος αλλήλον διεστάσων from the previous sentence, and the tautology of τὸλ τοῖς διαφέρουσιν κ.τ.λ. is not decisive against this, but there are other cases (as has been pointed out above) in which τε γάρ is answered by ὡμοίως δὲ καί, and irrespectively of this it seems likely that the genitive is of the same kind as in 1253 b 27, or in 6 (4). 13. 1207 b 30, δημοκρατία τε γὰρ οἱ μία τῶν ἁμεθέν ἐστὶ καί τῶν ἄλλων ὡμοίως, or in Phys. 8. 8. 263 a 1, καὶ τῶν κινησίων ἀρα ὡστάτως: cp. 1256 b 6, ὡμοίως δὲ καί περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. The translation will then be, ‘the same thing holds good of men too’—i.e. their mode of life also differs according to the food on which they live. Pastoral nomads live on tame animals (31), hunters on fish or wild birds or beasts, brigands on their booty, whatever it may be, husbandmen on the produce of the soil and the fruits of domesticated plants and trees.

31. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄργοτατοι. Μέν οὖν (which is taken up by οἱ δὲ 35) introduces a confirmation in detail of what has just been said (‘saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur,’ Bon. Ind. 540 b 42). For ἄργοτατοι, cp. ῥαστώναι 26, and Herodotus’ account of the Thracians (5. 6, ἄργον εἶναι κάλλιστον [κέκριται], γῆς δὲ ἐργάτην ἄντιμότατον τὸ ζῆν ἀπὸ πολέμου καί ληστῶν κάλλιστον). The remark illustrates the effect of men’s food on their mode of life. Is there a hint that the nomads live most like the golden race, who are described by Hesiod (Op. et Dies 112 sqq.) as living ἑστιν ἄπερ τε πίνων καί ἄδεικιν καί ἐκφέρει θεμάτα τίχους (compare the ‘table of the sun’ among the Ethiopians, Hdt. 3. 18)—most like the infant who simply draws on the stores of nature? It is possible, but it would be rash to assert this. For races are apparently held by Aristotle to take a step in advance, when they exchange the wandering pastoral life for the hard-working life of tillers of the soil (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 14). The leisure of nomad life may be too dearly purchased. On the merits of a pastoral (not nomad) population, see Pol. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19 sqq. For the contrast of Aristotle’s views as to the natural mode of life with those of Dicacarchus, see vol. i. p. 128, note 2.

32. ἀναγκαῖοι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Κ. p. de Part. An. 4. 6. 682 b 6, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν πτερών δῶν μὲν ἐστιν ἀ βίος πολιτικὸς καί διὰ τὴν τροφὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκτοπίζεται κ.τ.λ. Their way of moving about is enforced on them; their mode of life is none the less on the whole lazy and effortless, because they cannot avoid changing pastures from time to time.
36. ληστείας. In treating ληστεία as a form of hunting (like Plato, Laws 823 B) and a natural way of acquiring food, Aristotle is not thinking of the pickpocket or highwayman of civilized societies —this kind of ληστής is called by him αἰσχροκερδῆς and ἄθελενθέρος (Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1122 a 7) and ἄδικος (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 19)— but of ληστεία as he meets with it in the pages of Homer, or of the wild ληστικὰ Ἕδη mentioned by him in Pol. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 23. The Etruscans were ‘even more pirates than traders’ (Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, 1. 169), and practised piracy not only in the Western Mediterranean but even in the Adriatic (see Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, vol. i. p. 184) at the very time at which Aristotle was writing. Mr. C. T. Newton (Contemp. Rev. Dec. 1876) mentions a bronze plate recording a treaty between two cities of Locris, Oianthe and Chalion, which stipulates that it shall be lawful for the citizens of both States to commit piracy anywhere except within their own or their ally’s harbours. ‘The date of this inscription,’ he adds, ‘is probably not earlier than B.C. 431.’ Cp. also Cic. de Rep. 3. 9. 15: vitae vero instituta sic distant, ut Cretes et Aetoli latrocinari honestum poterunt. The Western Mediterranean was a scene of piracy down, probably, even to the time of Aristotle and later (Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, 1. 342 sqq.). The Greeks, after all, felt that the robber had something of the warrior about him. Both Plato (Laws 845 C) and Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. 2. 6 sqq.) approve the Spartan tolerance of adroit theft of necessaries. Aristotle makes ληστεία a kind of hunting, and hunting a kind of war (1256 b 23). We ourselves look back on the Vikings with admiration; yet, as Mr. Burton says (History of Scotland, 3. 232), the Vikings ‘got their capital by force.’ It should be noticed, however, that in c. 11 ληστεία is passed over in silence, and indeed ἡθεοτητίκη in general. Aristotle apparently regards λησται as plunderers for the sake of subsistence, for in 1256 a 19–b 7 he seems to be concerned with the provision of τροφῆς: he may perhaps also regard them as in the main appropriators of articles of food—grain, cattle, and the like. He does not explain how a brigand or pirate’s mode of life is marked off from others by a difference of nutriment, and it is not clear how it can be called αὐτοφατεῖν.

37. τοιούτην, ‘suitable for fishing’: cp. τοιαύτα 1253 a 24, where the sense is ‘possessed of the power of performing their appointed work’—so here ‘possessed of the power of supplying fish.’ See on τοιούτος Riddell, Plato’s Apology, p. 137.

39. τῶν ἡμέρων καρπῶν. Aristotle does not include in his
enumeration those who live on the fruits of wild trees, like the ‘acorn-eating Arcadians’ (Hdt. 1. 66: Alcaeus, Fragm. 91) of early days, before Demeter and Dionysus had given men corn and wine (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. 42).

40. ὧν γε αὐτόφυτων κ.τ.λ. Giph. ‘vitae genus quod naturae instinctu agat et actionem habeat naturalem’; Bern. ‘diejenigen (Lebensweisen), welche auf Ausbeutung von Naturerzeugnissen beruhen’; Sus. ‘welche eine unmittelbar-natürliche Thätigkeit betreiben.’ Vict., however, translates ‘vitae quaecunque suam e sequa natam culturam habent,’ and explains the words in his commentary ‘vitae quam pariat ipsa vi sua sinue alius auxilio quod alat’; and Liddell and Scott interpret αὐτόφυτος εἰγανία here as = αὐτωργία, a rendering not far removed from that of Vict., which is probably right——compare such words as αὐτόσωσι (Soph. O. C. 696), αὐτοτέλεστος, αὐτοφείεσθος. The meaning will then be ‘lives whose work is self-wrought,’ and not achieved with the help, or at the expense, of others, like the life of ἄλλαγη καὶ καπηλεία. Cp. 1. 10. 1258 a 40, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεφομενής δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλ' ἡπ' ἄλληλων ἔστιν, Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 a 21, διὸ τῶν ἐλευθερίως καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιμῶσι καὶ τῶν δικαίως ταυτότους δ' ὑπολαμαζόντως τοὺς μὴ ἀρ' ἐτέρων ἑτερας ταυτότου δ' οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργαζέσθαι, καὶ τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτωργοί μάλιστα, and [Plut.] Inst. Lact. c. 12.

41. δι' ἄλλαγης καὶ καπηλείας. Καπηλεία is perhaps meant to explain and limit ἄλλαγη, for ἄλλαγη up to a certain point is natural (1257 a 15, 28). Still even the simplest form of ἄλλαγη may possibly not deserve the epithet αὐτόφυτος.

3. προσαναπληροῦντες κ.τ.λ., ‘ecking out the shortcomings of one 1256 b. mode of life, where it falls short of completeness of provision, by adding on some other.’ The superlative εὐδείατατον is perhaps used because men may be εὐδεῖς not only εἰς τὰς ἄγχαις, as in the case before us, but also εἰς ἐπιρροήν ἢ εἰς ἀπολαυσιν (Rhet. 1. 12. 1372 b 24 sq.); or else it is used here, as elsewhere by Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. 403 a 3 sqq.), in a sense in which the use of the comparative would seem more natural. 'Ἡ τυγχάνει κ.τ.λ. implies that the added mode of life must be one which will supply the deficiencies of the other: thus when brigandage is added to the nomadic life, or hunting to agriculture, it is because brigandage and hunting fill up gaps which the pastoral and agricultural modes of life leave unfilled. Compare Strabo, p. 833. 27 sqq.: Dio Chrysostom’s picture (Or. 7. 224 R) of the life of the rude Euboean mountaineers, ἔως ἃ ἄρ' ὑμεῖς ὡς ὀ τοῦ, μικρῶν τε τῆς γῆς ἐπεργαζόμενα: Diodorus’ picture of the Ligurians (5. 39. 3, κενη-
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gías δὲ πουόνται συνεχέis, ἐν αἷς πολλὰ τῶν θηρίων χυρούμεναι τὴν ἐκ τῶν καρπῶν σπάσαν διαφθούνται): and Leyden's of the Border people (Scenes of Infancy):——

'The Scott, to rival realms a mighty bar,
Here fixed his mountain home: a wide domain,
And rich the soil, had purple heath been grain;
But what the niggard soil of wealth denied,
From fields more blessed his fearless arm supplied.'

'The Shetlander is a fisherman who has a farm; the Orkneyman a farmer who has a boat' (Tudor's Orkneys and Shetland, quoted in the Saturday Review for July 14, 1883).

4. αὐτάρκης. i. c. ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοι (cp. 4 ἐν πολλά 4), which is a very different thing from αὐτάρκεια τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐνν (3. 9. 1280 b 34).

6. συναναγκάζῃ. Bernays: 'wie das Bedürfniss zum Verbinden verschiedener Lebensweisen treibt' (compels them to combine different modes of life). But if we look back to 1256 a 27, we shall see that it is taste (τὸ ἡδο) that leads men to select this or that mode of life, though necessity may force them to eke it out with some other: will not the meaning therefore be——'as necessity in conjunction with taste may compel'? Cp. Rhet. 2. 7. 1385 b 2, where it is pointed out that a service may be explained away by the plea that those who rendered it did not render it out of kindness alone, but were in part compelled (συναναγκάζω): [Demosth.] adv. Aristog. 2. c. 10, ἥ προαιρομένους ἥ συναναγκαζομένους: and Xen. Hiero 3. 9.

7. τοιαύτη, that which is necessary for sustenance, and which is αὐτόφυτος. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 18, ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς εἰκονος ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία.

8. φαίνεται διδομένη, 'is evidently given.'

πᾶσιν, here not 'all human beings' (as in 1253 a 30), but 'all animals.'

9. κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν. We have the proof of this in 10—15, and of τελειωθείσων in 15—20, as Prof. Jowett has already remarked. The expression κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐν τῇ μητρὶ γένεσιν occurs in Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 a 7.

11. τοσαύτην . . . ὡς. Eucken (de Partic. usu, p. 51—52) finds in Aristotle's writings only one other instance of this use of ὡς—Pol. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32. He adds——'paullo sapcius in libris pseudo-Aristotelis particularis ὡς eo modo usurpatur.'

Anima, scolophosaic, *vii φως καὶ σκόλης* φῶν μὲν γὰρ εἶστιν εἰς οὓς γίνεται τὸ γινόμενον ἐκ μέρους, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐτικ τροφῆ ἡ γινόμενον, σκόλης δὲ εἰς οὔ τὸ γινόμενον διόλον διόλον γίνεται. A part of the contents of the egg is intended only to serve as nutriment for the young creature; it is used for that purpose and there is an end of it; the lower part of the σκόλης, on the contrary, though in Aristotle’s view it furnishes in the first place nutriment to the upper and thus aids its growth, begins itself, after it has done this, to grow and receive articulation; and thus no part of the σκόλης can be said, as a part of the egg can, to be set apart simply and permanently for the sole purpose of nutriment. This is explained in de Gen. An. 3. 11. 763 a 9—16, ποιούνται δὲ καὶ τὴν αὐξάνσιν ὁμοίως τοῖς σκόλησιν· ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνω γὰρ καὶ τὴν ἄρχην αἰγίζουσα ὁ σκόλης· εν τῷ κώτῳ γὰρ ἡ τροφῆ τῶν ἄνω· καὶ τοῦτο γε ὁμοίως έκεῖ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν φῶν, πλὴν εἰκεν μὲν καταλισκεὶ πάν, εν δὲ τοῖς σκόλησισιομοίως, όταν αὐξήθη ἐκ τῆς εν τῷ κάτω μορίῳ ανυπάκοος τὸ ἄνω μόριον, οὕτως εἰκο ὑπολείποι διαβροχιᾶτο τό κάτωθεν. On the σκόλης and τά σκολησσοκοῦντα (i.e. Insects, Hist. An. 5. 19. 550 b 26), see Dr. Ogle’s translation of Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, p. xxvii sqq. I can find space only for the following quotation. ’It has been supposed that Aristotle had in some extraordinary way overlooked the eggs of insects, and fancied that these animals produce primarily grubs or maggots. This, however, was not so. He says that there are two kinds of scolex, one capable of motion, in other words a grub or maggot, the other incapable of motion, and so excessively like an ovum in shape, size, and consistency, as to be indistinguishable from it, excepting by considering its ulterior changes (de Gen. An. 3. 9. 758 b 1o sqq.).’ The only difference between the case of σκολησσοκοῦντα and φιστοκοῦντα on the one hand and “σφιστοκοῦντα on the other is, that τὸ λειτομένον (1258 a 36)—i.e. the surplus material beyond that which is drawn upon in the process of generation—is in the former case severed from the mother, inasmuch as it forms a part of the egg or σκόλης, while in the case of “σφιστοκοῦντα it is retained within the person of the mother in the form of milk. Cp. de Gen. An. 3. 2. 752 b 19 sqq., ἢ γὰρ φύσις ἀμα τὴν τοῦ ζωοῦ ἐν ἐν τῷ φῶ θίθη καὶ τὴν ἱκανὴν τροφῆν πρῶτ τὴν αὐξάνσιν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὅν δὲνατα τελεοι ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ ὄρμες, συνεκτικτὴ τὴν τροφῆν ἐν τῷ φῶτις τὸς μὲν γὰρ φιστοκοιμεῖος ἐν ἀλλο υφριῳ γίνεται ἡ τροφῆ, τὸ καλούμενον γαία, ἐν τοῖς μακατοῖς τοὺς δ’ ὄρμει τούτο τοῖς ἠ φύτες ἐν τοῖς φῶις, τοινυντιον μέντοι ἢ οὔ το ἀνθρωποὶ οὐνται καὶ Ἄλκμεων φησιν ὁ Κριστανάτης, ὃ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἑτε γαία, ἀλλὰ τὸ ωχρῶν τούτο χαίρεται ἡ τροφῆ τοῖς οὐσίαις. In the case of many kinds of fish, indeed, and among them the Salmonidae, provision is made
for the sustenance of the young even after they have left the egg. This has long been known to naturalists. 'When the little fish emerge from the eggs, they have a large bag, the umbilical vesicle, attached to their stomachs; this contains the nourishment which is to serve them for several (three to eight) weeks' subsistence, and they do not commonly take in any food by the mouth until it is absorbed' (from a Paper on Salmon, by F. Day, Esq., F.L.S.). On milk as an evidence of the providence of Nature, see Plutarch de Amore Prolis, c. 3, an interesting passage already noticed in vol. i. p. 30, note 2.

13. τοῖς γεννωμένοις. See critical note.

15. φύσις. Cp. ἡ φύσις τῶν φλεβῶν, Hist. An. 3. 2. 511 b 20, where 'notio vocis φύσις adeo delitescit, ut meram periphrasim nominis esse putes,' though this is not really quite the case (Bon. Ind. 838 a 9 sq.). Cp. also ὅμωματα παρὰ τὰς ἄλλης φύσεις, 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 18. 'Thing' or 'object' seems to approach the sense of φύσις used in this way. So Bern., 'den Stoff, den wir Milch nennen.'

ὡστε. The argument is that if there is a provision of nutriment for the creature in process of birth, it is not likely that nutriment should not be forthcoming for it when past that early stage. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1237 a 29, ὡστε ἔτει καὶ ἅτελη (τὰ ὅμωμα ἄλλης χαίρει), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τελειοείται. Aristotle, however, carries his inference further, and argues that not only nutriment but ἄλλα ἄργα will be forthcoming. We see how large is the superstructure which he raises on the fact that in every species of animal a provision of nutriment is made for the earliest moments of existence.

γενομένους, which Sus.3 places within brackets, may well bear somewhat the same meaning as τελειωθέσις, which he substituted for it in his first and second editions (cp. Meteor. 4. 2. 379 b 20, ὅταν γὰρ πεθῇ, τετελείωται τε καὶ γέγονεν: Metaph. B. 4. 999 b 11.). Γενομένους may perhaps be used as a more comprehensive term than τελειωθέσις, for γένεσις in the sense of ἡ πρώτη γένεσις 9, or ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσις 10, does not necessarily involve τελειώθης. The meaning will be 'when the πρώτη γένεσις is over.' Thus milk is said (de l'art. An. 2. 9. 635 b 26 sq.) to be τροφή τοῦ γενομένου: τροφή τοῖς γενομένοις is something different. Prof. Jowett quotes Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 6, τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφέναι αἰτία (sc. ὅ γενοείς) καὶ γενομένους τοῦ παιδευθῆναι. As to the dative, see Bon. Ind. 166 b 26 sqq.

20. οἱ οὖν ἡ φύσις κ.τ.λ. The inference seems to be as follows—'plants exist for the sake of animals, and the lower animals—all tame ones and most of the wild—for the sake of men; [but the lower animals are made by Nature,] and Nature makes nothing in-
complete [in the sense of lacking an end] or in vain, therefore (οὖν) all of them must necessarily be made by Nature for the sake of men. Αἰτῶ πάντα 22 has been variously interpreted ‘all plants and animals,’ ‘all wild animals’ (Sepulv. ‘ipsas omnes feras’), and ‘all animals.’ I have explained the expression in the first of these ways in vol. i. p. 128, but perhaps on the whole the third interpretation is the one most likely to be correct, for plants have just been said to exist for the sake of animals generally, so that they would not be ‘in vain’ if they did not exist for the sake of men; besides, what Aristotle is here especially concerned to prove ( cp. θηρία 24) is that the lower animals are made by Nature for the sake of men: he proceeds, in fact, at once to infer from this, that the kind of war which is waged against wild animals and to compel natural slaves, who differ but little from the lower animals, to submit to enslavement is a natural form of Supply. ‘The interpretation of Sepulveda—’ all wild animals’—is a possible interpretation (cp. θηρία 24), though the assertion that Nature has made all wild animals for the sake of men seems strange, if we look back to 18, τῶν δὲ ἀγρίων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ γε πλείστα, where the contrary seems to be implied. It is true, however, that the same assertion is made, though less conspicuously, if we interpret αἰτῶ πάντα ‘all animals’ or ‘all plants and animals.’ Aristotle’s aim in the passage is to show that just as property in the sense of what is necessary for sustenance is given by Nature to all animals, so the lower animals themselves are made by Nature for the sake of men. Compare Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 10, and Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 14 (referred to by Mr. Eaton) and 2. 62–64 (referred to by Giph.). In the last-named passage Cicero argues that as flutes are made for the sake of those who can use them, so the fruits of the soil exist far more for the sake of men than for the sake of the lower animals, ‘tantumque abest ut haec bestiarum etiam causa parata sint, ut ipsas bestias hominum gratia generatas esse videamus.’ Cp. also Metaph. Α. 10. 1075 a 16, πάντα δὲ συνετάκται πῶς ἀλλ' ὅν όμοιός, καὶ πλοτύ καὶ πηνά καὶ φιτά καὶ υἱός ὑπὸ ἀπὸ ἓκει δοτὲ μή εἰσιν θατέρῳ πρός θατέρων μηδέν, ἀλλ' εἰσίν τι.

21. ἀτελεῖς. In using this word, is Aristotle referring to man or to the lower animals, which are made for the sake of man? He has often been taken to refer to the state of incompleteness in which man would be left, if he were unprovided with sustenance when past the earliest period of existence. Mr. Welldon translates the passage—assuming then that none of Nature’s products is incomplete or purposeless, |as man requires food and the other animals are
suited to his consumption]'. But looking to the form of the sentence (ποιῆ...πεισμένων), it seems more likely that Aristotle refers in the protasis as well as in the apodosis, and in ἄτελες as well as in μάτην, to the lower animals. 'Ἀτελεῖς may in fact bear the meaning 'lacking an end,' and it is thus that Zeller ('ohne Zweck,' Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 563, 6), Bonitz ('οὐκ ἔχων τέλος sive oē ἄνεκα,' Ind. 119 a 48), and Susemihl in his translation ('zwecklos') explain it here. Bonitz mentions no other passage in which the word ἄτελῆς is used in this sense, but perhaps de Gen. An. 1. 1. 715 b 14, ἢ δὲ φύσεις φεύγει τὸ ἀπειρὸν τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπειρὸν ἄτελες, ἢ δὲ φύσις αἰὲν ζητεῖ τέλος may be compared: cp. Plato, Phileb. 24 B, δὲ τοῖς δὲ λόγοι ημῶν σημαίνει τούτω μη τέλος ἔχειν ἄτελῆ δ' ὡστε δήπον παντάπασιν ἄπειροι γίγνεσθαι. But ἄτελῆς is rarely used in this sense, and I incline on the whole to follow Sepulveda, who translates 'imperfectum' and adds in his note the explanation 'quod non referatur ad aliquem finem, res enim quaecumque suo fine perfectur (Metaph. X),' where Metaph. 1. 4. 1055 a 12, τέλος γὰρ ἔχει ἡ τελεία διαφοράς, ὀσὲρ καὶ τάκλα τὸ τέλος ἔχειν λέγεται τελεία is probably referred to: cp. Metaph. Δ. 16. 1021 b 23, ἢτι οἷς ἑπάρχει τὸ τέλος σπουδαίοι, ταῦτα λέγεται τελείαν κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχει τὸ τέλος τέλεια.


ἄναγκαιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄνεκεν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is unaware that many animals existed long before man. We are reminded here of the Socratic teleology, according to which the movements of the sun in summer and winter are arranged with a view to the advantage of man (Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 8, καὶ ταῦτα παντάπασιν ἔσκευν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεκά γεγομένους). But to Aristotle man is only πῶς τέλος, not τὸ ἐσχάτον τέλος (Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 35). He assumes, it will be noticed, that animal food is necessary to man, and thus incidentally pronounces against those scruples as to its use which can be traced back in Greece to very early days. Orphic teaching forbade it (Plato, Laws 782): Empedocles was against it (see Prof. Campbell, Introduction to the Politicus of Plato, p. xxiii sq.): Democritus seems to have allowed the slaughter only of those animals which injure or wish to injure man (Stob. Floril. 44. 16, quoted by Bernays, Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit, p. 149), and in this view he was apparently followed by Theophrastus (Porphyry de Abstin. 2. 22), who may possibly be alluding to the passage of the Politics before us when he says (ibid. 2. 12), εἰ δὲ λέγω τις ὅτι οὐχ ἤττον τῶν καρπῶν.
καὶ τὰ ξόα ἦμιν ὁ θεὸς εἰς χρήσιν δίδωκεν—if indeed we are right in ascribing this passage, with Bernays (op. cit. p. 61 sqq.), to Theophrastus and not to Porphyry. His contemporary at the head of the Academy, Xenocrates, was also opposed to the use of animal food, though for a different reason (Xenocr. Fragm. 58—Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 3. 127: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 1. 678. 6, ed. 2). The unhesitating language of Aristotle on this subject is deserving of notice. If there were those in antiquity who ascribed the Politics to Theophrastus, this passage at all events can hardly be from his pen. Observe that Aristotle does not here notice the case of carnivorous animals other than man.

22. αὐτὰ πάντα. See above on 20.
23. διὸ κ.τ.λ. The following extract from Susemihl, Qu. Crit. p. 347, will show how variously this passage has been interpreted. 'Victorius si audimus, cui adstitulati sunt Giphanius, Schneiderus, Boisesenius, αὐτής et ἥ ad πολεμικής pertinent, ut nihil nisi parenthesis sint ἥ ἃρ ἡθρευτική μέρος αὐτῆς, qua indicetur cur bellum etiam contra bestias geri quest contendi: sin Lambinum, Schnitzerum, Stahlrium, Bernaysium, αὐτής ad πολεμικής et ἥ ad ἡθρευτικής: sin Garvceum, Hampkeum, alios, αὐτής ad κτητικήν et ἥ ad ἡθρευτικήν spectat.' Victorius' commentary refers ἥ to πολεμική, but his translation refers it to ἡθρευτική ('studium enim venatorum pars ipsius [artis bellicae] est, quo dect uti,' etc.). Bernays takes αὐτής as meaning τῆς πολεμικῆς and refers ἥ to ἡ θηρευτική, and this seems to be the more natural interpretation, looking to the close sequence in which ἥ stands to θηρευτική, but then we hardly expect τοῦτον τὸν πολέμον 26, though it is true that hunting has just been brought under the head of war (23: cp. 1255 b 38). Those who refer ἥ to ἡ πολεμική will point to the use of the word πολέμον in 26, and may also adduce Isocr. Panath. § 163, τῶν δὲ πολέμων ἐπελάμβανον ἀναγκαστικῶν μέν εἶναι καὶ δικαίωτα τῶν μετὰ πάντων ἅρματων πρὸς τὴν ἀγμοτητα τὴν τῶν ἡριῶν γεγραμμένων, δεύτερον δὲ τῶν μετὰ τῶν Ἐλλήνων πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους τοῖς καὶ φιότα πολέμιους ὑπερεται καὶ πάντα τῶν χρῶν ἐπισυνεφύτος ἢμιν (cp. Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 8: Porphyry. de Abstin. i. 14: and Dio Chrysost. Or. 38. 137 R); Isocrates here certainly speaks of war, not hunting. But Aristotle has just said that hunting is a part of war, and the sentence seems to run more naturally if ἥ is referred to ἡ θηρευτική. The words ἥ δὲι χρήσια πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία κ.τ.λ., in fact, acquire fresh point, if connected with ἡ θηρευτική: θηρευτική is not only to be brought to bear against θηρία, as the name might suggest, but also against men who are like θηρία. The reference of ἥ to ἡ θηρευτική is still further supported by two passages of Plato
(Sophist. 222 B–C: Laws 823 B), which seem to be present to Aristotle’s memory no less than the passage from the Panathenaic Oration of Isocrates just quoted, for in them Plato speaks of hunting as having to do not only with wild animals but also with men, in language much resembling that of Aristotle here. Δοῦ draws from the fact that animals are made by nature for the service of man, and that their acquisition is natural, the inference that men who are, like animals, made to be ruled, may be acquired without any infraction of the order of nature. Αὐτὸς can hardly mean τῆς κτητικῆς, for the fact that hunting is a part of κτητικῆ is no proof that war is in some sense a part of κτητικῆ, in the absence of a statement that hunting is a part of war. I incline therefore to translate the passage thus: ‘hence the art of war also is in some sense’ (i.e. so far as one kind of it is concerned) ‘by nature a form of κτητικῆ, for of the art of war the art of the chase’ (already said in 1256 a 40–b 2 to be a form of κτητικῆ) ‘is a part, which ought to be used against both wild animals and such human beings as being intended by nature to be ruled refuse to be ruled, seeing that this kind of war is by nature just.’ There were kinds of war which had nothing to do with acquisition (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 38–1334 a 2). The myth of Protagoras had contrasted the art of war with ἡ δημουργική τέχνη (Plato, Protag. 322 B, ἡ δημουργική τέχνη αὐτὸς πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἰκανή βοήθωσ ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδειξάτω πολιτικῆς γὰρ τέχνης οὕτω εἰγὼν, ἡς μέρος πολεμικῆ), and Aristotle may wish to point out, in correction of this view, that some kinds of τροφῆ cannot be obtained without war; he evidently does not agree with Rep. 373 D–E, where the origin of war is traced to the unbounded quest of wealth. On the contrary, he holds that one kind of war (that for the acquisition of φύσεως δαιμοί) falls within the sound or limited χρηματιστικῆ. Columella (de Re Rustica, Lib. 1. Praefat. c. 7) will not admit war to be a laudable form of κτητικῆ: cp. [Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 27, ἡ δὲ γεωργικῆ μάλιστα ὡτι δικαιὰ: οὐ γὰρ ἀντ’ ἀνθρώπων, εὖ ἐκόντων, ὡσπερ κατηλεία καὶ αἱ μισθαρκαὶ, οὐτ’ ἀκόντων, ὡσπερ αἱ πολεμικαί.

26. ἐν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first question which arises as to this much-debated passage relates to κατὰ φύσιν. Sepulv., Vict. (‘unam rationem quaerendi rem, illam inquam quae naturam sequitur’), Lamb., and Giph. connect κατὰ φύσιν with κτητικῆς, but this seems hardly possible. Bern., who connects κατὰ φύσιν with μέρος εἰστίν, translates ‘is a natural part of Household Science,’ but Susemihl and Mr. Welldon are probably right in translating ‘is naturally a part.’ The remainder of the paragraph (ὅ δὲ κ.τ.λ.) is thus ren-
dered by Sepulveda—' quae (quaestuaria) vel suppetere debet, vel
res ab ipsa comparari, quae condii reponique solent necessariae ad
vitam et ad civitatis aut domus societatem tuendam accommodatae';
he adds in his note the following explanation—' aut haequae-
estuaria facultas adesse debet patrifamilias atque homini civili, ut per
eam res necessariae ab ipsis comparantur, aut certe per cam res
necessariae comparari debent ab eo, cuicumque tribuat.' He
evidently refers αετήν 28, not to τις οἰκονομικής 27, to which Bern.,
Sus., Stahr, and others are probably right in referring it, but to εἰδος κτητικής 26. There is much more to be said for his view that
χρήματα, the suppressed antecedent of δς χρημάτων, is the subject of
ἐπάρχης. It is thus that both Stahr and Vahlen (Aristotel. Aufsätze,
2, 32) interpret the passage. For the case and position of χρημάτων
within the relative sentence, see Vahlen ublica, who compares
we follow these authorities (as I have done in vol. 1, p. 129), we
shall translate—' which (form of the Science of Supply) must either
be forthcoming, or Household Science must itself ensure that
storeable commodities shall be forthcoming,' etc. This interpreta-
tion of the passage, however, is open to the objection that it sup-
plies a different subject with the words ἐπάρχεν and ἐπάρχῃ, whereas
the sentence certainly reads as if one and the same subject should
be supplied with each. I incline, therefore, on further considera-
tion, to suggest a different interpretation. May not there be an
ellipse of 'having to do with' before ὅν ἐστί ἐπισκεπτόμενος χρημάτων,
just as there is in I. 3. 1253 b 3, οἰκονομίας ἐς μήρη, ἐξ ὅν πάλιν οἶκια
συμάτηκε, and in I. 11. 1258 b 27 sqq., τίτον ἐς εἰδος χρηματιστικής
... ὅσι ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γαμμάζων κ.τ.λ. (see above on 1253 b
3)? If we explain the passage thus, δ (εἰδος κτητικῆς) will be the
subject both of ἐπάρχειν and of ἐπάρχῃ. On Bernays' proposed
substitution of καθό for δ, see Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 352. For other
suggested emendations, and for Susemihl's own view of the pas-
sage, see notes 2 and 3 in Sus. 3, vol. 1, p. 116. In strictness
the function of οἰκονομική is not τὸ πορίσσασθαι τῷ κατὰ τὴν οἶκιαν, but
τὸ χρηματίσθαι (ί. 8. 1256 a 11: εἰς διαθέσιν, c. 10. 1258 a 24);
we are told, however, here (εἰς μολίστα, 'if possible,' c. 10. 1258 a
34), that if ἓ κατὰ φίλου κτητική is not forthcoming from the first,
οἰκονομική must see that it is forthcoming. 'Εστι θεσπισμός ap-
ppears to be added because there are things necessary to human
life (e.g. light, air, fire) which cannot be stored. On Storeableness
as an attribute of Wealth, see Comte, Social Statics, E. T. p. 131,
and J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy B. 1. c. 3. § 3.
Are slaves and cattle, however, susceptible of ῥησαρισμὸς? and does Aristotle’s definition of wealth include wealth in land? For the various kinds of wealth, genuine and other, see 2. 7. 1267 b 10 sq. and Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 12 sqq. J. S. Mill defines wealth (Principles of Political Economy, Preliminary Remarks, and B. 1. c. 3. § 3) as ‘useful and agreeable things of a material nature, possessing exchange value.’ Aristotle says nothing here of exchange value, though his definition of χρήματα in Eth. Nic. 4. i. 1119 b 26 as πάντα ὅσον ἡ ἄξια ποιμέσιμα μετρεῖται implies this limitation. How far does his account of wealth in the passage before us agree with his account of κτήματα in c. 4. 1254 a 16, where he seems to exclude ὄργανα πολιτικὰ from κτήσις? Such ὄργανα are certainly χρήσιμα εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἡ ἀκίας. On Mill’s definition, see Prof. H. Sidgwick in the Fortnightly Review for Feb. 1879. Μίν ὁμόν is taken up by μέν τοῖνυν 37, and answered by δὲ 40.

31. ἐκ τούτων. ‘Εκ is here used of the ‘material’ of which wealth is made, the ‘elements’ which constitute it: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 22, ἐκ πλεώνων ἀνθρώπων.

γάρ, ‘for true wealth is not unlimited in quantity (consisting as it does of ὄργανα, and no ὄργανον being unlimited either in size or quantity), and the wealth of which we speak is not unlimited in quantity.’ Just as a very large or very small shuttle, or too many shuttles or too few, would be in the way and ineffective for the end (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 35 sqq.), so too large or too small a supply of necessary and useful commodities is unfavourable to ἄγαθη ζωή. This thought was taken up by Epicurus: cp. Porphyry. de Abstin. 1. 49, ὄρματα γάρ, φρεῖν, ὧν τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ἐστιν εὐπόριστος, ὃ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν ἄφροτός τε ἂν καὶ δυσπόριστος. Bernays (Theophrastos’ Schrift über Frömmigkeit, p. 145) compares also the fourteenth κυρία δόξα of Epicurus (Diog. Laert. 10. 144). Cp. also Plutarch de Cupiditate Divitiarum, c. 4. 524 E–F. For αὐτάρκεια, cp. c. 9. 1257 a 30.

32. Σόλων. See Fragm. 13. 71 sqq., and Theognis 227 where the lines appear in a slightly altered form. They seem to be present to Isocrates’ memory in De Pace § 7.

33. πεφαςμένον ἀνδράσι, ‘made known to men.’

34. ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, ‘in the case of other arts.’

35. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον κ.τ.λ. Aristippus appears to have met this argument by anticipation; cp. Fragm. 58 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 412), οὐχ ὀδηγεῖται ὡς δέσποτα τοῦ μείζον δυσχρήστων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ πλείων κτήσις τοῦ μείζον γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρήσει τὸ περιττὸν ἐμποδίζει τῇ δὲ καὶ ὅλῃ χρήσει, κατὰ καιρὸν ἔξεστι καὶ μέρει.

36. See J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Preliminary
Remarks, on definitions of wealth which, like that in the text, treat it as ‘a mass of instruments.’

38. δι' ἡν αἰτίαν. The reason apparently is that the acquisition of the things assigned by Nature for the service of man is a necessity of human life. For ἡν, see above on 1252 a 20, and cp. de An. 2. 7. 419 a 6.

40. ἡν is affected by attraction to χρηματιστικήν, though αὐτὸ is C. 9.

not: the fem. continues to be used in 41—1257 a 5.

41. δι' ἡν. How this happens, we learn in 1. 9. 1257 b 35 sqq.

3. ἐκείνης. Pronomen ἐκεῖνος ab Aristotele etiam ad proximas 1257 a. voces trahitur’ (Busse, de praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 24, who refers to Pol. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 10: Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 8 sq).


7. καθ' αὑτό. On predication καθ' αὑτό, see Anal. Post. 1. 4. 73 a 34—b 24 and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 212 a 3 sqq. We have here to do with use καθ' αὑτό. A thing is used καθ' αὑτό, when it is used as being what it is and nothing else. Thus the term is explained in 12 by χρῆσθαι τῷ ὑποδήματι ἡ ὑπόδημα. The μεταβλητική χρήσις of a shoe is a use of it καθ' αὑτό, as much so in fact as the ὀικεία χρήσις, the use of it as an article of wear; it is because the shoe is a shoe that the buyer buys it and the wearer wears it; still the one use is ὀικεία τοῦ πρώγματος (the use for which the shoe was made) and the other is not. If the shoe were used, on the contrary, for measuring, it would not be used as a shoe, but as being of a certain length. This is explained in Eth. End. 3. 4. 1231 b 38 sq., where, however, the writer so far departs from Aristotle’s view that he treats the sale of an article as an use of it κατα συμβεβηκός, not καθ' αὑτό. From the use made of commodities in simple exchange must be distinguished the use made of them by the unsound χρηματιστική, which aims at the indefinite increase of wealth (c. 9. 1257 b 35 sq).

14. ἡ μεταβλητική, sc. χρήσις, as in 9, or τέχνη? The latter view seems preferable, for we must supply τέχνη with ἡ τοιαύτη μεταβλητική in 28. Perhaps, however, we may translate simply ‘exchange’ (Bern. Sus. ‘Tauschhandel’).

15. μέν has no δι' to answer to it, apparently because ἡ καθ' δῆλον the intended course of the sentence is changed: we expect it to be continued ‘but later passing the limit of necessity and nature.’

ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, ‘from that which is natural’ (Mr. Welldon, ‘from natural circumstances’).

17. ἡ καθ' δῆλον κ.τ.λ. Vict. ‘quo perspicuum etiam est non con-
stare natura pecuniariae genus cauponarium.' Lamb. (followed by Bernays and Susemihl): 'ex quo licet intelligere cauponarium (seu mercaturam sordidam quam profitentur atque exercent ii qui ab aliis emunt quod pluris revendant) non esse partem artis pecuniarum quaerendae natura.' In favour of Vict.'s rendering, cp. Phys. 2. 2. 194 b 2, τῆς ποιοτικῆς ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική, and the statement in 3, ἂντι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ' ὑποφέρει αὐτῶν: in favour of the other, c. 8. 1256 b 23, διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πως ἔσται. The interpretation of Lamb, is probably right. Bern. conjectures τῆς μεταβλητικῆς for τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, looking probably to ἡ μεταβλητικὴ 14, but all the MSS. read τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, and in 1257 b 2 we have θάτερον εἴδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς . . . τὸ καπηλικῶν.

18. ὅσον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Sepulveda: 'aliaquin necesse erat ut quatenus eis satis esset, commutationibus uterentur.' 'For if it were so, those who practise it would necessarily have made use of exchange only to obtain what suffices for themselves [whereas in fact they notoriously purchase not for their own use, but to resell at a profit]. So the commentators generally. Cp. 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 35, οὐ γὰρ δὴ παύοντας· τέλος γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἰναι τῷ βιῶν τὴν παιδῶν ἡμῶν. For the omission of ἢν in phrases like ἀναγκαῖον ἢν, see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 858. 3. ἱκανών takes up τῶν ἱκανῶν. Τὸ κατὰ φύσιν is τὸ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς (cp. 30 and 1256 b 11). It is possible, no doubt, to take ἢν historically, and not as = ἢν ἢν, and to translate 'for it was necessary (and therefore natural) to make use of exchange to obtain what suffices for the persons exchanging (which those who practise καπηλικῆ do not do),' and this rendering would suit the paragraph which follows, which is historical in purport; ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. would also be used in the same sense as four or five lines below (23); but the ordinary interpretation seems on the whole preferable.

19. μὲν οὖν introduces a slight correction of what precedes ('true, exchange is not necessary in the household'). It seems to be answered by ἀλλὰ, 21: cp. c. 13. 1260 a 13, and see Sus.1 Ind. Gramm. s. v. μὲν.

τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ, i.e. the household, though the union of male and female and that of master and slave are spoken of as κοινωνίαι (c. 2. 1252 b 10), and are of course prior to the household, for the household is formed of them. Cp. αἱ πρώται κοινωνίαι, c. 2. 1252 b 31.

21. αὐτής is taken apparently by Sus. to refer to ἀλλαγῆν 19, but I incline to follow Bern. and Mr. Welkdon, who refer it to ἡ μεταβλητικὴ 14 (cp. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλητική, 28). It is true that in 1257 b 1 the earlier form of μεταβλητικὴ is described as ἡ ἀναγκαῖα
ἀλλαγή, so that the sense is much the same, whichever view we adopt.

πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας ὀψης, i.e. 'extended,' in opposition to πρῶτη (Bon. Ind. 618 b 34): cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 12, καὶ παλαιται γ' ἢν τότε εἶναι πόλις, ὅταν αὐτήρηκ συμβαίνῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους. Ἡ μεταβλητική seems to be regarded as beginning in the κώμη and the πόλις.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. As to the phrase πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων, see Bon. Ind. 357 b 8: 'καὶ interdum duo adiectiva coniungit, quorum alterum defininge alteri inserviat, non solum ubi prius adiectivum πολλός est (πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, Eth. Nic. 1. 8. 1098 b 27 al.), sed etiam in aliis.' It has been much discussed, on what verb the words πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων depend. Schm. would supply εἴδωσα, while Bern. thinks that no addition is needed, inasmuch as κεχωρισμένον contains the notion of 'wanting.' For Susenbii's view, see his note. Vict., however, would seem from his commentary to supply εἰκονόμον -- certainly the most natural course, and that which best agrees with πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας ὀψης. Aristotle is commonly chary of words, and often expects us to supply a word from a previous clause which is not altogether suitable—e.g. in 3. 16. 1287 b 28 (ἵδια): 6 (4). 13. 1207 a 40 (πορίζεων): 2. 5. 1264 b 2 (οὐκονομίσει). Cp. also 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 16-18. Both household and village have a certain aggregate of commodities at their disposal, but whereas in the household what one member has all others have, in the village this is not so; on the contrary, some members of the village have corn and no shoes, others shoes and no corn. The members of the village are described as κεχωρισμένοι, i.e. they are no longer ὀμοιότατοι or ὀμοκαποι, but are parted into a plurality of households. The use of the word κοινωνία in reference both to the household and to the village is of course not fortunate, for the household shares in what it possesses in a different sense from the village.

23. κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις, in contrast to the practice of κάπηλου.

ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις... κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγήν. 'Ἀλλαγή here means 'barter': μετάδοσις is the more comprehensive word, including barter as one of its forms.

24. καί (in place of which Bern. conjectures καὶ νῦν) probably means 'no less than the members of the village.'

26. ἔτι πλέον δ' οὐδέν, i.e. no money, which is here contrasted with τὰ χρήσιμα, not that it is not itself one of τὰ χρήσιμα (36), but because it is not directly useful for subsistence, like corn or wine.

20. χρηματιστικής, i.e. τῆς μάλιστα χρηματιστικῆς, 1256 b 41.
30. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 18, ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ
φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία.
31. κατὰ λόγον, 'in accordance with reason and what one would
naturally expect': see the references in Bon. Ind. 368 b 50 sq. It is
often used in much the same sense as εἰλόγους (e. g. in Metaph. N. 1.
1088 a 4–6), and the phrase διὰ των αὐτῶν εἰλόγου (de Part. An. 2. 17.
660 b 16) may be compared. In Rhet. ad Alex. 9. 1429 a 28 we have—
τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων γίνεται κατὰ λόγον τὰ δὲ παρὰ λόγον.

ζενικωτέρας γὰρ κ. τ. λ. 'For, the supply of men’s needs coming
to be more drawn from sources external to the State.' Here the
origin of money is traced to an increased distance between buyer
and seller. Money being more portable than commodities in
general, an advantage is found in paying a distant seller in this way.
Aristotle perhaps remembers that the Greek coinage had its origin
in the commerce of Aegina: cp. Strabo, p. 376, 'Εθέρος η
ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ἄργυρῳ πρῶτον κοπήναι φησιν ὑπὸ Φειδωνος' εμπόρουν
γὰρ γενέσθαι. In Eth. Nic. 5. 8, however, the advantages of
money in all commercial transactions, whether between parties
near to or distant from each other, are recognized. Again, the
purchaser may not for the moment need any commodity in return:
in this case money serves as an ἐγγυητὴς ὅτι ἐσται εἰνὶ ἐκπλὴ
(Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 10 sq.). Still all this is quite reconcilable
with the view that what first called money into being was its use in
distant transactions. Plato (Laws 742 A) seems to regard the
payment of wages and of artisans’ remuneration as that which
makes some sort of money necessary. Giph. (p. 99) refers to
Isocr. Paneg. § 42, which is not without resemblances to the
passage before us.

32. ἡν ἐνδείεις. For the omission of εἰναι and its parts, see Vahlen
on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7 (p. 243).
35. διὸ πρὸς τὸς ἀλλαγὰς κ. τ. λ. Cp. 1. 10. 1258 b 4, οὐκ ἐφ' ὑπερ ἐπορίσθη μεταβολὴς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάρω (τὸ νόμουσα). The selection
of the particular commodity was a matter of convention, so that
here for the first time convention stepped in; but even then money
was for a space dealt with inartificially by weighing, till the measure
of its artificiality was made complete by the ingenious addition of
a stamp to denote the value of the coin. With συνέδεστο, cp. κατὰ
συνθήκην, Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 29.
37. εἰκὲ κ. τ. λ., 'possessed utility of a kind to be easily dealt
with and made available for the end of existence'—was, in
fact, easily carried, easily stored, easily converted into other com-
modities, and so forth. Vict. 'unum eorum quae ... possunt
facile deferrī ad alios'; but that is only one of the characteristics present to the mind of Aristotle. Lamb. better: 'usum haberet tractabilem ac facilem ad vitam degendam.' For εἰκε τὴν χρείαν (which takes up τῶν χρησίμων), cp. Sosipater (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 483)—

μεγάλην χρείαν τῶν εἰς τὸ πρῶμα ἔχει.

For τὸ δήμον, cp. 1257 b 41. The Thessalians are said by Isocrates to be Ἀνδρέας οὐκ εἰμι ταχεύστατον (Epist. 2. § 20). Aristotle notices portability and ease in use as characteristics of a satisfactory circulating medium, but not durability or steadiness of value. The last-named characteristic is, however, referred to in Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 11.3. b 1.3 sq.

38. σύνηρος κ.τ.λ. Iron, or the dross of iron—τὸ ἀχρεῖον τῶν σύνηρων—(by weight) by the Lacedaemonians ([Plato,] Eryxias 400 B): iron coins were also used by Byzantium (see Mr. Ridgeway, Trans. Cambr. Philol. Society, vol. 2. p. 131, who refers to Plato Com., Πεισαθέρος 3—Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 649)—and Ar. Nub. 249)—an iron coin of Hermaeus king of Bactria, brought by Sir Douglas Forsyth from the ruined cities of Central Asia, is mentioned in the Academy, Nov. 25, 1876 (p. 527). Cp. also Caesar de Bell. Gall. 5. 12: utuntur (Britannii) aut aere aut taleis ferreis ad certum pondus examinatis pro nummo. As to καὶ εἰ τὸ συνήρων ἐπέρων, we find in the Eryxias (399 E sqq.) a description of the leather money of Carthage; but, as Mr. Ridgeway says (ibid.), Aristotle may have in his mind 'some such coinage as the electrum money used at Cyzicus.'

41. ὁ γὰρ χαρακτήρ κ.τ.λ. The χαρακτήρ varied with the value. 'The tetradrachm of Syracuse is in early times stamped with a quadriga, the didrachm with a pair of horses, the drachm with a single horse with its rider. Thus the number of horses shows at a glance the number of drachms in any piece of Syracusan money. The obol is marked with the wheel of a chariot' (Prof. P. Gardner, Types of Greek Coins, p. 50). 'On the tetradrachm of Athens there are two owls; on the diobol the owl has but one head, but two bodies; on the triobol the owl is facing the spectator, and so forth... In Thessaly a horseman marks the diobol, a single horse the obol' (ibid. p. 66). But see Mr. Head's remarks, Hist. Numorum, p. lvi.

2. τὸ καπηλικῶν. The unsound kind of χρηματιστική is so called, 1257 b. not because none but κάπηλοι practised it, but because it was exemplified in, and best illustrated by, their way of trading, with which every one was familiar. The κάπηλοι did not himself produce what he sold, but bought it of the producer, and bought to sell again,
not to supply his own household needs. His operations were on
a smaller scale than those of the ἐμποράς, and, unlike his, were con-
fined within the limits of a particular State (cp. Plato, Polit. 260 C:
Rep. 371 D; Sophist. 223 D; and see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und
Erwerb, p. 454–6 and notes). This kind of χρηματιστική comes into
existence after the appearance of money on the scene, but its
existence is in reality due not to money, but to a radically wrong
view of the end of human life (1257 b 40 sqq., and esp. 1258 a 5).
Money, however, makes it possible,—how, Aristotle does not
directly explain; but he probably means that money facilitates sale
and re-sale, is easily stored, and the like, and thus meets the spirit
of gain half-way. If trade were carried on by barter, the practices
of the κάπηλοι would be defeated by the cumbrousness of the
operation, and they might suffer more by depreciation of stock.
‘The value of money,’ says Gibbon (Decline and Fall, c. 9—vol. i.
p. 356), ‘has been settled by general consent to express our wants
and our property, as letters were invented to express our ideas;
and both these institutions, by giving a more active energy to the
powers and passions of human nature, have contributed to multiply
the objects they were designed to represent.’ See also the quo-
tation from Xen. de Vectigalibus given in the note on 1257 b 33.

3. μὲν οὖν. See note on 1252 b 27 sqq.
πόθεν κ.τ.λ. Πόθεν seems to depend on τεχνικώτερον, which
itself seems to be adverbial to γινώμενον. But what is the nom. to
ποίησιν? Vict. and Bern. make μεταβαλλόμενον passive, the former
supplying τὸ νόμαμα, the latter ‘etwas’ (i.e. a commodity). Lamb.
and Giph. explain μεταβαλλόμενον by ‘permutando,’ apparently
making it middle: Bonitz also would seem to take it as middle (Ind.
458 b 15), for he adds ‘i.e. ποίων γένος τῆς μεταβλητικῆς.’ Adopting
this explanation of πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον, which makes τὸ καπηλικὸν
nom. to ποίησιν, we are still met by the question, what is the meaning
of πόθεν? Does it qualify μεταβαλλόμενον like πῶς, or are the words
πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον to be taken together by themselves, so that the
meaning will be,—‘carried on with a more studied skill in devising
from what source and by what kind of investment it will win most
profit’? Perhaps this is the correct interpretation. Cp. πῶς, c. 11.
1258 b 13.

5. διὸ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes on to describe the effect of
the emergence of this kind of χρηματιστική on opinion. It suggests
to many the erroneous conclusion that the aim of χρηματιστική is
the acquisition of money and of as much money as possible. But
then others by a natural reaction refuse to allow that money is wealth, or that this kind of χρηματιστική is χρηματιστική at all. This conflict of view enables Aristotle to step in, as is his wont, and to say that those who take the latter view are so far right that the κατηλκυμένη χρηματιστική is not χρηματιστική κατὰ φύσιν, nor is money natural wealth. The natural χρηματιστική is that which goes hand in hand with the science of household management, and which regards the acquisition of commodities, not as an end, but as a means to τὸ αὖ ζητοῖ rightly understood, and therefore not to be pursued beyond a certain limit of amount.

7. ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι, sc. δοκεῖ.
τὸ πλοῦτον καὶ χρημάτων. Vahlen (Aristot. Aufsätze, 2. 13 n.) compares 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 37, πλοῦτον καὶ χρημάτων; and 1. 9. 1257 a 1, πλοῦτον καὶ κτήσεως. Here, as often elsewhere (Bon. Ind. 357 b 13), καί appears to be used in an explanatory sense, just as it is two lines lower in τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν κατηλκυμένην, and in ἄλλα γε καὶ κατηλκυμένα, 1256 a 41. Χρημάτων is an ambiguous word, often meaning money and always suggestive of it (cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1119 b 26, χρίματα δὲ λέγομεν ποινά ὅτων ἡ αὐτί νομίσματι μετρεῖται, and [Plato,] Eryxias 493 D, quoted below on 11).

8. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον κ.τ.λ. These words supply an indispensable link in the argument, which seems to be as follows—χρηματιστική is ποιητική τοῦ πλοῦτον καὶ χρημάτων, πλοῦτος is νομίσματος πλῆθος, therefore χρηματιστική is ποιητική νομίσματος πλῆθους, or in other words, its έργον is τὸ δύνασθαι θεώρειν πόθεν ἐστι πλῆθος χρημάτων. This word χρημάτων might have been νομίσματος, but the two words do not lie far apart in meaning. In καὶ γὰρ somewhat of the force of καὶ perhaps survives: they not only misconstrue χρηματιστικὴ and take it to be concerned with money (5), but they also misconstrue πλοῦτος and take it to be abundance of money.
So we have τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὸν χρηματιστικὴν, 18.

and Aristot. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 23 sqq. But it is possible that the Cynics, or some of them, are also here referred to. The Eryxias, which is included among the dialogues ascribed to Plato, appears to treat the subject of money and wealth from a Cynical point of view, and we find in it not indeed the exact arguments here used, but arguments pointing to the same conclusion—e.g. 403 D, τι οὐκ ἐκείνον τὸν λόγον διετέλεσα, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα οὐκ ἔστι χρήματα, χρυσίων καὶ ἀργυρίων καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; When we are told (18) that the persons referred to by Aristotle in the passage before us sought wealth and χρηματιστική in something other than the things to which these names were commonly given, we are reminded of Eryxias 403 C, ἑπιστήμην γὰρ τίνα παραδίδους τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἁμα καὶ πλούσιον αὐτῶν πεποίηκε, and Diog. Laert. 6. 68, who says of the Cynic Diogenes—τὴν παιδείαν εἶπε τοὺς μὲν νέους σωφροσύνην, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παραμιθίαν, τοὺς δὲ πένης πλούτου, τοὺς δὲ πλούσιοι κόσμον εἶναι. The Cynics seem to have made out knowledge how to use things to be real wealth, and its acquisition true χρηματιστική. Compare the doctrine of the Stoics that 'the wise man alone is rich,' and see Cic. Paradoxa Stoicorum 6. 3. 51. Zeno of Citium in his ideal polity, which was much coloured by Cynicism, abolished the use of money altogether (Diog. Laert. 7. 33, νόμισμα δὲ οὔτ' ἄλλαγης ἐνεκεν ὀφεσθαί δὲν κατασκευάζειν οὔτε ἀποδημίας ἐνεκεν). The arguments used by the inquirers here referred to are far from convincing, though Aristotle does not stop to comment on them: money does not necessarily become valueless when deprived of the character of money (cp. τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ δὲν, 1257 a 36), and as Lord Macaulay noted on the margin of his copy of the Politics (Macmillan's Magazine, July 1875, p. 220), 'a man who has plenty of clothes and drink may die of hunger, yet you would call clothes and drink wealth.' Aristotle, it is true, speaks (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 31) of money being made 'useless' by demonetization, and he also looks upon articles of subsistence as furnishing the truest type of wealth (ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν, 1258 a 17), but he would hardly go so far as the inquirers he refers to here. Things which serve for clothing and as ἄργανα are to him part of true wealth (1256 b 15 sqq.).


μεταθεμέλειν. Mr. Welldon: 'give up a currency and adopt another.' For this use of the word, compare Fragm. Aristot. 568. 1561 b 4. ἔλαβεν ὁ Ἐὔδης γυναῖκα καὶ συνὼκε μεταθεμέλειν τὸν ὄμοι 'Ἀριστοδέξιν, and the use of the word μεταστήσωσιν in 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 8. Cp. also Plato, Laws 889 E.
12. οὐτέ. See critical note.
14. ἀπορέσσε. For this use of the third person, see Bon. Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.: 763 a 25 sq.
15. ἀπολείταται. For the future after τοιοῦτων οὗ, cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 36. Compare also Plato, Ethyd. 299 D–E.

τὸν Μίδαν ἐκεῖνον, sc. ἀπολείπόται.

20. Bekker reads ἢ δὲ καπηλική ποιητική χρηματῶν κ.τ.λ.: thus he evidently, like the Vet. Int., makes ἢ καπηλική the nominative. Susemihl’s stopping, however, which I have adopted, seems preferable. With this stopping, the translation will be—‘but the other is commercial.’ Cp. 1. 10. 1258 a 39.

21. ἀλλ' ἢ. All MSS. have ἀλλ' ἢ or ἀλλ' ἢ, none ἀλλ᾽. The sentence would have been regularly constructed, if it had run—οὐ ποιητική χρηματῶν ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ χρηματῶν μεταξοθές, οὐ ποιητική χ. οὐ πάντως, ἀλλὰ διὰ χ. μ. μόνον. Instead of adopting either of these forms, Aristotle anticipates in οὐ πάντως the coming exception and employs both οὐ πάντως and ἀλλ' ἢ: cp. Plato, Protag. 354 B, ἢ ἤχετ' τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν . . . ἄλλ' ἢ ἤδονας τε καὶ λέπτας, where Riddell (Apol. p. 175) remarks, ‘the ἄλλο is anticipatory of the exception, and this is also pleonastic.’

22. καὶ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. It is thought to be concerned with money, because it operates through exchange and money is the starting-point and goal of exchange. In reality, however, it deals with κτήσις (37), the same subject-matter as οἰκονομικὴ χρηματιστική deals with, though with a different aim. Στοιχείων, ‘id quod est simplissimum, ex quo reliqua consequentur’ (Bon. Ind. 702 b 32): cp. παραθέσθως οὐν ἢδον νομίσματος, 1257 a 41. Πέρας, ‘quía contenta haec ratio rei quaerendae est cum coacervat nummos, nec aliud sibi proponit’ (Vict.). Cp. Hegesipp. Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 479).

Οὐκ, ἄλλα τὸ πέρας τῆς μαγειρικῆς, Σύρη, εὐρηκέαν πάντων νόμιζε μονὸν ἐμὲ:

and Posidipp. Fr. (ibid. 4. 521),

Τῆς τέχνης πέρας
toūτ' ἐστιν.

Aristotle, however, recognizes a kind of exchange which is carried on independently of money and before money comes into being.

23. καὶ . . . δή. See note on 1253 a 18. Here is a further distinction between the καπηλική and the οἰκονομικὴ χρηματιστικὴ. Not only does the former seek wealth by means of exchange alone, but it aims at an unlimited amount. It makes wealth, which is a means, an end,
and as all arts pursue their end to an indeterminate extent, it consequently pursues wealth to an indeterminate extent.

25. εἰς ἀπειρὸν ἐστὶ. Cp. 1258 a 1, εἰς ἀπειρὸν οὖν ἐκέινης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὖσης, and Metaph. Π. 5. 1010 a 22, εἰναι εἰς ἀπειρὸν, where Bekker conjectures ἦναι without necessity: see Bonitz on the passage.

27. ἐκεῖνο. See above on 1257 a 3.

29. οἱ τοιοῦτοι κ.τ.λ., i.e. οἱ χρηματιστικὸς πλοῦτος—'a mass of χρήματα, and especially money, and the quest of this by exchange alone.'

30. τῆς δ’ οἰκονομικῆς κ.τ.λ. It is natural, looking to τὸ ἄκαλπτο τῆς χρηματιστικῆς 28, to explain τῆς οἰκονομικῆς as τῆς οἰκονομικῆς χρηματιστικῆς, and with this view to propose the excision of οὖ, or the substitution of αὖ (Bernays), which the wrong reading of οὖν for αὖ by Π³ in 1268 a 39 might well be used to support. But perhaps no change is necessary, for χρημάτων κτήσεως is very probably that which we are to supply. Transl.: 'but of housekeeping, not money-making, acquisition of commodities there is a measure, for money-making is not the business of the housekeeping acquisition of commodities.' Τούτο appears to refer to οἱ τοιοῦτοι πλοῦτος κ.τ.λ. Contrast 38, ὅστε δικεῖ τινὶ τούτι ἐναὶ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς [χρήσεως τῆς χρηματιστικῆς] ἔργον—i.e. ἡ αἰείς.

32. τῇ μὲν. Vict. 'hac quidem'—i.e. if at all, argumentis ducimus. The reasoning referred to is that which is set forth in 1257 a 10-31, where we learn that true wealth is that which is necessary to sustenance and for the purposes of the household generally, and that this kind of wealth is limited by the needs of the household (cp. also 1256 b 26-37). Lamb., however, followed by Bernays, translates 'huic quidem'—i.e. for the οἰκονομικῆ χρηματιστικῆ—not rightly, as it seems to me.

33. ἐπὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but we see the opposite occurring in the experience of life.' For συμβαίνοντα ἐπὶ, cp. de Gen. An. 2. 5. 741 b 19, συμβαίνει δ’ ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ τελευταῖον γινώσκον πρώτων ἀπολείπει, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον τελευταῖον. Aristotle is met by a contrariety between ὁ λόγος and τὰ γινόμενα (or τὰ συμβαίνοντα), and we might expect that he would apply the famous principle of de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 27 sqq., ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦ λόγου τὰ περὶ τῆς γινέσεως τῶν μελετῶν τούτων ἔχει τὸ τρόπων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν συμβαίνων δικοῦτον περὶ αὐτῶν. οὐ μὴν εἴληπται γε τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἰκανῶς, ἀλλ’ ἐν ποτὲ λεπτῇ, τότε τῇ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λόγῳ πιστεύειν, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν ὁμολογούμενα δεικνύομαι τοῖς φαινομένοις. But the question here is what ought to be and not what is, and τὰ γινόμενα are not as decisive as in a problem of
natural history; men's action, as Aristotle proceeds to point out, is in this matter the offspring of mistake.

δρω(μεν). See critical note.

πάντες γάρ κ. τ. λ. Cr. Xen. de Vectig. 4. 7, καὶ γάρ δὴ ἔστιν μὲν, ἐπεὶ δὲν ἡ τοιαύτη τῇ αἰκίᾳ, οὐ μάλα ἢ τὸ προσωπονότατα ἀγρύψων δὲ οὐδεὶς ποιοῦν πιθῶν κτήσιτι, ὡστε μὴ ἢ τὸ προσδείασθαι.

35. αἰτίων δὲ κ. τ. λ. What is αἰτίων? I incline to think, not the two kinds of χρηματιστική, but the two kinds of χρηματίσων κτήσις (30), or in other words, the two uses of χρηματιστική. The reason why men act as if wealth were subject to no limit is the mutual proximity and similarity of the two ways of using χρηματιστική. For either use of χρηματιστική, being of the same thing, overlaps the other, so as to seem one and the same; for property—the subject-matter of both (cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 13 sq.)—is applied by both to (or has to do with) the same use, but not with the same aim, the aim of the one mode of using it being its increase and that of the other something quite different. The two kinds of χρηματιστική are, in fact, only two different uses of the same science, or even an identical use, only with a different aim. Εκατέρα, which is the reading of all known MSS., though three MSS. of the Vet. Int. (b g h) have utrique pecuniariae, seems to be placed where it is to bring out the antithesis to τοῦ αἰτίου οὖσα more sharply. Sepulveda appears to have found ἐκατέρα in some MSS. (see critical note on 1257 b 36). There is certainly some strangeness in the immediate sequence of ἐκατέρα ἡ χρήσις and τῆς αἰτίς χρήσεως, and the genitive τῆς αἰτίς χρήσεως is perplexing. But if we accept, with Bern. and Sus., Götting’s emendation τῆς γὰρ αἰτίς ἦστι κτήσις χρήσις, we are not out of our difficulties, for τῆς αἰτίς κτήσεως is not a satisfactory expression. Perhaps the reduction of the two uses of χρηματιστική mentioned in 35-36 to the one use not κατὰ ταύτων of 37 may be no more than the word ἐπαλλάττει prepares us for. For the phrase τῆς γὰρ αἰτίς ἦστι κτήσεως κτήσις, Soph. El. 11. 171 b 29 may be compared (the passage also illustrates ὥστε κατὰ ταύτων)—καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν αἰτίων μὲν εἶτιν οἱ φιλέρεσθε καὶ σοφασταὶ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῶν αἰτίων ἑνεκέρ για καὶ λόγος ἢ αἰτίς μὲν ἦσται σοφαστικός καὶ ἑρμηνευτικός, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ ταύτων, ἀλλ’ ἢ μὲν νίκῃς φανερώμενες, ἑρμηνευτικές, ἢ δὲ σοφίας, σοφαστικές. Cr. also Pol. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 33, ὅταν ὅλως περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὕσιν εὑρήμασί συμβατίσῃ ποιώειν μνειαν, πῶς ἐκ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐξεν πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν αἰτίν; In 7 (5). 2. 1302 a 37 we have διὲ καὶ ὡς μὲν ἦστι ταύτα τοις εὑρήμασι, ἀλλ’ οἱ ὑπολάβοι.

38. ὡστε κ. τ. λ. takes up ἐπαλλάττει: the two uses of χρηματιστική overlap, and so the end of the καταλέγει χρήσις—the increase of
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property—is taken to be the end of the οἰκονομική χρήσις (for perhaps it is more natural to supply χρήσις here than χρηματιστική). Householders are thus led to follow the example of οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι in the use of property and to make its indefinite increase their aim. Aristotle seems, however, after all (40 sqq.) to trace the confusion of the οἰκονομική χρήσις of property with the κατηκληκή χρήσις of it to something more than the ἐπιλαξία of the two—to a wrong view of the purpose of life and of the nature of τὸ εὖ ζήν. Either men forget everything else for mere existence (τὸ ζήν), or they erroneously take τὸ εὖ ζήν to consist in bodily enjoyment. The same two contrasted classes of misusers of property appear in 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 36 sqq., and in a saying ascribed to Aristotle by Plutarch (de Cupiditate Divit. 8. 527 A), σὺ δὲ οὐκ ἀκούεις, φήσομεν, Ἀριστοτέλειον λέγοντος, ὅτι οἱ μὲν οἱ χρῆσαι [τοὺς χρήματα], οἱ δὲ παραχρῆσαι (I owe this quotation to an unpublished essay by the late Mr. R. Shute). As to the former of the two classes, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1120 a 2, δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλεια τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ώς τὸν ζήν διὰ τοῦτον ὑπεπρετερέωμεν, καὶ τότε μὲν (while in the enjoyment of the pleasures of youth) εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες: Eurip. Fragm. 284. 3–6: Hyperid. Fragm. 209 Blass, μὴ δύνασθαι καλῶς ζῆν, μὴ μαθῶν τὰ καλὰ τὰ εὖ τὸ βιό (and these Hyperides notoriously interpreted in this way): Theopomp. Fr. 260. Our own expression ‘living well’ is, however, illustration enough.

40. τὴν κ.τ.λ., ‘their wealth in money’: see below on 1259 b 19.

1258 a. 1. εἰς ἀπειρον . . . οὐσίας. See note on 1257 b 25.
2. οὕσι δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ., ‘and those who do aim at’; or perhaps the sense of καὶ is ‘at all’ (see Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 168).
4. καὶ τούτ’, i. e. not only τὸ ζῆν, but also τὸ πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις.

6. ὕληθεν. For this use of the word, see 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 14 sq. and Bon. Ind. 288 a 52 sq.

10. τῶν δυνάμεων here seems to include not only arts like στρατηγική, but also virtues like ἀνδρία: contrast Eth. Nic. 2. 4. 1105 b 20 sqq. and 5. 1. 1129 a 11 sqq.

οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. Plato (Rep. 346) had already insisted that pay is the end of the art of payment, not of medicine, or building, or navigation (cp. Rep. 342 D, ὁμολογεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβῆς ἱστρός σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων, ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστικῆς. There is perhaps a reminiscence of the passage before us in Magn. Mor. 1. 25. 1192 a 15 sqq., and possibly in Lucian, Cynicus 545.
11. ἑπατηγικῆς. Generals of the type of Charès (see Theopomp. ap. Athen. Deipn. 532 b sq.) were perhaps present to Aristotle’s mind. Aristotle does not refer to the ways of contemporary politicians, but he might well have done so: see Prof. S. H. Butcher, Demosthenes (p. 13), who cites Demosth. Olynth. 3. c. 26 and Isocr. Areopag. § 25. Sophists also used their ψανομένη σοφία with a view to χρηματισμῷ, Soph. El. ii. 171 b 27 sqq.

13. τοῦτο, i.e. τὸ χρηματίζεισθαι, which must be supplied from χρηματιστικάς.

τοῖς, ‘the end of all these δυνάμεις.’ Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 5 sq. for a very similar expression.

15. δι’ αἰτίαν τίνα κτλ. It has been explained (1257 b 40–1258 a 14) that men come to need the unsound kind of χρηματιστική, because they live for τὸ ζηων or for τὸ εὖ ζηων wrongly interpreted.

17. ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφῆν. The sound form of χρηματιστική is, however, concerned with the acquisition of many things besides τροφή —e.g. ἐσθής, ἀργανα, δοῦλα, as is explained in c. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq. Still Aristotle viewed articles of subsistence as the type of true wealth, herein apparently following the inquirers referred to in 1257 b 10 sqq., and trifling inexactnesses are not rare in the Politics, so that this one need not disturb us.

19. εἶ ἄρχας, c. 8. 1256 a 4, though there no reference had been C. 10, made to πολιτική. It was evidently a common view not only that the main function of the head of a household was to add to the household income, but also that the statesman’s main business was to provide the State with as large a revenue as possible: cp. c. ii. 1259 a 35, διάπερ τινές καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι τῶν πολιτευομένων ταῦτα μόνον, and see the account given of the πολιτής ἁγαθὸς in Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1446 b 33, ὅτις προσάδευσεν παραισκευάζει πλείστας, τῶν ἑδόσων μηδένα δημούων, and Theopompos’ picture of Fabulus (Fr. 96: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 293)—Εὔβουλος . . . δημαγωγὸς ἦν ἐπιμαθέσατος, ἐπιμελῆς τε καὶ φιλόσοφος, ἀργυρῶν τε συχνῶν πορίζον τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δείνεμεν διό καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τῆς ταύτης πολιτείας ἀναδροτάτην καὶ ῥαθυμοτάτην συνείχατα. Aristotle’s object here is to correct these erroneous conceptions of the office of the Statesman and the head of a household.

20. οὐ, not οίκ., though preceding ἄλλα, as in 1258 a 33 and 3. 14. 1284 b 39. ‘Οὐ is used before a vowel without the final η when it stands at the end of a clause and when it is emphatic: cf. Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 2: Cyr. 2. 3. 8. 5. 31. 8. 1. 5: Mem. 4. 7. 7’ (Holden, Oeconomicus of Xenophon, p. 191). For the transition to ἄλλα, cp. 1258 a 33: 3. 7. 1279 b 1: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 2.

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21. τοῦτο, not probably ἡ χρηματιστική, though this would harmonize well with c. 8. 1256 b 28, but χρήματα as in 35 (μάλιστα δὲ, καθάπερ εἶρηται πρῶτερον, δὲι φύτει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν). For the thought that the statesman has not, any more than the weaver, to produce the material on which he exercises his art, cp. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sqq.: 13. 1332 a 28. Cp. also Plato, Laws 889 A. Aristotle speaks somewhat differently in Phys. 2. 2. 194 b 7, ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἣμεις ποιούμεν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ ἔργου ἑνεκα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει οὐσα.

ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ ... οὖτω καί. See Sus.¹, Ind. Gramm. ὡσπερ.

23. τροφήν κ.τ.λ. 'So for sustenance nature must make over land or sea or something else.' Cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 5 sq., and Antiphon, Tetral. 3. 1. 2. For a similar use of τροφήν, cp. Xen. Oecon. 17. 14, ἡ ἀν ἐκείνα ἐγραφάμενα τροφήν καταβάουσι. For ἄλλο τι, cp. 8. c. 1256 a 37, Λίμνας καί Ἐλῃ καί ποταμοῖς ἡ βάλλαταν τοιαῦτα. The food of animals, indeed, is rather that which comes from earth and water, than earth and water (de Gen. An. 3. 11. 762 b 12); earth and water are food rather for plants (ibid.): still food is said to be a mixture of earth and water in de Part. An. 3. 5. 668 b 11.

24. ἐκ δὲ τοῦτων κ.τ.λ. Schneider, Bonitz (according to Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 356), and Susemihl himself explain ἐκ τοῦτων here as = μετὰ ταύτα, and there is much to be said for their view, though perhaps this use of ἐκ τοῦτων is more common in Xenophon than in Aristotle (as to Plato, see Riddell, Apol. p. 162). This rendering certainly has the merit of softening the harshness of the juxta-position of τοῦτων and ταύτα. But I incline on the whole to think that in the context in which it stands ἐκ τοῦτων means 'starting with this provision.' Ταύτα must mean 'food,' not 'land, sea, etc.,' for it is the function of οἰκοσωμική to deal with the former, not the latter; the word is perhaps in the plural because there are many kinds of food—τροφή ἐκ γῆς, τροφή ἐκ βαλάντισσας κ.τ.λ.

26. γνώναι. Cp. Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 36, δύο δὴ αἱ ἄρχουσα τῆς ὑλῆς καὶ αἱ γνωρίζουσαι τέχνη, ἡ τε χρωμένη καί τῆς ποιητικῆς ἡ ἀρχιτεκτονική. The ship-captain (representing ἡ χρωμένη), ποίον τι τὸ εἶδος τοῦ πηδαλίου, γνωρίζει καὶ ἐπιτάτει: ὁ δὲ (the ἀρχιτέκτων who superintends its construction), ἐκ ποίου ἡλίου καὶ ποίων κινήσεων ἔσται. The claims of ὁ χρωμένεος to be credited with knowledge are also maintained in Pol. 3. 11. 1282 a 17 sq.

27. καὶ γάρ. 'For, if this were not so.'

31. For ἐπί followed by οὖτω, cp. 1253 b 23–31. The householder must know bad commodities from good, but he need not know even the sound methods of producing or acquiring them. Cp. Cic. de Rep. 5. 3. 5.
33. τῶν χρημάτων. The article is probably added, because the
meaning is 'the commodities essential to the household.'

34. The use of the word μαλίστα implies that occasionally the
means of subsistence may not φύει ῥύμηχες, in which case the
householder must provide them as best he can. The territory of
the State may be so infertile and the sea so barren of fish, that a
resort to other modes of acquiring sustenance than the obtainment
of vegetable and animal food from the soil and sea may be in-
evitable. Aristotle's meaning may be illustrated by the instance of
λυπρότητα τῆς χώρας τῶν ἀνθρώπων θαλασσορυγώστων ἐμπορίκως.

πρότερον, 1258 a 23.

35. The proof that it is for Nature to supply the animal once
brought into the world with food, is that every creature finds its
food in the unexhausted residuum of the matter from which it
takes its origin, or in other words receives it from the hands of
Nature (c. 8. 1256 b 7 sqq.: see note on 1256 b 12). So we read
in de Gen. et Corr. 2. 8. 335 a 10, ἄπαντα μὲν γὰρ τρέφεται τοῖς αὐτοῖς
ἐξ ωσπερ ἔστιν. Not only is the earliest food used by an animal
born with him and the gift of Nature, but animals subsist through-
out life on the products of the earth and water of which they are
made (Meteor. 4. 4. 382 a 6 sqq.). Cp. Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 30,
ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν [ἡ γεωργία] ἦν φύει γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἡ τρο-
φή πάσιν ἔστιν, ὡστε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, and Lucr. 2. 1156,

Sed genuit tellus cadem quae nunc alit ex se:
Aristotle, however, would say 'land and water,' and would speak
not of the mother, but of the unused residuum as the true source
of food. But, if food is always won from land and water, all other
commodities, it is implied, should be sought from the same quarter,
and the Science of Supply should thus procure them.

38. πᾶσιν. Cp. c. 8. 1256 b 7, ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κτήσις ἐν' αὐτῆς
φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδαμένη πᾶσιν (i.e. πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις), though here
πᾶσι seems to mean 'for all human beings,' as in c. 2. 1253 a 30.

2. ἀπ' ἀλλήλων stands in contrast to ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων. 1258 b.
Cp. Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 a 21, διὸ τῶν ἐλευθερίων καὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων τιμῶσι
καὶ τοὺς δικαίους· τουούτοις δὲ ἐπολαμβάνουσι τοὺς μὴ ἀπ' ἐτέρων ἐνυπάρχοντας
tοιούτοι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργαζομένου, καὶ τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
οἱ αὐτοκηρομένη μᾶλλον. The idea is still further worked out in Oecon.
1. 2. 1343 a 27, ἢ δὲ γεωργικὴ μάλιστα [κτήσεως ἐμπείρεια] ὃτι δικαίως
οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων οὐθ' ἐκυστῶν, ἀσπερ καπηλεία καὶ οἱ μαθαρικαι, οὐθ'
ἄκωσιν, ἀσπερ αἱ πολεμικαί. Here the writer has before him Plato,
Soph. 219 D.
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η ὀβολοστατική, 'the trade of a petty usurer' (L. and S.): see also Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 501, n. 7, who quotes from Etymolog. Magn. 725. 13, ὀβολοστάτας γούν οἱ Ἀρτικοὶ τοὺς ὀλίγα δανείζοντας ἔλεγον ὑπερβολικῶς. Aristotle's objection seems to apply as much to lenders of large sums at usury as to lenders of small; but we find τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλὰ single out as objects of obloquy in the Nicomachean Ethics also (4. 3. 1121 b 34). Cp. M. Cato, de Re Rustica, praef.: maiores nostri hoc sic habuerunt, et ita in legibus posuerunt, furem dupli condemnari, feneratorem quadrupli; quanto peiorem civem existimaret feneratorem quam furem, hinc licet existimari. See also Cic. de Offic. 2. 25. 89, and Sandys and Paley on Demosth. contra Steph. 1. c. 70.

3. διὰ τὸ κ.τ.λ., 'because profit is acquired' (literally perhaps, 'the acquisition of profit results'): cp. for κτήσει, 1257 b 30 and 1256 a 19), 'from money taken by itself, and not from exchange, for which money was introduced.' For the eclipse of ἀπὸ τούτου before ἐφ' ἐπερ ἐπορίσθη, cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 3: 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 27: 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 29-30. In usury, according to Aristotle here, the profit comes from money taken by itself, not subjected to any process of exchange, nor converted into corn or any other commodity—the use for which it is intended. It was introduced to serve as a medium of exchange, not to grow, but usury makes it grow. It makes money come out of money, and hence the Greek word for interest (τόκος), for as children are like their parents, so is interest money no less than the principal which begets it. Things, however, should be used for the purpose for which they exist (c. 9. 1258 a 10); hence this mode of acquisition is in an especial degree unnatural. Νόμισμα νομίσματος is perhaps, like Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους, meant to express a filial relation. The nature of Interest on Money seems to be better understood in c. 11 (see below on 21).

C. 11. 9. We now come to a chapter differing both in matter and manner from the chapters which precede and follow it, and for which we can hardly be said to have been prepared in advance. A friend has expressed to me a doubt of its authenticity, and even if we hold it to be Aristotelian, it might be (as some other passages of the Politics appear to be) a subsequent addition, due either to Aristotle himself or to some succeeding editor. The question deserves examination, and it will be well to notice here a few considerations on either side.

The opening words of c. 8 promise an inquiry into all kinds of property and all forms of the Science of Supply. The question
whether the Science of Supply is a part of the Science of Household Management is here indeed singled out as the first question to be discussed, but we gather that other questions also will be treated. Still no reference is made to a division of the inquiry into a part relating to τὰ πρὸς τὴν γρόσων and a part relating to τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν. C. 11, however, starts with this distinction. 'Επεὶ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γρόσων διωρίκαμεν ἰκανῶς, τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δὲι διειλέειν (c. 11. inii). We have learnt—this seems to be the meaning—to distinguish the sound and unsound forms of the Science of Supply.

We have also learnt how far the οἰκονομικός has, as such, to concern himself with the Science of Supply; but we have not yet learnt in any degree how to practise this Science, nor which of its branches are most safe or most profitable or most alien to a freeman, nor generally what are the principles of successful money-making. There is nothing un-Aristotelian in giving advice to lovers of money-making (τοῖς τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, c. 11. 1259 a 5), for Aristotle disapproves of the tyranny and the extreme democracy at least as strongly as he disapproves of a money-making spirit, yet he advises both these constitutions how best to secure their own continuance. Besides, States may find the inquiries of this chapter useful (1259 a 33 sq.). And if to us instruction how to farm and trade seems to fall outside the province of a treatise on Household Management and Politics, this was not the view of Aristotle’s time, for Xenophon had sketched in his Oeconomicus how a farm was to be managed; the only novelty in this chapter is that it studies the principles of commercial success.

