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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION, TWO PREFATORY ESSAYS AND NOTES CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY

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VOLUME II
PREFATORY ESSAYS
BOOKS I AND II—TEXT AND NOTES

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THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

A TREATISE on Politics in eight books, probably identical with that known to us as 'the Politics,' finds a place in all the three catalogues of Aristotle's works which have been handed down to us—that given by Diogenes Laertius in his life of Aristotle, that of the anonymous writer first published by Menage in his commentary on Diogenes Laertius, and that of 'Ptolemy the philosopher,' which exists only in an Arabic translation.  

It is described in the first thus (No. 75)—πολιτικὴς ἀκροάσεως ὁς ἤ Θεοφράστου ἴς ἡ ζηγὲς ἐς ζηγὲς: in the second (No. 70)—πολιτικὴς ἀκρόασεως ἤ: in the third (No. 32)—if we follow Steinschneider's Latin translation (Aristot. Fragm. 1469 sqq.)—liber de regimine civitatum et nominatur bulitikun (s. bolitikun) tractatus viii.

The list of the Anonymus Menagianus is thought by Heitz not to be copied from that of Diogenes, but to be drawn from a common source. Some of its variations from the text of Diogenes, in fact, are too considerable to have arisen in the process of copying. It omits works named by Diogenes, but also names some which we do not find in his list. We see that the words ὁς ἤ Θεοφράστου do not appear in its version of the title of the Politics. They may probably not have existed in the document copied. We cannot tell how they came

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1 The three catalogues will be found at the commencement of the fifth volume of the Berlin Aristoteles—the third of them in a Latin translation by Steinschneider.
2 Die verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 17.
3 Heitz, ibid. p. 15.
to appear in the list of Diogenes. Did he find them in the source from which he copied his list, or did he add them himself? Or are they a gloss which has crept from the margin of Diogenes into his text? Their meaning is as doubtful as their origin. They may merely mean that the Political Teaching both of Theophrastus and of Aristotle was arranged in eight books: more probably they mean that the work was identical with one which was ascribed to Theophrastus as its author. Cicero sometimes cites, as from Theophrastus, statements the like of which we find in the Politics; but it does not follow that he may not owe them to Theophrastus, for Theophrastus may well have repeated remarks originally made by Aristotle, and we know that Cicero distinguishes between the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus on the best constitution, so that one part of the Politics at all events cannot have been ascribed by him to Theophrastus.

The term ἀκροάσεις perhaps implies that the work was delivered in the form of oral lectures, and to associates, not to οἱ πολλοὶ, but Galen speaks of Aristotle 'writing' his ἀκροάσεις, and makes no distinction in this respect between them and the rest of his works. In the Rhetoric (p. 8. 1366 a 21)—a reference which may well have been inserted by some later hand—we find the Politics called

1 See on this subject Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 678. 1.
2 De Fin. 5. 4. 11: cumque uterque eorum docuisset qualem in re publica principem esse conveniret, pluribus praeterea conscripsisset, qui esset optimus rei publicae status, hoc amplius Theophrastus, quae essent in re publica rerum inclinationes et momenta temporum, quibus esset moderandum, utcumque res postularet.
5 See the passage of Galen quoted in the last note. It seems to have been a common practice for the author of a book to read it aloud to an audience: cp. Cic. Brutus c. 51. 191: (Antimachus) cum, convocatis auditoribus, legeret eis magnum illud quod novistis volumen suum, et eum legentem omnes praeter Platonem reliquisen, 'legam,' inquit, 'nihilominus, Plato enim mihi unus instar est omnium.'
by the name by which we know it (τὰ πολιτικὰ). The Politics itself speaks of its inquiries as being περὶ πολιτείας καὶ τῆς ἐκάστη καὶ πολὰ τις (Pol. 3. 1. 1274 b 32: cp. Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29, ἢμῖν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας), and refers at the close of the first book to succeeding portions of the work as τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας (1. 13. 1260 b 12). It is also implied to be περὶ τῶν πολιτείων in 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 26².

References of any kind to the Politics, especially before the time of Cicero, are scarce, and therefore the question of the probable date and origin of the two first of these lists—the oldest, apparently, of the three—is an interesting one, for, as we have seen, they mention the work by name.

Diogenes Laertius himself lived no earlier than the second century of our era and possibly much later, but, as is well-known, he derives much of his information from far more ancient authorities now lost, and his list of Aristotle's works has been thought by many to have come to him through some intermediate compiler or other from Hermippus of Smyrna, the disciple of Callimachus of Alexandria, or, at all events to precede the rearrangement of Aristotle's works by Andronicus of Rhodes, who lived in the first century before Christ. A short review of the grounds for this opinion will perhaps not be out of place here.

We are told by Plutarch (Sulla c. 26) that when the MSS. of 'most of the works of Aristotle and Theophratus,' after being rescued from their long seclusion in careless hands at Scepsis, had been carried off by Sulla to Rome

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¹ So Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Aristot. Metaph. p. 15. 6 Bonitz), ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς: Julian (Ep. ad Themist. p. 260 D), ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς συγγράμμαι, I take these references from Sus.¹ p. xlv, note 85. The work of the Platonist Eubulus also was entitled Ἐνικεφῖς τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐν δεύτερῳ τῶν Πολιτικῶν πρὸς τὴν Πλάτωνος Πολιτείαν ἀντιτιθέμενων (Sus.¹ p. xlv: Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 678. 1).

² Michael Ephesius, quoting from the Politics, uses the expression ἐν ταῖς Πολιτικαῖς (lege Πολιτείας), and Eustathius, ἐν Πολιτείας (Sus.¹ p. xlv, note 85).

³ Hermippus lived till about the close of the third century before Christ.

⁴ See the story in Strabo, p. 608-9. Strabo speaks of 'the library of Theophratus, which included that of Aristotle,' passing to Neleus, and forgets to make it clear whether Apellicon purchased the libraries as a whole, or only
with the rest of the library of Apellicon of Teos, Tyranni-
non (a contemporary of Lucullus and Cicero) put them in
order (ἐνσκευάσασθαί τὰ πολλά), and Andronicus, ‘having
obtained from him the copies which had been made of
them’ (cp. Strabo, p. 609), ‘published them, and framed the
lists now current’ (παρ’ αὐτοῦ τὸν Ῥόδιον Ἀνδρόνικον εὐπο-
ρήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων εἰς μέσου θέειν, καὶ ἀναγράφας τοὺς
νῦν φερομένους πίνακας). We learn further from an equally
well-known passage of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus, that
Andronicus arranged the works of both writers on a new
principle. The passage is as follows:—’Επει δὲ αὐτὸς
(Plotinus) τὴν διάταξιν καὶ τὴν διόρθωσιν τῶν βιβλίων ποιεῖσθαι
ήματ’ ἐπέτρεψεν, ἐγώ δὲ κάκεινω ζῷντι ὑπεσχόμεν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἐπηγειλάμενον ποιήσας τούτο, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ βιβλία οὐ κατὰ
χρόνους έσται φύσιν ἐκδηδομένα ἑδικάωσα, μιμησάμενος δ’ Ἀπολλόδωρον τὸν Ἀθηναίου καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν περιπατητικόν,
ὅς ὁ μὲν Ἐπίχαρμον τῷ κωμῳδιογράφῳ εἰς δέκα τόμους φέρων
συγγράφει, δ’ ὁ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλειος καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγμα-
τείας διείλη, τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταύτῃν συναγάγων, ὅτε
καὶ ἐγὼ πεντήκοντα τέσσαρα δύοντα ἑκὼν τὰ τοῦ Πλατωνίων
βιβλία διέλοις μὲν εἰς τρ’ ἑνεάδας, τῇ τελείοτῃ τοῦ τρ’ ἀριθμοῦ
καὶ ταῖς ἑνεάδοις ἀσμένος ἐπιτυχών, ἔκαστῃ δὲ ἑνεάδι τὰ οἰκεία
φέρων συνεφόρησα, δοὺς καὶ τάξιν πρώτην τοῖς ἑλαφροτέροις
προβλήμασιν (c. 24).

It would seem from this passage that before the time
of Andronicus the works of Aristotle were arranged in a
confused and merely chronological order—the order of
publication, apparently—and that he introduced the new
plan of grouping them by their subject-matter, following the
example of the grammarian Apollodorus of Athens, who

the writings of Aristotle and
Theophrastus included in them. He says that Apellicon purchased
‘the books of Aristotle and Theo-
phrastus,’ and fails to notice the
ambiguity of this expression. His
mind is, in fact, absorbed in the
story which he is telling about the
fate of the writings of the two
great Peripatetic teachers, and he
forgets that Aristotle and Theop-
phrastus must have possessed
many books in addition to their
own compositions. Athenaeus in
his account speaks more distinctly,
and tells us that Apellicon pur-
chased ‘the Peripatetic writings’
(τὰ περιπατητικά) ‘and the library
of Aristotle and many others’
(Deipn. 214 d).
had in the previous century arranged the Comedies of Epicharmus in ten great τόμοι. The writings of Aristotle would include both dialogues and systematic works, and Andronicus would seem to have grouped them together, making, not form or date, but subject-matter the basis of his arrangement. We conclude that in his issue of the works the περὶ δικαιοσύνης, for instance, would be grouped with other ethical writings ascribed to Aristotle. It is possible also that in some cases Andronicus took separate treatises and formed a new whole out of them under some general name. Heitz (p. 36) thinks it probable that he did this for the treatises which together make up the 'Physics' of our editions. He is not stated, however, to have constructed any new treatise out of fragments of Aristotle, any more than Apollodorus constructed a new comedy of Epicharmus. His work would seem to have been one of arrangement, not of manufacture.

As the dialogues and other exoteric writings were apparently comprised in his edition and interspersed among the rest of the works, it must have been very different from our own Aristotle. Many spurious works, again, are included in our Aristotle which can hardly have been ascribed to Aristotle in the time of Theophrastus, or have been republished by Andronicus as part of the Scepsis 'find,' though we can well understand that some works of Theophrastus may have been ascribed to Aristotle or vice versa, the writings of the two authors having been mixed up together.

Andronicus' issue of Aristotle's works was probably an event of great importance, though not quite as important as a hasty reader of Strabo might imagine. When Strabo asserts, rightly or wrongly, that the Lyceum library at Athens had come, after the withdrawal of Neleus to Scepsis, to possess only 'a few' of the works of Aris-
totle, he makes this assertion with respect to that one library; he need not be taken to assert the same thing of other great libraries of the Hellenic world, such as those of Alexandria and Pergamon. Strabo's aim is, in fact, to give an explanation of the comparative torpor of the Peripatetic school at Athens during the interval between Neleus and Andronicus, which was in all probability really due to other causes. His assertion is limited to Athens; the libraries of Alexandria and Pergamon were no doubt in far better case. But even for them the publication of Andronicus' texts may well have been an important event. Not a few spurious works may have found a place among the writings of Aristotle preserved in these two great libraries, and perhaps some of the genuine works were wanting. The Scepsis purchase, on the contrary, would include only those works of Aristotle which were ascribed to him by Theophrastus and Neleus, and would probably include all of these. The publication of Andronicus' edition, and especially its publication at Rome, would serve to concentrate attention on the genuine works of these two writers, and to place them before the world in their entirety, at a moment when the really great philosophers, orators, and artists of Greece were being singled out from the crowd with an ardour which was altogether new. Copies of Aristotle's works acquired after this date would probably be copies of the edition of Andronicus.

The question now arises—Is the list of Aristotle's works given by Diogenes ordered after the fashion of Andronicus or not? The answer is not difficult. The list is not quite the chaos which it appears at first sight to be: on the contrary, it is to a certain extent in order; but its order is not the order of Andronicus. First we have the dialogues and other exoteric works, then two or three early abstracts of Platonic lectures or writings, then we come to a part of the list in which logical works seem to predominate; ethical, political, and rhetorical works predominate towards the middle; then come physical and zoological works; last in order we have works designed in all probability for Aris-
tote's own use ('hypomnemactic works'), letters, and poems. The arrangement can hardly be that of Andronicus. Dio-
genest's list of Theophrastus' works has been shewn by Usener to be derived from the catalogue of a library, and the same thing may probably be true of his list of Aristotle's works. As the former list is for the most part arranged on alphabetical principles, and the latter is not, it is doubtful whether they can have been derived from the same library-catalogue, for if they were, we should hardly ex-
pect to find the works of Theophrastus catalogued in one way and those of Aristotle in another. Be this, however, as it may, Diogenes' list of Aristotle's works is probably derived from the catalogue of some library which had purchased its copy of Aristotle's works before Andronicus issued his edition—very possibly an Alexandrian library, but about this we cannot be certain. The mention of the Politics in it may therefore date as far back as the for-
mation of the libraries of Alexandria, or rather perhaps the adoption by their authorities of the practice of dividing large works into 'books,' which is implied throughout the list. Some believe that this change dates only from the time of Callimachus, who was chief librarian of the Museum from about 260 to 240 B.C., but the point is doubtful.