And then again, if Aristotle does not prepare us in c. 8 or elsewhere in the First Book for a consideration of τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν in relation to the Science of Supply, it is nevertheless the case that in entering on the question of slavery (c. 3. 1253 b 14 sqq.) he had announced his aim to be not only to arrive at conclusions on the subject better than those commonly held, but also to throw light on the use to be made of the slave (τὰ τε πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαῖαν χρείαν ἕδωκεν, 1253 b 15), and a similar inquiry respecting χρηματιστικὴ is not unnatural. Throughout the Politics τὸ χρήσιμον, no less than τὸ ῥῆθος, is kept in view (see e.g. 2. 1. 1260 b 32 sqq.: 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35 sqq.)

On the other hand, the account given of χρηματιστικὴ in c. 11 differs in many respects from that given in cc. 8–10. Three kinds of χρηματιστικὴ are now distinguished, not two only as before—the natural kind (or, as it is also now called, ή οἰκειωτάτη), ή μεταφληγική, and a kind midway between the two of which we have heard
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nothing in cc. 8–10, and we find labouring for hire (μισθαρνία) and lending money at interest (τοκισμός) ranged under ἡ μεταβλητική χρηματιστική, whereas in cc. 8–10 nothing has been said of μισθαρνία, and ὁμολογιακή has been described as winning money, not from any process of exchange, but from the barren metal itself. The inclusion, however, of the work of the τεχνίτης, as a form of μισθαρνία, under ἡ μεταβλητική χρηματιστική is quite borne out by 1. 13. 1260 b 2, where τεχνίται are said not to exist by nature, though it does not seem to agree with the recognition of the τεχνίτης elsewhere (4 (7). 8. 1328 b 21: 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 1 sqq.) as one of the necessary elements of a State. The reference to writers on the subject and to τὰ λεγόμενα σποράδον (1258 b 39 sqq.), again, is in accordance with the advice given in Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 b 30 sqq., and this passage of c. 11 may well have been present to the mind of the writer of the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics, whoever he was (see Oecon. 2. 1346 a 26 sqq.). Hieronymus of Rhodes, as has been observed elsewhere, may possibly have had a passage from this chapter (1259 a 9 sqq.) before him. The writer of the sketch or epitome of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics which is preserved in the Eclogae of Stobaeus (2. 6. 17) would seem to be acquainted with the earlier part of c. 11 down to the notice of μεταλλευτική, for he says, δὲ ὁ καὶ πολλῶν ζυμετρων δειν εἶναι τῶν οἰκονομικῶν, γεωργίας προβατεῖες μεταλλεύεις, ἵνα τοὺς λυσιτελεστάνουσι ἁμα καὶ δικαιοτίτους καρπους διαμισθήσῃ: he may well have been acquainted with the later part also, though he does not mention anything from it. The following passage from the First Book of the Oeconomics may likewise be based on the teaching of c. 11—κτήσεως δὲ πρώτη ἐπιμέλεια ἡ κατά φύσιν κατὰ φύσιν δὲ γεωργική προτέρα, καὶ δεύτερα ὅσι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, οἶον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἰ τις ἀλλή τοιαύτη (c. 2. 1343 a 25 sqq.).

On the whole, I incline to think that this chapter is Aristotelian, and perhaps coeval with the rest of the First Book.

10. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαύτα κ.τ.λ. Stahr translates: 'auf diesem ganzen Gebiet hat freilich die Theorie freies Spiel, während die Praxis an nothwendige Bedingungen gebunden ist.' Bern. and Sus. follow him in this translation, and Mr. Welldon's version is—'it is to be observed, however, that in all such matters speculation is free, while in practice there are limiting conditions.' Vict. however translates—'cuncta autem huiuscemodi contemplationem habent libero homine dignam, usum vero necessarium'—and I incline to this view of the passage. We have ἐλευθέρα ἀγορά, 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 32: ἐλευθέρα ἐπιστήμη, Metaph. Λ. 2. 982 b 27.
Prof. Tyrrell (Hermathena, 12. 28) "thinks it will be found that ἐλεύθερος when of two terminations always means "liberalis," not "liber." The aim of the remark will then be to distinguish between what is liberal and what is not so in relation to these matters—an aim which appears also below, 1258 b 34–39, as well as in the contrast of ἐντυμήτερα and ἀναγκαιώτερα ἔργα, c. 7. 1255 b 28, and in 5 (8). 2. 13.37 b 15 sqq. We are told, in fact, that though speculation about matters relating to the practice of χρηματιστική is liberal, the exercise of the arts which fall under the head of χρηματιστική is not so. So in de Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 5 sqq. Aristotle tells us that he will treat of Zoology μηδὲν παραλιπόνων εἰς δύναμιν μὴ τιμιώτερον μὴ τιμιώτερον καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μη κεχαρισμένοις αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν ἔργων) πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὅμως ἡ δημιουρ- γίασσα φύσει ἀμηχανέος ἢδονάς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζει καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφως. It appears from Plato, Laws 889 D, that there were those who ranked agriculture very high among the sciences.

12. ἐστὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Varro in his De Re Rustica (lib. 2. praef. 5) gives a similar account of the qualifications which a farmer should possess:—quarum (sc. agriculturae et passionis) quoniam societas inter se magna ... qui habet praedium, habere utramque debet disciplinam, et agriculturae et pecoris pascendi, et etiam villaticae passionis: ex ea enim quoque fructus tolli possunt non mediocres, ex ornithonibus ac leporariis et piscinis. Compare also the opening lines of Virgil's Georgies, and Cicero de Senectute 15. 54. The following passage of Varro, de Re Rustica (2. 1. 16) is very similar to that before us—in qua regione quamque potissimum pascas, et quando, et quies? ut capras in montuosis potius loqusc et fruticibus, quam in herbidis campis, equas contra; neque eadem loca aestiva et hiberna idonea omnibus ad pascendum. It will be noticed that Aristotle places 'res pecuaria' before 'agricultura,' perhaps because pastoral farming long prevailed more extensively in Greece than agriculture (Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, pp. 208 sqq., 313), perhaps because it was more lucrative (cp. Cic. de Offic. 2. 25. 89), perhaps because animals like the horse and ox deserve precedence. We hear nothing from him as to the employment of slaves as a source of profit.

χρήσιμα (cp. 30. ἀκάρπων μὲν χρήσιμων δὲ) apparently takes up τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν and bears probably somewhat the same meaning as in Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 15, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀλευθέρα καὶ χρήσιμα· ἐστι δὲ χρήσιμα μὲν μάλλον τὰ κάρπημα, ἀλευθέρα δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπολασσόν· κάρπημα δὲ λέγω ἄφεν τοις πρῶτοις, ἀπολαυστικὰ δὲ ἄφεν τοις μηδὲν παρὰ τῷ χρήσιν γίγνεται, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον.


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κτήματα is used in 2. 1. 1261 a 5 in the same sense as κτήσεις, 1261 a 8, but here it seems to be used in a sense exclusive of γεωργία (cp. 17), and the illustrations which follow seem to show that its meaning is 'farm-stock' (Vic. 'pecora'). Horses, oxen, sheep, and some other animals (15) are included under κτήματα, but not, it would appear, the water-animals and birds referred to in 19.

13. πῶς. Vic. 'quomodo habita et curata.'

14. κτήσεις ποία τις, 'what course should be followed in the getting of horses,' so as to secure the maximum of profit. Κτήσει includes both breeding and purchase: ποία refers to quantity, quality, kind of animal, etc.

15. τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων, e.g. mules, asses, swine, goats. As to the animals referred to, see above on 12.

πρὸς ἄλληλα. Vic. 'oporet quasi conferre ipsa inter se, videquare ex equorumne gregibus sive armentis boum maiores utilitates capiantur.'

18. ἡδη. Cp. de Gen. An. 2, 6. 742 a 19, τὸ δὲ πρῶτερον ἡδη πολλαχῶς ἐστὶν: ibid. 2. 6. 742 b 33, ἀρχὴ δ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γνωμενοῖς ἡδη πλείους: ibid. 1. 20. 729 a 19, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ συνιστάντος πρῶτον ἐξ ἐνὸς ἡδῆ ἐν γίνεται μόνον. These passages may serve to illustrate the use of ἡδη in the text, though the word does not perhaps bear quite the same meaning in all of them. In the passage before us it may be roughly rendered by 'again.'


μελιτουργίας. As Vic. points out, honey was of more importance to the ancients than to us. See Büchsenschütz, p. 228 sq., who remarks that 'though sugar was known to the ancients, they used it solely for medical purposes, so that the only material they possessed for sweetening food was honey.' Plato's citizens in the Laws are to be γεωργοὶ καὶ νομεῖς καὶ μελιτουργοὶ (842 D).

10. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων. Should we translate 'and concerning the other animals, whether water-animals or winged,' or should we supply 'the management of' before 'the other animals' from the
latter portions of the words γεωργίας, μελισσοφαίας? Perhaps we are intended to supply these words. Aristotle seems here to refer, not to fish and fowl in a wild state, but to poultry-houses and fish-preserves. In his time these appurtenances of a farm would be on a simple and moderate scale, wholly unlike that of the 'villatica pastio' in the days when Roman luxury was at its height (Varro, de Re Rustica 3. 3. 6 sqq.). Yet a great ἰχθυοστροφεῖον existed at Agrigentum early in the fifth century before Christ (Diod. 11. 25. 4).

20. τῆς ... οἰκειοτάτης χρηματιστικῆς, 'of the Science of Supply in its most undistorted form.' The word οἰκείως is used by Aristotle in connexion with κύριος and with κατὰ φύσιν, and in contradistinction to βία (see Bon. Ind. s. v.). Ср. also с. 9. 1257 a 12, οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν χρήσιν, οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν γίγνοντω. 21. τοῦτα μόρια καὶ πρῶτα. Μόρια is sometimes used, like μέρη (Bon. Ind. 455 b 40 sqq.), of 'ea quae naturam alicuius rei constituant ac distinguant' (Bon. Ind. 473 b 55 sqq.), and this would seem to be its meaning here. The simplest elements of a thing are often called πρῶτα, as in Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 5, πρῶτα καὶ εὐάχιστα μέρη οἰκείας (see Bon. Ind. 652 b 42 sqq.), but here πρῶτα appears rather to mean 'the primary or leading elements' (cp. μέγασταν 22): see Bon. Ind. 653 a 26 sqq., 'πρῶτος significat ipsam per se rei notionem et naturam (ut quae iam a principio sit et rem constituat).' So we have in 28, τῆς πρῶτης χρηματιστικῆς (cp. Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 25 sqq.), and in de Caelo 1. 3. 270 b 2, τὸ πρῶτον τῶν σωμάτων. The account now given of the various forms of the οἰκειοτάτης χρηματιστικῆς, which is referred to in 28 as ἡ κατὰ φύσιν, is not harmonized with the account given in с. 8 of the βίας included under the natural χρηματιστικῆς: for instance, we now hear nothing of θυμεῖα. Aristotle, however, here mentions only τὰ πρῶτα.

τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς. Already in с. 10. 1258 b 1 the unsound χρηματιστικῆς has been called μεταβλητικῆς, instead of κατηκλικῆς, and here the change is especially necessary, for ἐμπορία could hardly be brought under κατηκλικῆ without some sense of strangeness. 'Exchanging' comprises, we are told, the transport and sale of commodities (ἐμπορία), and the letting-out of money (τοκισμός) or of labour, skilled or unskilled (μισθαρμία). 'This classification,' says Büchsenschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 455), 'neary approaches that accepted by modern political economy, inasmuch as the first of the three departments has to do with traffic by way of sale, and the second and third with traffic by way of letting, the object let out being in the one case capital (money, land, etc.),
and in the other labour.’ Aristotle, however, makes no reference to the letting of land. Büchsenschütz points out that in Plato’s Sophist (219 D) μίσθωσις is already brought under μεταβλητική (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 251 n.). He also compares Plato, Rep. 371 E, οἱ δὲ πωλούντες τὴν τῆς ιδιχως χρειὰν κέκληται μισθωτοί. In the passage before us Aristotle regards the work of the βάναυσος τεχνίτης as a form of μισθαρία: in Pol. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 12 sqq., however, μισθαρικαί ἔργασίαι are distinguished from βάναυσοι τέχναι.

22. ναυκληρία φορτηγία παράστασις. Sus. and others translate the first two words, ‘maritime trade,’ ‘inland trade’; but Büchsenschütz (p. 456 and note 1) explains them otherwise. According to him, ἐμπορία is here resolved into the three elements—the provision of a ship, the conveyance of cargo, and exposure for sale. The ναυκληρος lets out a ship, sometimes (Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 11) himself taking passage in it; the merchant transports goods from point to point; and the salesman, wholesale or retail, sets out goods for sale. Ἐμπορία is thus made to include the work of the κάπηλος, if this interpretation is correct. That φορτηγία does not refer exclusively to land-trade, appears from C. F. Hermann, Griech. Antiqq. 3. § 45. 6 (ed. 2). According to Büchsenschütz (p. 458), the transport of commodities was effected in Greece almost entirely by sea. It should be added that the same individual might often be ναυκληρος, φορτηγός, and wholesale salesman in one.

23. παράστασις would probably be safer and less remunerative than ναυκληρία and φορτηγία. As to the chances of ναυκληρία, see Eth. Eud. 7. 14. 1247 a 21 sqq., and for the general ὁρός ἀσφαλείας, Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 19 sqq. A shield-mannafactory was safer than a bank (see Sandys and Paley on Demosth. Pro Phorm. c. 11). The remark in the text is interposed to give useful guidance in the practice of χρηματιστική (cp. τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν, 1258 b 9); we find a similar hint in Oecon. 1. 6. 1344 b 28 sqq.

26. τῶν ἀτέχνων κ.τ.λ. is masc. There is no need to alter τεχνῶν to τεχνιτῶν. Similar transitions occur in 1. 10. 1258 a 33–34 (τοῦ ἀκοινόμου . . . τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς) and 3. 1. 1275 a 23–26. As the labour of the θῆς is of a purely physical kind, he is nearly akin to the slave: cp. 1258 b 38 and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 21, θητικῶν καὶ δουλικῶν.

27. τρίτων δὲ εἴδος κ.τ.λ. How can this kind be said to possess any of the characteristics of μεταβλητική? Probably because, though the commodities it acquires are acquired from the earth, it does not seek wealth ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων (1258 a 38), but
seeks it from things ἄκαρπα μὲν χρήσιμα δὲ, such as timber-trees, just as metathetic seeks it ἀπ' ἀλλήλων or from money.

29. ὁσα κ.τ.λ. '(Having to do with) things won from the earth and from products of the earth not yielding fruit, but still useful.' For the ellipse, see notes on 1253 b 3, 1256 b 26. Of commodities won ἀπὸ γῆς marble or chalk may serve as an example: timber is an instance of a commodity won ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δὲ. Metals probably fall under the former head, notwithstanding that they are called, together with some other mineral products, τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ γινόμενα (Meteor. 3. 6. 378 a 19 sqq.).

32. ἵδη, 'again' (see above on 18). The indifferent use of τένως and εἶδος should be noted here. Cp. Rhet. 1. 2-3, 1358 a 33-36.

35. φορτικὸν. Cp. Rhet. 3. 1. 1403 b 35. οὖσα δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περί αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λείαν ὑψεί προβλήθηκαν καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ἐπολαμβανόμενον. To overdo the illustration of one's meaning is φορτικὸν (Poet. 26. 1461 b 27 sqq.). And those who pay too much attention to τὸ χρήσιμον especially merit the epithet (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9: 5 (8). 3. 1338 b 2). Cp. also 7 (5). 11. 1315 a 40, περίφρον δὲ τὸ λέγειν καθ' ἔκαστον τῶν τοιοῦτων: Metaph. a. 3. 495 a 8 sqq.

εἰσὶ δὲ ... 39. ἄρτης. These remarks come in with singular abruptness, and it is not clear that they are not an interpolation. On the other hand, there is something not quite satisfactory in the sequence, if we omit them and place ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εἴδος κ.τ.λ. immediately after φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. Sussemlh places περὶ ἔκαστον τοῦτων 33—τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν 35 after, instead of before, εἰσὶ δὲ—ἀρτης, but τοιτῶν 33 is thus robbed of its significance and not much is gained in any way. There is this to be said for the passage, that a somewhat similar reference to the varying dignity of different kinds of slave-work is to be found in c. 7. 1255 b 27 sqq.

36. τεχνικῶταται. According to Eth. Eud. 7. 14. 1247 a 5, στρατηγία and κυβερνητική are instances of arts in which τέχνη ἐστὶ, πολὺ μέντοι καὶ τέχνης ἐνπάρχει. Agathon, on the other hand, traced a relation between Art and Fortune in the well-known line, quoted in Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 19, τέχνη τέχνη ἐστερέει καὶ τέχνη τέχνης.

37. βαναυσόταται. Those pursuits also are βαναυσιοί which deteriorate the character or the intelligence (τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν, 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8 sqq.), but this does not conflict with what is said here.

λωβόνται. For the third person plural after τὰ σώματα, see Bon. Ind. 490 a 44 sqq.
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38. δουλικώταται. Cp. i. 2. 1252 a 33: i. 5. 1254 b 18.
39. προσδει, i.e. in addition to technical skill (cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 1181 a 12).

ἐτεί δ’ εστίν κ.τ.λ. According to Varro de Re Rustica i. 1. 8, and Columella i. 1. 7, both Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote on agriculture. See Menage on Diog. Laert. 5. 50. They probably refer to the Γεωργικά, which the list of Aristotle’s works given by the Anonymus of Menage names as spurious (No. 189), though in the Arabic list based on Ptolemaeus (No. 72) it is accounted genuine. See Aristot. Fragm. 255 sq. 1525 b 1 sqq., and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 100. n. 1, who adds—’that Aristotle did not write on agriculture and the cognate subjects, appears from Pol. i. ii. 1258 b 33, 39.’ The Γεωργικά are thus probably spurious. Is it possible that Charcetides of Paros is the same as the Chartodras, whose opinions as to manures are referred to by Theophrastus in Hist. Plant. 2. 7. 4? A Messenian named Charcetidas figures in an inscription (Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscr. Graec. 240. 5, vol. i. p. 346). Apollodorus of Lemnos is mentioned by Varro and Pliny (see Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, s. v.).

1259 a. 3. ἐκ τούτων, ‘with the aid of their writings’: cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 1181 b 17: Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 b 30 sq.: de Gen. An. i. 11. 719 a 10: de Part. An. 2. 16. 660 a 7. As to the collection of scattered notices of instances of commercial sagacity and success, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 3, πάντα γὰρ σχέδον εύρητα μέν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκταται, τοῖς δ’ οὐ χρώνται γινώσκοντες, and Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 b 30 sq. An attempt to act on this suggestion appears to be made in the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics: see Oecon. 2. 1346 a 26 sqq.

6. οἱον κ.τ.λ. ‘such as the feat told of Thales.’ Cp. Plato, Rep. 600 A, ἀλλ’ οία δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα συφόοι ἄνδρος πολλαὶ ἐπίνοιαι καὶ εὐμήχανοι εἰς τέχναις ἢ τινας ἄλλας πρᾶξεις λέγονται, ὡσπερ αὖ θάλεως τε πέρα τοῦ Μιλησίου καὶ Αναχάρσιος τοῦ Σκύθου; Καὶ here as elsewhere serves to introduce an example. It is not quite clear whether οἱον κ.τ.λ. is adduced in illustration of the sentence immediately preceding or of ἐτι δὲ . . . συνλέγειν. Perhaps Sus. is right in taking the former view of the passage—cp. τούτο γὰρ ἐστι κατανόημα τι χρηματιστικών, which seems to take up πάντα γὰρ ὡφέλιμα ταύτῃ ἐστι τοῖς τιμῶσαι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, and also 1259 a 33, χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τῶς πολιτικῶν, which seems to refer back to the same words. The passage also gains in point when taken in this way, for it conveys a hint that Aristotle is aware how paradoxical the idea of χρηματιστικῶν learning anything from Thales
will appear to his readers. Τοῦ Μιλησίου is added to distinguish him from the Cretan Thales mentioned in 2. 12. 1274 a 28. His ingenuity was proverbial (Aristoph. Aves 946); yet there was also a popular impression that he was σοφός, but not φράνμος (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 b 3 sqq.).


τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τί δὲν, i.e. not confined to philosophers like Thales, but generally applicable in commercial transactions. We have not here a σοφὸς devising a novel subtlety, but rather an instance of the use of a recognized weapon from the armoury of χρηματιστική.


10. ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας. The Egyptian priests claimed to be able to predict καρπῶν φθορὰς ἡ τοῦ ναυτικῶν πολυκαρπίαν by means of their observation of the stars (Diod. 1. 81. 5).


ὁλίγων. The point of the story lies in the smallness of the capital. Thales only paid down the earnest-money of the rent of the olive-presses which he hired, trusting to his future profit to pay the rest. If we compare Cic. de Divin. 1. 49. 111, non plus quam Milesium Thalem, qui ut obiurgatores suos convinceret ostenderetque etiam philosophum, si ei commodum esset, pecuniam facere posse, omnem oleam, antequam florecre coepisset, in agro Milesio coemissem dicitur, we shall see that though this passage is very similar to the passage before us, Cicero's version of the story, nevertheless, as Vict. remarks, misses the point, for only a large capitalist could have done what Thales is described as doing. Cicero can hardly have had this passage of the Politics before him; still less can Pliny, who tells the story of Democritus (Hist. Nat. 18. 28). The version of Hieronymus of Rhodes, though abbreviated, is nearer to the Politics—φησὶ καὶ οὐθέν ηρώνυμος ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν σποριδῶν ἐπομηνίων, ὃτι θαλὸμενος δείξαι [ὁ Θαλῆς] ὡς ἐνα πλούτινα, φορᾶς μελλουσὶς ἀλανῶν ἢσεθατι, προνοφλεγές ἐμαυθώσατο τὰ ἐλαιοργία καὶ πάμπλεπτα αυφείλε χρήματα (Diog. Laert. 1. 26).

We cannot, however, be certain that Aristotle and he were not
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drawing from some common source. If the story is true, it would seem that a citizen of Miletus was legally capable of renting olive-presses in Chios. Chios and Miletus both belonged to the Ionic Confederacy, and a special friendship seems to have existed between the two States (Hdt. 1. 18 : 6. 5). This may have made the thing easier.

diaçoômenai is used because the owners of the presses were many.


15. For the two participles ἐκμισθοῦσα, συλλέξαντα, cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 8, διαλαμβάνοντας τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀφορμὰς διδόντας τρίτην ἐπ᾽ ἐργασίας, and Plato, Rep. 465 C, τὰ δὲ πάντως πορισάμενοι βέμοι παρὰ γυναῖκας τε καὶ οἰκέταις, ταμείεως παραδόντες. But here the participles are in different tenses.

17. πλούτευν, ‘to become rich,’ as in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 20.

18. μὲν οὖν (‘so then’) is here used as in c. 2. 1252 a 34.


‘But, as we said, the plan adopted by Thales—that of trying to secure oneself a monopoly—is a general principle of the science of money-making;’ Τὸ τοιοῦτον is explained by ἐὰν τις . . . κατασκευά-ξειν: compare the use of ἐὰν in Rhet. 3. 5. 1407 b 19, and of ἄτιαν in Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 30.

21. διό. Having said that this plan is not confined to philosophers but embodies a broad principle of money-making (χρηματισ-τικῶν 20), Aristotle points out that some States practise it, when they are in want of money (χρημάτων 22). See on the subject of State-monopolies in Greece Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 547 sqq., who traces them at Selymbria (Oecon. 2. 1348 b 33 sqq.), Byzantium (1346 b 25 sqq.), and Lampasacus (1347 a 32 sqq.), and refers to the scheme of Pythocles at Athens (1353 a 15 sqq.) and to the measures of Cleomenes, the governor of Egypt (1352 b 14 sqq.). ‘There is no evidence,’ he adds, ‘that mon-opolies were anywhere used in Greece, as they have often been in modern States, as a permanent source of revenue.’ ‘Nay,’ Aristotle continues, ‘in Sicily an individual with whom a sum of money had been deposited’—he seems to have had a larger
amount at his disposal than Thales—‘resorted to a similar device, but he found that his success aroused the jealousy of the ruler of the State.’ Thus the story incidentally bears out the assertion made in 21–23, that States occasionally seek revenue from sources of this kind. The hero of this story may probably have been a τραπεζής: cp. Demosth. Pro Phorm. c. 11, ἡ δ’ ἐργασία (of banking) προσόδους ἔχουσα ἐπικυνδύνους ἀπὸ χρημάτων ἀλλοτρίων, and see Büchsenschütz, p. 502.

24. συνεπρίατο. Compare the use of συνονείσθαι in Theopomp. Fr. 219 and Plutarch, de Cupiditate Divitiarum c. 3. 524 B.

25. τῶν σιδηρείων. Bern. ‘iron-mines’: Sus. ‘iron-works.’ The latter rendering is perhaps the more likely to be correct, as the metal would come from smelting-works, even if the ore was obtained in Sicilian mines, which may possibly have been the case, for iron-ore is still ‘found in the mountains of Sicily’ (A. K. Johnston, Dict. of Geography, art. Sicily). Actna and the Lipari islands were famed in myth as the scene of the labours of Hephaestus and the Cyclopes (Virg. Georg. 4. 170 sqq.: Aen. 3. 675 sqq.: 8. 416 sqq.: Ovid, Fasti 4. 287 sqq.).

ἔμπορίον. The merchants are conceived as sojourning at the ἐμπόριο (cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 11 sqq.), which would usually be on the seacoast or not far from it, like the Peiraeus or Naucratis (τῆς Αἰγίπτου τὸ ἐμπόριον, Aristot. Fragm. 161. 1505 a 14). Not every city was an ἐμπόριον.

26. ἐπιώλει. Note the tense.

27. τῆς τιμῆς, i.e. the usual price charged for iron. His winnings appear to have been due, in part to the advance on the usual price, which, though small mounted up in proportion to the large quantity of iron sold, in part to the large returns which even the usual price brought to the merchants.

ἐπὶ τῶν πεντήκοντα ταλάντων ἐπέλαβεν ἐκατόν. Cp. Matth. 25. 20, Κύριε, πέντε τάλαντα μου παρίδωκας· ἵδε, ἄλλα πέντε τάλαντα ἐκέρδησα ἐπὶ αὐτῶν, and Strabo p. 701, ὃν τινα κοινά καὶ ἅλλοις ἱνδοὺς ἰστάρτησα, ἢν τὸ μακράζων ὡστε καὶ τρίακοντα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκατὼν προσλαμβάνειν. The article may be prefixed to πεντήκοντα ταλάντων because the sum originally invested was fifty talents, or it may be added for the same reason for which it is prefixed to δέκα in Xen. Oecoon. 20. 16, ῥοδίως γὰρ ἀνὴρ εἰς παρά τούς δέκα διαφέρει τῷ ἐν ὧν ἐργάζεσθαι, or which passage Dr. Holden remarks, ‘where parts of a whole are stated in numbers, the article is sometimes prefixed to the numeral “to denote the definiteness of the relation”’ (Madvig, § 11, Rem. 6).’ Bernays translates, ‘he gained a hundred talents in addition to the
fifty which he had laid out': Mr. Welldon, 'he realized 200 per cent. on all his outlay.' Perhaps the passage quoted from St. Matthew makes in favour of Bernays' interpretation, though the article is probably to be explained in the same way as in the passage of Xenophon.

28. τούτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This man brought on himself expulsion from the State, while Thales won applause for his wisdom, but yet the two men proceeded on the same principle. Μὲν οὖν is answered by μέντοι 31.

31. ἀσυμφόρους. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 20, συμφέρουσα πρέπει τοῖς πράγμασιν. Dionysius probably objected to the whole available supply of a commodity so important both in war and peace as iron finding its way into the hands of a single private individual and coming to be obtainable only at an enhanced price. He would also hold that a private person had no business with a monopoly; monopolies would in his view be for the State. Besides, tyrants usually sought to keep their subjects poor (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 18) and distrusted the rich (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq.).

33. καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, i.e. to statesmen as well as to heads of households (cp. c. 8. 1256 b 37, ὅτι μὲν τοῖς ἄνδρες τις κριτικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, and Eth. Nic. 6. 5. 1140 b 10) and to those who held the science of money-making in high esteem (1259 a 5). For χρήσιμον γνωρίσειν, cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 33, χρήσιμον δ' ἐκαστον αὐτῶν γνωρίσειν.

34. πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεις κ.τ.λ. A large revenue was essential to the working of the extreme democracy (Pol. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sq.); States frequently at war were also bound to have plenty of money at command (2. 9. 1271 b 11). Households stand less in need of exceptional sources of income.

35. τινὲς καὶ πολιτεύονται, i.e. in addition to those who pursue these aims in private life. See Schneider’s note, vol. 2. p. 65, on the πορνεία at Athens, but Eubulus is probably referred to—cp. Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praecepta, c. 15 sub fin., and Theopomp. Fr. 96 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 293). See also Plato, Laws 742 D, and the account of the good citizen given in Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1446 b 33.

For ταῦτα as the object of πολιτεύονται, cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 18.

C. 12. 37. ἐπεί δὲ κ.τ.λ. ‘Since we distinguished’ (in 1. 3. 1253 b 3 sqq.) ‘three parts of οἰκονομική’ (for ἶν, cp. Metaph. Α. 6. 1071 b 3, ἐπεί δ' ἴσαν τρεῖς οὐσίας, and de Caelo 1. 3. 269 b 33), the question arises, with which of them is οἰκονομική most concerned? We have seen that the οἰκονομικὸς as such can hardly
be said to be directly concerned with χρηματιστική: but with which of the three relations that make up the household—γαμική, πατρική, δεσποτική—is he most concerned? This is the question which Aristotle apparently intends to raise here (compare the solution given at the beginning of c. 13), but his articulation of it is in unusual disarray. He has no sooner enumerated the three parts of οἴκονομική, than he proceeds to refer to the account which he has already given of δεσποτική, and to distinguish the rule exercised by the husband over his wife from the rule exercised by the father over his children, with the object apparently of showing that the two latter relations represent a higher kind of rule (πολιτική or μαστική) than the former—the result being that οἴκονομική is more concerned with πατρική and γαμική than with δεσποτική (cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 25, αἱ ἁλήτιαι ἡ ἁρχή ἢ τῶν ἁλήτων ἁρχομένων, and 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 27, τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς ἁρχεῖν ἢ τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἁρχή καλλίων καὶ μᾶλλον μετ’ ἀρετῆς), and that it is more concerned with δεσποτική than with χρηματιστική.

39. καὶ γάρ. Vict. ‘statim autem causam affert, cur distinguenter copulam patris ac liberorum a copula viri et uxoris; docet enim illa imperia diversa esse.’

ἁρχεῖν, sc. ἐφιμερεῖ (latent in ἡν, 37) τὸν οἰκονόμον. The reference would seem to be to c. 3. 1253 b 4 sq.

ὡς ἑλευθέρων μὲν ἁμφοῖν, i.e. τοῦ ἁρχομένου χώριν (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 3 sqq.), or perhaps for the common good of ruler and ruled (3. 6. 1278 b 37 sqq.). Contrast δεσποτική ἁρχή, 3. 6. 1278 b 32 sqq. Πολιτική, μαστική (3. 7. 1279 a 33), and ἀριστοκρατική ἁρχή (3. 17. 1288 a 11) are forms of ἡ τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἁρχή. It may be questioned whether it is quite an adequate idea of ἡ τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἁρχή to make it consist simply in ruling for the benefit of the ruled; Marcus Aurelius (Comment. 1. 14) seems to understand it otherwise.

1. πολιτικὸς, ‘as a citizen-ruler rules over his fellow-citizens.’ 1259 b. Πολιτική ἁρχή is said in 3. 4. 1277 b 7 to be the kind of rule which is exercised over τῶν ὁμοίων τῷ γίνει καὶ τῶν ἑλευθέρων, but this account seems too wide, for the rule of a father over a child would then fall under πολιτική ἁρχή: in 1. 7. 1255 b 20 it is explained as ἑλευθέρων καὶ ἰσων ἁρχή, and this seems more exact, but we must bear in mind that under ἰσων are included proportionate, as well as absolute, equals. Πολιτική ἁρχή usually implies an interchange of ruling and being ruled (cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.), but it does not necessarily do so (cp. c. 1. 1252 a 15)—it does not do so in the case of the wife, nor does it do so in the case of the rule of VOL. II.
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νοῦς over ἄρετις, which is πολιτικῆ καὶ βασιλικῆ (1. 5. 1254 b 5). The relation of husband and wife is elsewhere described as ἄρωτοκρατική (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32 sqq. ; 8. 13. 1161 a 22 sqq.), because it should be such as to assign τὸ ἀρμήζων ἐκάστῳ (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9, δοκεὶ δὲ ἄρωτοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μὴ ἄνα δὲ τὸ τιμᾶν ῥευματίζειν καὶ ἄρετίν). Aristotle holds that though on the whole and as a rule the man is superior to the woman, there is nevertheless work which she can do better than he, and that account should be taken of this fact in determining the position of the wife in the household.

2. ei μη' που κ.τ.λ. Sus. 'was nicht ausschliesst, dass das Verhältniss sich hie und da auch wider die Natur gestaltet,' and so Mr. Welldon: 'wherever the union is not unnaturally constituted.' Sepulveda, on the other hand, supplies as the nom. to συνίστηκα, not η κοινωνία, but 'mas et femina,' translating 'nisi ubi praeter naturam constiterunt,' and Lambinus 'mas,' translating 'nisi forte ita comparatus est, ut a natura desciverit.' I incline, however, to take συνίστηκα as impersonal and to translate 'except where there is a contravention of nature.' See Bon. Ind. 342 b 20 sqq., and for συνίστηκα παρὰ φύσιν, ibid. 731 a 20–27. As to the impersonal use of verbs in Greek, see Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 155 sqq. The following epigram on James I is quoted by the late Mr. Mark Pattison in his copy of Stahr's edition of the Politics (1839):

'Rex fuit Elisabeth, nunc est regina Iacobus.'

4. εν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν appears to be answered by δ' γ. In most cases of political rule, indeed, there is an interchange of ruling and being ruled, which does not occur in the case of husband and wife. Free and equal citizens, in fact, aim at being equal in nature and differing in nothing. (I take τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἄρχεμενον to be the nom. to βουλεταῖς.) Yet even here differences do not wholly vanish, for the holders of office seek for the time of their magistracy to have their position marked by a distinctive aspect and bearing, a distinctive mode of address and marks of respect; thus if there is an equality of nature, there is a temporary inequality in externals even among like and equal citizens. The relation in which the citizen-ruler stands to those over whom he rules during his term of office is that in which the male permanently stands to the female. (Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq., where the same idea appears that even ἐλευθεροὶ καὶ τίμησι are differentiated by the fact of their holding or not holding office.) The husband, we learn, rules his wife as a citizen-ruler rules his fellow-citizens; he is marked off from his wife less by a difference in nature than by a difference σχήματος καὶ λόγως καὶ τιμᾶς. The father, on the contrary, is different
in nature from his child (1259 b 14). Aristotle does not, perhaps, always abide by this view of the relation of husband and wife; thus in Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 26 sqq., τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, which obtains ἐπὶ κοινωνίαν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αἰτήματα, ἀλευθέρων καὶ ἰσών ἢ κατ' ἀναλογίαν ἢ κατ' ἄριστον, is said not to obtain even between husband and wife, though the conjugal relation comes nearer to realizing it than any other household relation, but only τὸ ὀικονομικὸν δίκαιον—indeed in this very book of the Politics (c. 13. 1260 a 29) he requires from the wife a submissive silence before her husband.

7. δὴν, 'for the time during which.'


8. σχῆμασι. Lamb. 'vestitu,' Bern. 'die Tracht,' but ἵσθητι and σχῆμα are distinguished in Eth. Nic. 4. 9. 1125 a 30 (cp. Rhet. 2. 8. 1386 a 32, if ἵσθητι is the right reading in this passage). Sepulv. and Giph. 'ornatu.' Vict. 'vestibus.' Perhaps 'aspect and bearing.' See Bon. Ind. 739 b 59—740 a 5.

λόγοις, 'mode and matter of address.'

καὶ (before "Ἀμασί") as elsewhere introduces an instance. Amasis is an instance of 'that which rules after being ruled.' He had been a subject and was now a ruler. He claimed that, like the utensil referred to, which had been recast to form the image of a god and now was an object of veneration to the Egyptians, he should be treated for what he was, not what he had once been. Cp. Hdt. 2. 172. A somewhat similar metaphor is used by Themistocles in Adian. V. II. 13. 30.

9. ἀεὶ ... τῶν ἐξεῖ τῶν τρόπων, 'at all times, not merely for a term, stands to the female in this relation.'

11. τὸ γὰρ γεννήσαν. Γεννῶν is used of the female as well as the male (cp. 4 (7). 16. 1334 b 36: de Gen. An. 2. 5. 741 b 3), but Aristotle is here evidently thinking of the father, not the mother.

ἀρχον ἐστίν, cp. Metaph. Α. 7. 1072 b 10, ἵδι ναίγης ἀρα ἐστίν ὅτι, and Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 19, ἐστων διαφημιστεί. It is not identical with ἀρχεῖ: the participle is used in an adjectival sense, 'a permanent quality being predicatd of the subject' (Holden, Oeconomicus of Xenophon. Index p. 36 e).

12. βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἀρχῆς, 'the specific nature of royal rule.' Sus. 'was denn eben die Form einer königlichen Gewalt ergiebt.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 24, ἥ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς νῦν κοινωνίᾳ
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14. τὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάντων. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 24—27, ἢ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς υἱὸν κοινωνία βασιλείας ἐχει σχῆμα, τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει· εὑντεύθεν δὲ καὶ Ὀμηρος τὸν Δία πατέρα προσαγορεύει, πατρικῇ γὰρ ἀρχῇ βούλεται ἢ βασιλεία εἶναι. Homer is praised for using the words 'father of gods and men' to designate the Kingship of Zeus over gods and men. For, Aristotle proceeds, the father is the truest type of a King. The King, like the father, 'should surpass those he rules in nature' ('indole,' Bon. Ind. 837 a 52, cp. Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 39, διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν ἰσους εἶναι πάντας), 'but be one with them in race.'

15. μὲν should logically have followed φῶςει, but, as Bonitz observes (Ind. 454 a 20), who compares 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12 sqq., 'interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur.'

C. 13. 18. Φανερῶν τοῖνυ. So far as the protasis introduced by ἐπεί in 1259 a 37 survives the long series of considerations which break in upon it in 1259 a 39—b 17, it here finds its apodosis, which is introduced by τοῖνυ, as elsewhere by ὅστε (Bon. Ind. 873 a 31 sqq.) or possibly διώ (Bonitz, Aristotel. Stud. 3. 122 sqq.). For the connexion of the whole, see note on 1259 a 37. Xenophon in the Oeconomicus had described with much zest the mixture of vigilance and geniality with which the thrifty Ischomachus gets everybody connected with his farm, from his wife and his steward downwards, to strain every nerve for the increase of his substance, which is, according to him, the aim of οἰκονομία (cp. Oecon. c. 6. 4, ἢ δὲ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὴ—i.e. ἢ οἰκονομία—ἐφαινετο ἢ οίκους δύνανται αἰθεῖν ἀνθρωποι). In tacit opposition to Xenophon, Aristotle here presses the consequences of the principle which he has established in the foregoing chapters, that χρηματιστικὴ, and even its soundest part, is in strictness no part of οἰκονομία, but only an auxiliary art (ὑπηρετική), and that though οἰκονομία will not be indifferent to the goodness or badness of the property it uses (1258 a 26), its business is nevertheless rather to care for the excellence of the human beings with whom it has to deal, and for that of the free rather than the slave. The original propounder of this view may well have been Socrates (Cleitophon 407 A sq.; see Wytenbach on [Plutarch] de Liberis Educandis c. 7. 4 F.), but traces of it appear in Plato, Politicus 261 C and Laws 743 F, and we find doctrines of a similar kind ascribed to Cynics like Diogenes (Aelian, V. H. 12. 56: cp. Diog. Laert. 6. 41). The views of Crassus, who was not unacquainted with the teaching of Aristotle (Plutarch, Crassus c. 3), may possibly have been influenced
by the passage before us (see the account of them given in Crassus c. 2. and above, p. xvii). Cato the Censor is praised by Plutarch (Cato Censor, c. 20) for combining with keenness as an economist care for the welfare of his wife and children. For the relation of the Stoic and Epicurean conceptions of ὀίκονομία to those of Plato and Aristotle, see Schömann, Opusc. Acad. 3. 234 sqq.

19. τὴν τῶν ἄφυξιν κτήσιν, 'inanimate property.' Cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 10, τὴν τῆς γῆς κτήσιν, and 1. 9. 1257 b 40, τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οικίαν.

20. τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, δὲ καλοῦμεν πλοῦτον. Sus. 'als diesen' (inanimate property) 'in den tüchtigen Stand zu setzen, den man Reichthum und Wohlbabenheit nennt,' δὲ καλοῦμεν πλοῦτον being explanatory of ἀρετὴ κτήσεως, cp. Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 18, πλοῦτος· ἀρετὴ γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικῶν πολλῶν ἁγιασώ.

21. τῶν ἑλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἡ δοῦλων. For the addition of the article before ἑλευθέρων and its absence before δοῦλων, see Vahlen's note on Poet. 4. 1449 a 1, where Rhet. 2. 13. 1390 a 16, μᾶλλον ἐστι κατὰ λογισμῶν ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον is quoted. It is, however, possible that a slightly depreciatory significance attaches to the omission of the article before δοῦλων, as in Agesil. 11. 4. ἦσει δὲ ἐξουσίεωι μὲν παντοῦδαποῖ, χρήσιμον δὲ τοῖς ἁγιασώ. Cp. 1. 7. 1255 b 32-33.

πρώτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν here as often elsewhere is introductory to a clearer definition of what has just been said. (The μὲν is apparently answered by δὲ 28.) Aristotle has spoken in the preceding sentence of an ἀρετὴ δοῦλων, and the thought occurs to him that there are two senses of ἀρετή, and that he may be understood merely to inculeate on the master the communication of technical excellence to the slave (cp. 1260 b 3 sqq.). He therefore loses no time in raising the question, what the virtue is in the case of slaves, which he has said the householder is to care for and promote; is it merely ὁμανική καὶ διακονική ἀρετή, or are they capable of ἵθελη ἀρετή? (For the terms in which the question is raised, cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 42, ὡς μὲν ἄλλα ζητητέοι μὴ ποτὲ τοιότα μὲν συμβεβηκέ, τιμιωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρίαιν.) Aristotle had defined the natural slave in the words, ὧδεν ἐστὶν ἐργαν ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῖτ' ἐστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βελτιστον, 1. 5. 1254 b 17—words which went farther even than the well-known saying in Homer (Ody. 17. 322), that Zeus in taking away a man's freedom takes away half his virtue—and he feels that a doubt may well be raised whether a slave is capable of moral virtue. The course of the argument on this subject seems to be as follows: — 'The answer is not easy, for if the slave has moral virtue, how does he differ from a freeman? Yet if he has it not, the fact is surprising, seeing that he is a man
and shares in reason. The same question, however, arises as to the wife and child, and it is better to put the question in its most comprehensive form—is the virtue of that which by nature rules the same as the virtue of that which by nature is ruled, or different? (It will be seen that Aristotle abstains for the present from raising any question as to that which neither naturally rules nor naturally is ruled.) If we say that both have complete virtue, why should the one rule and the other be ruled? If again we say that their virtue differs in degree, the same question arises, for between ruling and being ruled there is a difference not of degree, but of kind. If, on the other hand, we say that one has virtue and the other not, how can the ruler rule well, or the ruled obey well, without virtue? Both, it is clear, must have virtue, and virtue must have different kinds, just as there are different kinds of that which is by nature ruled. We are familiar with this in the case of the soul; in the soul there is a part which naturally rules and another which naturally is ruled, and to each of these two parts we attribute a virtue of its own. But if these two parts, related to each other as naturally ruling and ruled, exist by nature, then other pairs also, destined by nature to rule and be ruled respectively, exist by nature—the master and slave, the husband and wife, the father and child—and each member of these three pairs has a virtue of its own varying according to the constitution of the soul in each and the work each has to perform.' We must bear in mind that in the Meno of Plato Socrates is made to assert the identity of the temperance and other virtues of women and men, in opposition to the sophist Gorgias, and that Aristotle’s object here is to show that virtue varies with social function, the virtue of the ruled not being the same as the virtue of the ruler. It is, however, also his object to show, in opposition to those who confined virtue to the ruler (3. 4. 1277 a 20), that τὸ φύσει ἀρχόμενον, whether wife, child, or slave, is not without moral virtue, but has a sort of virtue varying with its psychical constitution and the function it discharges. Here therefore, as elsewhere, Aristotle steers a midway course between two extremes—the view of those who denied virtue to the ruled, and the view of those who identified the virtue of women and men.

24. σωφροσύνη κ.τ.λ. These virtues are instantiated as those most likely to be found in slaves, more likely than μεγαλοφυνία, φρόνησις, or σοφία.

28. ἐξει... ἀμφότερως. 'For whichever alternative we adopt, difficult questions arise' (Lamb. 'dubitationem habet, utrumcunque dixeris'). 'Ἐξει is probably here impersonal; see Bon. Ind. 305 b 31 sqq., and Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 155 sq.

29. εἰτε γὰρ ἐστι, sc. ἀρετή τις δούλων.

32. καὶ... δή. See note on 1. 2. 1253 a 18.

33. πότερον... ἐτέρα. This is not exactly the same question as had been raised about the woman and child just before; perhaps it is already felt to be paradoxical to deny to the ἀρχήμενον φύσει the possession of any kind of moral virtue. Besides, the question now raised is that which Socrates had raised (1260 a 22), and Aristotle is much preoccupied with his view on the subject.

34. γὰρ justifies ἐπισκεπτών by adducing difficulties which arise.

35. καλοκαίγαθια. The question is put as paradoxically as possible, for καλοκαίγαθια is precisely the type of virtue from which slaves and women and children are furthest removed; see L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen 1. 333 sqq., who refers to Xen. Mem. 1. 1. 16, πρὶ τῶν ἄλλων (διειλέγετο Σωκράτης), ἀ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἥγετο καλός καίγαθος εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνθρωπαθεῖς ἰν δικαιώς κεκληθαίναι. Καλοκαίγαθια is the virtue of knights and hoplites (Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 18 sqq.). Cp. also Eth. Nic. 4. 7. 1124 a 1, ἣς καὶ μὲν οὐκ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οίνῳ κόσμῳ τε εἶναι τῶν ἀρχητών' μεῖζος γὰρ αὐτῶς ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἀνευ ἐκεῖνων' διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλοψυχὸν εἶναι' οὗ γὰρ οἴον τε ἀνευ καλοκαίγαθια: Magn. Mor. 2. 9. 1207 b 20 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 10 sqq. The conception of καλοκαίγαθια is still further worked out in Eth. Eud. 7. 15.


38. οὐδέν, 'not at all,' as in Probl. 10. 35. 804 b 13.

40. ἀρχήσεται. The fut. med. ἀρχῶνται occurs in a passive sense in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36.


43. ταύτης δὲ... ἀρχόμενων. These words are often translated—'and that there are different forms of virtue corresponding to the differences between the naturally ruled.' But then hitherto, as Susemihl remarks (Hermes (1884), Bd. 19. Heft 4), Aristotle has been dwelling on the difference between ruler and ruled, not on the differences between various ruled elements, and if ὁσπερ here means 'corresponding to,' we certainly expect ὁσπερ καὶ τοῦ φύσει ἀρχόντως καὶ ἀρχομένων. Not ὁσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχόμενων καὶ ἀρχομένων, the reading to which the rendering found in two MSS. (a, z)
of the velus versio points—'quemadmodum et natura principantium et subiectorum'—for hitherto, as Sus. sees, though he accepts this reading, no stress has been laid on the fact of the existence of different forms of ἀρχῶτα and ἀρχάμενα: on the contrary, it is on the difference between τὸ ἀρχῶν and τὸ ἀρχάμενον and their respective ἔργα that the existence of different forms of virtue has been rested. Perhaps, however, ὀσπέρ does not here mean 'corresponding to,' but simply 'as indeed'—so that our rendering will run 'and that different types of virtue exist, as indeed differences also exist between the naturally ruled.' Compare the use of ὀσπέρ in I. 11. 1259 a 35, πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλει δει χρηματισμοῦ, ὀσπέρ οἰκία, μᾶλλον δέ. Aristotle's meaning will then be, that there is nothing more surprising in the fact of ruler and ruled having different types of virtue than there is in the fact of the naturally ruled differing in character. He has already said in I. 5. 1254 a 24, καὶ εἶδη πολλὰ καὶ ἀρχῶτων καὶ ἀρχαμένων ἑστίν, καὶ δει βελτίων ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ τῶν βελτίων ἀρχομένων. Perhaps, however, τῆς ἀρετῆς should be supplied before τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων, and the translation should be—'as indeed differences also exist between the virtue of one naturally ruled element and that of another.' Those who take ὀσπέρ in the sense of 'corresponding to' will be much tempted to read ὀσπέρ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχῶτων καὶ ἀρχαμένων, but this reading rests, as has been said, only on the authority of one or two MSS. of the velus versio, the rendering found in which may represent nothing more than a conjectural emendation. This change of reading might, indeed, be dispensed with, if an ellipse of πρὸς τὸ φύσει ἀρχῶν or πρὸς τὰ φύσει ἀρχῖντα could be supposed between ὀσπέρ καὶ and τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων (compare the ellipse of πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν in 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 17). But ὀσπέρ need not mean 'corresponding to,' and probably does not. (Since writing the foregoing note, I have become acquainted with the following annotation by the late Mr. Mark Pattison in the copy of Stahr's Politics already referred to (above on 1259 b 2). Stahr translates in this edition—'diese aber ihre Verschiedenheiten hat, so gut wie die, welche von Natur zum Beherrschen und zum Herrschen bestimmt sind.' The annotation is—'if the words [ἀρχῶτων καὶ] are to form part of the text, surely the meaning is, not "so gut wie die," but "have differences corresponding to the differences between the natural ruler and the natural ruled." But all the MSS. appear to omit them, and the meaning is—"and in the same way as there are differences between the virtues of the ruler and those of the ruled, so there are differences between the virtues of the different species of the ruled."')
4. καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. I take the literal rendering to be— and this has at once led the way for us in the case of the soul' ('this' being 'the existence of a natural ruler and a natural ruled, each with a virtue of its own'). For ψήφησαι in this sense, compare Plato, Lysis 217 A, ἀρ' οὖν καὶ καλὸς . . . ἴσηγεῖται ἡμῖν τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον; and the use of the word προοδοποιεῖσθαι in de Gen. An. 4. 4. 770 b 3.

Περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν is perhaps not far removed in meaning from ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (cp. Bon. Ind. 579 a 29 sqq.). The soul is one of the things that lie nearest to us, and on examining it the phenomenon of which we are in quest appears, and thus we are guided to detect it in other cases also. Cp. Plutarch, de Fraterno Amore c. 2 ini., καίτω τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς χρήσεως τῶν αὐτής ἡ φύσις οὐ μακρὰν ἔθηκεν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἀναγκαίων διὰ ταῦ καὶ ἀδελφὰ καὶ δίδυμα μηχανημένη, χέιρας, πόδας, ὀμματα, ὀστα, μῖνας, ἐδιδαξέν ὅτι κ.τ.λ. The perfect ψήφησαι may be defended, either as referring to the previous assertion of the existence of a ruling and a ruled element within the soul (1. 5. 1254 b 5), or as implying that the soul affords an already forthcoming and familiar example of the fact—cp. de Part. An. 1. 3. 643 b 10, δὲι πειράσθαι λαμβάνειν κατὰ γένη ταῦ ζωῆ, ὡς ἴσηγεῖθ' οἳ πολλοὶ διοίκησαν ἄρμοθε γένος καὶ ἰχθύος. Schütz' conjectural addition of τὰ before περὶ τὴν ψυχήν simplifies the passage, but is perhaps unnecessary. It should be added that Vict. takes ἴσηγεῖται in a passive sense (' incoemptum est '), and that Bonitz also (Ind. 807 b 46) gives it a passive meaning. The correctness of this view, however, is open to doubt. For the thought, cp. 4 (7).

14. 1333 a 16 sqq.
6. οὖν does not seem here to exemplify but to explain, as in 3. 13. 1283 b 1.
8. τῶν ἄλλων, 'other things besides the rational and irrational elements of the soul.'

ὡστε κ.τ.λ. Thurot (Études, p. 18), with most others, translates the words ὡστε φύσει τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα καὶ ἄρχόμενα 'de sorte que la plupart des êtes commandent ou obéissent par nature,' and fails, not without reason, to find a satisfactory meaning in the words when thus translated, adding ' du moins la leçon vulgaire ne se lie pas avec ce qui suit immédiatement.' Hence he proposes to read ὡστε πλείω τὰ φύσει ἄρχοντα καὶ ἄρχόμενα. But is not another interpretation of τὰ πλείω possible? May not the meaning of the passage be as follows—so that not only is this one case of a ruling element and a ruled natural, but the plurality of cases of the same thing which we observe are natural too—I say "plurality," for the free rules the slave in one way, and the male the female in another,
and the man the child in a third, and while (μὲν) the parts of the soul exist in all these, they exist differently in each.' The first conclusion drawn is, that in a plurality of cases we find a ruling element and a ruled, both existing by nature. The reason for proving their naturalness is that only τὰ φύσει ἀρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα have a moral virtue of their own; thus the τεχνίτης, being neither φύσει nor fully a slave, has not a moral virtue of his own, except so far as he is a slave. From this first inference Aristotle passes on to a second—that of a diversity of psychological constitution and of moral virtue in every ruling and ruled element subsisting by nature, according as the function discharged in each case is absolute and complete (τὸ ἀπλῶς ἔργων) or falls in various degrees short of being so. For τὰ πλεῖω ἀρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα, cp. de Gen. An. 2. 7. 746 a 12, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν μορφωτικά, τὰ δὲ πολυτικά τῶν τοιούτων ἐστὶ διόπως, καὶ τὰ πλεῖον τῶν ἐμβρύων ('mehreren Embryen,' Aubert and Wimmer) τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχει τρόπων τὸ εἶν. de Caelo 1. 8. 276 b 19, ἐν τοῖς πλεῖον οὐφανοῖς ('in den mehreren Himmelsgebäuden,' Prantl). So we have οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι ('a multiplicity of conjunctions') in Rhet. 3. 5. 1407 b 12, and οἱ πολλοὶ τεράποντες in Pol. 2. 3. 1261 b 37: cp. also Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 50 R, τῶλα οὕτως ἀγαπᾷ τὰ ἀρχόμενα τοῖς ἀρχοντα. Thurót, as has been said, would read ὡστε πλεῖον τὰ φύσει ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα, but this conclusion seems hardly to be that to which the preceding words point. Bernay avoids this objection in his rewriting of 8-17, as does also Susemihl in his still more sweeping reconstruction of 8-20 (Qu. Crit. p. 359: Hermes 19. 588 sqq.), but no MS. gives them any support, nor am I convinced that any change is necessary.

11. τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, i.e. τὸ ἀλογον and τὸ λόγον ἔχον: cp. de Gen. An. 2. 4. 741 a 2, τὰ διὰ ἄλλα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς (other than ἡ γεννώσα καὶ θεραπευτική ψυχῆ) τοῖς μὲν υπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ οἷς υπάρχει τῶν ἐφων. To give the slave τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ παθητικόν must be counted here (as in Eth. Nic. 1. 6. 1098 a 3 and 1. 13. 1103 a 2) as part of τὸ λόγον ἔχον, not of τὸ ἀλογον, for he has not the more indubitable element of τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ βουλευτικὸν (1260 a 12: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 32 sqq.), which is apparently identical with that which is called τὸ λογιστικόν in Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 12. Thus in 1. 5. 1254 b 22, he is said κοινωνεῖν λόγον τοσοῦτον ὡσον αἰτιώθεσθαι ἄλλα μὴ ἔχειν.

12. ἀκύρων, 'imperfect in authority,' 'imperfectly obeyed'— cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 10. 1151 b 15, λυποῦσατι, ἐὰν ἀκύρα τὰ αὐτῶν ὡσερ ψιθύματα. In women τὸ βουλευτικὸν is there, but often does not get its own way.

πηγήν τοῦ φρονίμου μήπω καταρτιζόμενη, καὶ Ἡρω. Πολ. 441 A—B. Cp. also Aristot. Phys. 7. 3. 247 b 18 sqq., where the child is described as in a state of φυσικὴ παραχή, which must settle down before it can become φρόνιμον καὶ ἐπιστήμον. In Eth. Nic. 3. 4. 1111 b 8 προαιρεσι, and in Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 8 νοῦς, are denied to the child, who is said in Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 b 5 to live κατ᾽ ἐπιθεώριαν.

ὁμοίως κ.τ.λ., i.e. the moral virtues, like the parts of the soul, exist in all, but differently. The construction of this sentence seems to be—ὑποληφτέων τούν ἀναγκαίον (εἶναι) ὁμοίως ἐχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἡθικὰς ἀρετάς, δειν μὲν κ.τ.λ. For the omission of εἶναι, see Bon. Ind. 43 a 6, 239 a 9 sqq., and cp. c. 9. 1257 b 32. A somewhat similarly constructed sentence occurs in Magn. Mor. 1. 18. 1190 a 15 sq.: cp. also 28, διὸ δὲ, ὡσείς ὁ ποιητὴς ἔφηκε περὶ γυνακῶς, οὖτω νομίζειν ἐχειν περὶ πάντων. Bekker and Sus., however, begin a fresh sentence with ὑποληφτέων.

16. δοὺς κ.τ.λ. Ἐπιβιβάλλει or some such word needs to be supplied here, but Aristotle follows pretty closely the language of Meno in Plato, Meno 72 A, καθ᾽ ἐκάστην γὰρ τῶν πρίξεων καὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν πρὶν ἐκαστὸν ἐγγον ἐκάστῳ ἡμῖν ἡ ἀρετῆ ἔστιν. Compare also for the thought Plato, Rep. 601 D.


20. οὖχ ἡ αὐτὴ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 20 sqq. This teaching is anticipated in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 26, ἡτα γὰρ ἐκατέρω ἀρετή (i.e. ἀδερφός καὶ γυνακία).

22. Σωκράτης. Cp. Plato, Meno 71—73, though the absence of the article before Σωκράτης seems to imply that Aristotle is speaking of the historical Socrates, not of the interlocutor in the Meno. Anti-
sthenes agreed with Socrates (Diog. Laert. 6. 12). On the views of
Socrates and Plato respectively as to the unity of virtue, see Zeller,
Plato, E. T. p. 448 sqq. Plutarch seeks to prove in his De Virtute
Muliebri, that though there are differences between the virtue of men
and that of women, just as there are differences between the same
virtue in different men (e.g. the courage of Ajax and Achilles), yet the
virtues of women are not specifically different from those of men.

24. τοὺς ἄλλας, sc. ἀρετάς, i.e. σωφροσύνη καὶ δίκαιοτης. The
word ἀρετή is so easily supplied that it is often suppressed—e.g. in
3. 5. 1278 b 1 and 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 15.

τούτο, i.e. the conclusion stated in 20–24. This had been
reached through premisses relating to the virtue of φύσει ἀρχοντα and
ἀρχόμενα in general, but it might also have been reached by ex-
amining the subject more in detail, as for instance by examining the
virtue of women, children, and slaves separately and successively
(κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν). This seems from what Meno says
(Plato, Meno 71 E) to have been the method followed by Gorgias.

25. καθισμοῦ. For the place of καθισμοῦ, see Vahlen’s note on
Poet. 17. 1455 a 24 (p. 184). The thought is too characteristic
of Aristotle and recurs too often in his writings to need much
illustration, but reference may be made to Eth. Nic. 2. 7. 1107 a 28
sqq.: Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 31; Rhet. 2. 19. 1393 a 16 sqq.

26. τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχήν. Plato had said this in Rep. 444 D,
ἀρετή μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕγεισα τε τίς ἄν εἶη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὔεξία ψυχῆς.

τὸ δρόμοπραγμαίν. As to the omission of ἐ for critical note. For this
definition of virtue, cp. Plato, Charmides 172 A: Meno 97.

27. ἔκαθαμοῦντες, as in Plato, Meno 71 E, πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ βούλεις
ἀνδρός ἁμέτρητον . . . εἰ δὲ βούλεις γυναικὸς ἁμέτρητον . . . καὶ ἀλλὰ ἐστὶ παιδὸς
ἀρετή, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἀρρενος, καὶ πρεσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἰ μὲν βούλεις,
εὐεὖρος, εἰ δὲ βούλεις, δούλον: cp. also 77 Δ.

28. διὸ seems to introduce an inference from the general tenour
of 17–24.

559 a. Where the following lines are quoted from the "Ὑπνος
of Xenarchus:

Εἰς εἰσίν οἱ τέττιγες οὐκ εἰδοίμονες,
ἀν ταῖς γυναιξιν οὐδ' ὡτιον φωνῆς ένι;

30. πάντων, slaves, children, and women. For the thought, cp.

For the asyndeton at γυναικί, compare the somewhat similar ex-
amples adduced by Vahlen in his note on Poet. 25. 1460 b 23
(p. 261 sqq.).

32. πρόσ τοῦ τέλος καὶ τῶν ἡγούμενων, 'relative to the fully developed human being' (contrasted with ἀτελῆς: cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 31, τέλος γὰρ ἀτῆς ἐκείνων) 'and to his guiding authority.' The child is apparently regarded as finding in his father the fully developed type of manhood which he himself is designed ultimately to realize and as accepting guidance from him. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1249 b 6, δεὶ δὴ, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον ζην καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξιν κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς τοῦ ἄρχοντος, οὐδὲν διάλογον πρὸς διεσπόστου καὶ ἐκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου καθήκουσαν ἀρχήν: Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 b 7, and 3. 5. 1113 a 5 sqq.

33. ὁμοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the thought, cp. Menander, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 56:

'Εμοὶ πόλεις ἔστι καὶ καταφυγῆ καὶ νόμος καὶ τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ τ' ἀδίκου παντὸς κράτη· ὁ διεσπότης' πρὸς τοῦτον ἐνα δεὶ ζην ἐμε, and Fragm. 150:

'Ελεύθερος πᾶς ἐνι δεδωλωται, νόμῳ, δυσίν δεὶ δοῦλοι, καὶ νόμῳ καὶ δεσπότης.

ἐδεικνύον, e. g. in c. 5. 1254 b 25.

35. The construction of τοσοῦτος with ὡς does not seem to be very common. See with respect to it Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 33, who compares Oecon. 1. 6. 1344 b 29, καὶ τῶν ἑργασίας (δεὶ) υἱῶν νενεμήσθαι ὡς μή ἄρα κινδυνεύσωσιν ἁπασίν.


ἀπορησαίει δ' ἀν τις κ.τ.λ. It would be possible to take ἄρα (37) and ἢ (39) as in the same construction, and the whole sentence ἄρα—πλείστων as dependent on ἀπορησαίει (for ἄρα followed by ἢ in indirect interrogations, see Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 1. 43 sqq., and on Poet. 4. 1449 a 7), but ἢ διαφερεῖ τοῦτο πλείστων is probably not a part of the question raised: it is rather Aristotle's own solution of the ἀπορία (see Bon. Ind. 313 a 7 sqq., and compare the very similar passage, 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 8—11). The difficulty raised is—'if we allow the existence of an ἀρετῆ διδοῦν, because the slave needs to possess it, must we not also allow the existence of an ἀρετῆ τεχνίτων?'

40. κοινωνίας ζωῆς. 'is a sharer with his master in a common existence': cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 16, τῆς ἁρχῆς εἰδὴ πόλει τῆς περὶ ἅπαντον καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς ζωῆς, and other similar phrases collected by Lasaulx, Ehe bei den Griechen (p. 13, note 22). It was only of φίλου ἁρχῶμενα that the possession of a form of moral virtue was

πορρώτερον, 'less closely attached to the master.' Cp. 3. 5.

1278 a 11, τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων οἱ μὲν εἰς λειτουργοῦσες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κωνιαί βάλανυσι καὶ θητες.

1260 b. 1. ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ ἐξεῖ δουλείαν. Sepulveda translates ‘determinatae cuidam servituti addictus est,’ and explains in his note that the βάλανυσις τεχνίτης is not a slave for all purposes, but only for the performance of a definite servile task. The extent of his slavery is determined by his ἔργον: cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 15, ἡ ἐκ πάντων ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, οὗν ἡ τιμήματι ἡ γένει ἡ ἀρετῇ ἡ τινι τοιοῦτο ἄλλω, and Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1159 b 33.

καὶ ὁ μὲν δοῦλος κ.τ.λ. The artisan is not only rather an adjunct of the household than one of its ruled members, but he is also not by nature. He is not a φύσις ἀρχόμενος, and all that has been proved in the foregoing is that φύσει ἀρχόμενα possess a moral virtue of their own. Nature has indeed provided men with materials for dress and consequently for shoemaking (1. 8. 1256 b 20), but the shoemaker works for hire and practises μισθαρνία, which was brought under the unnatural form of χρηματιστική in 1. 11. 1258 b 25. Yet in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 6 and 6 (4). 1. 1291 a 1 sq. artisans are admitted to be a necessary element in a State; it seems strange then that they are not by nature.

2. τῶν ἄλλων τεχνίτων. For the gen., see note on 1259 b 24.

3. φανερῶν τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. The reasoning is—we have seen that the slave possesses a certain ministerial form of moral virtue over and above his technical excellences, and that his moral virtue is relative to his master, who is his end and guiding authority; hence it is from the master quia master, and not from the master as possessing the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη, that the slave must derive the kind of moral virtue which he ought to possess. The concluding part of the sentence, if it were complete, would apparently run—τελείων ἔχοντα τὴν ἤθικὴν ἀρετὴν, ἀλλ' οὗ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δισποτικήν. Nothing is gained, as it seems to me, by introducing τῶν (with Bern. Sus. and others) before τὴν διδασκαλικὴν. The point insisted on by Aristotle appears to be that the master should be the source of moral virtue (in a subordinate and ministerial form) to the slave quia master, and as possessing complete moral virtue and reason, not as possessing the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη: it is not, that the master and nobody else is to be the source of moral virtue to the slave. Aristotle had said at the commencement of the chapter (1259 b 20), that the householder should care for the virtue of his slaves, and
he has now made it clear what sort of virtue he should seek to produce in them. In 1. 7. 1255 b 30 sqq. (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 23 sqq.) the δεσποτική ἐπιστήμη has already been said to be nothing great and to be in no way of the essence of the master. Socrates and Plato, who had denied the name of δεσποτίς to any one not possessed of the science of δεσποτική, are here glanced at; Aristotle perhaps also remembers the picture of the δεσπότης in Xenophon's Oeconomicus, himself training his slaves to be efficient servants. Xenophon, however, had already in the same work depicted the householder as teaching his slaves justice (πειρώματα ἐμποδίζειν εἰς τὴν δικαιοσύνην τοὺς οἰκίταις, Oecon. 14. 4: compare his account of the training of a housekeeper, ibid. 9. 13), and in this Aristotle is thoroughly with him.

5. διὸ λέγουσιν οὖν καλῶς οἱ λόγοι τοὺς δοῦλους ἀποστεροῦντες κ.τ.λ. When Aristotle speaks of ἐπιστήμη in connexion with the master of slaves, he has in his mind ἐπιστήμη περὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον: cp 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 25, οὐδὲν γὰρ τὸ γε δώλοι, γὰρ δώλοι, χρῆσθαι σεμνῶς ἢ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη οὐ εἰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδέν μετέχει τῶν καλῶν, and 1. 7. 1255 b 33, ἢ μὲν ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ σεμνώς, ἢ γὰρ τὸν δοῦλον ἐπισταύρις δεὶ ποιεῖ, ἐκείνοι δὲ ταῦτα ἐπισταύριθα ἐπιστήμην. The drift of the passage before us, therefore, seems to be— the master should be the source of moral virtue to the slave, hence he should not confine himself to commands relating to the slave’s discharge of his servile functions. But then comes the question—what is the meaning of οἱ λόγοι τοὺς δοῦλους ἀποστεροῦντες? Bern. and Sus. translate 'those who forbid converse with slaves'—Stahr, 'those who withdraw rational admonition (die vernünftige Zurechtweisung) from slaves' (cp. Xen. Oecon. 13. 9. ἀνθρώποι δὲ ἦσσαν πειθοτέρους ποιεῖν καὶ λόγος, ἐπισταμένως χαῖς συμφέρον αὐτοῖς πείθεται); but I incline on the whole, following Bonitz (Ind. 436 b 50) and the earlier commentators, to explain λόγον here as 'reason' (cp. 1260 a 17—19 and Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 33, ὅτι δὲ πειθεῖν ποιεῖ ὡς ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ὁλόγον, μηνένι καὶ ἡ νοθετήσας καὶ πάσα ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ παρακλήσεις), though it should be borne in mind that the two senses of the word λόγος, 'reason' and 'reasoning,' often tend to pass into each other. We still have to ask, however, what is the meaning of οἱ λόγοι ἀποστεροῦντες. The earlier commentators explain the words 'those who deny that slaves partake in reason' (cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 28, καίτοι γελαίοι τοῖς κυριακακῶς ἀποστεροῦν ἀρχῆς), but perhaps their meaning rather is 'those who withhold reason from the slave' (by withholding the reasoning which is its source, 1. 5. 1254 b 22). For the relation of λόγος to the moral virtues, see Eth. Nic. 6. 1. With
the teaching of the passage before us may be compared that of Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 10, συνασαθ湲νςθαί ἄρα δει καὶ τοῦ φιλοῦ ὅτι ἔστιν, τούτο δε γίνοιτ' ἀν εν τῷ συζύν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοιαίς· οὕτω γὰρ ἀν δίδειε τὸ συζύν ἐπί τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὀστερ ἐπὶ τῶν βους-
κημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. What is here said of the intercourse of two friends may hold a certain extent of the intercourse between master and slave. The reference in οἱ λόγοι τοὺς δούλους ἄποστεροντες κ.τ.λ. is to Plato, Laws 777 E.: cp. also 720 B sqq. Pallas, one of the favourite freedmen of the Emperor Claudius, 'would not deign even to speak to his slaves, but gave them his commands by gestures, or, if that was not enough, by written orders' (Capes, Early Roman Empire, p. 87). According to Clement of Alexandria (Aristot. Fragm. 179. 1508 b 7 sqq.), οὔτε προσγελάω δούλοις 'Ἀριστοτέλης εἰα. Is not this writer thinking of what Plato had said in the Laws?

6. φάσκοντες. 'Infinitives following certain verbs (of saying, thinking, etc.) sometimes contain a Dictative force... The governing verb gets a different and a stronger meaning: to "say" becomes to "recommend" or to "pray".' (Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 148). Φάσκειν is used of philosophers setting forth a dogma.

7. νοθετήτεον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not say why (Vic. wishes that he had), but his reason probably is that the slave's one chance of sharing in reason is to receive it in reasoning from outside. The child (1260 a 13) has τὸ βουλευτικῶν already, though as yet imperfect, whereas the slave has it not; all he has is the power of recognizing reason when set before him by another. One of Menander's characters says, in a fragment which perhaps belongs to the 'Ἄδελφοι (fr. 2: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 69)—

Οὐ λυποῦντα δει παιδάριον ὀρθοῦν, ἄλλα καὶ πειθοῦντα τι. Aristotle's view would probably strike his contemporaries as a decided paradox, for Pseudo-Plutarch, de Liberis Educandis c. 12. 8 F, most likely expresses the view commonly taken—κακεῖνο φημι, δειν τοὺς παιδας ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἐπιστήμων ἄγειν παρανεάσει καὶ λόγους, μὴ μία Δία πληγαίς μηδ' αἰκισμοίς. Δοκεῖ γὰρ ποτα ταῦτα τῶν δούλων μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἑλευθέροις πρότειν' ἀποφασίσω γὰρ καὶ φρῖτουσι πρὸς τοὺς πόνους, τὰ μὲν δὲ τὰς ἀληθοῦν ἔσω τῶν πληγήν, τὰ δὲ καὶ δια τὰς ἢτέρες: cp. also Ecclesiasticus 33. 28.

8. περὶ δ' ἀνδρὸς κ.τ.λ. Nothing of this kind appears in the Politics; its inquiries, in fact, seldom assume this delicate ethical character. There are a few words as to the mutual behaviour of
husband and wife in Oecon. i. 4. 1344 a 13 sq. which may possibly reproduce some part of Aristotle's teaching. See also the Latin translation of a fragment on this subject (which can hardly be from the pen of Aristotle) in Val. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 644 sqq.

11. τὸ καλὸς. See Bon. Ind. 291 b 25 sqq.

12. έν τοῖς περὶ τάς πολιτείας. The First Book (οἱ πρῶτοι λόγοι, έν οῖς περὶ οἰκονομίας διωρίσθη καὶ διασπορείς, 3. 6. 1278 b 17) is here marked off from τά περὶ τάς πολιτείας: cp. ή πρώτη μέθοδος περὶ τῶν πολιτείων, 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 26. So in Rhet. 2. 24. 1401 b 32, the phrase οἱ έν τοῖς πολιτείαις occurs, and Plato's Republic seems to have been sometimes spoken of as οἱ πολιτείαις (cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1, διάσπαρ Πλάτων έν τοῖς πολιτείαις: see for other instances Henkel, Studien, p. 10).

14. ταύτα, i.e. άνήρ καὶ γυνή, τέκνα καὶ πατήρ, though only παῖδες and γυναῖκες are mentioned in 16; it is perhaps taken for granted that the training of the head of the household will be relative to the constitution.

τήν δὲ τοῦ μέρους κ.τ.λ. Cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 29, μόριον γὰρ ἐκαστὸς τῆς πόλεως· ἡ δ' ἐπιμέλεια πέφικεν ἐκαστὸν μορίον βλέπειν πρὸς τήν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν.

15. πρὸς τήν πολιτείαν. The virtue of the part must be adjusted to the virtue of the whole; hence the virtue of the woman and the child must be adjusted to the constitution, for the constitution is the standard of virtue in the πόλις, the whole to which they belong. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.: 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 11 sqq. The course followed in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq. is quite in conformity with this principle, though we are concerned there only with the children, or probably the sons, not with the women; δῆλον γὰρ (says Aristotle in that passage), άσω ἑκατονθένα δεῖ οὶ τήν παιδείαν κατά τήν διαίρεσιν ταύτην (i.e. the decision whether the same persons are always to be rulers or not).


19. οἱ κοινωνοὶ τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. 3. 3. 1276 b 1, έστι δὲ (τῆς πόλεως) κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 28, άδε δὲ δεί παραλαμβανόμενον ἐκ τοῦ βιλτίμουν δήμου τοῦ κοινωνοῦ.

20. ὁμηλότερός ἐστίν κ.τ.λ. Birt (Das antike Buchwesen, p. 459. 3) holds that 'these last five lines are evidently added by the "redaction" to form a transition to the Second Book.' The opening paragraph of the Second Book, however, accords but ill with the close of the First (see note on 1260 b 27); in fact, καὶ πρῶτον 23... τῆς ἀριστής 24 would be better away, though it certainly is the case that
the designers of ‘best constitutions’ are criticised in the Second Book before actual constitutions like the Lacedaemonian, etc., are criticised. It is possible that the closing words of the First Book were added by a bungling editor, but it is also possible that Aristotle himself may be in fault. The opening paragraph of the investigations which now constitute the Second Book of the Politics may have been imperfectly harmonized by him with the closing sentence of τὰ περὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ δεσποτείας, just as the sequence of the Third and Fourth (Seventh) Books is not absolutely perfect, and the programme of the Politics given at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics is departed from to a large extent in the Politics itself. Or again the opening paragraph of the Second Book may have been an after-thought of Aristotle’s, and the book may have originally begun Ἀρχὴν δὲ πρῶτον ποιητέων κ.τ.λ. This is perhaps less probable, as τὰ τῆς σκέψεως 37 seems to refer back to θεωρήσαε περὶ τῆς κοινονίας τῆς πολιτικῆς 27. It is impossible to penetrate these secrets of the workshop; one thing, however, should be borne in mind, that the component parts of the Politics are not as closely welded together as they might be, and often look as though they were more or less separate works. This makes defects of 'callida iunctura' less surprising.

BOOK II.

C. 1. 27. Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The First Book ends, καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψώμεθα 1260 b. περὶ τῶν ἀποφαινόμενων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀριστης. The Second begins by premising that Aristotle’s aim is to inquire what form of political union is best for those most favourably circumstanced—a fact which had not been stated before—and then proceeds to argue that this involves a preliminary review of ‘other constitutions than that to be propounded by Aristotle’ (τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας), whether actual working constitutions (termed κύριαι in 2. 12. 1274 b 27) held to be well-ordered, or schemes in good repute put forward by individual inquirers. The two passages are evidently not in strict sequence. The opening paragraph of the Second Book is not perhaps absolutely inconsistent with the closing words of the First, inasmuch as all that is said at the close of the latter book is that those who have put forward views with regard to the best constitution will be first dealt with, but it appears to ignore them. In c. 12. 1273 b 27 sqq. the plan of the book is still further extended to include a notice of οἷς ἀποφθέγματι τι περὶ πολιτείας generally, and even of those
who were the authors of laws only and not of constitutions. Isocrates (Nicocl. § 24) refers to the Lacedaemonians and Carthaginians as admittedly possessing good constitutions; Polybius (6. 43) adds Crete and Mantinea, and in the opinion of some, Athens and Thebes. Plato (Laws 638 B) speaks of Ceos and the Italian Locrians as well-governed. Cр. also Plato, Rep. 599 E and Crito 52 E.

29. τάς ἄλλας πολιτείας, 'others than that which I am about to set forth': cp. παρ' αὐτῷ ἵππος, 33. It is possible that these words may be used in the same sense ('other than my own') in 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 34.

31. τὐγχάνωσιν. In eleven passages at least of the genuine writings of Aristotle, if the MSS. are to be trusted, we find ἐι followed by the subjunctive. These are as follows:—3b b 14, 66 b 9, 636 b 20, 1261 a 27, 136 a 20, 27, 179 b 22, 343 b 33, 1279 b 22 (συμβινυ, Vat. Palimpsest), 1447 a 24, and the passage before us. (In 1132 a 11 K has the subjunctive after κἀυ ἐι: see also 322 b 28, 326 a 6, 645 b 31, and Susennhil's apparatns criticus on 1323 a 2.) In the first four of these passages the subjunctive is used with καὶ ἐι, ἐι, ὁδ' ἐν ἐι, and ὀπὶ ἐν ἐι: in the remainder with κἀυ ἐι. See Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 1. 35 sqq., Bon. Ind. 217 a 31 sqq. and 41 a 26 sq., and Eucken, de Partic.Usu p. 59 sqq. All the MSS. but pr. P and possibly r have τυγχάνωσιν here, and all except P and possibly r have ἀλκυση in 1261 a 27. Vahlen's instructive discussion of the question as to the construction of κἀυ ἐι with the subjunctive in Aristotle's writings results in the conclusion that its use is 'very doubtful' and in Poet. 1. 1447 a 24 he substitutes κἀυ ἐι τὐγχάνωσιν for κἀυ ἐι τυγχάνωσιν, which is the reading of the one authoritative MS. of the Poetics. Bonitz would emend all the passages referred to above, so as to expel from Aristotle's writings the use of ἐι with the subjunctive. Eucken remarks (ubi supra, p. 63), that τυγχάνωσιν here, συμβινυ in 3. 8. 1279 b 22, and τυγχάνωσιν in Poet. 1. 1447 a 25 may very easily have arisen from τυγχάνωσιν, συμβίαι, and τυγχάνωσιν, and that it is only in passages 'ubi minima mutatione ex indicativo nasci potuit' that the subjunctive is found after κἀυ ἐι in Aristotle's writings. It is easy, however, to lay too much stress on arguments of this kind (see Blass as to Dawes' Canon, Handbuch der klass. Alterthums-Wissenschaft, 1. 252). In Plato, Rep. 579 D the MSS. have κἀυ ἐι μὴ τὐγχάνωσι, and in Thuc. 6. 21 an 'indubitable' instance of ἐι with the subjunctive occurs (Classen ad loc.). See Stallbaum's note on Laws 958 C, where other instances of the occurrence of this construction in Attic
writers are noticed. Aristotle is not a strictly Attic writer, and the fact should be noted for what it is worth that there are other passages of the Politics in which either the one family of MSS. or the other gives the subjunctive where we expect the indicative or else the subjunctive with ἄν: thus in 1301 a 38 Π² have 

τυργάνωσιν, and in 1307 a 37 ἄτριθ θῆλωσι, while in 1313 a 20 Π¹ have ἄσφι γὰρ ἐλαττώνον ὦτι κύριον. On the whole, I have contented myself with indicating by obelus the grave doubts which attach to the inculpated readings—

τυργάνωσιν here and ἐκκύριον in 1261 a 27.

32. ἵνα κ.τ.λ. There is a considerable resemblance between the passage before us and de An. 1. 2. 403 b 20 sqq. With regard to τὸ ἀρθῶς εἶχον and τὸ χρήσιμον as the two ends of inquiry in the Politics, cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 15 sq. and 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35 sq.

33. τὸ ἵππειν τι παρ’ αὐτός ἑτέρων very probably refers to Isocr. de Antidosi § 83, οὔδεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς δεῖ ἵππειν ἑτέρους [νόμους], ἀλλὰ τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδοκομούντας πειράθηναι συναγαγεῖν, ὁ ῥᾷδιος ὡς τίς ἂν ὄν βουληθεὶς ποιήσῃ. It is precisely this view that the Second Book is intended to disprove. See the opinion of Isocrates on this subject, de Antid. §§ 79–83. Πάντως probably goes with σοφιζεσθαι βουλομένων in the sense of ‘at all hazards.’

35. τὸς νῦν ὑπαρχοῦσας. Vict. ‘significat, ut arbitror, utrumque genus rerumpublicarum (id est, et usurpatas ab aliquibus civitatis et literarum monimentis proditas), etsi id nomen magis convenire videtur receptis iam, verius enim haec ὑπάρχει dicuntur.’

διὰ τούτο. Bonitz (Ind. 546 a 47) compares for this use of τούτο, in which ‘per ubertatem quandam dicendi quae antea exponuntur postea epanaleptice comprehenduntur,’ Categ. 5. 2 b 17: de An. 3. 3. 427 b 8–11. Cp. also c. 11. 1273 b 5.

36. ἄρχην δὲ κ.τ.λ. The natural starting-point of an inquiry περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πολιτικῆς (1260 b 27) is the question, in what and how much is there to be κοινωνία? The question put by Protagoras (Plato, Protag. 324 E) reminds us in form of that raised here, but Protagoras is there thinking of virtue as the thing shared.

40. πολιτεία. Cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 29, κοινωνία δ’ ἐστιν ἡ πολιτεία, where the meaning of πολιτεία is evidently ‘constitution’; thus Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 15) is apparently right in rendering the word here as ‘civitatis forma et ordo;’ otherwise we might be tempted by τοὺς πολίτας 38 and οἱ πολίται 1261 a 1 to explain it here, as in some other passages (see Bon. Ind. 612 b 10 sqq.), as = ‘the citizen-body,’ especially as in 3. 3. 1276 b 2 the πολιτεία is spoken of rather as the thing shared, than the κοινωνία—a term more usually applied to the πόλις.
41. Citizenship implies membership of the same city, and membership of the same city implies residence in the same locality. Still residence in the same locality does not amount to much: cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 11, τούτω δὲ γίνεσθαι ἂν ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοιαίς οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δοξέει τὸ συζῆν ἐπί τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ὡσπερ ἐπί τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νεῖμεσθαι.

2. πότερον κ.τ.λ. The question is raised in very similar 1261 a, language to the question about Kingship, 3. 14. 1284 b 37. This is worth remarking, as these correspondences show a certain continuity of treatment.

δεσιν. What are the objects which it is implied cannot be shared? This appears from Plato, Rep. 464 D, διὰ τὸ μηδένα οὗν ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δ' ἄλλα κοινά. In the Laws (739 C) Plato insists with humorous exaggeration, that even hands ears and eyes are to be common.

9 sqq. 'Community in women involves both many other C. 2. difficulties, and this especially, that the object for the sake of which Socrates recommends its establishment by legislation evidently is not borne out (proved to be a desirable object) by the arguments he uses, and then again as a means to the end which he marks out for the State, the scheme set forth in the dialogue is impracticable; yet how it should be limited and qualified, is nowhere definitely explained.' Socrates fails to make out that the aim with which he pleads for a community in women—that of rendering the State as far as possible one—is a correct aim; and the means which he adopts for the realization of his end are—apart from qualifications and limitations of which we hear nothing from him—impossible. The first of these two allegations is developed in c. 2 and the second in c. 3. The Platonic Socrates anticipates a reception of this kind for his suggestion of community in women and children; cp. Rep. 450 C, καὶ γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται, ἀπαστοίτ' ἄν, καὶ εἰ ὡς μᾶλλα γένετο, ὡς ἀριστ' ἄν ἐπὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ταύτη ἀπαιτήσθηται. Aristotle's criticisms on the Lacedaemonian and other constitutions are grouped under two heads (c. 9. 1269 a 30) in a not very dissimilar way. As to ἀδύνατον, cp. c. 3. 1261 b 30, διὸ ἔστι τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὃδε μὲν καλὸν, ἄλλ' ὃν δυνατὸν, ὃδε ὃδὲν ὑμνημοσύνῃ, and 1262 a 14 sqq. As to δὲ ἐν αἰτίαν, cp. c. 4. 1262 b 5 sq. For ὃν φαίνεται συμβαίνων in the sense of 'evidently does not result,' cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 5, οὗτ' ἐχουσα φαίνεται, and see Bon. Ind. 808 b 40 sqq. For συμβαίνων ἐκ τῶν λόγων, cp. Top. 8. 1. 156 b 38 (Bon. Ind. 713 b 16), and de Caelo 1. 3. 270 b 11. It seems
NOTES.

better to interpret these words as 'borne out by the arguments used' than with Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 19) to explain, 'la communauté n’atteint pas le résultat, en vue duquel Platon établit cette legislation.' The sentence ὁς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν appears to be the nom. to ἀστι, which we must supply with διώνατον: cp. c. 5. 1263 a 22, ὅν δὲ νῦν πρῶτον ἔξελε ... οὐ μικρὸν ἀν διενέγκατ. As to πρῶς, cp. 2. 4. 1262 b 3: 3. 13. 1284 a 1: 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 31 sq.: 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 42. For διελείν ('explicare,' Bon. Ind. 180 a 23, 29), cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 1. 1138 b 20 sq., and 9. 8. 1168 b 12, ἵνα δὴν τοὺς πτωτούς δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαρεῖν, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐκτερεῖ καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσα: also Metaph. A. 9. 992 b 18 sq.

15. ὅτι μάλιστα qualifies μίαν (cp. 1261 b 16, and τελέως, 1261 b 20).

16. ταύτην ὑπόθεσεν, 'this as his fundamental aim.' For this use of οὗτος, see Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq. For the gender—ταύτην, not τούτο—cp. 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32: 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 41. καίτοι κ.τ.λ. For the argument, compare 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 21 sqq.

18. πλήθος ... τι. Cp. 3. 1. 1274 b 41: 1275 b 20: 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 16—passages which explain the addition of τι. Plato had said in Rep. 462 C, καὶ ἡτις ἐγγύτατα ἑνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἐξελε (ἀυτή ἡ πόλις ἀριστα διοικεῖται), but his meaning is that the hurt of one member of the community is to be felt as a hurt by all, just as the hurt of a finger is felt as a hurt by the whole man. He knows well that the State consists both ἐκ πλειόνων ἀνθρώπων and ἐξ ἐδεί διαφερόντων (Polit. 308 C). Nevertheless there was a real difference of opinion between Aristote and Plato on this subject. The State is less of a σύμφωνος (2. 4. 1262 b 14 sqq.) to Aristote than to Plato; the individual counts for more with him, and is less lost and swallowed up in the State.

22. ἀναρίστησι γὰρ τὴν πόλιν. Cp. 1261 b 8 sq. For the future, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 5, μάλιστα δ’ ἀν γένοιτο φανερῶν, ἐξ ὑπὸ τοῖς ἐργοῖς ἰδον τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην' οὐ γὰρ διυνθείσται κ.τ.λ.

23. ἐξ ἐδεί διαφερόντων. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 5 sq., and the enumeration of the different γένη of the πόλις in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 20 sq. and 6 (4). 4. Especially the broad distinction of rulers and ruled is referred to (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12); but even among rulers there will be differences (1261 b 5). When we are told in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25 that ἡ πόλις βούλεται ἐξ ἵστων εἰκατα ὡς ὁμοίων ὅτι μάλιστα, the word πόλις appears to include only the citizens, as in the phrase ἡ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος ἐστίν, 3. 1. 1274 b 41. But even like and equal citizens can only be 'as far as possible' like and equal, for some of them will be rulers and others ruled.
25. μεν is answered by δε 29. For the thought expressed in 24–27, cp. Xen/ de Vestiig. c. 4. 32, ὀσπερ σύμμαχοι, ὅσοι ἐν πλείους συνίστσαν, ἵπποις ἐπικρατέροις ἄλληλοις ποιοίσσων.

27. ὀσπερ ἐν εἰ κ.τ.λ. It is not quite clear whether the meaning is 'just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a less,' or 'just as a greater weight depresses the scale more.' Giph. takes the words in the former way, Vict. in the latter. ὀσπερ ἐν εἰ does not always imply an ellipse after ὀσπερ ἐν (see Bon. Ind. 872 b 55 sqq. and Eucken, de Partic. Usu. p. 60), but it may perhaps do so here, and we may be right in translating (with Giph.)—'just as would be the case, if a weight were to depress the scale more.'

+ ἐλκύσῃ. See critical note on this word, and also above on 1260 b 31.

diooiei δε κ.τ.λ. The first of the many questions which arise as to this passage is, what is the meaning of τφ τοιούτω? Here as elsewhere it seems to mean 'in the before-mentioned respect,' but it is not quite clear whether it should be explained as τφ εξ εἰς διαφερόστων ἐλαῖον, or 'in being all the stronger for being larger, even though its components are identical.' Probably the latter explanation is the correct one. Κεχωρισμένα κατά κόμμα, again, may mean either 'scattered (sundered from each other) in villages' (cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 22, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένα πολλῶν πώλων καὶ ἐπίρων, and Hdt. 1. 96), or 'distributed in villages' (cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 6, οὐ γὰρ δινηθήσεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιήσαι τὴν πώλων, and Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 19). The two interpretations do not lie far apart, but perhaps the former of them is the more likely to be correct (see Liddell and Scott s.v. κόμη). Passing on to discuss the meaning of the passage as a whole, we find that ὅταν μη—'Ἀρκαίας has been taken by some to be explanatory of πώλις, and has been rendered 'when the members of the πώλις are not scattered in villages, but are concentrated in a city, like the Arcadians (after the foundation of Μegasopolis,' but it seems strange that 'the Arcadians' should be selected to serve as an example of a πώλις. It is far more likely that ὅταν μη—'Ἀρκαίας refers to the members of the ἐθνος, and is intended to explain under what circumstances the difference alleged to exist between the πώλις and the ἐθνος does really exist. But then comes the question, what is the meaning of οἱν ὅταν ἀρκάδιν; Sepulveda explains, 'gens quae non per castella et vicos distributa est, ut divisos habeat magistratus, sed sparsas per agros domos habitat, ut olim Arcaedes,' and Lamb., Ramus, and others follow in his track, but Aristotle does not indicate in any way that he is not referring to the Arcadians of his own day, who had long
ceased to live in this fashion. Dittenberger, on the other hand, whose able discussion of the passage in Gott. gel. Ainz. 1874, p. 1376 sqq. (see an extract from it in Sus.², Note 132) deserves careful perusal, explains the passage thus (p. 1383)—'provided, that is to say, that the nation is not distributed, like most barbarian nations, into non-independent (unselbständige) villages, but, like the Arcadian for instance, into a number of independent (selbständiger) City-States.' He holds that a distinction is drawn in the passage between 'nations forming a political unity (commonly with a monarchical constitution)' and nations composed of a number of City-States. This is a possible view of it, but it must not be forgotten that in Aristotle's day the Arcadians were a confederacy of City-States, and that a general assembly of the nation met at Megalopolis: cp. Aristot. Fragm. 442. 1550 b 6 (Harpocr. p. 280), μῦραι ἐν Μεγάλῃ πόλει . . . συνεδρίων ἐστὶ κοινῶν 'Αρκαίων ἀπάντων, οἱ πολλάκις μημονεύοντων οἱ ἱστορικοὶ διειλεκται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ 'Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ κοινῇ 'Αρκαίων πολιτείᾳ ἄρχόμενος τοῦ βιβλίου, and see Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2, 134, who refers to Diod. 15. 59, περὶ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων Δικαιμήθη ὁ Τεγεάτης ἦπεις τοὺς 'Αρκαίδας εἰς μίαν συντελειαν παχύναι καὶ κοινὴν ἔχειν σύνοδον συνεστάσαν εἰς ἀνδρῶν μυρίων, καὶ τούτους ἔξωσαν ἔχειν περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης βουλεύεσθαι, as well as to Paus. 8. 27 and some other passages. Cp. also Hyperid. adv. Demosth. col. 16. 14 (p. 10 Blass), τῶν κοινῶν συλλάγων Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ 'Αρκαίων. It is to this confederation that Müller (ubi supra) takes Aristotle here to allude, and the writer of some valuable remarks on the passage in the Guardian newspaper for Jan. 27, 1886 explains it in the same way. Is it not likely that Aristotle's meaning is—'a nation also differs from a City-State in being all the stronger for being larger, even though its components are identical, whenever at least the nation is not scattered in villages, as some nations are, but united in a confederacy, like the Arcadian'? It will then be implied that the addition of fresh villages to an uncompacted mass of villages brings no accession of strength, whereas the addition of fresh City-States to a confederacy like the Arcadian does so. An ἔθνος 'sundered in villages' seems, indeed, to have been little better than a rope of sand: cp. Diod. 5. 6, οἱ δ' οὖν Σικανοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν καμηδὸν φικόν, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχωτάτων λόφων τάς πόλις κατασκεύασαν διὰ τοῦ ληστᾶς· οὐ γὰρ ἦσαν ἢπο μίαν ἡγεμονίαν βασιλείων τεταγμένοι, κατὰ πόλιν δὲ ἕκαστριν εἰς ἕν ὁ διοικητῆς: Hist. 1. 96: Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom. 1. 9. Pollux, it may be noted, speaks as if the ἔθνος were always composed of πόλεις—καὶ αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ πόλεις εἰς ἐν συντελοῦσαι ἔθνος, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ κώμαι εἰς ἐν συμφόρουσαι δόμων πόλεις (9. 27, quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr.
Antiqq. 1. § 11. 10)—but this evidently was not the case. As to the position of καὶ before πόλεις, Dittenberger remarks that though it is surprising, it is not more surprising than much else in Aristotle's collocation of words. See note on 1254 b 16. Certainly καὶ ἔδον τὸ πόλεις would be more natural, but perhaps the idea uppermost in Aristotle's mind is, that there is another pair of things between which a similar contrast exists, and he places καὶ before both these two things. Compare the displacement of the negative noticed in Bon. Ind. 539 a 14 sqq.

29. ἔν. The State is a κοινωνία ἡ ἡ ἐν τῷ τό γένος, 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25: cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 28 sqq. For the various kinds of unity, see Metaph. Δ. 6. 1016 b 31 sqq. Aristotle inherits the thought expressed in this passage to some extent from earlier inquirers—from the Pythagoreans, from Heraclitus (Eth. Nic. 8. 2. 1155 b 4 sq.), and from Plato (Politi. 308 C: Laws 773 C sqq.). Of course he also holds the complementary truth that there should be an unity of ethical conviction as to τὰ ποιητικὰ εὐθαμονία in the minds of the citizens (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 37 sqq.).

30. διόπερ κ.τ.λ. For other passages in the Politics in which τὰ ἡθικὰ are referred to, see Bon. Ind. 101 b 19 sqq. It is the reciprocal rendering of an equivalent amount of dissimilar things, not the receipt of an equal amount of the same thing, that holds the State together (σῶσε τὰς πόλεις, cp. 1261 b 9 and 3. 12. 1282 b 16 sqq.). Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1132 b 33, τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀναλογον συμμετεῖ ἡ πόλις: 9. 1. 1163 b 32 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1243 b 29 sqq. and 1242 b 22 sqq. (In the first of these passages Aristotle includes under ἀντιπόδωσις a return of ill for ill, as well as of good for good, and thus takes a wider view of it than he does in the passage before us: ἀντιπόδωσις is made to include the return of ill for ill, and further (1133 a 4 sq.) the return not only of service for service, but of favour for favour.) The fact that the State rests on τὰ ἴσαν τὸ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, and not on the other kind of equality, serves to show that it is composed of unicls, for if all the members of the State were likes (e.g. shoemakers), there would be no question of equivalence: an absolutely equal share of the one product would be assignable. As it is, the ruler renders to the ruled the offices of a good ruler, and the ruled repay him with the offices of good subjects. It is thus that the State holds together, and that friendship is maintained between its members (Eth. Nic. 8. 8. 1158 b 11 sqq.). This is true even of free and equal citizens, among whom one would least expect any difference in kind to exist, for though here there is no intrinsic difference, yet the impossibility
of all ruling at the same time leads to an 'imitation' of, or approximation to, such difference, and breaks them into rulers and ruled, two classes different in kind, even though they interchange their positions from time to time. Hence here too τὸ ἵσον τὸ ἀντισπευδός is in place.

33. κατ' ἑναυτόν, 'year by year,' cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 40, ἐν ὀσταις μὲν πῶλεις τιμῶνται κατ' ἑναυτόν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μείζονε ἀπὸ τριτηρίδος ἡ περιτηρίδος. Mr. Welldon: 'they must follow a system of yearly rotation.' Vict. 'hoc igitur pacto solum id administrari potest, si interposito spatio anni unius id fiat.'

ἡ κατὰ τινα ἀλλην ταξιν ἡ χρόνον, 'or by some other order of succession' (Bern. 'Abfolge') 'or official period.'

34. καὶ . . . δὴ, see note on 1.2. 1253 a 18. For συμβαίνειν ὡστε Bonitz compares Pol. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12. Cp. also de Sensu 2. 437 b 8.

35. ὃσπερ ἐν εἰ κ.τ.λ., 'as all would be shoemakers and carpenters, if' etc. So Giph. p. 154.

37 sqq. οὖτως. Sepulv. 'ut nunc sese res habet in sutoribus et fabris, ut idem semper sint suotores, idem fabri.' Since it is better that the same men should always rule (cp. for the thought Isocr. Busiris § 16: Nicocl. §§ 17-18: Aristot. Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq. and 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39 sq.: Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 27 sq.: and contrast Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25), and that there should be a permanent difference between rulers and ruled, men seek, where this is out of the question, to get as near to this state of things as possible (μιμεῖται), and by alternation of office to create two different classes, rulers and ruled, thus conjuring up a difference where it can hardly be said to exist. For ἐν οἷς δὲ . . . τούτο δὲ, see Bonitz (Ind. 166 b 58-167 a 12), who points out that in this passage there is not (as in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 32: 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 11) any preceding sentence introduced by μὲν for the first δὲ of the two to answer. The same thing appears in Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 a 32 sqq. and other passages adduced by Bonitz.

1261 b. 1. εἰτ' ἀγαθὸν εἰτε φαῦλον τὸ ἄρχειν. Camerarius (p. 76) refers to Plato, Rep. 345 E sqq.: 346 E sqq. Cp. also Pol. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.

2. τούτο δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τούς ἵσους εἰκὴν τὸ δ' ὁς ὁμοίους εἰναι εἰς ἄρχης. I place in the text the reading of the first family of MSS., for though it is obviously untenable as it stands, it probably approaches the true reading far more closely than that of the second. See Sussemiti's able note on this passage in Qu. Crit. p. 360. He reads ἵσονοῖς for δ' ὁς ὁμοίους, and this conjecture may be correct, but it is of course only a conjecture. 'Εν τούτως δὲ (11)
might perhaps with advantage take the place of τοῦτο δὲ (II1), but
μειτᾶ (II') appears to suit better with οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχοντα κ.τ.λ. than
μειέθαι (II2), with which βέλτιον must be supplied, for, as Thurot
says (Etudes, p. 24), 'Aristote constate un fait, mais ne donne pas un précepte.'
A. Schott, in Heinsius' Paraphrase of the Politics
(p. 1044) conjectures τῷ in place of τὸ 3, and Sus. adopts this con-
jecture, which certainly simplifies the passage if τοῦτο δὲ is read or
if the reading of the second family is adopted, but if we read ἐν
τούτω δὲ μειτᾶ τὸ ἐν μέρι τούς ἑκείν ἐκαίν ἄρκης, ἃ ἐκ 
— ἑκείν will be the nom. to μειτᾶ, and the translation will be,
'in the case of these the alternation of ruling and being ruled imitates
an original inequality.' So Thurot (Etudes, p. 23), 'là où les mem-
bres de l'État sont naturellement égaux, l'inhégalité naturelle est
imitée par l'alternative dans l'exercice du pouvoir et dans l'obé-
sance. Les citoyens commandent et obéissent tour à tour, comme
s'ils devenaient d'autres hommes, c'est-à-dire comme s'ils étaient
égaux.' Cp. 1. 12. 1250 b 7, ὅσα τὸ μὲν ἄρχη τὸ δ' ἄρχηται. ἐτεὶ
diaphorών εἶναι κ.τ.λ. For μειτᾶ in the sense in which it is used
here, cp. Isocr. Archid. § 81, ἢν οὐ εἰλικρίνει τοῦτο παῖςομεν, ὅ μη
σαιμένοις ἡμῖν συνώντεν, οἴκ αὖθιν οὗτ μᾶδος τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπικράτη-
ςομεν, and Plato, Polit. 293 E, 301 A. Εἰκεῖν appears to occur
extremely rarely in Aristotle: Bonitz (Ind. 219 b 18) gives no
other instance of the pres. infinitive.

5. καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. 'And in the same way, again,
even when they rule, one man holds one office and another another
[just as if there were a difference between them].' So inseparable
is differentiation from the State, that when its members are alike
and equal, differences are conjured up not only between rulers
and ruled, but even among rulers. It is thus that I incline to
understand the passage; I add, however, Mr. Welldon's translation
of it—'the same principle [of alternation] during the period of
their rule regulates the distribution of the different offices among
different persons.'

7. On οὔτε, see critical note. As to πέφυκε, see Vahlen's note
on Poet. 6. 1450 a 2.

οὔτως. Cp. c. 5. 1263 b 31, δει μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶς μὲν καὶ τὴν νεῖλ
καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντως κ.τ.λ.: 1264 a 15, b 16, ὅτι μίλιστα:
1261 b 20, τέλιος: 1261 b 10, λαῖν.

8. τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθόν. Cp. Rep. 462 A. For the
pleonastic use of δι', cp. Phys. 8. 7. 260 a 25 and the passages
collected in Bon. Ind. 538 b 33 sqq. We have ἐν ταῖς πόλισιν here,
but ἐν is absent in the similar passage, c. 4. 1262 b 8.
10. καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον, i.e. by asking, not how the State is composed, but what is most desirable.


C. 3. 16. Ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle seems to pass to his second point (1261 a 12 sq.), that saying mine and not-mine of the same thing is not a means to the unity of the State. The unity of the State is not 'indicated' (ἀποδείκνυοντα, cp. σημείον εἶναι, 19) by men's saying mine and not-mine of the same thing.

18. κατὰ τὸν λόγον, 'in connexion with' (or 'in') the expression,' i.e. τὸ λέγειν πάντας ἀμα τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐμὸν.


29. καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις takes up and justifies παραλογισμὸς: not only do ambiguous terms such as these cause contention in practical life, but in discussions also they generate contentious syllogisms. Cp. Top. 8. 11. 162 a 16, ἀδύνατον δὲ συνολικός ἐρωτικός : 12. 162 b 3, ψευδός δὲ λόγος καλείται πετραχῶς, ἕνα μὲν τρόπον ὅταν φαίνεται συμπεραίνοντα μὴ συμπεραίνομενος, ὡς καλεῖται ἐρωτικός συνολικός. Cp. also Metaph. a. 3. 995 a 10, ξέχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβές τουούτον, ὡστε, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συρμβαλίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνέλευθεν εἶναι τις ἀκινήτης: Isocr. adv. Soph. § 7, τὰς ἐναντιώσεις ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων τηροῦντας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐργῶν μὴ καθορωμέναι (also § 14) : Plato, Polit. 306 A, τοῖς περὶ λόγων ἀμφισβητητικοῖς. Thurot (Études, p. 24) refers to Waitz, Top. 8. 3. 159 a 1 and An. Post. I. 1. 71 a 5. Perhaps Pol. 4 (7). 7. 1326 a 19, οὐ γάρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀκριβείαν δεὶ ζητεῖν διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων καὶ τῶν γεγονόμενον διὰ τῆς ἀσθενείας should also be mentioned.

31. οὐ δυνάτων. 'Jurusconsulti negant fieri posse ut eiusdem rei duo in solidum sint domini; hoc tantum permittunt, ut rei communis dominum quisque se vocare possit, sed pro parte indivisa, non in solidum' (Giph.). Cp. ἀδύνατων, 1261 a 14.

32. τὸ λεγόμενον, i.e. (probably) τὸ πάντα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ἐμὸν καὶ μὴ ἐμὸν.

34. φροντίζουσιν, 'men care for': cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 24, βούλονται: 8 (6). 1321 b 25, καθιστάσιν. Plato had claimed (Rep. 463 C-D), that his plan of an extended application of the names of brother, sister, father, mother, son, and daughter would not impair the fulfilment of the duties implied by such relationship. With this Aristotle does not agree.

35. ἡ δὲν έκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει. Vict. 'aut quantum suas partes postulare putant.' Men care for matters of common interest less,
or at any rate only to the extent to which they are personally concerned in them.

πρός γάρ τοῖς ἄλλοις is added to explain this limitation of attention. Even where there is no other cause for inattention, men may well think that some one else is looking after the matter. Camera-

rius (p. 78) compares Xen. Cyrop. 5. 3. 49 sq.

38. The argument is—each of the citizens has a thousand sons, and these not exclusively his, for every son is as much the son of one citizen as he is of another; hence all the fathers will alike neglect the sons. The indefiniteness of the relation between father and child and the neglect to which this will lead is here insisted on, as in the next paragraph the fractional character of this relationship and the consequent diminution of oikeiōtēs. Cp. Rep. 463 C, παρὰ γάρ, ὃν ἤντων χαῖνα τις, ἢ ὁς ἀδέλφῳ ἢ ὁς ἀδελφῇ ἢ ὁς πατρί ἢ ὁς μητρὶ ἢ νεοὶ ἢ θυγατέρι ἢ τούτων ἵκρονοι ἢ προγόνοι νομεῖ ἄντων χαίνειν.

γίνομαι, 'every citizen comes to have.' Cp. γίνομαι, c. 5. 1264 a 14: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24: 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 5.

πολιτών must be taken here in a sense exclusive of the third class of the Republic, though this class also is included by Plato within the citizen-body.

1. ἐτὶ κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle seems to pass from the point of 1262 a, neglect and defect of attention to that of defective oikeiōtēs. Plato had claimed (Rep. 462 B sqq.) that all the citizens of his State would feel as one man, and would sympathize as keenly with any one of their number who might happen to meet with good or ill fortune, as the physical frame responds to pain or pleasure affecting a limb. Aristotle contends, on the contrary, that they will be connected with any given member of their body only by a fractional relationship varying with the size of the State, and will feel only a fractional joy or sorrow at his prosperity or adversity, nor will they feel even that without doubt and uncertainty, for they will not know whether they ever had a child, much less whether it has survived.

2. οὔτως, i.e. 'fractionally;' or in other words, with the feeling that he has a thousandth share in him, not the whole; οὔτως is explained by ὁπόστος τυγχάνει τῶν ἀριθμῶν, as οὔτω 6 is explained by τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προσπαθεῖντας: cp. Metaph. B. 4. 999 b 33, τὸ γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἐν ἢ τὸ καθ' ἐκαίτων λέγειν διαφέρει οὐδέν: οὔτω γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' ἐκαίτον τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἐν, where τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἐν explains οὔτω (see Bonitz' note on the passage).

3. οἶον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δεῖνος κ.τ.λ., 'i.e. he will say he is my son, or so and so's, naming in this way each of the thousand fathers or

4. καθ’ ἐκαστόν τῶν χιλιῶν. Κατά is not ‘of’ here, for then we should have καθ’ ἐκαστόν (cp. 7 (5)). 7. 1307 b 2, εἰρηνα κατά πασῶν τῶν πολιτείων: we must take καθ’ ἐκαστόν as one word (= singulous): cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 13, καθ’ ἐκαστόν γὰρ ἰσαρεύει, and see Bon. Ind. 226 a 25 sqq. See also Ast, Lexicon Platon. 2. p. 145.

6. καῖτοι πότερον κ.τ.λ. Δισχιλίων καὶ (‘vi non multum ab ἦ distans,’ Bon. Ind. 357 b 20) μυρίων is probably gen. after ἐκαστὸν, which is the subject of λέγειν. Plato had hoped that when the whole of the citizens spoke of the same person or thing as ‘mine,’ the State would be pervaded with a feeling of friendliness and brotherhood. Μέν has nothing to answer to it, but instances of this are by no means rare: see for example 3. 13. 1284 b 13. On μὲν solitarium see Holden, Oeconomicus of Xenophon, Index p. 80. In the passage before us the reason why μέν has nothing to answer to it probably is that Aristotle in his eagerness hurries on to ἦ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. without pausing to add ‘but though using the same name, not feeling any clear sentiment of relationship.’

9. The words αὐτοῦ ... αὐτοῦ are emphatic: cp. ἰδιον ἰνεψιῶν, 13, and Plutarch de Esu Carnium 2. 5. 998 D, νῦν αὐτοῦ τῶν κείμενον ἦ ἰδελφῶν αὐτοῦ. Though A, B, C, and D call the same man severally by a different name, they nevertheless have that keen sense of something ἰδιον in connexion with him which, in Aristotle’s view, the change proposed by Plato would take away or seriously diminish.

11. οἰκειότητα, here included under συγγένεια, while in the Rhetoric (2. 4. 1381 b 33 sq.) οἰκειότης and συγγένεια figure as two distinct forms of φιλία.

12. ἦ τῶν αὐτοῦ. Giph. ‘ut si frater uxorem ducat.’

πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ἔτερον. All the MSS. read ἔτερον, but Bern. conjectures ἔτεροι, and Thurot (followed by Sus.) ἔτερος (Études sur Aristote, p. 26). ‘Ἐτέρος,’ says Thurot, ‘esta opposé à πρὸς τοῦτος, aux parents considérés comme faisant une seule classe: cf. 3. 14. 1285 a 29.’ We then have ὁ μὲν—ὁ δὲ—ὁ δὲ—πρὸς δὲ τοῦτος ἔτερος, and the sentence gains in neatness. And even if we take τοῦτος not as masc. (with Thurot), but as neut. (cp. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτος, 1261 b 32: 3. 14. 1285 b 10: 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13, and often elsewhere), and make πρὸς τοῦτος mean ‘besides’ or ‘again,’ the change of
Into ἓτερον or ἕτεροι is attractive. But all the MSS. are against it, and perhaps the point which Aristotle is pressing is not so much the number of persons related to one man as the number of appellatives indicating definite relationship in ordinary use under the actual system. "Ἑτεροι, if we retain it, will be added, because the person hitherto spoken of would not be called φράτωρ or φυλέτης by his relatives. It is not quite clear whether πρὸς τοῖτοι should be translated 'in addition to these appellatives,' or simply 'again.' It is to be noticed that Aristotle in defending the family defends also not only the more distant degrees of relationship, but the phratric and tribal relations, which in modern societies do not exist. Cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 8, and the mention of phratries in 3. 9. 1280 b 37.

φράτωρ φυλέτης. For the omission of Σ, see critical note on 1260 a 20.

14 sqq. Women had the credit in Greece of being especially quick in noticing resemblances between parents and children (Athen. Deipn. 5. 190 e). Athenaeus makes the remark in commenting on Helen's recognition (Odyss. 4. 141 sqq.) of Telemachus' likeness to his father, and this passage of the Odyssey may well be present to Aristotle's memory here.

16. κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοίωτας. Cp. κατὰ τὰς ὁμοίωτας, 21. Λαμ-βαίνειν τὰς πίστεις is more usually followed by ἐκ or διὰ, but these resemblances are referred to here rather as the standard by which conclusions as to parentage are arrived at, than as the source from which they are drawn. Compare the use of κατὰ in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 15, δὴ λογοῦ γὰρ ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖσει καὶ τὴν παθεῖαν κατὰ τὴν διάφρεσιν ταῦτα.

18. καί, 'in fact.' Not only is it likely to happen, but it does happen. Cp. de Gen. An. 1. 20. 729 a 31, ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται συμ-βαίνων.

19. τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους. Aristotle dwells in Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 33 sq. on the utility of these works in discussions about legislation, and here we have an instance of it. Hdt. 4. 180 is probably Aristotle's authority in this passage, though the Auseans, of whom Herodotus is here speaking, are said by him to be παραθαλάσσιοι (c. 181: see Camerarius, p. 79). Aristotle refers to Herodotus less respectfully in de Gen. An. 3. 5. 756 b 6 ('Πρῶτος ὁ μεθελόχος), and in Hist. An. 6. 31. 579 b 2. Meltzer (Geschichte der Karthager 1. 69) holds that the Libyans were as a rule monogamists, and that the customs here and elsewhere (4. 172, 176) ascribed to Libyan races by Herodotus were exceptional among them.

21. εἰοί δὲ τινές κ.τ.λ. Vet. Int. 'sunt autem quaedam etiam
femellae etiam aliorum animalium’; thus he takes γυναικες here as = ‘females,’ as do Lambinus and many other translators and commentators after him, including Susemihl (also Liddell and Scott, s.v.). Sepulveda however translates, ‘sunt autem mulieres quaedam et in aliis animantium generibus foeminae,’ and Bernays, ‘wirklich gibt es Frauen und auch Thierweibchen.’ θυναίκες is not often used by Aristotle in the sense of ‘females,’ and I incline to follow the rendering of Sepulveda and Bernays, especially as the word seems to bear its ordinary meaning in the very similar passage from the History of Animals quoted in the next note.


τ' Αγρόν εὐσεβέστερον γεγορεῖν οὐδένα
οἷαν' φέρει γὰρ ὅσα θεοὶ ἄνθη καλά,
κιττῶν, διάφυσιν' χρησὶ δ' εἰν σπείρα, πάντων
δικαιος ὧν ἀπεδωκε διὰς ὧν καταβάλω.

In the land of the just (Hesiod, Opera et Dicis, 225–237), as Mr. Evelyn Abbott has pointed out to me,

Τικτούσιν . . . γυναῖκες οὐκότα τέκνα τοκεύειν.

Mr. Bywater adds a reference to Hor. Od. 4. 5. 23:

Laudantur similis prole puerperae.

toútήn.

27. τούς δὲ ἐκουσίους. Cp. ἐλεγεωσιοῦ τοὺς δὲ ἐποσιοῦ ὑμεμάζου-
σιν, Poet. 1. 1447 b 14, and see Vahlen on this passage (Poet. p. 91), who collects other instances. See also Shilleto on Demosth. de Falsa Legatione c. 200. Aristotle refers to involuntary homicides, and then it occurs to him to add—‘and voluntary ones.’ Plato hoped to prevent outrages of the kind referred to here by his regulations as to relationship (Rep. 461 D: cp. 465 A–B); he holds that younger men in his State will not do violence to seniors, because they will regard them as their fathers. But Aristotle does not think that they will be restrained by consider-
ation for a fatherhood which he accounts unreal, and if they are not, then their violence may chance to fall on their real father or other near relative, and thus they may unwittingly sin against the divine ordinances.

28. ὁσιος. Herodotus often uses the epithets οὐχ ὁσιος and ἀνωτής of violations of duty to near relatives, e.g. in 3. 19: 3. 65: 4. 154’ (L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, 1. 400). Aristotle does not neglect in the Politics considerations of τὸ ὠσιον: cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 25. He writes as a Hellene animated by the religious feelings of his race and time. In his view, ignorance and absence of intention would not remove the lamentableness or even perhaps the guilt of these crimes. Nor would it excuse the absence of λύσεις. So Plato (Laws 865 A—866 B) enforces on the involuntary homicide not only purification but a temporary exile. His procedure in cases of homicide is largely copied from the Attic (Grote, Plato 3. 404—5). See as to the Attic Law on the subject Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 368 sq. In the Hercules Furens of Euripides, the hero, though his murder of his wife and children has been committed in the unconsciousness of raving madness, still veils his face before Theseus in order to save him the pollution inseparable from the sight of even an involuntary homicide (1050 sqq.). See also Prof. Jebb’s note on Soph. O. T. 1415. It appears from the Liber Poenitentialis of Theodore, 3. 14 (Thorpe, Ancient Laws of England, 2. 5, cp. Capitula et Fragmenta Theodori, ibid. 2. 74) and from that of Egbert, 2. 1 (Thorpe 2. 183), that even justifiable or unwilling homicide was regarded by the Church as needing to be expiated by penance. So again, under the laws of King Alfred, ‘even in the case of unintentional homicide, it was prima facie lawful and even proper to slay the slayer’ (Sir J. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law in England, 3. 24). Plato, however, set little store by λύσεις (Rep. 364 Ε), so far as ἀδικήματα are concerned; those to which Aristotle here refers, therefore, would in his view only avail in the case of an ἀκούσιον ἀμάρτημα (Laws 860 sqq.). Indeed, if Bernays is right (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 106), the Peripatetics thought little of expiatory sacrifice, so that Aristotle may here be speaking somewhat exoterically.

30. καὶ does not mean ‘both’ probably, but emphasizes πλεῖον.
31. τῶν μὲν γυμνοῦσιν, gen. after λύσεις.
40. τοῖς γεωργοῖς is in the dative not after χρήσιμον, but after κοινά, unless indeed we should compare the use of the dative in c. 7. 1267 a 37, τὸ τὰς ωυσίας εἶναι ἵσας τοῖς πολίταις.

1262 b. 2. τοιουτοὺς, i.e. ἦττον φίλους: cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 26 sqq.

3. δὲ ὁ λόγος δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has been making a number of objections to this or that feature of the proposed law, and the last of them (Ἠττον ἐστιν φίλως, 1) leads up now to a broad impeachment of the law as a whole. ‘Broadly, the law is a bad one; it brings about results the very opposite of those which a law should bring about.’ Compare the transition in Metaph. M. 2. 1077 a 14. For the thought that affection is the end of πολιτική, cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 1. 1234 b 22.

5. καὶ δὲ ἦν αἰτίαν, ‘and of that on account of which.’


τὸ γάρ is here duly followed by καί.

11. ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις. Cp. Plato, Symp. 191 A : 192 D sqq.: ‘in the discourses on the subject of love’ contained in the Symposion of Plato. It is not necessary to suppose that Aristotle means to designate the dialogue by this as a second title. See Sus., Note 148.

12. For this construction with λέγειν, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 20: Polyb. 6. 46. 9.


14. ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὡν κ.τ.λ. In this case τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν is present and the persons are only two in number (contrast μικρὸν γλυκὲν εἰς πολὺ ὑδρῷ μικθὲν): here therefore a close unity results which involves the absorption and disappearance of the two persons or one of them (cp. μίν ψυχῇ, Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 7). The case is, in fact, that of a σύμφωσις: cp. συμφωνήσας 13 (Plato, Symp. 191 A, had already used the word συμφώνα), and Phys. 4. 5. 213 a 9, σύμφωνας δὲ, ὅταν ἄμφῳ ἐνεργεῖ τοι γένωνται. But the measure which Plato is for applying to the State will not produce τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν, but only a weak and watery kind of affection, and this watery sentiment will be spread over a whole State. For both these reasons no σύμφωσις will result. Plato’s idea was not entirely novel (cp. Hdt. 4. 104), and it survived him, not only in the πολιτεία of Zeno of Citium (cp. Diog. Laert. 7. 131, and Athen. Deipn. 561 c quoted by Henkel, Studien p. 27), but far later (see Plutarch’s account of the proposition of Hor-
tensis, Cato Minor, c. 25). For τὸν ἐνα in the sense of τὸν ἐπαρν, cp. τῷ ἐν ταῖναι (‘the one form of paean’) Rhet. 3. 8. 1409 a 10.

17. ἡλυκό, probably the γλυκὸς ἀκρατος ὅιους of Diog. Laert. 7. 184. The γλυκό is φιλία, the ἐδωρ the κοινωνία, here the large κοινωνία of the State. A similar comparison recurs in de Gen. et Corr. 1. 10. 328 a 23 sqq., and in an illustration by Chrysippus of the nature of a κρίσις (Diog. Laert. 7. 151).

18. οὕτω κ.τ.λ. This sentence may be construed in two ways at least: either we may (with Sus. and others) place a comma after τοῖτων 20 and supply ἀναίσθητον ἐδωρ with τὴν οἰκειότητα κ.τ.λ., taking διαφοροτίζειν ἦκαστα ἀναγκαῖον ὧν κ.τ.λ. as an acc. absolute, or we may with Bonitz (Ind. 192 b 61) make διαφοροτίζειν govern τὴν οἰκειότητα. Συμβαίνει ἦκαστα ἀναγκαῖον ὧν will then go together (cp. οἷδ᾽ ἄλλο συμβάσεται νενομαθημένον, 2. 5. 1264 a 9). If we adopt the latter interpretation, the question will arise, how the genitives in ἦ πατέρα ὡς νίκων, ἦ νίκων ὡς πατρός, ἦ ὡς ἀδελφοῖς ἀλλήλων are to be explained. On this subject see Mr. Ridgeway (Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc., vol. 2. p. 132), who compares Metaph. M. 5. 1079 b 34, ἑδος ὡς γένους (‘an ἑδος viewed in relation to a genus’) and Pol. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 17, ταμίῶν ὡς κοινῶν (he would however read ἀδελφοῖς ὡς ἀλλήλων); but perhaps Susemihl’s interpretation, which is certainly simpler, is also more likely to be correct. For the acc. absol. with the participle of εἰμί and its compounds, see Dr. Holden’s note on Xen. Oecon. 20. 10, μᾶς ὡν πολλὰ ποιῶν, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 700. I take ἦκαστα with ἀναγκαῖον, not with διαφοροτιζεῖν. It is probably in order to avoid the repetition involved in ἀδελφόν ὡς ἀδελφοῖ, that Aristotle writes ὡς ἀδελφοῖς ἀλλήλων.

23. τὸ ὡδῖν is that which belongs to oneself, exclusively of all others: τὸ ἀγαπητὸν carum valet ... idque significare volupt Catullus cum inquit “si quid carius est oculis,” quo uno se aliquis consolatur, in quo omnem spem suorum gaudiorum collocatam habet, quo impetrate ac retento contenus vivere potest’ (Vict. on Rhet. 1. 7. 1365 b 16, quoted by Mr. Cope in his note on this passage, which should be consulted).


28. γινώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον. Susemihl asks (Sus.3, Note 152) ‘what harm will there be in this, so far as the displaced children of guardians are concerned?’ Mr. Welldon’s explanatory addition may well be correct—‘and hence a child cannot be absolutely separated from the class to which he belongs.’ Aristotle may also
hint that persons incorporated with one class and conscious of being related to the members of another will find themselves in an equivocal position, being neither quite the one thing nor the other.

29. πάλαι, above in 1262 a 24 sqq.: so τὸν πάλαι λόγον in 3. 11. 1262 a 15 refers to 1281 a 39–b 21.

33. If with Vet. Int. Ms and pr. P1 we read φιλαξι τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας in place of φιλαξὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, which the sense seems to oblige us to do, we must translate οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φιλαξὶ 'those placed among the guardians' (placed among them, but not born among them).

34. οὕσε κ.τ.λ. is connected, not with the whole of the preceding clause, but with the word προσαγορεύωσιν in it.

C. 5. 38. κατασκευάζεσθαι, probably passive.


40. τοῦτο δ᾽ αν τις κ.τ.λ. Toûto clearly refers to πότερον κοινὴν ἢ μὴ κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν, but in explaining it (λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ.) Aristotle does not, as we expect, repeat these words; he substitutes a slightly different topic of inquiry, i.e. whether both property and use ought to be common. He wisely decides to treat the question of community of property apart from that of community in women and children: experience has confirmed his view that the two questions are separable. His feeling appears to be—(1) that a decision in favour of severity as respects women and children does not necessitate a similar decision as to property; (2) that alternatives present themselves for consideration in reference to property which had not presented themselves in reference to women and children. For instance, the ownership of property may be several and its use common, or the ownership common and the use several, or both ownership and use may be common. He thus prepares the way for his own solution, which is, if we take into account the conclusions of the Fourth Book, that while part of the land is to be κοινὴ and to be set apart for the supply of the common meals and for the service of the gods, other property is to be owned in severality and yet made common in use.

41. λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and I mean that as to what relates to property (one may inquire) whether,' etc. Susenmd brackets τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν (see his remarks, Qu. Crit. p. 365), and these words may certainly be a marginal note which has crept into the text (see critical note on 1272 a 28 for an instance of this), but the expression λέγω δ', which, as Sus. allows, often introduces matter of a somewhat superfluous kind (see Vahlen on Poet. 13. 1453 a 4),
here perhaps applies to the whole of the succeeding sentence, and not to τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσεώς exclusively.

1. ἐκεῖνα, i.e. τὰ τέκνα καὶ αἱ γυναίκες. For the gender, cp. αὐτά, 1263 a. c. 5. 1264 a 7.

2. πάσι ‘commode opponitur ii quae sequuntur, ὅπερ ἐνα ποιεῖ τῶν εἶδών, et λέγονται δὲ τινας καὶ τοῦτον τῶν τρόπων κοινωνίαν τῶν βαρβάρων’ (Busse, De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 23). Yet the Libyans referred to in 1262 a 19 sq. had women in common (for other instances, see below on 1266 a 34). Πάσι, however, probably goes with ἐκεῖνοι, and not with what follows, as Sus. thinks.

3. The words τάς τε κτήσεις . . . χρήσεις imply that there is a doubt whether κτήσεις and χρήσεις need be treated in the same way, and ὁδὸν takes up this unexpressed doubt and instances a way (not the only one, nor indeed Aristotle’s own) in which κτήσεις may be made several and χρήσεις common. We might have expected that καὶ τά γίπτεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινοὺς. 8, would have been the first alternative introduced by ὁδὸν, but while it suits better the expressed thought of τάς τε κτήσεις—χρήσεις, the hint contained in these words that it is better to make a distinction between κτήσεις and χρήσεις would not have been taken up. Spengel’s proposed insertion of τάς κτήσεις ἡ τάς χρήσεις ἡ (οἴ τάς χρήσεις ἡ τάς κτήσεις ἡ) before τάς τε κτήσεις seems to me unnecessary.


5. τῶν εἶδών, Vict. ‘intelligit autem barbaras nationes’: this appears from καὶ τοῦτον τῶν τρόπων, 7. For τὰ ἐξήν in this sense, cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 19: 5 (8). 2. 1324 b 10. Diodorus (5. 34. 3) says of the Vacciæi of Spain—οὐδέν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἐτος διαρροῦμεν τὴν χώραν γεωργοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινοποιοῦμεν μεταφυσιαῖν ἐκάστῳ τῷ μέρες, καὶ τοῖς νοσφυσμένοις τὶ γεωργοῦς θάνατον τὸ πρώτατον τεθείκασι. Aristotle, however, will hardly have been acquainted with the Vacciæi. He may possibly have the Itali in his mind (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 5 sqq.), and other races practising the custom of common meals (cp. 1263 b 40, ὡσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Δακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτη τοῖς αὐστιτίας ὁ νομοβιτῆς ἐκοινωνεῖ). Κοινὴ ἀναλίσκειν is used in Rep. 464 C of Plato’s guardians, who, we know, had common meals (Rep. 458 C). Cp. also Diod. 5. 9. 4, τὰς οὐσίας κοινὰς παραγάμουν καὶ ζωντες κατὰ συνοίπην, and Strabo, p. 701 sub fin. Aristotle instances only barbarians; we find, however, an approach
to the system he describes in Crete, where the men, women, and
children received their maintenance from the State (ἐστι' ἐκ κοινοῦ
τρέφεσθαι πάντας, 2. 10. 1272 a 20). 'Les Syssities existent de nos
jours dans les communes kabyles sous le nom de Thimecheret'
(Jannet, Les institutions sociales à Sparte, who refers to Hano
teaux, La Kabylie 2. 82 sqq.).

η τοῦνατίνων κ.τ.λ. For γεωργεῖν κοινῇ, cp. Plato, Laws 739 E,
νεμάσθων μὲν δὴ πρῶτον γῆν τε καὶ οἰκίαν, καὶ μὴ κοινῇ γεωργοῦντων.
In this scheme the land would be common and cultivation common
—i.e. the cultivators would act under the control of some central
authority, and their labour would not be confined to a particular
piece of land, but applicable promiscuously to the whole cultivable
area belonging to the community. This system is hardly less
unlike than the preceding one to that of the Teutonic village-
community (see for a description of it Sir II. Maine's work on
Village Communities, p. 79 sqq.). 'In some Russian communes the
meadow portion of the communal land is mown by all the peasants
in common, and the hay afterwards distributed by lot among the
families' (Wallace, Russia 1. 208). No mention is made by
Aristotle of any barbarian races which treated both land and
produce as common, but the partly Greek population of the
Liparaean islands appears to have done so for a time; see the
remarkable passage of Diodorus (5. 9. 4 sq.) referred to in the last
note.

8. ἐτέρων, 'others than the citizens,' not, I incline to think,
'others than the owners,' though the two meanings do not lie far
apart. Aristotle is considering the question in the interest of οἱ μέλ-
λοιτοι πολιτεύοντας τὴν ἄριστην πολιτείαν (1262 b 38). For the contrast
between ἐτέρων ὑπὸ τῶν γεωργοῦντων and αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς διαπονοῦντων,
cp. c. 8. 1268 a 36 sqq. If those who till the soil are not citizens
but a separate and subordinate class, like the Helots or the tillers
of the soil in Aristotle's own ideal community (4 (7). 10. 1330 a
25 sqq.), disagreements would be less likely to result from the
citizens holding property in common, for, as the citizens would
not work themselves, individual citizens would not be in a position
to compare their own hard work and small recompense with the
easy work and large recompense of others, and thus one main
source of disagreement among the citizens would be removed.
If this observation is intended as a criticism of Plato's arrange-
ments in the Republic, it seems to miss its mark, for the guardians
cannot be said αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς διαπονεῖν, and though the γεωργοί are
made citizens by Plato, they are not intended to hold property in
common. It is true, however, that in Laws 7.39 E Plato uses the expression κοινὴ γεωργία in reference to the Republic.

9. ἀλλος ἄν εἰτ τρόπος καὶ ῥάμων. Vict. ‘alia erit ratio et minus molestiae in se continebit.’ Κοινωνίας should probably be supplied with τρόπος (cp. 7), or else τῶν περὶ τὰς κτήσεις (cp. 10).

10. αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν πολιτῶν—not, as it seems to me, τῶν γεωργοῦντων, though this interpretation has the high authority of Bonitz (Ind. 187 a 57) in its favour.

taxi perί τὰς κτήσεις, not (as Lamb.) acc. after διαποικισμῶν, but nom. to παρέχειν.


15. ὡς δέ, ‘but indeed we may say broadly that,’ etc. Apart from all intensifying circumstances, living together and sharing in everything is in itself enough to give rise to troubles.

καὶ introduces a limitation and explanation of τὸ συνῆν: see Bon. Ind. 357 b 13 sqq., and cp. c. 2. 1261 a 17, προοίμια καὶ γνωμενὴ μια μᾶλλον. The article is omitted before κοινωνίας, as it is omitted before βοηθήσαι in 1263 b 5, τὸ χαρίσματα καὶ βοηθήσαι (cp. also 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13 sq., 15 sq. : 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 40—b 18).

tῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων. Bonitz (Ind. 57 b 43) gives a reference to Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 a 28, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων (βοιλείονται).

16. τῶν τοιούτων, 'the things of which we have spoken,’ i.e. property, which, it is evident from what follows, is classified by Aristotle with ἐγκυκλία, cp. 18, τῶν ἐν ποσί . . . μικρῶν, and 21, ἐγκυκλίων. So in c. 7. 1266 a 36 sq. τὸ περὶ τῶν ὀνάσιας explains ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων. Aristotle appears to think that quarrels are more likely to arise over questions relating to ἀναγκαία and τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν than over greater matters.

17. τῶν συναποδήμων. Fellow-travellers are perhaps conceived here, as Bernays implies by his translation, to be sharers in a common purse, but this is not quite certain, for the next illustration is taken from a master and his servants, who would not have a common purse. It is enough to cause quarrels, if men κοινωνοῦσι τῶν ἐγκυκλίων.


ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσί . . . ἄλληνοις explains how their differences arise.
NOTES.


20. προσχρώμεθα seems here to be used in a sense (‘utor in aliquam rem’: see Ast, Lex. Platon. 3. p. 213) more common in Plato than in Aristotle.

táς διακονίας τάς ἐγκυκλίους. Cp. c. 3. 1261 b 36, ἐν ταῖς οἰκετικαῖς διακονίαις, and Plato, Theaet. 175 E, ὃς ἀνεμέτρητοι εὐθέτει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι, ἀπει δὲ δουλικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι συνεκνύσασθαι μηδὲ ὑφὸν ἠδύνατί ἥ θύπας λάγους.

22. For ὃν δὲ νῦν τρόπον κ.τ.λ. as the subject of διενέγκαι, cp. c. 2. 1261 a 13. But why is ἐπικοινωθέν neut.? Does it agree with some neut. latent in ὃν ... ἔχει, perhaps τὸ μὴ κοινὴς εἶναι τὰς κτίσεις?

23. καί before ἐπικοινωθέν (add. Π) implies that severity of property is not enough without ἦθη κ.τ.λ. The use of καί is somewhat similar in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 22, πέμπτον τὸ πέρι τῶν ἵδιων συναλλαγμάτων καὶ ἑχόντων μέγεθος. We have in 1263 b 39 τῶν ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, and Π read ἔθεσι here, but ἔθεσι (Π) is in all probability the correct reading—cp. Plato, Laws 751 C, ἔσεται αὖ τούτων μελλονταί αἰρήσεσθαι τεθράφθαι τέ ἐν ἔθεσε νόμων εἴπεπαινεύμονον πρὸς τὸ κ.τ.λ.: Rep. 557 C, πάσιν ἔθεσι πεποκυκλήμενη πολιτεία: Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 302, τῶν δικαιοτάτων ἔθεσι χρωμένων.

24. ἔχει γάρ κ.τ.λ. This implies that there is good in community of property. What this is, is not distinctly stated, but Aristotle probably means that it ensures every one having what he needs. See 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 2 sqq.

26. πῶς, i.e. κατὰ τὴν χρήσιν.

δόλως, ‘broadly, on the whole.’

27. αἱ μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ. ‘For when every one has a separate province, one main source of disputes will be removed, and work will prosper all the more, because each man will feel that he is applying himself to business of his own.’ Γάρ explains and justifies the preceding sentence. Τὰ ἐγκλήματα, i.e. those mentioned in 12. Αἱ ἐπιμελείαι appear to be nom. to ἐπιθέσουσι (Bon. Ind. 271 a 43). Cp. Soph. El. 33. 183 b 19 sqq., Xen. Hiero 9. 7, ἡ γεωργία αὐτῆ ἀν πολὺ ἐπιδίον, and Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 38, καὶ βέλτιον ἐκαστὸν ἔργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματούσης ἡ πολυπραγματούση.

29. δ’ ἄρετῆν is here emphatic (cp. δ’ ἄρετῆν, 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 19, where the antithesis is δ’ ἀλλαζόμεν, which is not far removed in meaning from εἰς ἀνάγκης, 1263 b 10, ἔργον γάρ καλὸν ἀλλοτρίως οὕσης ἀπέχεσθα διὰ σωφροσύνης, and 22, διὸ οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνίαν ἄλλη διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν): δὲ answers to μὲν 27. ‘And on the other hand it will be owing to virtue, that according to the proverb,
2. 5. 1263 a 20—35.

"friends' goods" will be "common goods."

Virtue will be called forth for the accomplishment of this result, and this will be a gain. Pythagoras was, it would seem, the original author of the saying (Diog. Laert. 8. 10), but Zeller doubts whether he meant it as an injunction to practise communism (Gr. Ph. 1. 291. 3). The addition here of πῶς τὸ χρήσιμα (cp. εἰπὶ τὴν χρήσιν, 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 10) perhaps looks as if Aristotle so understood it. Epicurus certainly did so: cp. Diog. Laert. 10. 11, τὸν τε Ἐπίκουρον μὴ ἀξιοῦν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατατίθεμαι τὰς οὐσίας, καθάπερ τὸν Πυθαγόραν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων λέγοντα: ἀπιστοῦντων γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τασοῦτον, εἶ δὲ ἀπιστῶν, οὐδὲ φιλῶν.

31. éνιας πόλεων. Tarentum (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 9 sqq.): Carthage (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 4 sqq.): the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States (1263 b 40 sqq.): Rhodes (Strabo, p. 652). Compare also Isocrates' picture of the earlier Athens (Areopag. § 35). For the appeal here made to the practice of existing States, cp. Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 a 18, εἰ περὶ πίστας ἡ τῆς κράτεως καθάπερ ἐν ἑνίας τε νῦν εἰστὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ μιλίστα ταῖς εὐνομομέναις, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶχον ὁ τι λέγοντα.

ὑπογεγραμμένον. For the meaning of this word, cp. de Gen. An. 2. 6. 743 b 20—25, ἐπι λαοῦ ὑπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὐ
tως ἐπαλείφθησα τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζώον: it explains τοπέρι διορίζειν in de An. 2. 1. 413 a 10. The fact that the institution of property assumes here and there in outline the form which Aristotle wishes it to assume is taken as an indication that this form is not impractical.

34. τὰ μὲν χρήσιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φιλοῖς. Virt. 'copiam quorundam ipsorum faciant amicis, reliquumque ipsis ea utenda.' Cp. Xen. Mem. 2. 6. 23, τῶν δὲ φίλων παντάπασιν ἀφαιρῆσαι (οἱ καλοὶ κίγμαθι), τὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φιλοῖς οἴκεια παρέχοντε, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων ἑαυτῶν νομίζοντε.

χρήσιν κοινοῖς. For the absence of ὡς, cp. 36, ἱδίοις: c. 3. 1261 b 24. οἱ κοινοῖς χρώμενοι τοῖς γυναιξί: Isocr. Paneg. § 181 (quoted in Aristot. Rhet. 3. 9. 1410 a 14). Plutarch, speaking of brothers (De Fraterno Amore, c. 1), uses the expression, καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον κοινὸς τοῖς πατρίδοις χρήσιμοι καὶ φίλοις καὶ δόξαι: cp. ibid. c. 11, χρήσιν δὲ καὶ κρίσιν ἐν μέτα κείσθαι κοινῷ καὶ ἀνίμητοι ἀπίστων.

35. ἐν Ἀλκεδαιμόνι. See Xen. de Rep. Lac. 6 as to this Lacedaemonian practice. As to slaves, Xenophon there says, ἐποίησε δὲ (ὁ Λυκούργος) καὶ οἰκίος, εἰ τις δεηθείη, χρήσιν καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, and he adds the same thing of dogs and horses. The expression ἐν Ἀλκεδαιμόνι frequently recurs in the Politics (see Bon. Ind. 421 b 7 sqq.). Ἀλκεδαιμόνι is used by Xenophon (Strz, Lexic. Xenophont. s. v.) and other writers to designate both the city of Sparta
and Laconia. Aristotle perhaps uses ἐν Λακεδαίμονι here as he uses ἐν 'Ἄθηναις in 2. 8. 1268 a 10, ἦστι δὲ καὶ ἐν 'Ἄθηναις οὗτος ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέραις τῶν πόλεων, where the name of the city seems to stand for the State. He does not seem to intend to contrast ἐν Λακεδαίμονι with ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν, or to suggest that it was only in the city that men placed their slaves, horses, and dogs at each other’s service. Nothing of the kind is said by Xenophon in the passage of the de Rep. Lac. (6. 3 sq.) which Aristotle seems to have before him here.

36. καὶ δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδίων, i.e. καὶ ἐφοδίως, ἐν δεηθῶσι (cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 6. 4, ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ὑπὸ βήρας ὑψισθέντες δεηθῶσι τῶν ἐπιτη- δείων). The word ἐφοδίως is caught into the construction of the conditional clause and must be supplied from it: cp. χρημάτων, 1. 8. 1256 b 29.

37. ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν. This seems at first sight tautological, and many emendations have been suggested: see Susemihl’s critical note (Sus. 2, vol. i. p. 170). Both Busse (Sus. 3) and Mr. Welldon suggest, ingeniously enough, the substitution of ἐν ταῖς ἀγραίν for ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς—a change which agrees well with the passage of Xenophon de Rep. Lac. part of which has been quoted in the last note, for Xenophon makes no mention of ἀγροῖ and does use the words ὑπὸ βήρας ὑψισθέντες. The passage concludes—τοιγαροῦν οὕτως μεταδιδόντες ἀλλήλους καὶ οἱ τὰ μικρὰ ἔχοντες μετέχουσι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, ὅποταν τεῖν δεηθῶσι. But we find ἐν ἀγρῷ in the very similar passage, [Plutarch] Inst. Lac. c. 23, and the meaning of ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς κατὰ τὴν χώραν may not improbably be ‘in the farms throughout the territory.’ Sturz (Lexicon Xenophon. s. v. ἀγροῖ) collects many passages of Xenophon in which ἀγροῖ = ‘praedia.’ The word may possibly bear this meaning in Pol. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 19, ἐπὶ τῶν ἁγρῶν οἰκεῖν τῶν ἐδμον ἀσχολοῦν ὑπάρχον πρὸς τοῖς ἐργοῖς. In Plato, Laws 881 C, however, we have κατ’ ἁγροῦ τῆς χώρας ποι, so that there is nothing strange in the conjunction of the two words. The χώρα, or district attached to the city, included villages or even towns, as well as woods, fields, and the like (cp. Xen. Hiero 9. 7, κατ’ ἁγροὺς ἥ κατὰ κώμας).

38. For the change of subject from εἶναι to τοιεῖν, see note on 1263 a 3. As to the thought, Plato himself had said, Laws 740 A (while giving up community of property as impracticable in the absence of a complete reform of marriage, rearing, and education)—νεμέσθων δ’ ὡν τοιδε διανοίᾳ ποις, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ τῶν λαχῶντα τὴν λῆξιν ταῖτεν νομίζειν μὲν κοινὴν αὐτὴν τῆς πόλεως ἐξουσίας κ.τ.λ. But the expression used by Aristotle appears to be derived from Isocrates.
(Arcopag. § 35)—κεφάλαιον δὲ τοῦ καλῶς ἀλλήλοις ὁμαλῶς αἱ μὲν γὰρ κτήσεις ὑσταθὲν, οἰσπερ κατὰ τὸ δικαίου ὑπῆρχον, αἱ δὲ χρήσεις κοινὰ πάσι τοῖς δεομένοις τῶν πολιτῶν. Cp. also Xen. Mem. 2. 6. 23, τὸν δὲ φθόνον παντάπασιν ἅψαμον (οἱ καλὸι κἀκεῖθεν), τὰ μὲν ἐαυτῶν ἁγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχουσε, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων ἔαυτῶν νομίζομεν.

39. τοιοῦτοι, sc. ὡστε τῇ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινὰς τὰς κτήσεις. For the thought, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 31 sqq.

40. καὶ πρὸς ἡδονήν, as well as in relation to virtue, cp. 29. But how does the fact that a reasonable degree of self-love is natural prove that to regard something as one's own adds greatly to human pleasure? Perhaps the link is supplied by Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 3, ἀνώψῃ σὺν ἑαυτῷ ἐστὶ τὸ τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἑναν οὐκ ἅπα τοῖς πολιτείας, where we learn that pleasure arises from the satisfaction of nature, and Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 25, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἱκανότατος τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 3. ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μοισικῆ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικὴν, ὡς πάσιν ἡλείοις καὶ πάσιν ἡθείοις ἡ χρήσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶν προσφιλής). If so, the complete argument will be 'for the satisfaction of a natural craving brings pleasure, and is not self-love in moderation natural'? Compare also Rhet. 1. 11. 1371 b 18 sqq., and Hist. An. 8. 1. 589 a 8, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδονῆς διόκει δὲ πάντα τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδονῆς. Or should we complete the ellipse thus—'for is there not a purpose, namely pleasure, for which we are so constituted as to feel love for ourselves, and is not this an ordinance of nature'? Or again—'yes, and natural pleasure too, for is not self-love implanted in us for a purpose and natural'? The first of these ways of completing the ellipse is probably the correct one.

41. νομίζειν ἰδίον τι, 'to regard a thing as one's own,' for νομίζειν will hardly be used here in the sense which it bears in 3. 1. 1275 b 7, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίας νομίζομεν ἀλλὰ συγκλήτοις. μὴ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See on this use of μὴ, Bon. Ind. 464 b 43 sqq. ('dubitanter et modestius affirmantis est'). Eucken (de Partic. Usu p. 57) would read ἔχει for ἔχει in b 1, because Aristotle sometimes uses the subjunctive in this construction (e.g. in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 9, where all the MSS. have the subjunctive: Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 36: 10. 10. 1179 b 24), and 'in eodem libro ad candum sententiam significandam modo coniunctivum, modo indicativum adhibuisse minime verisimile sit.' But the indicative is found under similar circumstances (without various reading) in Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 a 34 and 10. 2. 1173 a 23, and Bekker, whom Susemihl follows, is probably right in retaining this variation of mood.

2. τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The connexion just established between affec: 1263 b.
tion for oneself and Nature reminds Aristotle of a fact which seems to conflict with it, that φιλαντρία is blamed and justly so, and he proceeds to explain that the epithet φιλαντρος is applied to those who are fonder of themselves than they should be. Herein he follows Plato, Laws 731 E sqq. (cp. 732 B, διὸ πάντα ἀνθρωπον χρῆ φιλέγειν τὸ αφόδρα φιλεῖν αὐτὸν), and he repeats the same view in Eth. Nic. 4. 10. 1125 b 16 (cp. 3. 13. 1118 b 22 sqq.: 2. 7. 1107 b 28 sqq.: 4. 10. 1125 b 9 sqq.). In Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 15-23 and 1169 a 20 sqq. the unfavourable use of the word is connected rather with the preference of money, honour, and τὰ περιμικήτα ὑγιὰ ὑπολογίζεται generally to τὸ καλὸν: so too in Magn. Mor. 2. 13. 1212 b 2-6. Affection for oneself is implied in Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 12 to be to a certain extent a preservative against ἀκρασία, though not a complete preservative like virtue.

3. If here we read, with all the MSS. except P', καθίστη καί τῶν φιλοχρήματον, we must explain 'as it is for this that we blame the money-lover,' ψέγομεν being supplied from ψέγεται 2. To read τὸ for τῶν undoubtedly makes the sentence far less rugged: its meaning will then be—'as to be a money-lover is to be fonder of money than one ought to be.' Cp. Plato, Rep. 347 B, ἡ οὐκ οἰσθα, ὅτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι δὲν διδό εἶναι τε καὶ ἔστων;

4. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ., 'and it cannot be intended to blame men for loving what all love' seems to be here suppressed. Cp. ὥσπερ δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι φαμέν, Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 36, and Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 3.

6. For the absence of the article before βοβήθησαί, see above on 1263 a 15.

ἐταίρως, Π2 rightly: cp. Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 b 34. For the thought, cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1169 b 10 sqq.: 8. 1. 1155 a 7, τὶ γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς ποιῶσις εὔτερης, ἀφαιρεθείσης εὐφροσύνης, ἡ γίνεται μὴ λιγότερο καὶ ἐπανετρωτάτη πρὸς φιλοὺς; Aristotle possibly has in his mind some lines of Antiphanes (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 4: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 133).

ὁ γίνεται κ.τ.λ. shows that χαρίσασθαι, βοβήθησαι must be used in reference to goods or money, for it would still be possible to help and confer favours on friends in other ways, even though property were common.

7. ταῦτα, if we read οὐ συμβαίνει, appears to refer to τὸ νομίζειν ἓνων τι and τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ βοβήθησαι φιλοῦ—'these things do not come to pass for those who;' etc.: cp. 2. 9. 1269 b 39 sq., and Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 11, καὶ φονεύειν ἢ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἤκαστα συμβαίνει.


καὶ δικαιοσύνης. It would seem from Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 21—b 1 that both προσώπεις and πράξεις are necessary to perfect virtue. But the passage before us does not raise this subtle question; it appears to imply (cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 19. 1190 b 1 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1219 b 11: 2. 11. 1228 a 16), that men may be virtuous without being able to evidence their virtue.

9. φανερώς, ‘undisguisedly’ or ‘visibly and unmistakably’? Probably the latter (cp. φανερῶν, c. 7. 1266 b 20).

tὸ περὶ τὰς γυναίκας, sc. ἐργον, which comes to the surface in the parenthesis.

10. καλόν, and therefore a work of virtue (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 28.)

ἀλλοτρίας is emphatic: no woman, it is implied, would be another’s in the State described in the Republic.

11. ἔσται. For the suppression of the subject, cp. de Part. An. 1. 3. 643 b 17: Metaph. Z. 12. 1038 a 13.

13. ἐν τῇ γάρ. For the place of γάρ (ἐν γάρ τῇ, Ald.), cp. διὰ τὸ ἄντι περίνης γάρ, de Part. An. 2. 6. 652 a 18: ἐν τοῖς δεξίοις γάρ, de Part. An. 3. 9. 671 b 35. As to the thought here expressed, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 2. 1120 b 27 sqq., where we find that ἐλευθερώτης has to do both with δόσεις and λαθῆς, though more with the former than with the latter (4. 1. 1119 b 25).

15. μὴν here seems to have no δὲ to answer to it, because the structure of the sentence is altered at ἃν, 22. If the sentence had been more regularly constructed, it would apparently have run—'hence, while legislation of the kind proposed wears a plausible look, it will in reality fail to remove the evils which it is designed to remove, it will involve the loss of many goods, and it will require men to live a life which cannot be lived by man.'

ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία. Cp. c. 4. 1262 b 20, ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ, and c. 5. 1264 a 6, τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν.

16. ὁ γὰρ ἀκροώμενος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is probably thinking here of communism in relation to property: cp. τήν οὐσίαν, 20. Yet Ephorus seems, if we may judge by his eulogistic remarks on some Scythian races which had women children and property in common, to have been, in their case at all events, well pleased with the institution (Strabo, p. 302), to say nothing of Cynics and half-Cynics, like Diogenes of Sinope and Zeno of Citium (Diog. Laert. 6. 72: 7. 33, 131). Plato had not been sanguine of support (Rep. 450).


21. **peri συμβολαίων.** Compare Strabo p. 702, quoted below on 1267 b 37. These suits would be brought within narrow limits in the State of the Laws (742 C : cp. Rep. 556 A); there were indeed some actual States in which they were not permitted (Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1164 b 13 sqq.). Theophrastus recommended the registration of property and of contracts (συμβολαία) in the hope of avoiding suits on this subject or diminishing their number (Fr. 97). Such a register appears to have existed in some States (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 49. 10). Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, was for getting rid of law-courts altogether in his ideal State (Diog. Laert. 7. 33). It is evident that Greek society had more than enough of litigation. As to actions for false evidence, it is obvious that the adoption of community of property would remove only one of their occasions.

23. καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους κ.τ.λ. Sus. 'dass gerade Leute welche Etwas gemeinschaftlich besitzen und benutzen ...' Here καὶ is perhaps rightly rendered by 'gerade': 'it is just those who possess and enjoy things in common, whom' etc. Among the cases referred to here would be that of brothers holding undivided property, which seems to have been not uncommon at Athens (see Caillemer, Succession légitime à Athènes, p. 34 sqq.) and elsewhere (Jannet, Les institutions sociales à Sparte, p. 88 sqq.). 'Les enfants, après la mort de leur père, au lieu de partager entre eux sa fortune, restaient quelquefois dans l’indivision' (Caillemer, ubi supra). See C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. (ed. Thalheim), Rechtsalt. p. 54. 2.

25. ἄλλα θεωροῦμεν κ.τ.λ. 'θεωρεῖν is here synonymous with ἄρων' (Bon. Ind. 328 a 36). 'But those who fall out in consequence of owning common property look to us to be few in number, because we compare them with the large number of those who own property in severalty,'

28. **στερήσονται.** The fut. med. of στερέω, like that of several other verbs (θέσωνται, c. 6. 1265 a 16: ἄρξονται, 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36), is often used in a passive sense.

κοινωνήσαντες (cp. κοινωνοῖς, 23), 'having made common stock': so we have χρημάτων κοινωνήσαντας, Xen. Oecon. 6. 3. For the tense, see below on 1270 a 4 and 1271 b 4.

29. Vict. 'tot autem tantaque sunt (bona quibus spoliabant), ut plāne cognoscatur non posse ullo pacto vitam traducī illa lege.' The life which the members of Plato's State are to live is in such flagrant opposition to well-ascertained tendencies of human nature—so starved and poor in pleasure, affection, and virtue, and so wanting in concord—that it will be unliveable.
30. παρακρούσεως is usually rendered 'error,' but perhaps Liddell and Scott, who compare Soph. El. 17. 175 b 1, are right in rendering it 'fallacy.'

31 sqq. Compare the argument in 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 21 sqq.

33. προίονσα. Cp. c. 2. 1261 a 17, προίονσα και γινομένη μία μάλλον.

33 sq. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 27, οὗ μόνον διαφέρει τῷ θελτίῳ καὶ χείρῳ γίνεσθαι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μη τὴν αὐτήν.

35. τὸν ποθημὸν βάσιν μίαν. The unit of a rhythm—the ἀνδρομετον of which it is composed—is the βάσις or else the syllable (Metaph. N. 1. 1087 b 36). The βάσις is in dancing the 'step,' in verse the metrical foot. Thus to make the State absolutely and in every way one is here compared to dwarfing a long rhythm to one single βάσις, i.e. to one of its component parts: cp. c. 2. 1261 a 19, οἰκία ἐκ πάλινως, ἄνθρωπος δ' ἐξ οἰκίας, where ἄνθρωπος answers to βάσις.

36. πρότερον. C. 2. 1261 a 18.

διὰ τὴν παϊδείαν. Eucken (Præp. p. 39) explains διὰ with the acc. here 'by means of' ('durch, vermittelt'), comparing de Caelo 3. 2. 301 18, σύγκρισιν ἕν τοῖς διὰ τὴν φιλότητά: Meteor. 2. 8. 366 b 5: Phys. 4. 11. 219 b 29, cp. b 23 sq. So Bonitz remarks (Ind. 177 a 45), 'διὰ cum acc. coniunctum legitur, ubi genetivum exspectes,' instancing this passage and referring to διὰ ταύτης, 38.

37. κοινὴν καὶ μίαν. Bern. 'zum einigen und Einen Staat machen:' Sus. 'zur Gemeinschaft und Einheit gestalten.' Perhaps the latter translation comes nearest to the sense. There is no English word which adequately represents κοινήν: 'to make it social and so one' is an approach to the meaning of the words.


39. τοῖς τοιούτοις, i.e. 'by the measures which we have described,' measures which do not unite the State by improving the character of the citizens.

40. τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, distinguished here from τοῖς ἔθεσι, as from ἀνθρία, καρτερία, and other ethical virtues in 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 23, 32, where Bonitz (Ind. 821 a 6) explains the meaning of the word to be 'virtus intellectualis': cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 17, ἡ δ' ἡδικὴ ἀρετὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται. Here perhaps 'intellectual culture' (Mr. Welldon) is the meaning.

41. τοῖς συσσιτίοις, adduced apparently as an instance of a law acting on the character. Compare Aristode's language as to syssitia in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 1 sqq.
1261 a. 1. τοῦτο αὐτὸ, ‘this by itself’: cp. αὐτὸ τότε, 1. 6. 1255 a 18.

2. τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ κ.τ.λ. Plato himself appeals (Rep. 376 E) to the testimony of Time in favour of γνώματική and μονακτική. For ἐτέσιν Bernays (Gesammelte Abhandlungen 1. 177) conjectures ἔθνεσιν (comparing Simonides Ceus, Fragm. 193) Bergk: he might have added to his citations Plato, Laws 638 E, ἐπειδή καὶ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίον ἔθνη περὶ αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντα ὡμίν πάλσει δύνει τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχοντ’ ἂν, for the saying of Simonides appears to be present to Plato’s mind in this passage of the Laws), and the suggestion of a reminiscence of this bit of Simonides here is brilliant and ingenious, but we find ἐκ πολλῶν ἐτῶν καὶ παλαιῶν χρόνων in Aristot. Fragm. 40. 1481 a 41, and tautological expressions are not rare in Aristotle’s writings (see Vahlen, Poet. p. 87, on Poet. 1. 1447 a 17, ἐτέρως καὶ μὴ τόν αὐτὸν τρόπον): besides, ἐν οἷς suits ἐτέσιν better than ἔθνεσιν.

4. εὐρήται. Cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 25, σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἀλλα δεὶ νομίζειν εὑρήσατε πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δ’ ἀπεφάντοις. Aristotle held that the world existed from everlasting (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 432 sq.) and mankind too (ibid. 508. 1), and that in the infinity of past time everything has been discovered, and, if lost, discovered over again. Hence he advises inquirers rather to avail themselves of what has been already made out and to investigate what has been insufficiently investigated, than to seek to strike out something altogether new (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 33 sq.). There seem, however, to have been subjects on which Aristotle claims to have inherited little or nothing from his predecessors (see Eucken, Methode d. Aristot. Forschung, p. 5, who refers to Phys. 4. 1. 208 a 34: de Gen. et Corr. 1. 2. 315 a 34: Meteor. 1. 13. 349 a 14).

οὐνηκταί, ‘gathered together for scientific use’: cp. Metaph. A. 9. 991 a 18 and 5. 986 a 3, ὅσα εἴχον ὁμολογημένα δεικνύων ἐν τοῖς ἀμφιβολοῖς καὶ ταῖς ἀμμοῖς πρὸς τά τοῦ αἰρανοῦ πάθη καὶ μέρη καὶ πρὸς τὴν ὀλην διακύσμην, ταῦτα συνάγωντες εὑρήμενον. The word is already used by Isocrates, de Antid. §§ 83, 45.

5. μάλιστα δ’ ἂν κ.τ.λ. Thurot (Études, p. 28) would supply ‘l’impossibilité de l’unité sociale, telle que la veut Platon,’ but perhaps it is more natural to supply εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχει from 3.

7. δυνηστεῖαι. For this use of the third person ‘non addito τίς,’ see Bon. Ind. 586 b 47. For the future, see above on 1261 a 22. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 2. 7) Romulus’ first step was to effect divisions of the kind here referred to. Cp. also Xen. Hiero c. 9. 5, διώρρηται μὲν γὰρ ἄπασαι αἱ πάλασι αἱ μὲν
Katà filàs, aí ðì kàtì µóras, aí ðì kàtì lòxous. Aristotle probably remembers Nestor's advice (II. 2. 362)—

Kònv ãndras katà filà, katà phrìtara, 'Agrímerwv, ós phrìtrh phrìtrphèfìn ãrìghs, filà ðì filàs,

and the line (II. 9. 63) which associates the ãphrìtowr with the ãdè-µìstos and the ãnàstìos.

αὐτά = 'eives,' Sus., Ind. Gramm. s. v. (who however doubts the correctness of the reading), or perhaps in a somewhat vaguer sense 'the materials of the State:' so Camerarius (Schn. 2. 88) 'ea quae Socraticis rationibus contrahuntur et fiunt unum.' For the neuter, cp. ἑκεῖνα, 1263 α 1.

χωρίζων. Bonitz (Ind. 860 a 10) compares Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 19.

8. τὰ μὲν... τὰ δὲ, 'on the one hand'—'on the other.' Plato, in fact, adopts syssitia in the Republic (416 E: cp. 458 C), and syssitia (Laws 842 B), phratries (785 A), and tribes (745 E) in the Laws. Syssitia differ from phratries and tribes in not being based on relationship: Herodotus also regards them as belonging to τί ët πάλεµwν ëxònvta (1. 65: see Trieber, Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 15, 18 sqq.). Dosiadas (ap. Athen. Deipn. 143 b) says of Lyctus in Crete, δάιρηται δ' οἱ πολῖται πάντες καθ' étàrías, καλούνται δὲ ταύτας ἀνδριά (= συνταστία).