We are on surer ground in referring Diogenes' list of Aristotle's works to pre-Andronican times than in at-
ttempting to fix its exact date, or the exact source from which it ultimately came. Diogenes may have copied it himself from some library-catalogue, or on the other hand

1 The list is said by Heitz (p. 234) to resemble most of those we find in Diogenes in placing the dialogues first, the letters and poems last, and last but one the hypomnemactic writings.

2 For other reasons which make it unlikely that the list of Aristotile's works given by Diogenes is ultimately derived from Andronicus, see Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 51 sq.

3 Analecta Theophrastea, p. 13 sqq.

4 Heitz' comment on the title ἀπαρται ζη (No. 127 in Diogenes' list of Aristotle's works) is as follows: 'one would conjecture that the substantive to be supplied is ὑπομνηματα. For the choice of the title the person who catalogued the papyrus-rolls is unquestionably responsible, and we must no doubt set it down to some Alexandrian librarian' (p. 236–7).

5 See on this subject Birt, Das antike Buchwesen, p. 482 sqq.
it may have come to him through intermediaries. The latter is perhaps the more probable supposition. Usener believes that Diogenes' list of the works of Theophrastus came to him ultimately from Hermippus of Smyrna, who was the author of a work entitled Βιοι, which dealt, among other subjects, with the lives of philosophers and orators. He admits that there are peculiarities in the structure of this list which at first sight make against his view. It is taken, as he has shewn, from the catalogue of a library, which apparently added from time to time, by purchase or otherwise, to the collection of the writings of Theophrastus which it originally possessed, and catalogued both its original stock and (for the most part at all events) its later acquisitions in alphabetical order. Thus the list consists of a long alphabetical list followed by a shorter alphabetical list, which is in its turn succeeded first by a group of books not arranged in any order, and next by a third alphabetical group. We know that Hermippus was an accomplished writer and scholar, and it is natural to ask, would he have made his list a mere transcript of an ill-arranged library-catalogue? Usener replies that few of the early πυκκογραφοι did their work any better. Ancient authorities speak of Hermippus and Andronicus as having drawn up lists of Theophrastus' works, and mention no one else as having done so; and Diogenes' list of his works is clearly not by Andronicus. But if the Βιοι of Hermippus is the ultimate source from which this list came, it does not follow that Diogenes' list of the works of Aristotle was also derived from it. We do not know

1 See Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 35.
2 We owe to him the vivid sketch of Theophrastus in his lecture-room which Athenaeus has preserved for us (Deipn. 21 a).
3 'Meae sententiae' (the view that the list came through Hermippus) 'illa ipsa obicere possis unde ex bibliothecae usu ortam hanc tabulam esse studui ostendere. uerum haud scio an im-
merito: nam omnibus antiquorum πυκκογραφοι—si librorum tabulas ab ipsis scriptoribus aut discipulis familiarissimis confectas ut par est excipias—id proprium est, quod ea tantum quae in certis bibliothecis siue Alexandrina siue Pergamina siue aliiis conlecta erant respici solent uolumina' (Usener, Analecta Theophrastea, p. 24).
4 Heitz, p. 47.
for certain that Hermippus drew up a list of Aristotle's works; and if we admit that it is highly probable that he did, we are still met by the difficulty of accounting for the entire contrast between the structure of the one list and that of the other. The list of Theophrastus' works is alphabetical; that of Aristotle's works is not.

Notwithstanding this difficulty, however, it is perhaps more than possible that both lists may have come from the work of Hermippus. They may even have come from a still earlier source. The Βίοι of Hermippus was probably in part an expansion and revision of portions of the vast work of Callimachus (in 120 books), entitled Πίναξ παντοθαπάνον συγγραμμάτων, or πίνακες τῶν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ διαλαμψάντων καὶ δὲν συνέγραψαν, which gave lists of authors—orators, poets, lawgivers, philosophers—classified in separate groups according to the nature of their writings, and added in each case the full titles of these writings, the number of books, the initial words, and the number of lines. ‘In the case of writers who were the authors of more works than one the total number of lines contained in their works was given.’ We are at once reminded of the remark with which Diogenes concludes his list of Aristotle's writings, that they contain 445,270 lines. His enumeration of the writings of Theophrastus concludes with a similar mention of the number of lines contained in them. The work of Callimachus, who, as has been said, was chief librarian of the Alexandrian Museum, was probably based on the collection of books preserved in the Museum Library and the stores of other Alexandrian libraries, and this would explain some characteristics of the two lists to which reference has already been made.

The Politics, then, is included in a list of Aristotle’s works which dates in all probability from an earlier epoch than that of Andronicus. Other indications of its existence are:

1 See Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 46.  
2 See Birt, Das antike Buch-Hermipp. Callimach. fr. 46.
are derivable from works whose date is less doubtful and also probably earlier.


In the Magna Moralia the following—1. 25. 1192 a 16 sqq., cp. Pol. 1. 9. 1258 a 10 sq. and 10. 1258 a 21 sq. : 1. 34. 1194 b 9, cp. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25: 1. 34. 1194 b 18, cp. Pol. 1. 4. 1254 a 12.

The so-called first book of the Oeconomics (which is ascribed by Philodemus to Theophrastus2, though Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 944) is half inclined to ascribe it to Eudemos) is to a large extent a reproduction of the teaching of the Politics on this subject, though the writer also makes use of the Laws of Plato and the writings of Xenophon. The compiler of the so-called second book of the Oeconomics, which seems to be of a later date, is also apparently acquainted with the Politics (compare Oecon. 2. 1346 a 26 sqq. with Pol. 1. 11. 1259 a 3 sq.).

Indications of an acquaintance with the Politics appear also in the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, which is wrongly included among the works of Aristotle: e.g. in 3. 1424 a 12 sqq., with which Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 78. 2) has compared Pol. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27–38 (cp. also Pol. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 11 sqq.): also in 3. 1424 b 3 sqq., cp. Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 34

1 Since the above was written, I find that Susemihl has drawn attention to one of these passages (Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1258 b 5 sqq.) in his third edition of the Politics (p. xix, note). He also thinks that in Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1248 b 26 sqq. the writer had Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 21 sqq. before him. Zeller (Hermes 15. 553 sqq.) holds that in Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1218 b 32 sqq. the writer had before him, not only Eth. Nic. 1. 8. 1098 b 9 sqq., but also Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 21 sqq.

An acquaintance with Pol.(7) 4. 1303 b 28 sqq. on the part of the writer of the De Animalium Motione may possibly be indicated in c. 7. 701 b 24 sqq.

So again, in the passage from Theophrastus περὶ βασιλείας of which we have the substance and something more in Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 73–4, we seem to detect many reminiscences of the Politics, and especially a clear reminiscence of Pol. 3. 14. 1285 a 30 sqq. If Bernays is right (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 61 sqq.) in regarding Porphy., de Abstin. 2. 12 sqq. as an excerpt from Theophrastus, the disciple perhaps refers in the words εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις κ.π.λ. to his master’s teaching in Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq.

In the Fragments of Aristoceon, again, we seem to trace occasional echoes of the Politics: compare, for instance, Fragm. 19 from his Πνευμονικὰ ἀποφάσεις (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278) with Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 14 sqq., and Fragm. 20 with Pol. 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 11 sqq.¹

¹ It is unfortunate that the loss of a few letters in the Herculaneean papyri on which what remains of the work of Philodemus de Virtutibus et Vitiis is written makes it uncertain whether Metrodorus, the friend and disciple of Epicurus, had or had not seen the Politics. Philodemus says in the Ninth Book of this work (col. 21: I quote from the text of it appended to Götting’s edition of the Oeconomic ascribed to Aristotle)—κἀπειτα ὧ ... ἀ λιγχ ὡ τις τε πολλοὺς ἐσελέγχει[ντε]海绵 ἀν ἐναντίον [τι αὐτοῖς] καθηγο[μο]σαν ὑπὲρ τόν αὐτόν, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθο[ν]μένων τι διδ[α]κτοντες, δ[π]ερ Ἀριστοτε[λ]ε[ν] ... ἐπάθεν [κατά] τόν ἐν τῷ πε[ρ] το[μ] [ο]λέτικης λόγον ὑπὲρ τοῦ τόν [μ]έν [ἀγαθὸ]ν ἄνδρα καὶ χρυ[μ]αθιστὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τόν δ[ι] φ[αι]λικαὶ καὶ χρυ[μ]αθιστὴν [φαί]λικον, ὥσ ὁ Μητρόδαρος δ[π]ερ[δ]εζε. Götting (p. 206) supposes that the reference is to Eth. Nic. 4. 1, but the context (col. 17 sqq.) might equally well be taken to refer to the passage about Thales in Pol. 1. 11. 1259 a 6–18. It is, in fact, just possible that the word which Götting supplies as πολιτικής, or πολιτικής, was πολιτείας—Rose supplies πολιτείας and takes the reference to be to Pol. 1. 8–10—but it seems more probable that the reference is to a dialogue, in which case we may supply either πλοῦτον (with Spengel, followed by Heitz, p. 195, and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 361. 1), or possibly πολιτικόν. When Metrodorus is related (Plutarch adv. Colot. c. 33) to have found fault with philosophers, who
Hieronymus of Rhodes, who lived at the close of the fourth and in the first half of the third century B.C., seems from Diog. Laert. i. 26 to have told in his Σποράδην ύπομνήματα the story about Thales which we read in Pol. i. 11, and in a form which, though shortened, is very similar to that of the Aristotelian narrative. It is, however, possible that the two writers derived it from a common source.

In the dialogue entitled Erastae, which is included among Plato’s works, though it can hardly be his, there are things which remind us of Aristotle’s teaching: the distinction drawn (135 C sqq.) between ὑπ’ ῥῆν τέχνην ἐχεῖν and ὑπ’ ῥεπαίδευσις is perhaps more emphasized than we expect to find it in a pre-Aristotelian work and recalls, among other passages of Aristotle, Pol. 3. 11. 1282 a 3 sqq.; we note also that the teaching of the first book of the Politics is contradicted, intentionally or otherwise, in 138 C. But we cannot say positively that the writer is acquainted with the Politics.

Polybius.

Polybius has often been said to show no acquaintance with the Politics, and it must be confessed that though there are passages in his Sixth Book which remind us at once of the Politics, it is not clear that he had a first-hand knowledge of it. His account of the origin of society and his constitutional teaching seem rather to be based on the

in their pride misinterpreted the function of philosophy, and made themselves ridiculous by seeking to rival Lycurgus and Solon, he may be referring to the Republic and Laws of Plato, not to Aristotle.

1 Since the above was written, I find that Prinz (De Solonis Plutarchei fontibus, p. 24) and Susemihl (Sus. 3 p. xix) have already drawn attention to this.

2 Compare Polyb. 6. 57. 2, ἄνων δὲ τρώπων ὅντων καθ’ οὗ φθιέρσθαι πέφυκε παν γένος πολιτείας, τοῦ μὲν ἐξοδεῖν, τοῦ δ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς φυμένων with Aristotle. Pol. 7. 10. 1312 b 38 sq. and other passages: Polyb. 6. 18. 5 with Aristotle. Pol. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 25 sqq.: Polyb. 6. 3. 7 with Aristotle. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq. The account of βασιλεία in Polyb. 6. 10 sqq. reminds us of that of Aristotle: Polybius’ fear of αἰσχύς ὑπὲρ τοῦ δεῶν (6. 10. 7) reminds us of Aristotle’s warnings against αἰσχύς ποιῆσαι τὸ ἀνάλογον (7. 5). 3. 1302 b 33 sqq., cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 10 sqq.); and the language of Polybius as to the Roman Constitution (6. 11. 11 sqq.) resembles that of Aristotle about the Lacedaemonian constitution (Pol. 6. 4). 9. 1294 b 13 sqq.), no less than that of Plato (Laws 712 C sqq.).
views which were fashionable in the third century before Christ than on the teaching of the Politics.

Society originates, according to him, in the gregarious tendencies common to man and many other animals, not in the household relation, and just as a herd of bulls is led by the strongest, so the primitive form of Monarchy among men is the rule of the strongest and boldest. It is only after a time, in the view of Polybius, that the experience of social life develops in man an ἐννοία τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἄδικου, τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ αιχμαλωτοῦ (Polyb. 6. 5. 10: 6. 6. 7, 9)¹

—Aristotle, on the contrary, had held perceptions of this kind to be presupposed by human society (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 15 sqq.)—and that the Monarchy of the strongest gives place to Kingship, which Aristotle had said to be the primitive constitution. All unmixed constitutions, however, have, according to Polybius, a tendency to degenerate, and so Kingship passes into Tyranny. Aristocracy, the rule of the few good, succeeds, and in its turn passes into Oligarchy, the rule of a bad few. Then comes Democracy, the rule of a virtuous Many, followed by Ochlocracy, the rule of a vicious Many. Combine Kingship, Aristocracy, and Democracy in one constitution, and much will have been done to prevent constitutional decline and change. Thus Polybius recommends a mixture of these three constitutions; this is what mixed government means to him, something quite different from what it means to Aristotle.