9. ὡστε κ.π.λ. ὡστε with the indicative ('and so') draws an emphatic conclusion: cp. c. 8. 1268 a 20. Plato will not succeed in making his guardians an undivided unity; he will only succeed in forbidding them to cultivate the soil. But this is nothing new (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.). Thus what is new in Plato's scheme is not practicable, and what is practicable is not new. The mention of the prohibition of agriculture to the guardians reminds Aristotle that two classes will exist in Plato's State, guardians and cultivators, and he now turns to consider their mutual relations.

10. καὶ νῦν, 'as it is.'

Ἀκεδαµώνιοι. For the absence of the article, see Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 90, who remarks that the article is commonly absent in Attic Inscriptions before names of peoples in the plural, though exceptions to this rule occur even in inscriptions of an early date. Aristotle sometimes omits and sometimes adds the article (see, for instance, 1264 a 20, and c. 9. 1269 a 29—b 7). The references given in the Index Aristotelicus suggest the view that Aristotle uses the word Ἀκεδαµώνιοι of the Lacedaemonians in their public capacity as constituting a State.
while he uses Λάκωνες both of the State (as in 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 23, oί δὲ Λάκωνες τούς δήμους κατέλυον) and of the people, but more often of the latter. See Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. i. 40. 1.

ἐπιχειροῦσιν, 'attempt to bring about.' Schiller (Sclaverei, p. 21, n. 72) remarks on this word. Some Spartans were probably compelled by need to till the soil. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 6, πολλοὺς πένθος, and Plutarch, Agis 5. 3, πενία ἄσχολίαν τῶν καλῶν καί ἁνελευθερίαν ἐπιχείρουσα. Prof. Jowett points out that ἐπιχειρεῖν is often used pleonastically by Plato, though he does not adopt the view that it is pleonastic here, but translates 'try to enforce.' Cp. c. 9. 1270 a 6, ἀγειν ἐπιχείρησαι.

11. οὗ μὴν ἀλλὰ. Why 'not but that'? How is this sentence in opposition to that which precedes? Perhaps Aristotle's meaning is—'but indeed it is not only in this respect that the constitution is in fault, for the whole scheme of it is hard to make out.'

ὁ τρόπος κ.τ.λ., i.e. the whole σύνθεσις of guardians and cultivators, as distinguished from the arrangements as to the guardians with which Aristotle has hitherto been occupied. Cp. c. 7. 1267 a 17, ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλήνος πολιτείας, c. 9. 1271 b 2, ἡ πάπα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων, and Polyb. 4. 20. 7, τὴν ὑπὸν πολιτείαν. Much pains have been taken to secure the internal unity of the guardians, but none to secure the harmony of the whole State, which includes the third class as well as the two upper ones. Cp. Plato, Rep. 421 Α, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἔλεγεν λόγος κ.τ.λ.

12. τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν, i.e. τοῖς πολιταῖς: cp. i. 13. 1260 b 19, oί κοινωνοι τῆς πολιτείας. Bern. 'für alle Angehörigen eines solchen Staates.'


14. γίνεται, 'results in being,' cp. i. 2. 1252 b 7: Rhet. 3. 9. 1409 b 26: Strabo, p. 653, εἰ δ'...εξ'Αργοὺς καὶ Τήρυνθος ἀπῆκον ὁ Τηληπόλεμος, οὖδ' οὖτω Δωρικῇ γίνεται ἡ ἐκεῖθεν ἀποικία.

περὶ δὲν κ.τ.λ. 'Immemor fuit Aristoteles locorum, quales sunt de Rep. iii. p. 417 A: iv. p. 419, quibus certe possessiones eorum non constituendas esse communes disertis verbis dixit Plato, et profecto per se satis superque apparat uxorum, liberorum, possessionem communionem ex eius sententia propriam esse debere custodum,' Sus.1 (cp. Sus.2, Note 170). See also Tim. 18 B. As Susemihl remarks, Aristotle seems to take it for granted above, c. 4. 1262 a 40, that community of women and children is to be confined to the guardians.

15. ἢ καί often means 'or even' (e.g. in Plato, Phileb. 61 A) :
elsewhere, however, and perhaps here, it seems to mean 'or also,' 'or again' (e. g. in de Gen. An. i. 18. 723 a 29, ἐν τῷ σήμερον ἦ ἀύμετρον εἶναι ἡ καὶ δὲ ἄλλην των τεσσάρυν αἰτίαν: ibid. i. 18. 724 b 5, πάτερον ὡς εἶπαν καὶ πάσχουν ἡ ὡς εἶδος τι καὶ παοῦν, ἡ καὶ ἄφρω).

17. τι μὲν γάρ κ. τ. λ. Three alternatives are considered: 1. the case of the γυνοὶ having women, children, and property in common (17-22): 2. the opposite case (22-40): 3. the case of their having women and children in common but not property (40 sqq.). The other case of property being common and women and children not so, is not considered.

18. τι διοίσουσιν κ. τ. λ. Cp. c. 4. 1262 a 40 sqq. If a community in women, children, and property produces close friendship, it will do so among the cultivators no less than among the guardians. The two classes will be, it is implied, on a par in point of unity, and in whatever excellence flows from community in these things. Yet rulers ought to differ from those they rule (cp. c. 6. 1265 b 18), and this is the opinion of Plato. Evidently, however, it does not follow, if women, children, and property are common in both classes, that the two will be absolutely alike, as Aristotle's argument implies.

19. ἢ τι μαθώντες κ. τ. λ. 'Or what is to make them' etc.? The use of τι μαθώντες perhaps implies that their submission to ὄμοιον would be a mistake. 'Τι μαθὼν signifies an intentionally, τι παθὼν an accidentally, wrong action,' Jelf, Greek Grammar, § 872. 2 k.

21. τάλλα ταύτα κ. τ. λ. Cf. c. 6. 1265 a 5, τὰ ἄλλα ταύτα ἀποδίδωσιν.

For ἐφέντες, cp. c. 6. 1265 b 22, ἐφίησιν.

Τοῖς δούλοις probably includes those elsewhere called περίφοικοι by Aristotle (e. g. in c. 10. 1272 b 18), though a distinction seems to be made between the terms δούλος and περίφοικος in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq. Aristotle's account of the status of the Cretan slaves is confirmed by the tenour of the recently discovered inscription containing a portion of the laws of Gortyna. See Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 64: 'their legal status appears to have been good . . . they have property of their own (col. 3. 42), a well-developed family-law, are capable of marriage with free women
(col. 7. 3): nay, they even have a remote and contingent right of succession to the property of their master’ (col. 5. 27: see also Bücheler und Zitelmann, p. 144).

Compare the well-known scolon of Hybrias the Cretan (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr.):

*n*θυτι μοι πλούτως μέγας δόρυν καὶ ξίφος καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαισήνον, πρόζημα χρωτός.

* 

τούτῳ δεσπότας μνοίας κέκλημαι. Τοὶ δὲ μὴ τολμῶντ’ ἔχειν δόρυν καὶ ξίφος καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαισήνον, πρόζημα χρωτός, πάντες γόνιν πεπτηώτες ἀμόν .... (προσ)κυνεύτι (με) δεσποτᾶν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα φωνεύτες.

Compare also 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 29 sq., and what Xenophon says of Cyrus (Cyrop. 8. 1. 43)—οὐς δ’ αὖ κατεσκεύασεν εἰς τὸ δουλείαν, τούτους οὔτε μελετῶν τῶν ἐλευθερίων πόσων οὔδενα παρόμοια οὔθ’ ὡσα κεκτήσαν ἐπέτρεπεν’ ἐπεμέλετο δὲ ὅπως μήτε ἄστιν μήτε ἀποστὶ ποτὲ ἐσόντο ἐλευθερίων ἕνεκα μελετημάτων. Plato (Laws 625 D) speaks of bows and arrows as the arms most suitable to Crete, but he no doubt does not intend to imply that the Cretans did not possess and use ὡσα of a heavier kind.

22. εἰ δὲ, καθάπερ κ.τ.λ. Sepulv. ‘sin autem eodem modo, quo in alis civitatibus, haece’ (i.e. households and property) ‘fuerint apud ipsos constituta, qui erit communis modus?’ It should be noted that the expression, τέσ ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας, is used by Adeimantus in Rep. 449 C, though in reference to the guardians alone.

25. δύο πόλεις. Aristotle retorts on Plato the charge which he had brought (Rep. 422 E sqq.) against most large States of his own day.

26. πολεί γάρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 419: 415 D—417 B: 543 B—C. φυλακή was a common euphemism at Athens for the garrison of a dependent city (Plutarch, Solon c. 15): cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 16 sqq. Yet the term φυλακεῖς must have had a somewhat unpleasant sound in the ears of Greeks, for the Athenians gave this name to the officials whom the Lacedaemonians called harmosts (Theophr. Fragm. 129 Wimmer: Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens E. T. p. 156). Πολίτας, 27, is the predicate.

29. καὶ τούτωσι, to the cultivators and artisans who are the real citizens of Plato’s State, no less than to the citizens of actual States.
ο Σωκράτης, Rep. 425 C-D.

32. ἀποδιδοῦσ. Vict. ‘cum tamen tribuerit’: cp. 1265 a 3, βουλο-

33. ἀποφορά is the technical term for ‘the money which slaves let out to hire paid to their master’ (Liddell and Scott): see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb p. 195. The contribution in kind which the Helots rendered to their masters went by this name (Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 8: Inst. Lac. c. 40). Plato’s designation for the contribution of οἱ ἄλλοι πολίται to the support of the guardians is, however, not ἀποφορά (for this would imply that they were slaves), but μισθάς τῆς φιλαξίας (Rep. 416 E).

34. πολὺ μάλλον, because they are free and citizens, and have the land in their hands.

35. εἰληφείαι, ‘bodies of Helots,’ just as πολιτεία is used by Aristotle occasionally (Bon. Ind. 612 b 10 sqq.) in the sense of ‘a body of citizens.’ So δουλείας, 36: cp. Thuc. 5. 23, ἦν ἡ δουλεία ἐπαναστάτης.

36. ‘Whether a definite settlement of the question as to property and the family is as necessary in relation to the cultivators as it is in relation to the guardians or not, at present at all events nothing definite has been laid down.’

37. καί, ‘nor.’

38. τὸ here as elsewhere τιν vocabulo additur, quod utrique mem-

bro commune est,’ Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq. The meaning of πολιτεία here is not absolutely certain; it might possibly be ‘participation in political power’—cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 13, ἀρμοδιότητος ἀποδιδόνα τῷ πολιτείαν τούτῃ (‘hanc partem reipublicae administrandae,’ Bon. Ind. 612 b 47). See Bon. Ind. 612 b 38 sqq. in illustration of the sense ‘ius civitatis, potestas in civitate.’ But Bonitz does not appear to attach this sense to the word in this passage, and perhaps the ordinary meaning of ‘political constitution’ is more probable here. Aristotle has been speaking of this class as a separate πόλις (24), and he would like to know what its πολιτεία is to be, because it is essential that its character should be suitable to its position, and the πολιτεία is a main determinant of character.

40. οὔτε ... κοινωνίαν. ‘Nor is their character of slight importance in relation to the preservation of the guardians’ society.’ For the construction, cp. Ερυξιάς 394 D, ἦ τῆς μιν οἰκίας ἦ τε χρήσις πολλῆ τυγχάνει οὐδα καὶ ἰσογεία, καὶ μεγάλα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ διαφέροντα τὰ πρὸς
NOTES.

τῶν βίαν ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ οἰκίᾳ οἰκεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν σμικρῷ καὶ φαύλῳ οἰκείῳ:

This is the passage before us. We have to propose τιμακταὶ instead of the simple infinitive οἰκεῖν. (see above on 1257 a 11 and 1258 b 19); perhaps, however, τιμακταὶ itself will do (cp. 3. 18. 1288 a 34).

καὶ εἰ ... γυναῖκες. ‘And who will keep house, if . . .?’ This clause has much exercised the commentators (‘sechuserunt Sylburgius, Bekkerus, ante τίς 2 traiecerunt Schneiderus et Coraes, lacunam post haec verba statuit ante Sus. iam Thurotus’ Sus.1), but a similarly constructed sentence is to be found in Phys. 8. 3. 254 a 27, εἰπερ οὖν εὐτί δίκαιος καὶ κατάλογος, καὶ κατὰ τὸ κατάλογον γυναῖκες εἶναι. Götting: ‘Deinde verba καὶ εἰ κοιναὶ κ.τ.λ. sic intelligenda sunt: καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπορθηκεῖν ἐν τις (sc. τίς οἰκονομῆσαι αὐτῶν); εἰ κοιναὶ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες εἶναι.’ So Vict. ‘idem etiam incommodum illic nascetur, si’ etc.

But no fresh apodosis need be supplied: τίς οἰκονομῆσαι is the common apodosis of the whole sentence. (If in the much-debated passage, Soph. O. Τ. 227–8, we retain the reading of all the MSS, ἵππελλὼν αὐτὸς καθ’ αὐτοῦ, the apodosis (κελεύω πάντα σημαίνει ἐμοί) must be obtained from the preceding line (226) in much the same way as in the passage before us and in the passage just quoted from the Physics.) If women are common, the question will arise who is to keep house, whether property is also common or not, for ‘nulla certam aut suam domum habebit’ (Giph. p. 187). Whether Aristotle’s objection holds, is another matter.

4. ἄτοπον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 451 D. In the Laws, however (804 E), Plato appeals to the example of the women of the Sauromatae to show that women’s pursuits should be the same as men’s. Still Plutarch (de Amore Prolis, c. 1) found men even in his day inclined to regard the lower animals as furnishing a standard of that which is natural in matters relating to marriage and the begetting and rearing of offspring; he himself seems to think that they follow nature more closely than man. This short treatise is well worth reading even in the abbreviated and imperfect form in which we have it.

6. οἷς probably refers to θηρίων: Bonitz, however (Ind. 500 b 22), refers it to ἄνδρας. οἷς is here used in a pregnant sense, as in 1. 5. 1254 b 19, and Isocr. Paneg. § 123.
7. τοῦς αὐτοὺς, i.e. as Vict. points out, not 'eosdem homines,' but 'eundem ordinem.'

8. στάσεως αἴτιον. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 9 sqq. Sus.² (Note 182) explains the difference between the schemes of Plato and Aristotle in regard to this matter.

Θ. διίμα. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1117 a 22, ἀνδρεῖον δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ αἱγοούντες, καὶ εἰσιν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εἰκελπῶν, χείρων δ' ὅσω αἰσθώμα συδεὶν ἵναςαι (i.e. οἰδὲνος ἑαυτούς αἰσθοῦν, Bon. Ind. 70 a 43). ἑκεῖνοι δὲ.

ηπούθεν δὴ. So Ἡ, except that accentuation varies and Vet. Int. with Μ* reads εἶποθέν δή. Ἡ ποῦ γε δὴ Bekk.¹ (following Vict. Schn. Cor. with some differences of accentuation): ηποθεν δὴ Bekk.² "ηποθεν δὴ does not appear to occur elsewhere, though ηποῦ ννν... δῆ occurs in Eurip. Troad. 59, and ηπον δῆ ibid. 158, and Thucydides has ηπον δῆ 1. 142. 3, and ηποῦ γε δῆ, 6. 37. 2, and Aeschines de Falsa Legatione, § 88. ηπον... γε. The particle ἦ is nowhere found in Aristotle, if we except this passage (Eucken de Partic. Usu p. 69). Δηποθεν is common enough, though it is not found apparently in Aristotle.

θυμοειδεῖ καὶ πολεμικοῖς. The members of the second class of Plato's Republic are referred to, who are thus designated in Rep. 375 Λ, 376 Α (Eaton).

11. ἀλλοὶ is governed by μέμυκται: ταῖς ψυχαῖς is added to give the place of mingling: cp. Rep. 415 Β, ὥ τι αὐτοῖς τούτων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμυκται.

13. φησί, Rep. 415 Α.


14. μίζαι, sc. τῶν θείων.

15. καὶ τὴν εὐθαμονίαν, 'even the happiness of the guardians' (Sus. 'selbst die Glückseligkeit der Wächter'). Is the meaning, 'not only wives children and property, but even happiness'? Or is it 'even their happiness which is the last thing one would expect him to take away'?

16. φησί, 'Rep. iv. p. 419 sq., at immemor fuit Aristoteles alterius loci v. p. 465 sq. neque respexit quae Plato docuit ix. p. 580—592 B, et sic haud intellexit non cam quam ei tribuit, sed plane contrarium esse veram Platonis sententiam' (Sus.!). There is, however, as Zeller observes (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 698. 2) a real difference between the views of Plato and Aristotle on this point, 'for Plato is in principle opposed to the contention of Aristotle that the happiness of the individual as such is to be a decisive consideration in framing the institutions of the State, and he insists
for precisely this reason (Rep. 420 B sqq.) that the individual must find his highest happiness in a self-forgetting (selbstlosen) devotion to the Whole.’


18. μὴ τὸν πλείστων κ.τ.λ. One expects μὴ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, but a not very dissimilar displacement occurs in 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 37, ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβάινει καὶ ἐνδεχεται κ.τ.λ.: cp. also Magn. Mor. 1. 20. 1190 b 19, λέγω δὲ ὅτι οἱ πολλοί φοβοῦνται ἢ οἱ πάντες. Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 698. 2) would like to get rid of the second μὴ, but cp. Laws 766 A, μὴ ἰκανὸς δὲ ἢ μὴ καλὸς τραφέν κ.τ.λ.

19. οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 35, παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ἦν ἑαυτῶν, ὅπερ ὡς σοφιστικὸς λόγος: εἰ ἐκαστὸν μικρὸν, καὶ πάντα, τούτο δὴ ἐστὶ μὲν δὲς, ἐστὶ δὲ ἐς τὸ γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρῶν, ἀλλὰ σύγκειται ἐκ μικρῶν, and also Plato, Protag. 349 C.

24. ἢ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία (cp. εν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, 28) gives the title of Plato's Πολιτεία (mistranslated ‘Republic’) as we have it: so τῶν νόμων 26 agrees with the title of the Laws. Aristotle’s testimony supports not only the authenticity of both dialogues, but also that of their titles: cp. Athen. Deipn. 507 f, οἱ δὲ συνεθέντες ὅτ’ εἶναι νόμου καὶ τούτων ἔτι πρότερον ἡ πολιτεία τῇ πανομοσχεμῇ: The plural, αἱ πολιτείαι, seems, however, to have been sometimes used: see note on 1260 b 12. The object of the criticisms on the Republic which we have been perusing is, we see from this sentence, in the main to point out ἀπορίας enough in connexion with the work to show that there is still room for another attempt to depict a ‘best constitution’ (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 32 sqq.). The same may be said of the somewhat grumbling criticism of the Laws which follows. Aristotle’s real opinion of the two works must be gathered from the Politics as a whole; we shall best be able to gather it, if we note, as we have sought to do in vol. i, the points in which his political teaching and method depart from those of Plato.

C. 6. 26. ἱχεδόν δὲ παραπλησίως κ.τ.λ. . . διά. Giph. ‘Reddit initio rationem, cur et in secundam Platonis Rerpublicam disserat hanc: quia ut primae, item et secundae sua sint vitia et incommoda.’ To study the rocks on which other voyagers have been wrecked is the best means of avoiding similar disasters. A further reason seems to be introduced by καὶ γὰρ 28.

31. τῆς πολιτείας τῆς τάξιν. Probably not after περί, but acc. after διώρισκεν. The expression seems to refer especially to the
distribution of political power (cp. 2. 10. 1272a 4: 3. 11. 1281b 39: 7 (5). 7. 1307b 18); thus in what follows we are told in what hands Plato has placed the supreme authority of the State.

33. τρίτων δ᾽ εκ τούτων, 'and third recruited from these last' (i.e. from τὸ προτόπολεμον μέρος): cp. Plato, Rep. 412 D, ἀλλεκτίον ὦρ' εκ τῶν ἄλλων φιλιάκων τοιούτως ἄνθρας, οἶν ἄν κτ.λ. For the expression, cp. de Part. An. 2. 1. 646a 20, δευτέρα δὲ σύστασις ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἕ τῶν ὁμοομερῶν φύσεως: Plato, Laws 891 C, ψυχήν δὲ εκ τούτων (earth, air, fire, and water) ὑστερον: Phileb. 27 B, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖν ἀπειρον λέγων, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἐπειτ' εκ τούτων τρίτων μικτὴν καὶ γεγενημένην οὐσίαν. For the identification of τὸ βουλευόμενον and τὸ κύριον, cp. 6 (4). 14. 1290 a 1.

34. περὶ δὲ . . . μή. 'Reapose haec non praetermissa esse a Platone invitus ipse testatur Aristoteles 6–10 et 31–34' (Sus.1). But perhaps the recognition of the first class as ἀμφοτερς and of the second as τὸ προτόπολεμον μέρος does not absolutely involve the denial of all office and all share in military service to the third class. That Aristotle did not understand Plato to have pronounced clearly for the denial of ὀπλα to the third class appears from c. 5. 1264 a 20 sq.

37. τὰς μὲν γυναίκας κτ.λ. Plato, Rep. 451 E–452 A. Aristotle hints his surprise that Plato should say so little about the γυναικεῖον and τεχνιταί, and so much about the women.

39. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κτ.λ., 'but for the rest' (for τὰ ἄλλα, cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 39: Plato, Rep. 403 B: Laws 763 E), 'we find that he has filled the dialogue with extraneous discussions' (cp. Demosth. de Cor. c. 9), 'and with discourse about the education of the guardians.' A somewhat similarly constructed sentence occurs in c. 11. 1273 a 9, δὲ δ᾽ ἄν εἰσφέρωσιν οὕτω, αὖ διακούσαν μοῦν ἀποδιδώσαι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ διάφανα τὰς ἀρχομαί. What extraneous matters are here referred to? Among other things perhaps, as Sus. conjectures, 'illa quae 608 C–621 D de animorum immortalitate proponuntur,' but also probably the ethical discussions, such as that on justice, which Aristotle himself deals with in a separate treatise (cp. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 39, ἔτερα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔργον σχολὴς ταύτα). The same complaint as to extraneous matter in the Republic is made by Dio Chrysostom, Or. 7. 267 R. The juxtaposition of λόγους and τῶν λόγον here is awkward, but not much more so than that of λέγεται and λεξέργησε in de Gen. An. 2. 7. 746 b 7 sqq.

3. ταύτην βουλόμενος κτ.λ. 'Though wishing': cp. c. 5. 1265 a 1264 a 32. Κωνοτέρων ταῖς πόλεις probably means, not 'having
more affinity to existing States,' but 'more suitable to them' or 'more within their reach': cp. 6 (4). I. 1288 b 38, where (as Bonitz points out, Ind. 399 b 15 sq.) τὴν μᾶς καὶ κοινωτέραν ἀπόσιασ (ταῖς πόλεσι πολετείαιν) is apparently used in the same sense as τὴν μᾶλλον πόλειν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἰσόμορσαν 34. For the fact, cp. Laws 739 E.

4. εἰς. Cp. 3. 3. 1276 b 14, ὅταν εἰς ἐτέραν μεταξάλλη πολετείαιν ἡ πόλις, and 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 14 sq.


7. παιδείαν τὴν αὐτήν. The subjects of education prescribed in the two dialogues are much the same—γυμναστική, μουσική, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy; even dialectic reappears, for this study seems to be required in the Laws (965 B sqq.) of the members of the Nocturnal Council, as it is required of select individuals in the Republic. 'The main principles of education are essentially the same as in the Republic' (Zeller, Plato E. T. p. 542). But as the education prescribed in the Laws is in the main designed for the whole body of citizens and not for a few of them only, like that of the Republic, it must probably be intended by Plato to be less arduous and exacting.

dὸ... ἤν. 'Plat. Legg. 741 E: 806 D—807 D: 842 D: 846 D: 919 D sq.' (Sus.1).

8. καὶ... γυναικῶν. 'Plat. Legg. 780 D sqq.: 806 E: cf. 842 B' (Sus.1). We are not expressly told in the Republic that women are to take part in the syssitia, though, as Sus. remarks (Sus.2, Note 153), they are probably intended to do so, but in the Laws this is distinctly insisted upon. Giph., however (p. 194), takes Aristotle's meaning to be, that while in the Republic men and women are intended to take their meals at the same tables, in the Laws separate mess-tables are instituted for women. The notion of syssitia for women would be all the more surprising to Greeks, as one name for the syssitia was Andreia and the institution was regarded as an essentially military one (Hd. 1. 65).

9. τὴν μὲν. 'He makes to consist' seems to be suppressed, unless we suppose φτισὶ δεῖν εἶναι to be carried on, which is perhaps less likely.

χιλιῶν. Cp. Rep. 423 A, ὡς ἀληθῶς μεγίστη, καὶ εἴπαν μύϊν ἡ χιλιῶν τῶν προσεξειμένων. For the total of the citizens of the Republic, the number of the first class and that of the third (far the largest) must be added.

μὲν ὦν, 'it is true that,' as in 17. We pass with μὲν ὦν from description to criticism, as in c. 10. 1272 a 12.

11. περιττόν, 'uncommon, out of the common,' but no English word adequately translates it. The epithet suggests an aspiring wisdom which follows paths of its own—which has something of greatness, but also of superfluity: cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 42, 2. 8. 1267 b 24, and περιεργότερον, 25. So περιττή τῶν ἄλλων, Poet. 24. 1459 b 36 seems to be represented by σημῶν καὶ αἰθίδες, Ῥητ. 3. 3. 1406 b 3 (Vahlen, Beitr. zu Poet. 3. 291: Bon. Ind. 585 a 59). Περιττός is often joined with ἰδιος, but is less wide and more subtle in meaning.

tοῦ Σωκράτους. Aristotle identifies with Socrates the Ἀθηναῖος ξένος of the Laws. Grote (Plato 3. 301 n.) conjectures that the latter name was preferred by Plato to avoid the difficulty of implying the presence of Socrates in Crete. In c. 7. 1266 b 5 we have Πλάτων ἐκ τῶν νῦν οὐκ ὄρφων, and in c. 9. 1271 b 1, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νῦνοι ἐπιστήμων.


καλῶς ὑπὲρ πάντα, sc. ἰχειν: see Bon. Ind. 306 a 16.


πληθὸς. For the acc. cp. c. 9. 1271 a 9, and see Dr. Holden's note on Xen. Ὀεον. 13. 3, τὰ ἔργα μάθῃ ως ἐστιν ἐργασία. In the criticisms on constitutions contained in the Second Book Aristotle commonly notices first, or at any rate before he has gone very far, their arrangements with respect to what he terms in the Fourth Book the ἐποιεῖσθαι of the State—the number of the citizens and the extent of the territory (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 38, ὡς δὲ ὁ πολλὰ πρῶτοποτεθείσθαι καθάπερ εἰχομένους, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τοῦτον ἀδύνατον λέγω δὲ όν ὑπὲρ τι πλῆθος πολιτῶν καὶ χώρας).

14. Βαβυλωνίας. Cp. 3. 3. 1276 a 28.

15. Yet the territory of the Spartans (is Aristotle thinking of his own time, when Messenia had been lost?) is said in 2. 9. 1270 a 29 to be capable of supporting 30,000 hoplites and 1,500 horsemen, who, if Spartans, would be ἀργοί. But perhaps this is not present to Aristotle's mind. He does not probably mean to assert that it would be capable of supporting 31,500 ἀργοί. See note on 1270 a 29.
16. θρέψονται. See note on στερήσονται, 1263 b 28.
17. μεν οὖν (here answered by μέντοι, as in 1257 a 28 and 1259 a 28) prepares the way for and helps to emphasize the correction introduced by μέντοι. ‘True, it is right to presuppose freely, but one must not presuppose anything impossible.’ Plato had, in effect, said much the same thing (Laws 709 D: 742 E: Rep. 456 C). Aristotle repeats this remark in 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 38, without any indication that he is conscious of the repetition.

18. λέγεται. ‘Expressis quidem verbis hoc non fit in Legibus Platoniciis, sed recte hanc sententiam e iv. p. 704–709 et v. p. 747 D eruere potuit Aristoteles’ (Sus.3). Add 625 C sqq. and 842 C–E. In Laws 705 D–E the Cretan laws are censured for looking only to war (i.e. πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιῶτας τῶπους), whereas the Athenian Stranger claims that he legislates looking to nothing but the virtue of his citizens. For this reason he dispenses with a fleet. Aristotle does not approve of this (cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 21 sqq.). If, as Susemihl following Schlosser points out (Sus.2, Note 204), Plato pays regard to considerations of defence against neighbours in fixing the number of the citizens (Laws 737 C–D: cp. 628 D), Aristotle would no doubt ask why he does not keep them in view when dealing with other matters. See also c. 7. 1267 a 17 sqq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6–22.

22. πολιτικόν, i.e. a life of intercourse with other States: cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 3 sqq., where we have ἥγεμονικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν βίων.


23. ὀπλαῖος. Is there not a reference here to Plato, Laws 625 C sqq., where the Cretan lawgiver is said to have chosen for the Cretans such arms as were most suitable to swift runners in a hilly country like Crete—bows and arrows, in fact? Aristotle urges that the arms used by a nation should be such as to enable it not only to cope with its foes in its own territory, but also to retaliate on them in theirs, which bows and arrows would not enable it to do. He dwells elsewhere on the importance of a fleet for this purpose (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 23 sqq.).

28. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ κ.τ.λ. The connexion of this with what precedes is illustrated by the similar sequence of topics in c. 7. 1267 a 17–27. The amount of the collective wealth, no less than the nature of the ὀπλα at the command of the State, must be fixed in relation to perils from without. The verb after μύτος is suppressed and ‘must be supplied in the indicative, not the subjunctive, as the idea of “warding off” (Abwehr) is here absent’ (Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 17).
29. βελτιον k. t. l. Tó Ἑαρὰς μᾶλλον explains ἐτέρως—‘in a way which differs through being clearer’: cp. de Part. An. 4. 5. 681 a 18, ἐτέρα τωιτῆ εν τῇ βαλάντῃ μικρὸν διαφέρει τούτων τῷ ἀπο- λεύσθαι. Lamb. ‘alter definiere, hoc est, planius atque apertius.’ Bern. however seems to take it as explaining βελτιον: ‘ob nicht vielleicht eine andere Begrenzung besser, weil deutlicher, ist.’

30. Φησ. Cp. Laws 7.37 D. Ephorus also (ap. Strab. p. 480) had praised the Cretans for living σωφρόνως καὶ λιτῶς. I do not feel the difficulty which Susemihl follows others in raising (see Sus.2, Critical Note, and Qu. Crit. p. 368 sq.) with regard to τοῦτο—ζην at all as strongly as he does. Aristotle makes two objections to Plato’s ἄρως—1. that it is too vague and fails to enlighten: 2. that it tends to mislead. For other instances in which μᾶλλον is used in the sense of λιπ., see bon. Ind. 445 a 1 sqq. In de Gen. An. 2. 8. 748 a 7 we have, οὗτος μὲν ὅν ὁ λόγος καθελθον λίπω καὶ θεόν. Τοῦτο—ζην gives the reason for Aristotle’s suggestion in 28 sq. that a clearer definition should be substituted.

33. σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως. Cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 30 sqq., a passage which shows that Aristotle intended fully to discuss in a later part of his work the question of the true mode of using property.

χωρίς γὰρ κ. τ. λ., ‘for if we part the one from the other, liberal living will accompany luxurious life, and temperate living a life of hardship.’ For ἀκολούθει as here used, Bonitz (Ind. 26 a 44) compares 3. 13. 1285 a 39 and Eth. Eud. 3. 5. 1232 a 31. Cp. also Theopomp. fragm. 110 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 295), τῶν ἀγάθων καὶ τῶν κακῶν οἷδεν αὐτό καθ’ αὐτό παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ συντέκτακα καὶ συνακολουθεῖ τοῖς μὲν πλούσιοι καὶ ταῖς δυναστείαις ἀμοι, καὶ μετα τούτην ἀκολαστία, ταῖς δ’ ἐνδείκνυς καὶ ταῖς ταπεινώτητι σωφρόνως καὶ μετρώτητι. In c. 7. 1266 b 26 and in 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 37 sqq. the alternative to τρυφῶν is γλαστρῶν, not ἐπιπάνως, ζην.

34. τῶ ἐπιπάνως, sc. ζην, suppressed as already implicitly expressed in τρυφῶν (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 19).

35. ἔξεις αἵρεται (see critical note and cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 1 sq.) is a wider term than ἀρεταί: ἐγχρίται (e.g.) is a στοιχεῖον ἔξεις, but not an ἀρετή in the strict sense of the word (see the references in Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 627. 2). Those who reject Victorius’ conjecture of αἵρεται for ἀρεταί, which is the reading of all the MSS., and prefer to strike out one of the two words ἔξεις and ἀρεταί, should probably strike out the former, for the illustrations which follow (35 sq.) show that good ἔξεις are alone referred to.

37. τὰς χρήσεις. i. e. τὰς ἐνεργείας. in contradistinction to τὰς ἔξεις
NOTES.

(see Bon. Ind. 854 b 37 sqq. for instances of this use of the word). Here also Aristotle would seem to refer to commendable χρήσεις only.

38. τὰς κτήσεις, ‘landed property,’ as in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18. Plato does not equalize all kinds of property (cp. 1265 b 22). The lots of land, however, are evidently intended by him to be equal or virtually equal (Laws 737).

39. κατασκευάζειν, ‘de placitis philosophicis (cf. ποιεῖν, τίδεσθαι) dicitur,’ Bon. Ind. 374 b 17 sq.

άφειναι κ.τ.λ. It is not the case that Plato trusts to ἀτεκνία alone to maintain the numbers of his citizen-body unaltered: see Laws 740 D—E, 923 D. Aristotle, however, desires a limitation of τεκνοποία: he wishes the State to fix a definite number of children, not to be exceeded, in the case of every marriage (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 22). Aristotle must be quite aware that Plato intends to fix the number of citizens in the Laws, but he appears to think that Plato takes no effectual means to secure that the number named shall not be exceeded.

40. ἀν ὁμαλισθησωμένην. On ἂν with the Future Participle, see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 41. 4. Madvig (Adversaria Critica 1. 463) would read ἀνομαλισθησωμένη, but this verb appears only to occur elsewhere in a single passage, Rhet. 3. 11. 1412 a 16, καὶ τὸ ἀνομαλίσθαι τᾶς πόλεις.

41. διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας, ‘by means of’: see note on 1263 b 36.

1265 b. 1. ὅτι δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. Plato does not give this reason. The fact mentioned by Aristotle is interesting.

δεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘this stationariness of numbers will need to be maintained with greater accuracy in the State of the Laws than it is now,’ for in this State those over the right number will be starved, which now is not the case. This remark was perhaps suggested by an observation in the Laws (928 E)—ἐν μὲν ὅν ἄλλη πολιτείᾳ πᾶς ἀποκεκρυμμένος οὐκ ἄν ἐξ ἀνύχης ἀπολείπει ἐνι, ταύτης δὲ, ἢς οἰδὲ οἱ νόμοι ἔσονται, ἀναγκαῖος ἔχει εἰς ἄλλην χώραν ἐξουδετερεῖται τὸν ἀπάτορα’ πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς τεταράκοντα καὶ πεντακισχίλιοι οὐκ οὐκ ἔστω ἕνα προσγενέσθαι.

3. ἀπορεῖ, ‘is destitute’ (cp. μηδέν ἔχειν 5).

For μερίζεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ὀποσοῦν πλῆθος, where εἰς seems to be used of the recipients, cp. c. 9. 1270 a 18, εἰς ὀλίγους ἥκεν ἡ χώρα, and de Part. An. 3. 3. 664 a 27 sq.

2. 6. 1265 a 38—1265 b 12.


10. τῶν ἄλλων, i.e. other than τῶν γεννησάντων implied in τῶν γεννηθέντων.

If with Plut. Bekk. we read ταῖς πλείσταις, we must infer that in some States a check of some kind on the procreation of children existed. Aristotle’s suggestion in 7—10 much resembles that of Plato, Rep. 460 A, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τῶν ἁρχουσι παύσωμεν, ἵνα μὴ συναυτίζωσί τὸν αὐτῶν ἀρμήνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὸς πολείμων τε καὶ νόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ τουαίτα ἀποκοποῦντες. 

12. κακουργίαν. Vict. ‘ali autem in minutoribus rebus exercent malitiam suam, qui multis locis in his libris vocantur ab ipso κακοίργοι, id est, fraudulentis.’ Кακοίργοι and μεκροπόνηροι are conjoined, it is true, in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 10, and contrasted with ὑστατοί καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι (cp. Khut. 2. 16. 1391 a 18), but in Pol. 7 (5). 1308 a 19 the malpractices ending in tyranny which long terms of office favour are spoken of by this name, and these cannot be said to be ‘in minutoribus rebus.’ ‘Knavery’ perhaps comes near the meaning. For the thought here expressed, Sus.2 compares c. 7. 1260 b 13 (cp. also Isocr. Areopag. § 44); yet Aristotle seems to make less of this danger in 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 18 sqq.

Φείδων μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. ‘Pheidon, in fact.’ Here, as in ἐνοικοῦμεν οὖν, 1265 b 33 sqq., and also in 3. 5. 1278 a 6 sq., μὲν οὖν introduces a confirmation of what has preceded, in order to emphasize the sentence introduced by ἐδʼ. The arrangements of the Laws are said to be the opposite of those of Pheidon, because Pheidon, though careless as to the equality of the lots, fixed for ever both the number of households in his city and the number of citizens, whereas Plato equalizes the lots and fixes the number of households, but does not effectually fix the number of citizens (cp. 1265 a 38, ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἱσαύρα τὸ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ’ ἀφεῖναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀόριστον). Under Pheidon’s scheme no pauper citizens would exist: Plato, on the contrary, takes no effectual means for preventing their existence. Is Pheidon’s early date mentioned to indicate surprise that Plato took no better means than he did of preventing the existence of paupers within the citizen-body? If Pheidon legislated for Corinth, we can understand how it came to send forth so many colonies in early days. Aristotle would go farther, however, than Pheidon; he would not be content with excluding the over-plus from citizen-
ship, but would prevent it from coming into existence. 'O Kopthòs is probably added to distinguish this Pheidon from the better known tyrant of Argos (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 26). Compare with the aims of Pheidon those of Philolaus, who also was a Corinthian (c. 12. 1274 b 4 sq.). We learn from Isaeus de Apollodori Hereditate § 30 (quoted by Caillemére, Succession légitime à Athènes, p. 133), that the Attic law required the Archon to take care that no house was left without a representative (καί ὁ μόνον ἰδία ταῦτα γινώσκοντι, ἄλλα καὶ δημοσία τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πολεως οὔτω ταῦτα ἔγγοκε νόμοι γὰρ τῷ ἄρχοντι τῶν ὦκων, ὃποιοι ἐν μὴ ἐξερημώνται, προστάται πὴν ἐπιμέλειαν). But Pheidon went much further than this; he fixed not only the number of households, but also the number of the lots and the number of the citizens. Lycurgus is conceived to have fixed the number of households and lots in Plutarch, Agis 5. 1.

13. ὅν νομοθῆτης τῶν ἄρχαιοτάτων. For the gen. see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 533. 1.

14. οἴκους, used of households especially as owning property: see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, E. T. p. 142 n. (who refers to Xen. Oecon. 1. 4–5), and Holden’s Index to the Oeconomicus, p. 95*. Here perhaps something of this meaning is present; elsewhere, however, e.g. in 1. 7. 1255 b 19 and 1. 2. 1252 b 14, the difference between οἶκος and οἰκία seems hardly traceable.

ἰσοὺς, ‘as they originally were’? or ‘at their original number’? If the former, the primitive distribution of property, as well as the primitive number of households, would be stereotyped; if the latter, only the primitive number of households. Perhaps this is all that is meant.

15. ἀνίσους . . . κατὰ μέγεθος. For the severance, cp. de Part. An. 4. 8. 683 b 28, τούτων δ’ ἐκάστον πλείω εἶδη ἐστὶ διαφέροντα οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος πολύ, and see below on 1265 b 29.

16. τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς νόμοις recurs in 18, and also in 1266 a 1. τοῦναντίον. See above on 12.


18. ἀλλακείηται δὲ κ.τ.λ. At first sight it seems surprising that Aristotle digresses here to the subject of οἱ ἄρχοντες from that of the property and numbers of the citizens, with which he has been dealing, for he returns to the subject of their property in 21, but the reason for this is that he has just been mentioning an omission (a 38–b 17), the omission to regulate τεκνοποία, and now he has another omission to mention, the omission to explain distinctly
2. 6. 1265 b 13—22.

in what way the rulers are to be different from the ruled. Hence the Kai before ta peri tois archontas.

19. δησος. So Π² Bekk.: Ms Π² πως. In either case ‘how’ will be the translation. Giph. (p. 201): ‘hoc tantum Plato . . . magistratus privatis antecellere et meliores esse debere, universe et confuse, similitudine suo more adhibita, monuit.’ Aristotle would have been glad if Plato had spoken more definitely and in detail on this subject.

ἐσοναι διαφέροντες. See above on 1259 b 11.

φησί. ‘Plato, Legg. 734 E: non tamen prorsus neglegere debuit Aristoteles quae Plato disseruit 961 A sq.: 951 E sqq.’ (Sus.¹). Some few of the citizens are to receive a more scientific training in arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy than the rest (Laws 818 A). In 632 C we find the guardians of the State described as of two kinds—φύλακας ἐπιστήμης, τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ διὰ ἀληθοὶς δόξης ἱοιτας—so that even the ‘warp’ of the State will apparently be of two textures, and this is confirmed by 961 A sq. and 951 E sqq.

20. τῆς κρούκης, called ὣφωφή in Laws 734 E.

21. For the repetition of δεῖν, compare the repetition of δῆλον in 3. 13. 1283 b 16 sqq., of ἑρων in 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq., and the addition of ἄτερος in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 16 and ἐκεῖνον in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 17. See also above on 1261 b 8.

22. πειναπλασίας. Sepulv. p. 43 b—‘mirum est Aristotelem ad quintuplum dicere, cum in libro quinto de legibus Plato ad quadruplum dicat, nisi forte, quod suspicor, vitio librarioorum factum est ut in Aristotelicius exemplaribus πειναπλασίας scriptum sit pro τετραπλασίας’: Sus.¹—‘immo τετραπλασίας, v. Plat. Legg. 744 E, cf. 754 D sqq.: errorem ipsius Aristotelis esse, non librarioorum, inde apparat quod idem repetitur 7. 1266 b 5 sqq.’ Plato’s words, Laws 744 E, are—μέτρον δὲ αὐτῶν (i. e. τῶν ὄρων = τῆν τοῦ κλίματος τιμήν) θέμενος ὁ νομοθέτης διπλάσιοι ἐάσει τούτων κτάσιν καὶ τριπλάσιον καὶ μέχρι τετραπλασίων. He would seem therefore, as Prof. Jowett points out (Politics of Aristotle 2. 1. 63), to permit the acquisition of property four times the value of the lot in addition to the lot, so that the richest man in the State would be, as Aristotle says (c. 7. 1266 b 5 sqq.), five times as rich as the poorest, who has nothing but the lot. The passage 754 D sqq., to which Sus. refers, does not seem to bear on the subject, if Stallbaum’s interpretation of it is correct. Μείζων 22 appears (cp. τῆς ἐλαχίστης, 1266 b 6) to mean ‘greater than the minimum with which every citizen starts’ (i. e. the lot).

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23. διὰ τί κ.τ.λ. 'Why should not an increase be allowed in respect of land up to a certain point?' The answer is 'because if a citizen were allowed to add to his landed property, what he gains other citizens must lose; their lots must pass from them or be diminished, and thus, besides an infraction of the laws, the main security against pauperism within the citizen-body, itself not complete (cp. 1265 b 4 sq.), would be still further weakened.'

25. συμφέρει. Eucken de Partic.Usu p. 58: 'particula ita adhibita (i.e. in oratione obliqua) vulgo cum indicativo construitur, ita ut μή indicet cum qui dicat expectare ut affirmetur sententia, μή oò ut negetur—cf. Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 42: Phys. 8. 6. 259 b 3: Eth. Nic. 8. 9. 1159 a 6.' Some MSS. (not the best) have συμφέρη, and it is possible that the Vet. Int. ('ne forte non expedit') found it in his Greek text. The subjunctive occurs in this construction in only four other passages of Aristotle, if we exclude the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum: these are Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 19: Top. 6. 9. 147 a 21: Metaph. M. 4. 1079 b 6: Metaph. N. 3. 1090 b 8 (Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 16: see also Eucken, ubi supra).

ένειμε. 'Plat. Legg. 745 E: 775 E sqq., cf. 8.48: at mirum est hoc loco idem in Platone ab Aristotele reprehendi, quod ipse instituit, 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 14 sqq.' (Sus.3). But Aristotle's words in that passage are δύο κλήρων ἑκάστῳ νεμθέντων—two lots, not necessarily two houses. The object of Plato in this arrangement seems to have been to provide a means of settling the married son in a separate household of his own (Laws 776 A). Aristotle would probably approve the separation, but perhaps in his State there would be little need for the arrangement, for if the father were 37 years of age when he married, and the son waited to marry till he was 37, he would not be very likely to marry in his father's lifetime. At any rate, Aristotle does not provide for the contingency in what we have of the Politics.

26. διελών χωρίς. Vict. 'distinctas separatasque.'

χαλεπῶν δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν. Cp. Demosth. in Boeot. de Nomine, c. 26, εἰ γὰρ οὕτω δαπανηρὸς ἦν ὅστε γάμῳ γεγαμηκὼς τὴν ἐμὴν μητέρα ἐτέραν εἶχε γυναῖκα, ἴσως ἔστε, και δῦ οἰκίας οἷς, πῶς ἄν ἀργύριον τοιοῦτον ὄν κατέλιπεν;

26 sqq. Here Aristotle passes from the subject of the citizens, their numbers and property, to that of the constitution. His objections to the constitution described in the Laws are as follows. It is not the next best after that which Plato places first, for it aims at being a polity, which is a constitution compounded of two constitutions, whereas an ἀριστοκρατία like the Lacedaemonian, which is
compounded of three, is better. Nor again (1266 a 5 sqq.) does it answer to Plato’s own account of the best constitution, for this is compounded, according to him, of monarchy and democracy, whereas the constitution of the Laws is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy and leans rather to oligarchy.

27. βουλεται μέν. This μέν appears to emphasize βουλεται and to imply that success is not attained; we see, however, from 1266 a 7, μᾶλλον δ’ εγκλίνει βουλεται προς τὴν ὁλιγαρχίαν, that, in Aristotle’s view, the constitution of the Laws hardly remains true even in aim to a midway course between oligarchy and democracy.


29. εἰ μέν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μέν οὖν (‘now while’) here introduces an admission which does not exclude, but rather lends fresh emphasis to, a coming criticism introduced by δ’. Translate: ‘now while, if his view in constructing (1265 a 39) this constitution is that it is the constitution most readily attainable by States.’ Ὅς κοινοτάτην must be taken with ταῖς πόλεσι and with πολιτείαν. For the severance of πολιτείαν from ὃς κοινοτάτην, cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 15, and see above on 1253 a 21. For κοινοτάτην τῶν ἄλλων, see Bon. Ind. 403 a 3 sq. (‘superlativus comparativi vim in se continet, ita ut vel ipse coniungatur cum genetivo comparativo’).

31. εἰ δ’ ὃς κ.τ.λ. This is Plato’s meaning (Laws 739 E, ἀδικασίας ἐγγύτητα καὶ ἥ μία διετέρως). ‘Ita tamen cum Platone agit Aristoteles, ut videatur id compertum se non habere; hoc autem facit, ut aqueor ipsi videatur’ (Vict.). For τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, cp. Laws 739 B.

33. ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν, ‘more aristocratic than the State of the Laws’ is probably the meaning, not than the Lacedaemonian State. Aristotle is inclined to regard the State of the Laws as leaning too much to oligarchy (1266 a 7).

ἐνοι μέν οὖν, ‘some, in fact’: see note on 1265 b 12. Who these inquirers were, is not known; they seem to have recognized only three constitutions, monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy; neither Socrates nor Plato, therefore, can well be referred to, though Plato (Laws 691 C–693 E: cp. 773 C–D) praises the Lacedaemonian constitution for tempering the ‘strong wine’ of royalty with a senate representing age and sobriety, and with the Ephorate representing the democratic principle of the lot or something like it. There is a nearer approach to the views of these ἐνοι in the doubt expressed by Megillus, the Spartan interlocutor in the Laws (712 D), whether to call the Lacedaemonian constitution a tyranny
(because of the Ephorate) or a democracy or an aristocracy or a kingship. On the difference between their conception of mixed government and that of Aristotle something has already been said, vol. i. p. 264, and above, p. xiii. Whether Aristotle agrees with them in regarding the senate as an oligarchical element in the constitution, is not quite clear, for though in 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 18 sq. he describes the mode of electing the senators as δυναστευτική, he elsewhere says of the senate, ἄθλον ἡ ἀρχή αὐτῆς ἡ ἀρετή ἑστίν (2. 9. 1270 b 24). He clearly, however, did not agree with them in their view that the Lacedaemonian constitution was a mixture of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, for he speaks of it as a mixture of virtue (or aristocracy) and democracy in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 16 sq. With the passage before us 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 18–34 should be compared, where other grounds for finding a democratical and an oligarchical element in this constitution are mentioned.

38. δημοκρατεῖσθαι. Bonitz remarks on this passage (Ind. 174 b 54), 'ubi subjectum non additur, δημοκρατεῖσθαι non mul tum differt a δημοκρατίαν εἶναι,' and he refers to 40 and to 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 16. It is not, however, quite certain that τὴν πολιτείαν should not be supplied: cp. 2. II. 1273 a 41, where Πί is probably right in reading ταύτην ὁχι ὦν τε βεβαιῶσ ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν, and 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 14 sqq.

39. κατά, 'in respect of': cp. τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἥγεμονικῶν, 3. 17. 1288 a 11.

ἐκ τοῦ δήμου. For this mention of a demos in the Lacedaemonian State, cp. c. 9. 1270 b 8, 18, 25 : 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 30. It is not meant that the ephors were always taken from the demos, but that all citizens were eligible (cp. c. 9. 1270 b 25, καθάσταται γὰρ ἐξ ἀπαντῶν). As to the distinction between 'people' (or οἱ τυχῶτες, c. 9. 1270 b 29) and καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ (1270 b 24), see Schömann, Opusc. Acad. 1. 108 sqq.: 'non Homoeos illis qui ἱπομενόν εραν opposition, sed in ipsis Homoeis alios καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς esse innuit, alios autem in quos haec appellatio non conveniat... Dignitatis tantum atque exisationis discrimen est' (p. 138). See 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 29 sq.


1266a. 1. ἐν δέ κ.τ.λ. 'Aristotle understands this last principle' (that the best constitution should be a compound of monarchy and democracy) 'somewhat differently from what Plato seems to have intended' (Grote, Plato 3. 363 n.). Plato says (Laws 693 D)
that μοναρχία (not τυραννίς) and δημοκρατία are the two mother-forms of constitution, Persia being an extreme example of the former, and Athens of the latter: ἰδιὶ δὴ οὐν καὶ ἀναγκαῖοι μεταλαβέν ἀμφότεροι τούτοις, εἴτε ελευθερία γέται καὶ φιλία μετὰ φρονήσεως: that is to say, a good constitution should partake of each of the two mother-forms (not of their extreme phases), or as he expresses it in 692 A, the fiery self-willed strength of birth (ἡ κατὰ γένος αὐθαίνης ρώμη) must be tempered by the sobriety of age and checked by an approach to the principle of the lot. In other words, the force of authoritative hereditary government and the tempering element of freedom ought to find a place in every good—State. It is doubtful from the sequel whether Plato intended to represent monarchy, even in its milder form, as an essential ingredient. Thus in Laws 756 E he describes his scheme for the election of councillors as 'a mode of election midway between monarchy and democracy,' though it is hard to see anything in it which could in strictness be called monarchical. He certainly never meant that a good State must be an union of tyranny and extreme democracy, of which forms alone it could be said that they are the worst of constitutions or not constitutions at all. Aristotle here seems to confound democracy with extreme democracy, for he elsewhere speaks of democracy in general as the least bad of the παρεξήγασεις (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19; Pol. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 4 sqq.).

δέν. It is possible that εἴστι should be supplied with δένον here, as in Eth. Nic. 2. 7. 1107 a 32 and 7. 3. 1145 b 28. Bonitz, however, is apparently inclined to emend the latter passage and to adopt a different reading from that of Bekker in the former (see Ind. 168 a 50 sqq.).

3. As to tyranny, cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 28 sqq.: 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 2. Aristotle must refer, as has been said already, to the extreme democracy (cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31: 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 36), which is called in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 14 ἡ μικρότερη ἐίναι δικοῦτα δημοκρατία, but he nowhere else seems to treat the extreme democracy as worse than the extreme oligarchy: both are διαμεταί τυραννίδες, 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 37.

4. ἡ γάρ κ.τ.λ. The ἀριστοκρατία, which is a mixture of οἱ εὐποροι, οἱ ἀτρόποι, and οἱ καλοὶ καγώδαι, or of πλοῦτος, ελευθερία, and ἀρετή, is superior to the polity, which combines only οἱ εὐποροι and οἱ ἀτρόποι (πλοῦτος and ελευθερία): cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 15: 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 7 sqq. Each of the three elements—πλοῦτος, ελευθερία, ἀρετή—is the ὄρος of a constitution (1294 a 10): hence the ἀριστοκρατία may be
said to combine three constitutions. It is true that a constitution combining only two of the three elements is admitted (6 (4), 7. 1293 b 16) to be ἀριστοκρατική, but this is not Aristotle’s usual account of the ἀριστοκρατία. Susemihl, following Riese, brackets ἡ γὰρ—βέλτιων: he is inclined, indeed, to question with Schmidt the authenticity of the whole passage 1265 b 29, ἐδ—1266 a 6, δημοκρατική (Qu. Crit. p. 370). His reason for bracketing ἡ γὰρ—βέλτιων is that the view expressed in this clause cannot have been held by Aristotle, who would regard, for instance, a combination of aristocracy and democracy, or even of oligarchy and democracy, as better than a combination of oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny (Sus.², Note 222). The clause seems certainly open to this objection, but perhaps the contrast present to Aristotle’s mind is that which he has just drawn between an ἀριστοκρατία like the Lacedaemonian and a polity like that of Plato’s Laws.

5. οὐδ’ ἔχουσα φαίνεται. See note on 1261 a 9.

7. τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, as in c. 11. 1273 a 22 (contrast 1273 a 6).

9. ἐξ αἱρετῶν κληρωτοὺς. ‘In the appointment of members of the Boulé, of the astynomι, and of the judges of competitions, Laws 756 B—E: 763 D sq.: 765 B—D’ (Sus.², Note 223). As to κοινῶν ἀμφίων, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 6 sqq.

10. ἐκκλησιάζειν. Plato, Legg. 764 Α, Sus.¹—compulsory for the first and second classes only. See 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 17 sqq., where provisions of this nature are reckoned among ὀλιγαρχικὰ σοφίσματά τῆς νομοθεσίας.

φέρειν ἄρχοντας. ‘In reality, only in the election of the judges of gymnastic competitions (Laws 765 C), and also of the Boulé (Laws 756 B—E), and Aristotle has not yet come to the subject of the Boulé’ (Sus.², Note 225).

11. τούτο δὲ takes up τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ.: see Bon. Ind. 166 b 58 sqq.

12. καὶ τὸ πειράσθαι κ.τ.λ. So the astynomι and agoranomι must belong to the first or second class (763 D—E); the three hundred names from which the Nomophylakes are selected are to be chosen by those who are serving or have served in war as hoplites or horse-soldiers, and hoplites and horse-soldiers were well-to-do, substantial people (753 B sqq.); the superintendent of education is to be chosen by the magistrates out of the Nomophylakes (766 B); the select judges are to be chosen by the magistrates out of their own number (767 C—D). As to the Nocturnal Council, see 951 D—E.

13. καὶ τὰς μεγίστας κ.τ.λ. ‘Haec falsa sunt, v. Plat. Legg. 753 B sqq.: 755 B sqq.: 766 A sq.: 945 E sqq.’ (Sus.¹). It is true
that selection from the two highest classes is enforced only in the cases of the astynomi and the agoranomi, but Plato probably counted on his arrangements proving adequate to secure the same result as to the Nomophylakes (for these needed at least as much as the Astynomi to be at leisure to attend to public affairs—cp. καὶ τοῦτον, 763 D), and therefore as to the superintendent of education, the select judges, and the Nocturnal Council. On the other hand, the emphasis with which Plato insists on high excellence in his magistrates, especially in reference to the superintendent of education (ἀριστός εἰς πάντα, 766 A) and the priests of Apollo (πάντα ἄριστον, 946 A), seems to negative Aristotle’s charge that the constitution approaches oligarchy. Still, in Aristotle’s view, an ἀριστοκρατία selects the best ἐκ πάντων, not ἐκ τιών ἀφωρισμένων (6 (4). 5. 1292 b 2–4).

14. καί, ‘as well as the choice of ἀρχωτες.’ The distinction between membership of the Boule and ἀρχή is not always maintained: cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 8. As to the election of members of the Boule, see Laws 756 B sqq.

15. ἄλλα seems to answer to μεν (see Sus., Ind. Gramm. s. v. μεν). It introduces a limitation of what has just been said, as in Eth. Nic. 10. 5. 1176 a 21, ἡδε δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἄλλα τούτοις καὶ οὕτω διακε-μένοις: cp. Rhet. 2. 24. 1402 a 27.

16. ἐκ τῶν τρίτων. Should we supply τιμημάτων here with Mr. Eaton, or is τῶν τρίτων masc.? The same question arises with regard to τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων, 17, and τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δεύτεροις.

18. In the passage of the Laws, the substance of which Aristotle is here reproducing (756 B sqq.), Plato has ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων, ἐκ τῶν δεύτερων τιμημάτων, ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων, and lastly ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου τιμημάτος, and if he changes without apparent cause from the plural to the singular, it is possible that Aristotle, who has hitherto used the singular (τοῦ πρώτου τιμήματος, τοῦ δεύτερου τιμήματος, 15 sq.), may change from the singular to the plural. It is, however, also possible that τῶν τρίτων may be masc., and mean ‘the members of the third class.’

17. πλὴν οὐ πάσιν ἐπάναγκες ἢν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων. Here again the doubt arises whether τιμημάτων should be supplied with τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων, or whether these words are of the masculine gender. Πάσιν has universally been taken to agree with τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων, and if we thus take it, τιμημάτων must be supplied, and the meaning of the sentence will be, ‘but Plato did not make voting compulsory [in elections from the third class] on all the members of the third and fourth classes.’ This is a strange
way of expressing the fact that Plato compelled the three higher classes alone to vote in elections from the third, and it is not surprising that extensive alterations have been suggested in the MS. text. But is it absolutely certain that πᾶσιν agrees with τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἡ τετάρτων? May not the meaning of the passage be—

't but Plato did not make voting compulsory on all in the case of those elected from the thirds or fourths,' or, if we supply τιμημάτων, 'from the third or fourth classes'? For the dative τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἡ τετάρτων, if we understand it thus, cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 34, τοῖς ἀλλαῖς τέχναις ('in the case of other arts'), and [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 5, ἐνοικί τῶν ἄνθρωπων, and see Bon. Ind. 166 b 26–38. Πᾶσιν is no more bound to be in agreement with τοῖς κ.τ.λ. than ταύτησι with τῆς ἡγεμονίας in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 22–23: see for other instances of the same thing de Part. An. 4. 9. 685 a 9: 3. 1. 662 a 9. If, however, the interpretation of τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἡ τετάρτων which I have ventured to suggest should be thought inadmissible, I would propose the omission of τοῖς: αἱρεῖσθαι will then need to be supplied, as in the next sentence. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus, and Qu. Crit. p. 370 sqq., for the emendations which have been already proposed. As to ἡς, cp. 1. 12. 1259 a 37.

18. ἐκ δὲ [τοῦ τετάρτου] τῶν τετάρτων. The probability is that τοῦ τετάρτου and τῶν τετάρτων are alternative readings, which have been by some misadventure admitted together into the text. See critical note for other instances of the same thing. It is hardly conceivable that Aristotle wrote 'from the fourth class of the fourths,' and the only remaining alternative is to adopt Victorius' conjecture of τῶν τετάρτων, which Sepulveda found in some MSS.—there also probably a conjectural emendation.

19. ἐκ τούτων, 'from the persons so elected.'

20. οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους. These words seem to go together as the subject of the sentence. For οἱ ἐκ τ. μ. τιμημάτων, cp. Plato, Laws 756 D, τῶν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ τρίτου τιμήματος ... τῶν δ' ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πρώτου. Βελτίους, 'the more respectable': cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 36. That these words refer not to the elected but to the electors, is evident from Plato's use of them; besides, the μεγίστα τιμήματα (i.e. the first and second, 13) will number in the Boulé exactly as many representatives as the third and fourth. Not only most of the magistrates will belong to the well-to-do classes (1266 a 12), but also most of the voters in the election of members of the Boulé.

23. τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, 'the constitution of which we have spoken,' i.e. τὴν ἄριστην, 1266 a 2. The conclusion here arrived at
is considered by Aristotle to be established, partly by what he has said in 1266 a 3, and partly by the failure of Plato to construct his State in the way in which he had announced that it ought to be constructed. We need not infer from 1266 a 4, that the best constitution of Aristotle will be a compound of more constitutions than two; all that Aristotle says is, that a constitution compounded of more than two is better than a constitution compounded of two only. It is evident from the passage before us, as well as from the commencement of the Second Book, that Aristotle is looking forward to an inquiry as to the best constitution.

26. καὶ περὶ τῆς αἰρεσιν τῶν ἀρχῶνων, i.e., as well as in the election of members of the Boulê. For in the election of the Boulê, though Aristotle has not fully described it in the passage before us, the process laid down by Plato is threefold (Laws 7,6 B sqq.):—first, an equal number of individuals is to be nominated by election from each class in the manner he prescribes: next, all the citizens are to select out of those thus nominated 180 persons from each class: thirdly, half of these are to be taken by lot. Thus Plato’s scheme for the election of the Boulê is one which involves τὰ ἑξὶν αἰρετῶν αἱρετῶν, and Aristotle implies by καὶ that this is a perilous way of electing a Boulê. Plato employs the same method in the selection of the Nomophylakes, Laws 7,53.


28. τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. Aristotle does not meddle with the laws which occupy so large a part of the dialogue (1265 a 1), because his aim is to show that the constitution sketched in it is unsatisfactory, and that there is still room for an effort to suggest a better.

31. πολιτεία. Bern. ‘Verfassungsentwürfe.’ Aristotle refers to C. 7. constitutional schemes, not to actual constitutions like those of Solon and Lycurgus.

The word ἰδιώτης is used by Aristotle both in contrast with such terms as ἀρχήν (6 (4), 16. 1300 b 21) or οἱ τὰ κοινὰ πράττοντες καὶ πολιτευόμενοι (4 (7), 2. 1324 b 1), and in contrast with οἱ ἐλθόντες (3, 11. 1282 a 11: cp. Plato, Soph. 221 C, Protag. 322 C). Here both these contrasts seem to be combined: we find the former of the two in c. 11. 1273 a 35 and c. 12. 1273 b 29. The distinction of the ἰδιώτης and the philosopher survives in Cicero (Vict. quotes
pro Sestio 51. 110) and in Epictetus (Arrian, Epictet. 3. 19)—
see Grote, Plato 3. 130 n.

33. καὶ καθ' ὃς κ.τ.λ. Vict. 'est quasi declaratio antecedentis illius nominis.'

34. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. We read of the Cynic Diogenes in Diog. Laert. 6. 72, ἐλεγε δὲ καὶ κοινὲς εἶναι δεῖν τὰς γυναῖκας, γυμνὸν μηθένα νομίζων, ἀλλὰ τὸν πείσαντα τῇ πεισάσῃ (πεισδέίης conj. H. Stephanus) συνείναι κοινῶς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοὺς νυός: but if this view was expressed in the Πολιτεία which passed under his name (Diog. L. 6. 80: Henkel, Studien p. 9), Aristotle knows nothing of it. The work must either have been spurious or of a later date than this passage. Zeno of Citium taught a community of women among the wise in his Πολιτεία (Diog. L. 7. 131), and was followed by Chrysippus (ibid.), but this would be after the time of Aristotle. The Ecclestazusea of Aristophanes was not a Πολιτεία. Aristotle, however, mentions in 2. 3. 1262 a 19 sqq. that some Libyans had women in common, and he might have mentioned other instances of this, just as he notices the customs of some barbarous tribes in relation to community of property (c. 5. 1263 a 1 sqq.): see for instance Hdt. 4. 104, and Strabo's report (p. 302) of the stories of Ephorus about some Scythian tribes—ἐίτε αὐτολογεῖ διότι ταῖς διαίταις εὐτελεῖς ὄντες καὶ οὐ χρηματισταῖ πρὸς τε ἄλληνες εὐνομοῦνται, κοινὰ πάντα ἔχοντες τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τέκνα καὶ τὴν ὅλην συγγένειαν, πρὸς τε τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὤμαυοι εἶσι καὶ ἀνίκητος, οὐδὲν ἔχοντες ὑπὲρ οὐ δουλεύουσι. Cp. also Ephor. Fr. 53 and Strabo p. 775. Euripides in the Protesilaus (Fr. 655 Nauck) had made one of his characters say,

Κοινὸν γὰρ εἶναι χρήν γυνακείων λέχος:

indeed, we are told by Polybius, that among the Lacedaemonians καὶ πάτρων ἦν καὶ σύνθες τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἔχειν τὴν γυναίκα καὶ τέκταρας, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ πλείους ἀδέλφους ὄντας, καὶ τὰ τέκνα τούτων εἶναι κοινὰ (12. 6 b, 8 Hultsch). In c. 12. 1274 b 9, the plan of a community in property as well as in women and children is spoken of as special (ἵππον) to Plato; here only the latter.

36. ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄρχονται. The authors of constitutional schemes before the time of Plato seem to have made their special care the supply of the necessary wants of their citizens. (It is not clear how far this is true of Hippodamus.) Plato, though he too attaches great importance to questions relating to property (Laws 736 C sqq.), did not lose sight of higher things. Cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27, where τὰ ἀναγκαῖα are contrasted with τὰ εἰς εὐσχήμωσιν καὶ περιουσίαν and are said to be attended to first. Plato has some remarks in Laws 630 E on the way in which the legislators of his
own day approached their task. For ἄρχονται, cp. de Sensu 1. 436 a 19—b 1: Top. 1. 14. 105 b 12—15. Their starting-point was also their main point, as the next sentence shows. Cp. Isocr. Areopag. §§ 44—45.

38. ποιεῖναι. We have ποιεῖνι στάνων, 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 4, but ποιεῖναι τὰς ἐπιθέσεις, 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 20, and στασιωτικῶς πορταμένων τὴν κοιλιστίν, 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 38. See on phrases of this kind Shilleto, Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 103, where he says—‘any verb in Greek may be resolved into the cognate substantive with ποιεῖναι.’

39. τοῦτ’ perhaps means the regulation of property with a view to prevent civil discord. Bern. ‘dahin zielende Vorschläge.’ Others, who must probably be earlier in date than Phaleas (for he is contrasted with τῶν πῖλαις τινές in 1266 b 16), e.g. Pheidon the Corinthian (c. 6. 1265 b 12), had sought to regulate property. According to Henkel, Studien p. 36, who refers to Roscher, Thucydidès p. 247, Ann. 1, Phaleas was an older contemporary of Plato.

40. τὸς κτήσεως, ‘landed property’ (1267 b 9), as in c. 6. 1265 a 38 and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18.

1. κατοικιζομένως is probably not to be taken with χαλεπῶν, but 1266 b. rather in the sense of ‘for,’ or possibly ‘in the case of.’

οὐ χαλεπῶν ὑπέτο. It would seem from this that even in the foundation of colonies unequal lots of land were often given. Πόλεις must be supplied here and πόλεις in the next line. This is a word which Aristotle often omits: thus πόλεις has to be supplied in c. 9. 1269 a 34: τὴν πόλιν in c. 11. 1272 b 31: πόλεις in 8 (6).

4. 1319 a 37 and 3. 6. 1278 b 12.

τὸς δ’ ἡδή κατοικισμένας sc. πόλεις ὀμαλίζειν. Cp. for this phrase Rhet. 3. 11. 1412 a 16, καὶ τὸ ἀνωμολίαθα τὰς πόλεις.

3. τῷ τάς προῖκας κ.τ.λ. Rich men were to give dowries when their daughters married poor men, but not to accept them from the parents of the bride, if poor, when they or their sons married. Poor men were never to give dowries, but only to receive them. Aristotle does not criticise this regulation, but it appears to make it the interest of rich fathers to marry their daughters to rich men; thus it tends to defeat its own object. An additional regulation compelling rich families to intermarry with poor ones would seem to be needed. This scheme of equalizing landed property by regulations as to dowries implies that dowries were often given in land, and also that they were often large, as we know from other sources that they were. We see also that poor fathers commonly gave dowries as well as rich ones. Plato abolishes dowries
altogether in the Laws (742 C: 774 C). Vict. remarks, 'in mentem hoc etiam venit Megadoro Plautino,' and quotes Plaut. Aulul. 3. 5. 4:

Nam meo quidem animo, si idem faciunt ceteri
Opulentiores, pauperiorum filias
Ut indotatas ducant uxores domum:
Et multo fiat civitas concordior
Et invidia nos minore utamur quam utimur,
Et illae malam rem metuant, quam metuunt, magis,
Et nos minore sumptu simus quam sumus.

The absence of a dowry, however, would be much felt by the wife, owing to the facility of divorce in Greece: cp. Menand. Sentent. 371, νώμφη δ' ἀπροκος οὐκ ἔχει παρρησιάν, and see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqiq. 3. § 30. 16, who quotes this line. See also vol. i. p. 171 sq.

12. ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ., 'the abrogation of the law must of necessity follow': 'neque enim pati poterunt patres filios suos esurire' (Vict.). Some render λύσθαι 'be broken,' but the following passages, collected by Bonitz (Ind. 439 a 5) — 2. 8. 1269 a 15: 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 10: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 31 — seem to point rather to 'abrogation' as the meaning. Cp. also c. 8. 1268 b 30, νόμον λύσιν ἂν ποιήσαι, and 1269 a 15, τὸ δὲ ἐδίζειν εὐχέρως λύειν τοὺς νόμους φαίλων.


14. διότι, 'that.'

μὲν οὖν here, as in 1265 b 29 and elsewhere, introduces an admission which lends emphasis to the criticism introduced by ἀλλά, 24. What the main value of equality of property is, appears from c. 9. 1270 a 38. Another useful effect of laws of this kind is mentioned in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 6 sqq.


_ëxei tina dúnamen eis tìn politikìn koivnìan._ For this use of eis, cp. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 20, ósa eis tìn politieian fírei.

16. _fainontai diegynokítes_, ‘clearly have recognized’: see note on 1261 a 9.

17. _Sólovi._ To what law of Solon’s does this refer? C. F. Hermann (Gr. Antiq. 1. § 106. 12) and E. Curtius (Gr. Hist. 1. 329 E. T.) take it as referring to some law fixing a maximum limit to the acquisition of land, but Grote (Gr. Hist. 3. 182, ed. 3) thinks that ‘the passage does not bear out such an opinion.’ He seems to hold that Aristotle here only refers to Solon’s ‘annulment of the previous mortgages,’ and to the Seisachtheia generally. The former view is probably correct, but in any case Solon’s legislation is evidently conceived by Aristotle to have tended to an equality of property. It is deserving of notice that no mention is made of the equality of landed property which Lycurgus is alleged by some authorities to have instituted.

παρ’ ἄλλους. Laws of this nature appear at one time to have existed at Thurii (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 29 sq.) and elsewhere (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 6 sqq.). On the other hand, Polybius remarks as to Crete (6. 46. 1, quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiq. 3. § 63. 16), tìn te γὰρ χώραν κατὰ δύναμιν αὐτοῖς ἐφίσσιν οἱ νόμοι, τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον, εἰς ἀπειρὸν κτάσθαι. The Licinian Law at Rome probably imposed a limit only on the occupation (possessiv) of the public land.

19. _Aσκρόις._ According to Büchenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 32 n., the Italian Locrians are meant, and the law was probably among those ascribed to Zaleucus. It appears, unlike the rest, to have applied to property generally (owía), and not merely to land.

21. ἕτε δὲ κ.τ.λ. It seems better to supply νόμος ἐστὶ from 17, 19 with ἀδισώζειν than to supply some word from κωλίονειν (19) with the opposite meaning of ‘enjoin.’ Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 10, ἢν δὲ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐν πολλαίς πάλεσι νεομοθετημένον μηδὲ πωλεῖν ἑξείναι τοῖς πρώτοις κλήροις. A special protection was given in the Lacedaemonian State to the ‘original share,’ if we may trust Heraclid. Pont. de Rebuspublicis 2. 7, πωλεῖν δὲ γὰρ ἀκεδαμικοῖς αἰσχρῶν νεομόστατα τὴν δ’ ἀρχαίας μοίρας υπὲρ ἑξείσως. Aristotle approves the discouragement by the Lacedaemonian lawgiver of the sale of landed property (if that is the meaning of ἡ ὑπάρχουσα [γῆ?], c. 9. 1270 a 20: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 13, τὸ μὴ δανίζειν εἰς τὶ μέρος τὴν ὑπαρχούσης ἐκάστῳ γῆς). Pheidon the Corinthian, again, had sought to keep the number of landowners the same. These legislators appear to have endeavoured, like Plato in the Laws, to secure each household in the possession of the original lot. The motive probably was
partly a wish to prevent the impoverishment of old-established households and the civil troubles which were apt to follow, partly a wish to prop up an oligarchical régime, for Plato (Rep. 552 A, 556 A) notices prohibitions of alienation as a means, though one too rarely resorted to, of preserving oligarchies, concentration of wealth in a few hands being regarded by him as commonly the cause of their displacement by democracies.

22. καὶ περὶ Λευκάδα, i. e. 'at Leucas to name one instance,' as in i. 12. 1259 b 8. As to περὶ Λευκάδα, see Bon. Ind. 579 a 29 sqq.

23. οὖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The meaning apparently is that men became admissible to office on the strength of half a lot or less, an arrangement suitable enough to an agricultural democracy like Aphytis (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 14 sqq.), but not suitable to an oligarchy, because poor men came to hold office.


33. παίδειας. A remarkable view, probably suggested by Spartan precedents: cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 21, οὖν πρῶτον τὸ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τῶν παιδῶν ὀμοίως γὰρ οἱ τῶν πλουσίων τρέφονται τοῖς τῶν πενήτων, καὶ παιδεύονται τῶν τρόπων τούτων ὦν ἄν δύναμτο καὶ τῶν πενήτων οἱ παιδεῖς ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐχομένης ἡλικίας, καὶ ὅταν ἄνδρες γένωνται, τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων, οὐδὲν γὰρ διάδηλος ὁ πλούσιος καὶ ὁ πενίς. Aristotle is quite with him in this matter (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 21 sqq.).

36. τοιαύτην ἔξ ἡς. See above on 1257 b 15, and cp. 1267 a 24.

38. ἐτι, for which Spengel and Sus. would read ἐπεί, Sus. 3 ὅτι ?, seems defensible. 'The meaning is—' besides, you need to deal with office in addition to equalizing property, for στάσις is occasioned not only, as Phaleas and his school think, by questions about property, but also by questions about office. It is as great a trial to a man of high capacity to have to share office equally with his inferiors as it is to a poor man to be starved.' Compare Jason's saying (3. 4. 1277 a 24), that it was starvation to him not to be a tyrant. Cp. also Stob. Flor. 45. 21, ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν Ἀριστοτέλους διατριβῶν αἱ πλέονται στάσεις διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἐν ταῖς πόλεις γίγνονται, περὶ τυμῆ γὰρ οίχι οἱ τυχόντες, ἀλλ' οἱ δυνατῶτατοι διαμαφώσοντοι.

1. 3. 1095 b 22, οἱ δὲ χαριέτες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμὴν [προαιροῦνται], and Pol. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 9, where this quality in the rulers is treated as a security that they will not plunder or outrage the ruled.

Εν δὲ ἡ κ. τ. Α. Hom. II. 9. 319 is quoted to support by the authority of Homer what has just been said as to the feeling of οἱ χαριέτες. Cp. Plato, Laws 756 E, δὸλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ δεσπόται οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο φίλοι εἰς τοὺς ἱσαις τιμίας διαφορεῖσθαι φιάλοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι: Eth. Eud. 2. 3. 1221 b 1: and the remarks on constitutions placed by Isocrates in the mouth of Nicoles (Isocr. Nicoles § 14 sqq.).

2. οὐ μόνον δ'. Here there is a transition from σταυρίζοντες, 1266 b 38 to ἀδίκοσειν, 3—from men as citizens to men as moral beings. As inequality of property is not the only cause of civil discord, so neither is it the only cause of ἀδικία. Aristippus had apparently anticipated a part of what Aristotle says in the passage which follows: see Plutarch, de Cupiditate Divitiarum, c. 3. 524 A sqq., a passage which I do not notice in Mullach's collection of the Sententiae et Apophthegmata of Aristippus in the Fragmenta Philosoporum Graecorum. Compare also Cic. de Offic. 1. 7. 24. 1. 8. 26 (referred to by Giph. p. 217).

3. διὰ τάναγκαια ἀδικοσεῖν, ἵνα ἄκος. "Ἀκος τιμῶς, genetivo vel id significatur quod avertitur, Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 26, vel id quod expetitur, Pol. 2. 7. 1267 a 3. 9: 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32′ (Bon. Ind. 26 b 50 sq.). For this second meaning of the word ἄκος (‘a means of obtaining’), see Liddell and Scott s.v., and cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32, ἄκος δὲ τοῦ ἶ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἵ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἢττον τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φίρειν τοῖς ἄρχοντας, and 2. 11. 1273 b 23, φάρμακον τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ. Bonitz, it will be seen, explains ἄκος as ‘a means of obtaining’ both here and in 9, and there is much to be said for this view. But on the whole I incline, with the commentators generally, to give it in these two passages its more usual meaning of ‘remedy’ (Sus. 'Gegenmittel'). ἰνα ἔως ὁ will then refer, not to τῶν ἀναγκάων, but to ἀδικημάτων, which must be supplied from ἀδικοσεῖν. The view of Phaleas was probably shared by many: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sq. and [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 5.

4. ὃστε . . . πεινῶν explains ἵνα ἄκος: ‘the result being that no one will be driven to steal clothes by cold and hunger.'

5. διόσ . . . ἐπιθυμῶσιν. Χαίρωσι is introduced here and not before, because when a man satisfies an absolute need, though he feels pleasure (see de Part. An. 4. 11. 690 b 26–691 a 5), yet pleasure is not his aim. Compare the distinction drawn between μὴ ἀλγεῖν and χαίρειν in Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1225 a 24: cp. also Rhet.
1. 12. 1372 b 24, ἀδικοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα τοὺς ἔχοντας ὃν αὐτῷ ἐνδεῖς ἢ εἰς τάναγκαία ἢ εἰς ὑπεροχήν ἢ εἰς ὑπόλαυσιν.

ἐὰν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This passage would be much simplified, if ἀδικοῖοι were substituted for ἐπιθυμοῖοι in 8, but it is perhaps possible to elicit a satisfactory sense from it as it stands. Taking it as it stands, I incline to translate as follows—'for if men have a desire going beyond mere necessaries, they will commit wrongful acts to cure it: nay, not only to cure a desire of this nature, for they may desire superfluities with a view to experiencing painless pleasures.' I follow Lamb. and Bern. in my rendering of διὰ ταῦτην. Sepulveda translates these words 'medendi gratia,' apparently interpreting ταῦτην as = ἱστρείαν, not τὴν ταῦτη ταυτείαν: it would also be possible to supply τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν with ταῦτην. For μείζω ἐπιθυμιάν τῶν ἀναγκαίων (i.e. μείζῳ ἐπιθυμιάν τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων), cp. c. 10. 1272 a 28, χείρον τῶν ἐφόρων (i.e. χείρον ἡ τὰ τῶν ἐφόρων), and see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 781 d. For ὁτούν, cp. Xen. Anab. 7. 6. 19, συνεπόμενων μηδὲ ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ ἔλαβον εὐληφθέναι, μὴ τούτων μηδὲ ὅσα τῶν λοχαγῶν ἵναι, and Demosth. de Cor. cc. 107, 244. What pleasures are meant by 'painless pleasures,' appears from Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 16, ἄλτου γὰρ εἰσὶν αὐτὶ τα μαθηματικαὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αὐτὰ διὰ τῆς ὀυφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροίματα δὲ καὶ ὀράματα πολλὰ καὶ μνήμα καὶ εὐπίθεια καὶ δειπνέων καὶ de Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 7 sq. Isocrates (ad Demon. §§ 46–47) is already acquainted with the distinction. It has long been noticed that painless pleasures are elsewhere said by Aristotle not to be accompanied by desire (Eth. Nic. 7. 13. 1152 b 36, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις εἰσὶν ἠδονίς, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν θεωρεῖν εὔρεσιν, τῆς φύσεως ὡς ἐνδεέος ὑπνής: 3. 14. 1119 a 4, μετὰ λύπης ἡ ἐπιθυμία: Eth. End. 2. 10. 1225 b 30, ἐπὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ μὲν καὶ θυμοῦ ἑλει μετὰ λύπης). Still an ἐπιθυμία τοῦ θεάσασθαι is spoken of in Rhet. i. ii. 1370 a 25 sq., and an ἐπιθυμία μαθήσεως in Eth. Nic. 3. 3. 1111 a 31. But here perhaps the question hardly arises, even if we retain ἐπιθυμοῖον, for the desire spoken of in the passage before us is not a desire for the painless pleasures themselves, but for the superfluities through which men sometimes mistakenly seek them. If this is so, it would seem to be unnecessary to adopt any of the emendations of the words καὶ ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖοι which have been suggested with the view of meeting this difficulty, among which may be noticed that of Schneider, καὶ ἄν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν, that of Bojesen, whom Sus. follows, καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ καὶ ἄνεπιθυμήσατο (cp. Clem. Al. Strom. vii. p. 742 A, B), and that of Bernays, who omits ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖοι. With the account here given of the motives of ἀδικία, compare (in addition to the passage from the Rhetoric

9. τι οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; For Bonitz’ interpretation of ἄκος, see above on 3. The last three words have been translated in many different ways. Lamb, supplies ‘malorum,’ Vict. ‘fomitum,’ Sepulv. and Giph. ‘cupiditatum.’ Susemihl translates, ‘in allen diesen drei Fällen’: Bernays, ‘für diese drei Klassen.’ Others supply ἀδικημίωτων, and, I incline to think, rightly (cp. 16, πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας Βασιλείας). If we take this view, the translation will be, ‘what then is the remedy for these three kinds of wrong-doing?’ The three are (1) wrong-doing for the sake of absolute necessaries; (2) wrong-doing for the sake of superfluities with a view to curing painful desire and obtaining pleasure; (3) wrong-doing for the sake of superfluities with a view to obtaining painless pleasure.

11. δὲ αὐτῶν χαίρειν. We expect, not δὲ αὐτῶν χαίρειν, but χαίρειν ταῖς ἀνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς: Aristotle, however, seems to say that those seekers for painless pleasure who desire to be independent of others for their enjoyment will ask the aid of philosophy, for all other pleasures save that of philosophy (αι ἄλλα, 12) presuppose the assistance of other human beings. He does not absolutely deny that ἵππολαι are a means to some sorts of painless pleasure; a tyrant, for instance, may use his power over other men to provide himself with exquisite sculpture or music; but those seekers after painless pleasure who desire to be independent of others will go to philosophy for it (cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 a 27 sqq.).

12. ἐπεὶ ἀδικοῦσι γε κ.τ.λ. ‘Other remedies, in short, besides that of Phaethus, are necessary, for...’ For ἐπεὶ... γε, cp. 1. 5. 1254 b 34: 1. 6. 1255 a 19. In the passage before us ἐπεὶ... γε introduces an evident fact adduced in support of the unexpressed conclusion to which the preceding sentences point—the conclusion that to remove the occasions of ἀδικία something more than a due supply of the necessaries of life is requisite—training, in fact, both moral and intellectual. Both these kinds of training tend to wean the mind from the pursuit of excess—τὰς ἱππολαῖς, i.e. an excess of wealth, power, glory, and the like (4 (7). 1. 1323 a 37–38), or an excess of other goods such as wine and good living (Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1154 a 15 sqq., referred to by Congreve)—the one by limiting the desires, the other by affording pleasures attainable without command over other human beings; and it is through a craving for excess that men come to commit the worst offences. Men become tyrants, for instance, when they are not content with
the honours and emoluments of citizen-rulers (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 7); and how great the tyrant’s crime may be gathered from the high honours paid to the tyrannicide.

14. καὶ αἱ τιμαί, 'the honours, as well as the crime the punishment of which they reward.'

15. For the place of οὖ, see Bon. Ind. 539 a 5 sqq.

17. ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείαι. Cp. c. 5. 1264 a 11.

ἐτι κ.τ.λ. Compare the criticism passed on Plato’s Laws in c. 6. 1265 a 18 sqq. Ephorus had already insisted that it is as necessary for a State to possess the qualities which enable it to repel attacks from without as the internal concord (ἁμορφονία) which secures it from στάσεις (Diod, 7. 14, 3-4, cp. Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 480), and Aristotle in a similar spirit (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq.) now goes on to point out that it is necessary to take considerations of national security into account, not only in framing the constitution, but also in reference to the question of the amount of property to be possessed by the members of the State, for if this is too small—and perhaps Aristotle imputes to Phaleas a leaning in this direction, though the latter had said nothing definite—the State will hardly be a match for States similar to itself, while, if the amount is too large, States superior to it in power may well be tempted to attack it. (It is interesting to notice that a Greek State might be too poor to resist attack. In Aristotle’s day (4 (7). 11. 1331 a 1 sqq.) the matériel of war had become elaborate and costly.) Thus an ὁποῖς τῆς οὐσίας is necessary, as he had already said in 1266 b 27; he returns, in fact, to this point, reasserting it on grounds of national security, whereas in the intervening passage, 1266 b 28–1267 a 17, his aim had been to show the insufficiency of even a correct ὁποῖς τῆς οὐσίας without a correct education. Down to 1267 a 37 Aristotle in criticizing Phaleas seeks in the main to point out the latter’s errors of omission—he ought to have regulated τεκνοποιία, to have fixed an ὁποῖς τῆς οὐσίας, to have satisfied the Few as well as the Many, to have instituted a given kind of education, to have taken the security of the State into account: in 1267 a 37–1267 b 9, on the other hand, he deals directly with Phaleas’ panacea for στάσεις, and points out how small is its value, indicating at the same time the true remedy. Thus the passage 1267 a 17–37 finds an appropriate place where it stands in the text: to place 1267 a 37–b 13 before it (with Susemihl) as an alternative version of 1266 b 38–1267 a 17 (which it does not seem to me to be) is, surely, to disturb the sequence of the criticisms contained in this chapter. For τὰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς πολιτεύονται καλῶς,
2. 7. 1267 a 14—31.

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cp. Polyb. 6. 46. 8, Ἕκαται δακταλικοῖς ... καλλίστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ πρῶτο σφίς αὐτοῖς πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ συμφορεῖν.

19. For the contrast implied in καὶ πρῶτοι γειτνώτας καὶ τοῖς ἐξωθεὶς πάντας, cp. 4 (7). II. 1330 b 35 sqq. and Thuc. 1. 80. 3.

22. τὰς πολιτικὰς χρήσεις. Vict. 'domesticos usus': cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 8, where, as here, it is contrasted with πολιμία (the sense of πολιτικῶν in c. 6. 1265 a 22 is quite different). Here (cp. 18) the political activities of fellow-citizens in relation to each other are referred to. The citizens of a State must possess a due amount of property (3. 12. 1283 a 17: cp. also 2. 11. 1273 a 24).

24. τοσσοῦτον ... ἄν. See Vahlen, Aristotel. Aufsätze 2. 21 n., and cp. 1266 b 36. Thasos was a case in point. As to its wealth, see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens E. T. p. 311. 'The Thasians were compelled to defend their gold mines on the continent from theupidity of Athens, which perhaps claimed them as a conquest won from the Persians' (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 3. 6). Samos also suffered for its fertility in a similar way (Strabo, p. 637).

οἱ πληγὸι καὶ κρείττοις. Cp. 1266 a 20, οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίων, and 1263 b 5, τὸ χαράσσεσθαι καὶ βοηθήσαι.

25. ἀμύνειν with the acc. seems to occur but rarely in the writings of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s.v. and Mr. Ridgeway, Camb. Philol. Trans. 2. 132), but it is less infrequent in those of Plato (see Ast, Lexicon Platon. s.v.).

28. μέν οὖν ('it is true,' as in 1265 a 17) prepares the way for, and lends increased emphasis to, δεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. I take the meaning of the passage to be—'Abundant wealth is advantageous' (why it is so, we learn from 1267 a 22—24: cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 17 sq.: 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33): 'therefore, let us ask abundant wealth for the State, only stopping short of that excessive amount which suffices of itself to attract attack on the part of stronger States, apart from any other causes of war.' Cp. Poet. 7. 1451 a 3, ὡστε δεὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐφων ἐχεῖν μὲν μέγεθος, τούτῳ δὲ εἰσίνυστον εἰναι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθῳ ἐχεῖν μὲν μήκος, τούτῳ δὲ εἰμιημό-νευτον εἰναι.

31. οὕτως ὡς ἐν κ.τ.λ., 'but only under circumstances under which they would go to war, even if' etc. In the anecdote which follows Aristotle's principle finds illustration and confirmation. The wealth of Atarneus was not out of proportion to its defensibility. It was not considerable enough to lead stronger States, not influenced by other motives for attacking it, to attack it in the hope of gain, for a long continuance of costly operations would be necessary for its
reduction. Atarneus was a renowned stronghold, like Pergamon in the same region. As to Eubulus, see Boeckh, Hermias von Atarneus (Ges. Kl. Schriften, 6. 183 sqq.), and Sus.², Note 247. He was a wealthy Bithynian money-changer, who had got possession of two strong places on the coast of Asia Minor, Atarneus and Assos, at a time when the Persian Empire was falling to pieces. The crisis in his fortunes referred to here must have occurred before he was succeeded—about 352 B.C. according to Boeckh, but certainly not later than 347 B.C.—by Hermias. Boeckh places it as early as 359 B.C. (Ol. 105. 1), when the Persians under Autophradates were operating in this region against the revolted satrap Artabazus. Aristotle, being a friend of Hermias, would be well acquainted with the history of Eubulus, and also with the neighbourhood of Atarneus. For other illustrations derived from this part of the world, see the references in Bon. Ind. 662 b 61 sqq. Autophradates remained a conspicuous Persian leader till 332 B.C., when he disappears from the scene (A. Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 3. 169).

35. ἡδη, 'on the spot.'
37. ἐστι μὲν οὐν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν, which is here answered by οὐ μὴν, introduces a summing up on the merits of Phales' scheme, which is no longer criticised for not being accompanied by other measures, but considered in itself. Susemihl regards ἐστι, 37—αἰδικώνται, 1267 b 8, as a repetition or alternative version of 1266 b 38—1267 a 17, but it hardly seems to repeat 1267 a 2—17, for this passage refers to αἰδικία, not to στάσις, and its teaching does not agree with 1266 b 38—1267 a 2, for there we are led to infer that equality of property would be a remedy for στάσις, so far as the mass of men are concerned, whereas here we are told that the desires of the many are boundless and that a mere sufficiency will fail permanently to satisfy them.


40. καί φαίνονται. Not only are the χαρίειτες likely to feel irritation, but as a matter of fact they visibly make attacks, etc. (cp. c. 3. 1262 a 18).

1267 b. 1. ἀπληστον. Cp. Isocr. de Pace, § 7, where Solon, Fragm. 13. 71 sqq. is in the writer's mind.
2. διωβολία. The form found in Attic Inscriptions is διωβελία (so too ἐπωβελία, ἡμιωβελίαν, δεξελίσκος, δεξελία), though they have τριώβολον, πεντώβολον, δεκάβολον, and the old form δεκλός only once (and that before B.C. 444) takes the place of the usual δεκλός (Meisterhans,
Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 9). All the MSS., however, have ἐνωθαλία here. See Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens E., T. p. 216 sqq., where the fact noticed by Aristotle is fully illustrated. Here, as is often the case in the Politics, Athens is glanced at without being referred to by name.

πάτριον, 'a settled, traditional thing.'

3. For ἔως without ἄν with the subj., see Bon. Ind. 307 b 38.

5. τῶν τοιούτων, 'the before-mentioned things': i.e. τοῦ μη στα- σιάζειν πρὸς ἄλλους καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄνει διέθαι τοῦ πλείων (or τοῦ μη πλεονεκτεῖν, 7). 'Ἀρχή, which has called forth many emendations, seems to be used in the sense of 'source': cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 4 : 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 7 : Meteor. 1. 14. 351 a 26, ἀρχή δὲ τούτων καὶ αἵτων κ.τ.λ. For the thought, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 1 sqq. : 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 6 sqq. Compare also Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 16, and the answer of the Pythia to Lycurgus, when he enquired, 'by the establishment of what kind of usages (πώς νύμμα) he would most benefit the Spartans'—ἐὰν τοῖς μὲν καλῶς ἥγεσθαι τοὺς δὲ πειθαρχεῖν νομοθέτησῃ (Diod. 7. 14. 2).

6. ἐπιείκεις . . . φαύλους. Vict. 'honestiores et humiliiores.'

13. ἦ ('aut certe,' Bon. Ind. 313 a 26) τάξιν τινὰ μετρίαν, 'some moderate maximum.'

14. Is ἐκ to be taken with φαίνεται (as Vict. takes it) or with κατασκευάζειν (as Bern.)? Probably with the former. 'It is evident from the legislation of Phaleas that he constructs his State (or citizen-body) on a small scale': cp. Meteor. 2. 2. 354 b 15, ἐκ ταύτης δὴ τῆς ὑπορίας καὶ ἀρχῆς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπάθειν εἰναι καὶ τοῦ παιτῶν ἐδοξοὺς ἡ διάλεξις. For τὴν πώλιν (Vict. 'ordo civium'), cp. c. 8. 1267 b 30 and 3. 1. 1274 b 41.

15. Phaleas seems to have been as unfavourable to the τεχνίται—a far wider term than our 'artisans,' for we hear of τεχνίται who were favourites of tyrants, 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 4—as Hippodamus was the reverse. Hippodamus, himself one of the class, brings them within the citizen-body (c. 8. 1267 b 32); Phaleas makes them public slaves. The βάπανασι τεχνίται, as we learn from 3. 5. 1278 a 6 sq., were in early times in not a few States either slaves or aliens, and this continued to be the case to a large extent down to the time of Aristotle. But Phaleas wished them to be public slaves. We do not learn why he proposed this. When Xenophon proposed in the De Vectigalibus (4. 23) that the Athenian State should invest in 1200 public slaves, and let them out for service in the mines of Laurium, his aim was to increase the revenue of the State. The scheme of Phaleas would obviously have this effect,
for it would secure the State a monopoly of skilled labour, but
whether the object of Phaleas was to enrich the State, is perhaps
doubtful. More probably, he wished to keep down an aspiring
class, the members of which often acquired considerable wealth
(3. 5. 1278 a 24) and would be likely to overshadow or even to
buy up his cherished class of small landowners, to say nothing
of the difficulty of fixing a maximum to their income. Aristotle,
we see, recoils from the strong measure of making all τεξνηται
public slaves, but he seems to be willing that οἱ τὰ κοινὰ ἔργαζόμενοι
(cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 36, κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν κοινῶν) should be
so. Does this mean ‘all workers on public land, buildings, and
property’ or ‘all τεξνηται employed on public property’? It is
not clear: perhaps the latter is the more probable interpreta-
tion, though, as a matter of fact, Aristotle does make the cul-
tivators of the public land in his own ideal State public slaves
(4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31). In any case he adds the proviso that even
this measure must be carried into effect in a certain way, if it is
to have his approval. Diodorus describes (11. 25. 2 sqq.) how the
cities of Sicily, and especially Agrigentum, employed the multi-
tude of Libyan and Carthaginian captives taken after Gelon’s
victory at Himera in all sorts of public works (αἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰς
πέδαις κατέστησαν τοὺς διαμεθύνεσαν αἰχμαλώτους καὶ τὰ δημόσια τῶν ἔργων
diα τούτων ἐπισκεύαζον κ.τ.λ.). The work was no doubt cheaply
executed, and this would be one of the advantages of employing
public slaves for this purpose. Another would be that work would
be executed more rapidly and efficiently than if, in accordance
with the usual method, a contractor (ἐργολάβος) was employed:
see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 42. 8 (ed. 2). Plato, it may be
noted, includes ἐργολάβοι among the indications of a φλεγμαίνουσα
πόλις (Rep. 373 B). On the system of ἐργολαβεία or ἐργοννία, see
C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 69. 15 (ed. 2), or in the later edition
by Thalheim, Rechtsalt. p. 99. 1, and Dittenberger, Syloge Inscr. Gr.
2. 481 sqq., 507 sqq. (inscr. 353, 367). The scheme of Diophantus
would no doubt be unpopular with the many citizens of Athens
who were τεξνηταί (Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, pp. 325–8),
and it probably came to nothing (κατασκεύαζεν, 18). Whether the
Diophantus here referred to is the well-known Athenian statesman
of the time of Demosthenes (as to whom, see A. Schäfer, Demo-
thenes und seine Zeit, 1. 11. 1: 1. 182), is quite uncertain.
Schömann (Griech. Alterth. 1. 365) thinks not.

16. ἀλλ’ εἶπεν κ.τ.λ. I see no cause for any change in the text.
'Ως, which Bekker, following Morel, inserts before Διϊφαντος, 18,
rests on no MS. authority and can probably be dispensed with. Aristotle's intention perhaps was to make the sentence run καθιστά τιν 'Επιδήμων τε και 'Αθηναί, but then he remembered that the scheme of Diophantus remained unexecuted.

22. Ἰππόδαμος δὲ Εὐρυφώντος Μιλήσιος. Hesychius calls him C. 8. Εὐρυφώντος παῖς: Photius, Εὐρυκώντος Μιλήσιος ἡ Θεύρως (C. F. Hermann, de Hippodamo Milesio, p. 4 sqq.). He was one of the colonists of Thurii. We notice that the name of Hippodamus' father is here mentioned, whereas in c. 7. 1266 a 39 Phaleas is simply described as Φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδώνος. Were there other Milesians who bore the name Hippodamus?

τὴν τῶν πόλεων διαίρεσιν, 'the division of cities into streets' or 'quarters': Bern. 'den Städtbau mit getheilten Quartieren.' Diodorus thus describes the laying-out of Thurii, which was done under the direction of Hippodamus—τὴν δὲ πόλιν διελάμανεν κατὰ μὲν μήκος εἰς τέταρτας πλατείας... κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλάτος διελάμανεν εἰς τρεῖς πλατείας... ἔπο δὲ τοιτὸν τῶν στενώπων πεπληρωμένων ταῖς οἰκίαις ἡ πόλις ἐφαινετο καλῶς κατασκευάσθαι (Diod. 12. 10. 7). For the use of the word πλατεία here, compare the phrase ξενικῆ ὠδός (Hoeck, Kreta 3. 452), which Hoeck explains as 'a strangers' quarter.' C. F. Hermann (de Hippodamo Milesio, p. 52) thinks that when Meton is made in the Aves of Aristophanes (941 sq.) to design an agora at the centre of his city with straight streets converging on it from every point, he reproduces the Hippodameian agora at the Peiraeus, but this seems doubtful, for then Meton's scheme would be nothing new, and much of the point would be lost. Besides, Thurii was not thus laid out.

23. κατέτειν. See C. F. Hermann, ibid. p. 47. 'The word is used of 'cutting up' a surface with roads, trenches, or mines: so Strabo (p. 793) says of Alexandria, ἀφαιρεΐται κατατέτειται ἑπταεκάττων καὶ ἑφταεκάττων. In the passage before us ὠδικά is not expressed. A city laid out in Hippodamus' fashion with straight roads was said to be κτισμος, 4 (7). 11. 1339 b 23, 30. This laying out of Peiraeus is not to be confounded with its fortification by Themistocles; it is probably to be referred to the time of Pericles.

24. καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλου βίων, 'as well as in his architectural innovations.'

περιττότερον, see note on 1265 a 11. Hippodamus belonged to the stirring generation, active in striking out fresh paths (5 (8). 6. 1341 a 39 sq.), which followed the Persian Wars.

25. περιεργότερον, 'in too studied and overdone a way.' The meaning of the word is well illustrated by its use in a fragment of
NOTES.

Dicaearchus (Fragm. 33 a: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 246), περίέργως γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη σχηματοποία καὶ προσοπίτης κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Isocr. ad Demon. § 27, εἶναι βούλου τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐσθήτα φιλόκαλου, ἀλλὰ μὴ καλλωπιστῆς ἐστὶ δὲ φιλοκάλου μὲν τὸ μεγαλोπρεπῆς, καλλωπιστοῦ δὲ τὸ περίέργων. Hippodamus was probably influenced, as will be shown presently, by the teaching of Ion of Chios, who was himself perhaps influenced by Pythagoreanism; but his peculiarities of dress, etc., seem to be characteristic rather of the individual than of any school of opinion, political or philosophical. The Pythagoreans of Hippodamus' day do not seem to have worn long hair: Diodorus of Aspendus, who apparently lived at and after the time of Aristotle, is said to have been the first Pythagorean to wear it after the fashion of the Cynics (Athen. Deipn. 163 c—164 a, ὁ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ πυθαγορικῶν λαμπρὰ τε ἐσθήτη ἀμφιεσθείνων καὶ λουτρώς καὶ ἀλείμματι κουρά τε τῇ συνήθει χρωμένων). Long hair was in Hippodamus' day a mark of Laconism, and it does not surprise us in a Thurian (cp. Philostrat. Vita Apollon. 3. 15, quoted by C. F. Hermann, de Hippodamo p. 20)., καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὥσπερ Δακεδαιμόνιοι πάλαι καὶ Θωῦριοι Ταραντῖνοι τε καὶ Μήλιοι καὶ ὀπόσους τὰ λακωνίζεν ἦν ἐν λόγῳ, but the expensive adornment of the long hair of Hippodamus points perhaps rather to his Ionic extraction (cp. Thuc. 1. 6. 3), if it does not remind us of the Θουριομάντες, ἰστροτέχνας, σφραγισθούσαρχοκομίτας of Aristoph. Nub. 326. His abundant and expensively ornamented robes would recall the Persian costume (Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1. 148, καὶ Πέρσαι μὲν ἄνθισασθεί τε τοιαύτῃ καὶ ποιήσαντες χρῶσειν νομίζουσιν ἐπι-πρετές εἶναι, ἤμεις δὲ ἀπρετές), or the Ionic (Tim. Fr. 62: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 206), or the garment which Zeuxis, a resident at Ephesus, wore at the Olympic festival, into the fabric of which his name was woven in gold letters (Plin. Nat. Hist. 35. 62), were it not that they were of cheap material and that he made a point of wearing warm clothing in summer as well as winter, notwithstanding the current proverb, ἐν θέρμῃ τὴν χλαῖναν καταρτίζεις (Leutsch und Schneidewin, Paroemiogr. Gr. 1. 74). This would seem to have been a purely individual whim, comparable to that of the Sophist Hippias, who would only wear things which he had made himself (Hippias Minor, 368 B sqq.), for if the Cynic Crates (Philemon, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 53, ap. Diog. Laert. 6. 87)

Τοῦ θέρους μὲν εἶχεν ἰμάτιον δασύ, ἐν' ἐγκρατησ̄̄ γ̄, τοῦ δὲ χειμώνος ύμῖος,

his crotchet is far more comprehensible than that of Hippodamus. Perhaps, however, like Protagoras (Plato, Protag. 321 A), he held that the thick shaggy hides of animals served them as a defence
not only against the cold of winter, but also against the heat of summer, and sought to protect himself in a similar way. Be this as it may, Aristotle had little patience with affectation even in a man like Xenocrates (Athen. Deipn. 530 d, quoted by Bernays, Phokion p. 119), and what he thought of one of these whims of Hippodamus may probably be gathered from Rhet. 3. 7. 1408 a 11, τὸ δ' ἀνικλο-γόν ἕστιν, εὖν μήτι περὶ εὐάγκων αἰτοκαθόδαλως λέγηται μήτε περὶ εὐετέλων σεμνῶς, μήδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεί ἀνύματι ἐπὶ κόσμος· ἐν δὲ μή, κομφωδία φαίνεται, σῶν ποιεῖ Κλεοφών' ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνα ἐλεγε καὶ εἰ ἐπιεῖν ἄν ἐν 'πότνια σκή.'

(Compare the quotation from Strattis in Athen. Deipn. 160 b, 

Παρανείπαι δὲ σφῶν τι βαύλομαι υσων· 

ὅταν φιλῆν ἐφητε, μὴ πιέχειν μύρον,

and the whole following passage in Athenaeus, and see Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 780.) There was a saying about the people of Miletus—Μιλήσιοι ἄξυντο μὲν ὁκ εἰσίν, ἀρδεύει δ' ἀλάπερ οἱ ἄξυντοι (Eth. Nic. 7. 9. 1151 a 9)—which the eccentricities of Hippodamus recall (cp. also Ephor. Fr. 92 Müller). Aristotle must have obtained these details about Hippodamus from some earlier source, but I do not think that there is much reason for doubting the authenticity of the passage. The Greeks were vigilant observers and keen critics of things which seemed to us personal trifles (see Mr. Sandys’ note on Demosth. contra Steph. 1. c. 68). Hermippus took the trouble to record that Theocritus of Chios criticised the dress of Anaximenes as ἀπαιδεύτος (Athen. Deipn. 21 C), and we also hear in the same passage that the grammarian Callistratus in one of his writings found fault with his great contemporary, the Homeric critic Aristarchus, ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ εἰρήθως ἄμπεξεθαί, φάροντος τι καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου πρὸς παυδεῖας ἐξέτασιν.

The Socratic Aeschines seems to have been very severe on the dress of Telauges in one of his dialogues (Athen. Deipn. 220 a sqq.). Plato himself reckons it as one of the merits of μουσική (Rep. 425 B), that it teaches men how to dress and wear their hair and carry themselves. Aristotle’s object in this curious paragraph probably is in part to prepare the reader for the fancifulness of Hippodamus’ constitution, but he also regarded a man’s life and character as to some extent a guide to the value of his speculations, in practical philosophy at all events; thus Eudoxus’ view that Pleasure is the greatest good gained support from his remarkable temperance (Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 15 sqq.; cp. 10. 9. 1179 a 17 sqq., and Rhet. 1. 2. 1356 a 5 sqq.).

26. ἐκθῆτος I incline to make dependent on πλήθει καὶ κόσμῳ πολυτελεί. C. F. Hermann makes it depend on πλήθει only (de Hippodamo, p. 21 n.), but it seems more natural to carry on both
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The combination of costly ornament with clothing of a cheap material is quite in harmony with the other eccentricities attributed to Hippodamus in this passage.

28. λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀλην φύσιν, ‘learned in Physics also’ (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 963. 5), as well as about the laying out of cities: ‘learned about Nature as a whole also.’ As to the word λόγιος, see Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 284. For τὴν ὀλην φύσιν, cp. τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως, 1. 5. 1254 a 31: τῆς ὀλης φύσεως, Metaph. Λ. 6. 987 b 2 (opp. τὰ ἡδικά): Metaph. Λ. 8. 1074 b 3, περιέχει τὸ θείον τὴν ὀλην φύσιν (cp. Pol. 4. 1326 a 32). To Aristotle the medd-ling of Hippodamus with ἡ ὀλην φύσις was probably a further sign of περιεργία: cp. de Respir. 21. 480 b 26, τῶν τε γὰρ ἱατρῶν ὅσα κομψοί ἡ περιεργεῖ, λέγουσι τι περὶ φύσεως καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκείνην ἄξιονι σαλαμάνεαν. Was Plato thinking of men like Hippodamus, when he speaks (Rep. 495 C sq.) of ἀνθρωπόσκοι who ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν ἕκπεδώσων εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ ἣν κομψότατο δότες τυχάνουσι περὶ τὸ αὐτῶν τεχνὶ; 30. κατεσκεύαζε. The imperfect is used with reference to Hip-podamus’ plans, as being nothing more than plans.

31. μυριάνδρον, ‘of ten thousand citizens.’ Isocrates contrasts Sparta with αἱ μυριάνδροι πόλεις, Panath. § 257. Hippodamus evidently wished his State to be large for a Greek State, but not so large as Athens, which had 20,000 citizens.

τρία. In this view of Hippodamus, which may have suggested Plato’s classification in the Republic, we can perhaps trace the in-fluence of Egypt: cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.: Plato, Tim. 24 A sqq.: Isocr. Busiris, § 15 sq. Compare also the three classes into which the population of Attica was divided—Eupatridae, Geomori, and Demiurgi. But Hippodamus evidently had a passion for threefold divisions, inherited very probably from Ion of Chios: cp. Isocr. de Antidosi § 268, ἰο negligent βὴν παλαιὸν σοφιστῶν ὅ μὲν ἀπεραυνόμας τὸ πλῆθος ἐφισεν εἰσὶν τῶν ὀντῶν, ἢμεθεδοκῆς δὲ τέτταρα, καὶ νέικω καὶ φιλίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἵον δ’ οὐ πλεῖο τριῶν. See vol. i. p. 381 n. and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 450. 1. This leaning to the threefold was also Pythagorean: cp. de Caeilo 1. 1. 268 a 10, καθάπερ γὰρ φασι καὶ αἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὸ πῖν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τριαίν ὁμοστου, and the whole passage down to 268 a 29. That which was divisible into three was held by them to be perfect and continuous. Aristotle himself is inclined to say, τελευτή ἃ ἐν τρισὶ πώντα: see note on 1252 b 27 sqq., and cp. Meteor. 3. 4. 374 b 33 sqq. He would not, however, agree that there are only three μέρη πόλεως, or that these are γεωργοί, τεχνίται, and τὸ προπολεμοῦν: contrast his own enumerations in 4 (7). 8—9 and 6 (4). 4.
33. καὶ explains and limits τὸ προπολεμοῖν. See note on 1263 a 15.

τὴν χώραν. In most Greek States there was sacred, public, and private land. This was so in Crete, in the Lacedaemonian State (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 1. 305), at Athens, etc. Aristotle divides the land of his 'best State' into public (including sacred) and private land, his public land being set apart for the support of the syssitia and the worship of the gods, not for the support of the military force, like that of Hippodamus. The public land, here termed δημοσία, is called κοινή in 36 (cp. 4 (7), 10. 1339 a 10), because it was to be the property of the community (Sus. 'Staatssacker'), and not of private individuals. We are not told why Hippodamus made the soldiers' land public land; perhaps he did so, wishing to keep it more under the control of the State than private land would be—to prevent its alienation, for instance, or its passing into other hands than those of soldiers.

34. ιδίαν. In 3. 4. 1277 b 26 the fem. ιδιος is used.

37. It would seem that Hippodamus regarded the office of law as measurable by the action of the law-courts; if the law-courts only checked mutual wrong, law did no more. This would not satisfy Plato or Aristotle, who, unlike the Sophist Lycophron (3. 9. 1280 b 10 sq.), expected law to do something more than protect men from mutual wrong—required it, in fact, to aim at making them good and just. As to the classification of offences here given, C. F. Hermann (Gr. Ant. 3. §§ 61–62) traces in Attic law a classification under the three heads of ὑβρις, κακουργία, and φήμος. As to ὑβρις, see Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 23 sqq. and Rhet. 1. 13. 1374 a 13 sq., where its nature is explained: see also the remarks of Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 61. As to the δίκη δικαιοσύνης, which included all damage, direct or indirect, not falling under some recognized category of offence, see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 70 and note 9. Mr. Pattison, in his copy of Stahl's edition of the Politics, quotes Strabo, p. 702, where Onesicritus, in recording the customs of the Indians of Musicans' territory, says —δίκην δὲ μὴ εἶναι πλὴν φήμον καὶ ὑβρεῖσιν οὐκ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ γὰρ τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ταῦτα, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς συμβολαῖς ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ ἐκεῖστο, ὥστε ἀνίχνευτον δὲν ἕως τις παραρήτη τὴν πόλιν, ὅλλα καὶ προσέχειν ὑπὸ πιστεύτων, καὶ μὴ δικῶν πληροῖν τίνι πόλιν. Compare with this Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 20, and note on 1263 b 21. C. F. Hermann (de Hippodamo, p. 29) regards offences against the State and against religion as omitted in Hippodamus' classification, and it would seem that if they are to be included, they must be brought under one or other of his
three heads. A different classification of the subject-matter of laws will be found in Demosth. contra Timocr. c. 192, where of περὶ τῶν ἱδίων νόμων are distinguished from of περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον (see Hug, Studien, p. 81). Aristotle’s own classification of δικαστήματα, which is given in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 18 sqq., throws light on his views as to this subject.

39. ἐνομοθέτεις δὲ κ.τ.λ. See as to this Supreme Court, vol. i. p. 382 sqq. That a few should judge, as this court would do, of all matters, is treated as an oligarchical arrangement in 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 12: an aristocracy or polity would commit some subjects to all the citizens, others to a few, but here the few were to judge (in appeals at any rate) on all subjects.

1268 a. 2. φέρειν, sc. φέτο δεῖν. ‘Deposit’ is probably the meaning (Bern. ‘einreichen’)—cp. ψήφοφορίας, and Plato, Laws 753 C—not ‘ferri domo’ (Vicl.), or ‘dari unicumque’ (Lamb.).

3. γράφειν is in the same construction as φέρειν. This proposal implies that most people of the class to which dicasts belonged could write. The regulations as to the Ostracism suggest the same conclusion. But then it must be remembered that in either case only a word or two would have to be written, and that in the Ostracism at all events persons unable to write would be allowed to get others to write for them.

τὴν δίκην, cp. ἐρήμην καταδικάζεσθαι [sc. τὴν δίκην], de Caelo 1. 10. 279 b 10.

4. κενόν, sc. φέρειν πινάκιον.

τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μη, ‘wished partly to acquit, partly to condemn.’

tούτο διορίζειν, ‘to particularize this.’

5. ἀναγκάζειν. We see from οἶδεis in 1268 b 17, that the unexpressed subject of ἀναγκάζειν probably is a person or persons, but it is not clear whether we should supply τὸν νομοθέτην or interpret with Bern. ‘people compel them.’

9. γίνεσθαι is dependent on νόμον εἴθει = ἐνομοθέτει.

ὡς οὖσα κ.τ.λ. See on this passage Dittenberger, Gött. gel. Anz., Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1360 sqq. With him I take Aristotle to mean that Hippodamus proposed this law as a novelty (compare the importance attached to τὸ ἱδίον in c. 12), whereas, in reality (νῷ, i.e. ‘in Wirklichkeit’), says Aristotle, it exists in several States. I do not think Aristotle means that Hippodamus’ suggestion may be taken as an indication that no such law then existed, whereas in his own day it existed in several States, for his remark would then possess merely an antiquarian interest and would be out of place where it stands. Besides, the other interpretation suits better
with the use of ὤς with the participle. On νῦν in the sense of 'id quod in re ac veritate est,' see Bon. Ind. 492 a 60 sqq. As to the existence of this law at Athens, see A. Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit 3. 2. 33, who compares Aristot. Fragm. 428. 1549 a 5 sqq.: Aeschin. in Ctes. c. 134: Isocr. de Pace § 82. It is noticed as a wise law in democratic States in Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 34 sqq. It is not clear how if all the fighting class was supported by public land together (doubtless) with its offsprings, there should be any need in Hippodamus' State for a separate enactment securing to the children of those slain in war sustenance from the State.

10. τὰρ ἄλλοις, 'in other States than that designed by him.'

12. αἱρετοῦς, 'elected,' not taken by lot—a sign of oligarchy (6 4). 9. 1294 b 8 sqq.). Cp., however, 2. 11. 1273 a 26 sq.

δημον δ' ἑποίει κ.τ.λ. This is added, because the word is often used of the poor only, as in c. 6. 1265 b 39 and c. 9. 1270 b 25. Hippodamus might well have meant by it only the γεωργοὶ and τεχνῖται.

13. κοινῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν, 'public matters, matters relating to aliens, and matters relating to orphans.' For ξενικῶν, Bonitz (Ind. 493 a 42) compares 3. 5. 1278 a 7. Hippodamus would seem to have contemplated the sojourn of aliens in his State—contrast the Lacedaemonian ξενικαί (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 1. § 27. 14)—and to have provided for magistrates like the Pole-march at Athens (Aristot. Fragm. 388. 1542 b 14 sqq.), charged with their supervision. 'Ὀρφανοφύλακες and ὀρφανισταί (in the Law of Gortyna, col. 12. 21, ὀρπανοδικασταί) were also known to Greek States (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thalheim, Rechtsalt. p. 14. 3), and orphan heiresses were especially cared for (Hdt. 6. 57). Hippodamus' classification, however, brings the supervision of aliens and orphans into unusual prominence: contrast Aristotle's treatment of the subject of magisterial competence in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 10 sqq. and 8 (6). 8. C. F. Hermann notices the omission of 'res sacrae,' but they are probably included under 'public matters': Hippodamus made a liberal provision for worship (1267 b 35).

16. πρῶτον μὲν seems either not to be taken up at all, or not till ἐν καλῶν δ', 1268 b 4.

τὴν διαίρεσιν. For the acc. after ἀπορησαί, cp. Meteor. 2. 2. 355 b 24.

20. γίνονται, i.e. those without arms, the cultivators and artisans. We see from the scolion of Hybris the Cretan, that the possessor of arms was the lord and master of those who had them not. But
the enslavement of one part of the citizen-body to another is a constitutional soleism: cp. c. 12. 1273 b 37 and 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25, βούλεται ἢ πόλες ἐξ ἵστον εἶναι καὶ ὀμοίων ὑπὶ μᾶλλον.

21. μὲν οὖν, I incline to think, introduces, not a correction of ὦστε γίνονται σχεδοῦ δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὁπλα κεκτημένων, but an inference, as in i. i. 1252 a 7: each of the two words retains its own meaning, μὲν being answered by δὲ, 24.

22. πολιτοφύλακας. A magistracy bearing this name existed at Larissa (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 29). Its main duty probably was to guard the city against external, and possibly also internal, foes: see Aen. Tact. Comment. Poliorc. i. 3 and 22. 7, where the words πολιτοφύλακεῖν and πολιτοφύλακα is used. The mention of στρατηγοῦσι just before supports the view that this was a military office (see also Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30—b 1). Sepulveda suggests (p. 51 b) that πολιτοφύλακες were to exist in the State of Hippodamus, and it is possible that strategi also found a place in it.

23. μὴ μετέχοντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. On the phrase μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, see the references in Bon. Ind. 462 b 26 sqq. It is here used in contradistinction to κοινωνεῖ τῆς πολιτείας, though in 27, four lines lower down, it appears to be used in the same sense as this phrase. In line 23 it is implied that, while those who elect to magistracies κοινωνεῖ τῆς πολιτείας, only those who are eligible to the supreme magistracies can truly be said μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας. In 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 2 sqq., however, the distinction between the two expressions is differently drawn, for in that passage οἱ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας are those who possess, οἱ κοινωνεῖτε those who actually exercise political privileges. The contrast between the Lacedaemonian constitution and that of Hippodamus is probably present to Aristotle’s mind, for under the former the ephorship was open to the people, and this helped to recommend the constitution to them (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 29 sqq.). Yet at Carthage the demos was propitiated, not in this way, but in another (2. i. 1273 b 18 sqq.), and the constitution of Solon, the merits of which are often acknowledged by Aristotle, though it opened the dicasteries to all, excluded a large portion of the citizens from office. Even under the fully developed democracy, the Athenian demos seems to have willingly left some offices of the highest importance to be filled by those who were fittest to fill them ([Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 3).

25. ἀλλὰ introduces a rejoinder from some imagined defender of Hippodamus’ scheme, and τοῖς 8’ 26 Aristotle’s comment in reply.

29. ἐπὶ κ.τ.λ. Hippodamus probably intended, as Vict. suggests, that the cultivators should sell food, etc. to the artisans: this would
be a sufficient raison d’être for them. This implies, no doubt, that the cultivators will produce enough from their lots to supply both themselves and the artisans, whereas Aristotle questions (42) whether two households could be supported even from the cultivators’ and warriors’ land together. Still, how else are the artisans to be maintained?

31. καθάπερ, i.e. in the State of Hippodamus (where they have no land) as in others.

33. εὐλόγως, because any social element that contributes to the existence of the State is in a broad sense a part of the State (6 (4).

34. ἰδία, ‘for themselves.’

36. γεωργῆσουσιν, ‘are to till the soil’: see on this use of the future (cp. ἰσαντα, 38) Bon. Ind. 754 b 17 sq.

40. ἀλλότριον, ‘alien to the constitution,’ and in all likelihood hostile to it (cp. 23 sq.). Hippodamus, however, probably meant the public land to be cultivated by slaves. Aristotle, we notice, does not raise any question as to the mode of cultivating the sacred land, though the same difficulty might arise here also.

42. τὸ τε πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. ‘It will be a difficult matter to produce enough to enable each of them to support as a cultivator two households, and then again, why are not the cultivators to derive directly from their own farms and from the same lots of land at once sustenance for themselves and a supply of food for the fighting class?’ Εἰδὼς means ‘without any preliminary distinction between public and private land.’ Ἀποροῦν seems to be used in the same sense as in Metaph. Z. 3. 1029 a 33 and Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 8, or perhaps as in Plato, Rep. 378 A and 453 D, though Bonitz would appear to explain it as ‘deficient,’ to judge by the passages with which he groups the passage before us (Ind. 85 b 20). Vict., Lamb., Giph., Sepulveda, and others also translate the word ‘too small.’ I have rendered γεωργῆσει δύο οἰκίας ‘support as a cultivator two households,’ because this rendering seems to be required by the sense, but it is difficult to extract it from the words. Stahr translates ‘zwei Haushaltungen zu bestreiten,’ but this translation is open to the same objection. Γεωργῆσει does not suit well with καρπῶν: Spengel, in fact, conjectures πόνως in place of καρπῶν (Aristot. Studien 3. 15), but γεωργῆσει appears to be the doubtful word. The expression γεωργῆσει δύο οἰκίας has long been felt to be a very strange one: we fail to find a real parallel to it in such phrases as χορεύων ψώμιον, Pind. Isthm. 1. 7 (cp. Soph. Antig. 1151), and if we retain the reading γεωργῆσει (see critical note), we must
probably seek an explanation of the construction in the use of the
cognate accusative. We have *oikeiv δῶον οἰκίας* in c. 6. 1265 b 26,
and it is possible that Aristotle here substitutes *γεωργεῖν* for *οἰκεῖν*
seeing that the phrase *οἰκεῖν δῶον οἰκίας* (or even *διοικεῖν δῶον οἰκίας, 4 (7).
10. 1330 a 7) would obviously be inapplicable to the
cultivator of whom he is speaking. In 6 (4), 1. 1289 a 1 sqq. we
find, if the reading of Π² is correct, *τάξιν ἵνα μᾶλλον διώγμοιται κοινωνεῖν. For ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς = ἀπὸ τοῦ γηπέδου, see Liddell and Scott s. v. γῆ and
Bon. Ind. 154 a 39 sq. Or do the words mean 'from the land as a
whole'? Bern. would omit καὶ and read ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς τῶν αὐτῶν
κλῆρων, where however τῆς γῆς seems superfluous. As to the thought,
Comte, on the contrary (Social Statics E. T. p. 130), 'assumes as
an average that, under all conditions which are not very unfavour-
able, the labour of every agricultural family can support at least
one other as numerous as itself, if not two or three.' It will
be observed that Aristotle takes it for granted that the cultivators
will be equal in number to the warriors in the State of Hippodamus,
for if the former were more numerous than the latter, one cultivator
would not have to maintain two households, and the difficulty
anticipated by Aristotle would not arise.

1268 b. 5. τὸ κρίνειν ἄξιον. So Π, and though Vet. Int. has 'lex
judicare dignificans,' there is no doubt of the correctness of this
reading: cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 11, ὅ περι τῆς μέθην νόμος, τὸ τοῖς νήφοντας
συμποταιρχεῖν, and 1274 b 19-20. 'Αξίον is 'to prescribe' (cp.
φάσκειν, 1. 13. 1260 b 6), as in 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 3, where it answers
to φάσκοντες, 1330 b 32.

τῆς δίκης ἀπλῶς γεγραμμένης. Π² read κρίσεως: Π¹ δίκης, which
Sus. adopts. In 18 we have εἰπερ ἀπλῶς τὸ ἐγκλήμα γέγραπται δικαίως.
If we read κρίσεως (and perhaps we thus get some additional point
from the more marked contrast with κρίνειν διαιροῦντα), we cannot
well attach to it a different sense from that which it bears in the
preceding line, where it seems to mean 'adjudication' or 'judicial
decision.' We cannot well interpret the first κρίσεως thus, and the
second (with Bonitz, Ind. 409 b 60) 'causa,' 'the action.' But if
we translate the second κρίσεως also as 'the decision,' we must
apparently take 'the decision' here as meaning 'the charge to be
adjudicated upon.' This is awkward, and it seems better to adopt
the reading of Π¹. Κρίσεως may well have been repeated by mis-
take from the preceding line.

ἀπλῶς, 'in absolute terms,' without saying τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ ὑ, 1268 a 4,
or πῶς μὲν οὔτι πῶς δ' οὐ. For this was, as is implied here, the
special province of the διαιτητής (τὸ διαιρεῖν): cp. Phys. 3. 6. 206 a 12,
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6. τούτο δ' ἐν κ.τ.λ., 'for this (τῷ κρίνειν διαποίντα) is possible in an arbitration, even if there are more arbitrators than one.'

10. μὴ κοινολογῶνται. Vict. 'arbitror, cum verba auctoris attendo, ipsum ostendere voluisse illos nomothetas praecepisse sedilia ipso-rum ita aedificari, ut si vellent capita conferre, non possent, commun-i-narque opiniones inter se.' But perhaps we need not go quite so far as this. The object of the prohibition of communication between jurors seems to have been to preserve the secrecy of suffrage (see Shilleto on Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 265, p. 192 of his edition, and C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 1. § 143, 1, who compares Plato, Laws 876 Α, ἐν πόλει, ἐν ἡ δικαστήρια φαιλα καὶ ἄφωνα, κλέπτοντα τας αἰτίων δόξας, κρίβον τάς κρίσεις διαδίκαιες). In τιμητοῖ δίκαιοι, however, where the jurors were left to fix the penalty, com-munication must have been unavoidable (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 1. § 143, 11), to say nothing of the 'shouting dicasteries' censured by Plato in the Laws (876 B), the members of which must soon have come to know the opinion of their fellows.

11. ταραχώδης, 'full of perplexity': cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 40, and πολλην ἕξει ταραχήν ('involves much perplexity'), 1268 b 4.

12. ὁ μέν, Π²: other MSS. μὲν ὁ, a more logical order, but for the displacement of μέν, see Bon. Ind. 454 a 20 sqq.

ὁ δικαζόμενος, 'he who brings the action, the plaintiff,' as in 3. 1. 1275 a 9.

14. ἡ ὁ μὲν πλέον, ὁ δ' ἔλασσον. These words have been variously interpreted. Bernays translates them 'or whatever larger sum one may select for the plaintiff and whatever smaller sum for the juror': others 'or one juror more than ten and another less.' Susemihl now apparently adopts the rendering of Bernays (Qu. Crit. p. 375). The meaning of the words is doubtful, but perhaps on the whole Bernays' view, which makes them parenthetical, is the one most likely to be correct.

15. καὶ τούτον δὴ is right, though Π² have δὲ instead of δὴ, for here we have, as in 1. 13. 1259 b 32 and 2. 3. 1261 b 23, a transition from particular statements to an universal statement.

μεριότων, 'divident sententias,' Lamb. followed by Bonitz (Ind. 454 b 30). Is it not rather 'split up the amount' (Schn. 'summam pecuniae divident')? Those who vote part of the amount claimed are apparently contrasted with those who vote all or none. Cp. Philemon, Στρατιώτης (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 27),

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Oî μὲν ἱππασών τι γάρ,
oî b' οὐδ'εν, oî δὲ πάντα.

18. εἶπερ . . . δικαίως, ‘if the charge has been duly brought in an unqualified form’: i.e. if the question which ought to be raised is really an unqualified one. ‘Duly,’ not ‘truly,’ for of course if the unqualified charge were true, no one could suppose that the juror who decided that it was so would perjure himself, and the denial of perjury would apply only to a case in which perjury obviously would not occur. For δικαίως in the sense of ‘properly,’ cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 b 34. Aristotle seems to admit by implication that if the charge has been brought in an unqualified form not duly, but otherwise, then the juror, if compelled to give an unqualified verdict, may have to break his oath; he ascribes, however, the perjury thus necessitated, not to the plan of requiring an unqualified verdict from the jury, but to the putting of an improper question.

19. οὐ γάρ κ.τ.λ. No doubt; and Hippodamus would say at once that the case adduced by Aristotle is not one of those which would create the difficulty he foresees. The kind of case in which he anticipates difficulty is that in which the charge is partially true and partially false (τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μὴ, 1268 a 4), and this is not so where a debt of 20 minae is untruly alleged. It is possible that Hippodamus had in view cases in which the issue put to the jury included more charges than one. The indictment of Socrates was of this nature: it ran (Diog. Laert. 2. 40: Xen. Mem. 1. 1)—'Αδίκει Σωκράτης οὔ μὲν ἥπολε νομίζει θεοῦ οὐ νομίζων, ἄτερα δὲ καὶ δαμάντα εἰςηγούμενον’ ἀδίκει δὲ καὶ τῶν νέων διαφθείρων τίμημα θινατος. Suppose that a juror thought that one of these charges was true, but the rest not: was he to say Yes or No to the indictment? The latter would probably be the correct course, yet some might think it not wholly satisfactory. In Socrates’ case the three questions ought to have been put separately to the jury, and then the difficulty would not have arisen; but the same evil may well have occasionally assumed subtler forms. No doubt, however, there is much force in Aristotle’s plea that the fault lay in the question put to the jury, not in expecting the jury to give an absolute answer. The Roman plan of a ‘non liquet’ verdict would not have met Hippodamus’ difficulty; nor would the form of verdict which the Emperor Augustus adopted in one case (Suet. Aug. c. 33: et cum de falso testamento ageretur, omnesque signatores lege Cornelia teneretur, non tantum duas tabellas, damnatoriam et absolutoriam, simul cognoscentibus dedit, sed tertiam quoque, qua ignoscercetur iis quos fraude ad signandum vel errore inductos constitisset).
21. ἀλλ’ ἔκεινος ἦδη ἐπιρκεῖ. For the use of ἦδη in this passage, cp. Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 4, τούτο γὰρ ἦδη . . . ἀξιολογητῶσιν ἀνήροις ἔργον ἐστίν, and Plato, Gorg. 485 C, ὥσπερ δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἴδω ἐτι φιλοσοφοῦντα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενον, πληγῶν μοι δοκεῖ ἦδη δεῖσθαι . . . οὕτος ὁ ἀνήρ. In the passage from Xenophon Sturz, Lex. Xenoph. s.v., translates ἦδη by ‘utique’ or ‘quidem,’ but perhaps in all three passages something of the usual meaning of ἦδη is traceable, and we may render that before us ‘in him we do arrive at a man who perjures himself.’

22. Athens already awarded special honours to persons who had done great service to the State and their descendants, and even to victors at the four great games (Demosth. in Lept. c. 105 sqq.: see also R. Scholl in Hermes 6. 32 sqq.), and Aristotle makes no objection to this; he is himself quite willing to award honours for integrity in office (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 13); but he disapproves of the proposition to award honours to those who claimed to have discovered something advantageous to the State. False accusations, he thought, would thus be encouraged—accusations, for instance, directed against persons deemed to be withholding money from the State or otherwise damaging it. Eubulus appears to have risen to power at Athens by repeated exposures of men who detained or embezzled public money (Schäfer, Demosthenes 1. 175). Aristotle thinks that legislation of the kind desired by Hippodamus might even result in changes of the constitution: thus Theramenes according to Lysias (contra Eratosthen. cc. 68, 70) overthrew the Athenian democracy and laid Athens at the feet of her foes under cover of an assurance that he had made a great and valuable discovery (φῶτοιν πράγμα εὐρήκεια μέγι καὶ πολλοὶ ἔξων). The recommendations of Simonides in Xen. Hiero c. 9 (esp. § 9, εἰ δὲ φιλονεῖν γένοιτο ὅτι καὶ ὁ πρόσωπον των ἄλοπον ἐξευρήσον τῇ πόλει τιμᾶσαι, οὐδ’ αὐτὴ ἀν ἢ σκέψις ἔργατο, cp. § 10, ὃ ἄγαθόν τι εἰση- γούμισο) recall this one of Hippodamus, and are perhaps present to Aristotle’s mind. Contrast the view of Diodotus (Thuc. 3. 42. 7) —τὴν δὲ σώφρονα πόλιν [χρή] τῷ τε πλείστῳ εὖ βουλευόμενῃ μὴ προστίθε- ναι τιμήν, ἀλλὰ μηδ’ ἐλασσοῦν τῆς ὑπαρχουσης.


26. ἀλλο . . . ἐτέραν. See Bon. Ind. 34 b 34 sq.

27. τινες. Very possibly Pythagoreans, for this school held, according to Aristox. Fragm. 19 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), that it was better μεῖον τῶν πατρίων ἔθεσι τε καὶ νόμιοι, εἰ καὶ μικρὸ χείρῳ τῶν ἐτέρων εἰς. It was a charge against tyrants that they
altered time-honoured laws (Hdt. 3. 80). The fact, however, that the Greeks used the same word (κωνία) for the alteration of a law and the development of an art or science, tended to disguise the difference between the two things, and thus Isocrates had said (Evagoras § 7), ἔπειθή καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμους ἴσως γιγαντιάς καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων οὐ διὰ τῶν ἐμμένοντας τῶν καθεστώσων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν ἐπανορθώσας καὶ τολμώσας ἀεὶ τι κανέν τῶν μη καλως ἐχόντων (compare the remark of the Corinthian orator to the Lacedaemonians in Thuc. 1. 71. 3, ἀνάγκη δ’ ὀσπερ τέχνης ἀεὶ τὰ ἐπιγεγραμμένα κρατεῖν, καὶ ἴσως καὶ συνεχόμενη μὲν πολεῖ τὰ ἁκοίντα νόμιμα ἀριστα, πρῶτοι πολλά δὲ ἀναγκα-ζομένως ἡνναι πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀεὶ, which may possibly be in Aristotle’s memory here: compare also the view ascribed to Charondas in Diod. 12. 16, to Zaleucus in Stob. Floril. 44. 21, p. 280). Plato provides for the improvement, in course of time, of his legislation in the Laws (769 D), but subject to strict conditions (772 Α–D) which almost exclude the possibility of serious changes. See also Polit. 298 E–299 E.

30. ἐνδέχεται δ’. Sus., after Spengel, reads γάρ in place of δ’ without MS. authority, but Aristotle occasionally uses δ’ where we rather expect γάρ (e.g. in 3. 9. 1280 a 15, σχέδων δ’ οἱ πλείστοι φαίνοντι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν ὁκείων, where we expect σχέδων γάρ, and in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 19, where ταύτη γάρ might well take the place of ταύτη δ’). Perhaps he adds the words—‘and it is not impossible that changes in the laws or constitution may be proposed as a common good’—to anticipate an objection that no revolutionist would proceed in this way (compare the use of δ’ in 1. 5. 1254 a 36); for it was only those who claimed to have discovered something for the advantage of the community that it was proposed to reward. Theramenes had, in fact, done exactly what Aristotle here says might be done: see note on 22 above.

35. ἰατρική, i.e. has improved. This must be elicited from αὐτάν ὀφειλέτων.

36. αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις. For the difference between an art, or ποιητικὴ ἐπιστήμη, and a ‘faculty,’ see Cope on Rhet. 1. 4. § 6. 1359 b 12 sqq., where ὑποτεχνή and διαλεκτική are said to be not ἐπιστήμαι but δυνάμεις. It is implied in what follows that if ἡ πολιτικὴ κινεῖται, this will involve τὸ κανὲν τῶν νόμων, which are ἔργα τῆς πολιτικῆς (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 a 23).

39. ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων. For this use of ἐπ’, see Bon. Ind. 268 a 31 sqq.

νόμους. Perhaps unwritten: cp. 1269 a 8. In 42 νομίμων is the word used, apparently in the same sense as νόμος here: these
words are interchanged, as Bonitz points out (Ind. 488 a 16 sqq.), in 4 (7), 2, 1324 b 5, 7 also. Much the same thing is said by Thucydides (16. 6. 7, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἀποδείξει τὸ παλαιόν ἑλληνικῶν ὁμοιότροπα τῷ νῦν βαρβαρικῷ διαστόμουν). Popular sentiment, however, with which Isocrates appears to agree (de Antid. § 82), praised most highly the oldest laws, and Aristotle himself often counts the antiquity of an institution or opinion as a point in its favour.

40. ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο. Cp. Thuc. 1. 5 sq. where we find both the active and the middle. As to the contrast of Hellenic and barbarian practice in this matter, see Lucian, Anacharsis c. 34.

41. τὰς γυναικάς, i.e. brides, not wives. This custom existed among the Thracians (Hdt. 5. 6). Thirlwall remarks (Hist. of Greece, 1. 175) with respect to Homeric Greece, that 'it does not seem that the marriage contract was commonly regarded in the light of a bargain and sale,' but he adds in a note—'compare, however, Od. 15. 367 and 18. 279 with the constant epithet ἀλβεσί-βουαί.' Plato (Laws 841 D) seems to recognize the purchase of brides—ταῖς μετὰ θεῶν καὶ ἱερῶν γάμων ἐλθοῦσαι εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, ὡνηταί ἐκί ἄλλῳ ὄφοιν πρότα χρήται.

42. λαπτά, 'still in existence.'

1. Κύρη. Which of the cities of this name is meant, is unknown, 1269 a. as also in 7 (5). 5, 1305 a 1.

πλῆθος τι, 'a definite number,' as in 3. 1. 1274 b 41. Τῶν αὐτοῦ συγγενῶν is to be taken with μαρτίρων—'witnesses from the number of his own kinsmen.' We are reminded of the practice of compurgation, but compurgators were called by both parties to the suit, they 'swore to the purity and honesty of the oath of their principal,' and they had to be 'possessed of qualities and legal qualifications which should secure their credibility' (Stubbs, Const. Hist. of England 1. 610–1). Some traces of a not very dissimilar custom to that mentioned by Aristotle have been thought to be discoverable in the law of Gortyna—see the recently discovered Gortyna Inscription, col. 2. 37 sqq.: 3. 51: 4. 8, and the comments of Zitelmann (Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 76–77).

3. ξητοῦσι δὲ ... πάντες. Cp. 1. 1. 1252 a 2: 2. 5. 1263 b 4: Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 36, ὁ πάντες δοκεῖ, τούτο εἶναι φακεῖν.

4. τοὺς πρῶτους, 'the earliest human beings': cp. Polyb. 4. 20. 7, τοὺς πρῶτους Ἀρκάδων ('priscos Arcades'): Plato, Tim. 22 Α., Φορωνείως τοῦ πρῶτου λεξείτων: Antiphon, Tetral. 3. 1. 2, τοὺς πρώτους γενομένως ἡμῶν.

5. εἰτε γηγενεῖς ἦσαν εἰτ' ἐκ θεόρας τινὸς ἐσώθησαν. Here two
current views as to the human race are grouped together—the former enshrined in Greek poetry and literature (Pindar, Nem. 6.1; Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 108: Plato, Menex. 237 D), and taught by Anaximander (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 209 sqq.)—the latter adopted by Plato in the Laws (676 sqq.) and the Timaeus (22 B sqq.). Euripides had already dealt a blow at the 'earth-born' myth of man's origin in his Ion, where Ion says (482), γίς ἄνεπτέφυκα μητρός, and Xuthus rejoins, οὐ πέδου τίκτει τέκνα: and Plato (Laws 781 E sqq.) holds that 'the human race either had no beginning at all and will never have an end, but always will be and has been, or had a beginning an immense time ago' (Prof. Jowett's translation).

Aristotle himself believed that not only the world (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 432 sqq.), but also mankind (ibid. 508. 1) had existed from everlasting. (See on this subject Dicaearch. Fragm. 3 and 4 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 234 sqq.), and Bernays, Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 44 sqq., and Über die unter Philon's Werken stehende Schrift über die Unzerstörbarkeit des Weltalls, p. 58 sqq.)

Thus Aristotle cannot have believed in the 'earth-born' theory of man's origin, though in de Gen. An. 3. 11. 762 b 28 sqq. he thinks it worth while to inquire how γηγενεῖς can have come into being. The other view, that the earliest known men were the survivors of some vast φθορά was more reconcilable with the doctrine of the eternity of the human race, but Aristotle does not seem to admit universal, or nearly universal, φθορά. The φθορά he recognizes are quite partial, arising from some local excess of moisture or aridity (see the interesting discussion of the subject in Meteor. 1. 14). As to the Stoical view, see Zeller, Stoics E. T. pp. 155-160.

6. ὅμοιοις κ.τ.λ. For ὅμοιοις καί, see Bon. Ind. 511 a 21: Vahlen, Beitr. zu Pöet. 3. 314: Sus.1, Ind. Gramm. s.v., who compares 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 3. 'Similar to ordinary or even' (Bon. Ind. 357 b 20 sqq.) 'weak-minded people nowadays.' Why οἱ πρότοι should be so, Aristotle does not explain; but as to the γηγενεῖς, cp. de Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 18, συμβαίνει δ' ενιά γε καὶ γλαφυρωτέραν ἔχειν τίν διάνοιαν τῶν τουτών, οὗ διὰ τὴν ψυχρότητα του αἴματος, ἅλα διὰ τὴν λεπτότητα μᾶλλον καὶ διὰ τὸ καθαρὰν εἶναι τῷ γᾶρ γεώδεις οὐδέτερον ἔχει τούτων, and Dio Chrys. Or. 21. 507 R, παντελῶς σκληροὶ καὶ ἄρμοι, τῆς γῆς τὰ τέκνα. As to the survivors of the φθορά, he probably conceived the φθορά as entailing a wholesale destruction of knowledge (cp. Aristot. Fragm. 2. 1474 b 6, [αἱ παρομοιαὶ] πάλαις εἰσὶ φιλοσοφίας εἰ ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνθρώπων φθοραίς ἀπολογένθης ἐγκαταλείμματα περισσοτέρα διὰ συντομίαν καὶ δεξιότητα: and Metaph. A. 8. 1074 b 10 sq.): he also ascribes the progress of the arts to the
favouring influence of time (Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 23 sq.: Poet. 4. 1449 a 9–15). Plato had already said that the remnant left by the deluge (in Greece, at all events—Tim. 22 D) would be hill-shepherds or herdsmen ignorant of the arts which flourish in cities (Laws 677 B–678 B), though he draws a favourable picture of their morals and social state (678 E–679 F). Contrast the opposite view of some of the later Stoics: τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων στοιχίων φασί τινες τοὺς πρῶτους καὶ γγενεῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ πολὺ τῶν μὲν συνετείς διαφέροντας γεγονέναι (Sext. Empir. adv. Phys. 1. 28).

10. ὠσπερ γάρ κτλ. ‘For, as in relation to the other arts, so in relation to the political [art, and its product, the political] organization it is impossible that everything should be written down with complete precision.’ As to οἱ ἄλλοι τέχναι, cp. τὸ κατὰ γράμματα ἰατρείαςθων φίλων, Pol. 3. 16. 1287 a 33. It seems to be implied that as written law is necessarily couched in general terms, and human action, which it seeks to guide, is concerned with particulars, it is unlikely that the first form of a law will be as ακριβῆς (cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 a 1 sqq.) as it may be rendered by revision after fuller experience (cp. Plato, Laws 769 D, a passage probably present to Aristotle’s mind here: Aristot. Pol. 3. 16. 1287 a 27: Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 20, περιγεγράφθω μὲν ὤν τάγαθον ταύτην ἰδεῖ γάρ ὡς ἑντοπισθοί πρῶτον, εἶδ’ ὑστερον ἀναγράψαι et sqq.: Soph. El. 33. 183 b 17 sqq.: Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 b 2). For the omission of περὶ before τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν, Bonitz (Ind. 630 b 2) compares 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 37: Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 15, 17: see also below on 1274 b 12. ‘It political τάξις seems here to include not the πολιτεία only but also laws; it means something more, therefore, than ἡ τάξις τῆς πολιτείας means in Pol. 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, and elsewhere (cp. c. 10. 1271 b 40, where ἡ Κρήτηκη τάξις is used in a different sense from τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις, 1272 a 4).

13. ἄλλον ... τρόπον, i.e. looking not to cases where the law is antiquated and absurd, but to cases where changing it brings little gain and tends to weaken men’s respect for law. It appears from 17, that Aristotle feels the same reluctance to disturb measures adopted by magistrates of the State.

17. ὡφελησεται. See note on 1263 b 28. For the omission of the subject (Μἠ ἐν wrongly supply τὸ), see note on 1268 a 5.

19. ψεῦδος δὲ κτλ. Cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 32 sqq.

21. παρὰ τὸ ἔδος. If we adopt this reading (which is that of the better MSS.) instead of παρὰ παρὰ τὸ ἔδος Bekk., παρὰ will mean ‘other than,’ or ‘except’ (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 18, ἐπειδόν τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτείας ἀρχῶς, and 1. 13. 1239 b 25), and the ἔδος will be
viewed as a kind of ἵσχύς: cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 29, ἵσχύν τινα περὶ αὐτὸν ἡ δύνασθαι διαίτησθαι τούτω μὴ δουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν. For the thought, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 14 sqq.

23. ἐτέρους νόμους κανονοὺς. For the order, cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 15–16: de Part. An. 2. 14. 658 a 28, καθ' ὅλον τὸ σῶμα πρανές: Pol. 2. 11. 1272 b 26, αὐτῷ αἱ πολιτείαι πρεῖς. We have, however, in the indictment of Socrates (Xen. Mem. 1. 1: Diog. Laert. 2. 40) ἐτέρα καινὰ δαμόνια (though in the version of the same indictment given by Plato, Apol. 24 B, ἐτέρα δαμόνια καινά). So we find in de Gen. An. 3. 2. 752 b 6, στόλον μικρὸν ὀμφαλώθη. In each case, probably, a reason can be discerned for the order in which the words are placed.

24. εἰ καὶ κυνητέα, 'if in fact it is allowable to change them': see Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 168, and compare the use of εἰ καὶ in 2. 2. 1261 a 21 and 2. 11. 1273 b 6.

25. Should the laws which embody the constitution be changed? Or sacred laws? Or unwritten laws, such as are referred to in 3. 16. 1287 b 5? Should laws be allowed to be changed even in the case of the best constitution? And is anybody to be permitted to propose a change, or only selected persons? Plato had held (Laws 634 D–E) that only old men should be allowed to draw attention to defects in the laws. Aristotle is, however, perhaps thinking of assigning the right of proposing a change to a specially constituted magistracy.

26. ταύτα γὰρ ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν. 'For there is a great difference between these various alternatives.' (See for this expression Bon. Ind. 192 b 13 sqq.) Hence the discussion of the question is likely to take time, and Aristotle drops it.

C. 9. 29. Aristotle speaks in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 18 sq. of 'the writers on the Lacedaemonian Constitution' as if there were not a few of them, and describes them as 'admiring the lawgiver because he had trained his citizens to face perils and thus enabled the State to win a wide supremacy.' He names only one of them, Thibron, but Xenophon's work on the subject is also probably present to his mind (see Sus.², Note 911ab, who refers to Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 1), besides others which, like that of Critias, have not come down to us. Ephorus had treated of the Lacedaemonian constitution in his history, and he too may possibly be referred to. Aristotle mentions in the chapter before us (1271 a 37) that he was not the first to criticise the arrangements respecting the Admiraltyship, but it is not
certain whether he means that writers on the constitution had done so. The grounds on which the Lacedaemonian constitution was approved were very various. Hippodamus, like others after him, would praise it for the distinction which it drew between soldiers on the one hand and cultivators and artisans on the other, but it seems to have been commonly commended mainly for two reasons—first, because the system of training which it enforced had given the State empire, and secondly, because it harmonized the claims of the Few and the Many. It was held to be a skilful mixture of all constitutions (2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.), and especially of two, democracy and oligarchy (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 14 sqq.). At Sparta rich and poor received the same education in childhood, they dressed alike and fared alike at the public mess-tables. This would please both Phæleas (c. 7. 1266 b 31 sqq.) and Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 485). Oligarchs and democrats, soldiers and philosophers all found something to commend at Sparta. Socrates commended the obedience to law which gave the State happiness in peace and irresistible strength in war (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 15). On the other hand, opinions were much divided as to the Helottage (Plato, Laws 776 C sqq.), and other weak points in Lacedaemonian institutions were well known to Thucydides and Isocrates. Aristotle would no doubt be fully acquainted with what had been said on the subject, but he is especially influenced by the views of Plato. Plato is perhaps more favourable to the Lacedaemonian constitution in the Republic than in the Laws. In the Republic he ranks it (with the Cretan) next to the ideal constitution, whereas in the Laws he assigns this place to the constitution described in the dialogue, which differs much from the Lacedaemonian, and if it is true that in the Laws a new merit is discovered in the Lacedaemonian constitution—its mixed and tempered character—it is also true that much is borrowed in this dialogue from Attic legislation.

If we turn to Aristotle's criticisms in the chapter before us, we note first of all that his object is mainly to point out defects, not to give a complete estimate of the constitution. His admiration for Lycurgus is sufficiently proved by his reference to him in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 20, and by the remark which Plutarch reproduces from the Politics—ὅπερ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐλάττωνος σχεῖν φησὶ τιμᾶ ἡ προσήκον ἰν αὐτῶν ἱκεῖν ἐν Λακεδαίμοι, καίπερ ἵκουσα τάς μεγίστας ἰεράν τε γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ θύσιν καθ' ἱκαστον ἐναυτῶν ὡς θεῖ (Lycurg. c. 31). In criticizing the constitution he takes the word πολιτεία in its widest sense and examines the whole social and political organization of the State. Plato had tested the Lacedaemonian constitution by
NOTES.

comparing it either with the ideal constitution or with other actual constitutions of Greece, whereas Aristotle also inquires how far its arrangements fulfill the design of the lawgiver, which was to found an ἀριστοκρατία. This was perhaps the most novel feature of his criticisms. He had included a notice of the Lacedaemonian constitution in his Politics—indeed, he probably repeats in the chapter before us not a little of what he had said in that work—and his studies must have given him an unrivalled knowledge of the subject, but his grasp of the details must not lead us to forget how often he repeats previous criticisms of Plato. Plato had already said that the Lacedaemonian laws aimed only at the production of a single kind of virtue, warlike prowess (Laws 626 A sqq., etc.)—that the Spartans valued external goods such as wealth and honour more than virtue (Rep. 548)—that the Helot type of slavery was wrong (Rep. 469 B sqq.: Laws 776 sqq.)—that the lives of the Spartan women were left unregulated by law (Laws 780 E). He so far anticipated in the Laws Aristotle’s account of the causes which had thinned the ranks of the Spartan citizens that he makes the lots of land in his State inalienable and indivisible (740 B sqq.), forbids dowries (742 C), restricts the right of bequest (922 E sqq.), and asserts the claims of relatives both in relation to inheritances and in the disposal of orphan heiresses (924 D sqq.). On the other hand, his attention does not seem to have been called to the mischievousness of the Lacedaemonian law by which the enjoyment of political rights was made dependent on the payment of a quota to the syssitia. Nor does he criticise the Lacedaemonian Kingship, Senate, and Ephorate, though we observe that he does not seem to adopt any of these institutions in the Laws.

30. δῶ. The organization of slavery in the Lacedaemonian State is apparently criticised in what follows as being by no means the best possible; the γυναικῶν ἁνέσεις, on the other hand, as not only wrong from an ideal point of view but also as not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution (1269 b 12–14). The διάστη τῶν ἐφόρων (1270 b 31) and the φύσει (1271 a 31) are criticised on the latter ground. In 1271 a 41 sqq. we find a criticism of the ὑποθέσεις of the constitution which may perhaps be brought under the first of the two heads, though the ὑποθέσεις itself can hardly be said νεό-μορφα (32). What does Aristotle consider the ὑποθέσεις of the Lacedaemonian constitution to be? Probably he views it as an ἀριστοκρατία (i.e. as a mixture of ἀρετή and δῆμον) organized πρώς τῷ κρατεῖν: cp. 1269 b 19–20: 1271 b 2–3: 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 7 sqq.: 2. 11. 1273 a 4; πρῶς τήν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας: 6 (4).
7. 1293 b 15 sqq. Yet, as Sus.² (Note 1262) points out, Aristotle seems to speak in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 14 sqq. as if the Lacedaemonian constitution were a polity, i.e. a combination of oligarchical and democratic elements. As in the chapter on Phaleas, so here Aristotle begins with subjects connected with the primary elements of the State—slavery, the household, property, population, and the like—and passes on from them to constitutional questions.

34. For the omission of πολειτείας, see note on 1266 b 1. We see from Plato, Laws 831 C sqq., that something more than slavery—freedom from the spirit of money-getting—is necessary to secure leisure to a State. In illustration of the difficulty of determining how the citizens of a State may best be secured leisure from necessary work, Aristotle refers to three slave-systems, in two of which the slaves had attacked their masters, while in the third, according to him, a similar catastrophe was only warded off by fortuitous circumstances. These three slave-systems were especially conspicuous and famous (Plato himself refers to two of them in entering on the subject of slavery, Laws 776 C sqq., a passage present to Aristotle's mind here); and it is perhaps for this reason that Aristotle regards their failure as proving the difficulty of the subject. It is not impossible, however, that they enjoyed a good deal of credit in some quarters: we see from the passage of the Laws just referred to, that even the Helotage of the Lacedaemonian State had its defenders. Many Greeks may have preferred serfage to slavery, and in all the three systems referred to, the slaves were only half enslaved (μεταξύ ἐλευθερων καὶ δουλων, Pollux 3. 83, quoted by Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 127: δοῦλοι εἰπὶ τοιχῶν τεσσαραι, Strab. p. 365, cp. p. 701: θητέωντες, Strab. p. 542). Aristotle, however, holds that serfs of the type of the Helots and Penestae (c. 5. 1264 a 34 sqq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.) are dangerous inmates in a State, especially if neighbouring States are not withheld, as in Crete, by their own interest from making common cause with the revolted serfs of their antagonist. Where this is not the case, war with neighbours commonly brings in its train risings of the serfs. As to the importance of the attitude of neighbours in this matter, see Plato, Rep. 579 A–B. In c. 10. 1272 b 18 sqq. another reason is given for the quiescence of the Cretan serfs—the distance of Crete from the rest of Greece, together with the fact that it possessed no dependencies outside the island to tempt interference, and was for a very long time exempt from invasion. They probably were not as purely Hellenic as the Helots; they do not seem
to have been employed as hoplites in the wars (c. 5. 1264 a 21), and their freer and more satisfactory position (1264 a 21) may, as Oncken suggests (Sus.², Note 281), have made them more manageable. Aristotle’s language in this passage seems to imply that the Argives, Messenians, and Arcadians had no class corresponding to the Helots; yet περίουκοι (serfs) are mentioned at Argos in 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 8 (Herodotus speaks of slaves in 6. 83), and it would seem that the Gymnesii or Gymnetes of Argos answered in some degree to the Helots (see Sus.², Note 1518, and Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 74). It is to be noticed that Aristotle in constructing his best State (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.) prefers slaves to serfs, and insists that, if serfs there are to be, they shall be non-Hellenic (βάρβαροι). The Mariandynian serfs of the Pontic Heracleia (Strabo, p. 542) were non-Hellenic, but we know not whether Aristotle would regard this race as sufficiently submissive (1330 a 26).


1269 b. 3. τοῖς δὲ Λάκωσιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. Phillip. § 51, πολεμοῦσι μὲν γὰρ [Ἄργειοι], ἐξ οὗ περ τὴν πόλιν οἰκούσι, πρὸς τοὺς δομόρους, ὡσπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τοιούτων δὲ διαφέρουσιν ὄσον ἐκεῖνοι μὲν πρὸς ἄτταυς αὐτῶν, οὕτω δὲ πρὸς κρείττους, and § 74. Does ἦσαν mean ‘at the time when the Helots first revolted’? Possibly, but the past tense recurs frequently throughout the chapter: see below on 1269 b 31.

5. ἐπεί addsuce a proof that the cause assigned for the troubles of the Lacedaemonian State and the exemption of Crete is the true one.

7. καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἔτερον, such as (e.g.) self-defence against their attacks. So Vict. ‘si nihil periculi impenderit reipublicae ab hoc genere colonorum, relictio hoc malo.’

8. αὐτοῦς, ‘serfs such as the Helots.’ Aristotle gives a promise in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31 sq. to consider the question how slaves are to be treated. He would offer ultimate emancipation to slaves as a reward for good conduct. This is just what the Spartan owner had no power to do (Strabo, p. 365, κρηθῆναι δοῦλους ἐπὶ τακτοῖς τισιν, ὡστε τὸν ἔχοντα μὴ ἔλευθερον ἐξεῖναι μήτε πωλεῖν ἐξω τῶν


Plato (Rep. 549 A) seems to regard the Spartans as erring on the side of severity, for in his description of the timocratic man, the type of character corresponding to a timocracy like the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions (544 C), he speaks of him as διοικεῖν ἄριστος, οὗ καταφρονῶν δούλων, ὥσπερ ὁ ικανός πεπαιδευμένος, and Aristotle himself is said by Plutarch to have ascribed the institution of the Cryptea to Lycurgus (Aristot. Fragm. 495. 1558 b 19 sqq.). But the Spartans may have had occasional fits of leniency.

12. τρότον, probably 'mode of organization,' referring to τρότον, 1269 a 36, not to τρότον, 1269 b 9, for Aristotle is concerned rather with the organization than the administration of the State, and he is opposed to slave-organizations like the Lacedaemonian, not merely to the way in which the Spartans behaved to their slaves.

τούτο συμβαίνει (cp. 1269 a 40, οὐδέν πω τοιοῦτον συμβαίνει) probably refers to 1269 a 38 sq., and also to 1269 b 7 sqq.


14. τρός εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. Aristotle adopts this phrase from Plato, Laws 781 B, a passage relating to the subject here discussed. But Mr. Congreve is probably right in explaining it here as = πρὸς τὴν ἀριστήν τάξιν, 1269 a 31 (see Sus. 2, Note 284).

ὡσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For μέρος, not μέρη, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 10, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἐως ἄν ὡς πλῆθος καὶ μῆ χαρισθῇ, ὥσπερ μέρος ἀπὸ τιν. In 3. 4. 1277 a 7 man and wife are said to be the component parts of the household, and perhaps the same thing is said here, though on the other hand Mr. Welldon may be right in translating μέρος, not 'the constituent elements,' but 'constituent elements.' For though man and wife are the most important parts of the household, others are mentioned in 1. 3. 1253 b 4-7. Plato thinks that, as women are inferior to men in excellence, and therefore need more legislation, the lawgiver who omits to legislate for them leaves far more than half his work undone. See on this subject Plato, Laws 781 A sq.: 806 C: Aristot. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 10 sqq. The Spartan girls were trained both in gymnastic and music (Plato, Laws 806 A: cp. Plutarch, Lyc. c. 14), and marriage and the education of children were controlled by the State, but Aristotle looked to the State to do something more than this—to exercise a control over the life of women inside and outside the household and to develope in them, as well as in children (1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.), the moral virtues which they need to possess.
15. δῆλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ. What is the construction of this sentence? Viet. translates, 'ita prope accedere civitatem ut bifariam dissecta sit . . . existimandum est,' apparently making the sentence run δῆλον ὅτι δει νομίζειν καὶ πόλιν (εἰναι) ἐγγὺς τοῦ δίχα δικρησθαι, but the translators and commentators generally take ἐγγὺς τοῦ δίχα as an adverb meaning 'nearly equally.' Probably the latter view is correct, though adverbs thus formed do not seem to be by any means common.

19. δὴν τὴν πόλιν. See below on 1273 a 38.

20. καρτερικήν. Compare the description of the Lacedaemonian training given by the Lacedaemonian interlocutor of the Laws in Laws 633 B sqq., where the expressions καρτερήσεις τῶν ὕληδό- νων, πολέστοις πρὸς τὰς καρτερήσεις, δειναὶ καρτερήσεις are used.