We know that even in Aristotle’s time there were those who commended the kind of mixed government which Polybius commends². The Lacedaemonian constitution gave the hint of it. But in the century after Aristotle’s death the union of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy rose more than ever into credit, vigorously preached by the Stoics, and also probably by the Peripatetic Dicaearchus. Polybius inherited this theory, and handed it on to Cicero and the eulogists of the English constitution in the last century.

¹ Compare the similar view of the Epicureans (Porphyr. de Abstin. 1. 10).
² See Aristot. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.
A connexion has been ingeniously suggested\(^1\) between the constitutional views of Polybius and those of the Eighth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (c. 12. 1160 a 31 sqq.). Polybius may perhaps have been acquainted with this treatise\(^2\), but it is more probable that the source from which he drew was the τριπολιτικός of Dicaearchus\(^3\) or some other intermediate authority\(^4\). His theory of constitutional change would be suggested or confirmed by the history of Rome, in which the μοναρχία of Romulus was succeeded by the kingship of Numa, and the tyranny of Tarquin by the aristocracy of the early Republic and the mixed constitution which Polybius commends.

Cicero inherited far more from the Politics than Polybius. He lived like Aristotle at a time which greatly needed moral reinvigoration, and, like Aristotle, he sought this at the hands of the State. He accepts Aristotle's account of the end of the State (de Rep. 4. 3. 3: 5. 6. 8), as he accepts his account of its origin (de Rep. 1. 25. 39), rejecting that of Epicurus (1. 25. 40). It exists to promote 'good and happy life.' But if we ask what kind of State best fulfils this end, the answer is that a combination of kingship, aristocracy, and democracy does so. Here he returns to the views of Polybius. As to unmixed constitutions, kingship is the best of them, but they are all very liable to decline into forms not based on 'ius consensus et utilitatis communio'—into tyranny, the rule of a faction, and anarchy (de Rep. 1. 45. 69). Cicero goes far beyond Aristotle in his condemnation of the perverted forms and denies to the

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\(^1\) By the late Mr. R. Shute in an unpublished essay.

\(^2\) Polyb. 3. 4. 11 at any rate appears to echo Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 30 sq.

\(^3\) See Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 242.

\(^4\) It is worthy of notice that when Carneades wished to attack Aristotle's notion of justice, he would seem to have sought it in the Περὶ Δικαιοσύνης, not in the Nicomachean Ethics. See Cic. de Rep. 3. 6. 4: 3. 7. 10: 3. 8. 12. This, however, does not necessarily prove that the Nicomachean Ethics was not well-known at that time; the other work may have been still better known, or it may have contained in its four large books a fuller treatment of the subject.
communities in which they exist the name of ‘res publicae’ (de Rep. 1. 25. 39: Augustini argumentum libr. iii: de Rep. 3. 31. 43).

To devise a best State is, in Cicero’s view, beyond the power of any single inquirer. The only way to arrive at a true conception of the best State is to study the Roman constitution, which is the work of many generations and centuries, and hence of unsurpassed excellence (de Rep. 1. 46. 70: 2. 1. 2). It is to the experience of Rome, therefore, that Cicero has recourse, when he seeks to discover what institutions best promote a good and happy life. The institutions which do so are Roman institutions—the censorship, the patria potestas, and others. Cicero has too much national feeling to follow Greek guidance in politics implicitly, and there is a certain originality in the way in which he accepts the central principle of the Politics without accepting its application in detail. His main aim is a conservative aim—to recall his countrymen to a sense of the value of the triple constitution under which Rome had achieved greatness, and which was increasingly imperilled every day by the rising tendency to autocracy.

Cicero inherited much from the Politics, but it does not necessarily follow that he had a first-hand acquaintance with the book itself. There are passages in the De Republica which seem to indicate such an acquaintance. Thus it is possible that the procedure of Aristotle in the first and third books of the Politics is present to Cicero’s mind, when he announces his intention of departing from the practice of those learned inquirers on politics who begin with the union of male and female, the birth of offspring, and the formation of a body of kinsfolk, and frequently distinguish the various meanings in which this or that word is used (de Rep. 1. 24. 38: see vol. i. p. 34). His criticisms on Plato’s Communism (de Rep. 4. 4. 4) seem still more clearly to imply an acquaintance with the Politics. The following passages may also be compared: de Rep. 1. 34. 51 with Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 30 sq. and with 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sqq., 1294 b 17. sq.—de Rep. 1. 35. 55 with Pol. 3. 16. 1287 b
One would suppose from the De Finibus² that Cicero was at all events acquainted with the part of the Politics which treats of the 'optimus rei publicae status,' were it not that in the De Republica³ he makes Laelius contrast the method of Plato, who constructed a model State, with that of all other inquirers. All save Plato 'disseruerunt sineullo certo exemplari formaque rei publicae de generibus et de rationibus civitatum.' Cicero himself will in the De Republica so far follow Plato's example as to investigate 'non vaganti oratione, sed defixa in una re publica.' It certainly looks as if Cicero was not aware, when he wrote the De Republica, that both Aristotle and Theophrastus had sketched the best form of the State.

In reading the fragmentary remains of Philodemus de Musica (ed. Kemke), we often notice that Philodemus combats, or refers to, arguments which remind us of those used in the Fifth Book of the Politics. Thus Kemke (pp. xiii-xiv) compares lib. 3. fragm. 52 (in his edition) with Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 18 sqq.: fragm. 53 with 1340 a 14 sq.: fragm. 65, 66 with 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 8 sqq. One or two other passages of which the same thing may be said are noted by Gomperz, Zu Philodem's Büchern von der Musik, p. 18 sq. (lib. 3. fr. 24: cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 2) and p. 31 (lib. 3. fr. 54: cp. 1340 a 22). Perhaps the following passages may also be added to the list—lib. 1. fr. 16, cp. 5 (8). 3. 1338 b 1: fr. 17, cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 2-5: lib. 3. fr. 45 (where ᾰ[π]ο-φα[η]ερα[ι] should probably be read in place of ᾰ[λλ'] θ φδ[πη]ερα[ι], Kemke), cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 8-10: fr. 55 and lib. 4. col. 3. 23 sqq., cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 12 sqq.: lib. 4. col. 15. 5 sqq., cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 16 sq.: col. 16. 17 sqq., cp. 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 24 sqq. On these similarities the observations of Gomperz, pp. 28-29, are well worth reading. The language

¹ See also Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 151. 6.
² 5. 4. 11.
³ 2. 11. 22.
of these passages, as he remarks, differs sufficiently from that of the Politics to make it probable that Philodemus had not the Politics before him, but either some work of Aristotle's (a dialogue, Gomperz thinks) used by him in the composition of the Politics, or some work which reproduced the Politics. It is evident, however, that the subjects discussed in the Fifth Book had been much discussed before Aristotle dealt with them, and possibly some at any rate of the expressions which strike us as similar in the Politics and the De Musica may have been originally used by inquirers of an earlier date than Aristotle, and have come both to him and to Philodemus by inheritance.

If Meineke is right, and the short sketch of the political teaching of the Peripatetics contained in the Elogae of Stobaeus (2. 6. 17) is taken from the work of Areius Didymus, the instructor of the Emperor Augustus, then we have clear evidence that the Politics was well known to this writer, for nearly everything in the sketch is derived from the Politics.¹

The writer whom Plutarch follows in the latter part of the second chapter of his Life of Crassus was probably acquainted with the Politics, for the following passage contains several expressions familiar to readers of its first book. Plutarch here says of Crassus as an owner of slaves—τους ὀνόματις ἐκέκτητο καὶ τοιούτοις ... αὐτὸς ἐπιστατὴς μακατάνουσι καὶ προσέχουσι καὶ διδάσκουσι καὶ ἄλων νομίζουσι τῷ δεσπότῃ προσήκει μάλιστα τὴν περὶ τοὺς οἰκέταις ἐπιμέλειαιν ὡς ὀργάνα ἐμφύση-τῆς οἰκονομικῆς. Καὶ τὸὺτο μὲν ὅρθως ὁ Κράσσος, ἔχωρ, ὅσ ἔλεγεν, ἡγεῖτο τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διὰ τῶν οἰκετῶν χρήματι, τοὺς δὲ οἰκέτας διὰ αὐτὸν κυβερνῶν τὴν γὰρ οἰκονομικὴν ἐν ἀγχόροις χρηματιστικὴν ὀδύαν ἐν ἀνθρώπως πολιτικὴν γνω-μένην ὅρκεμεν ἐκέφαλο ἃς τῷ ἱερδῶν νομίζειν μηδὲ φάσκειν


² This is of course nowhere said by Aristotle, who would not allow the identity of any section of οἰκονομικὴ either with χρηματιστικὴ or πολιτική, yet his teaching in the Politics perhaps underlies this modification of it.
Crassus (c. 3) was interested in the teaching of Aristotle, and was instructed in his doctrines by a Peripatetic named Alexander, from whom these facts about him may ultimately be derived.

The writer, again, whom Plutarch followed in Agis c. 5 may possibly have sought to meet the criticisms which Aristotle passes in Pol. 2. 9. 1270 a 18 sqq. on the laws of the Lacedaemonian State, and to show that Lycurgus was not in fault. See my notes on 1270 a 4 and 19.

Those who are well versed in the Greek and Latin writers of the earlier Roman Empire will probably be able to add to the following scanty list of passages from writers of that epoch, which seem to indicate an acquaintance, direct or indirect, with the Politics or with some points of its teaching:

Plin. Epist. 7. 17 (cp. Pol. 3. 11. 1281 a 42 sqq.)

Dio Chrysostom, Or. 3. 115 R sqq. (?): the reference in Or. 36. 83 R to the ἀγαθὴν ἐξ ἀπάντων ἀγαθῶν πόλιν: Or. 7. 267 R, cp. Pol. 2. 6. 1264 b 39: Or. 14. 439 R, cp. Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 36:

Plutarch, De Monarchia Democratia et Oligarchia (if the work be his), c. 1, καθάπερ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου βίοι πλέονες, ἐστὶ καὶ δῆμον πολιτεία βίος (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 40): several passages in the Reipublicae Gerendae Praecepta—c. 15. 812 B, where the προφετικὸς is spoken of as the ἄργανον of the κυβερνήτης (cp. Pol. 1. 4. 1253 b 29): c. 15. 812 D, οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῆς δυνάμεως κ.τ.λ. (cp. Pol. 2. 11. 1273 b 12 sqq.): c. 17 init. (cp. Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 37 sqq.): c. 24 init. (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 26 sq. and 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 34 sqq.): c. 32. 825 A, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις κ.τ.λ. (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 31 sqq.).

In passages like these, however, Plutarch may well be

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1 Some particulars respecting him will be found in Stahr, Aristoteles bei den Roemern, p. 18.

2 Plin. Epist. 1. 20 seems to contain a reminiscence of Poet. 7. 1450 b 34 sqq., rather than of Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 33 sq.
reproducing, not the Politics, but some work which the Politics reproduces—very possibly the Politics of Aristotle—for we find Plutarch in the last-named passage (c. 32. 825 A–C) relating stories similar to those told in Pol. 7 (5). 4. 1303 b 20 sqq., and 37 sqq., but with more fulness of detail, and these are stories which may well have found a place in the Politics. In Plutarch's An Seni sit gerenda Republica, c. 7. 787 C–D, we are reminded of Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 38 sqq., but it would be quite unsafe to infer an acquaintance with the Politics from this passage. So again, in the De Cupiditate Divitiarum (c. 8. 527 A) the lovers of wealth are divided into two classes, just as they are in Pol. 1. 9—those who make no use of their wealth and those who squander it on pleasures—but Plutarch here quotes from Aristotle an expression which does not occur in the Politics, and he may well be making use of a dialogue of Aristotle in which similar views were put forth. In Plutarch de Liberis Educandis c. 13. 9 C, the saying πάς ὁ βίος ἡμῶν εἰς ἀνέσεως καὶ σπουδῆς διήρηται reminds us of Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 30, but there is so little in the rest of the treatise to point to an acquaintance with the Politics that it is doubtful whether the writer had the Politics before him.

We are reminded of the Politics, again, when we read in Arrian, Epictetus 2. 10, that 'the whole is superior to the part and the State to the citizen,' but doctrines such as this were the common property of the Peripatetic school, and a reference to them in no way implies a first-hand acquaintance with the Politics.