22. ἕξημεληκέν, 'has wholly neglected to apply his principle.' ζώσε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. An old indictment (Eurip. Androm. 575 sqq.: Ibycus ap. Plutarch. Num. et Lycurg. inter se comp. c. 3: Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 24, οὕτε ἄρθρια, ὅσπερ Λακεδαιμίνιοι, τὰς τῶν γυναικῶν φυλακάς) stated in exceptionally strong language. What the charge amounts to, we see from Eth. Eud. 3. 2. 1231 a 19, οἰνοφλυγία γὰρ καὶ γαστρομαργία καὶ λαγνεία καὶ ὄρθοφαγία καὶ πίντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τὰς εἰρήμενας ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς ἀπερ μύρια ἡ ἄκολος ἀδιαρεῖται (cp. πάσαν ἀκολούθια, Theopomp. Fragm. 178: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 308). Plato (Rep. 548 B) speaks of the Spartan women as the objects of extravagant expenditure; but in Laws 806 A we get a more favourable impression of their life, and we see from Plutarch's Lives of Agis and Cleomenes that even in the corruptest period there were noble exceptions. According to [Plutarch,] Apophth. Lac. Lycurg. 20, men looked back to a time when adultery was unknown at Sparta. Πρὸς, Bon. Ind. 641 b 46 sqq.

23. ὡστε ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. The necessity of this is explained by what is said in 1. 9. 1258 a 2 sqq. 'Εν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ means 'in a constitution of the kind we have just described' (cp. 17, ἐν ὅσις πολιτείαις φαιλῶς ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναικές, as well as c. 4. 1262 b 20 and c. 5. 1264 a 6). In a constitution which allows half the population to live a dissolute life, wealth as the means to dissoluteness must be honoured, especially if the dissolute half of the population bears virtual sway. In [Plutarch,] Apophth. Lac. Lycurg. 20, a Spartan of the 'good old days' asks, πῶς ἀν μοιχὸς ἐν Σπάρτῃ γένοιτο, ἐν ἡ πλούσιος καὶ τρυφῆ καὶ καλλοπισμὸς ἀτμάζοιται;

25. καθάπερ κ.τ.λ. We may gather from 4 (7), 2. 1324 b 9–21, what nations are referred to. Cp. Ephor. Fragm. 78 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 258), or rather Scymnus Chius (888 sq.),
Contrast 1. 2. 1252 b 5, εν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ δοῦλον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν. It would seem, therefore, that the more warlike barbarian races allowed at all events some of their women to gain ascendency over them; but it does not follow that many or most of the sex were not made drudges. These nations were strong in θημός, and θημός, we learn from Pol. 4 (7). 1327 b 40, is the seat of the affections as well as the source of military spirit.

τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ πολεμικῶν γενών. For γένος in this sense, cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 67, ἕστε γὰρ ἄρχικότατα μὲν τῶν γενών καὶ μεγίστας δυναστείας ἔχουσα Σκύθων καὶ Θράκες καὶ Περσαῖ. The word στρατιωτικός ('soldierlike') is not a common one, but it recurs in 1270 a 5. Compare the contrast of πολεμικός and στρατηγικός in [Plut.] Inst. Lac. c. 25.

26. Κελτῶν. The commentators refer to Athen. Deipn. p. 603 a (see Sus., Note 287). See also Diod. 5. 32. 7 and Strabo 4. p. 199, who probably draw from the same source as Athenaeus. Sextus Empiricus speaks in similar terms of the Germani (Pyrrhon. Hyp. 3. 199) and of the Persians (ibid. 1. 152). 'Aristotle, like the earlier Greeks generally, appears to make no distinction between the Celts and the Germans' (Sus., whose notes 287, 722, 953 should be consulted). From the sources of the Danube in the mountain Pyrene (the Pyrenees?) the Celts seem to have extended to the sea (Meteor. 1. 13. 350 a 36 sqq.; Eth. Nic. 3. 10. 1115 b 26 sqq.). There were, besides, Celts at this time 'settled in the neighbourhood of the Ionian Gulf,' an embassy from whom reached Alexander after he had crossed the Danube (Arrian, Anab. 1. 4. 6). Ephorus appears to have given a great extent to the designation (Strabo 4. p. 199, ὑπερβαλλομένων τὸ μεγέθει λέγει τὴν Κελτικήν, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν τῶν ἱππόροις καλούμενοι ἐκεῖνοι τὰ πλέοντα προστείμεν μέχρι Πυθείρων). As to ἄνευρός, cp. Polyb. 6. 56. 4, παρὰ μὲν Καρπηδο- νίοις δῷρα ἄνευρός διδότες λαμβάνουσα τὰς ἀρχὰς, and perhaps we should also compare the language of Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 19, with regard to the lawgivers of Thebes—λαμπρῶν δὲ τῶν ἔρωτα ταῖς παλαιάραις ἐνθερψάτο συγκεραυνίτε τὰ ἱδη τῶν νέων. If Aristotle is not thinking exclusively of barbarian races, he may allude to the Thebans here, and also to the Cretans (cp. c. 10. 1272 a 24) and Chalciadians (Aristot. Fragm. 93. 1492 b 22 sqq.).

28. ὁ μυθολόγησας πρῶτος. Sus. (Note 288) points out that just as Aristotle traces the πόλεις to a 'first constructor' (1. 2. 1253 a 30), so here he speaks of ὁ μυθολόγησας πρῶτος. For a similar hint
of the truth in myth, see 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 2. The myths are con-
ceived by Aristotle to embody fragments of truth saved from the
wreck of previous periods of greatness in philosophy and art
age, however, he ascribes to the myth here mentioned does not
appear.

συζεύξαι, ‘paired,’ as in 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 16 (‘join in wedlock’).
Cp. Lucret. 1. 31-40. The two deities are often named together:
see Tümpe1, Ares und Aphrodite (Teubner, 1880), who illustrates
their association in local worships (esp. at Thebes, Aeschy1. Sept.
Pyth. 4. 155: Simonides, Fragm. 43 Bergk: Aeschyl. Suppl. 664
sq.)—and in art. The Ares of the Villa Ludovisi has an Eros at
his feet and may perhaps have formed a group with Aphrodite:
the Venus of Milo is thought by some to have formed part of a
similar group. Tümpe1 points out that the tradition passed to
Rome, where it did the Julian house the service of bringing Venus
Victrix, its foundress, into close union with the national god Mars,
and thus consecrated the rule of the Caesars. So on silver coins
of Augustus we see the Julian Venus looking down at a helmet in
her hand, the symbol of Mars (Tümpe1, p. 677 n.): compare the
couplet ascribed to Petronius Arbiter (Fragm. 46 Buecheler):—

Militis in galea nidum fecere columbae:
Adparet, Marti quam sit amica Venus.
The lines of Rutilius Namatanius (De Reditu Suo, 1. 67 sq.) may
also be quoted—

Auctorem generis Venerem Martemque fatemur,
Aeneadum matrem Romulidumque patrem.
Sulla, indeed, had already inscribed on his trophies "Ἀρη καὶ Νίκη
καὶ Ἀφροδίτη (Plut. Sulla c. 19), and the month sacred to Venus at
Rome (April) came next to that sacred to Mars (Plut. Numa c. 19).
Compare also the Chalcidian song, Aristot. Fragm. 93. 1492 b 30, σύν
γὰρ ἀνδρεία καὶ ὁ λυσμέλης Ἑρως ἐπὶ Χαλκίδων βιβλεῖ πόλεσιν. Αφρο-
dite is, however, occasionally conjoined with Dionysus, as in Probl.
30. 953 b 31, ὁρῶς Δίανυσος καὶ Ἀφροδίτη λέγονται μετ’ ἀλλήλων εἴναι,
but this is quite comprehensible, as is also the statement of the
Scholiast on Aristophanes, Ranae 315, συνίδρυται τῇ Δήμητρι ὁ
Δίωνυσος.

30. κατακώχιμοι. See critical note.
31. τοῦθ’, ‘the latter.’ Cp. Plut. Agis c. 7, ἀπὸ δὴ τῶν Ἀκεδαιμο-
νίων ἐπισταρμένας κατηχόουσα διότας ἀλ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ πλείων ἐκείνως τῶν
dημοσίων ἢ τῶν ἰδίων αὐτῶν πολυπραγμονεῖν διδότας, and Lycurg. c. 14,
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μᾶλλον τοῦ προτύπωσα αὐτὰς ἐθερίπευνον καὶ δεσπόινας προσηγήρευον.

ὑπὲρχεν. We have already had ἦσαν in 1269 b 4, and the past tense recurs in 1269 b 37, 1270 a 18, 31, 32, though we find the present in 1270 a 23. Aristotle appears to look back to the days of Lacedaemonian greatness, wishing perhaps to make his criticism of the constitution apply to the time when its apparent success was greatest.

32. ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν, 'at the time when they held the empire of Hellas': cp. c. 10. 1271 b 33, τὴν ἀρχὴν τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ, and Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 1, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς. Aristotle probably refers to the time between the close of the Peloponnesian War and the battle of Leuctra (cp. Xen. Anab. 6. 6. 12 sq., and Diod. 14. 10).

καίτοι κ.τ.λ. The meaning is—'and yet if the rulers of the State are ruled by women, how does this differ from women holding office themselves, of which of course the Spartans would not dream?'

Aristotle's words recall the remark addressed to Gorgo the wife of Leonidas (Plut. Lycurg. c. 14)—εἰποῦσα γὰρ ταύς, ώς ἑκατε, ἔκεις πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς "μόνας τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρχητε ἐμείς αὐτίκαναν," "μόνας γάρ," ἐφη, "τίκτουμεν ἄνδρας." For the construction of διαφέρειν with ἦ, cp. c. 10. 1272 b 13 and Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 19.

35. ἄλλ' εἰπερ, 'but if for any purpose whatever': cp. 7 (5). 11. 1315 a 9, and see Bon. Ind. 217 a 55 sqq.

36. ταύδ', i.e. τὰ τοῦ πολέμου.

37. ἐθηκώσαν δ'. Cp. Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 28: Plutarch, Agesilaus c. 31. Plato may possibly have this circumstance in view in Laws 813 E—814 B. Theopompus seems to have mentioned the fact (Fragm. 291: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 327). As Vict. says (note on 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 32), the Spartan women appear to have behaved far better during the defence of Sparta against Pyrrhus in 272 b.c. (Plutarch, Pyrrhus c. 27).

38. Sus. translates—' for they were of no use any more than women in other States are on similar occasions.' But there is probably a reference to 34, χρησάμον δ' αὐτὴς τὴς ὑμετέρητος πρὸς αὐτέν τῶν ἱγκυκλίων, and I take the meaning to be—'for they were not at all useful, as women are in other States' (i.e. πρὸς τὰ ἱγκυκλίων). Cp. c. 10. 1272 a 40, αὐτέν γὰρ λήμματος τι τοῖς κῶσινοι, διαπερ τοῖς ἐφύρως. Women have often been useful in their own sphere in times of peril from war; for instance, there were 110 baking-women with the force blockaded in Plataea (Thuc. 2. 78).

39. θορυβὸν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Lamb. 'sed tremulationem et tumultum civitati incusserunt maiorem quam hostes.'

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µὲν οὖν, 'indeed' or 'true,' taken up by µὲν οὖν, 1270 a 8, and then answered by σαλατ, 9. Aristotle here seeks to account for the error of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver, whose name he mentions (perhaps out of respect) only once in this chapter (1270 a 7), though oftener in later ones (c. 10. 1271 b 25: c. 12. 1273 b 33, 1274 a 29: also in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 20). He often seeks to account for the errors he corrects (e.g. in 1. 9. 1257 b 40 sqq.), and explains his reason for doing so in Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 a 22 sqq.

1270 a. 2. ἀπεξενύντο. Giph. (p. 245) refers as to the Messenian war to Justin 3. 4, where however Ephorus is the original source (fragm. 53: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 247). Cp. also Aristot. Fragm. 504. 1560 b 17 sqq.

'Αργείοιος. Πάλω (3) seems to imply that the war with Argos preceded the other wars (see Bon. Ind. 559 b 5 sqq.).

4. σχολάσαντες. For the tense, see note on 1271 b 4, ἀρξαντες.

'Ο νομοθέτης does not always, apparently, in this chapter mean Lycurgus (e.g. in 1270 b 19 the reference would seem to be to Theopompus, for it is to him that Aristotle ascribes the establishment of the epohrate in 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 26 sqq.); but here Lycurgus is referred to, as is evident from 1270 a 7. Thus the passage before us would seem to place the date of Lycurgus' legislation after the close of, at all events, the first Messenian War—i.e. according to the ordinary chronology, after B.C. 723. Yet Aristotle makes Lycurgus the guardian of Charilaus, whom the ordinary chronology places about 880 B.C. Triebcr (Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 44–65) illustrates the contradictions in the testimony of the authorities as to the date of Lycurgus, without, however, referring to this passage. Plutarch, indeed, already notes the fact (Lycurg. c. 1). The remarks of Plato (Laws 780–1, esp. 780 B and 781 A) are probably present to Aristotle's mind here. Plato speaks of Lycurgus as having given way in the matter of the women (ἐξακολούθησε τοῦ νομοθέτου, 781 A). The following passage from Plutarch's Life of Lycurgus (c. 14) deserves to be quoted in full—οὐ γὰρ, ὡς 'Αριστοτέλης φησίν, ἐπιχειρήσας σιφρονίζειν τὰς γυναίκας ἑπαινεῖα μὴ κρατῶν τῆς πολλῆς ἀνέσεως καὶ γυναικοκρατίας διὰ τὰς πολλὰς ορταπείς τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν αἷς ἰγακάζων κυρίας ἀπολείπειν ἐκεῖνοι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μάλλον τοῦ προσήκωτος αὐτῶς ἐδερπέτεοι καὶ δαισποιάν προσήγω- ρευόντις ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων τὴν ἐνθεχομένην ἐπιμελείαν ἐποίησατο. Is Plutarch here commenting on the passage of the Politics before us? It is quite possible that he is, for though he connects the γυναικοκρατία with the prolonged absence of the husbands on campaigns far more
distinctly than Aristotle does, and though Aristotle says nothing about the title δεσποινα, there is a great resemblance between what he makes Aristotle say and this passage of the Politics. Perhaps, however, it is more likely that Plutarch is commenting on a passage of the Politics, for Aristotle may have used this work here, as he seems to have done elsewhere in the Politics (see above, p. xvi sq.)

πρωδοποποιημένους. The form πρωδοποποιημένη, πρωδοποιηταί is elsewhere used by Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s. v.), and Liddell and Scott (s. v.) would read πρωδοποποιήσει here. Πρωδοποποίησε, however, as these authorities remark, occurs in Probl. 3o. 1. 954 b 12. See Gottling's note on πρωδοκοινήσει in his edition of [Aristotle,] Oeconomica, p. 74.


6. μέρη, i.e. εἶδή, Bon. Ind. 455 b 46 sqq. (cp. 1271 b 2).

άγειν ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους. Bonitz (Ind. 5 a 47) groups this expression with 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 19, ἄγειν τὰς βασιλείας ἐπὶ τὸ μετρέοντον. In Demosth. adv. Timocyr. c. 31 we have ἄγετα' αὐτούς ὑπὸ τοὺς νόμους.

8. αὐταί μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὐταὶ τῶν γενομένων. 'The causes then of what happened are these': for the omission of the article before αὐτία, see above on 1. 3. 1253 b 11. The causes referred to are the long absence of the husbands and the fact that the women had not been prepared by previous experience to submit to the lawgiver's yoke.


10. τίνι is probably neuter, like τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς in the next line, not masculine. Cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 3. 1146 a 2 sqq.


13. οὐ μόνον κ.τ.λ., i.e. not only spoils the harmony of the constitution taken by itself, but also spoils its influence and has an ill effect on character. The negligence of thelawgiver in relation to women is not only inconsistent with the ἐπιθέσεις of the constitution, but also unfavourable to virtue: cp. 1269 b 12, ἐτε δ' ἡ περὶ τῶν γενομένων ὀνείς καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαιρέσιν τῆς πολιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐπαθείας πόλεως. I incline to the reading αὐτής καθ' αὐτήν, not αὐτvat καθ' αὐτήν, though the latter is the reading both of MS and II². Τὴν φιλοχρηστίαν, because the Spartan fondness for money was well-
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15. γέρ. 'I draw attention to this now, for the arrangements of the State respecting property are my next topic.'

toῖς περὶ τήν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως. Cp. 1270 b 7, τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν.

18. διόσπερ. Property in general falling into a few hands, land did so too. For the fact, cp. Occon. 1. 6. 1344 b 30, πρῶς δὲ φυλακὴν τοὺς τε Περσικοὺς συμφέρει χρῆσθαι καὶ τοῖς Λακωνικοῖς, on which Schömann (Opusc. Acad. 3. 223–4) remarks, that both the Persian and the Laconian methods referred to are designed for 'latifundia.' In what follows (18 sqq.) the unequal distribution of landed property in the Lacedaemonian State is traced in part to the freedom of gift (especially on marriage) and of bequest. But nothing here said excludes the operation of another cause, to which the inequality of wealth in this State is ascribed in 7 (5).

7. 1307 a 34, ἦτι διὰ τὸ πᾶσας τῶν ἀριστοκρατικῶν πολιτείας ὁλιγαρχίας εἶναι μᾶλλον πλευρικοῦσιν οἱ γρόμοι, οἴκῳ καὶ ἐν Λακεδαίμοις εἰς ὁλίγους οἱ οὐσίαι ἔρχονται. For this use of εἰς, compare also Plut. Agis c. 5, τῆς εὐπορίας εἰς ἀλήθειαν συννοίκησε, Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 1 sqq., and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 11, ἐπὶ λαττόνων εἰς ἐξακονών ἔδειξαι, and see Bon. Ind. 222 b 17 sqq.

τοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'This matter'—i. e. probably τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως, though it is evident from what follows (τῆς πάσης χώρας, 23: τῆς χώρας, 29) that the faulty distribution of the land is uppermost in Aristotle's mind. Cp. 32, φαίνως αὐτοὺς εἴχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξειν ταύτην, and 38, βέλτιον τὸ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως ὁμαλοποιήσει πληθεῖν ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν, passages which serve to explain that before us. Aristotle is bound to trace the evil in some degree to the lawgiver, because he is occupied in the Second Book with a criticism of constitutions and lawgivers, and if the faulty distribution of property in the Lacedaemonian State had been due not to ill-conceived laws, but to some other cause, its mention would not have been in place in an attempt to show that the laws of the State were not wholly satisfactory (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 34, διὰ τὸ μὴ καλὸς ἐχεῖν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην δοκῶμεν ἐπιμαλείσθαι τὴν μέθοδον). The remarks which follow (18–39) are interesting, especially because they indicate to some extent how Aristotle intended to deal with the question of property in his 'best State.' We learn from his comments here what we do not
learn from the Fourth Book, that he was in favour of making the citizens' lots of land inalienable and of regulating, or perhaps putting an end to, gift and bequest. He would abolish dowries or limit their amount, and would not allow either a father or his heir to give an heiress in marriage to any one they pleased. See below on 21. We do not learn whether he was, like Plato, in favour of Unigeniture.

19. ο ωνείοσθαί μεν γάρ κ.τ.λ. Μέν here = 'while.' The nom. ο νομοθέτης must be supplied from τῶν νόμων: cp. c. 8. 1268 a 5, if τῶν νομοθέτην is to be supplied there. Is οὐσίαν or γῆν to be supplied here with τῖν ἐπάρχομαι? Probably the latter: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1310 a 13, τὸ μὴ διανείειν εἰς τι μέρος τῆς ἐπαρχομένης ἑκάστῳ γῆς, and 10, ἢν δὲ τὸ γε ἀρχαίον ἐν πολλαῖς πίλευεν νεομοθετημένου μοιδὲ πολεῖν ἐξεῖναι τοῖς πρώτοις κλήροις, and the regulations of Plato in Laws 741 B; cp. also Heraclid. Pont. de Rebuspublicis 2. 7, πολεῖν δὲ γῆν Δακεδαμονίων αἰσχρόν νεομοτιμάτα τῆς δ' ἀρχαίας μοίρας οὐδὲ ἐξεῖναι: and [Plutarch.] Inst. Lac. c. 22 (quoted by Gilbert, Studien, p. 163–5), ἔννοι 8' ἐφαίναν ὅτι καὶ τῶν ξένων ὡς ἄν υπομείνῃ ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν τῆς πολιτείας κατὰ τὸ βασιλεία τοῦ Λυκόφρου μετείχε τῆς ἀρχής διατεταγμένης μοίρας πολεῖν δ' οἷς ἐξήν. Aristotle says nothing here about the 'original share': on the other hand, we see that the purchaser no less than the seller lay under a ban. Polybius (6. 45–46) implies that not only had the land been at the outset divided equally among the citizens, but that this equality of landed property was enforced by law; he also holds in the same passage that all ambition to make money was thoroughly and successfully discountenanced by the Lacedaemonian constitution. In all these contentions he is altogether at issue with Aristotle, who can hardly have credited Lycurgus with an equal division of the land belonging to the citizens, or he would have mentioned the fact in c. 7. 1266 b 14 sqq. and here, and who certainly does not hold that an equality of landed property was enforced by law, or the love of money discouraged. Aristotle, however, would evidently have attached but little value to an equal division of the land unsupported by checks on population and by laws making the lot inalienable and regulating gift and bequest. He refers to the subject of population in 1270 a 39 sqq.: here he dwells on the lawgiver's omission to regulate gift and bequest, and traces the inequality of property in part to this cause. Was this criticism of Aristotle's (or possibly a similar criticism in the Politics) known to the writer whom Plutarch follows in his life of Agis (c. 5)? For here the inequality of property in the Laces-
daemonian State is traced to precisely the same cause—the freedom of gift and bequest—though the error is not ascribed to the original lawgiver, but to an ephor named Epitadeus in the fourth century, who is said to have effected a change in the law, of which Aristotle does not seem to be cognisant (ἐφορευότας δὲ τις ἄνης δυνατός, αὐθάδης δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶς τῶν τρόπων, Ἐπιτάδευς δνομα, πρὸς τὸν νῦν αὐτῷ γενναίης διαφοράς ὑπήραν ἐγεραφέν ἐξείσαι τῶν οἰκον αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν κληρον ὡς τις ἐβελαν καὶ ζώντα δοῦναι καὶ καταληπτέων διαστέμενον). There were evidently two views current in Greece as to the cause of the decline of the Lacedaemonian State: many (e. g. the writer of the fourteenth chapter of Xenophon's treatise de Republica Lacedaemoniorum and of [Plutarch.] Inst. Lac. c. 42) ascribed it to a departure from the laws of Lycurgus; Aristotle, on the contrary, ascribed it to faults in his laws (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 23, ἐτι δὲ τούτῳ γελόσι, εἰ μένοντες εν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενον ἐμποδιζόντος πρῶς τὸ χρήσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποβεβλήκασι τὸ ζην καλῶς). Is it not, to say the least, possible that the writer whom Plutarch follows in this chapter of his Life of Agis, belonged to the former school, and was anxious to save the credit of Lycurgus from the criticism passed on him by Aristotle here or in the Polities? He in effect replies to Aristotle, that Lycurgus was not in fault; the fault was that of Epitadeus and the degenerate Spartans of his day. In just the same way Plutarch (Lycurgus c. 28) will not believe that Lycurgus can have had anything to do with the Crypteia, which Aristotle had attributed to him, or with the illtreatment of the Helots generally, and in another chapter of the same life (c. 14), as we have seen (note on 1270 a 4), will not admit that Lycurgus failed to subject the women to his laws.

21. Διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν κ.τ.λ. We must here again supply τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν γῆν. Vict. 'non vidit idem incommodum nasci ex utroque facto, non minus enim usus venit ut aliqui locupletiores quam oporteat siant posteriore hoc modo quam priore.' A man might impoverish himself and his family and enrich others by giving and bequeathing as easily as by selling. He might, for instance, give or bequeath more than he ought to a favourite son and so leave his other sons poorly off, or he might give or bequeath to some flatterer or legacy-hunter (Plato, Laws 923 B: cp. Aristot. Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 21 sq.) property which ought to have descended to his own children, but Aristotle probably refers especially to the giving and bequeathing of dowries to daughters (cp. 25). If these were large, as they often were at Sparta, the father might impoverish both himself and his sons and enrich husbands perhaps already
sufficiently wealthy, while his own sons, if impoverished, would be little likely to receive large dowries with their brides. Thus the rich would become richer and the poor poorer. The Spartan father, however, seems from what follows to have had not only full power to give and bequeath dowries, but also full power to give and bequeath an εἴκληρος or heiress to any one he pleased. The Attic law also gave this power to the father, though his exercise of the right to bequeath an εἴκληρος was often, it would appear, contested by the relatives, if his will interfered with their claims to her hand (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thalheim, Rechtsalt. p. 57. 1). The Lacedaemonian law, however, seems to have gone further than the Attic, for if the father died leaving an εἴκληρος and without having disposed of her hand by will, the person who inherited the εἴκληρος had full power to give her in marriage to any one he pleased. He was not bound to give her in marriage to a relative; he might give her away to an entire stranger, possibly to a man already rich. In this way again the rich would become richer and the poor poorer. Under the Attic law an εἴκληρος who had not been given or bequeathed in marriage by her father descended to the nearest male relative, who would be entitled to marry her if he chose, but if he did not, would have no right to give her in marriage to any one he pleased: the right to marry her would in fact pass from him to the male relative next in succession. ‘If the person entitled to marry a rich εἴκληρος waived his claim, he left the field open to the claims of less near relatives (Isaeus 3. 74, p. 45, and 10. 5, p. 80), while in the case of a poor εἴκληρος (θήσαρα) the Attic law required the nearest relative to marry her or to give her a dowry’ (Hermann-Thalheim, p. 57. 1). Aristotle holds that property stands a better chance of being evenly distributed when inheritances pass, not by gift or bequest, but by descent, and he recommends oligarchies to adopt this system of succession (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.). Thus, though he would prefer the provisions of the Attic law to those of the Lacedaemonian, he would evidently wish to go far beyond them. He is clearly unwilling to allow even a father to give or bequeath an εἴκληρος to any one he pleased, and he may well have been in favour of abolishing the right of bequest altogether, or at any rate of imposing severe restrictions on it. Plato had adopted the latter course in the Laws (922 E sqq.), where he confines the discretion of testators within narrow limits and exhorts them to remember that their property belongs not to themselves alone, but to their family (γίνοις) and to the whole State (contrast the language of Plutarch as to Solon’s law περὶ διαθήκων, Solon c. 21), while he
prescribes that in the disposal of heiresses not bequeathed in marriage by their fathers regard shall be had to nearness of relationship and to the preservation of the lot, and in fact gives the relatives in a fixed order of succession the right to marry the heiress, thus withholding from the inheritor of the επίκληρος the prerogative which he possessed at Sparta of giving her in marriage to any one he pleased. In the time of Herodotus, if the father had not betrothed his επίκληρος before he died, it fell to the Lacedaemonian King to determine to whom she was to be married (Hdt. 6. 57), but possibly only in case there were more claimants than one for her hand; it would seem, however, that by the time of Aristotle the inheritor of the επίκληρος had come to have the same right to dispose of her hand as her father. There were some who asserted that Lycurgus forbade dowries (see C. F. Hermann, De vestigiis institutorum veterum per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis, p. 24, n. 78, who refers to Hermippus ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 555 C, Aelian, Var. Hist. 6. 6, and Justin 3. 3. 8). In Crete dowries were fixed in amount by law at half a son’s share: this had been mentioned by Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 482) and was probably known to Aristotle. Compare the Gortyna Inscription, col. 4. 48, and see Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 116. The law of Gortyna also placed a maximum limit on gifts (Bücheler und Zitelmann, pp. 125-9), which seem usually to have been left uncontrolled by Greek legislation (Hermann-Thalheim, p. 64). Under the Attic law there was no right of bequest if there were sons (Isaeus 3. 68, p. 45), but if the story of Epitadeus, as Plutarch tells it, is true, testators at Sparta would appear not to have been subject to this restriction, for Epitadeus’ object in introducing the right of bequest is implied to have been to disinherit his own son.

23. καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, i.e. not only belongs to a few but to women. For the fact, cp. Plutarch, Agis c. 4, τῆς τε μητρὸς Ἀγρισετράτας καὶ τῆς μάμμης Ἀρχιδαμίας, αἱ πλείοντα χρήματα Λακεδαιμονίων ἑκέκτηρτο: and c. 7, ἡν δὲ τοῦτο τῶν Λακωνικῶν πλούτων ἐν ταῖς γυναιξὶ τὸ πλείοντον.

24. γυνομένων. The tense indicates a continued occurrence of the circumstance: cp. 1270 b 5.

25. η. For the suppression of ἄν, see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 49. 2.

26. η καί, here apparently ‘or even’: see note on 1264 a 15. νῦν δ’ ἔξεστι, ‘but, as it is, so far from that being the case...’ I do not think, with Bücheler, Sus. (see Sus. 2, Note 30.4), and others, that we are obliged to suppose a lacuna after τετάχθαι. The law,
says Aristotle, ought to fix some limit to the amount of dowries, but, as it is, so far from doing so, it actually allows the father or his representative to give an heiress in marriage to any one they please, or, in other words, to dispose as they like of an entire inheritance. It goes, in fact, quite into an extreme in its complaisance. We often find a contrast between what ought to be and what is drawn, as here, by means of βέλτιον or δεῖ followed by νῦν δὲ (e.g. in 1271a 11–14 and 1273b 21 sqq.).

27. δτω ἄν βούληται. According to Plutarch, Lysand. c. 30 (cp. Stob. Floril. 67. 16), there was a form of action at Sparta (κακογαμίου δίκη) available against those who looked to the wealth rather than the virtue of a family in marriage (cp. Plutarch, Apophth. Lac., Lysand. 15. 230 A). But of this Aristotle seems to know nothing.

28. μη διαθήμενον, 'without having disposed of her hand by will.'

δν ἄν καταλήπη κληρονόμον. For the phrase, cp. Plato, Laws 740 b. Camerarius (p. 99) asks, 'qui autem est heres iste alius praeter illum ἐπίκληρον?' and Coray in his edition of the Politics (p. 276) quotes Harpocration's explanation of ἐπίκληρος—ὑρφανή ἐπι παντὶ τῷ κλήρῳ καταληκμένη, μη δινος αὐτῇ ἀδελφόν. If all the property of the father passed to the ἐπίκληρος, how would it be possible for him to leave a κληρονόμος in addition to the ἐπίκληρος? (It may be noted that Harpocration's account seems not to be literally correct, for there might be more ἐπίκληροι than one (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 64. 11), but that does not concern us here.) The explanation of the enigma probably is, that the κληρονόμος referred to in the passage before us is the κληρονόμος τῆς ἐπίκληρου, the person who inherits the ἐπίκληρος : cp. Demosth. contra Eubulid. c. 41, ἐπίκληρον δὲ κληρονομήσας εὐόρον, and Heraclid. Pont. de Rebuspubl. 28, καὶ ἀποδιοίκουσι τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὡσπερ τάλλα, σύνω καὶ τῆς γυναῖκας κληρονομώσις. C. F. Hermann (Gr. Ant. 3. § 64. 10) quotes Gans, Erbrecht, 1. 339—'diesen' (i.e. this recognition of the ἐπίκληρος) 'liegt durchaus nicht der Begriff zu Grunde, dass sie selbst als Erbende auftreten, sondern dass sie mit dem Vermögen von den Collateralen ererbt werden.' So too Caillemer (Droit de succession à Athènes, p. 40) says that in an ἐπιδικασία for an heiress 'les formes de procédure ressemblaient beaucoup à celles que le législateur avait établies pour les demandes d'envoi en possession d'un heredité.' The κληρονόμος would be 'the nearest adult male relative, or if there should be more than one equally near, the eldest of them' (Sus. 2. Note 305), for we need hardly concern ourselves with the unlikely case of the father naming a κληρονόμος without disposing of his daughter's hand.
20. τοιγαροῦν κ.τ.λ. As the land found its way into fewer and fewer hands, the number of citizens would dwindle, especially as in the Lacedaemonian State the citizen who could not pay his quota to the syssitia lost his political rights. As to the extent of the territory, cp. Isocr. Panath. § 45. (Λακεδαμώνες) ἔχοντες πολὺν ἀλλωτριάν καὶ χώραν οὐ μόνων ἰκανήν, ἀλλ' ὀσφον οὐδεμία πόλις τῶν Ἐλληνίδων. Does Aristotle mean by τῆς χώρας the territory belonging to Spartan citizens both in Laconia and in Messenia, or in Laconia alone, for Messenia had long been lost to the Lacedaemonians, when he wrote? He is probably speaking of the time before Leuctra (cp. ησαυ., 31), and, if so, he refers to Laconia and Messenia together. It is perhaps not necessary to suppose that he means 31,500 ἄργολι, though, as a matter of fact, the Spartans were ἄργοι. If he does, he need not have gone so far as to Babylon to find a parallel to the extent of the State-territory in Plato's Laws. See note on 1267 a 15. As the women who owned land would be married to Spartans, the military strength of the State can hardly have been impaired, however large the number of households may have been in which the family property was derived from the wife, and not from the husband. The evil appears rather to have lain in the concentration of landed property in a few hands, than in its frequent devolution to females. It is, however, no doubt true that female landowners, even when they were free from the vices which Aristotle ascribes to the Spartan women, might be less inclined to use their property for the good of the State than male landowners trained from their earliest years to live for the discharge of their duties as citizens. It does not seem that the feudal plan of proportioning the amount of military service due from the holder of land on military tenure to the amount of land held occurred to the Lacedaemonian lawgiver or to the lawgiver of any other Greek community. If there were no males in the family of the owner, no military service was rendered: the owner was not bound to supply hired military service. Yet the land, whether owned by women or by men, might have been made subject to the burden of supplying a given number of soldiers. It is true that hired military service, though not unknown to the Lacedaemonians, would not have been as satisfactory, or as politically safe, as that of citizens.

31. αὐτῶν, 'by themselves,' apart from any reasoning.

32. φαύλως, an epithet frequently applied in this book of the Politics to defective social and political arrangements (e.g. in 1271 b 10, c. 10. 1272 b 7, c. 11. 1273 a 36, b 8). Οὐ καλῶς (1271 a 26, etc.) is a somewhat milder expression.
33. μίαν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Leuctra, of course, is meant. Cp. Isocr. Archid. § 56, τίνας γὰρ ὠμον, ὄν καὶ ποιήσασθαί μνεῖαιν ἄξον ἐστίν, οὖτως ἀπὸ ἡπτάδες καὶ μὲν εἰσβάλης γενομένης, οὔτως ἀπὸ ἡπτάδες ἐκμακρύνθησαν πάντα τὰ προστατικά μακρὰς ποιήσεως; and Polyb. 4. 81. 12. The power of Carthage, Athens, and Syracuse had survived several defeats.

34. τὴν ὀλιγανθρωπίαν, ‘its paucity of citizens,’ or possibly ‘its well-known paucity of citizens’: for the meaning of ὀλιγανθρωπία, see 3. 5. 1278 a 31. Xenophon (Rep. Lac. c. 1) had already spoken of Sparta as τῶν ὀλιγανθρωποτάτων πολέων οὔσα: cp. also Isocr. Panath. §§ 255, 257.

λέγουσι δ' ὡς κ.τ.λ. On μίν not followed by δὲ, see above on 1262 a 6. The suppressed clause evidently is, ‘but that now they do not, or rather perhaps, ‘though they do not now.’ Sus.² (Note 310) thinks that the Aegeidae and Talthybiadae, old families of non-Doric extraction, are referred to. The case of the Epeunacti, as to whom see Theopomp. Fragm. 190 (Müller, Fr. Hlst. Gr. 1. 310), is, however, also to the point. Trieber (Forschungen, p. 101) suggests that Aristotle here has in view the statement of Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 364 sub fin.), τὴν δὲ Σπάρτην (Εὔρισθένη καὶ Προκλῆ) βασιλείον ἀποθήκη σφίσιν αὐτοῖς· εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀλλὰς πέμψα βασιλείας, ἐπιτρέπασθαι δέχεσθαι συνοκούσ τοῖς βουλομένουσι τῶν ἔλεοι διὰ τὴν λειπανθρίαν: but this seems to refer to the Perioecic cities, not to Sparta. Alcman the Lydian is said to have become a Spartan in an epigram which is given in Anth. Pal. 7. 709 and in Plutarch, de Exilio c. 2. Herodotus, on the other hand, knows only of two men, Tisamenus and Hegias, who were ever made Spartan citizens (9. 35).

35. On ὅστ' οὖ γίνεσθαι, see Appendix B to Shilleto's edition of Demosthenes de Falsa Legatione.

36. πολεμοῦντων, ‘though engaged in war’: cp. 1271 b 12 and c. 5. 1264 a 32.

καὶ φασιν κ.τ.λ. Τοῖς Σπαρταῖσις, cp. 1271 b 10, φαύλως δὲ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ καυὴ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρταῖσις, and 1270 b 8, αὐτοῖς. Demaratus (Hdt. 7. 234) makes Sparta a city of 8000 citizens at the time of the invasion of Xerxes. Nine thousand lots are said by Plutarch (Lyc. c. 8) to have been assigned to Spartans by Lycurgus. Isocrates, on the contrary, puts their number at 2000 only even in the earliest times (Panath. § 255), and contrasts Sparta with αἱ μνημίαθροι πόλεις (§ 257).

38. βέλτιον, i.e. better than populousness obtained by the admission of strangers to citizenship: cp. Plutarch, Agis c. 6, καλῶν ὥρ αγις, ὥσπερ ἤν, ποιούμενος ἔξισωσα καὶ ἰσοπλημέναι τὴν πόλιν.
40. ταύτην τήν διόρθωσιν, i.e. the correction of ὀλιγαρθωσία by means of an equalization of property. For, though this law tends to promote an increase of population, it does nothing to equalize property; on the contrary, it tends to increase the number of pauper citizens and to add to their poverty, thus intensifying the existing disparities of wealth. It encourages parents to bring offspring into the world for whose maintenance no land is available. Plato may possibly have this Lacedaemonian law before him, when he says (Laws 740 D), μηχανεί δ' εἰσὶ πολλαί: καὶ γὰρ ἐπισκέψεις γενέσεως οἷς ἀν εἴρην γίνεσι, καὶ τοιναυτίον ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ σπουδὴν πλῆθους γεννηματίων εἰσὶ τιμαίοις τε καὶ ἀτημίασι καὶ νουθετήσει πρεσβυτῶν περί νέων κ.τ.λ.

1270 b. 2. προαγεῖα. Spengel (Aristotelische Studien 3. 16): 'imo προαγεῖα.' The middle does not seem to be used in this sense by Aristotle elsewhere (see Bon. Ind. s. v.), but a reference to Liddell and Scott will show that it is thus used by other authors.

3. νόμος, 'a law': cp. c. 10. 1272 a 15, εἰ δὲ μὴ, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τῆς πολιτείας, and Isaeus De Apollodor. Hered. § 30, καὶ οὐ μῶνοι ἴδια τάστα γινόσκοιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὔτω ταύτ᾽ ἐγνωκεν, νόμων γὰρ τῷ ἀρχούται τῶν ὀκὼν, ὡς ἄν μὴ ἐξερημωσται, προστάτει τήν ἐπιμέλειαν. Νόμος takes up ο νομοδέθης.

4. ἀφρουρον. 'Φρουράν Lacones dicebant τήν στρατείαν, ut in nota illa formula οἱ ἐφόροι ἐφήμαν φρουράν, Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 59' (Schn.).

6. πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πένητας. Sus. 'many poor must come into being': Mr. Welldon, 'there will inevitably be a large body of poor': but I incline to translate (with Prof. Jowett) 'many must necessarily fall into poverty' (cp. c. 7. 1266 b 13, φαίλον τὸ πολλοὺς ἐκ πλούσιων γίνεσθαι πένητας). The father of several sons would be likely to become a poor man, and the sons still poorer.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. This subject naturally follows. There being many poor men among the citizens, and all being eligible for the ephorship, the corruption of the ephorship followed from the unequal distribution of property.

8. αὐτή, 'by itself': cp. αὐτογράμματα, 29.

αὐτοῖς, Bernays connects αὐτοῖς with τῶν μεγίστων, translating 'über die wichtigsten Angelegenheiten Sparta's' (Mr. Welldon, 'issues of the highest importance to the Lacedaemonian State'), but perhaps αὐτοῖς should be connected with the sentence generally and translated 'amongst them' or 'in the Lacedaemonian State' (cp. 1271 a 35, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτοῖς ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, and c. 10. 1272 a 27, τοὺς Κρήταν ἥ τοῖς Λάκωσι).

γίνονται κ.τ.λ. As to the nature of the distinction between the
demons and the καλοὶ κάγαθοί in the Lacedaemonian State, see Schömann, Opusc. Acad. i. 138. It is not necessarily implied here that none but members of the demos ever became ephors; the meaning is, that all the seats in the college of ephors were as open to the demos as to anybody else (cp. 25, καθώσις ἕξ ἀπώτων, and c. 6, 1265 b 39). It appears from 1271 a 3, however, that the senators also, though presumably καλοὶ κάγαθοί, were often bribeable.

10. ἦσαν. The tense is noticeable. Is it used because Aristotle is speaking here, as elsewhere in this chapter, of the time of the Lacedaemonian empire, or because he looks back to definite instances of corruption arising from poverty?

11. ἐθήλωσαν. Vict. 'sc. se esse tales ut muneribus facile labefacti possint': cp. ἐθήλωσαν δὲ, 1269 b 37.

ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδριώτις, 'in the events at Andros,' 'in the Andros business': cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 38, μετὰ τὰ τυραννικά: Isocr. περὶ τοῦ θεύους § 25, τὴν δ' εὕρων ἦν εἰκὼν εἰς τὸ πλῆθος, ἐν τοῖς τυραννικοῖς ἐπεδείξασθε συγγενεῖς γὰρ ὅτες Πεισιστράτων κ.τ.λ.: and τὰ Κύπρια, the subject of an Epic poem, Aristot. Poet. 23. 1459 b 1. It is quite unknown to what Aristotle here refers, but I venture to suggest whether it is not possible that certain events of the year 333 B.C. are referred to. In that year the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus and Autophradates advanced from Chios first to Andros and then to Siphnos (nearer to Laconia), with the object of bringing about a rising in Greece against Macedon, and thus effecting a diversion in favour of Persia at the critical moment when Alexander was commonly thought to be 'caught and cooped up in Cilicia' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 12. 157 n.). We have, indeed, no record of any negotiations between the ephors and the Persian admirals while the fleet was at Andros, though we know from Diodorus (17. 29) that the Lacedaemonians were already on the side of Persia, and that Memnon had won over many of the Greeks by means of bribes; but at Siphnos King Agis made his appearance in a single trireme, and commenced negotiations for a subsidy and for the despatch of a fleet and an army to his aid in the war which he was contemplating with Macedon. The news of Issus, however, arrived in the midst of these communications and nipped the project in the bud (see A. Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 3. 1. 163, who refers to Arrian 2. 13. 4 sq.; Curt. 4. 1. 37). If, as is probable, the ephors sent Agis on this errand, Aristotle may well have thought that they came near to ruining their country. Τὴν πίσι, 13, in any case probably means
the Lacedaemonian State, not Andros, for the fact that the corruptness of the Ephors nearly ruined Andros would not be to the point: Aristotle has to prove that it was perilous to their own State. If events of 333 B.C. are really referred to, the circumstance would be interesting, because it would show that this passage was added to, if not written, subsequently to that date. I mention the hypothesis for what it is worth.


δημαγωγεῖν. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 24 sqq. According to Plutarch, Agesilaus was fined by the ephors on one occasion for seeking to court the senators (De Fraterno Amore, c. 9, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοροί, τοῦ 'Ἀγγελίαν τῶν ἀποδεκυμένων οἱ γερῶντων έκάστην βοῶν ἀριστεῖν πέμποντος, ἔξημισαν αὐτὸν αἰτήν υπειπόντες, ὅτι τοὺς κοινοὺς λαὸν κτάτα δημαγωγῶν καὶ χαριζόμενοι).

15. ὡστε κ.τ.λ., 'so that, together with the kingship itself, the constitution received injury in this way also' (i.e. it suffered not only through the venality of the ephors, but also through the kings being forced to court them).

16. δημοκρατία γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Sepulv. 'nam ex optimatum imperio in principatum popularem mutabatur' (sc. respublica), and so Sus. and others, but the expression ἡ πολιτεία συνέβαιν δημοκρατία seems a strange one, and it is possible that δημοκρατία is the subject, not the predicate: cp. Plato, Rep. 545 C, τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένον ἐν εὖ ἀριστοκρατίας. For συνέβαιν, cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 23.


μὲν οὖν, 'true' or 'indeed,' answered by ἄλλα, 26. Aristotle has just been saying that the organization of the ephorate was such as to injure the constitution, and he now admits its value in holding the constitution together, only to reaffirm (ἄλλα ἀρετὴν ἑδει κ.τ.λ., 26) his statement respecting its defects of organization.

19. διὰ τῶν νομοθέτων, 'owing to the lawgiver': cp. c. 11. 1273 b 22, and δὲ ἀρετήν, c. 5. 1263 a 29. It would seem that Theopompos must be referred to here: cp. 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 26 sqq. 'Plerumque γίγνεται ἀπὸ τῆς νῆς dicitur, sed etiam διὰ τῆς νῆς, Phys. 2. 4. 195 b 32: Rhet. 1. 10. 1368 b 34' (Bon. Ind. 780 b 40 sq.). See critical note.

21. δεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. All the MSS. have the word ταύτα after διαμένειν, except P¹ O¹, which have ταυτά, and P⁴, which has ταύς (Vet. Int. 'has'). Ar. has 'oportet enim rempublicam quae duratura sit velle ut omnes civitatis partes constant atque in statu
su permancant': he therefore probably read ταυτά. But if we retain this word, την πολιτείαν must, it would seem, be the subject of βουλεύσαι. The next sentence (23–26), however, certainly reads as if, not την πολιτείαν, but πάντα τα μέρη were the subject of βουλεύσαι, and this impression will be confirmed, if we compare c. 10. 1272 a 32 sq.: c. 8. 1268 a 23 sqq.: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 36 sqq.: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14 sqq., especially as εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν is used of constitutions in 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 38–40, αιτήται μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αἰτῶν (i.e. democracy and oligarchy) εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ἀνευ τῶν εἰπόρων καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 12). It is true that we gather from 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 15 and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16 sqq. that the safety of a constitution is sufficiently secured, if the stronger section of the elements of the State, not necessarily all of them, desire its preservation, but nevertheless I incline on the whole to think that ταυτά should be omitted. It may have been added by some one who deemed it necessary for the completion of the sentence, or it may be a blundered dittography of πάντα, 21: a dittography of τα ἄλλα occurs in 1. 8. 1256 b 18, where II appear to repeat these words from 16 (see Susenihl's apparatus criticus). Schneider would omit ταυτά or read την αὐτήν in place of it; Bernays would read κατά ταυτά. On the phrase μέρη τῆς πόλεως, which comes to Aristotle from Plato, Rep. 552 A, see vol. i. Appendix A. The 'parts of the State' are here βασιλείς, καλοὶ κάγαθοι, and δήμοι—quite a different enumeration from those given in 4 (7). 8 and 6 (4) 4.

23. μεν οὖν, 'saepus usurpatur ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur' (Bon. Ind. 540 b 42): so here πάντα τά μέρη are successively taken up and considered separately: a similar use of μεν οὖν occurs in Soph. El. 6. 169 a 18 sqq.

τιμήν. Aristotle occasionally applies the term ἄρχη to a Kingship (e.g. in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 8 and 2. 11. 1273 a 30).


28. παιδαριώδης. The same thing is said in 1271 a 9 sq. of the κρίσεις in the election of senators. Susenihil has already pointed out (Sus. 2, Note 324) that the condemnation here passed on the method of electing ephors is not thus limited. We learn from Plutarch, Lyc. c. 26, how elections to the γερουσία were decided. The test was the comparative loudness of the shouts of approval evoked on the appearance in the popular assembly of the different candidates. Plato's language as to the ephorate—
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ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαγῶν δυνάμεως (Laws 692 A: cp. 690 C)—has led to the conjecture that the election of the ephors was in some way or other determined by auspices. See Sus.², Note 324, and Schömann, Gr. Alterth. 1. 247. Schömann suggests that the people may have designated a certain number of persons for the ephorate, and that five of those designated may have been selected for the office by taking the auspices. The language of Aristotle in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 29 sq. has been held to imply that the people did not elect to the ephorate, and the passage before us does not expressly say that they did, though it implies that the office was in some sense an elective one (cp. Isocr. Panath. § 154). In c. 10. 1272 a 31 sqq. we have ἐνταῦθα δ' (in Crete) οὐκ ἐξ ἀπάντων αἱροῦνται τοὺς κόσμους, and as Aristotle is here contrasting the election of the cosmi with that of the ephors, his language might be taken to imply that the Lacedaemonians elected the ephors, if it were certain that we should supply οἱ Κρῆτες with αἱροῦνται. But in c. 11. 1272 b 36 αἱροῦνται is used of the election of the Hundred and Four at Carthage, who were not elected by the people, if they were identical with the Hundred, for the Hundred were elected by the Pentarchies (c. 11. 1273 a 14). All we can be sure about, therefore, is that the ephors were elected in a way which Aristotle regarded as ‘very childish.’ He evidently thinks that the office might safely remain open to all, if the mode of election were improved. He seems, in fact, to hold that the ‘very poor’ and ‘venal’ men of whom he speaks (1270 b 9 sq.) would not then be elected ephors.

κρίσεων . . . μεγάλων. Sus.² compares 3. 1. 1275 b 9, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικαίως τῶν εὐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας. Add 8 (6), 2. 1317 b 26, περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγάστων καὶ τῶν κυριοτάτων, οἷον περὶ εὐθυνῶν καὶ πολιτείας καὶ τῶν ἱδιῶν συναλλαγμάτων.

30. κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους. For the omission of the article before γράμματα, see Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq. Καί is explanatory, as in c. 5. 1263 a 15. The recently discovered Inscription containing a portion of the laws of Gortyna refers to its own provisions as τάδε τὰ γράμματα (col. 12. 17), οὐ τὰ ἐγραμένα (col. 1. 54).

31. καὶ ἡ διάστα. Their mode of life as well as their powers, which in effect turn an ἀριστοκρατία into a democracy, 16. Cp. Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 31. Plato (Laws 674 A sq.) forbids wine to magistrates during their year of office. He does not seem, however, to have been aware of any excesses on the part of the ephors: see Laws 637 A. The ephors did not take their meals at the public mess-tables, but had a συνσώτιον of their own (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 57, who refers to Plutarch, Cleom. c. 8).
32. το βουλήματι τής πόλεως, ‘the aim of the State.’ We expect rather τον νομοθέτου (cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 4), or τής πολιτείας (Scaliger), and the words πόλις and πολιτεία are often interchanged in the MSS.: still τής πόλεως is possible.

άυτή μὲν γάρ, ‘for that’ etc.: compare the use of αὐτήν in 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 21, and see Vahlen on Poet. 15. 1454 b 17.

33. τοῖς ἀλλοις, sc. πολιταῖς (Coray).

μάλλον, ‘rather than in the opposite direction,’ as in c. 11. 1273 a 6, or = λίαν, as in c. 6. 1265 a 31? Probably the former.

ὑπερβάλλει, sc. η διαίτη (Bon. Ind. 684 a 39). For the fact, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 12 sqq.

34. λάθρα τῶν νόμων ἀποδιδράσκοντας. Aristotle has here in his mind the language of Plato about the Spartans in Rep. 548 B, λάθρα τῶν ἕδωκαν καρποίμενα, ὠσπερ παιδες πατέρα, τῶν νόμων ἀποδιδράσκοντας. The expression, however, was perhaps first used by Alcibiades: see Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 37. Lysander was said to be one of these recreants (Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 8). Dercyllidas also liked to live away from Sparta (Xen. Hell. 4. 3. 2: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 15). As to the Spartan Archidamus, see Theopomp. Fr. 250 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 322).

37. ἐπιεικῶν μὲν γάρ κ.τ.λ. Xenophon had adduced the arrangements respecting the senate in proof of the care taken by the lawgiver of the State to encourage καλοκαίραβια even in old age (de Rep. Lac. c. 10. 1); he had already dwelt (c. 4) on the lawgiver’s skill in developing ἄνθρωπαβια in the young (c. 4. 1–2). ἄνθρωπαβια is rather a Xenophontic than an Aristotelian word (Aristotle would seem from Bonitz’ Index to use it nowhere else), and perhaps the aim of this passage is to controvert the opinion of Xenophon. As to the meaning of ἄνθρωπαβια, see L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen 1. 301 sq. Xenophon, according to him, used it in much the same sense as ἀριθμή, to denote ‘moral perfection.’ Συμφέρων, sc. ταύτην τήν ἀρχήν.

39. Aristotle seems to have held that judges of important causes should not retain their office after a certain age, for there is an old age of the mind as well as of the body. The view is noticeable, for we are familiar with the opposite practice. He apparently would not approve the life-long tenure of the members of the Athenian Areopagus. The best men in his own ideal State become priests in advanced life. Plato is of much the same opinion (Laws 755 A: 923 B): extreme old age in parents is for reverence rather than for u-c (Laws 931). The γιορτασις of the Lacedaemonian State tried cases of homicide (3. 1. 1275 b 10). As to διανοιας γήρας,

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however, contrast de An. i. 4. 408 b 19 sqq., though this passage may perhaps be only aporetic (see Wallace ad loc.), and compare Rhet. 2. 13. Giph. compares Lucr. 3. 445 sqq. For ὀσπερ καὶ answered by καὶ, Sus. (Ind. Gramm. s. v. ὀσπερ) compares c. 8. 1269 a 9 sqq.

1271 a. 2. ἀπιστεῖν, cp. 23 sqq. Contrast Polyb. 6. 10. 9, τῶν γερίστων, ὥστε καὶ ἐκλογὴν ἠριστικήν κεκριμένοι πάντες ἐμεῖλλον ἣτι τὸ δικαίω προσνε-μεν ἕαυτοις.

3. φαίνονται δὲ κ.τ.λ. ‘And it is evident that those who have enjoyed this dignity have often been led by bribery and favouritism to deal recklessly with the public interests.’ I have ventured (with Lamb. and others) to connect πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν not only with καταχαριζόμενοι but also with καταδιωκοκόμενοι, though this use of καταδιωκοκόμενοι (med.) is uncommon and hardly finds a complete parallel in Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 377; ὅτι γὰρ ταύτα ἀπίστευτα ἐνδιώκεται καὶ τιμὴν ἐχουσιν ἀπαίτων τοὺς ὑποτατοὶ (‘they have done this because they have been bribed,’ Shilleto), for the acc. here is of the thing done, not of the thing betrayed. Sepulv., Vict., Bern., and Sus., in fact, take πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν with καταχαριζόμενοι only. They may be right, but the sentence seems to read rather the other way.

5. ἀνευόμους. Ἀυτεύθυνος is common in Aristotle: ἀνευόμους occurs only here, according to Bonitz’ Index.

6. δόξεις δ’ ἐν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4, ἐφοροὶ οὖν ἱκα-νοὶ μὲν ἐστὶν ξημοῦν ὡν ἄν βουλουνται, κύριοι δ’ ἐκπράττειν παραχρήμα, κύριοι δὲ καὶ ἄρχονται μεταξὺ καταπαύσαι καὶ εἰρθαί γε καὶ περὶ τῆς ψυ-χῆς εἰς ἄγωνα καταστήσασαι: they have also the power to inflict immediate punishment on elected magistrates for any infraction of the laws, as tyrants and the superintendents of the great festivals have. Aristotle does not approve this mode of exacting an account. He regards the power of the ephors as ἰσοτύραννοι (1270 b 14) and probably wishes it to be regulated by law (cp. c. 10. 1272 b 5–7). The Athenian plan of requiring a public account from the magistrate at the close of his term of office would evidently be inapplicable or unsatisfactory in the case of magistracies held for life. It would seem from Rhet. 3. 18. 1419 a 31 that the ephors held office subject to accountability.

8. οὐ τούτῳ. ‘Ad augendam oppositionis vim negatio, quae poterat ad universum enunciatum referri, ipsi nomini negato praeponitur, veluti 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 6: 2. 7. 1267 a 15’ etc. (Bon. Ind. 539 a 5).

9. τὴν αἰρέσιν. For the acc. cp. c. 6. 1265 a 13. The subject
of approaching comment is first mentioned (in the acc.), and then the comment follows. The regulation which determines who may become candidates is distinguished from the selection (κρίσις), both being incidents of ή αύγωσις. Perhaps κρίσις was the technical term: at all events both Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. 10. 1, 3) and Plutarch (Lyc. c. 26) use it in referring to the election of the senators at Sparta. This election was, in fact, an αύγωσις, in which the prize was awarded to the best and most temperate of the candidates (see Xenophon and Plutarch, ubi supra). Plutarch describes the process, which seems, as Sus.2 (Note 333) says, to be a peculiar development of the rude old-fashioned method of voting by 'cry.' In 7 (5). 6. 1366 a 18 the process of choosing senators at Elis is said to be δύναστευτική, and similar to the same process in the Lacedaemonian State. Thus the childish method followed in the latter State seems somehow to have favoured the predominance of a few wealthy families. Contrast with Aristotle's account of the election of the Lacedaemonian senate those of Isocrates (Panath. § 154) and Polybius (6. 10. 9).

10. αἰτεῖσθαι, 'ask to be elected,' 'offer himself for election.' I do not think that the making of 'a personal canvass' (Mr. Welldon) is necessarily implied.


13. νῦν δ’ ὀπερ κ.τ.λ. We have just been told what ought to be: now we are told what is: compare for the contrast of δεῖ and νῦν δεῖ 1270 a 25 sq. and c. 11. 1273 b 21 sqq.

14. φιλοτιμοῦσα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Sepulveda (who seems to read τοίτῳ) translates (p. 55): 'ut enim cives ambitiosos redderet, hanc senatores deligendi rationem invito, cum nemo non ambitiosus imperio se praefici petat.' Mr. Welldon also reads τοίτῳ and translates in much the same way. It seems to me that this view of the passage is the right one, and that τοίτῳ (cp. c. 11. 1273 b 20 and 3. 5. 1278 a 31 sq.), not τούτως, is the true reading: I translate, therefore, 'for it is in his anxiety to make his citizens emulous of distinction, that he has adopted this regulation for the election of senators'—the regulation that the future senator must ask to be elected—'for' etc. To require men to ask to be elected is to make φιλοτιμία a condition of the attainment of the highest honours, and so to encourage the citizens to be φιλοτιμοῖ. Sus. and others read τοίτῳ but explain it as = τῷ φιλοτιμῷ. If τούτως is read (with II² Bekk.), then we must translate, 'for in his anxiety to make his citizens emulous of distinction, he makes use of men of this type in filling vacancies
in the senate'; but τούτων κέχρησαι πρὸς τὴν ἀρέσιν τῶν γερόντων is an awkward way of expressing this.

16. τῶν γ' ἄδικημάτων τῶν ἐκουσίων. Π ² Bekk, read τῶν γ' ἄδικη- μάτων ἐκουσίων, and it is not impossible that instances might be found of a similar displacement of the adjective when emphatic (compare, for instance, Plato, Laws 713 D, ταύτων δή καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα 

φιλάνθρωπος ὄν τὸ γένος ἀμεινὸν ἡμῶν ἐξίστη τοῦ τῶν δαιμόνων: Theopomp. Fr. 143 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 302), ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἄροτων τρίτων καὶ σπώρων ή ὡρα γ', but the probability here is that, ἄδικημάτων immediately preceding τῶν, the latter word was omitted in copying by a natural and frequent error of copyists. The words imply that ἄδικηματα ἀκούσια are possible; contrast Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 a 15-23. For the view expressed in this passage, cp. Plato, Laws 870: Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 7. 'I would rather,' said Dr. Johnson, 'have the rod to be the general terror to all to make them learn, than tell a child, if you do thus or thus, you will be more esteemed than your brothers and sisters.' For other accounts in the Politics and elsewhere of the causes of ἄδικα, see note on 1267 a 5. Plato says of the timocratic State (Rep. 548 C)—διαφανεστάτους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἔστιν ἐν τι μόνον ὧπ' τοῦ θυμοειδές κρατοῦσας, φιλονεκία καὶ φιλοστίμως.

19. μὲν is probably not taken up either by ἀλλὰ μὴν...γε, 20 or by δε, 22: it seems here as in 1270 a 34 to stand by itself, the course of the sentence being broken at ἀλλὰ μὴν.

20. ἄλλος ἐστώ λόγος, 3. 14-17. ἀλλὰ μὴν...γε, 'but certainly': cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 18, 1277 a 25, and see Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 103.

21. μὴ καθ' ἄλλως, 3. 11. Göttl, 'intellige катα τὸ γένος.' Cp. on this subject c. 11. 1272 b 38-41. Aristotle appears to have agreed with Lysander, if the object of the latter was not, as some thought (7 (5). 1. 1301 b 19 sq.), the abolition of the kingship, but the opening of it to the best men irrespectively of descent. Lysander's scheme was, according to Ephorus (ap. Plutarch. Lysand. c. 30), ὁς χρή τῶν Εὐρωποτιδῶν καὶ Ἀγαδάν τὴν βασιλείαν ἀφελομένους εἰς μέσον θείαν καὶ ποιείσθαι τὴν ἀρέσιν ἐκ τῶν ἀριστῶν—a sentence continued as follows in the version of the same story given in [Plutarch,] Apophth. Lac. 229 E sqq. (Lysand. 14), ὡς μὴ τῶν ἀδ' Ἡρακλέους, ἀλλ' οίος Ἡρακλῆς τῇ ἀρτῇ κρινομένων τὸ γέρας γ', γ' κάκειος εἰς δεων τιμᾶς ἀνίχθη. Cp. also Plutarch, Comp. Lysandri et Sullae c. 2. Aristotle does not approve of the restriction of the kingship to the Heraclids, nor of the mode in which the kings were selected from their number. The merits of a father or a family should not help the son; his claims should be decided according to the life led by
him personally (cp. for βίων Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 18 sq., and for κρίνεις Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 30). Aristotle's language reminds us of the views expressed in the composition of Lysander, the substance of which appears to be given in the passage from the Apophthegmata Laconica quoted above.

22. ὃ τι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ. The connexion perhaps is—'it is impossible to make sure of educating men taken simply on grounds of seniority from a given family (1272 b 40) into models of manhood, and this the lawgiver himself seems virtually to admit.' Ποιεῖν 23, sc. τούς Βασιλίας.

24. συμπρεσβευτάς, i.e. with the kings or one of them. Two ephors usually accompanied the king on campaigns, and it is to their presence, according to Schömann (Gr. Alterth. i. 250), that Aristotle here refers. If so, however, the use of the word συμπρεσβευτάς seems strange. It is more likely that Aristotle refers to occasions on which the kings were sent on embassies. The lawgiver is here viewed as the author of these administrative traditions.

25. σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει κ.τ.λ. Contrast c. 2. 1261 a 30, διότι τὸ ἵσον τὸ ἀντιπεπεμβόλου σώζει τὰς πόλεις, and Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 19, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἑστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως.

26. οὗ καλῶς δ' οὔδε κ.τ.λ. The defect in the arrangements respecting the syssitia here noticed does not seem to have occurred to Plato: cp. Laws 842 B.

28. ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, 'at the public expense': see the references in Liddell and Scott s.v. In c. 10. 1272 a 20 we have ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι: in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 19, τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως. For the Cretan system, cp. c. 10. 1272 a 12 sqq. For τῷ σύνοδον ('meeting' or 'gathering'), Bonitz (Ind. 731 b 25) compares 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 10: 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32. Compare also Plato, Laws 640 A, and Theaet. 173 D.

30. καὶ intensifies σφάδρα ('though some citizens are extremely poor' etc.).

32. βουλεταί μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'For he intends' etc. Cp. c. 6. 1265 b 40 sq. The rich are said (Plutarch, Lyc. c. 11) to have been violent in their opposition to the institution of syssitia.

33. κατασκεύασμα, 'device' perhaps rather than 'institution' (Lamb. 'inventum'). Compare the use of the word in 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 19-30.

γίνεται. See note on 1264 a 14.

35. ὅπος δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and this is the traditional standard by which participation in the advantages of the constitution is regulated in
the Lacedaemonian State.' Cp. c. io. 1272 a 15, el de μή, μετέχειν νόμος κωλύει τής πολιτείας, καθάπερ εἰρηνα καὶ πρότερον, and Plato, Rep. 551 A–B, a passage which throws light on the meaning of ὄρος τῆς πολιτείας here. In 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 11 the phrase seems to bear a different meaning, 'the criterion of a democratic constitution.'

38. καὶ ἑτεροί τιμεῖς. 'Critiae tyranni Lacedaemonii πολιτείαν vel similis libros respici probabile est,' Bon. Ind. 822 a 37 sq.

39. στάσεως, as in Lysander's case, 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 19 sq.:

ἐπί γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεύσιν. Bonitz (Ind. 268 b 36) compares Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 9, ἐπὶ τούτους, 'practerea,' apparently making the meaning 'for in addition to the kings,' but perhaps something more than this is meant—'as a check upon the kings' (cp. 1271 a 23 sq. : 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 36, ὁ πρὸς θουδουκαθεστάτοι ἐπὶ τοῖς βουλευταίς).

40. οὕσι στρατηγοῖς αἵδιοις. Cp. 3. 15. 1285 b 38. These words are probably added to show how it is that the Admiralship can fairly be called an additional Kingship. It is because the Kingship is nothing more than a perpetual Generalship. It should be noted that an αἵδιος ἀρχή is apparently distinguished from one held for life in Polyb. 6. 45. 5.


3. χρησίμη. 'Feminini forma et χρήσιμος et (fortasse paullo rarius) χρησίμων exhibetur' (Bon. Ind. 854 b 19).

4. ἀπαλλυντο δὲ ἀρξαντες. Cp. 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 6, αἱ γὰρ πλείους τῶν τοιούτων πάλιν πολεμοῦσα μὲν σώζονται, κατακτησάμεναι δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπαλλυνται. For ἀρξαντες in the sense of 'having acquired empire,' cp. σχολάδες, 1270 a 4, and κοινωνίςαντες, c. 5. 1263 b 28, and see Schömann's note on ἐφορεύσας δὲ τις ἀνὴρ δυνατός in his edition of Plutarch's Agis and Cleomenes, p. 106. As to the fact, see Plutarch, Agis 5. 1. The ruin of the Lacedaemonian State is also traced to ὀλγανθρωπία in 1270 a 33, but the deeper cause of it is now for the first time dwelt upon. A fuller culture, moral and intellectual, would have taught the Spartans to resist the temptations of their newly acquired wealth and power: cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 22–34. Ephor us had said much the same thing of the Thebans in a striking passage of his history (Fr. 67: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 254): compare also Plutarch's remarks on the character of Marius (Marius c. 2).


τούτου δὲ κ.τ.λ. The fault now noticed is hinted by Plato, Laws
661 D-662 B. Isocrates had said much the same thing (Panath. §§ 187-8. 228). Aristotle virtually repeats the charge in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9; cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1248 b 37 sqq. He finds much the same fault with Carthage in c. 11. 1273 a 37 sqq.

7. τάγαθά τά περιμάχητα are goods for which the many strive (cp. Rhet. 1. 6. 1363 a 8 sqq.), such as wealth, honours, bodily pleasures, Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 16 sqq.


10. φαύλως δε ἔχει κ.τ.λ. In this passage the words of Archidamus (Thuc. 1. 80. 4)—οὕτε ἐν κοινῷ ἐχαμεν (χρηματα) οὕτε ἐτοίμως ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων φέρομεν—seem to be present to the mind of Aristotle. Polybius (6. 49. 8 sqq.) draws a contrast between the Lacedaemonian and Roman States in this respect.

11. οὕτε ἀπ' τε. ‘Not only is there nothing in the public treasury, but they also are slow to pay extraordinary contributions.’ For οὕτε followed by τε, cp. c. 10. 1272 b 19 sqq.

ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, ‘in the public treasury.’ See Liddell and Scott s.v. for this sense of the word; they refer among other passages to Thuc. 6. 8. 2, καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὡς ἐκ ἐτοίμα ἐν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς πολλά καί ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς.

12. ἀναγκαζομένοις, ‘though they are compelled’: cp. c. 5. 1264 a 32 and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 12.

13. διὰ γάρ κ.τ.λ. Here most of the territory is said to belong to the citizens. In Plutarch’s life of Lycurgus (c. 8), on the contrary, we are told that Lycurgus made 9000 lots for the Spartans and 30,000 for the Perioeci, nor is there anything to show that the Spartan lots were larger than the Perioecic. In the division made by Agis (Plutarch, Agis c. 8)—4500 Spartan lots against 15,000 for Perioecic hoplites—much the same proportion obtains. It is very possible (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 34 sq.) that the portion of Laconia belonging to the citizens increased as time went on, and that the aim of Agis was to restore what he conceived to have been the proportion at the outset. We see that the εἰσφοραί of the State fell to a large extent, if not wholly, on land: as to Athens, see Boeckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens E. T., p. 506.

16. τίν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here describes the result of the lawgiver’s arrangements.

17. φιλοχρημάτους, for the lawgiver has not brought the extravagant habits of the women, who nevertheless rule their husbands, under the control of the State, and he has taught his citizens to prefer wealth to virtue (1271 b 7 sqq.).
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18. ταύτα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The translation probably is, 'for these are the main points for censure,' not 'for these are the main censures which one may pass upon it': cp. Demosth. in Lept. c. 148, οὗ τὸν τέντ ἐπιτιμῶ. It is true that ἐπιτιμῶ is used in 1271a 38 with a dative of the thing found fault with, and that Aristotle does not seem to use ἐπιτιμῶ with an accusative in this sense anywhere else: still we have τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἄν in c. 11. 1273a 2 and αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακῶν in Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114a 30.

C. 10. 20. The similarity of the Cretan institutions to those of the Lacedaemonian State must have been early recognized, for Herodotus found the belief prevailing among the Lacedaemonians that Lycurgus had derived his institutions from Crete (Hdt. i. 65). Plato in the Republic (544 C) classes the Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitutions together as timocracies and makes the same description serve for both (547 A sqq.). And so again in the Laws the chief interlocutor draws little or no distinction between the constitutions under which his Cretan and Lacedaemonian comrades live; he applies the same criticisms to both (631 B sqq., 634, 635 sqq., 780 E sqq.). He finds in the one constitution no less than in the other a mixture of monarchy, or authoritative government, with democracy, or the principle of freedom; both are constitutions in the truest sense of the word, inasmuch as they are framed with a view to the common good, whereas in many States part of the citizens are slaves to the rest. It is as hard to decide with regard to the constitution of Cnosus as it is with regard to the Lacedaemonian constitution, whether it is a democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, or kingship (712 E). Not only Plato, but Xenophon, Ephorus, and Callisthenes are said by Polybius (6. 45 sq.) to have treated the Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitutions as the same, and we see from Strabo, p. 481 sq., that Ephorus did in fact trace many resemblances between them, though he mentioned certain customs as peculiar to Crete (Strab. p. 483) and also spoke of the Lacedaemonians as having 'perfected' the Cretan institutions, which implies that they had altered them to a certain extent. He describes how Cretan freedom was guaranteed by the unanimity and valour which were the fruits of the constitution, in language which contrasts strangely with Aristotle's remark, σώζεται διὰ τῶν τόπων, and with his reference to intervals of civil discord during which the Cretan States were at the mercy of any one who chose to assail them. Ephorus probably wrote, as Plato certainly did, before the raid of Phalaecus (345 B.C.) had
revealed the weakness of the Cretan laws, whereas Aristotle wrote after it. It is perhaps for this reason that Aristotle is far more alive than Plato or Ephorus to the differences between the Cretan and the Lacedaemonian constitution. So far indeed as deviations from the best constitution are concerned, he agrees that the same criticisms are applicable to both (c. 11. 1273 a 2 sq.), but while in the chapters on the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian constitutions he inquires how far the lawgiver has succeeded in his design of constructing an ἀμπατοκρατία, he seems to think it hardly worth while to raise this question as to the Cretan constitution; the doubt is rather whether it is a legally ordered constitution at all. Still there seem to have been points in which the Cretan laws were superior to the Lacedaemonian. The freedom of the Cretan States from troubles with their serfs appears indeed to have been no more than a happy accident. But the Cretan syssitia were better organized than the Lacedaemonian, for the citizens were not expected to contribute a quota to them, and poverty cost no man his rights under the constitution. No fear can have been felt in Crete of a paucity of citizens, for while in the Lacedaemonian State rewards were given to the father of more than two sons, the Cretan lawgiver discouraged large families. The Cretan women, again, though Plato speaks of them in the Laws (780 E sqq.) as equally ἀμφατητα with the Spartan, seem to have been less indulged, for dowries were limited in amount to half a son’s share (see above on 1270 a 21), and, at Gortyna at any rate, certain important portions of the inheritance were reserved for sons and could not pass to daughters (see below on 1272 a 17). If in the Lacedaemonian State the caprice of testators was, as Aristotle implies, among the causes which led to the concentration of the land in a few hands, Gortyna would seem to have had nothing to fear on this score, for there is no indication in the fragment which we possess of its laws that wills were known there ( Bücheler und Zittelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 134). The inheritor of an heiress, again, unlike his Spartan compeer, had no right to give her in marriage to any one he pleased: if he were unwilling to marry her, the right to her hand passed to the next in succession ( Bücheler und Zittelmann, p. 151 sqq.). How far Crete had its reward in a comparatively even distribution of landed property, we are hardly in a position to say; the language of Polybius (6. 46. 1) points the other way, at any rate as to his own time. A further fact may be noted to the credit of the Cretan States, that though, unlike the Laced-
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daemonian, they had no ambitious dreams of empire, they nevertheless maintained and enforced a laborious system of gymnastic training.

On the other hand, the constitutional organization of the Cretan States was very defective. The government in each of them was in the hands of ten Cosmi and of a Bou lé composed of persons who had held the office of Cosmus. We see that this office was not held for life, but whether it was an annual office in the time of Aristotle, as it seems to have been in that of Polybius (6. 46. 4), is uncertain. Aristotle’s use of the word μεταξένο in 1272 b 5 appears to imply that it was held for some definite term or other, though Zitelmann points out (Bücheler und Zitelmann, p. 54) that the expression ‘if he quits office,’ and not ‘when he quits office,’ is used of a Cosmus in the law of Gortyna (col. 1. 52). The Cosmi had large powers, for they were not only the rulers of the State, but also its generals in war. It would perhaps be hardly safe to infer from αἰροιναί, 1272 a 34, that they were elected by the whole citizen-body, but we are distinctly told that only the members of certain gentes were eligible; the people, however, acquiesced in their exclusion from the office, because it brought those who held it no illicit gains; nevertheless the monopoly of supreme authority by a few families, which was all the more marked as the powers of the popular assembly were small, cost the Cretan States dear, for it led to the occasional displacement of the Cosmi by violent means. The worst point in the working of Cretan institutions, however, was the insubordination of the most powerful men. They occasionally carried their turbulence to the length of declaring an abeyance of the office of Cosmus, the result being a temporary dissolution of the body politic. The δυνατοί here referred to would probably belong to the families whose members were alone eligible to this office. It is evident that whatever the effect of the syssitia may have been in equalizing rich and poor, the people in Crete readily rallied round δυνατοί, just as in youth they formed ἄγελαι under the leadership of a δυνατός (Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 483). In an island so rich in legend as Crete the great families would be likely to be strong.

ʹΗ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία. This must mean the constitution which prevailed in the Cretan cities, for Crete was not gathered into one State. ‘The forms of government established in the Dorian colonies in Crete’ (and, it would seem, in the Cretan cities generally) ‘so closely resembled each other, that we find one only described as common to all’ (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece i. 284).
According to Ephorus, Lyctus Gortyna and some petty towns had remained truer to the primitive institutions of Crete than Cnosus (Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 481). How much Aristotle has drawn in this chapter from Ephorus will best be seen, if a few extracts from Strabo’s summary of Ephorus’ account of the Cretan constitution are appended (Strab. pp. 481–2)—λέγεσθαι δ’ ὑπὸ τινῶν ὡς Λακωνικὰ εἰπτα τὸν πολλά τῶν νομοθέτων Κρητικῶν, τὸ δ’ ἀλήθες εἰρήσθαι μὲν ὑπ’ ἔκτινων, ἠρμισθώνει δὲ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας . . . καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ Λυκτικὰ νῦμμα ποιείσθαι μαρτύρα τοῖς τὰ Λακωνικὰ πρεσβέτερα ἀποσφάινοντας: ἀποικίαν γὰρ ἔτοις φυλάττειν τὰ τῆς μητροπόλεως ἔθνη, ἐπεὶ ἄλλως γε ἐγεύθη εἰναὶ τὸ τοὺς βασιλεὺς συνιστῶτας καὶ ποιητεομένους τῶν χειρόνων ζηλωτάς ἀποφαίνειν· οἷς εὖ δὲ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι . . . πολλὰς γονῶν τῶν ἀποκόιδων μὴ φυλάττειν τὰ πάτρια, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀποκόιδων ἐν Κρήτῃ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχειν τοῖς ἀποικίοις ἔθνη (cp. 1271 b 28 sq., where Aristotle adopts Ephorus’ view that the colonists of Lyctus found the characteristic Cretan institutions already existing there on their arrival). Besides (Ephorus continues) Althaemenes the founder of the settlement lived five generations before Lycurgus: τῶν δ’ ἀρχίων τὰ μὲν καὶ τὰς διοικήσεις ἔχειν τὰς αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπωνυμίας, ὅσπερ καὶ τὴν τῶν γερώνων ἀρχὴν . . . τοὺς ἐφόρους δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ἐν κρήτη κόσμοις διοικώντας ἐτέρω ὠνομάσθων· τὰ δὲ συστήματα ἀνδρεία παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Κρητικῶι καὶ νῦν ἐτι καλείσθαι (cp. Dostidas ap. Athen. Deipn. 143 b), παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις μὴ διαμείναι καλούμενα ὁμοίως πρότερον παρ’ Ἀλκαμάνι γονὸν οὕτω κέισθαι “φοίνικας δὲ καὶ ἐν θυίσισιν ἀνδρείων παρὰ διαμιμώνοις πρέπει παιδά ἀνά τοις κατάρχεις.” Then follows, in the form in which it was current among the Cretans, the story of Lycurgus’ visit to Crete after giving up his guardianship of the child Charilaus; this is told at greater length than Aristotle tells it in 1271 b 24 sqq., but to the same effect, except that Aristotle does not allow (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 20) that Lycurgus ever was king, while the next allegation of these Cretan informants of Ephorus—the statement that Thaletas was the instructor of Lycurgus—is rejected in c. 12. 1274 a 29 sqq. on grounds of chronology, and Aristotle is silent in the Politics as to Lycurgus having, like Minos, asked for guidance in his legislation from a god, though in the Politics (Aristot. Fragm. 492. 1558 a 30 sqq.) he would seem to have followed Ephorus and his Cretan authorities in this matter. Cp. also Strab. p. 476, ιστορημα δ’ ὁ Μίνως νομαθήτης γενώτιθα σπουδαίος θαλαττοκρατηματία τε πρῶτος, where Ephorus is perhaps again referred to, for he is quoted a few lines lower. The germ of some of the statements in 1271 b 32 sqq. may, in fact, be detected in some lines of the poem which passes under the name of Scymnus Chius—lines which
evidently reproduce passages of Ephorus: see Ephor. Fragm. 61 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 249):—

Πρώτους δὲ Κρητιάς φασὶ τῆς Ἐλληνικῆς ἀρχῆι βαλάττησι, ὡς τε νησιωτιδας πόλεις κατασχείν, ὡς τε καὶ συνοικίασαι (cp. 1271 b 38) αὐτῶν Ἕφορος εὑρηκεν, εἶναι φησὶ τε ἐπώνυμον τῷ νῆσου ἀπὸ Κρητός τινος, τοῦ δὲ γενομένου βασιλέως αὐτόχθονος' πλοῦν ἡμέρως ἀπέχειν δὲ τῆς Δακωνικῆς (cp. 1271 b 35).

The statements of Diodorus 5. 78. 3–4 seem to be based on the same passage of Ephorus. I have not observed that any commentator has pointed out its resemblance to the passage 1271 b 35 sqq.

πάρεγγυς. Ephorus, according to Polybius (6. 45: cp. 6. 46. 9 sq.), treated the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions as identical. Polybius says the same thing less emphatically of Xenophon, Callisthenes, and Plato.

21. μικρὰ μὲν οὐ κείρον, e.g. the syssitia. ήττον γλαφυρῶς, 'with less neatness of finish,' explained by ἡττον διήρθωσαί, 24. It is an exception to the general rule, when Charondas is found, c. 12. 1274 b 7, to be τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν νῦν γλαφυρῶ-τερον καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετών.