It is far otherwise when we find Alexander of Aphrodisias distinctly quoting the Politics (in Aristot. Metaph. p. 15. 6 Bonitz, τὸν γὰρ δούλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἶναι εἶπεν δὲ ἀνθρώπως δὲν ἄλλου ἐστὶν). Here we have a direct reference

1 It is uncertain when the spurious fragments of Hippodamus and other Pythagoreans (see as to these, Zeller, Gr. Ph. 3. 2. 85. 2, ed. 2) came into existence, but we often find in them what seem to be indications of an acquaintance with the Politics.

2 It should be added, however, that the Laurentian MS. of Alexander (L) has the reading—τὸν γὰρ δούλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπων τὸν ἄλλου ἄντα καὶ μὴ ἔστιν.
of an indubitable kind. Susemihl's first edition of the Politics (p. xlv. note 85: cp. Sus. p. xviii. sq.) supplies a list of references and quotations subsequent to this date which need not be repeated here.

The passages which have been adduced will suffice to show that we are perhaps in possession of as many indications of the existence of the Politics between the time of Aristotle and that of Alexander of Aphrodisias as could well be expected, considering the extent of our literary losses and the entire change in matters political which resulted from the establishment of the Roman Empire.

It is not impossible that one or two large works had already appeared broken up by their authors into 'books'—i.e. volumes, or rather papyrus-rolls, of a portable and handy size—before the Politics came into existence. It would certainly seem that the historical work of Ephorus was published in this form, for it was divided into thirty books, each dealing with a separate subject. Aristotle himself had apparently divided his dialogues—if we may thus interpret the phrase ἐξωτερικοῦ λόγου in Cic. ad Att. 4. 16. 2—into books, prefixing to each book a separate proemium. But the Politics was not composed after this fashion, which was quite a new one in those days. It was divided by Aristotle into πρῶτοι λόγοι and other λόγοι, the first book having as its subject οἰκουμένα καὶ δεσποτεία (3. 6. 1278 b 17) and being thus distinguished from τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας (1. 13. 1260 b 12), but falling nevertheless within

1 As Blass points out (Handbuch der klassischen Alterthums-wissenschaft, i. 313), large works were probably from the first often published in more rolls than one for convenience in perusal, but each scribe who copied them would divide them after a fashion of his own, according to the size of his rolls, without paying much attention to the nature of the contents, and it was a decided step in advance when the sections into which a work was to be divided came to be authoritatively determined at the outset.
2 See Diod. 5. 1: 16. 1. Birt (Das antike Buchwesen, p. 471) does not feel absolutely certain (see his remarks on the subject, p. 466 sqq.), but the fact is highly probable, to say the least. See Blass ubi supra.
3 See Cic. ad Att. 4. 16. 2, and Blass ubi supra.
the πρῶτοι λόγοι (3. 6, 1278 b 17). Where these πρῶτοι λόγοι end, it is not easy to say, for we cannot infer from the use of the past tense in 3. 18, 1288 a 37, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρῶτοις ἐδείχθη λόγοις, that the πρῶτοι λόγοι are over before the beginning of this chapter, since we have ἔρημα δὴ καὶ κατὰ τούς πρῶτους λόγους in 3. 6, 1278 b 17—a chapter which certainly seems to form part of the πρῶτοι λόγοι, for in 6 (4), 2. 1289 a 26 sqq. the distinction of the ὀρθαὶ πολιτείαι and the παρεκβάσεις (3. 7) is said to fall within the πρῶτη μέθοδος. On the other hand, there is nothing to show that the Fourth and Fifth Books belong to the πρῶτοι λόγοι. But if the point at which the πρῶτοι λόγοι close is uncertain, there seems to be no doubt that the distinction between πρῶτοι and other λόγοι is due to Aristotle, while the division into books is probably not so. Still the eight books of the Politics are marked off from each other by clear differences of subject-matter, so that no great violence was done to the composition when it was broken up into books.

If we take the first three books first, and ask how far they hang together, we shall find on examination that there is some want of unity even here. The First Book, as has been already noticed, proves that the household exists by nature, yet the Second treats the question whether it should exist or not as one still open for discussion, and makes no reference to the arguments of the First Book. Perhaps, however, we should not attach too much importance to this, for in the First Book itself the slave is assumed as an element of the household, long before the naturalness of slavery is investigated and established. Then again, the closing sentence of the First Book, as has been noticed elsewhere ¹, is not quite in accord with the opening paragraph of the Second, nor is there anything in the conclusion of the First (apart from this closing sentence) to lead us to expect that immediate transition to the subject of the best constitution which we note at the commencement of the Second. There is no clear indication, again, in the Second Book that the First has preceded it. The passage

¹ See notes on 1260 b 20, 27.
2. 2. 1261 b 12 sqq., no doubt, reminds us of 1. 2. 1252 b 28 sq., as do 2. 5. 1263 b 37 sqq. and 2. 9. 1269 b 14 sqq. of 1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.; but we are not referred back in these passages to the First Book. The Second Book has one or two links with the Third (compare, for example, 2. 9. 1271 a 18 sq. with 3. 14. 1284 b 37 sqq.), and it stands in a close relation to the Fourth, for in constructing the best State in the Fourth, Aristotle avoids many of the rocks of which we are warned in the Second, and we find one or two subjects discussed in this Book which have been marked out for discussion in the Second (compare 2. 6. 1265 b 16 with 4 (7). 16). The Second Book, in fact, seems to be more closely related to the Third and Fourth Books than to the First. Yet we note that while at the beginning of the Second Book the best constitution is announced as the subject of inquiry, the Third Book, on the contrary, addresses itself (3. 1. 1274 b 32) to an inquiry respecting all constitutions (περί πολιτείας καὶ τίς ἕκαστη καὶ πολὰ τίς). On the other hand, the Third Book, unlike the Second, distinctly refers to the First (3. 6. 1278 b 17 sqq.: cp. 1. 2. 1253 a 1 sqq.), and its discussion of the virtue of the citizen reminds us of the discussion of the virtue of the woman, child, and slave in the First.

If we pass on to the Fourth and Fifth Books, and ask how far they form a satisfactory sequel to the first three, we raise a question which has given rise to much debate. Something has already been said on this subject 1. We have just seen that the Second Book prepares the way for the Fourth 2, and we observe also that the conclusions of the First and Third Books are made use of in more passages than one of the Fourth (compare, for example, 1. 3. 1253 b 18–1. 7. 1255 b 39, 1. 12. 1259 a 37–b 17, and 3. 6.

1 See vol. i. p. 292 sqq.
2 I incline on the whole to agree with those who take 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 34, καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας ἡμᾶς τεθειόραται πρὸτερον, as referring to the contents of the Second Book (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 29, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψασθαι πολιτείας, and 2. 12. 1274 b 26, τὰ μὲν αὐτὶν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας, τὰς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἑφημένοις, ἐστω τεθειόρατα τοῖς τρότοις τοῦτοι). But the sentence is one which it would be easy to interpolate.
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1278 b 30–1279 a 21, with 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 27–31, and 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 3 sqq.: compare also 3. 5. 1278 a 40 sqq. with 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 11 sqq.)¹. The discrepancies, however, which have already been noted² between the Fourth and Fifth Books on the one hand and the first three on the other must not be lost sight of. It is possible that these two books, like the Seventh, were not originally written for insertion in the work of which they now form a part, at all events in its present form, and were incorporated with it by an afterthought³. The close relation, however, in which they stand to the Second, must be admitted to make against this view, and the only safe course is to confess that we cannot penetrate the secrets of the workshop, or perhaps we should rather say, the Peripatetic school.

We are far more conscious of a break when we pass from the five books to the remaining three. There are indeed many links between the two groups of books. Not only are anticipations to be found in the earlier group of the teaching of the later (compare, for instance, 2. 6. 1265 b 26–30 with 6 (4). 11. 1295 a 25 sqq.), but we trace in both the same twofold aim—the aim of scientific truth and the aim of utility (1. 11. 1258 b 9: 2. 1. 1260 b 32: 3. 2. 1275 b 21: compare 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35).

But the emphatic announcement at the outset of the Sixth Book of the multiplicity of the problems of Political Science strikes us as something altogether new. We expect that Aristotle will pass quietly on from the best constitution (or in other words Kingship and Aristocracy) to Polity, the only δρῆθη παλιτεία still undiscussed, and if it is true that he gives good reasons (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 22 sqq.) for departing from this course and for studying oligarchy and democracy before he studies the polity, still we are conscious of a considerable change of tone

¹ It should be noted, however, that the references to the πρώτοι λόγοι in 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 30 and 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 3 can easily be detached from the context in which they stand, and may well have been added by a later hand.
² Vol. i. p. 295 sqq.
³ A further question might be raised, whether they were incorporated with the Politics by the hand of Aristotle.
when we pass to the Sixth Book. Aristotle here becomes suddenly aware that Political Science has a technical as well as an ethical side; he insists that the statesman, like the physician (Eth. Nic. io. io. 1180 b 25 sqq.) or the general (Eth. Nic. i. II. 1101 a 3 sqq.), must be able to make the best of the material which happens to be at his disposal—may, that he must understand how to construct any constitution that may be demanded of him, even if it is not the best that the circumstances permit. In the earlier books (1-5) πολιτικὴ and the πόλις seem to be regarded on the whole from a more ideal point of view, as the sources of good life: the keynote of these books is the exaltation of πολιτικὴ ἀρχή over δеспοτικὴ and ἀληθομοικὴ ἀρχὴ, of which we hear so much in the first book. The παρεκβάσεις are viewed throughout them as originating in an erroneous view of justice (as indeed they still are in 7 (5). I. 1301 a 25 sqq.); in the Sixth Book, on the contrary, we discover for the first time that they are in some cases the only possible constitutions, the social conditions of the community permitting no other forms (6 (4). I2. 1296 b 24 sqq.). The Seventh Book goes so far as to advise a tyranny how to maintain itself in power. Another obvious difference between the two groups of books is that the one is far fuller of historical detail than the other.

A further peculiarity of the later group (6-8) is the emphasis with which these books dwell on a fact which finds no mention elsewhere—that of the existence of many forms of democracy and oligarchy. The Third Book, it is true, had distinguished various kinds of Kingship, so that there is nothing new in the recognition of sub-forms of this or that constitution; but still we nowhere learn outside these three books that democracy and oligarchy have many forms. No truth, however, is more insisted on in the three books, or rather in the Sixth and Eighth, for in the Seventh it is referred to only in the closing chapter ¹, a

¹ The only subdivision of oligarchies and democracies recognized in the remainder of the book is that into ἐννομοι and κύροι (7 (5). 6. 1306 b 20).
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chapter which, though quite Aristotelian, may well be of later date than the rest of the book.

We might be tempted by the entire silence of the Fourth and Fifth Books with regard to much that comes before us in the Sixth and Eighth to regard the former pair of books as written before the latter. But then it is not by any means certain that the Fourth and Fifth Books were in existence when the Sixth and Eighth were penned. The Sixth Book no doubt refers to the inquiry respecting the best constitution as concluded, but it is not clear that the inquiry referred to is that contained in the Fourth and Fifth Books. It alludes to an inquiry respecting ἀριστοκρατία contained in the πρώτοι λόγοι, but we cannot be sure that the Fourth and Fifth Books are intended to be referred to. The passage is as follows (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1 sqq.):

ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν ὅνων καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἲς δυνάμεως εὖ τοῖς πρῶτοι λόγοις· τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀριστών ἀπλῶς κατ’ ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώπων, μόνην ὄλκαιον προσαγορευέων ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἀπλῶς οἱ αὐτῶν ἀνήρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθὸς ἑστιν· οἱ δὲ εἰς ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὐτῶν.

The reference here may well be to the Third Book, in which we find all the characteristics of the best constitution here dwelt upon mentioned (cp. 3. 18); and the same thing perhaps holds of the reference in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 2 to τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν, where 3. 12. 1283 a 14 sqq. may possibly be the passage alluded to. It is true that there are two passages in the Sixth Book which remind us of the teaching of the Fourth and Fifth Books—c. 2. 1289 a 32, where both ἀριστοκρατία and βασιλεία are said to rest on ἀρετὴ κεχορηγημένη, and c. 11. 1295 a 25 sqq., where a πολιτεία κατ’ εὐχήν is spoken of, requiring a type of virtue above the ordinary type and an education presupposing not only high natural gifts, but also a χορηγία which only Fortune can give. These passages are quite in harmony with the teaching of the Fourth and Fifth Books, but they might have been written before these books were written. Yet it is far more clear that both the Fourth and Fifth Books,
and the Sixth and Eighth, were written after the Third, than that either pair of books was written after the other. These two pairs of books seem to be to a considerable extent independent of each other. Both, we notice, are incomplete; there is no clear evidence that either group was ever finished, though the opening of the Sixth Book (6 (4). 2. 1289 a 30) speaks of the inquiry respecting the best constitution as complete, and the Eighth Book, as we possess it, appears to close in the middle of a sentence. It is possible that Aristotle went on with the Sixth Book after completing the Third, instead of proceeding with the sketch of the best State. If he did so, however, it is strange that we find in the Fourth and Fifth Books so few traces of the teaching of the Sixth and Eighth.

A noteworthy feature of the Sixth Book is the state in which we find its earlier portion. The programme given in its second chapter (1289 b 12–26), as has been pointed out elsewhere (vol. i. p. 492 sqq.), does not altogether correspond with the list of questions marked out for treatment in the first chapter. The repetitions of prior discussions which we remark in c. 4 are still more surprising; c. 4. 1290 a 30–b 20 goes over much the same ground as the eighth chapter of the Third Book, and c. 4. 1290 b 21–1291 b 13 not only repeats (with considerable variations of method and result) the investigations of the preceding chapter, but contains much that is similar to the contents of the eighth chapter of the Fourth Book. The first four chapters of the Sixth Book may perhaps not have received a final revision, or may have been tampered with by some later hand.

The Seventh Book was probably originally written as a separate treatise, and only inserted by an afterthought between the Sixth and Eighth Books. Not many references to other books of the Politics occur in its pages, and

1 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 9, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ὥς ἐν τούτῳ, σχεδὸν εἰρηταὶ περὶ πασῶν, where we have μὲν οὖν without any δὲ to follow.

2 Such references as those in 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 28 (δοσπερ εἰρηταὶ καὶ πρῶτερον) and 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 2 (ποία δὲ λέγομεν τῶν πολιτειῶν σοφίσματα, πρῶτερον εἰρηταὶ) may easily have been added by a
it has some marked peculiarities. As has been already remarked, it systematically distinguishes between μοναρχία (including Kingships) and πολιτεία, and it takes no notice (till its last chapter) of the many sub-forms of oligarchy and democracy dwelt on in the Sixth and Eighth Books; it also advises in one passage (c. I. 1302 a 2—8) the blending in constitutions of ἵστος δικητικὴ with ἵστος κατ’ ἄξιαν, as the best security for durability. It is perhaps by supposing that the Seventh Book has been inserted between two closely related books composed consecutively, that we shall best explain some difficulties occasioned by the references in the Eighth Book to the Sixth and Seventh Books. On the one hand, the Eighth Book refers more than once to the Seventh as preceding it, and one of these references at all events is too much interwoven with the context to be easily explained away as an addition by a later hand (c. 5. 1319 b 37 sqq.). On the other hand, the Sixth Book is referred to in 8 (6). 2. I. 1317 b 34 as ἡ μέθοδος ἡ πρὸ ταύτης, and in c. 4. I. 1318 b 7 as οἱ πρὸ ταύτων λόγοι. If these references are from the hand of Aristotle—which is by no means certain, for they can readily be detached from the context—it may well be that they were inserted before the Seventh Book was intruded between the Sixth and the Eighth, and through an oversight escaped excision afterwards.

Some further light will be thrown on the subject which we have been considering, if we note down from the pages of the Politics some promises of future investigations which are not fulfilled in the work as we have it.

The earliest of these (I. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq.) prepares us to later hand, or by Aristotle himself, if heincorporated the Seventh Book with the Politics.

1 Vol. i. p. 521.
2 A similar distinction is implied in 3. 15. 1286 b 8—13. Μοναρχία and πολιτεία are often distinguished in the ordinary use of the Greek language (see Liddell and Scott s.v. πολιτεία), and the Seventh Book conforms to the common way of speaking. The Seventh Book also agrees with the Third in tracing the plurality of forms of constitution to varying views of what is just (7 (5). I. 1301 a 25 sqq.; cp. 3. 9).
3 This recommendation, it may be noticed, is borrowed from Plato, Laws 757 E.
xxviii  THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.

expect a full investigation of the virtue of husband and wife, father and child, and of the conduct they should observe to each other, and also of the various forms which each of these relations should assume under each constitution; we are to be told how every constitution will educate the women and children who fall under its authority. Perhaps these inquiries were to find a place in the discussions τερὶ παιδονυμίας to which the Fourth Book (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 2) bids us look forward; but at any rate the intimation of the First Book leads us to expect an interesting ethical investigation which we do not find in the Politics, though the necessity of adapting education to the constitution is often insisted on (e.g. in 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 11 sqq.: 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.: 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 1 sqq.). The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Books, as we have them, seem in fact too much preoccupied with purely political problems to find room for the delicate ethical inquiry promised in the First Book. Yet we are told at the beginning of the Eighth Book that only a few subjects remain for discussion, and the subject dwelt upon in this passage of the First Book is not included in its enumeration of them. The announcement there made appears, in fact, to be completely forgotten.

Then again, the intimation in the first chapter of the Sixth Book that the making of laws, as distinguished from constitutions, is a part of the province of πολιτική, and that the whole province of πολιτική must be fully dealt with, leads us to look for an inquiry on the subject of laws in the Politics (cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 5, ἀφελεσθω τὴν πρώτην). But, as has been noticed already, the programme given in the very next chapter (the second) omits all mention of this topic, and the opening paragraphs of the Eighth Book fail to include it among the subjects which still demand treatment, though it certainly is not dealt with in any part of the Politics which has come down to us.

Other intimations of future discussions which never actually occur will be found in 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 32 sqq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 4 and 1330 a 31 sqq.: 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 2 sqq.:
These passages, however, only prove what we knew without them, that the inquiry as to the best State and its arrangements is incomplete, and also that the Eighth Book is incomplete. The fact that there are no references in the Politics to past discussions which cannot be explained as relating to existing passages in the treatise as we have it, seems to make it probable that no considerable part of the work has been lost, and that it was never finished.

We see then that though there is a certain amount of unity about the Politics, it is not a well-planned whole. Its component parts fit together more or less, but the fit is not perfect.

How is it that this is so? How is it that the Politics, though indisputably a whole, is yet a whole in which we trace these discrepancies of plan?

Beyond all doubt, we must not expect a Greek philosophical treatise to be arranged precisely in the order in which we expect a modern work of the same kind to be arranged. A modern work would not first prove that the household exists by nature, and then inquire whether it ought to exist. Yet this is what Aristotle does in the First and Second Books of the Politics. Cicero has already noticed in the Tusculan Disputations some peculiarities in the methods of investigation practised by Greek philosophers, as distinguished from Greek geometricians. 'Verumtamen mathematicorum iste mos est, non est philosophorum. Nam geometrarum aliquid docere volunt, si quid ad eam rem pertinent, quae ante docuerunt, id sumunt pro concessu et probato: illud modo explicant, de quo ante nihil scriptum est. Philosophi, quamcunque rem habent in manibus, in eam quae conveniunt congerunt omnia, etsi alio loco disputata sunt. Quod si ita esset, cur Stoicus, si esset quaesitum, satisne ad beate vivendum virtus posset, multa diceret? cui satis esset respondere se ante docuisses nihil bonum esse, nisi quod honestum esset; hoc probato, con-
sequens esse beatam vitam virtùte esse contentam, et quo modo hoc sit consequens illi, sic illud huic, ut si beata vita virtute contenta sit, nisi honestum quod sit, nihil aliud sit bonum. Sed tamen non agunt sic. Nam et de honesto et de summo bono separatim libri sunt, et cum ex eo efficiatur satis magnam in virtute ad beate vivendum esse vim, nihil minus hoc agunt separatim. Propriis enim et suis argumentis et admonitionibus tractanda quaeque res est, tanta praesertim.

Seneca, again, in an interesting passage of his Fortieth Epistle, contrasts Greek and Roman oratory, and finds more deliberation, reflection, and system in the latter. 'In Graecis hanc licentiam tuleris: nos, etiam cum scribimus, interpungere assuevimus. Cicero quoque noster, a quo Romana eloquentia exsilivit, gradarius fuit. Romanus sermo magis se circumspicit et aestimat praebetque aestimandum.'

But differences of this kind do not suffice to explain the phenomena which need explanation in the Politics. What we remark is that, of the three or four parts of which the work is made up, those which precede and those which follow very nearly correspond to each other, but do not quite do so. In passing from one part to another, we are conscious that the two parts do not completely match: the part which we must place second in order is not quite what the part which precedes it leads us to expect it to be, though it is very nearly so. Some of the discrepancies which we notice in the Politics may be accounted for on the supposition that the work was never finished and never received a final revision at its author's hands, but then it must be remembered that a similar, or even greater, want of unity has been traced in the Nicomachean Ethics, which can hardly have suffered from the same cause.

Whatever may be the case as to the Nicomachean Ethics, perhaps the state of the Politics becomes in general intelligible if we suppose that Aristotle, notwithstanding his turn for systematization, allowed himself some freedom in work-

1 Cic. Tusc. Disp. 5. 7. 18-19.
ing successively at different parts of the treatise, permitted each part to forget to some extent its membership of a whole, and failed to force on his investigations that complete harmony, of form as well as of substance, which rigorous criticism would require. Very probably his views developed as he passed from one portion of the work to another; he seems throughout it to be feeling his way as a pioneer would, and we need not be surprised to find in the Sixth and Eighth Books ideas of which there is no trace in the earlier ones. Possibly some interval of time elapsed between the composition of the different parts. The Third Book is the centre round which the whole treatise is grouped; it is presupposed both in the inquiries of the Fourth Book and in those of the Sixth.

We notice that we have no such programme of future inquiries at the outset of the Politics as that which the first and second chapters of the Sixth Book set forth for the remainder of the work, and it may well be the case that Aristotle began the Politics without any definite scheme of it before him. He had evidently cast aside the programme which we find at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics, and yet he framed no fresh one to take its place. If he had done so, perhaps he would have prepared us by some intimation early in the work for the break of which we are sensible in passing from the first five books to the remaining three. Something might have been lost in freshness and freedom, if the structure of the Politics had been more rigorously systematic—if a definite programme had been announced at the outset and adhered to throughout, but the bisected aspect which the work wears at present would have been removed, and the gulf would have been

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1 This will not, however, explain everything; it will not explain, for instance, the state in which we find the first four chapters of the Sixth Book.

2 It is also possible that some of the books were rewritten, and that the Politics, as we have it, is a mixture of two or more editions. For instance, a Second Book may once have existed with a commencement in fuller harmony with the conclusion of the First than that of the present Second Book, and a Fourth Book in fuller harmony with the Third than the present Fourth.
Apart from possible interpolations, the Politics would seem to be the work of one author, and that author Aristotle, not Theophrastus.

Some may be inclined to suspect that the Politics is the work of more authors than one. It is very possible that it is not free from interpolation, but there seems to be no reason to doubt that the bulk of the treatise is to be referred to one and the same author. The same peculiarities of style appear throughout it—peculiarities which are traceable more or less in other works ascribed to Aristotle, and which afford marked indications of character. We are sensible of a certain combativeness—of a fondness for tacitly contradicting other writers, especially Plato; we feel that we have to do with a writer who is at once eager in utterance and circumspect in drawing conclusions.

If we refuse to trust to the evidence of style, we may note that a work composed by more authors than one, and especially a work on Politics, would probably betray its origin by anachronisms, unless these authors were contemporaries. The works of Theophrastus on Plants, though far removed in subject from current events, mark their own date by referring to events long subsequent to the death of Aristotle.\footnote{See Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 98 n.: 811 n.}

Then again, each of the three or four parts into which the Politics falls seems to be the work of a writer who is thinking out the subject for himself—a pioneer, not a deft expositor and elaborator of another man's system. Perhaps the very discrepancies and variations of view which we note in the Politics indicate this. The system is in making, not made. The earlier books of the treatise appear to be unfamiliar with doctrines which are insisted on with emphasis in the later ones. The writer is evidently one who has known Greece in the days of its freedom and greatness before the defeat of Chaeronea—one who belongs perhaps rather to the age of Philip than to that of Alexander: the opinions he combats and corrects are those of that day; they are the opinions of Plato or Isocrates or the Socratic Schools, not those of a
later time. If the Politics, or any part of it, had been written even twenty years after Alexander's death, would not the fact be readily discoverable? Would a writer of that date have committed himself to the sanguine view that the Greek race, if united, would be able to rule the world? Would the passages recommending the constitution resting on the μέσοι have been expressed as they are, if they had been written after Antipater's introduction of a property-qualification for citizenship at Athens? The writer at any rate would not have needed to go back to οἱ πρώτεροι ἔφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ γεγονότες to find a statesman of far-reaching authority who favoured a constitution resembling the polity.

Nothing surprises us more in the Politics than the fact that, though it was apparently written after Chaeroneia, it is almost entirely preoccupied with the petty States of Greece, and the constitutions prevailing in them. Macedon, it is true, might profit by the pages devoted to Kingship, but throughout the greater part of the work the writer evidently has the Greek City-State and its difficulties in view. He seems wholly unconscious that the sceptre had passed irrevocably from Greece to Macedon; he has not fully deciphered the meaning of Chaeroneia. We need not blame him for this: if Greece had been less exhausted and wiser, Chaeroneia might not have been 'finis Graeciae.' But his view of the situation probably shows that he wrote not long after the battle, and before the magnitude of the catastrophe had been fully realized.