22. λέγεται, by Herodotus (1. 65), who says that according to the Lacedaemonians themselves Lycursus derived his laws from Crete (contrast Plato, Laws 624 A), whereas others ascribed them to the counsels of the Pythia; and by Ephorus, as we have seen, who appears to have blended the two accounts and to have traced the institutions to Crete, though he adds that Lycursus promulgated them as proceeding from the Delphian Apollo (Strabo, pp. 481–2). Xenophon (Rep. Lac. c. 8. 5) and Plato (Laws 624 A: 632 D: 634 A: contrast Minos 318 C sq.) say nothing of the derivation from Crete (Triber, Forschungen p. 73 sq.). Isocrates boldly alleges that Lycursus borrowed from Thesean Athens (Panath. §§ 152–3), but this is only 'his way.' On καὶ ... δὲ, 'and also,' see Liddell and Scott δὲ iii, and cp. Pol. 3. 16. 1287 a 7.

24. ήττον διήρθωσαί, 'less elaborated,' 'less fully worked out in detail': cp. Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 16. The word is sometimes used of the change of an embryo into a fully articulated animal—e.g. in Hist. An. 7. 3. 583 b 23: so διαρθροῦν in Probl. 3. 31. 875 b 22 is replaced by διακριβῶν, 24 (ηκριβωκέινα δὲ τοῖς Σπαρτήσις is the expression used by Ephorus, ap. Strab. p. 481): cp. de Gen. An.
25. τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν. Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 20. οὗ γὰρ ἦν βασιλεὺς. However, the guardianship after the birth of Charilaus was admitted by some who, like Ephorus (Strabo p. 482), held that Lycurgus was king till Charilaus was born.

Χαρίλλου. See critical note.


27. διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν, i.e. the relationship of Lyctus, a Laconian colony in Crete, to its mother-city. The same expression is used in i. 2. 1252 b 21 sq., and probably of the same relation. Strabo (p. 476) found Λύκτος the name of the city in Homer, but he writes it himself Λύττος (cp. νυττὶ νυκτὶ in the Law of Gortyna, col. 2. 14), and this is the form used on coins and in inscriptions (Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 569. 3). On its remarkable situation commanding the one zig-zag track which leads from its fertile plain to the mountain-pastures, see Bursian ibid. p. 570. Λύττος is ‘Cretan for ἡφιλὸς’ (Liddell and Scott, s.v.).


31. ὡς κατασκευάσατος, ‘their view being that’ etc.

32. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ μῆχος κ.τ.λ. What follows down to Κάμικος (40) is evidently taken from Ephorus: this is clear from the lines of Scymnus Chius quoted above. The passage may be an interpolation, but it is more probable that it was placed where it stands by the hand of Aristotle himself, who has already drawn largely in this chapter from Ephorus, and may well have added it in order to show that there was nothing improbable in the view that the Lacedaemonians owed their famous laws to Crete. Crete, he in effect says, though now so out of the world, is well adapted by nature for supremacy over the Greek race, for it commands the Ionian sea, round which the Greek race is planted. This the Lacedaemonian king Agis III saw, when in b.c. 333 in preparation for an attack on the power of Macedon he despatched his brother Agesilaus to secure Crete.

καὶ before πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν is translated by Sus. ‘also,’ not ‘both,’
and he is probably right. For πεφυκών πρῶς, cp. Rhet. i. 5. 1361 b 10 sq.

34. πᾶση ... τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ‘the sea as a whole’ (see above on 1. 4. 1253 b 33). What sea, however, is referred to? Evidently ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ θάλασσα, if we compare the lines of Scymnus Chius quoted above on 1271 b 20, with which σχέδιον τῶν Ἑλλήνων κ. τ. λ., 34, agrees, and ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ θάλασσα would seem to be the Aegean (‘the sea by the Greeks familiarly called their own,’ Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, i. 2), not the Mediterranean: cp. Thuc. 1. 4, and Plutarch, Eumenes c. 19, ὅποιος μηδεὶς αὐτῶν εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀπεστεὶ μηδὲ ὑπεταὶ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν θάλασσαν. The explanation ἀπέχει γὰρ κ. τ. λ., 35, seems to suggest a reference to the Aegean. We find, in fact, that Eudoxus placed Crete in the Aegean (Strabo p. 474), a view to which Strabo objects. For the connexion of empire in Greece with the sea, cp. Thuc. 1. 15. Ephorus (Fr. 67: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 254) praised Bocotia for being ἀπεδαλαστὸς and pronounced it well-adapted for hegemony. So in Pol. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 4 an adequate fleet is considered essential for hegemony over other States.

ἐπικείται, ‘lies close to,’ perhaps with some notion of commanding or dominating: cp. Polyb. 1. 42, 6, and 5. 44. 4, 5, ἐπικείται δὲ καὶ κρατεῖ τῶν καλομιμῶν Καισπίων πυλῶν.

35. ἀπέχει γὰρ κ. τ. λ. ‘From the isle of Cythera, which is parted by a narrow channel from Laconia, the snowy summits of the Cretan Ida are clearly visible, and from them the eye can probably reach the Rhodian Atabyrus and the mountains of Asia Minor’ (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, i. 2). Cp. Diod. 5. 59. 2, Διὸς λεγον τοῦ προσαγορευομένου Ἀταβύρου . . . κείμενον ἐπὶ των ψηλῆς ἀκρας, ἃς ἐστιν ἀναφέρων τῆν Κρήτην. This temple was in Rhodes.

39. τῇ Σικελίᾳ, also an island.

40. ἀνάλογον, here an adverb: see on this word Liddell and Scott, and Bon. Ind. 48 a 51 sqq. The Cretan institutions are said to be ‘analogous’ to the Lacedaemonian, whereas in c. 11. 1272 b 33 sqq. some of the Carthaginian institutions are said to be ‘analogous,’ and others ‘similar’ (παραπλήσια) to the Lacedaemonian. Things may be ‘analogous’ without being ‘alike’ (Hist. An. 2. 1. 497 b 33: de Part. An. 1. 4. 644 a 16 sqq.: see Bon. Ind. 48 a 46), but here a certain amount of likeness is no doubt implied; still ‘analogous’ is probably a less strong word than ‘similar.’

ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις. Not only τῆς πολείταις ἡ τάξις, 1272 a 4, but the whole body of Cretan institutions (see above on 1269 a 9).
On the importance of this severance between the military and cultivating classes, which was common to the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States and also to Egypt, see 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq. Here as there the syssitia are mentioned in immediate connexion with it, perhaps as an institution tending to mark off soldiers from cultivators (cp. Hdt. i. 65, where syssitia are included under τὰ ἐς πόλεμον ἔχοντα). Compare Strabo, p. 542, εἰρήται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι πρῶτον τὴν Ἰράκλειαν κτίσαντες Μιλήσιοι τοὺς Μαρι- ἀνθόνους εἰδώτειν ἡμᾶς οὖν τοὺς προκατέχοντας τὸν τόπον, ὧστε καὶ πιπράσκεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, μὴ εἰς τὴν ὑπεραρχίαν δὲ (συμβῆναι γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτοις), καθάπερ Κρητικὸς μὲν ἐδήοτεν ἡ Μυκῆς καλομεῖνη σύνοδος, Θεσπολοὶ δὲ οἱ Πενίσται.


οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοροὶ κ.τ.λ. Trieber (Forschungen, p. 90 n.) justly remarks that Aristotle seems to be in conflict with himself, when he derives the ephorship from Crete as if it had been introduced by Lycurgus, while nevertheless he ascribes its institution to Theopom- pus (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 25 sq.), unless indeed he supposes that Theopompus also borrowed from Crete. The functions of the cosmi do not seem to have been quite the same as those of the ephors, for they commanded the troops on a campaign (1272 a 9), which the ephors did not.


βασιλεία δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle goes on to mention other similarities between the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions. Kingship once existed in Crete, as it still does in the Lacedaemonian State, and the popular assembly in Crete is like the Lacedaemonian. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, 1. 285) thinks that Aristotle probably 'has the age of Minos in his view,' but, as he points out, Herodotus mentions (4. 154) a King of Axus in Crete as grandfather of the founder of Cyrene according to the Cyrenean tradition. We are perhaps in the region of fable when we read in Diodorus (5. 59. 1) the moving history of 'Althaemenes, son of Catreus, king of the Cretans,' and still more when we mount up to the autochthonous King Cres mentioned in the lines of Scymnus Chius. For πρώτον μὲν answered by εἶτα, see Bon. Ind. s.v. εἶτα.

11. κυρία δ' οὔδενος κ.τ.λ. With the passage before us should be compared Aristot. Fragm. 493. 1558 b 9 (Plut. Lycurg. c. 6)—for what Plutarch here says may well be based on the Λακεδαιμονίων
NOTES.

Politia of Aristotle, whom he mentions by name shortly before—

τού δὲ πλήθους ἀνθρωποτέτοις εἰσείται μὲν οὐδενί γρώμων τῶν ἁλλῶν ἐφείτο, τὴν δ' ὑπὸ τῶν γερmóntων καὶ τῶν βασιλείων προτεθέστων ἐπικρίνω κύριος ἢν ὁ δήμος, and also Pol. 2. 11. 1273 a 9, ἀ δ' ἀν εἰσφέρωσιν οὖντο (i.e. the Carthaginian Suffetes and senators), οὐ διακοίνωσι μόνον ἀποδίδοντο τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τῶν ἄρχων, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις ἀντείπειν ἔχειστιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑτέραις πολιτείαις οἷον ἔστων (i.e. in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions). It is not quite clear whether ὅπερ—ἔστων refers to both κύριοι—εἰσὶ and τῷ βουλομένῳ—ἔχειστιν, or only to the latter clause. We have, however, a definite intimation in the passage before us that the only power possessed by the assembly in Crete was that of confirming the resolutions of the senators and cosmi (cp. Polyb. 22. 15. 1 [21. 32. 1, Hultsch], referred to by Liddell and Scott s. v. συνεπιψήφιζω—δόξαντο δὲ τῷ συνεφίζῳ καὶ τοῦ δήμου συνεπιψήφισαντος, ἐκφώθη τὰ κατὰ τὰς διαλέειας). It might probably withhold that confirmation, and most authorities think that, if it did so, the resolution laid before it remained without legal force, but Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 221) thinks otherwise, and there is much to be said for his view, if we take ὅπερ—ἔστων to refer to κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ as well as to τῷ βουλομένῳ—ἔχειστιν. In any case the fact that it was not open to any member of the assembly who pleased to speak against the proposals of the senate and cosmi—whether any one at all was empowered to do so, we are not distinctly told, though we gather that any member who pleased might speak in support of them—must have tended to make a refusal to confirm an event of rare occurrence. Still the rights of the members of the assembly in Crete were in this matter of speaking the same as those possessed by the members of the Lacedaemonian assembly, and that the Lacedaemonian assembly possessed real authority we see from such passages as Thuc. i. 87: Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 19: Plutarch, Ages. c. 6. The various ways of limiting the powers of the popular assembly are described in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 26 sqq. One of them is ἡ ταῦτα ψφιξευσαὶ τῶν δήμων ἡ μηδέν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις, a plan not very unlike the Cretan. In some States no such thing as a popular assembly existed (3. 1. 1275 b 7). The Speaker of the English House of Commons of 1593 in answer to his request for liberty of speech, was told that it is granted, ‘but not to speak every one what he listeth or what cometh into his brain to utter; their privilege was Ay or No’ (Acland and Ransome, Political History of England, p. 82).
12. μὲν οὖν here, as in c. 6. 1265 a 10 and c. 11. 1273 a 2, introduces a transition from description to criticism: we have been told that the syssitia and cosmi in Crete correspond to the Lacedaemonian syssitia and ephors, but now we learn that while the organization of the Cretan syssitia is better than that of the Lacedaemonian, the Board of Cos-mi is a less satisfactory institution even than the ephorate. The sentence introduced by μὲν οὖν is repeated in 26, and then the answering δὲ comes in 28.

15. νόμος, 'a law': see above on 1270 b 3.

16. πρότερον, c. 9. 1271 a 26–37. κοινοτέρως, sc. τὰ τῶν συσσίτων ἔμει: ‘the syssitia are placed on a more public footing’: cp. c. 9. 1271 a 28, ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινοῦ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνοδον, καθάπερ ἐν Κρήτῃ, and below 1272 a 20, ὥστε ἐκ κοινοῦ τριφέσθαι πῶς. Ephorus had already mentioned that the Cretan syssitia were maintained at the public expense (ap. Strab. p. 480)—τοῖς δὲ τελείοις ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἄ καλοίσιν ἀνδρεία συσσιτείων, ὡσποδ’ ἀυτῶν μεταίχοις τοῖς εἰπόροις οἱ πενείστεροι δημοσία τρεφόμενοι (cp. Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 40 sq.)—but whether he also stated that this was otherwise in the Lacedaemonian State, we do not know. In Crete we see that the provision for the syssitia was put on a level with that for the worship of the gods and the public liturgies.

17. ‘For from the whole of the agricultural produce and live stock raised on the public land and the tributes rendered by the serfs one part is assigned for the service of the gods and the discharge of the public liturgies, and the other for the syssitia.’ For the order of τῶν γεωμετρῶν καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημάτων ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων, cp. de Part. An. 4. 10. 690 a 23, τὸ ἐκλείπον οὐσώδες ἐκ τοῦ ποδοῦ: 4. 1. 676 b 15, διὰ τὰς εἰρημείας αὐτὰς πρότερον. For τὰς κοινὰς λειτουργίας, cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 23, τοῖς δὲ πλουτοῦσιν εἰς τὰς κοινὰς λειτουργίας ἐκοινών ἀπασιν φαλοτριών ἐμποίησας. It would seem that the liturgies, elsewhere borne by rich men, were undertaken in Crete by the State. Compare Aristotle’s own arrangement as to the public land (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 9 sqq.), which is not very dissimilar from the Cretan, though no provision is made for the liturgies, many of which he would be glad to abolish (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 3 sqq.). The scheme for the division of the produce adopted in Plato’s Laws 847 E is said to ‘approach near to that sanctioned by the Cretan law,’ but it is not easy to combine it with that described here. It is enough to say, with Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, 1. 288), of Dosiadas’ account (ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 143.) of the syssitia at Lyctus, that the system which prevailed at Lyctus seems to have been different from that which Aristotle here describes as obtaining.
generally in Crete. The public land was evidently in part arable, in part pasture. Bicheler and Zitelmann (Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 138 sqq.) infer from some provisions of the succession-law of Gortyna (col. 4. 31 sqq.), which reserve for the sons, where there are sons and daughters, the succession to houses in Gortyna itself and to cattle and sheep, no mention being made of land, that the citizens of Gortyna grazed their cattle and sheep on the public pastures, which consequently must have lain, in part at all events, near the city. If this was so, the θεσκήματα here referred to would probably be private property. It is not quite clear from Aristotle's language, whether the produce from the public lands and the φόροι of the serfs were used for these purposes exclusively, no balance being left for others. The term φόροι applied to the contributions of the serfs indicates subjection, and probably conquest. These φόροι would seem to have been due to the State: a rent would perhaps be payable to the owner of the land in addition.

20. ὥστ' ἐκ κοινοῦ κ. τ. λ. If we understand this to mean that women and girls took part in the Cretan syssitia, it conflicts with Plato, Laws 780 E, as Oncken points out (Staatslehre des Aristoteles, 2. 386 sq.), and also with c. 12, 1274 b 11, not to dwell on the name ἀνδρεία. Probably all that is meant is that the share of produce given to each householder was sufficient to provide not only for the needs of himself and his sons at the public tables, but also for his wife and daughters at home. See Sus.², Note 366.

22. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀλησφοτιάν κ. τ. λ. 'And for securing scantiness of fare, in the view that it is beneficial, the lawgiver has devised many contrivances.' The transition from syssitia to ἀλησφοτία, and next to preventives of πολυτεκνία, is, as we shall see, easy. 'Ὄφελιμον includes considerations both of health and morality. The aim of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver in studying the same thing is explained in Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 5-6, Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 10, and [Plutarch.] Inst. Lac. c. 13. Ephorus confirms Aristotle's statement as to Crete (Strab. p. 480, σωφρόνως καὶ λιτῶς ξώσων ἀπασών). Epimenides the Cretan is, in fact, said (Plato, Laws 677 E) to have achieved by his 'device' (μηχάνημα) what Hesiod divined before him: the reference no doubt is to the lines (Op. et Dies, 40)—

Νηπίων, οὐδὲ ἔσπασιν ὅσον πλέον ἔμισιν παντὸς,

οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μαλάχει τέ καὶ ἀσφοδέλωρ μέγ' ὄνειρο.

The μηχάνημα referred to by Plato may possibly be the famous ὀλιμος, 'of which a small quantity satisfied both hunger and thirst': see Herodor. Fr. 19 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 33) and Hermipp. Callim. Fr. 18 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 40), together with Stallbaum's
note on Laws 677 E, and also the note of Mr. Purves (Selections from Plato, p. 370), to whose references may be added Plutarch de Facie in Orbe Lunae c. 25. 940 C, ἦνίζετο μὲν 'Ἡσίῳδος, εἰτῶν
Οὐδ' ὅσον ἐν μιᾷ 
καὶ ἱσφοδελῷ μὲν ὀνειρ,
ἐυγοὶ δ' ἐμβαθεὶς παρέσχεν Ἐπιμενίδης, διδάχας ὅτι μικρὸ παντόπλων ἡ
φύσις ὑπεκκαύματι ωσπεριέ καὶ συνέχει τῷ ἄνω, ἐν ὅσον ἑλαιας μέγεθος
λιθι, μηδεμίας ἕτε τροφής δείμενον. It is possible that Aristotle here
includes the invention of Epimenides among the expedients which
he ascribes to the Cretan lawgiver. At any rate, Crete seems to have
given birth to, or derived from Egypt (Diod. i. 82. 2), an idea which
came to be widely diffused in Greece. The object of the original
lawgiver probably was to make hardy soldiers of his Cretans (cp.
Xen. Cyrop. 8. i. 43, where we are told that Cyrus, in the case of
those whom he destined for slavery, ἐπεμελείτο ὅπως μήτε ἀστιον μήτε
ἀποτε ἐποστα ἐλεθρίων ἑνάκε μελετμάτων: it is hardly likely
that he shared the mystical and ascetic tendency of Epimenides,
still less that he found the virtues in a spare diet which Xenophon
and others attributed to it. To them scanty food meant scanty
περιττόματα, and scanty περιττόματα meant freedom from disease:
thus the Persians of the Cyropedia owed it, we are told, to the scant-
tiness of their food that they rarely needed to spit or to blow their
noses (Cyrop. i. 2. 16: 8. 8. 8–9): cp. Plutarch de Sanitate Tuenda
1. 14, μάλιστα δὲ τροφαίς πρωθύμενοι ἐμφιάθησαν καὶ κρεώδεσαν ἡ ποικίλας,
ἀλγοστιέν, καὶ μηδείν ὑπολιπέσ περιττόματος πλῆθος ἐν τῷ σώματι: so
too Dicaearchus ap. Porphyry, de Abstinentia 4. 2 (ed. Nauck, p. 158.
14 sqq.: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 233–4), and Porphyry in the
account of the Essenes which he gives on Josephus' authority (de
1. 46. 865 a 1, ἣ ὅτι τοῦ νοσείν αἰτίον περιττόματος πλῆθος, τούτο δὲ
γίνεται ἠρικα τροφής ὑπερβολὴ ἡ πώς ὑδεία: Theopomp. Fr. 57
(Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 286). Aristotle himself holds that luxuri-
ous living accelerates puberty (Phys. 5. 6. 230 b 1, αἰξίσεις αἱ
tῶν ταχυ ἡ τροφήν ἡ ᾧ ὤσατον). Thus the transition from ἀλγοστίεα
to checks on πολυστεία is easy. Aristotle's ὅροι, however, is not
γλίσχρω, ἀλλὰ σοφρήσεως καὶ ἐλευθερίως ... ἐν (c. 6. 1265 a 29 sqq.: 4
(7). 5. 1326 b 30 sqq.); he is for avoiding either extreme.

πάντες ἀναγκαίονται παρ' αὐτοῖς οἱ κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν χρίσαι ἐκ τῆς τῶν παιδῶν
ἀγάλησ ἐκκρεβίστες, οίκ εἰδίς δ' ἀγνώσται παρ' ἀστιοῦ τῶν γιαμμέθεισα
παίδας, ἀλλ' ἐπί θοὺ διακυκλίναι ἢκαίναι ὡσα τὰ περὶ τῶν οἰκῶν, and see
Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 223 sq., who refers to Heraclid. Pont. De
Rebuspubl. 3. 3 sub fin. (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 211). Aristotle approves the end (cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 36–b 2), but not the means used in Crete, for though the discussion on this point is postponed, his judgment is not doubtful. Contrast the law of the Lacedaemonian State which encouraged πολυτεκνία (c. 9. 1270 b 1 sqq.).


26. In place of δὲ Sus,23 following Laminus reads δὴ, but compare 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 8, ὅτι δὴ ἡ τυφλικὴ ἔχει κακὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς δημοκρατίας καὶ τὰ τῆς διεξαρχίας, φανερῶν.

28. δὲ answers to μὲν ὄν, 12.

29. γίνονται, ‘are elected’: cp. γινομένως, 36, and c. 9. 1270 b 8.

30. συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ‘is of advantage in relation to the constitution’ (explained by Βοιότεαι μὲν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν, 33): cp. c. 9. 1265 b 25, συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν, and see Bon. Ind. 719 a 35 sqq.

35. περὶ ὅν κ.τ.λ. The third of these criticisms, that relating to ‘rule exercised without the check of law,’ reminds us of Aristotle’s remark as to the Lacedaemonian Ephors (c. 9. 1270 b 28 sqq.), that they ‘judge without the check of law,’ while his first and second criticisms repeat those which he has passed on the Lacedaemonian Senators (c. 9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), but to refer ὅν both to the Cosmian and to the Senators makes the sentence read awkwardly, and it is more likely that Aristotle is here speaking of the Senators only, though he has not said of the Lacedaemonian Senators that they ‘rule without the check of law.’ For this expression, which is not quite the same as ‘judge without the check of law,’ cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 12. Demosthenes (in Lept. c. 107) speaks of the Lacedaemonian Senator as διεξαρχής τῶν πολιτῶν. We see that while the magistracy of the Cosmian is more defective than the Ephorate, the Cretan Senate may be characterized in the same way as the Lacedaemonian. For γινομένως 36, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 5, τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς γινομένους. 40. ‘De oūδεν τι ν. Jacobs. ad Achill. Tat. p. 728’ (Göttl.). See critical note. For the happy results which follow when office is not a source of gain, see 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 31 sqq., and Isocr. Panath. § 145, who speaks of τὰ λήμματα τὰ εἰδισμένα δίδοσθαι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς.

41. ὡσπερ. Cp. c. 9. 1269 b 38.

πάρρῳ γε κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably regarded Persia or the Greek States of the mainland of Europe and Asia as the most likely
sources of corruption (cp. Hdt. 5, 51): the Greek islands were usually poor (Isocr. Paneg. § 132: cp. also Xen. Hell. 6. 1, 12, οίσθα δὲ δήμου ὅτι καὶ βασιλεῖς δὲ Περσῶν οὐ νήσους ἄλλ' ἦπερων καρποῦμενοι πλουσιότατοι αὐθρόπων ἐστίν). In cities like Athens corrupting agencies might no doubt be found within the State: cp. Aristot. Fragm. 371. 1540 a 17 sq. (Harpocr. s. v., δεκαζών), 'Αριστοτέλης δ' ἐν Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία ἂνυτῶν φησι καταδείξα: τὸ δεκαίειν τὰ δικαστήρια. Has Aristotle the passage before us (cp. also 1272 b 17) in his mind, when he says in 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 24, σώζονται δ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω εἶναι τῶν διαφθείροντων, ἄλλα ἐνίοτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς? If so, he uses διαφθείρειν in a different sense from that in which he uses it in 1272 b 1.

1. τῆς ἀμαρτίας ταύτης, i.e. the restriction of the offices of 1272 b. Cosmus and Senator to certain families, notwithstanding the large-ness of their powers.

2. οὐ πολιτικὴ ἄλλα δυναστευτική. Cp. 10, and 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 26, πῶς γὰρ ἐν εἰς τοῦτο πολιτικὴν κηρυκτικῶν, ἀ γα μὲν νόμιμον ἐστίν; οὐ νόμιμον δὲ τὸ μή μόνον δικαίως ἄλλα καὶ οὐδὲς ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δ' ἐστι καὶ μή δικαίως. The remedy employed involves a resort to arbitrary measures on the part of a handful of powerful men quite out of character with a constitution governed by law: hence it is δυναστευτική for a δυναστευτία is the tyranny of a handful, as the τυραννίς is the tyranny of one man and the extreme democracy the tyranny of the Many (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31 sq.), and tyranny is least of all a constitution (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29). See below on 10.

4. αὐτῶν, 'their colleagues themselves,' whom one would least expect to do such a thing.

ἐξεταί δὲ κ.τ.λ. It would seem that not only might individual cosmi resign before the expiration of their term of office, but that the cosmi might resign in a body, thus leaving the State without cosmi. Apart from this, however, Aristotle objects to the magistrate resigning in the midst of his term, for, as he says in c. 6. 1271 a 11, διὰ καὶ βιωλόμενον καὶ μὴ βιωλόμενον ἄρχειν τῶν δὲιν τῆς ἀρχῆς. Possibly, however, resignation before the close of the official term was not usually allowed in Greece. It seems to have been allowed at Rome (Mommsen, Römishes Staatsrecht 1. 508 sqq.: Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities, art. Magistratus, p. 724 a).

6. Congreve, followed by Welldon, would read δὲ in place of δῆ, but perhaps δῆ is defensible (it is the reading of all the MSS. and the Vet. Int.). 'As the present method leads to violence and other inconveniences, it is therefore better to regulate the matter by law.'
7. οὗ γὰρ ἀσφαλῆς ὁ κανῦ. Cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 17 sq.: Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 35: Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 9. 23 sqq. (p. 63 Blass). Aristotle may possibly here have in his mind a familiar line from the Petithous of Euripides (Fr. 600 Nauck), which seems also to be present to his memory in 3. 16. 1287 b 6 sq.:

Τρόπος ἐστὶ ἥρωτός ἀσφαλέστερος νόμον.

8. τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας κ.τ.λ., 'the way the great men have of declaring an abeyance of the magistracy of the Cosmi': cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρηματῶν νεωτηρίζειν. 'Ἀκοσμία is formed upon the model of ἀναρχία, 'the abeyance of the archonship,' Xen. Hell. 2. 3. 1. I have retained in the text the reading of Π², but not without much hesitation. Π¹ read πάντων δὲ φαινότατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἢν καθιστᾶται πολλάκις ὅταν μὴ δίκαιο βούλωσιν δοῦναι τῶν δυναστῶν. This is unintelligible without Coray's slight emendation of οἱ ἂν for ὅταν, but with this it is certainly smoother Greek, though perhaps not more Aristotelian, than the reading of Π². But all the MSS. and also the Vet. Int. have ὅταν. As to the reading of Π¹ τῶν δυναστῶν, perhaps we rather expect to hear of δυνατοὶ than δυνάσται, notwithstanding δυναστευτικής. 3. The Cretan constitution is not pronounced to be a δυναστεία μᾶλλον till 10, and even then is probably regarded rather as a virtual, than as an actual, δυναστεία. The mention of δυνάστας no doubt makes the inference that the constitution is a δυναστεία easy: perhaps indeed it makes it too easy. For if Aristotle had already spoken of δυνάσται, he would hardly need to draw the inference that the Cretan constitution approaches a δυναστεία, as he does in 1272 b 9 sq. We find a reference to δυνατοὶ in Crete in the account of Ephorus ap. Strab. p. 483, τὰς δ' ἀγέλας συνάγοντι οἱ ἐπιφανεστάται τῶν παιδῶν καὶ δυνατόστατοι. Cretan methods remind us of the 'liberum veto' of Poland. They far transcend the turbulence of medieval Genoa (Machiavelli, History of Florence, p. 211 E. T. Bohn).

10. οὗ πολιτεία, because a constitution is not compatible with these moments of surrender to the will of powerful individuals: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32, ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἀρχοντες, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία. Intentionally or not, Aristotle negatives here the remark of the Athenian interlocutor of the Laws (712 E) to Cleinias the Cretan and Megillus the Lacedaemonian—ὅτως γὰρ, δ' ἀριστοι, πολιτείων μετέχετε· ὅτι δὲ ὧν οἰκομάκαιροι νῦν, οὐκ εἰσὶ πολιτεία. A δυναστεία is thus described in Pol. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 5—τέταρτος δ' [εἰδος ὀλγαρχίας], ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τὸ τε νῦν λεχθὲν (i. e. ὅταν παῖς ἀντ' πατρὸς εἰσινὶ), καὶ ἀρχὴ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἄρχοντες· καὶ ἄστιν ἀντιστροφός αὐτὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλγαρχίαις ὁπερ ἡ τυραννίς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἡς τελευταίας εἰσαιμεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημο-
2. 10. 1272 b 7—17.

κρατίσις καὶ καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τουκύτην ὄλγαρχίαν δυναστείων: επ. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 30, ὅταν ἦδη παλι ὑπερείνωσε ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς πολυφιλίαις, ἐγένετο δὲ τουκύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστίν, καὶ κύριοι γίνονται οἱ ἀνθρώποι ἄλλοις ὅμοιοι. Aristotle holds that the Cretan constitution is rather a δυναστεία than a constitution regulated by law, because, though in its ordinary course the magistrates are appointed by election, and the popular assembly possesses certain rights of a definite, though narrow, kind, and so far the constitution does not resemble a δυναστεία, it is subject to intervals of license, in which the will of a few powerful individuals overmasters all law.

11. εἰώθασι δὲ κ.τ.λ. We see from the passages quoted in the preceding note that Aristotle regards a δυναστεία as 'near to monarchy,' and now we are told that the leading men form followings for themselves by breaking up the demos and their friends into factions, and so set up a monarchy (επ. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 8, τῶν τάς ἀρατοκριτικὰς βασιλείαμον ποιεῖν πολιτείας), just as Peisistratus did according to Herodotus (Hdt. I. 59, ὅς στασιαζόντων τῶν παριδῶν καὶ τῶν ἢκ τῶν πεδίων Ἀθηναίων... καταφραγμάτα τὴν τυραννίδα, ἤγερε τρίτην στάσιν). As to διαλαμβάνοντες ('dividing into parties'), επ. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 8, διαλαμβάνοντας τοὺς ἄπόρους, and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 10, εὖ δὲ τάς μικρὰς ῥήμας τὸ διαλαμβάνει εἶναι δύο πάντας κ.τ.λ. With this picture of Cretan feuds compare Polyb. 4. 53. 5, ἐκφυλοτιμίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας ἡκ τῶν τυχόντων, ὅπερ ἐδοκεῖ Κρητικός, ἑστασάσαν πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους.

13. τὸ τοιοῦτον, 'the state of things just described.' For the thought here expressed, cp. c. 11. 1272 b 30–33, where the absence of στάσις and of any τύραννος is said to be σημείον πολιτείας αὐστηγο-μείνης, and Thuc. I. 18. 1, ἡ γὰρ λακεδαιμον... ἐπὶ πλείστον οὐκ ἴσην χρόνου στασιάσαν, ὅμοιο ἢκ παλαιοτάτον καὶ εὐνορήθη καὶ ἀεὶ ἀτηρώνυτος ἦν.

15. ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον κ.τ.λ. 'A State in this condition' (subject to intervals of non-existence) 'is in peril, as' (or 'if') 'those who wish to attack it are also able to do so.' Stahr, however, translates, 'läuft derselbe (Staat) Gefahr, jedem der ihn angreifen will und kann zur Beute zu werden,' but in the absence of other instances of this use of ἐπικίνδυνον with a genitive it is hardly safe to interpret the passage thus.

17. εἰρήναι, 1272 b 41.

σώζεται, sc. ἡ πόλις, for Aristotle seems to forget that he is speaking not of one State, but of the many States of Crete.

ξενηλασίας plural, as usual. 'Distance has produced the effect of a law expelling foreigners.' Hoeck (Kreta 3. 442 sqq.) illus-
trates the isolation of Crete, but also points out (p. 450 sqq.) that there are many indications that foreigners were not excluded from the island. He refers to Plato, Laws 8.48 A among other passages.

18. καί may perhaps here mean ‘for instance,’ as occasionally elsewhere (e. g. in 1. 12. 1259 b 8).

μένει τοῖς Κρητισίν. ‘The perioeci stand firm in the Cretan States’ (not, I think, ‘are faithful to the Cretans,’ as some translate, though the dative τοῖς Κρητισίν probably implies some advantage to the Cretans from their attitude). Cp. 1272 a 26, ὅτε δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰ συστάτων βέλτιον τέτακται τοῖς Κρητισίν ἡ τοῖς Δάκωσι, φανερῶν, and 1270 a 37, τοῖς Σπαρτάταις, and for μένει, 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 35, μίαν γὰρ ἡ δῶν ἡ τρεῖς ἡμέραι οὐ χαλεπῶν μεῖναι πολιτευόμενοι ὀποιωνήν.


οὔτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. apparently gives the reason why the Cretan perioeci do not revolt like the Helots; but Aristotle does not explain how external domination leads to the revolt of serfs. Does he hint that it was the foreign empire of the Lacedaemonians that led to the liberation of Messenia by Thebes? Perhaps he only means that external domination involves foreign war, which he has stated in c. 9. 1269 b 5 to be one main reason for serf-revolts. ‘Not only,’ we are told, ‘do they not possess any external dominion, but’ (οὔτε—τε) ‘it is only lately that a foreign war’ (πολέμου ἔξωκός—εἰς ἡγεμονίας, 17—not, probably, ‘a mercenary war,’ for its being waged by mercenaries is not to the point) ‘has passed over to the island’ (εἰς Χοερίλου ἀπεικονίζεται, 14. 1415 a 17, ὅπως ἀλλα ἀλλὰς ἠλέου τοι ἐν ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ πολέμου μεγάς). Wars between one Cretan city and another, he has already said, did not lead to revolts of the serfs (c. 9. 1269 a 40 sqq.): indeed it would seem from the language of this passage—περὶ δὲ τοῖς Κρητισίν οὐδὲν πω τούτων συμβεβηκεν—that even the ‘foreign war’ here referred to did not, though it manifested the weakness of their institutions. Whether Aristotle refers here to the operations of Phalaeus and his mercenaries in the island (345 b.c.), or to its subjugation by Agesilaus, brother of the Lacedaemonian king Agis III, in 333 b.c., is uncertain, but perhaps it is more probable that Phalaeus is referred to, for Aristotle is evidently speaking of the first intrusion of a foreign war into Crete. Though Phalaeus was ultimately foiled and slain before Cydonia, he had previously taken Lyctus.

C. 11. 25. περιττός, ‘in a vein above the common.’ See note on 1265 a 11.
μάλιστα δ’ ἐνια κ.τ.λ., 'but so far as the Carthaginian constitution can be said to resemble any other, it comes nearest in some points at least to the Laconian.' Cp. σύντηγές πως, 27.

20. αὐταὶ γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι τρεῖς. For the order, which is quite regular, see note on 1269 a 23. The Cretan constitution is now brought in, which had already been said to be the model on which the Lacedaemonian was framed.

20. The older editors place a full stop after Καρχηδονίων (as do Bernays and Susemihl), whereas Bekker places only a comma there, thus making αὐτοῖς, 30, refer to all three States. There is something to be said in favour of Bekker's view, but on the whole I am inclined to think that Bern. and Sus. are right. If we place a full stop or colon after Καρχηδονίων, καὶ πολλὰ 29 will take up πολλά 25.

30. σπημείον δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'And it is an indication of a constitution carefully framed with a definite aim that, possessing though it does its well-known popular element, Carthage remains faithful to the arrangements of its constitution.' In most States the laws are not συντεταγμέναι, but χέδνων κείμενοι, 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5–9. The meaning of the word comes out clearly in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 7 sq.: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 6: Metaph. Α. 10. 1075 a 18 sq. Schneider, followed by Bernays and others, would insert εὖ before συντεταγμένης, but this is probably unnecessary: cp. Democrit. Fragm. 45, τοῖς ὅ τρόποις ἐστὶ εὑστακός, τοντίωσι καὶ βῶς ἐνυτέτακται. Τεταγμένη πολιτεία is a term used by Plato (Rep. 619 C)—in a different sense, however, for it seems to be used in that passage of a constitution favourable to the formation of habits of virtuous action. With ἔχουσον (which Ἡ Ῥιτ. Int. have, though it is omitted in Ἡ Ῥιτ. Π'), I supply τὴν πόλιν, which, as has been already noticed in the note on 1266 b 1, is often omitted by Aristotle. Ὁ τῶν δῆμων, as in c. 12. 1274 a 2, τῶν δὲ δήμων καταστήσαι, and 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 30, τὸ ἀγόρα: it was well-known that the citizen-body at Carthage comprised a mass of poor (cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 5, where Carthage is even described as δημοκρατουμένη, if the reading is right, and Plutarch, Præcepta Reipubl. Gerend. c. 3, where the character of the Carthaginian demos is sketched and contrasted with the character of the Athenian in a striking passage probably based on some earlier authority). For δῆμος in the sense of 'a popular element,' cp. c. 12. 1274 a 2: c. 6. 1263 b 39. For η ὀξίς τῆς πολιτείας, cp. c. 10. 1272 a 4. The quiescence of the demos, it appears later (1273 b 21), is due to a fortunate accident rather than to the skill of the lawgiver.
NOTES.

32. στάσιν. The design of Hanno, however, is mentioned in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 5.
καί, ‘at all’ (Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 168).
τύραννον. Yet in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 a tyranny is said to have changed into an ἀριστοκρατία at Carthage, if the reading is right. Perhaps Aristotle intends to confine his assertion to the duration of the ἀριστοκρατία, and does not reckon what preceded it. It is, we note, in this same twelfth chapter of the book on Revolutions (B. 7)—a chapter somewhat loosely hung on to the book and not impossibly later in date—that Carthage is referred to as δημοκρατο-μένη (1316 b 5).

33. ἔξει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Some remarks on the Carthaginian constitution will be found in Appendix B. The word ἐταιρία is used in so many different senses that it is hardly possible to determine the exact nature of these συσσίτια τῶν ἐταιρίων at Carthage. Its most usual meaning is ‘a political club or association,’ but Aristotle would hardly compare gatherings of this nature with the Lacedaemonian Phidia. Ἐταιρία is used by Dosiadas in his description of the syssitia of Lyctus in much the same sense apparently as συσσίτιοι (cp. Athen. Deipn. p. 143, διήρηται δ’ οἱ πολίται πάντες καθ’ ἐταιρίας, καλοῦσι δὲ ταύτας ἄνδρειας—τὴν τ’ ἐπιμελεῖαν ἔξεις τοῦ συσσίτιον γνυῆ), so that τὰ συσσίτια τῶν ἐταιρίων may here only mean ‘the common meals of the messes.’ One would suppose from the comparison of them with the Phidia, that they must have comprised the whole citizen-body, and that they must have been designed, like them, to promote efficiency in war.


38. καὶ βέλτιον δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and it is also better that the kings (at Carthage) neither belong to one and the same family, nor that again an ordinary one; and that if the family from which they are taken is of marked excellence, they are appointed from it by election rather than by seniority.’ I have adopted the reading of Π², κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος (κατ’ αὐτὸ pr. Π¹, καταυτῷ pr. Μ⁴, καταυτῷ corr. Μ⁵, ‘per se’ Vet. Int.), but Susemihl’s reading, καθ’ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος (‘do not form a family apart’), has many claims to attention. The κατ’ αὐτῷ of Π¹ and καταυτῷ of Μ⁴, however, may easily have originated in a miswriting of κατὰ ταυτό, the second τα being omitted, as often happens (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 27, where κατὰ ταύτας τὰς διάφορας, which is probably the right reading, has undergone similar changes); and there is some roughness in the expression τοὺς βασιλεῖς καθ’ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος. Besides, no MS. gives καθ’ αὐτό. There is also some awkward-
ness in the sequence of μηδὲ (or μήτε, Sus.) τούτο τὸ τύχαν, if we read καθ’ αὐτό, for we shall have to translate—'it is better that the kings do not form a family apart, nor this an ordinary one': we seem to need 'do not belong to' instead of 'do not form,' but it is not easy to get this meaning from the words μήτε καθ’ αὐτό εἴναι γένος. And how can it be said that the kings form a whole family? On the other hand, it must be admitted that the use of κατά in κατά τὸ αὐτὸ εἴναι γένος is not a common one. Κατά with the acc., however, occasionally bears much the same meaning as ἐν: thus κατά τὴν αὐτὴν ἥλικιαν, de Gen. An. 1. 19. 727 a 5, is replaced by ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἥλικία, de Gen. An. 1. 20. 728 b 24. (The use of the phrase εἴναι κατά is slightly different in 3. 4. 1276 b 33, where ἀγαθὸν should perhaps be supplied.) Aristotle objects to a single family monopolizing two posts of such importance as the Lacedaemonian kingships: cp. 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 22 sqq. and 7. (5). 6. 1305 b 2 sqq. Arrangements of this kind often led to στάσεις, especially when the favoured family was not one of conspicuous merit, and Aristotle does not seem to think that the Heracleidae of the Lacedaemonian State were so: hence the design of Lysander (7 (5). 7. 1306 b 31 sq.). We have in this passage μήτε followed by μηδὲ and te, much as we have μήτε—μηδὲ—μήτε in Plato, Gorg. 500 B, μήτε αὐτὸς οὖν δεῖν πρὸς ἐμε παῖζειν, μηθ'/ο τι ἀν τίχρισ παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦσα ἀποκρίνου, μητ'/ αὖ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ οὔτως ἀποδείξω ὡς παῖζοντοι. On μήτε—μηδὲ, see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 775. 2. d and Obs. 5 (where this passage from the Gorgias is quoted), and Ast. Lex. Plat. s. v. μηδὲ, otēi. Μηδὲ following μήτε 'gives its clause an adversative or emphatic force,' 'neither—nor yet' (Jelf, ibid.). No change, therefore, is called for in μηδὲ. As to the view here expressed by Aristotle, cp. Cic. de Rep. 2. 12. 24, quo quidem tempore novus ille populus (the Roman) vidit tamen id quod fugit Lacedaemonium Lycurgum, qui regem non deligendum duxit, si modo hoc in Lycurgi postestate potuit esse, sed habendum, qualiscunque is foret, qui modo esset Herculis stirpe generatus. Nostri illi etiam tum agrestes viderunt virtutem et sapientiam regalem, non progeniem, quaeri opore. Herodotus (5. 39, 42) evidently bears no goodwill to the rule of succession by which Cleomenes was preferred to Dorieus.

41. εὐτελεῖς, 'insignificant in character': Bonitz (Ind. s.v.) compares Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 24, εἰσὶν οἱ παλλοὶ (τῶν εὐγενῶν) εὐτελεῖς.

2. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ. τ. λ. Aristotle here passes with μὲν οὖν from fact 1273 a, to criticism, as in c. 6. 1265 a 10 and c. 10. 1272 a 12, but he
continues to make the Carthaginian constitution the subject of his remarks, so that it hardly seems necessary to add (e conj.) τῶν Καρχηδόνων either (with Thurot, Études p. 32) after μᾶλλον, 6, or (with Sus.) after πολιτείας, 5. The Carthaginian and Cretan States, no less than the Lacedaemonian, are open to the charge of making military success and predominance their aim and thinking τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ περιμάχητα better than virtue. The same thing is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5 sqq. of the lawgivers of all the best-constituted Hellenic States. Cp. also below, 1273 a 37 sqq. Τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἄν must here mean ‘of the points open to censure’ (not ‘of the censures one might pass’): cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 a 30, αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακίων. See note on 1271 b 18. Here the παρεκβάσεις referred to are παρεκβάσεις τῆς ἀριστης πολιτείας (cp. c. 9. 1269 a 31), as in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 24 sqq., not παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτείων as in 3. 7.

4. τῶν δὲ, sc. ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἄν. The framers of ‘aristocratic’ constitutions are said in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq. often to give the rich too much power.

πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κ.τ.λ., ‘in relation to its aim of being an Aristocracy or Polity.’ For καὶ = ‘or,’ see Bon. Ind. 357 b 20 sq. It is possible, however, that καὶ τῆς πολιτείας is added (cp. 1. 9. 1257 b 9, τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικὴν) to explain the sense in which the word ἀριστοκρατία is used, for it might mean ‘the best constitution’ (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1).

5. δῆμον = δημοκρατίαν, as (e.g.) in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 16.

6. μᾶλλον, ‘rather than in the opposite direction’ (cp. c. 7. 1266 a 36 and c. 9. 1270 b 33).

τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. A deviation in a democratic direction is here noticed. Μὲν (= ‘while’) is answered, I think, by δ’ in a δ’ ἄν εἰσφέρωσιν. For the parenthesis εἰ δὲ μὴ κ.τ.λ., cp. c. 10. 1272 a 15.

8. If πάντες is read (which P2 omits) after ὁμογενῶσιν, two explanations are possible: either πάντες means ‘both authorities,’ as it frequently does in the style of Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 571 b 50 sqq.), or absolute unanimity not only of the Suffetes but of the senators was required. The latter is improbable: Sus.2 (Note 387) refers to Liv. 21. 3 sqq. 21. 9. 3–11. 2: 23. 12 sqq. to disprove it. Aristotle most likely means by ‘are unanimous’ ‘are unanimous as to bringing or not bringing a given question before the popular assembly.’ Καὶ τοῦτων, 9, will then mean ‘over matters as to the reference of which to the popular assembly the kings and senators are not unanimous, as well as over those which they agree to refer to it.’ If, on the other hand, ‘are unanimous’ means ‘are agreed
on a measure,' then καὶ τοῦτων will mean 'over the measure which is the subject of that difference of opinion, as well as over matters voluntarily referred to the assembly in cases of unanimity.' In either case the power possessed by the assembly was a very real and substantial one, though it would seem that it had not, like most popular assemblies in Greece (6 (4). 14), an absolute claim to have certain specified matters, such as questions of war, peace, alliance, and the like, referred to it. If the kings and the senate agreed not to refer a question to the assembly, they could effectually prevent this question coming before it. Susemihl (Note 387) remarks that the Second Punic War was decided on by Suffetes and Senate alone, notwithstanding that the assembly had by that time (Polyb. 6. 51. 6) gained the chief voice in deliberation.

9. ἰδίως ἀν εἰσφέρων οὗτοι, 'as to any matters brought by them before the assembly' (cp. εἰσφορὰν, 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 14). See note on 1264 b 39.

οὐ διακόσια μόνων κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1113 a 7, δήλων δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχικῶν πολιτειῶν, ἀσ "Ομορός ἐμμείτο " οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἀ προδοτοῦ ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ.

10. ἀποδίδασι. See note on 1265 a 6. 'Αποδιδόμενον often means 'dare id quod convenit vel par est' (Ast, Lex. Platon. s.v.), as for instance in Plat. Polit. 295 Α, ἀκραθῶν ἐνί ἐκάστῳ τὸ προσήκον ἀποδιδόμενον.

11. κρίνειν, 'to come to a decision of their own.' The word used in Plut. Lycurg. c. 6 (Aristot. Fragm. 493. 1558 b 9 sqq.) to describe the powers of the Lacedaemonian assembly is ἐπικρίνειν—τοῦ δὲ πλῆθους ἀδραμέντος εἰπεν μὲν οὐδενὶ γνωρὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐφείτο, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν γερῶν καὶ τῶν βασιλέων προτεθέντα επικρίνειν κύριος ἦν ὁ δήμος. For the meaning of ἐπικρίνειν, cp. Plato, Laws 768 Α, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ δύνησθων κοινωνίᾳ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτοῖς, τὴν βουλὴν ἐπικρίνειν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀφίκειν ἑκατέρων, and for that of κρίνειν, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1113 a 11, ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι κρίνειντες. See note on 1272 a 11.

12. ὀπερ. See note on 1272 a 11.

ἐν ταῖς ἐπέραις πολιτείαις, i. e. the Lacedaemonian and Cretan.

13. τὰς πεισταρχίας. As δικαρχία = 'decomviratus' (cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 2), so πεισταρχία = 'quinqueviratus' (Kluge, Aristoteles de politia Carthaginiensium, p. 121-2). Nothing is known about these bodies of five magistrates. On self-election as an oligarchical feature, cp. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 1 sqq.; it is so only if eligibility is confined to a few.

16. τηλεύναι ἀρχεῖν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων. So ὀλυγοχρόνοι ἀρχαῖ are a sign of democracy (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24). Τῶν ἄλλων is translated
by Bern. 'als die Mitglieder anderer Behörden,' and by Mr. Welldon 'than any other board of officers;' but Sus. translates 'than all other magistrates;' and, I incline to think, rightly.

εξεληθυότες, 'after exit from office.' Kluge compares εἰς τὸς ἄρχας βαδίζειν, 2. 7. 1266 b 24 : cp. also εἰς τὸς ἄρχας παρείναι, 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 17.

17. τὸ δὲ ἀμίθους καὶ μὴ κληρωτάς, sc. εἶναι. Here Aristotle notices one or two points which might seem to be deviations in an oligarchical direction, but are not. The payment of magistrates is democratic (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 35–38), but the non-payment of them is compatible with aristocracy as well as with oligarchy. The same may be said of appointment by election, not by lot (cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 7–13, 32–33, etc.). No deviation from the aristocratic ἰτόθεσις of the constitution is involved in these arrangements.

19. καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας κ.τ.λ. The Carthaginian and Lacedaemonian States had this feature of judicial procedure in common, that in them all suits came before magistrates of the State for adjudication, not before the citizen-body (3. 1. 1275 b 8 sqq.). In the latter State, however, each magistracy had its own exclusive field of judicial competence, so that a very small number of persons possessed the right of dealing with this or that offence—of inflicting, for instance, the punishment of death or exile (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 33, where this is noted as an oligarchical feature of the constitution)—whereas at Carthage this was not so: all magistracies were competent to try any suit—whether severally or in combination, we do not learn. We are left to guess why this arrangement is more suitable to an aristocracy than the other, just as in 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 20 we are not told why a plurality of 'strong places' in a city is suitable to an aristocracy; but the reason may perhaps be that under the Carthaginian system less is left to the decision of a very few, for it must be remembered that an ἀριστοκρατία takes account of ἀλευθερία (or δῆμος) as well as of wealth and virtue (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sq.: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19–25). Or possibly the Carthaginian system may be regarded as more suitable to an aristocracy, because it assumes and implies a greater diffusion of virtue among the holders of magistracies than the other.

21. For παρεκβαίνειν followed by a genitive, see Bon. Ind. 568 a 27 sqq.

22. διάνοιαν here = δίξαν, Bon. Ind. 186 b 4 sqq.

23. συνδόκει, i. e. approves itself not only to the Carthaginian constitution but also to the mass of men. Cp. Plato, Laws 763 D, δεὶ δὴ καὶ τούτους δυνατοῖς τε εἶναι καὶ σχολαίζωντας τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
and see the criticisms which Aristotle passes on the Laws in c. 6.

25. καλῶς probably qualifies both ἀρχεῖν and σχολίζειν: cp. 4 (7). 5. 1236 b 30, πλήθει δὲ καὶ μεγίθει τοσαύτην ὡστε δύνασθαι τοὺς οἰκουμένας ζην σχολίζοντας ἑλευθερίως ἀμα καὶ σωφρίνως. Καλῶς σχολίζειν is a condition of καλῶς ἀρχεῖν.


29. εἰς δύο ταῦτα βλέποντες. In 35 (cp. c. 12. 1274 b 21) we have βλέπειν used with πρὸς: for βλέπειν with εἰς, see Bon. Ind. 138 a 51 sqq.

30. τὰς μεγίστας. Ἀρχάς is omitted, though it is some time since even ἀρχοντες were referred to (24); but no one will be at a loss to supply the missing word, so it drops out.

31. ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου, 'a lawgiver's error': cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 20, ὡς ὁποῖον των ἀρχοντός παιδίων. Lawgivers are regarded as responsible, if what ought to be attended to at the outset (εἰς ἀρχής, cp. c. 9. 1269 b 39) is not attended to. Here Aristotle traces back the practice of the Carthaginians in paying regard to wealth as well as excellence, when they elect magistrates, to an omission on the part of the lawgiver or founder of the State (cp. c. 9. 1270 a 18, τοῖτο δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως), who ought to have done what Aristotle himself does in constructing his best State (4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.), and secured εἰσπορὰ to the best men of the State. Cp. Isocr. Busir. § 18, ἐτε δὲ τὸ μηδένα (τῶν μιχύμων) τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀποροοῦν τῶν κοινῶν πρωταγοράτωι ἀμελεῖν.

35. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ., i.e. but if it is right to look to wealth as well as to virtue in electing to offices, it is not right or necessary to go to the extreme of making the greatest offices in the State purchaseable; yet there is a law at Carthage to this effect. For the fact, cp. Polyb. 6. 50. 4, παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίων δόμα φανερῶς διδόντες λαμβάνοντο τὰς ἀρχάς. Plato perhaps was thinking of Carthage, when he speaks (Rep. 544 D) of ὠνηταί βασιλεῖαι.

χάριν σχολῆς. 'Χάριν plerumque ipsi nominui postponitur; aliquoties antepositionem legitur,' Bon. Ind. 846 a 42.


38. τὴν πολύν δόλην. Compare the use of this phrase in c. 5. 1264 b 16 sqq., in 3. 13. 1283 b 40, where it seems to be explained
by τῶν πολιτῶν 41, and in 2. 9. 1269 b 19, where it includes not only the citizens, but also the women of the citizen class.

39. ὅτι δ' ἐν κ.τ.λ. Susemihl reads γάρ, though all the MSS. as well as Vet. Int. have δέ. Δέ seems to be quite in place here, for the sentence which it introduces does not appear to be added in proof of that which precedes (ἐντιμον γάρ—φιλοχρήματον), in which no reference is made to τὸ κύριον. Aristotle’s meaning probably is—‘the law makes wealth to be esteemed more than virtue, and renders the whole city fond of money, and those who purchase these high offices will come to prize above all other things the wealth by which they are won, yet what the possessors of supreme authority prize most will be most prized by the other citizens also.’ We read already in Xen. Cyrop. 8. 8. 5, ὅπωτερ τινες γάρ ἐν οἱ προστίτατα δαμι, τοιοῦτοι καὶ οἱ ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς ὡς ἑπί τὸ πολύ γίγνοντας, and the same thing is said by Isocrates (ad Nicocl. § 31, τὸ τῆς πόλεως ὁδὸς ἡδον ὁμοιάται τοῖς ἀρχοντιν: cp. Areopag. § 22 : Nicocl. § 37). Cp. also Plato, Laws 711 B sqq.

41. τοῦτος = τῇ τούτων, just as in the passage quoted in the last note from Isocr. ad Nicocl. τοῖς ἀρχοντιν = τῷ τῶν ἀρχόντων (see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 781 d. Obs. 2). Τοῦτος refers to τὸ κύριον: for the plural, cp. 1273 a 11, κύριοι, which refers to τῷ δήμῳ, 10. We are reminded of Plato, Laws 711 C, καὶ πῶς οὐδεμία ταχὺ ἐνακολουθήσει τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας τῷ τῶν τοιαύτην πειθῶ καὶ ἀμα βίαν εἶληφότι;

1273 b. 1. οὐχ οἶν τε βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. So Π¹: οὐχ οἶν τ’ εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν, Π². With ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι we expect πολίω rather than πολιτείαν, but it may possibly be right to supply τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων (πολιτείαν) with δημοκρατεῖσθαι in 2. 6. 1265 b 35–38 (see note on this passage). Perhaps on the whole it is probable that the reading of Π¹ is the original reading, and that of Π² the result of an attempt on the part of some one or other (possibly Aristotle himself, though that is not very likely) to soften the harshness of ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι. As to the thought, we must bear the passage before us in mind when we are told in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq., that an ἄριστοκρατία will pay regard to πλοίως, ἀρετή, and δήμος. It will not be durable, if it does not honour virtue most. Compare the passages referred to above on 37, and also 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 5 sqq. Aristotle seems to have thought it likely that the Carthaginian ἄριστοκρατία would ultimately pass into an oligarchy.

ἐθίζεσθαι δ’ εὐλογον κ.τ.λ. This is a further objection. Not only does this law lead the citizens to count wealth more precious than virtue, and thus tend to imperil the aristocratic character of the
constitution, but the purchasers of these great offices will probably learn by degrees to seek to replace the money spent in their purchase by dishonest gains.

3. \(\epsilon i \, \pi e n h \, \mu e n \, \dot{\omega} n \, \ldots \, \kappa e r d a i n e i n\). And this is the view implied by the law making these offices purchasable (cp. 1273 a 24 sq.). After \(\phi a v l o i t e r o s \, \dot{\omega} \, \dot{\omega} n\) we should supply, with Bernays, ‘like those purchasers of office.’ The argument is an argumentum ad hominem addressed to the lawgiver or the supporters of this law.

5. \(\delta i o \, \kappa . t . l .\). This amounts to saying—‘therefore the \(\epsilon p i e i k e i s\) should be put in a position to rule’: \(\epsilon i t o r i a\) should be secured to them. And then, in the next sentence, Aristotle goes on—‘but even if the lawgiver neglected to secure a sufficiency of means to the best men both in and out of office, still it is better that he should provide for their leisure when in office.’ As to \(\tau o i t o u s\), 5, see note on 1260 b 35 and Bon. Ind. 546 a 47. For \(\pi r o e i t o\), Liddell and Scott (s. v.) compare 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 4: see also Bon. Ind. 638 b 54 sqq.

9. \(o \theta e r \, \kappa . t . l .\). M. Yriarte says of the Venetian system of government (Vie d’un Patricien de Venise, p. 95)—‘il permet le cumul de plusieurs fonctions, et le permet à un tel point qu’il n’est pas rare de voir un Sénateur occuper en même temps jusqu’à cinq ou six postes très-importants dans l’État.’ See also Dr. Arnold, History of Rome 2. 550, note 6. We learn from Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22, that some of the earlier tyrannies owed their origin to the practice adopted by certain oligarchies of entrusting the most important magistracies to a single holder.

11. \(\pi r o s t a t t e i n\). Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 7 sq.

12. \(\dot{e} p o u \, \mu \eta \, \mu i k r a \, \pi o l i s\). Cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 34 sqq. and 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 8 sqq.

\(\pi o l i t i k o w t e r o v\) here seems to be taken by Bonitz (Ind. 614 a 30–39, b 10–24) in a similar sense to that which it bears in 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 41, koivón \(\epsilon i \) kai \(\mu e n o u \, \tau o i t o w \, \dot{a} m f o t e r a \, \tau a i t a, \, \dot{e} i o \) kai \(\pi o l i t i k o w, \, \mu e n k t a i \, \gamma a r \, \dot{e} x \, \dot{a} m f o i n: \) i.e. in a sense contrasted with \(\dot{e} m o k e r a t i c o w, \, \dot{a} l a g a r c h i k o w\) etc., ‘aptum ad moderatum quoddam imperium popularis.’ But must it not be used here in some sense in which \(k a i \, \kappa i l l i o w--\dot{e} a t o u\) can serve as a justification of it? Its meaning is probably ‘more statesmanlike,’ ‘more agreeable to political science,’ as in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 26 (cp. \(\dot{e} r o n \, \tau o w \, \pi o l i t i k o w, \, 24\)) and 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 35. Cp. also Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 114 Shilleto (p. 373), \(k a t a i t \, \tau o w \, \dot{e} m p e n o u \, \tau o i t o w \, \dot{a} m e m i a \, \dot{e} s t i \, \pi o l i t i k h \, \dot{e} i d i e \, \dot{d} i k a i a\), where Shilleto translates ‘one which you would take from a statesman.’
13. ΚΟΙΝΩΤΕΡΟΝ ΤΕ ΓΆΡ Κ.Τ.Λ. ‘For it is fairer to all, as we said’ (the reference probably is to 2. 2. 1261 b 1 sqq.), ‘and work of one and the same kind, whatever it is (ἐκαστων), is done better and more quickly.’ Cp. Plato, Rep. 370 C, ἐκ δὴ τούτων πλείω τε ἐκαστα γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ μᾶκν, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καρδιᾷ σχολήν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγων πράττῃ, and Aristot. Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 3 sqq. For κοινωτέρον, cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 9. 1430 a 1, καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ, ἀν ὑπὸς καὶ κοινῶς πρὸς αὐτοὺς προσφέρωμεθα, πολέν χρόνον τὴν συμμαχίαν φιλά-ξομεν, where κοινῶς is conjoined with ἦς (see Liddell and Scott s. v. ἦς, ii. 3) and opposed to πλεονεκτικῶς, 1429 b 38. Ἐκαστόν τῶν αὐτῶν seems = ἐν ἑργῶ, 1273 b 9, e. g. τὸ σκυτοποιεῖν as distinguished from a combination of αὐλεῖν καὶ σκυτοποιεῖν: cp. Isocrates. Busiris. § 16, ἀπαντάς δὲ τούς ἀρμιθων περιλαθῶν εἷς ὄν ὄμωτι ἀν τις τα κοινα διουκίσειν, αἰέ τοὺς αὐτούς τὰς αὐτίς πράξεις μεταχειρίσεθα προσέβαζε, εἰδὼς τοὺς μὲν μετα-βαλλόμενοι τῶν ἐργασίας οὐδὲ πρὸς ἐν τῶν ἑργῶν ἄκρισος ἔχοντας, τοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτίς πράξεις συνέχος διαμεύνονται εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ἐκαστον ἀποστε-λοῦντας, and Nicocl. § 18, αἰ δὲ αἰε τοὺς αὐτούς ἐπισταυρίζετε κ.τ.λ. Yet there is much to be said for Bernays’ conjecture of τῶν ἑργῶν in place of τῶν αὐτῶν. Has Cicero this passage in his memory when he writes to Atticus (13. 10. 2)—Ad Dolabella, ut scribis, ita puto faciendum, κοινότερα quaedam et politiκότερα? We perhaps find an echo of it in Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praecepta c. 15. 812 D, οἱ γὰρ μόνον τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς πολλοῖς διανέμεσθαι δοκοῦσης, ἦτον εἰσχλεῖ τῶν φύσιν τὸ μεγέθος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν χρεών ἐπιτελείται μᾶλλον.

15. τοῦτο, i.e. the advantage of a diffusion of ἀρχῆ. It is not quite certain whether ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν means ‘in military and naval affairs’ or ‘in affairs of war and in maritime affairs.’ I rather inclined to the former view. In fleets and armies almost every one may be said both to rule and to be ruled, for each has a superior at the same time as he commands inferiors. There were in the Lacedaemonian army even enomarchs, i.e. leaders of 30 or 40 men, and very possibly commanders on even a smaller scale. Lord Napier of Magdala remarks (Times, July 25, 1885), that ‘the command even of a small body of soldiers involves ... the exercise both of subordinate discipline and of discipline in command.’ In civic life a share of ruling and being ruled is secured in a different way—by alternation (2. 2. 1261 b 1 sqq.)—but the result is the same.

17. διὰ πάντων διελήθηε. This phrase recurs in 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 17 and 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 26, where, however it is used of office, not of ruling and being ruled.

18. διλυγαρχικῆς, and hence exposed to much danger of being
upset (7 (5). 12. 1315 b 11: 7 (5). 1. 1302 a 4 sqq.: compare the transition in c. 6. 1266 a 11 sqq. from ὀλιγαρχικῶν, 12, to ἐπικύδωνον, 27). As oligarchies rest on wealth, the remedy employed at Carthage (that of enrichment) was an excellent one, for it brought fresh blood into the ruling class, or at all events made the people less hostile. See on this subject 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35-b 16, τεχναστέων οὖν ὅπως ἀν εὐπορία γένατο χρόνος κ.τ.λ. Isomachus (Xen. Oecorn. 14. 4 sqq.) contrasts the laws of Draco and Solon, which punish those who do wrong, with the ‘royal laws’ (i.e. those of kings, or perhaps those of the king of Persia—see Holden, Oeconomicus, p. 217), which enrich those who do right, and says that in his management of his slaves he employs both methods, and that further, when he finds slaves anxious to be commended by him, τούτως ὡσπερ ἐλευθερώεις ἤδη χρώμαι, οὗ μόνον πλουτίζων ἀλλὰ καὶ τιμῶν ἁς καλὸς τε θύγαθος. See also Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 22.

ἐκφεύγοις, sc. τῶν κίνδυνων (Coray). Bernays, ingeniously enough, would insert (ἐ εἰσέπρατο) στάσιν after ἀρματα, but it is doubtful whether anything has dropped out. Aristotle often omits a word where it will be readily supplied. See note on 1266 b 1, and cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 17, where πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν is left to be supplied by the reader. We find ἐκφεύγων, however, used absolutely now and then, and ἐκφεύγων is frequently thus used (e.g. in Hdt. 1. 10).

19. τῷ πλουτεῖν. So all MSS. Τῷ πλουτεῖων (Schn.) would certainly be much simpler, but perhaps τῷ πλουτεῖν (which Bernays leaves unaltered) is defensible. Πλουτεῖον means ‘to become rich’ as well as ‘to be rich,’ cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 20, and Menand. Κόλαξ, Fr. 6 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 154), καθές ἐποίησεν ταχώς δίκαιος ὅν: thus τῷ πλουτεῖν may here be translated ‘by becoming rich,’ ‘by enrichment.’ Members of the demos became rich and contented through being despatched to the cities dependent on Carthage in some capacity the exact nature of which is uncertain (as officials, if we follow Susemihl—as colonists, if we follow Grote, History of Greece 10. 545): cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 4, τοιοῦτον δὲ τινα τρόπον Καρχηδόνων πολιτευόμενοι φιλον κέκτησαν τοῦ δῆμον· ὑπὲρ τινα ἐκπέμπωντες τοῦ δῆμον πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδια ποιοῦσιν εὑρόμενοι. See Sus., Note 398, who explains the ‘cities’ here mentioned to be cities of the agricultural section of the indigenous Libyans subject to Carthage, as distinguished on the one hand from Phoenician cities ruled by her and on the other from pastoral Libyan tribes.

ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις. In 1320 b 4 sqq. (quoted in the last note) ἐκπέμπων is used with πρὸς. Ἐπὶ perhaps implies that they were sent out to rule the cities: cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 20, τούτων Σινοκλέα μὲν καὶ

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ἀλλον ἐταξέν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱππεᾶς κ.τ.λ. Ἐκτέμπευν is used of sending out officials in c. 9. 1271 a 24. but it is also commonly used of colonists (see Liddell and Scott s.v.). For τὰς πόλεις, 'the cities dependent on Carthage,' compare the use of ἀπὸ τῶν πόλεων in Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 20 and of ἐν ταῖς πόλεισιν in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 14.


touti. Aristotle would seem, if we may judge from the Index Aristotelicus, to use οὕτως but rarely. For the contrast between τίχες ἔργον and διὰ τῶν νομοθέτην, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 29 sqq., and for διὰ τῶν νομοθέτην, see above on 1270 b 19.

23. φάρμακον . . . τῆς ἡσυχίας. Compare the use of ἄκους in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32 sq.

25. Κρητικῆς. For the omission of the article, see Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq. and Vahlen, Beitr. zu d. Poet. 4. 409.

diakias surprises us, but still the Cretan constitution had its merits.

C. 12. 27. Τῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Looking to the programme of the Second Book which we find in its opening chapter, we might well expect it to close with the review of the Carthaginian constitution. We are there prepared for a review of the constitutions subsisting in reputedly well-governed States and of schemes of constitution put forth by individuals and generally well thought of; but now Aristotle speaks as if he had promised a review of ὁ ἀποφημίως περὶ πολιτείας, divides them into two classes, those who had not taken an active part in politics and those who had, and calls to mind that he has not yet spoken of anyone except Lycurgus belonging to the latter class. He will now, we gather, enter on a review, not of existing constitutions or of schemes of constitution, but of lawgivers who had played a part in politics. It is no doubt true that, as Aristotle ranks Solon among the best lawgivers in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 18 sqq., we look for a criticism of the Solonian constitution from him, and that this constitution, having passed away and given place to another, is not in strictness included in either of the two classes of constitution marked out for treatment in the first chapter of the Second Book. Still there is some awkwardness about this addition to the programme, and the purpose of the book—the indication of what is good and useful in the constitutions reviewed and the revelation of their general inadequacy (2. 1. 1263 b 32–35)—seems to be but little served by the inquiries of this concluding chapter. The more valuable portion of it—that relating to Solon—rather corrects current mistakes as to the
nature of his legislation than criticises it, and the remainder is little more than a collection of jottings. The notice of Solon’s legislation, though possibly incomplete, seems to be Aristotelian, but it may have been tacked on by some later hand to the notice of the Carthaginian constitution, and the authenticity of the rest of the chapter in its present shape is very questionable. See note on 1274 a 22.

35. Σόλωνα δ’ ένιοι κ.τ.λ. This approval is mentioned because good repute confers a claim to notice (c. 1.1260 b 32). Plato had already said in Rep. 599 E, σέ δέ τίς αἰτιώτατο πόλις νομοθέτην ἀγαθόν γεγονέων καὶ σφών ὁμοληκών; Χαρώνεια μὲν γάρ Ἰταλία καὶ Σικελία, καὶ ἡμεῖς Σόλωνι. Aristotle himself ranks Solon among the ‘best lawgivers’ (see above on 27). It is not clear whether Isocrates is referred to among these ένιοι, though he was an eulogist of Solon and of the πάτριος δημοκρατία (cp. Areopag. §§ 16-17, 26-27, 37: de Antid. § 232). They regarded Solon as the destroyer of an extreme oligarchy, on the ruins of which he constructed the πάτριος δημοκρατία. A wisely mixed constitution: they took him to have founded the Areopagus, to have introduced the system of filling magistracies by election, and to have created the popular dicastery, thus as it were equipping the State with a complete set of new institutions. ‘Most writers,’ says Plutarch (Solon c. 19), ‘made Solon the author of the Areopagus’: Plutarch himself, however, doubts the fact for the reason he there mentions. To this view of Solon’s work Aristotle objects; he says that Solon would seem to have found the council of the Areopagus and the system of filling the magistracies by election already established, and that he was only so far responsible in relation to those matters that he left them as he found them, whereas he did institute the popular element in the constitution by founding the popular dicasters. He appeals in support of his contention to the opinion of a second set of critics, who made Solon responsible for the existing extreme democracy. They complained that so far from being the author of a mixed constitution, he overpowered the oligarchical element of the constitution by the democratic, inasmuch as he gave supreme power to the popular dicastery. Armed with this judicial authority, the people became masters of the State; one statesman after another had to play into their hands, and so the extreme democracy gradually came into being. Aristotle, however, holds that these inquirers ascribed to Solon’s institution of popular dicasteries consequences which would not have resulted from it, if it had not been for accidental circumstances. Solon was far from intending to found an extreme democracy; he
gave, in fact, only a modicum of power to the people—enough to content them and no more—and reserved office for the better-to-do classes. On the other hand, he was not the contriver of an elaborate mixed constitution, but rather the founder of the beginnings of popular liberty; still less was he the undoer of the power of the Few. He left office in their hands, and gave the people only just enough power to make the holders of office govern well (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27–1319 a 6). That Aristotle approved of Solon's legislation is evident from 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 18 sq.: 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.: 3. 11. 1281 b 21–1282 a 41.

39. μίξαις καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν κ.τ.λ. These critics appear to have thought that a good mixed constitution should include oligarchical, aristocratical, and popular elements: compare the view referred to in c. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq. Aristotle may perhaps have regarded the Areopagus as an oligarchical rather than an aristocratical institution (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20: cp. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27), but he would hardly agree that election to office, unless it is κατ' ὄψιν, is an aristocratical feature (cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 7 sqq.), or think that the mere admissibility of all citizens to serve on the dicasteries, without the accompaniment of pay to the poor for serving, is a large step in the democratic direction.

41. Here, as it seems to me, Aristotle's statement of his own opinion begins.

1274 a. 2. τῶν δὲ δήμων καταστήσαι κ.τ.λ., 'set up the demos' (gave a place in the constitution to the demos) 'by enacting that all the citizens should be admitted to sit on the dicasteries.' Aristotle uses the same words—καταστήσαι, καταστήσασι—as had been used by the critics to whom he refers, in order to bring out clearly the difference of his own view. Solon is here so far connected with the dicasteries that he is said to have provided that membership of them should be open to all citizens.


6. τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν. Cp. 10, where this expression is repeated. It is implied that the Athenian democracy was in the writer's time a democracy of an advanced kind—perhaps a τελευταία δημοκρατία. The passage is noticeable, because Aristotle commonly avoids mentioning Athens in connexion with his censures of extreme democracy. Some have doubted its genuineness because of its unwonted outspokenness.

8. Ἐφιάλτης... καὶ Περικλῆς. cp. Plutarch, Praecepta Reip.
Gerend. c. 15. 812 D, ὡς Περικλῆς Μενίππῳ μὲν ἐχρήτῳ πρὸς τὰς στρατηγικὰς, δὲ Ἐφαμίλτων δὲ τὴν ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγων Βοσκῶν ἐπαιτείνωσε, διὰ δὲ Χαρίνου τὸ κατὰ Μεγαρέων ἐκφύσε σφήμα, Δάμπωνα δὲ Θοίριον οἰκεῖαν ἐξητήνθην.


12. ἀπὸ συμπτωμάτων. Cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 6, τῆς ναυαρχίας. a rare word, apparently, in the sense in which it is here used.

13. ἐν τοῖς Μηδίκοις. Cp. 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20, οἷον ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ Βουλῇ εἰδοκυρίασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδίκοις ἐδοξε συντονώτεραν ποίησα τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος γενόμενος αἰτίας τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα πίνης καὶ εἰς ταῖτης τῆς ἱμερονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ βάλαστον δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἔσπορησαν: Isocr. de Antid. § 316 sq.: Plato, Laws 707, and also 708 E, ἐμελδὼν λέγει, ὡς οὐδές ποτὲ ἀνωθότων οὐδὲν νομοθετεί, τέχα δὲ καὶ ξυμφορα παντῶν πέπτωσα παντοῖος νομοθετοῦσι τὰ πάντα ἴμαν· ὡς ποιήμα τις βιασύνης ἀνέτρηψε πολιτείαν καὶ μετέβαλε νόμους κ.τ.λ.

14. δημαγωγός φαύλος. Probably those alluded to by Isocrates, de Antidosi §§ 316–7, a passage which Aristotle evidently has in his mind here. Aristotle had a good opinion of the antagonist of Pericles, Thucydides son of Melesias (Plutarch, Nicias c. 2), but would hardly have applied this expression to Pericles, even for the sake of contradicting Isocrates, who calls him δημαγωγός ἀγαθός (de Antid. § 234).

15. ἑπεὶ Σόλων γε κ.τ.λ. Cp. Solon, Fragm. 5 (Bergk), and Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 32 sqq. It would seem, however, from 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sqq., that Solon might have given the people less; and Plato in the Laws, though he allows the people some share in judicial and deliberative functions, reserves the review of the conduct of magistrates in office for his great college of the priests of Apollo.

16. ἀποδιδόμαι. See note on 1273 a 10, ἀποδιδόμαι τῷ δήμῳ.


18. ὀρχαί, here as in 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 1–3 (contrast 3. 1. 1275 a 23–26) distinguished from τὸ ἐκάζων. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 1, διὸ παρ᾽ εἰσόδιον ἀνθρωπορρήτῳ τὸ παλαιὸν ὀρχαῖα, πρὸς δὲ θεοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦ ἔσχατον, where Athens may be among the States referred to, for, as Schömann says (Gr. Alterth. 1. 342), 'it is clear that as the three upper classes of the Solonian Constitution were framed in relation to the amount of their landed property, all those who
owned no land must have been placed in the fourth, even when well endowed with other kinds of property. The Archonship was probably confined to the first class (Plut. Aristid. c. 1).

19. ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίμων κ.τ.λ. Diels (Über die Berliner Fragmenten der 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία des Aristoteles, p. 33, 3) regards 1274 a 19–21 as an interpolation, and if with Susemihl we regard all that follows νομοθέται δὲ, 22, as spurious, there is something to be said for rejecting ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίμων—μετῆν, 21, also. These words, however, seem to be added to justify and enforce τῶν γυνώμων καί τῶν εἰπόρων, and to show that Solon not only confined office to well-to-do men, but did so by the requirement of a property qualification (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 30, ἄρχειν δὲ τὰς μεγάστας αἱρέσεως καί ἀπὸ τιμημάτων ... ἢ καί ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μὲν μηδείμαν, ἀλλὰ τούς δυναμίνους).

20. τρίτου τέλους probably means 'third in mention' (cp. c. 6. 1264 b 33: c. ii. 1272 b 28), not necessarily 'third in point of dignity.' Susemihl brackets (though doubtfully) these two words as spurious, but τέλους seems to be needed for τὸ τέταρτον, 21.

21. οἰς κ.τ.λ. The fact was mentioned by Aristotle in the 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία also (Aristot. Fragm. 350. 1537 a 20 sqq.).

22. νομοθέται δὲ ἐγένοντο κ.τ.λ. The review of Solon's legislation seems, as has been said, hardly to be complete. Be that, however, as it may, we expect it to be followed by a review of lawgivers who legislated for their own States or for others after taking an active part in politics (πολιτευόμενες αὐτοὶ, 1273 b 31), whether they were the authors of laws only or of constitutions as well as laws, for it is doubtful whether Susemihl is right in thinking that the authors of laws only are dismissed in 1273 b 32 from consideration. And we do find that in what follows lawgivers who legislated for other States than their own (Charondas, Philolaus, Androdamas) are specially noted. Nothing, however, is said as to the lawgivers now enumerated having taken an active part in politics, and we are even more at a loss in this part of the chapter than in that relating to Solon to see how the scanty notices given of their legislation serve the main purpose of the book, which is set forth in c. i. 1260 b 32–36. Of Zaleucus all that we are told is that he legislated for the Epizephyrian Locrians, and it would even seem (see next note) that Aristotle elsewhere gave an account of him which would at all events exclude the idea of his having legislated after taking an active part in politics, according to the Πολιτεία he was a shepherd and a slave when he became a lawgiver. About Charondas we learn a little more, and perhaps there is a reason for the insertion of the story about Philolaus and
Diocles, though it seems out of keeping in the Politics. From this point onward the object of the writer appears to be to note anything special and peculiar to each lawgiver. This aim had not, to say the least, been equally prominent in previous chapters, though we find, it is true, some traces of it in c. 7. 1266 a 33-34 sq. and c. 8. 1267 b 29. The passage 1274 b 9-15 is especially open to suspicion. A recurrence to Phaleas and Plato seems quite out of place, especially now that we are concerned with lawgivers, and with lawgivers who had taken an active part in politics, of whom Plato was not one. The statement (1274 b 9 sq.) that Plato was the first to propose a community of property conflicts with c. 7. 1266 a 34 sq. It is true that there is much that is characteristic of Aristotle in the style of the passage which begins at 1274 a 22 and extends to the end of the chapter. The quiet correction of Ephoros (1274 a 25 sqq.), and of the too patriotic Locrian legend which traced back the beginnings of the legislative art to the Locrian Onomacritus, is also quite in Aristotle’s vein.

On the whole, the guess is perhaps permissible that Aristotle may have left only the fragment about Solon and a few rough data for insertion after the notice of the Carthaginian constitution, and that some member of the school, not very long after his death, completed them as he best could. Zeller, it should be noticed, holds that the chapter has suffered from interpolation (Gr. Ph. 2. 676).

Zāleukós te κ.τ.λ. Of the lawgivers noticed in the remaining portion of the chapter, some seem to have been authors of constitutions as well as laws, others of laws only. We cannot be certain that the ‘ill-compounded ἀμοινοκρατία’ at the Epizephyrian Locri which Aristotle criticises in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 38 sq. was regarded by him as the work of Zaleucus, but Plutarch speaks of Zaleucus as the author of a constitution (Numa c. 4). Chersonas, however, appears to be referred to in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq. as the founder of an ἀμοινοκρατία, or at all events of a constitution of some kind: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 21: 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 21 sqq. Draco and Pittacus, on the contrary, are stated to be authors of laws only in 1274 b 15, 18. It is hardly likely that Cicero refers to this passage in Ep. ad Att. 6. 1. 18: Quis Zaleucum leges Locris scripsisse non dixit? Num igitur iacet Theophrastus, si id a Timaeo reprehensum est? Cp. Cic. de Leg. 2. 6. 15, where Timaeus is said to have denied that Zaleucus ever existed. There were perhaps some who ascribed the Politics to Theophrastus, but Cicero can hardly have been among them,
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for, as has been pointed out elsewhere, he says in the De Finibus (5. 4. II) that both Aristotle and Theophrastus had written 'de optimo statu rei publicae,' so that at all events the two books of the Politics which relate to this subject cannot have been attributed by him to Theophrastus. It has apparently escaped notice, that while Zaleucus is here classed among those who had become lawgivers after taking an active part in politics (πολιτευθέντες αυτοί, 1273 b 31), he is said by the Scholiast on Pindar on the authority of Aristotle to have been a shepherd and a slave when he was called on to legislate (Aristot. Fragm. 505. 756 ff a 5 sqq.). Perhaps, however, the words πολιτευθέντες αυτοί need not be interpreted as implying that the participation in political life preceded the legislation; the intention may be only to contrast lawgivers who took an active part in politics at some time in their life with those who διετέλεσαν ἤδιωτεύοντες τῶν βίων (1273 b 28).

24. ταῖς Χαλκιδικαίς. Some would omit ταῖς, but cp. I. II. 1258 b 19, τῶν ἄλλων ξών τῶν πλατῶν ἡ πτηνώ, διά δὲ δῶν ἐστὶν τυχαῖον βούθεα, where τῶν ἄλλων ξών undergoes a similar series of limitations.

25. πειράται δὲ κ. τ. λ. 'And some attempt even to put facts together, their view being that,' etc. Welldon, following Congreve, translates συνάγειν 'to make out a catena of legislators,' and so also Bernays, 'eine ununterbrochene Reihenfolge von Gesetzgebern nachzuweisen,' but the correctness of this rendering seems doubtful. For the construction, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 20. Who were these τινές? Trierber (Forschungen, pp. 67, 72, 101) and Sus.2 (Note 418) say Ephorus; and it is true that Ephorus (ap. Strab. 10. p. 482), on the authority of 'the Cretans,' brings Lycurgus into communication with Thales—μελοποιὸν ἄνδρι καὶ νομοθετικῷ—from whom he is said to learn in particular the way in which Rhadamantus, and afterwards Minos, fathered their laws on Zeus. But we nowhere learn that Ephorus connected Thales with Onomacritus; and as to Zaleucus, Ephorus would seem from Strabo 6. p. 260 to have regarded his laws as a compilation ἐκ τε τῶν Κρητικῶν νομίμων καὶ Λακωνικῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀρεσπαγατικῶν. This hardly looks as if he made Zaleucus and Lycurgus disciples of Thales, and therefore contemporaries or nearly so. Ephorus, it is true, was an enthusiast for things Cretan, and may well have pointed to Crete as the birthplace of the legislative art among others—indeed, those who traced the beginnings of Greek civilization to Crete were probably very much in the right (see E. Curtius, History of Greece
E. T. 1. 73)—but one would rather suspect a Locrian origin for a tradition which made a Locrian the first skilled legislator, and placed Zaleucus and Lycurgus on a level, thus virtually denying the debt of the former to the latter. We know that the Italian Locri claimed to have been the first State to use written laws, those which Zaleucus had given it (Scyimnus Chius, 314 sqq.). If again the Locrian Onomacritus mentioned here is the same man as the well-known Athenian oracle-monger of Peisistratid times, the anachronism is very great—too great, probably, for Ephorus to have committed. We should also expect Ephorus, with his strong interest in Crete, to look back to Rhadamanthus or Minos as the earliest able lawgiver.

28. γυμνασθήμαι δ' αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ., 'and that he trained himself by practice in Crete, though a Locrian and sojourning there in the exercise of the prophetic art.' For γυμνασθήμαι, cp. Isocr. de Antid. § 187, where it is coupled with ἐμπεδεῖς γενέσθαι.

28. Θάλητα. Thales the Cretan, in contradistinction to whom Thales the Milesian is thus designated in 1. 11. 1259 a 6. On Thales the Cretan, the other and probably later form of whose name is Thaletas, see Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, and Sus., Note 419. In associating Thales with Lycurgus, Ephorus and the authorities here criticised gave currency to a long-enduring and widespread error, which survives not only in Plutarch, Lycurgus c. 4, but also in Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. 2. 21, and Diog. Laert. 1. 38. We probably learn the true date of Thales the Cretan from the De Musica attributed to Plutarch (c. 10), where he is said on the authority of Glaucus (a Rhegian, contemporary with Democritus) to have lived after Archilochus. The contradiction given in the text on chronological grounds to the ingenious combination of these τινες may perhaps apply to the whole of it. Lawgivers do not fall so easily into an order of filiation: Lycurgus was not the pupil of Thales, nor Thales the contemporary of Onomacritus, nor Zaleucus the contemporary of Lycurgus, nor Charondas the pupil of Zaleucus.

30. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. For the transition, cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 33; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἰδιός ἐξωτερικωτέρας ἑστὶ σκέψεως, τὸ δὲ ξών πρώτων συνεστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, where Aristotle turns from a question lying somewhat off his path to the inquiry which he is pursuing. So here the meaning seems to be—but all this rests on an error of chronology, and to return to our subject, Philolaus the Corinthian also legislated for a city not his own, Thebes.' It seems doubtful whether, as some have thought, the τινες of 25 are found fault with
here for omitting Philolaus in their enumeration. 'Εγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλολαος is repeated in 1274 b 18, ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακός, and 23, ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας.

The passage is continued by Bonitz (Ind. 856 a 20), who gives this passage with 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 and 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 24, and the plural is certainly far more usual in this sense. As to λέγουσι . . . λέγοντες, the repetition, though harsh, may perhaps be explained by such phrases as ἔποιησαν οὐ καλῶν, ὄρθως ποιήσας, c. 9. 1270 a 20.

32. ἦν δὲ κ.τ.λ. The purpose of this narrative seems to be partly to show how remarkable the career of Philolaus was, but still more to explain how a Corinthian came to live at Thebes: we were informed a few lines back how it was that a Locrian came to sojourn in Crete. The striking feature of the story to the mind of a Greek would be that a member of the ruling family of Corinth should have been willing to give up country and home, honours and power, and to accompany Diocles into a life-long exile. A tale like this was not out of place at the head of the legislative traditions of Thebes: cp. Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 19, ὅλος δὲ τῆς περὶ τούς ἔρματας συνθεσίας ὁμιλεῖ, ὡσπέρ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, Θηβαίως τὸ Λαύου πάθος ἀρχὴν παρέσχει, ἀλλ' οἱ νομοθεταὶ τὸ φύσει θεμελιώθην αὐτῶν καὶ ἀκρατον ἀνέναι καὶ ἀνυγρανεῖν εὖθυς ἐκ παῖδων βουλήμενοι πολὺν μὲν ἀνεμίζαντο καὶ σπανῇ καὶ σπαδία πάση τῶν αὐλῶν εἰς τιμὴν καὶ προσθήμαν ἀγομεῖ, λαμπρῶν δὲ τῶν ἐρωτα ταῖς παλαιόστρωσις ἐνθράψαντο συγκεραυνοὺς τὰ ἐχθα τῶν νεων. Plutarch's reference to the untempered strength of the spirited element in the Theban nature suggests that the Thebans may be present to Aristotle's mind when he says (4 (7). 7. 1327 b 34), τὰ μὲν γὰρ (τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἑθυν) ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μονόκολων.

36. καὶ νῦν ἔτι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle seems also to have mentioned (perhaps in his Ἐρωτικός) a tomb of Iolaus, probably at Thebes, at which lovers exchanged pledges of fidelity (Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 18: Aristot. Fragm. 92. 1492 a 39).

37. πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν Κορινθίων χώραν, 'in the direction of the Corinthian territory.' The tombs were mounds, but the distance would be not far from 40 miles, as the crow flies. So Althaemenes, after exiling himself from Crete lest he should fulfil prophecy and kill his father, built the temple of the Atabarian Zeus on a high peak in the island of Rhodes, from which his native land could be described on the horizon (Diod. 5. 59. 2). As to the position of the tomb of Diocles, compare the last stanza of Wordsworth's Laodamia:
even the elm-trees planted on the grave of Protesilaus could not
bear the sight of Ilium (Anth. Pal. 7. 141).

40. διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους. Vict. 'propter odium illius
affectus' (cp. διαμισήσας τὸν ἄρωτα, 34).

ὁποῦ . . . ἐσται after ταξασθαί. Weber (Die Absichtssätze bei
Aristot., p. 36) compares Soph. El. 33. 183 b 3 sq.

ἀποτοσ τοις 'visible,' not, as in Soph. Aj. 15, 'invisible.'

3. παιδοποιίας, not τεκυποιίας. Τεκυποιία, 'the begetting of off-
spring,' is common to man with the lower animals; not so παιδο-
ποιία, which means 'the begetting of children': we often find παιδο-
ποιία conjoined with γαμοῖ (e.g. in Plato, Rep. 423 E, 459 A, Symp.
192 B: Plutarch, Solon c. 6). But C. F. Hermann (Gr. Ant. 1.
180. 10) may possibly be right in translating the word here 'ado-
potion,' for in Plutarch, Quaest. Platon. 1. 3. 1000 D we find παιδο-
ποιίσθαμ used in the sense of 'adopt' (ὡσπερ ὁ μή τεκυν παιδοποιεῖται
tῶν ἁρματων, where however Wytenbach would read πάδα ποιεῖται,
comparing Paus. 7. 1. 3). On the other hand, it should be remem-
bered that the laws referred to might be called θετκοί without
relating solely to adoption. No other instance of the occurrence
of παιδοποιία in Aristotle's writings is given in the Index Aristo-
telicus, though τεκυποιία, which is never used by Plato or by the
Attic Orators, is of frequent occurrence in them.

The antecedent of ὦς seems to be in the gen. after νομοβίτης:
it is, however, as often happens, caught into the relative clause.

4. θετκούς, 'relating to adoption.' See Büchsenschütz, Besitz
und Erwerb, p. 32, and C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 65. 2, who
points out that Philolaus, if he was the first to permit adoption at
Thebes, in effect introduced testation. This would be the case even
if the form of adoption introduced by him was, like that prescribed
by the law of Gortyna (Bächeler und Zitelmann, p. 161), adoptio
intel tivakov. The aim of Philolaus in permitting adoption was very
different from that which Isaeus ascribes to the Attic lawgiver—
ὁ γὰρ νομοβίτης, ὁ ἄνδρας, διὰ τούτο τῶν κόμων ἐλέγεν οὕτως, ὡς ἡ λό-
νην ταύτην καταφυγήν οὕτως τῆς ἐρήμως καὶ παρασφήν τοῦ βίου τοῖς
ἀπασι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ ἑξαίμ πούσασθαι ἐν τιμή ἐνοπλώνται (2. 13).

ἱδίως. His aim he shared with Pheidon, who was, like himself, a
Corinthian (c. 6. 1265 b 12 sqq.), and perhaps earlier than Philolaus,
but the means used were peculiar to the latter. From this point on-
wards we note an effort to point out anything special and peculiar to
each lawgiver. Some attention had been paid to this before (c. 7.
1266 a 33−36, 39: c. 8. 1267 b 29), but now the thing is done
systematically. Probably the view is that enactments peculiar to a
lawgiver are those which are most likely to deserve attention. To produce something ἔδωκε was held to be the surest sign of capacity and training: cp. Plutarch adv. Colot. c. 26. 1121 E., τούτου ἄρκεσιν λάδου τὸν Ἐπίκουρον οὐ μετρίως ἔστεκεν ἡ δόξα παραλειπέν ... μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔδωκε λέγοντα, φησίν, ὑπόλυψιν ἐμποιεῖν καὶ δορὰς ἀνθρώπους ἀγαμμάτως, ἀνε ἐς πολυγράμματος αὐτὸς ὧν καὶ μεμουσομένος: Aristotle. Metaph. A. 1. 981 b 13 sqq.: Metaph. A. 4. 984 b 31: see also de Soph. El. 33. 183 b 20 sqq. Ephorus and others are said by Polybius (6. 45. 3) to have pointed out certain things as ἔδωκε τῆς Ἀκεδαμονίων πολεμίας. Inquiries respecting εὐρήματα and their authors were popular in Greece (Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 2 sqq.: Aeschyl. Prom. Vinct. 476 sqq.: Plato, Phaedrus 274 C, Rep. 600 Α), and they were especially popular in Aristotle’s day: Ephorus paid much attention to the subject in his History (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. vol. 1. p. lxii), and is also said to have written a separate work on εὐρήματα, as did two successive heads of the Peripatetic School, Theophrastus and Strato (Diog. Laert. 5. 47, 60): Hermippus also in his book on Lawgivers concerned himself with εὐρέσεις (Athen. Deipn. 154 d). Isocrates, in arguing (Paneg. § 10) that honour should be paid rather to the best practitioners of an art than to its originators, implies that the prevailing tendency was in the latter direction. It is not surprising, then, that the authors of anything ἔδωκε in legislation should be noted here; still the aim of the Second Book is not history but criticism, and of criticism there is hardly anything in this concluding chapter.

6. ψευδομαρτύρων. See critical note.

7. πρώτος γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ‘For he was the first to introduce the denunciation for false witness.’ See Mr. Sandys’ note on Demosth. Or. 2 adv. Steph. c. 7 (p. 115 of his edition), and, on the general significance of the innovation, which gave unsuccessful litigants an opportunity of re-opening questions decided against them, C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 72 (in Thalheim’s edition, Rechtsalterth. § 17. p. 119 sqq.), who refers to [Demosth.] contra Evurg. c. 1. These suits had evidently become in Aristotle’s time a great social nuisance: cp. c. 5. 1263 b 20 sqq. Ἐποίησε is here used of a legislator, as e. g. in c. 9. 1270 a 20.

8. γλαφυρώτερος, ‘more finished’: see note on 1227 b 21.

9. [Φαλέου ... ἀρχηγον.] As to this passage, see note on 1227 a 22. In c. 7. 1266 a 34 we read οὖν γὰρ οὖν τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας ἄλλος κεκανωτόμηκεν (except Plato) οὐτε περὶ τὰ συνόπτητα τῶν γυναικῶν: here, on the contrary, the suggestion of a community of property is said to be also peculiar to him. The
two passages seem inconsistent, and probably the earlier statement is the truer. Most of the suggestions with which Plato is here credited are trivial enough, and it may well be doubted whether this paragraph is anything more than a marginal annotation from the pen of some reader of the treatise, which has crept into the text. Its style, however, resembles that of Aristotle, and its date may well be very early. *Φιλάδων* seems to be the correct reading, not *Φιλολάων*, though *Φιλελάων* has the weight of MS. authority in its favour, for a re-equalization, or at any rate an equalization, of *οὐσία* (the word *οὐσία* is used also in 1266 a 37 and 1267 b 5, though, as Aristotle points out in 1267 b 9, his project extended only to land) has been ascribed to Phaleas (c. 7. 1266 b 1 sq.), whereas nothing of the kind has been attributed to Philolaus.

*ἀνωμαλώσις*. Here all the MSS. read *ἀνωμαλώσιας* (Vet. Int. *irregularitas*)—i.e. ‘partitio inaequalis,’ which is evidently not the sense intended. *ἀνωμαλώσις* (‘aequalitatis restitutio’: see Bon. Ind. s.v.) is probably the true reading: the word does not, however, occur elsewhere in Aristotle: still we have *ἀνωμαλίσθαι* (from *ἀνωμαλίζειν*) in Rhet. 3. 11. 1412 a 16, and some would read *ἀνωμαλισθησομένην* for *ἀν ὀμαλισθησομένην* in Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 40.


12. καὶ τὴν...ἀρχησον. Sus. compares Plato, Laws 794 D—795 D. Τὴν...ἀσκησιν is governed by περὶ, 11: see the passages collected by Boniz (Ind. 630 a 39 sqq.), and cp. also Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 37, and de Gen. An. 3. 1. 749 b 24, where PZ omit δι. Κατὰ τὴν μελέτην (13), ‘by practice’: cp. κατὰ φύσιν, κατὰ τίχην. Plato’s view was that the difference between the right hand and the left has arisen ἐν τῇ ἑθῃ, οἷς ἁμβώς χρωμένων, there being by nature none whatever (Laws 794 E). Aristotle, on the contrary, held that this difference existed by nature (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 33 sqq.: de Caelo 2. 2. 284 b 6 sqq.: Hist. An. 2. 1. 497 b 31), though men might make themselves ambidextrous by practice: cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 34. 1194 b 32, ὁ φύσις ὅτα μεταλαμβάνωσι μεταξύλιν: λέγω ὃ οἶδα τῇ ἀμετέρῳ μετλήμον πάντως ἢ ἄλλην, γενόμεθα ἐν ἀμφιδείου ἀλλὰ φύσιν γε ἀμετέρῳ ἐστί κ.τ.λ. He would probably, however, be opposed to attempts to counteract nature by habituation (4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1: 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 35 sqq.).


τοῖν χεροῖν. 'In Attic the dual of ὃ, ἥ, τό has commonly but one gender τῶ, τῶν' (Liddell and Scott s.v.). See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 388.

3 b, and cp. Plato, Protag. 314 D: Theaet. 155 E.

17. καὶ, 'at all': see Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 168.


18. A transition is made from Draco to Pittacus, because Pittacus also was the author of laws only: the two lawgivers, however, had more than this in common, for Pittacus' law about drunkards was, like those of Draco, famous for its severity ([Plutarch,] Sept. Sap. Conv. 13, τῶν σῶν ἐκείνων τῶν χαλεπῶν νόμων).

20. τι πταίσωμι. See critical note.

21. οὖ πρὸς τὴν κ.τ.λ. Literally, 'he paid regard not to the greater consideration which it might be pleaded is due to men who offend when drunk, but' etc. "οτι is used, and not ἦν, because the writer does not wish to affirm that this greater consideration is due. The question with regard to which neutrality is here maintained, a neutrality perhaps slightly benevolent to the drunkard, is solved without hesitation in Eth. Nic. 3. 2. 1110 b 24 sqq., where the drunken offender is said not to act δι' ἄγνωσιν, much less involuntarily (in which case alone συγγνώμη is called for, Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1109 b 31 sq.), but only ἄγνωσίν: thus Pittacus was quite right, ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύριος γάρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἁγνωσίας (Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1113 b 30 sqq.). Lesbos, we remember, was a wine-producing island, and Pittacus was engaged in restoring order to Mytilene. According to the English law, if intoxication amounts to stupidity, it reduces the crime (Ruling of an English Judge, Times, Feb. 4, 1881). It should be noted that Pittacus was credited with the exclamation Συγγνώμη τιμωρίας κρείσσον, on liberating his opponent Alcaeus (Diog. Laert. 1. 76).

24. οὖ, sc. νόμος, latent in νομοθέτης.

26. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Constitutions which 'took effect' (κυρίας) seem to be here distinguished from schemes which remained mere schemes. Κυρίας, however, would more naturally mean 'actually in force,' and this winding-up would be more in place at the close of the notice of the Carthaginian constitution, than at the end of a chapter on νομοθέτης, for it makes no reference to νομοθέται. We note also that μὲν οὖν is not taken up by δὲ at the commencement of the next book, which begins τῶ περὶ πολιτείας εἰπώσκοψεντες without any connecting particle, as does the Sixth Book likewise. This is hardly reassuring as to the state of the text, though it is impossible to say what precisely has happened to it.
APPENDIX A.

The Relation of the teaching of the Nicomachean Ethics to that of the Politics.

It is proposed to examine in the present Appendix, so far as limits of space will allow, the relation in which the Politics stands to the Nicomachean Ethics, and also to ask how far its teaching agrees with that of the latter treatise—how far the two works can be said to form well-planned parts of a coherent whole.

In dealing with these questions, it will be necessary for us to take the Nicomachean Ethics as it stands, without pausing to inquire whether parts of it are due to other hands than Aristotle's, or whether intrusive or interpolated matter is present in the work, or again whether its component parts were designed at the time of composition to form part of the whole which they at present constitute. To enter on these and other vexed questions with regard to the state of the text of this work would carry us too far.

That the Nicomachean Ethics should have a sequel was necessary for more reasons than one. As we have already seen, Aristotle himself mentions one of these reasons at the beginning of the last chapter of the treatise. Moral Philosophy is to him a practical science with a practical aim: οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλοι τὸ θεωρη-σαι ἐκαστα καὶ γνώσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτό (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179a 35)—οὐ γὰρ ἐν εἰδώμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀγαθώ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδέν ἐν ἧν ὀφθαλμος αὐτής (Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1103b 27): the study of Morals thus involves a study of the means by which men are made good. It involves therefore a study of the State. To stop short at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics would be to leave the science of moral action incomplete, to balk its aim and rob it of its effectiveness.

But then again it is in the State that happiness assumes its noblest form (Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094b 7 sqq.). We must study it in the State if we wish to see it at its best. Nor is this all. Aristotle
would probably say that we have not fully explored the nature of the ἀρετή till we have explored the State of which he is a part. We do not fully understand what the ἀρετή is until we have viewed him as a part of a whole—as a husband, father, citizen, soldier, and ruler.

Plato had treated of Ethics and Politics in one and the same dialogue. He had not only traced a parallel between the State and the soul of the individual, but had laid stress on the mutual reaction of individual and State. As is the individual, so is the State; as is the State, so is the individual. The individual, he seemed to say, could no more be understood apart from the State than a limb apart from the body to which it belongs. Ethics and Politics, according to this view, gain by being treated together; the individual must not be severed from the State which makes him what he is, nor the State from the individual who gives it its character. The Republic of Plato gains in concreteness by its adoption of this method. We study the good man and his opposites, as we see them in actual life, in a ‘setting’ of institutions. We view them in connexion with the little world of which they form a part. We recognize not only what the ἀρετή is, but what makes him what he is, and see the medium in which he lives and moves. The relation between the individual and the State has never been more vigorously portrayed than in the Republic. The unsound State, we see, is fatal even to sound philosophy. The four virtues of the Republic are public virtues, all of them relative to the Whole of which they are the pillars; they presuppose the State and the State presupposes them.

Aristotle’s plan, on the contrary, is to part the study of εὐδαίμονία and the virtues of which it is the outcome from the study of the State and its various forms. He thus severs what Plato had joined together. Plato’s plan of dealing with Ethics and Politics in one work had, in fact, its disadvantages. Pent within so narrow a space, neither could really thrive. It brought out, indeed, more effectively than any other method could have done the pressing need of a return to justice and of a reform of the State, and this was precisely what Plato sought to do; but a full scientific treatment of the two subjects was hardly possible without a double inquiry. In dealing with them separately Aristotle took a great step in advance. In the interest of science, he concerns himself in the Nicomachean Ethics primarily with the individual viewed as the subject of εὐδαίμονία and as exercising the various moral and intellectual virtues. He asks what constitutes virtuous action and happiness, and dwells only
incidentally on the forces external to the individual which bring them into being, and the field in which they are realized. His aim is for the time to view virtue as an internal fact, a psychological diathesis, rather than as the life-breath of society or its product—to approach it rather from the side of Psychology than from that of Politics. But he too, in his turn, as he passes from virtues like Temperance or Liberality to virtues like Justice and Moral Prudence, and then to Friendship, is led further and further into the domain of Politics. If we are not yet asked to analyse the State, we are taught to study the work of Justice in the State. If the objects in the foreground are still virtues, we look through them into a background of Politics, and thus the study of Ethics leads Aristotle on to the study of Politics. If, unlike Plato, he treats of Ethics in one work and Politics in another, he is far from intending to break the link which binds the two subjects together, or to stop short in his inquiries at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics.

It was necessary then that this treatise should have a sequel, but how far is the Politics an appropriate sequel to it and in accord with it?

It is easy to see that the two treatises have much in common. Not only do both of them presuppose the great central principles of the Aristotelian philosophy, but a broad similarity of method and treatment is traceable throughout them. We find evidence in both of a desire to gather up all that is sound in the work of previous inquirers and in the beliefs of ordinary men, to do justice to all aspects of truth, and to frame a creed in which all the jarring schools would find their best results embodied. Half-truths were to vanish before the whole truth, as the stars disappear before the light of day. Aristotle sought to mediate between contending doctrines, and to sum up the best traditions of the Greek race and the net result of Greek inquiry in a broad-based and broad-minded system1. This could only be done by steering a midway course. Truth no less than moral virtue lay in a mean; the conception of the mean is of the very essence of Aristotle’s philosophy. We

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1 Τὸ διορίζειν was precisely that of which the Many are incapable (Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1174 b 3) and of which the philosopher should be capable. Ἰποκάλον τὸν τόσον τοιούτοις δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαμένειν καὶ διορίζειν ἐαν ὅσον ἐκάρτιον καὶ πολλῷ ἀκριβῶς (Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 12). Αὐτίκειος ἤδη τρῶτος ὦτε ἦλθε τὰ τε δικαιεῖται περὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἀποδώσει καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντίωσις. τοῦτο δ’ ἦτοι, ἢν καθότας ψάνθηται τὰ ἐναντία διακάλυπται μάλιστα γιὰ ὁμολογούμενον τὸ τοιοῦτο ἦται λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις. συμβαινεῖ ἢ δὲ μίκτων τὰς ἐναντίωσις, ἢν ἦτοι μὲν ὡς ἄλληθεν ἢ τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἢτοι δ’ ὄν τιν ἐν (Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1135 b 13 sqq.).
hear less of the mean in the Politics than in the Nicomachean Ethics, but the idea is very present there also 1. The same breadth of view appears in Aristotle's readiness to recognize higher and lower forms of things. Just as in the Nicomachean Ethics the recognition of higher forms of virtue, or justice, or pleasure, or friendship does not preclude the recognition of lower forms also, so in the Politics, side by side with the true citizen and the best constitution, the citizen of the deviation-forms and the deviation-forms themselves receive recognition. Aristotle declines to say, as Cicero in effect said 2, that the lower forms of State are not States at all. Many a problem is solved in both treatises by the use of this method. It enables Aristotle to do justice both to the higher and to the lower forms of things without sinning either against truth or against the ordinary use of language 3, and authorizes a careful study both of the more and of the less perfect. The Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics would have been far less comprehensive in treatment than they are, if Aristotle had followed a different course in this respect. So again, the two works agree in aiming both at speculative truth and practical utility 4. Another common feature is an unwillingness to rest content with generalities. Broad general descriptions of things are wanting, Aristotle feels, in clearness; they seem to say much, but really say little. We learn but little when we are told that virtue is τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχήν (Pol. 1. 13. 1260a 25 sq.). Plato and the contemporary Academy dealt too much in these generalities. Aristotle insists on τὸ διορίζειν (e. g. in Pol. 2. 5. 1264a 14, 37, and 2. 6. 1265a 28 sqq., b 18 sqq.), and his definition of virtue is full and particular. This effort to be clear and detailed is traceable in both treatises. In both Aristotle learns the nature of the Whole (e. g. ειδαμονία, οἰκία, πόλις) by beginning with the part and working up from it to the Whole.

But these broad similarities do not carry us very far, and if we are to judge to what extent the two works are in accord, we must recall some of the more important passages in the Nicomachean

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2 See vol. i. p. 216 note, and above p. xiv.
3 Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 5. 1157 a 25, ἐπεί γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φιλοὺς καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον ... καὶ τοὺς ἤδονην ἀλλήλους στέργοντας ... ἵσος λέγειν μὲν δει καὶ ἡμῖν φίλον τοὺς τουτούς, εἰδὴ δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλεῖο, καὶ πρῶτος μὲν καὶ κυρίως τῆς τῶν ἀγαθών γνῶσι, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καὶ άρμοδίτης.
4 See Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1103 b 26 sqq., 10. 10. 1179 a 35 sqq., and above on 1. 3. 1253 b 14 as to the Politics.
APPENDIX A.

Ethics in which light is thrown on the State, its functions and organization.

The reader of the Nicomachean Ethics, as he passes on from book to book, finds the relation of virtue to the State and of Ethics to Politics coming ever more prominently before him. Virtue, he learns, is the offspring of law, and law is an incident of the State. Virtue varies with the constitution, and reaches its full height only in the best constitution. Some virtues, again, belong exclusively or especially to the ruler. In these and other ways we are constantly being reminded of the importance of the State.

The earliest pages of the treatise bring the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη before us, the Science which is at once the Science of the State and the Science of Life. Its end is nothing less than the end of human life; it is supreme over the State as over the individual, ‘determining what sciences are to exist in the State, and what each man is to learn, and how far’—‘legislating what is to be done and not done.’ (Not a word, we note, is said here about those lower problems of πολιτικῆς, of which we hear so much in the first chapter of the Sixth Book of the Politics.) We are told further, that the happiness of a State or nation is a nobler and more divine thing than the happiness of an individual; later (Eth. Nic. 1. 5. 1097 b 8 sqq.; cp. 9. 9. 1169 b 16 sqq.), we learn that man is by nature a political animal, and that his needs are not fully satisfied unless the needs of the persons who live in society with him—his parents, wife, children, and fellow-citizens—are also satisfied. In all this the Nicomachean Ethics anticipates the teaching of the Politics, that man is more fully a political animal than any of the gregarious animals (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 7 sqq.), that the training which produces a πολιτικός is the same as that which produces a συνθετής, so that the πολιτικός cannot be far other than the συνθετής (Pol. 3. 18), and that the πολιτικός must know both the end of human life and the best means of attaining it (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 26 sqq.).

Later on in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics (c. 13. 1102 a 18 sqq.), we are told that broad psychological data, such as the division of the soul into a rational and an irrational part, have an interest and importance for the true πολιτικός, and we soon learn why: the appetitive section of the irrational part of the soul needs to be brought under the control of right reason (λόγος), so that moral virtue may be developed, but this can only be accomplished through habituation, and habituation to virtue is the business of the lawgiver, or in other words, of the State. The true statesman—the lawgivers of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan
States, for instance—is generally held to concern himself with the development of virtue (Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 a 7 sqq.); every lawgiver aims at making his citizens virtuous, and the only difference between lawgivers is that some do this well and others not; it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one (Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 2 sqq.). In fact, as those are held to be bravest whose States honour the brave and disgrace the coward (Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1116 a 18 sqq.), the virtue of the individual appears to depend on the distribution of reward and punishment, pleasure and pain, by the State. Often as in this treatise the ordinary πολιτικοὶ are weighed in the balance and found wanting, νομοθετεῖ are always treated with respect: νομοθετικὴ, we are told in a later book (Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1141 b 24 sqq.), is the architectonic form of φρόνησις περὶ πόλεων: the makers of ψηφίσματα are mere χειροτέχναι.

Aristotle’s psychology and ethics reveal to him, in fact, the necessity of a power capable of disciplining the lower nature by habituation, and he ascribes a power of this kind to the lawgiver. Not all lawgivers were wise enough to begin their training of the citizen in childhood, or to supervise education and the habits of adult life (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.), but all sought more or less wisely and well to make their citizens virtuous by a skilful use of pain and pleasure, or, in other words, by habituation. The account of Universal Justice in the Fifth Book confirms all this, for what the laws prescribe (or ‘normally constituted laws,’ at all events) is there said to be universally just (c. 3. 1129 b 14 sqq.); and if (c. 5. 1130 b 26 sqq.) a question is raised, whether πολιτικὴ has to do with the training which makes a good man as distinguished from a good citizen, this is perhaps nothing more than an anticipation of the teaching of the Politics, that πολιτικὴ is concerned with other forms of State than the best, in which alone the virtue of the citizen is identical with that of the good man.

Already then we discern the ethical necessity of the lawgiver and the State, but the study of Particular Justice brings the State more vividly before us. Aristotle’s account of it incidentally corrects Plato’s account of Justice in the Republic, according to which a just man is he who does the work for which he is fit (τὰ αὐτῶν πράττει). Justice, in Aristotle’s view, has rather to do with external goods—honour, wealth, and the like—than with work. He is just who gives these to those to whom they are due, not he who does the work for which he is fit. Justice is a question of external goods, not of functions. But the main purpose of the
Fifth Book probably is to show that Justice, like all other moral virtues, has to do with a mean—that it is ἁνάλογον and ὡς ὁ λόγος (the word for reason and proportion in Greek being the same), and that it has more kinds than one. True justice does not, as Plato thought (Laws 757 A-D), always take account of virtue in the award it makes. The justice of the lawgiver and ruler does so, but not that of the judge.

We see in Aristotle's account of Justice an effort to be more definite than Plato had been, and to keep closer to facts. We learn that Justice differs with the social function. The justice of the ruler is not as the justice of the judge. Far more than any other moral virtue, justice presupposes the κοινωνία of the State, for it especially appertains to the lawgiver, the ruler, the judge, and the citizen, if it also appears in the ἀλλακτικὴ κοινωνία, which need not, of course, be between fellow-citizens. Its highest type apparently implies rule. It is to be found rather in the relations of the State than in those of the household—ὑπὸ κοινωνίων βίων πρὸς τὸ εἰναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἑλεθέρων καὶ ἰσών ἡ κατ' ἁνάλογάν ἡ κατ' ὀρθών (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 26)—between those between whom law subsists (30) or can subsist (Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 b 6 sq.). But then there are two kinds even of τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, one natural, the other conventional, and we gather that the true standard of that which is naturally just among men is to be found in the best constitution (μὲν μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ὑπόστη, Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 a 5).

1 Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 10. 1115 b 17, ἐφ' ἅμα ὡς ἀ δεί καὶ ὡς ἐνεκα ἱσορροπῶν καὶ φασιστῆρων καὶ ὡς δεί καὶ ὡς, ὑπόλοιπο δὲ καὶ παρρησίας, ἀνθρώπου κατ' ἀξίων γῆς καὶ ὡς ἐν ὁ λόγος πάσχει καὶ πράσινον ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

2 In my opinion, says Mr. Jackson (Fifth Book of the Nic. Ethics, p. 87), "c. 5 [of Eth. Nic. 5] should be read in close connection with cc. 2-4, the passage as a whole being an attempt at once to connect and to distinguish three kinds of particular justice. In order to connect these three kinds of particular justice, the author regards them each as ἁνάλογον τι: in order to distinguish them, he represents each by a special and appropriate kind of ἁνάλογον."

3 In the account of the ἀλλακτικὴ κοινωνία (Eth. Nic. 5. 8) and the part that money plays in making it possible, a social value is assigned to money different from that which it is implied to possess in the First Book of the Politics, though there too money is said to be the στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς, just as here it is said to be the μέσον, or standard, by which the value of the commodities exchanged is measured and determined (cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1164 a 1 sq.).

4 This would appear to exclude the παμβασιλεία: cp. Pol. 3. 13. 1284 a 11 sqq. It of course implies that the relation of man to the lower animals is in strictness one with which justice has nothing to do: they have, in Aristotle's view, no rights against man and cannot be wronged ἀδίκεσθαι by him; they are merely ὄργανα for his use, not κοινωνία: they are not even, like the slave, human ὄργανα and therefore capable of being the objects of friendship (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32 sqq.). See as to this view Porphyry de Abstinentia, 1. 4-6. It justified the slaughter of animals, the rightfulness of which had been questioned by some.
Already we have been told (5. 6. 1131 a 26 sqq.) that different constitutions distribute what they have to distribute on different principles, and now we are made aware that justice varies with the constitution, and attains its true form only in the best constitution. This quite agrees with the teaching of the Politics (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 37, εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταύτων τὸ δίκαιον κατὰ πάσας τῶν πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι διαφοράς).

Aristotle’s ethical treatise is pervaded by the half-mathematical conceptions of the mean and the proportional, and we nowhere learn more clearly than in its Fifth Book how important is the part played by ‘proportion’ (τὸ κατ’ ἀνάλογαν ἱσον) in holding the State together (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1132 b 33, τῷ ἀντιποιείν ἀνάλογον συμμεῖν ἡ πόλις: cp. Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, τὸ ἵσον τὸ ἀντιποιοῦσα σῶει τάς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡμικοῖσι εἴρηται πρώτον).

The books on Friendship possess an especial interest for the student of the Politics, both on account of the importance of Friendship to the State (Eth. Nic. 8. 1. 1153 a 22 sqq.: Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b 7 sqq.) and because they study Friendship not only in its highest form—the friendship of the good—but also as a concomitant of every kind of κοινωνία. The less temporary and the more comprehensive are the aims with which a κοινωνία is formed, the stronger is the link which binds one member of it to another, and the fuller the friendship. The link which binds together a band of merchants making a voyage for gain is a far less close one than that which binds together the members of a State, for the latter have joined together not for the sake of that which is advantageous for the moment, but to win that which will benefit their life as a whole (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 21). We learn in these books how all κοινωνία should be constituted, if friendship is to prevail within them. We learn the true form both of the parental relation and of the manifold relations of kinship which spring from it; we study the relation of husband and wife, the relation of master and slave, and then again the political relations on which the family relations seem to be modelled—those which prevail between ruler and ruled in a Kingship, an Aristocracy, and a Timocracy, or again those prevailing in a Tyranny, an Oligarchy, and a Democracy. The study of all these κοινωνία, and especially of the six constitutions, makes it clear that justice is a condition of friendship in κοινωνία. The members of a κοινωνία must render honour and advantage (φιλία) to each other κατ’ ἄξιαν, if friendship is to prevail in it. The father must benefit the child, and the child must honour the father. The king must rule for the advan-
tage of his subjects and they must render him honour. It is because in Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy the rulers rule, not for the advantage of the ruled, but for their own advantage, thus monopolising both honour and advantage—it is because, in fact, they rule unjustly—that there is so little friendship in States thus governed. Honour belongs justly to rulers, benefit to those ruled, but the rulers in a deviation-form grasp both at honour and gain.

Thus the books on Friendship enforce anew the importance of Justice: we learn more clearly than before how essential Justice is to κόινωνία: we see that not only the lawgiver, the ruler, the judge, and the trader need to be just, but that all members of κόινωνία need to be so—even children and slaves—and that precisely in so far as they are so, will Friendship be present in the κόινωνία. This holds good both of equal and unequal κόινωνίαι (Eth. Nic. 8. 15. 1162 b 2 sq.): τὸ ἱσόζεων is necessary in both. It is best, indeed, that in friendship ‘the same thing should be rendered on both sides’ (Eth. Nic. 8. 5. 1156 b 33 sqq.)—that the friendship should rest not on the return of an equivalent amount of different things, but on an identical return: in the relations of the State, however, and in many of those of the household this is not possible; hence here a return must be made καὶ ἄξιον.

Political society rests on τὸ ἀνάλογον, on τὸ καὶ ἄξιον: this is the far-reaching principle laid down in these books of the Nicomachean Ethics. It is an infraction of the principles of political society, when the ruler draws to himself the whole advantage: rule to be justifiable must be πρὸς τὸ κοινὴ συμφέρον. The just is that which is for the common advantage. Aristotle’s ethical treatises thus contains the germ and something more of his Politics. The former treatise gives us at all events one of the main laws which govern κόινωνία: the latter works it out in its application to the State.

And yet there are points in which the teaching of these books of the Nicomachean Ethics is not quite borne out by that of the Politics. Take, for instance, the account they give of the deviation-forms of constitution. These are implied in the Eighth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics to arise from the deterioration of the rulers of the normal constitutions. The rulers of an oligarchy are ‘few and bad’ (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 12 sqq.). The Politics appears to be more ready to recognize that even the deviation-forms are founded on δικαίων τι. The book on Revolutions, 1 Cp. Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 40 sq.
indeed, goes so far as to say that it is not safe to base a constitution wholly on ἡ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσοτης (7 (5). 1. 1302 a 2 sq.)¹: the most durable constitutions are those which are partly based on this kind of equality, partly on arithmetical equality. We learn in the Sixth Book of the Politics that the deviation-forms are not mere gratuitous embodiments of injustice: we are taught, on the contrary, to trace the law of their appearance; the social conditions of a community, we find, have much to do with its government. A deviation-form of some kind is often the only possible constitution. Aristotle had also learnt by the time at which the Sixth Book of the Politics was written, that there are better and worse shades of each deviation-form. So again, the scheme of constitutional change given in Eth. Nic. 8. 12, according to which Kingship passes into Tyranny, and Aristocracy into Oligarchy, and Timocracy into Democracy, is quite different from any of those given in the Politics (ep. Pol. 3. 15. 1286 b 8 sqqu.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqqu.). In the former of these passages Kingship is made to change into Polity, in the latter first into Oligarchy, and then into Polity. In the Politics (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 20–25: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 17 sqqu.) Aristotle is far from thinking that constitutions change most often into the forms most akin to them. His view of the just or normal constitution in the Politics seems also to be different. Justice, we are there told, requires that all elements which contribute to the being and well-being of a State—not only virtue, but also wealth and free birth—should receive due recognition (Pol. 3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqqu.). Constitutions which rest on a bare superiority in one such element only, even if that element be virtue, are unjust. Superiority in virtue must be transcendent if it is to confer an exclusive title to rule.

We are further surprised to find Aristotle speaking in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 13 sqqu. of πολιτικαὶ φιλίαι as resting on compact (οῖον γὰρ καθ' ὀμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται ἑναί), when we remember the decided way in which at the outset of the Politics he de-

¹ The view that the constitution should rest partly on ἀρμοτεκτὴν ἴσοτης, partly on ἡ κατ' ἀξίαν ἴσοτης is, it should be noticed, derived from Plato's Laws 757 D, ἀναγκαίως γε μὴ καὶ τοῦτον παραρμόσως ('his quae insta quidem vocantur, nec tamen revera iusta sunt;' Stallbaum) ποτε προσχρή- σαθαι πώλων ἰπασαν, εἰ μᾶλλον στά- σεων ἴσοτη μὴ προσκοινοφήσατι κατὰ τι μέρος . . . διὸ τῷ τῶν κληρῶν ἴση ἀνάγκη προσχρήσασθαι δύσκολίας τῶν πολλῶν ἔνεκα . . . εὐτῶς δὲ χρηστών ἀναγκαίως μὲν τῶν ἴσοτητῶν ἀμφότεροι, ἢς δὲ ὑπαρέχεται ἐπί ἀλγάτειας τῇ ἐτέρᾳ, τῇ τῆς τύχης δεομένῃ. Plutarch (Solon, c. 14) even carries the idea back to Solon—λέγεται δὲ καὶ φανῇ τις αὐτῶν περιμερομένη πρότερον εἰ- πόντος ὡς τὸ ἵκον πόλεως ὡς τοι τῶν κτητισιῶν ἀρέσκειν καὶ τοῖς ἀκτή- μοι, τῶν μὲν ἀξία καὶ ἀρέτη, τῶν δὲ μέτροι καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἵκον ἔξειν προσδο- κώστων.
APPENDIX A.

clares the State to be based on nature. The relation of kinship, again, seems in this book of the Nicomachean Ethics to count for more in comparison with the political relation, than in the Politics, and man is said to be by nature συνεδριατικῶν μᾶλλον ἡ πολιτικῶν (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 17). On the other hand, when we read that πολιτικῇ φιλίᾳ thrives best between good men (Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 4 sqq.: cp. 9. 8. 1169 a 8 sqq.), we recognize an anticipation of the teaching of the Politics, that the best State is the State whose citizens are ἀπλῶς σπουδαίοι. The same book also prepares us for the limitation of the number of the citizens in the best State (Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 29 sqq.: cp. Pol. 4 (7). 4).

The whole tenour of the Nicomachean Ethics points to the conclusion that virtue not only presupposes a life in relation to others, but life in a State, and further a good State, or even the best State. Nay more, one kind of Justice presupposes the exercise of rule, for it appears only in the ruler. That φρόνησις is peculiar to the ruler, Aristotle asserts in the Politics (3. 4. 1277 b 25)¹, but not, it would seem, in the Nicomachean Ethics.

So largely indeed does the latter treatise admit virtue to be modified by the constitution and by the social function discharged, that we might almost expect it, seeing that it has a practical aim in view, to deal with the variations of duty under different constitutions and in different social positions. But this it does not do. Its moral teaching seems to apply indifferently to all constitutions, for all that we hear to the contrary. And then again, if the State is represented in the Nicomachean Ethics as essential to virtue, it seems to be essential rather to moral than to intellectual virtue. We do not learn whether the State does as much for the highest element of man's nature, the speculative intelligence, as it does for the appetitive nature and for moral virtue. At all events, we are not told what it is that the State does for σοφία, though we know that it 'rules for its sake' (ἐπιτάττει σοφίας ἕνεκα, Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145 a 9)².

The last book of the treatise, which finds τελεία εἴδαμνοι in the contemplative life and exalts this life above the political life, should have traced the dependence of the highest of man's energies on the excellence of the State. So far however is it from doing this, and completing the indications given us earlier in the work of the intimate relation between virtue and the State, that it closes with a

¹ Following Plato (Rep. 433 C) and Xenophon (Cyrop. 1. 6. 22).
² We learn from the Republic of Plato how much a defective State could do to corrupt philosophy.
chapter (c. 10), which, though it points to the State as the most
effective agency in the production of virtue, seems half to hint that
its place may to a certain extent be filled by heads of families
trained in legislative science. We are conscious, as has been ob-
served elsewhere, of some change of tone, when we pass to the
commencement of the Politics. We there learn that man is by
nature a part of a Whole; he is a part of the State, born to rule
and be ruled with a view to the highest and most complete life.
The Politics asserts emphatically and in unmistakable terms the
truth which the abstract method of the Nicomachean Ethics had
kept somewhat in the background, though even there facts con-
stantly force it on our notice—the truth that the life of the State is
marked out for man by nature. Even the virtue of the wife and the
child, we are here told, is relative to the constitution (Pol. i. 13.
1260 b 8 sqq.); much more is this true of the virtue of the citizen.
The citizen varies with the constitution, but the citizen of the best
constitution, and therefore the σπουδαῖος, is he who is able and pur-
poused to rule and be ruled with a view to a life in accordance with
virtue (Pol. 3. 13. 1284 a 1 sqq.). We might well infer that the
life of ruling and being ruled, or in other words the political life,
is the highest life open to man. It is not till we reach the Fourth
Book of the Politics, that the lesson of the last book of the Nico-
maeian Ethics is again impressed on us—the lesson that the
supreme end of man is not work (ἀγχολία) but leisure (σχολή)—not
the political life, not even the life of the ruler in the best State, but
rather the life of leisure and contemplation. The highest employ-
ment of man, we are again told, is the employment of leisure; his
highest and most godlike moments are moments of speculation,
not of political activity. True, the right use of leisure presupposes
the active virtues (Pol. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16 sqq.); still the ruler
rules for the sake of speculative virtue (σοφία), not over her. But
the Politics couples this doctrine with the emphatic assertion that
man is a part of the State. Many of the virtues enumerated in the
Nicomachean Ethics drop out of sight in the Politics, but some
features in the character of the σπουδαῖος acquire a fresh pro-
minence. We see him in a ‘setting’ of institutions, as we know
him in actual life; we see him as a member of a πόλις, and there-
fore as one who is ‘his brother’s keeper’, and who cares for the
virtue of all his equals and dependents in the community to which he
belongs. We see him in connexion with the social positions which
he fills—a husband, a father, a master, a proprietor, a citizen, and

1 Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.
APPENDIX A.

a ruler. Virtue is depicted diffusive of itself and radiating its influence through household and State. We learn to know happiness better, when it is embodied for us in an entire State of happy men.

Thus the Politics completes the Nicomachean Ethics. The latter treatise is, in fact, presupposed by the former. It would not have been possible to discover the best constitution, if the nature of the most desirable life, or in other words of *εὐδαιμονία*, had not been ascertained previously (Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sq.: 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 7 sqq.).

But then again, the last three books of the Politics teach us a lesson of which we have heard but little in the Nicomachean Ethics. If the State is at its best when it is realizing *εὐδαιμονία*, Political Science falls short of completeness unless it can deal with cases in which the production of *σπουδαίον* and *εὐδαιμονία* is out of the question. The highest mission of Political Science is not its only mission; it needs to understand the deviation-forms and to know how to constitute them, as much as it needs to understand the best State. Political Science has its technical side; it is not a mere handmaiden to Ethics. Thus if the Nicomachean Ethics sought in some measure to view the moral agent apart from the State, one portion of the Politics studies the State apart in some degree from ethical aims. In Aristotle’s hands, Ethics and Politics show to this extent an inclination to draw away from each other.

Not all the Politics, we see, is a strictly necessary sequel to the Nicomachean Ethics. When Aristotle announces his intention to study all constitutions—which he does as early as the close of his ethical treatise—he goes beyond the limits of the task which the interests of Moral Philosophy obliged him to undertake. He in effect implies that his purpose is to deal with Political Science not simply as a sequel to Ethics, but as a science deserving of study even apart from ethical considerations. Plato had studied the inferior constitutions in the Republic, only to show how fatal they are to justice and happiness; Aristotle will study them because it is the business of the πολιτικός to know how to construct even these lower forms of the State.

Aristotle, in fact, worked out to its results the parallel between πολιτική on the one hand, and γεμιστική and ἑαυτική on the other, which he inherited from the Gorgias of Plato (464 B sqq.) and from Socrates. These are arts, while πολιτική is a practical science; yet on the whole a resemblance exists between them¹, though it is

not complete at all points. Politicē, no less than δυνάμεις like Rhetoric and Dialectic, resembles the arts in dealing with cases in which an imperfect success is alone attainable as readily as with others; 'it is quite possible to treat scientifically patients who can never enjoy health' (Rhet. i. 1. 1355 b 13). Just as it is the business of Medicine to treat any one who may be proposed for treatment (τῶν προτεκτῆσα, Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1186 b 26'), so it is the business of politicē to study how any given constitution is to be brought into being, and how, having been brought into being, it is to be kept in being as long as possible, even if the constitution thus demanded at its hands falls short of that to which the circumstances of the particular State enable it to attain (μήτε τὴν ἐνδεχόμενην εἰ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀλλὰ τίνα φαυλοτέραν, Pol. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 28 sqq.).

Thus the political branch of politicē seems, as it were, to waver between two levels; it is, on the one hand, a practical science closely akin to Ethics, if indeed it does not deal with a nobler subject-matter; it is, on the other, an art or productive science like Medicine, ready to construct on demand any constitutional form which may be asked of it, whatever its merits or demerits, in such a way as to be as durable as possible; indeed, stooping even lower than Medicine, for while Medicine seeks in all cases to restore some degree of health, Political Science is not in every case to require States to adopt a good constitution.

Why, we ask, does not the Nicomachean Ethics also make it its business to deal with τῶν προτεκτῆσα and to do as much as possible for the virtue and happiness of the ill-circumstanced individual, just as the Politics does its best for the ill-circumstanced State? We do, in fact, find lower as well as higher virtues described in the Nicomachean Ethics—continence as well as temperance; the lower kinds of friendship as well as the higher; justice as well as equity and friendship; prudence as well as speculative virtue—but why does not the treatise go on to trace out a life for the less favourably constituted individual, as the Politics traces a fitting organization for the less favourably circumstanced State? The answer is that

1 Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 19 sqq.: 3. 16. 1287 a 32 sqq.
2 Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 b 12 sqq.: 1. 1. 1355 b 10 sqq.: Top. i. 3. 101 b 5 sqq.
3 Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 3, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν παρὸντι στρατοπεδίῳ χρήσαι πολεμικῶτατα καὶ σκυτότομον εἰ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν, τῶν αὐ-
4 τῶν δε τρόπων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνών ἀπαντᾶς.
4 See on this subject the remarks of Teichmüller, Einheit des Aristotel. Eudæmonie, pp. 105-108, though perhaps there is more difference between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics in this matter than Teichmüller here allows.
in strictness it has to do only with the virtues and the virtuous action which culminate in eidos: it seeks to draw out the contents of eidos; thus its aim is essentially ideal, and any attempt to do for the less well-endowed individual what the Politics does for the less favoured State would have conflicted with its plan. The question, however, remains, why the work was constructed on this plan—why Aristotle's treatment of Ethics is more ideal than his treatment of Politics. Perhaps the steps which Plato had already taken in the direction of sketching lower and more easily attainable forms of the State (Laws 739 E) may have suggested to Aristotle a broader and more practical treatment of Politics.

But if the Politics is something more than a sequel to the Nicomachean Ethics, the teaching of the latter treatise seems also to be less adjusted to that of the former than we might have expected. We learn in the Politics to regard man as a part of a greater Whole, the State, and we expect to find this fact kept in view by Aristotle in his ethical treatise. Virtue, we anticipate, will be the sum of the qualities which tend to the maintenance and excellence of the Whole, and the first question discussed in the work will be the question what these qualities are. The course followed, however, is quite different. Aristotle's ethical ideal is deduced partly from psychological facts, or alleged psychological facts, such as the natural supremacy of a certain part of the soul over other parts, partly from opinion, and especially opinion evidenced in action, or the opinion of wise and good men; in no way from the nature of the State or the conditions of its successful working. On the contrary, the State seems rather to be adjusted to the πολιτικός than the σωφρόνις to the State; we are nowhere taught by Aristotle to deduce the nature of virtue from the nature of the State. If this had been otherwise, the ethical ideal of Aristotle might have been somewhat different from what it is. The virtues which tend to make men valuable members of a Whole would probably have assumed a more conspicuous place in it. The highest virtue would have been discovered not by asking what is the virtue of the most divine part of the soul, but by asking what virtue tends most to the harmony and excellence of the State. We do, in fact, find that in the Politics the highest virtue, that virtue whose exercise is more the end of human life than the exercise of any other—speculative virtue—is placed in a new light, as being (together with temperance, prudence, and justice) preservative of the State in those times of peace and leisure which are fatal to the exclusively military
State (4 (7) 15 1334 a 22 sqq.) But we hear nothing about this in the Nicomachean Ethics. There, on the whole, the principle that man is by nature a part of the State seems to find less application than might have been expected. Virtue is described rather as the supremacy of that part of the soul which is rightfully supreme, than as the adaptation of the individual to the maintenance of the highest type of society. Ethical Science dominates Political Science, not Political Science Ethical. The supreme end of the State is contemplative activity, precisely the activity in the exercise of which the individual is most independent of his fellows.

But then again, as we have seen, Political Science claims freedom for itself. The Politics studies the πολιτεία and the various πολιτείαι more independently of Ethics than we might have expected. If Aristotle's only object had been to complete the Nicomachean Ethics, the Politics would have been a very different work from what it is. It would have been more ideal and less technical.

We see then that the two treatises are to a certain extent correlated, but that they are not perfectly adjusted to each other.

One remark may be added. There is no sign that Aristotle deduced from the Politics the lesson which it would seem clearly to imply, as to man's chance of attaining full virtue and happiness. The further we advance in the Politics, the more clearly we see how dependent the moral virtue of the individual is on the constitution—that is, on the ethical creed adopted by the State as a whole—and also how much the constitution depends on causes not altogether subject to man's control. The result is—as the reader of the Politics can hardly fail to see, whether Aristotle himself saw it or not—that virtue can rarely be attainable in its purity, for only the citizen of the best constitution is ἄριστος σουσόδαος, and that if virtue is rarely attainable, still more must this be the case with happiness, for happiness presupposes not only pure and complete virtue, but also a certain measure of external and bodily goods. We hardly saw this, while we were

1 Some virtues which are implied in the Politics to be essential to the successful working of the State appear to escape notice in the Nicomachean Ethics: e.g. that which is exercised in caring that others shall be virtuous (Pol. 3 9 1280 b 1 sqq.; 1 13 1259 b 18 sqq.)—unless indeed, as is probably the case, φρόνησις is the virtue whose existence is here implied. But then, how imperfect is the sketch of φρόνησις or πολιτεία in the Nicomachean Ethics, if this important feature of its action is not dwelt on there.
APPENDIX B.

On the Carthaginian Constitution

The Carthaginian State was not a declining State when Aristotle wrote, like the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States, but was perhaps in its prime or approaching it. Carthage was a seaport, unlike Sparta and most of the Cretan cities, and a very populous seaport, for even in the days of its decline it is said to have had seven hundred thousand inhabitants; the number of its citizens, therefore, was probably also very great—great enough, one would have thought, to remove Carthage from the category of well-governed States, if in these the citizen-body was never allowed to pass moderate limits (4 (7). 1. 1326 a 27 sq.). We know not who had written on the Carthaginian constitution before Aristotle—he himself may have already sketched it in his Polities—but it evidently enjoyed a high reputation. Aristotle remarks that the fact of its stability, notwithstanding that a demos existed at Carthage, proved it to be a well-designed constitution, and that under it Carthage had been free from serious civil trouble, and also from tyrants. It is clear that whatever Aristotle may say as to the political weaknesses of Asiatic

1 Cp. Pol. 6 (4), 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.
2 See on this subject Suscinii's notes (Sus., Notes 176-308), which have been of much use to me.
3 It is thus that Grote (History of Greece, 10. 542 interprets the words of Strabo, p. 543, πολεις μεν εν τιχον τραπεζοτατοι εν τη Λιβυη, άνθρωποι δ' εν τη ποιει μοναδις εβδομηκοντα. Mommsen, however, takes Strabo to refer, not to the inhabitants, but to the citizens of Carthage, 'whether dwelling in the city or its neighbourhood, or resident in its subject-territory or in other lands' (History of Rome, E. T. 2. 24 n.)
races (4 (7). 7), the Carthaginians deserve the credit, often ascribed too exclusively to Greece and Rome, of being among the earliest pioneers of free institutions.

We do not hear that, like the Lacedaemonian State, Carthage forbade its citizens to practise agriculture, trade, and the handicrafts, but it seems to have sought to encourage a military spirit in them (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 12 sqq.), and though we are not told that anything corresponding to the Lacedaemonian and Cretan systems of gymnastic training existed at Carthage, we hear of the existence of syssitia, and these may well have been there also, no less than at Sparta and in Crete, designed with a view to war.

It is, however, on the political constitution that Aristotle mainly dwells. His chapter on the Lacedaemonian constitution throws much light on the social organization of the Lacedaemonian State, but this cannot be said of his chapter on the Carthaginian constitution. We learn far less from him, indeed, than we could wish even as to the political constitution, for he is mainly preoccupied with the question, how far the Carthaginian constitution fulfilled its aim of being an ἀριστοκρατία, and not an oligarchy or a democracy. His remarks on this question throw some light on the arrangements of the constitution, but only enough to make us wish for more.

He had mentioned at the outset of the chapter that the Carthaginian constitution was similar in some respects to the Lacedaemonian, and he is thus led to enumerate, though in the briefest and baldest way, first those Carthaginian institutions which were similar (παραλήψει, 33), and next those which were analogous (ἀνάλογαν, 37), to Lacedaemonian institutions. The former epithet is applied to the Carthaginian syssitia and to the Council of the Hundred and Four, which are respectively compared with the Phiditia and the Ephors, while the Carthaginian kings and senate are described as analogous to their Lacedaemonian correlatives. The Carthaginian constitution, though an ἀριστοκρατία (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq.), is held by Aristotle to deviate from the true model of an ἀριστοκρατία both in an oligarchical and in a democratic direction. It sometimes conceded too much to the people and sometimes too much to the rich. A strict ἀριστοκρατία would not have given as much power to the popular assembly as the Carthaginian constitution gave it 1—would not have given it full power to arrive at decisions of its own or have allowed any one who pleased to speak against the pro-

1 See Sus.2, Note 388, who points out how limited were the powers of the people even in a democracy of the more moderate type.
posals of the magistrates. On the other hand, poor men of high merit had a career open to them in the Lacedaemonian State which was not open to them at Carthage. Carthage, indeed, not only tended to exclude poor men from high office, but confined two at least of its highest magistracies to wealthy men, actually making them purchaseable. The Carthaginian practice of allowing several offices to be held by one man also had an oligarchical tendency, inasmuch as it diminished the number of office-holders. Many even of the wealthy would find that office came to them but rarely. Thus, if we can understand how the Carthage of Aristotle's day could be described, not quite baselessly, as δημοκρατική (7 (5). 12. 1310 b 5), we can still better understand the language which Isocrates puts into the mouth of Nicocles with regard to it—ἐι δὲ Καρθηνίαν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίαν τοὺς ὁμοίους ἔμπειραν πολεμω-μένοις οὐκα μὲν ὀλιγαρχαμένοις, παρὰ δὲ τῶν πολεμοῦν βοσκομένοις (Nicod. § 24). Carthage, he holds, was oligarchically ruled at home, but ruled by kings in the field. Aristotle, on the contrary, would say that the Carthaginian constitution was an aristocracy, though it deviated from the true standard partly in the direction of democracy and still more in that of oligarchy. It was an aristocracy because it did homage to virtue as well as to wealth and popular power (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq.), but it was so much mastered by a worship of wealth that Aristotle doubted whether it was a durable aristocracy, and would seem to have anticipated that it would ultimately become an oligarchy (1273 a 41 sq.). If it is allowable slightly to alter a phrase of Mr. Lowell's, the Carthaginian aristocracy was 'an aristocracy with oligarchical instincts.'

When we pass from the broad outline of the constitution to details, we find ourselves much at a loss, but it would seem that till the fifth century before Christ, when the Council of the Hundred and Four was instituted, the Kings (i.e. the Suffetes or Judges) and the Senate were supreme at Carthage, and that even after that event they probably retained to a large extent the immediate administration of affairs, for we are told that nothing came before the popular assembly except matters referred to it by them, or matters as to the reference of which to the popular assembly the kings and senate were not agreed (1273 a 6 sqq.). It would appear, therefore, that in practice either the kings or the senate could compel the reference of a question to the popular assembly. It does not seem that there were any determinate subjects with which the popular assembly had the exclusive right of dealing, and
APPENDIX B.

no doubt the kings and the senate would commonly deal with administrative questions themselves. For all we hear to the contrary, they may have had the right to legislate also.

The Kings, or Suffetes, who were probably two in number, and who are compared by Livy to the Roman Consuls (30. 7. 5, suffetes, quod velut consulare imperium apud eos erat), cannot have held office for life, as Cicero appears to imply that they did (De Rep. 2. 23. 42-43), for Aristotle tells us (1273 a 15 sqq.) that the members of the Pentarchies held office for a longer term than any other magistrates, and they did not hold office for life. The kingship was probably an annual office, but those who held it may have been indefinitely re-eligible. We gather from Aristotle's language (1272 b 38 sqq.) that the kings were not taken, like the Lacedaemonian, from a single family, and that they were elected from families of merit, and were men of mark themselves, though they needed also to be wealthy men, but we know not by whom they were elected; Aristotle speaks, indeed, of the kingship as a purchasable office (cp. Plato, Rep. 544 D). Isocrates, in the passage of the Nicoeles which has already been quoted (§ 24), appears to regard the kings as the generals of the State, but Aristotle distinguishes the offices of King and General (1273 a 36 sq.). These two offices, however, may often have been combined. They are described by Aristotle in 1273 a 30, 36 as the greatest in the State, but in 1273 a 15 he refers in similar terms to 'the Hundred.' We have seen that in comparing the Carthaginian kingship with the Lacedaemonian he uses the epithet 'analogous,' not 'similar,' and it is clear that these two forms of kingship differed in many respects; the Carthaginian kingship was elective and purchasable, was not held for life, and was not always combined with the Generalship.

We learn little from Aristotle as to the Senate. We have already seen that it probably shared with the Kings or Suffetes the ordinary administration of the State, and that he speaks of it as 'analogous' to the Lacedaemonian. It must have been a far more numerous body than the Lacedaemonian Senate, for the inner council by which it was to a large extent guided itself numbered thirty members (Liv. 30. 16. 3: oratores ad pacem petendam mit-tunt triginta seniorum principes; id erat sanctius apud illos consilium, maximaque ad ipsum senatum regendum vis), and the Carthaginian Senators cannot, like the Lacedaemonian, have held office for life, at any rate in the time of Aristotle, for Aristotle implies that no magistracies at Carthage were held for life (1273 a 15
sqq.). Valerius Maximus (Facta et Dicta Memorabilia, 9. 5. 4) remarks on the arrogance of the Carthaginian Senate in using a bath of their own, distinct from that used by the plebs, and the contrast of Roman and Carthaginian custom in this matter is not without significance. See on the subject of the Carthaginian Senate Sus, Note 382.

The Council of the Hundred and Four is described by Aristotle as ‘similar’ to the Lacedaemonian Ephorate. He probably means that its function in the State was similar, and that, like the Ephorate (c. 9. 1271 a 6), it exercised a control over the other magistracies, and especially over the kings. He mentions a body called ‘the Hundred’ as the greatest magistracy of the State (1273 a 14 sq.), and the question arises whether he means by ‘the Hundred’ the Hundred and Four. It is not absolutely certain that he does, for the use of the word ἡμών (1272 b 36) in reference to the election of the Hundred and Four might be taken to suggest (if we supply οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, as in 1273 a 29) that they were elected by the citizens generally, whereas we are told that the Hundred were elected by certain Boards of Five called Pentarchies; it is also true that, if we identify the Hundred with the Hundred and Four, we shall have to suppose that the Pentarchies, which Aristotle criticises as defectively constituted (1273 a 13 sq.), nevertheless elected the Hundred and Four well and fairly, for Aristotle says that the Hundred and Four were chosen on grounds of merit (1272 b 36). Still it is difficult to believe that a Council answering, as the Hundred and Four did, to the Lacedaemonian Ephorate, which, as Susenmihl points out (Note 379), is itself called ἡ μεγίστη ἀρχή in 2. 9. 1270 b 18 sq., can have been second to any other magistracy at Carthage; it seems, therefore, on the whole, likely that it is to be identified with the Hundred, ἡ μεγίστη ἀρχή. If, however, we identify the Hundred and the Hundred and Four, the resemblance which Aristotle traces between the Hundred and Four and the Ephorate cannot have extended to the mode in which the members of these two magistracies were appointed, for the Ephors were not elected by Pentarchies. Nor can the Hundred and Four have resembled the Ephorate in being recruited from the people and in forming a bulwark of popular power, for it was a principle at Carthage to prefer rich men to poor men in elections to office. Aristotle himself implies that the Hundred and Four were far superior to the Ephors in character, position, and capacity (1272 b 35 sq.).

The resemblance between the two magistracies must probably have
lain, as has been said, in similarity of function. The Hundred and Four, like the Ephors, seem to have controlled the Kings and the Generals, and perhaps also the Senate.

This great council has commonly been identified with the magistracy, the original creation of which in the fifth century before Christ is thus described by Justin (19. 2. 5–6)—dein, cum familia tanta imperatorum (the descendants of Mago) gravis liberae civitati esset omniaque ipsi agerent simul et iudicarent, centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur, qui reversi a bello ducibus rationem rerum gestarum exigerent, ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi iudicia legesque respicerent. Aristotle says nothing about the Hundred and Four being senators, and Justin speaks of the 'centum iudices' as reviewing the conduct of the generals after their return from the field, not as controlling the kings and senate, but they may have added to their functions as time went on, and we have already seen that the kings were often the generals of the State. It is a further question whether Livy alludes to the Hundred and Four, or even to the 'centum iudices' of Justin, in the well-known passage (33. 46) in which he depicts the 'impotens regnîm' of the 'ordo iudicum' at Carthage in the time of Hannibal. 'Iudicum ordo Carthagine ea tempestate dominabatur, eo maxime quod idem perpetui iudices erant. Res fama vitæque omnium in illorum potestate erat. Qui unum eius ordinis offensisset, omnes adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infenso iudices deerat.' The term 'ordo iudicum' would seem to be a wider one than 'centum iudices,' and may perhaps include the whole 'order' of judges at Carthage, not merely a single court, however important. And then again, if 'the property, the good fame, and the life of every one lay in the power' of the 'centum iudices,' their jurisdiction must have at this time extended far beyond its original limits, for their functions were confined at the outset, as we have seen, to the control of the Generals. The 'ordo iudicum' of Livy, again, is recruited by the accession to it of quaestors, and probably other magistrates, at the expiration of their term of office (Liv. 33. 46. 4); we hear nothing of this in relation to the Hundred and Four, or indeed the 'centum iudices.' And if Livy means by saying 'idem perpetui iudices erant,' that the members of the 'ordo iudicum' held office for life, this certainly was not true of the Hundred and Four in Aristotle's time. It is evident, indeed, from the expression 'ea tempestate,' that Livy is describing a state of things which had not always existed. He is speaking of a time a century and a quarter after that of Aristotle.
We have seen that Isocrates puts in the mouth of Nicocles an interesting remark on the dual character of the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian constitutions. They were, he says, oligarchies at home and kingdoms in the field. It was probably with a view to diminish this duality and to bring the Kingship and the Generalship under the control of the oligarchy, that the Council of the Hundred and Four was instituted. The Lacedaemonian Ephorate was intended to serve a similar purpose, but a democratic character was skilfully imparted to it which was wanting in the Hundred and Four, and the services of the Lacedaemonian demos were thus enlisted in the task of checking and controlling the Kings.

In the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions, and indeed in the earlier constitutions of Greece generally (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 15 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 21 sqq.), not a few great magistracies found a place. This is true of the Carthaginian constitution also, though the great magistracies tenable for life, which form so conspicuous a feature of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions, seem to have been wanting in it. The democratic spirit (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sqq.), though stronger at Carthage than in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States, had not yet begun in Aristotle's day to abolish or cripple the great magistracies. When in the fifth century before Christ the House of Mago had threatened to become too powerful for the safety of the State (Mommsen, History of Rome, E. T. 2. 16), its ascendancy was checked by the creation of a new great magistracy, not by the abolition of the Kingship and Generalship, the offices through which it asserted its influence, or by the aggrandisement of the popular assembly. The Carthaginian constitution, after this great change had been made in it, came to belong to the class of constitutions in which the magistracies are ranged, as it were, in two tiers, one or more magistracies being charged with the control of the rest. At Carthage this controlling authority was lodged with the Hundred and Four, just as in the Lacedaemonian State it was lodged with the Ephors, in early Athens with the Council of the Areopagus, and in the State described in Plato's Laws with the Nomophylakes, the priests of Apollo, and the Nocturnal Council.

In reading Aristotle's remarks on the Carthaginian constitution, we must not forget that he criticises it from a point of view from which it was probably seldom regarded by its framers. Their desire was for a constitution which, while it favoured the acquisition and preservation of empire by the State, would also guard its liberties—a constitution under which the virtues and the ascend-
ency of great leaders like those of the House of Mago might be made as useful to the community and as little perilous to it as possible; Aristotle, on the other hand, is mainly interested in the inquiry, how far does the Carthaginian constitution give supremacy to virtue and place power in the hands of virtuous men?

APPENDIX C.

The following are the variations of MS. Phillipps 891 (z) from the text of the first two books of the *Vetus Versio* of the Politics printed by Susemihl in his edition of 1872. Some unimportant variations of spelling are omitted.

BOOK I.

pr. z, but the words are added above the line (with a caret) in an ink very similar to that of the MS.: 5. trimatistica: despota] despotica: 
guidam (with a): Siracusis: 11. plus] plura. 27. 3. om. omnes: 4. quae est] quae et: 6. magnum after habens (with a): 7. haec] hoc. 28. 3. om. utique: 8. et is added before ex (as in a): 10. om. quidem: 12. utrum autem] utrum autem enim, but enim is expunged by dots placed beneath it (by whom, is uncertain) and utrum autem (except the first n) is written over an erasure in darker ink than that of the MS. 29. 3. multae] multa pr. z; i is added above the line in a different ink: 4. agricultiva] agricultura (with a t): 5. universaliter] utiliter: 7. om. et before animalium (with a): 9. enim] et enim (so a): quidem] quod: 10. que is added in a different ink above utro: 11. esse is added after quidem. 30. 8. necessarium after fuerit (with a b t): 9. m of viventem is over an erasure. 31. 1. tot before, not after, fere: 2. quicunque] quaecunque: sponte natam] spontaneam (with a): 3. per commutationem] percontationem pr. z?, but the word has been touched up with darker ink and made hardly legible, so that it is not easy to say what the original reading was (i. commutationem is written above in similar ink to the MS.): 7. simul after furativam: 10. videtur after natura (with a): 11. perfectionem] perfectam: 13. coe of coparviant is over an erasure (as in a). 32. 1. om. utique (with a): om. sibi ipsi: 3. generatis] genitis: om. in se ipsis: 7. om. cibi: 8. ipsis] eis: 10. ipsa after omnia. 33. 2. om. et: 3. possessivae after naturam (with a): 4. quorum] quarium: 5. communionem (with b c): 6. videntur] universaliter was first written, then expunged, and videntur added in the margin probably by the writer of the MS. 34. 1. om. ponitur after viris pr. z (it is added above in darker ink): 2. organum] organorum: nullius] ultius: 7. vocare] vocari: om. quam: 8. terminus after esse (with a t Alb.): 12. fit after magis (with a): 13. autem] enim. 35. 2. om. rei: 6. factum after est (with a): 10. qual] quare. 36. 1. est after opus (with a): 9. nulla] ulla: 11. magis is joined to the preceding sentence in z, and not to peregrino. 37. 1. enim after facile: 6. ponderet et magnitudine (so a): 7. absolvant: 9. species after pecuniativae. 38. 2. rursum deliramentum esse after videtur (so a): 4. om. nullo dignum: 6. sit is added after inconvenientis (as in a): perit: 7. om. propter (with pr. a): 8. om. factis: 9. alterum after aliquid (as in a): 11. full stop after yconomica, the next word Campsoria beginning with a capital letter: 12. per] propter. 39. 3. in infinitum] infinitorum: 5. -um of illum is over an erasure: om. in before infinitum (with a c m Alb.): 10. necessarium] necessariarum: 11. video] videi (= videmus), but the e is followed by an erasure, and I do not feel absolutely certain that the symbol for -mus is in the ink of the MS.; still it resembles other symbols

BOOK II.

 CONTRIBUTIO C.  

| 61. | est before similiher: 12. autem is added after adhuc, but struck out. |
| 66. | i. | quocubus contingit et quocubus contingat: 3. aut autem: quorumcunque: quocubus: 6. sic so pr. z, but it has been altered into sit in a different ink: 7. om. millium after decem: 11. aut autem: ad haec adhuc: contribulem: contribulem with a dot under the first e. |
diverit (with a): om. bene after non (with a): the first letter of Ipodamus is not filled in: 10. curiusentis miliosis: 13. curiasus (with a b).

APPENDIX C.

is added before *ex* (as in a): *ferunt* [*fuerunt*]: *ferunt* [*fuerunt*]: *haec* [*huius*]: *et* is added after *ut* (as in a b c t Alb.): *omnes* [*hominis*]: *et* is added before *ad*: *5.* disiusagationem [*disiugationem*] (with a Alb.); *9.* sunt [*sin*]: *in* is added after *quam* [*manifestum*] *infra* [*kosmos*]: *komens* [*11.* ephororum [*fororum*] ephororum. 134. 2. enim *est*: *3.* datus is added after omnibus, and *esse participans populus maximus principatus vult* omitted: *4.* hic [*hii*]: *5.* c *ex*: *6.* after *kosmos* follows de at the beginning of the next line but projecting into the margin, and between de and quibus is inserted *esse participans populus maximus praesidit*: *8.* ipsis [*temporis*]: *9.* autognomonas [*aut gnomonas*]. 135. 4. intermedie [*intermedium*] (with a): *kosmois* [*komenis*] (with a): *6.* *omnia* is added after *quam*: *7.* id [*ad*]: *8.* sententias [*sententiae*] *sententiae* (with a): *10.* assumentes [*consumentes*] (with a). 136. 1. at pr. z. altered into aut not (I think) in the ink of the MS.: *6.* et quod pr. z. altered to et quidam, perhaps in the ink of the MS.: *12.* calcedontii. 137. 3. sunt [*sibi*]: *5.* se is added in the margin in the hand and ink of the MS.: *7.* dici [*dicit*]: *9.* sociatum [*civitatum*] civilatum [phililiois]: *filiciois* (with a): *10.* ephorum [*ephorus*]. 138. 1. om. autonom: *2.* gerusiam [*gerusia*] (with a): *3.* autonom [*autem*]: *4.* esse [*quid*]: *5.* quod: *6.* et is added before multum (as in a): *8.* om. utique [*utique*]: *10.* denum [*denum*]: *demoticum*. 139. 3. quaeque [*quaeque*] quodcunque [*quodcunque*]: *et* is added after intulerint [*intulerint*]: *4.* audire [*audire*] audire: *5.* solis [*solis*]: *6.* dominas existentes [*dominans existens*]: *qui* is added after hos (as in a). 140. 1. alius [*his*]: *7.* igitur [*ejus*]: *om. autonom: *8.* quidam [*quidam*]: *13.* hoc [*que*] after videre. 141. 2. avicere: *4.* regnum [*regnum*]: *6.* quodcunque autem [*qui- cunque enim*: *om. esse*. 142. 3. praefert [*praefert*] (with a): *legislator* [*legem la- torn*]: *sed et* [*sed et*]: *4.* om. utique [*utique*]: *5.* acceptatur, and so elsewhere: *7.* legum laorem [*legum lato- rem*]: *8.* ubi [*ibi*] (with a): *9.* participare principatibus [*principatibus*] *periphe principantibus*: *11.* velotius. 143. 2. egi- guint: *inditando* [*inditando*] in ditando: *3.* emittentes [*eminentes*]: *6.* abecesserit [*abcesserit*] abscen- virit: *7.* est [*esse*. 144. 1. perseverarunt [*perseverarunt*] perseverarum [*perseverarum*]: *2.* singulari [*singuli*]: *3.* singuli [*singuli*] pr. z. corrected in a different ink: *4.* om. fuerunt [*fuerunt*]: *5.* politice [*polityc*]: *polityc* quidem [*quidem*]: *6.* lieburgus [*lieburgus*]: *9.* legum laorem [*legum lato- rem*]: *10.* intemperatum [*intemperatum*]: *12.* quod [*quod*]: *13.* quidem [*quidem*]: *quod quod*, but a dot beside the first quod is perhaps intended to expunge it. 145. 1. scilicet [*sael*]: *2.* om. et [*et*]: *3.* quod [*quod*]: *4.* secerit [*secert*]: *5.* tyranno [*tiranno*] *titano* [*titanos*]: *8.* perides [*perides*] pr. z., but perides est is written in the margin in the same hand: *9.* populi [*populi*]: *10.* epieikeis [*epieikeis*]: *4.* crit [*critis*]: *5.* esset [*esse*]: *6.* medicinis altered into medigniis [*medigniis*]: *8.* legum laores [*legum latori*]: *9.* karondas catameus [*katameus*]: *11.* legum lationem [*laurationem*]: *12.* Locrus [*locuris*].

VOL. II.

E C
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. xii, line 17. An epic fragment of Rhianus Meineke, Analecta Alexandrina, p. 199: Prof. Mahaffy, Greek Life and Thought from the Age of Alexander to the Roman Conquest, Appendix C, reminds us here and there of Pol. 6. 41, 11. 1295 b 6 sqq., but we cannot be sure that Rhianus was acquainted with this passage.

P. xxxiii, line 11, for γενόμενος read γενόμενον
P. 26, last line but one, dele the commas
P. 31, line 22, read τοὺς μίν
P. 87, last line, read in
P. 93, heading, for 15 read 7
P. 95, heading, read 1273 b 15—1274 b 20.
P. 120, line 1, for 3 a read 32
P. 151, line 9, for of one read alone
P. 169, line 4, read ἀλλήλους
P. 185, line 17, dele bracket after 649
P. 194, line 14, for 8. c. read 8.

P. 200, end of note on κτήματα. Add The shepherds of a hamlet near Elympos in the island of Carpathus 'call their mules κτήματα or possessions... This use of the word κτήματα is, I take it, of distinctly classical origin' (Mr. J. T. Bent, Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 6, p. 241).

P. 212, line 1, read βασιλεία
P. 213, line 13, read ἄγαθων.
P. 221, line 29, for ἀπα read ἀπό
P. 245, line 2, add Compare the use of λίγω δὲ in Oecon. 1. 6. 1345 a 26 sqq.

P. 262, line 4, after οἰκίην add Compare Oecon. 2. 1352 b 1 sqq.
P. 294, line 1, after labour add (cp. Oecon. 2. 1350 b 30 sqq.)
P. 294, line 30, read ἑρῶδας.
P. 309, last line but eleven, for of a not very dissimilar custom to that mentioned by Aristotle read of the employment of witnesses of this kind
P. 316, note on 1269 a 35, add Cp. also Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 b 14 sqq.
P. 322, last line but six, read ἐπιπάσατο
P. 323, note on προσδοκοημίους, add See also Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Dative, s. v. ὀδοντορίας.

P. 334, line 25, after ἀρσενοκρατίας add and Aristotle, Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1393 a 5.
P. 370, line 2. Plutarch here speaks only of the Eponymous Archonship, but C. F. Hermann Gr. Ant. 1. § 109, Schomann Gr. Alterth. 1. 343, and Gilbert Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 134 hold that the restriction applied to all the Archonships.

P. 386, lines 24-27. I believe that this remark was suggested by a remark in Mr. J. Cook Wilson's unpublished Essay for the Conington Prize, which I read with much interest some years ago.