The ὡς ἡ Θεοφράστου in the list of Diogenes may suggest the question whether Theophrastus was not the writer of the Politics, or of a part of it. Theophrastus was only 12 or 15 years younger than Aristotle, though he survived him apparently 34 years or more. It is very possible that he wrote some of his books before the death of Aristotle; the Politics might belong to that epoch and yet be his. If this were so, we should still feel pretty sure that we possessed the gist of Aristotle's political
teaching, for the work of Theophrastus would certainly be based on the views of his master. But we feel in reading the Politics that we are in presence of the master, not of the disciple—of the originator of the system, not of its expositor. There is a difference, again, between the style of Aristotle and that of Theophrastus; the writings of the latter were probably far easier reading than those of the former—sweeter, more flowing, and less sinewy. Opinions also find expression in the Politics which Theophrastus seems not to have held. He would hardly have been willing to assert, as the First Book of the Politics asserts (c. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq.), the naturalness of animal food. He may perhaps also have rated the importance of external and bodily goods to happiness rather than we find it rated in the Fourth Book of the Politics.

Theophrastus was famed for the freshness with which he could treat a subject already treated by Aristotle, and it is probable that the treatise in six books entitled Πολιτικά, which Diogenes Laertius ascribes to him, was different in many respects from the work which we know as Aristotle's Politics. Cicero distinctly implies that the work of Theo-

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1 Cic. Brutus 31. 121: quis Aristotele nervosior, Theophrasto dulcior? Heylbut (de Theophrasti libris περὶ φιλίας, p. 9) remarks: 'taceri quidem nequit nonnulla minus severe et magis ad communem sensum a Theophrasto tractata esse, qui longe suaviore et faciliore quam Aristoteles scribendi genere utebatur.'

2 See Bernays, Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit, passim. It is not quite clear that the so-called first book of the Oeconomics (c. 2), which Philodemus ascribes to Theophrastus, contemplates the use of animal food. If, again, as Bernays appears to think (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p.96 sqq.), it is to Theophrastus, and not to Porphyry, that we are to ascribe the strong assertion of the identity of men and animals in desires and anger, and also in reasoning (λογισμοῖς), and above all in perceptions, which we find in Porphyr. de Abstin. 3. 25, Theophrastus can hardly be the writer of such a passage as Pol. 1. 2. 1253a 15 sqq.

3 Cicero at all events seems to have thought that he rated these goods higher than Aristotle (see Acad. Post. 1. 9. 33: 10. 35). Theophrastus appears in his Ethics to have thought the question worthy of discussion, whether πρὸς τὰς τύχας τρέπεται τὰ ἰδή καὶ κανονίζεται τοῖς τῶν σωμάτων πάθεσιν ἐξίσοιο τῆς ἀρετῆς (Plutarch, Pericl.c.38: Sertor.c.10). He appears to have speculated whether great calamities might not spoil even a good man's character.

4 Cic. de Fin. 1. 2. 6: quid? Theophrastus mediocrerine delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos?
phrastus 'De optimo statu reipublicae' was not identical with the work of Aristotle on the same subject, and if it should be suggested that the Fourth and Fifth Books of our 'Aristotle's Politics' are the treatise of Theophrastus or its remains, it may be replied that internal evidence points rather to Aristotle as their author.

Thus far we have assumed that the Politics is a compo-

sition committed to writing by its author or authors, but this is precisely what has been questioned by some. One or two critics have drawn attention to the accounts given of Aristotle's style by Cicero and others1 who were familiar with his dialogues—accounts which are borne out by some of the still existing fragments of those dialogues—and have asked whether the extant works of Aristotle, marked as they are by many rough-

nesses and peculiarities of style, can really have been composed by him—whether they are not, or most of them are not, mere notes of Aristotle's lectures taken down by his hearers and perhaps put in shape by some one disciple. To some of them, indeed, this theory would not apply. The History of Animals can hardly have had this origin, and the hypomnematic works of Aristotle—if they were intended for his own use—must also have been committed to writing by him. But setting these on one side, and setting on one side also works incorrectly con-

nected with his name, it has been asked whether many, if not all, of the remaining works are anything more than reports of his lectures.

There is undoubtedly a colloquial air about them; some have more of it than others, and none more than the Politics. The Politics reads, even more than the Nicom- machean Ethics, like the talk of an experienced inquirer engaged with others in a difficult investigation, and feeling his way through it. We know that notes were taken by

1 See Zeller's note, Gr. Ph. 2. 111. 1, where some of them are collected. Among these is the well-known passage, Cic. Acad. 2. 38. 119: veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles.
pupils in the lecture-rooms of the great Greek teachers. Aristotle himself took notes of Plato's lectures peri τάγαθον, and other disciples of Plato did the same. We are told that the Cynic Metrocles 'burnt the lectures of Theophrastus,' an expression which some have taken to mean notes taken by him of Theophrastus' lectures. But then we observe that the works which we associate with the name of Aristotle resemble each other in style more than we should expect, if they had come into existence in this way, unless indeed the report were verbatim or nearly so, or the whole of the lectures were reported by a single individual. If the reports were, as they probably would be, by different hands and not very close, it is natural to expect that the rendering of one reporter would differ a good deal from the rendering of another, and that in the result the works ascribed to Aristotle would differ from each other in style more than they actually do. It seems hardly likely that any mere 'redaction' by a single disciple would suffice to restore to them the degree of uniformity which they exhibit. The question then arises—is it likely that the reports would be verbatim or nearly so?

Aristotle's report of Plato's lectures peri τάγαθον was, it would seem, pretty close, so far at all events as certain expressions of Plato were concerned, but it is perhaps hardly likely that a long course of lectures would be taken down in the close way in which we must suppose Aristotle's language to have been taken down, if most of what we call his works are in fact reports of his lectures. If his

1 Heitz, Verlorenen Schriften des Aristoteles, p. 217 sq.
2 Diog. Laert. 6, 95, oýtoς τά ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμματα κατακαίων, διό χρησιν ἑκάστων ἐν πρώτῳ Χρεών, ἐπέλεγεν.
Тαῦτα έστι οὐ̄νικέρων περετέρων φαντασματα,
οίναν λόγος οί οιθ' ὁτι τας Θεοφράστου ἀκροαζέων ἐπέλεγεν.
'Εφαματε, πρόμολοι, ἀδειες, Θεῖες νύ τι σείο γατίζεις.
3 Cp. Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. 362 a 12 (quoted by Heitz, p. 217), εν τοις peri τάγαθον λόγοις, οίς ὁ 
'Ιωσετιλής καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ἡσαίων καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἑταίρων παραγενόμενοι ἀνεγράφατο τὰ προσωπίδως, ως ἔρρηθα.
4 It would seem from Plutarch's treatise De recta ratione audiendi (c. 18) that the lecturers of his day were liable to be interrupted by questions put by some member of their audience, to which they were expected to reply. If this was so in Aristotle's time, a faithful report of a lecture would give
NOT A PUPIL'S RECORD OF HIS LECTURES. xxxvii

lectures, however, were thus taken down, the reports would differ but little from compositions strictly so called, for ancient authors, like modern, may often have dictated their writings to an amanuensis.

But no ancient authority conceives the works of Aristotle to have come into being in this way. Galen, as we have seen, speaks of Aristotle as 'writing' the ἀκροάσεις for his pupils. Theophrastus, in a letter to the Peripatetic Phanias cited by Diogenes Laertius, seems to use the term ἀναγράφεις of his own lectures. The περὶ τὰ γλαυκῶν of Aristotle, which consisted of notes of Plato's lectures, was never included among the works of Plato, and it would be equally easy to distinguish between reports of Aristotle's lectures and works written by Aristotle. It seems, besides, only natural that Aristotle should write down a course of lectures which he probably intended to re-deliver. He was not, like Socrates or Carneades, one who systematically abstained from writing; he had been a writer from his youth; and is it likely that after composing his Dialogues and his History of Animals and his work on Constitutions, and even noting down the Problems which suggested themselves to him, and accumulating a mass of memoranda, he trusted his political and other teaching to the chapter of accidents? Even if, on the first occasion on which each course was delivered, he used no notes, and a pupil took down a report of the lectures, is it not likely that he would adopt this report, and use it, possibly in an amplified and revised form, on subsequent occasions?

The remark may be added that if the Politics is a pupil's record of Aristotle's lectures, it is the record of a course of lectures singularly broken up into parts. We ask with some curiosity, why a continuous course of lectures should form so imperfect an unity. One would have expected that a single course delivered without notes would have been far these replies, and probably record the interruption which elicited them.

1 Above, p. ii.
2 5. 37. It would of course be unsafe to build too much on the testimony of an alleged letter, which may have been, like much of Greek epistolary literature, falsified or spurious.
more of an unity than the Politics seems to be. It is no
doubt possible that the work is a pupil's record of three or
four courses put together; but, on the whole, the supposi-
tion which involves fewest difficulties seems to be that the
Politics was written by Aristotle for use in his lecture-room,
or at all events for the use of his pupils. It is evident
that Greek teachers had to study with some care how
best to carry their pupils with them. Some hearers, we are
told in the Metaphysics¹, would accept nothing but strict
mathematical demonstration; others demanded a frequent
use of examples, while others again expected the lecturer
to adduce passages from the poets in confirmation of his
teaching. Aristotle is careful to explain at the very outset
of the Nicomachean Ethics, for the benefit of the first-
named class of critics, that ethical and political problems
do not lend themselves to mathematical demonstration, but
he often illustrates his teaching by familiar examples and
often also refers to the poets. These methods would be
especially in place in an educational, or acroamatic, treatise.
Unlike Plato, who seems for the most part to have written
in one and the same way for the outside world and for his
pupils, Aristotle made a distinction between the style of his
published works and the style of those which he intended
for use within his school. With his pupils he seems to
have been less attentive to form, less rhetorical, and more
colloquial.

His lecturing is not of an ex cathedra or formal type; on
the contrary, he seems to regard himself rather as the
pioneer of a body of investigators, and takes pains to
select that path through the thicket along which they will
find it most easy to follow him. He never forgets the
traditional impressions, prepossessions, and prejudices of
the better sort of Greek; he himself has inherited these
traditions, which need only a certain amount of sifting and
correction to become the basis of his own philosophical
system. His tone is thus rather that of a comrade than
a teacher. We can imagine how great would be the im-

¹ Metaph. a. 3. 995 a 6 sqq.
pression produced on thoughtful Greeks by the Politics; its teaching would be the more effective, because it was so little ex cathedra and was conveyed in an unlaboured and conversational style.

It is not impossible that many of Aristotle's works are records of his teaching drawn up by him after the lectures had been delivered. Several of the treatises comprised in the 'Moralia' of Plutarch are thought to be based on lectures previously given; the treatise De Audiendis Poetis is expressly said by Plutarch to be so (c. 1). The orators had set the example of writing down their speeches before or after delivery. We need not suppose that all the works of Aristotle were designed for one and the same purpose, or that they all originated in exactly the same way. The extreme brevity and compression of his style in some of them (for instance, in parts of the Metaphysics and in the third book of the De Anima) would seem to render these writings more suitable for private perusal than for reading aloud. We do not often observe a similar degree of compression in the Politics.

The displacement of the Fourth and Fifth Books may be accounted for in many ways. It may be due to the unfinished state of the work: Aristotle may have left his manuscript in pieces, and the 'disiecta membra' may not have been put together aright. Or the particular MS. or MSS. of which the MSS. we possess are reproductions may have had this defect. Several MSS. of the Metaphysics of Aristotle (S, A, B, C, E)—among them one of the best (A)—place Books M and N before K and A. Bekker remarks at the close of the Sixth Book of the History of Animals (581 a 5), that several MSS. place the Eighth Book immediately after the Sixth: 'octavum et A sufiungit et P Q C D E F G m n, septimo in noni locum depresso.' So again, according to Bekker's note at the close of the Seventh Book of the same treatise, P A C

1 See Volkmann, Leben Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch, 1. 65. 2 Bonitz, Aristotelis Metaphysica, p. v sqq.
add after ἀρχιταξ, the last word of this book, the words προιονσης ὅτι τῆς ἡλικίας, 'quod est initium libri decimi': here apparently we have a trace of an arrangement of the books by which the spurious Tenth Book was inserted at the close of the Seventh.

Displacements of this kind are said to have frequently occurred, when codices of parchment took the place of papyrus-rolls and works were transcribed from papyrus to parchment.

Or again, the same thing may have happened to the Politics which some think has happened to the Facta et Dicta Memorabilia of Valerius Maximus. The Fourth and Fifth Books (i.e. the fourth and fifth volumes or papyrus-rolls) may have circulated as a separate work, and may have been wrongly placed, when restored to the work of which they originally formed a part. If, as may well be the case, the displacement of the two books occurred at a very early date, or at all events prior to the general disuse of papyrus-rolls, this may have been the way in which it came about. But indeed a mere mistake in numbering the eight papyrus-rolls of the archetype would suffice to account for it. It is, no doubt, possible that these two books belong to a different edition of the treatise from the Third Book, and that this circumstance has in some way or other led to their being placed at the end of it. It is not easy, however, to see how it can have done so; nor is the position in which we find them accounted for, if we take the view that they were not originally designed to form part of the work, for this may very probably be true of the Seventh Book, which nevertheless stands fifth in order in the MSS.

1 Some MSS. of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation of the Politics in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris (Fonds de Sorbonne, 928: Fonds de Saint-Victor, 336) are said by Jourdain (Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote, p. 181) 'n'annoncer que sept livres; et le dernier se termine cependant par ces mots: Palam quia tres hos faciendum ad discip-

2 See Birt, Antike Buchwesen, p. 374. The change came to be of common occurrence, according to this writer, in the fourth and fifth centuries of our era.

3 See Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, art. Valerius Maximus.
ON THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE POLITICS AND THE LATIN TRANSLATION OF WILLIAM OF MOERBEKE.

The publication in 1872 of Susemihl’s critical edition of the Politics will always be regarded as marking an epoch in the study of the work. It comprises a complete collation of all the more important MSS. then known to scholars and a partial collation of the inferior ones; it also contains a revised text of William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation of the Politics, based on a collation of a number of MSS. I have not attempted to revise Susemihl’s collations. I have, however, collated the first two books of the Politics in MS. 112 belonging to Corpus Christi College, Oxford (referred to by Susemihl in his edition of the Nicomachean Ethics as O¹, but not, I believe, previously collated for the Politics)¹, and I have collated the first two books of William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation in MS. 891 of the Phillipps Library, Cheltenham (referred to by me as z), and in MS. 112 belonging to Balliol College, Oxford, named o by Susemihl (Sus.¹ p. xxxviii), whose collation of this MS., made by Dr. M. Schanz, extends, however, only to the First Book. I have also collated a number of passages in the first two books of the same Latin Translation in a Bodleian MS. (Canon. Class. Lat. 174), which I refer to as y. This MS. and the Phillipps MS. have not, so far as I am aware, been collated before. The latter MS. is of some importance, for though it is neither copied from the a of Susemihl (MS. 19, sciences et arts, latin, of the Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal at Paris) nor a from it, these two MSS. evidently belong to the same family, a family of which a has

¹ See as to this MS., so far as its text of the Politics is concerned, the remarks prefixed to the Critical Notes (below, p. 58 sqq.).
hitherto been the sole representative, and Susemihl (with whom Busse concurs, de praevidiiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 11) says of a (Sus.\(^1\) p. xxxv)—'omnium librorum mihi adhibitorum longe est optimus, quoniam, etsi ceteris non rarius peccat, tamen longe saepius quam alius quis verum retinuit solus.' The words prefixed in a to the Translation of the Politics—incipit liber politicorum Aristotilis a fratre Guilielmo ordinis praedicatorum de greco in latinum translatus—which enabled M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in 1837 (Politique d'Aristote, tome i, p. lxxix) to establish the truth of Schneider's conjecture and to designate William of Moerbeke as its author, and which have not hitherto been found in any other MS., are prefixed to this translation in z also, though z does not add at the end of it the words which are found at the end of it in a (St. Hilaire, ubi supra: Sus.\(^1\) p. xxxiv); the closing words in z are, in fact, explicit liber politicorum Aristotilis\(^1\).

Still it is on Susemihl's apparatus criticus that the following remarks are mainly based, so far at least as the more important MSS. of the Politics are concerned, and my aim in them will be to derive as much instruction as possible from the copious data with which he has furnished the student of the Politics, and especially to throw light on the characteristics and comparative value of the two families into which his MSS. fall, and of the more important MSS. individually. I am all the more desirous to acknowledge my debt to Susemihl, because on questions relating to the text I have often been led to conclusions at variance with his. On these questions I shall be able to speak more definitively, when I have completed my commentary, but something must be said at once as to the principles on which I have framed my text.

Some Palimpsest Fragments of the Third and Sixth (Fourth) Books of the Politics ascribed to the tenth century

\(^1\) See below(p.60 sqq.) astothes MSS. of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation of the Politics. I will only add here as to z, that though its text often agrees with that of a, it does not by any means always do so; in fact, it occasionally offers readings peculiar to itself, some of them excellent.
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have recently been discovered, or rediscovered, in the Vatican Library\(^1\), but no complete MS. of the work is older than the fourteenth. Nor have we any Greek commentaries on the Politics, such as we possess in the case of some other works of Aristotle, which might aid us in the correction of the text. The extant complete MSS. fall, as has been said, into two families, the second of them including a superior and inferior variety. The chief\(^2\) representatives of the first family are the two manuscripts, M\(^a\) (B 105, ‘ordinis superioris,’ of the Ambrosian Library at Milan), belonging to the second half of the fifteenth century, and P\(^1\) (MS. 2023 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris), transcribed by Demetrius Chalcondylas\(^3\), possibly at Milan (see Sus.\(^1\) p. vii), at the close of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century\(^4\). A full account of these manuscripts will be found in Susemihl’s large critical edition of the Politics

\(^1\) See the Preface.

\(^2\) They are not its only representatives, for we are furnished with many readings characteristic of this recension by the corrections and various readings found in P\(^2\) and in larger numbers in P\(^4\), two MSS. of the second family. P\(^5\)\(^,\) a manuscript of mixed type, being related to both families, would also be of much use, if it were not very late (it belongs to the sixteenth century), and both for this reason and for others, of very doubtful authority. It is also imperfect, for its earlier portion is lost, and it commences only at 1306 a 6. See on these sources Sus.\(^5\) præf. p. vi sqq.

\(^3\) Or rather Chalcocondylas—‘of the bronze pen’ (Gardthausen, Gr. Palæographie, p. 72). In studying the readings offered by P\(^1\) it is necessary to bear in mind that Demetrius Chalcondylas was no mere ordinary copyist; he was a learned scholar, and superintended editions of Homer (Florence, 1488), of Isocrates (Milan, 1493), and of Suidas (1499). Susemihl (Sus.\(^3\) p. xiv) is no doubt right in regarding as emendations of his several

of the good readings which are found only in P\(^1\). Here and there, however, as Busse has pointed out (de præsidii, etc., p. 45), P\(^1\) appears to preserve the reading of the archetype more faithfully than any other MS. of the first family (e.g. in 3. 9. 1280 b 5).

\(^4\) P\(^1\) must be classed with the first family, though many of the corrections introduced into it by Demetrius belong to the second, just as P\(^2\) and P\(^4\) must be classed with the second family, though many of the corrections introduced into them by their writers belong to the first. It is singular that each of the writers of these three MSS., and perhaps also the writer of the MS. used by Leonardus Aretinus, should have corrected his MS. from the recension to which it does not belong. This may indicate that some doubt was even then felt as to the comparative value of the two recensions. Some of the corrections of this kind in P\(^1\) are in the same ink as the MS., and were therefore probably made either at the time of writing or not long after.
(1872), pp. vii–xii. Bekker omitted to collate these two MSS. for his edition of Aristotle (1831). Some readings from them, however, had been communicated by Haase to Götting and had been published by the latter in his edition of the Politics (1824), and M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (1837) carried the study of the Paris MSS. of the Politics much farther; but any one who compares the full collation of M^4 P^1 made on behalf of Susemihl with previous accounts of the text of these MSS. will see that our knowledge of the readings they offer was greatly enlarged by the publication of his edition of 1872. So far then as extant manuscripts are concerned, the text of the first family has only recently come to be thoroughly known, but it must not be forgotten that students of the Politics have had at their disposal from the first an extremely literal Latin translation published probably about 1260 (Rhein. Mus. 39. p. 457) and based on a Greek text of the first family. This translation is the work of one of the earliest students of Greek in Western Europe—William of Moerbeke, a Flemish^1 Dominican, who was Archbishop of Corinth at the close of his life (1280–1)^2—and if we may judge by the number of copies of it which exist, was largely used in the middle ages, notwithstanding the censure passed by Roger Bacon on the class of translations to which it belongs^3 and its occasional almost complete

1 Moerbeke, or Meerbeke, is a small town of Eastern Flanders, some miles from Ghent. It is not perhaps quite certain in what sense this translation was the work of William of Moerbeke. More hands than one may have been employed upon it: some parts of it (e.g. the last chapter of the Second Book) show much more ignorance of Greek than others. We cannot feel sure that William of Moerbeke translated the whole; indeed, his functions may have been confined to supervising the work of others and editing the book. The MSS. which mention his name are not the earliest. Some scribe or other, perhaps a Dominican, would appear to have added the name, when the work had become famous. We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that a great similarity of method is noticeable throughout the translation; this makes in favour of its being the work of a single author.

2 Oncken, Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles, p. 70.

3 Speaking of William of Moerbeke, Roger Bacon says—\footnote{Williamus iste Flemingus, ut notum est omnibus Parisiis literatis, nullam novit scientiam in lingua graeca, de qua praesumit, et ideo}
unintelligibility, which is mostly due to its extreme literalness, though not unfrequently it is the result of the translator's imperfect knowledge of Greek. As no known MS. of the Politics except the Vatican Fragments is older than the fourteenth century, this translation is based on a Greek text earlier than any complete text we possess. Not much earlier, however, it would seem, if Susemihl is right, for he says (Politica, ed. 1872, p. xii)—Rudolphus Schoellius ex compendiorum natura libri Ms archetypum saeculo xii° aut xiv° antiquius non fuisset collegit, unde vel ipsum illum codicem quem vertendo expressit Guilelmus saeculum xii° et xiii° exiens aut xiii° iniens aetate non superasse ex magno vitiorum numero mirum in modum Guilelmo et Ambrosiano communium conclusendum esse videtur.

Still the importance of the Latin translation is great, and here again Susemihl has done excellent service, for he has collated several manuscripts of it for his critical edition of the Politics (Sus. p. xxxiv). The value of this translation as an authority for the text of the Politics only gradually came to be perceived. The Aldine edition (1498) was based on a manuscript of the second family, and it was

omnia transfert falsa et corruptit sapientiam Latinorum' (quoted by Jourdain, Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote, p. 67), and Sepulveda remarks in the preface to his translation of the Politics: 'vix enim eos in numero interpretum habendos puto, qui verbum verbo inepta quadam fidelitate reddant.' Yet it is impossible not to respect the feeling which led William of Moerbeke to adopt this mode of translating Aristotle. He followed the example of most of the translators of the Bible in antiquity (Blass, Handbuch der klassischen Alterthums-Wissenschaft I. 223).

Thus προθεύοντος is rendered by praemissos, 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 29: ἀνοικοί by domestici, 2. 10. 1271 b 27, and ἄνοικοι by expulsos, 7 (5). 3. 1303 b 3, while ἀνοίκησις is vicinia in 1. 2. 1252 b 17, 21 and 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 14, but familiarietas in 2. 10. 1271 b 29. In 2. 5. 1264 a 35, τὰς παρ ἐνίοις εἰλορείας τε καὶ πενεορείας καὶ δοκείας is rendered a quibusdam obsequia et humiliationes et servitutes, and blunders equally portentous swarm in the translation of the last chapter of the Second Book. In 1. 6. 1255 a 6 the translation has promulgatio for ὁμολογία: and in 14 violen- tiam ἐπὶ φόβος ὀφθαλμων, with ruin- ous results to the sense of the passage. In 1. 11. 1259 a 15, ἐκ- μισθωτορα is rendered by pretium taxans. The translator's rendering of ἐκ by quam in 2. 3. 1261 b 35 seems to show an entire misappréhension of the meaning of the Greek. 'Ek τῶν ἐν οὐσί 2. 5. 1263 a 18 is ex his quaer in polibus.
not till 1550, when the third Basle edition of Aristotle appeared, that any use was made of the Latin translation in correcting the text (see Sus.\(^1\) p. xxxii: Sus.\(^2\) p. xvii). Two years later, Victorius published his first edition of the Politics, and in 1576 a second edition with a commentary (Sus.\(^2\) p. xviii). He seems to have used the Latin translation for the emendation of the text in both his editions (Schneider, Aristot. Pol. Praefat. p. xx), and he speaks of it thus in his preface to the second:—'quoscumque calamo exaratos codices indagare potui, cunctos deteriores mendosioresque inveni quam fuerit exemplar, quo illa usa est' (see also his commentary on 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13 sqq. Distribui autem, and on 2. 5. 1264 a 17 sqq. Si namque eodem pacto). Schneider bears equally strong testimony to its value for critical purposes in the preface to his edition of the Politics, published in 1809 (p. xxv). Susemihl, with manuscripts of the first family before him, takes a somewhat more measured view on the subject. He sees\(^1\) that it is in some cases impossible\(^2\) and in others difficult to say what the translator found in his text. The translator's rendering is not always equally literal\(^3\). He sometimes, as Susemihl points out, omits or adds small words, and where he finds that the meaning of

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\(^1\) Sus.\(^1\), p. xxxiii.

\(^2\) E.g. where questions arise as to the insertion or omission of the article, or as to the spelling of Greek words (if the Greek word is not reproduced). Occasionally indeed, the article is expressed by the translator, as for instance in the important passage 1. 13. 1260 a 8, quare natura quae plura principantia et subjecta.

\(^3\) This will be evident from the following examples. In 1. 6. 1255 a 8, γράφοντας παραπόθων is rendered, literally enough, *scribunt iniquorum*: in 1. 8. 1256 b 10, ὑπερἠκτείνει is *coeparunt*: in 1. 9. 1257 a 32, τὸ ἑλεόσυνθαν is *per adduci*. In 3. 15. 1286 a 9—10, again, the translator finds in his Greek a masculine plural nominative conjoined with a verb in the third person singular. His Latin reproduces this false concord. Literalness could certainly be carried no further. But in other passages the version is not equally exact: thus for instance in 1256 b 9, τελεωθεσίων is rendered *secundum perfectionem* (or *perfectam — sc. generationem*): in 1259 a 13, ἀλίγου μυθωσάμουν *modo pro pretio dato*: in 1259 a 22, τούτων ποιοῦνται τὸν πόρον hoc modo factum divi-lias (see also 1255 b 35, 1268 b 5). An exact 'ad verbum' rendering is, in fact, impracticable in Latin, and one or two of these passages seem to show that the translator does not always make his version as literal as he might.
a sentence will thus be made clearer, he does not scruple to add a Latin word or two, for which no equivalent existed in his Greek text (Sus.¹ pp. xxxiii–xxxiv). That Greek text, again, Susemihl allows to have been here and there deformed by chance corruptions, by arbitrary changes, and by the intrusion of glosses (Sus.¹ p. xxxi). Notwithstanding all this, however, Susemihl claimed, in his edition of 1872 at all events, that the Latin translation is ‘instar optimi codicis, qui quamvis non eandem auctoritatem quam E in Physicis, Meteorologicis, Psychologicis, et A° in Poeticis et Rhetoricis, tamen eandem quam K in Ethicis et fortasse paulo maiorem habeat’ (p. xxxii). Dittenberger in his valuable review of Susemihl’s edition of 1872 (published in the Gött. gelehr. Ans. for Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1349 sqq.) expressed a doubt (p. 1363), whether Susemihl had in that edition ‘kept himself entirely free from the tendency, which he had noticed in Victorius and Schneider, to over-value the Vetus Interpres,’ and though in his two subsequent editions of 1879 and 1882, and especially in the latter, where he abandons (p. xii. n.) the comparison with K, Susemihl shows less confidence in the unsupported testimony of the Vetus Interpres, he perhaps still rates it somewhat too high. It is not, to begin with, absolutely clear that we have a right (with Susemihl) to take this translation as a reproduction of a single Greek manuscript. Obviously it renders with great literalness the Greek text which it adopts, but we must bear in mind that a translator, even if he does his work as literally as the author of this ancient translation, is not quite as mechanical a being as a copyist. He may not be invariably faithful to one manuscript¹, and if he is, he may now and then prefer to render some gloss or conjectural reading which he finds in its margin, rather than the reading which stands in its text². He may adopt con-

¹ Susemihl himself points out (Sus., p. xxxv), relying on a marginal annotation in one MS. of the Vet. Int. on 3. 17. 1288 a 15, that ‘aut in Γ’ (the manuscript which the Vet. Int. is supposed to have used) ‘hic illic adscriptae erant variae lectiones, aut præter híc illic etiam alium codicem vel plures alios (Guilelmus) inspexerat.’

² Roemer in the preface to his
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jectural emendations of his own or of others. We must, I think, allow for these possibilities in the case of this Latin translation of the Politics, and not rate its testimony quite so high as we should rate that of a Greek manuscript of the same date. We must also remember that William of Moerbeke, its probable author, was not a Greek by birth, and that he may have been as little infallible in deciphering Greek manuscripts as he certainly was in interpreting Greek words.

Nevertheless the readings offered by the thirteenth-century translator commonly deserve attention, and Bekker, who has here and there (for the most part in the wake of earlier editors), with manifest advantage to the text, adopted a reading based on his unsupported authority, might well have done something more than he did in his critical edition of the Politics (1831) to call attention to them. He also omitted, as we have already seen, to collate the manuscripts M and P, though he must have learnt their importance from the imperfect notes of their readings given in Götting's edition (1824) on the authority of Haase. This omission has now been fully repaired by Susemihl, who has been in his turn, perhaps, in his first two editions at all events, a little inclined to overrate the value of the authorities which he was the first fully to turn to account. In his third and last edition, however, besides being generally more conservative in his

edition of Aristotle's Rhetoric (Teubner, 1885, p. xiii) says of William of Moerbeke's Latin Translation of this treatise—'varietates et glossas, quas pro correctionibus habuisse videtur' (cp. Sus., Praef. p. vi), 'ubique cupide arripientem videmus hominem omni sano iudicio desitutum.'

1 I have followed Susemihl in designating the Greek text which the Vetus Interpres appears to render by the symbol Γ, but I must not be understood to imply by this that I feel sure that it invariably represents the text of a single manuscript.

2 E.g. in 2. 1. 1260 b 41 he accepts el' δ' τῆς on the authority of the Vet. Int. in place of ἱστόρῃ, the reading of all known MSS.: in 2. 7. 1266 b 2 he accepts δ' ἥδη on the same authority: in 3. 12. 1283 a 7 he gets ἀνερέχεις in place of ἀνερέχειν from the same source: in 4 (7). 1336 a 6 he is probably right in reading εἰσδάχειν (Vet. Int. inducere): in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 22 he adds παρ' before ἐκατέρως, which seems quite indispensable, but which only Vet. Int. gives (apud).
dealings with the text, Susemihl is, as we shall see, more cautious in his acceptance of the readings of the first family of manuscripts, and also in his acceptance of the unsupported testimony of the Vetus Interpres. He says himself of his third edition (praef. p. xii), that it is 'Bekkerianus multo similior quam dueae priores.'

Besides, however, being the first to give a full record of the readings of the first family of manuscripts, Susemihl has done much to add to our knowledge of the second family also. This is considerably more numerous than the first; it includes, according to Susemihl, nearly a score of manuscripts. The most important of them are P², the I³ of Bekker (MS. Coislin 161 in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris), a manuscript of the fourteenth century from one of the monasteries on Mount Athos, of which a full account will be found in the preface to Susemihl's edition of 1872 (pp. xvi–xx); and P³ (MS. 2026 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris), the earliest complete MS. of the Politics known to scholars, for it belongs to the beginning of the fourteenth century (see pp. xx–xxi of the same preface). These two manuscripts have been collated throughout by Susemihl. Of the less good variety of this family¹, only P⁴ (MS. 2025 of the Paris Bibliothèque Nationale) appears to have been collated from beginning to end, but Bekker used some of the manuscripts falling under this head for particular books, and Susemihl has had them collated for the passages indicated by him in his critical edition (1872), pp. xxviii–xxix, and in his explanatory edition (1879), pp. xvi–xvii². O¹ belongs to this variety.

¹ See on the MSS. composing it Sus.¹ p. xxi sq. Their text has often suffered from the intrusion of glosses (see critical note on 1253 a 12) and supplementary additions (see critical note on 1255 b 12). They also frequently omit words, especially the article. Yet here and there they have alone preserved the true reading (e.g. in 1320 a 16, μὴ ῥῦ ἔρχεται).
² I add an explanation of the chief symbols which I have adopted from Susemihl. Π stands for the consent of the Aldine edition and all extant MSS., so far as these sources have been consulted for Susemihl's editions: Π¹ for the consent of the extant MSS. of the first family (in the first two books Μ* Π¹ only) and the text followed by the Vetus Interpres: Π² for the consent of the Aldine edition and the MSS. of the second
If we except the Vatican Fragments\(^1\), the manuscripts of the Politics are of a late date, later than the text translated by the Vetus Interpres, which was itself apparently not very early. They are evidently full of the faults which are commonly found in manuscripts. The scribes did their work mechanically for the most part—often without a thought of the meaning of what they were writing—though here and there we seem to detect efforts to emend the text, especially in the case of puzzling words or passages. The manuscripts often incorporate glosses with the text; they often omit whole clauses, especially clauses intervening between repetitions of the same word; still oftener they omit one or more words; they are often led astray by homoeoteleuton; their errors are particularly frequent in relation to certain words; they repeat words from the preceding line; they are apt to place contiguous words in the same case; sometimes they seem to admit two alternative readings together into the text—sometimes we notice that clauses are transposed. To say that they have these defects is, however, only to say that they share the common lot of manuscripts. Their lateness has probably added to their imperfections. We note, for instance, that many of the variations which we observe in them are variations in the termination of words\(^2\), and these may often have arisen from the misreading or miswriting of contractions, which were used with increasing frequency after the eleventh century. How easily they might thus arise will be seen from Gardthausen’s work on Greek Palaeography

\(^1\) See the Preface.

\(^2\) See, for instance, the various readings in 1271 a 37 (\(\alpha\delta\gamma\ς\ \Pi^1\), \(\alpha\ς\upsilon\ \Pi^2\), \(\alpha\upsilon\nu\ \Pi^3\), \(\alpha\upsilone\ \Pi^8\)), 1280 a 24 (\(\varepsilon\lambda\nu\theta\varepsilon\rho\iota\pi\iota\ \Pi^7\), \(\varepsilon\lambda\nu\theta\varepsilon\rho\iota\nu\iota\ \Pi^2\), \(\varepsilon\lambda\nu\theta\varepsilon\rho\iota\nu\iota\ \Pi^8\)—the true reading being doubtless \(\varepsilon\lambda\nu\theta\varepsilon\rho\iota\nu\iota\), 1282 a 27, 1284 b 41, 1286 a 25, 1286 b 24, 33, 1287 b 30, 1288 a 23, 1292 b 36, 1297 a 1: and see Sus.\(^1\), p. xii, note 21. Not many pages, however, of Susemihl’s \textit{apparatus criticus} are free from instances of error in terminations.
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(p. 246), where we find the remark that the same contraction may be used to represent θέότητος, θέοτητι, θεότητα, while another represents πόλις, πολύς, πόλεμος, πολέμος, πολίτης; and even πολιτεία (though the last word is more usually represented by a different contraction), and that a single contraction may be employed to express βάλλωντος, βάλλοντι, βάλλοντα, βάλλοντες, βάλλοντας.

Occasionally all the manuscripts, in addition to the text used by the Vetus Interpres, offer a reading almost or quite certainly wrong\(^1\), but they seem on the whole to preserve with considerable fidelity the idiosyncrasies of Aristotle's peculiar and highly characteristic style. In a large number of passages earlier critics have condemned readings which a closer and more sympathetic study of Aristotle's use of language has proved to be undoubtedly correct\(^2\). Often and often the manuscripts have retained little idiosyncrasies of style, which less mechanical copyists, or copyists more ready to insist on the ordinary rules of Greek writing, might well have smoothed away. Peculiarities in the order of words\(^3\), occasional omissions of a word or words\(^4\), constructiones ad sensum\(^5\), carelessnesses\(^6\)

\(^1\) E.g. in 2. 12. 1274 b 7, ΓΠ (except perhaps pr. P\(^3\)) have επισκέψεων (instead of επισκέψεως): in 3. 3. 1276 b 9, ΓΠ have λεγομένων for λέγομεν: in 3. 8. 1279 b 28, προσαγορευοι or προσαγορεύοι, one or other of which appears in ΓΠ, must be wrong: in 3. 15. 1286 a 9–10, δικεί...οἱ νόμοι ΓΠ: in 3. 16. 1287 a 29, ΓΠ seem to be wrong, and the Vossian codex of Julian alone right. Cases in which all the MSS. are wrong and Γ alone is right also occur: see for example the passages referred to above, p. xlviii, note 2.

\(^2\) Those who do not happen to be acquainted with the second of Vahlen's Aristotelische Aufsätze will thank me for referring to it in illustration of this remark.

\(^3\) E.g. 1. 6. 1255 b 2, ὡ δὲ φύσις βουλεῖται μὲν τόσο ποιεῖ, πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι δῶσαί (80 ΓΠ, except that M\(^*\) P\(^1\) place τοῦτο after ποιεῖν): 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 27, τίλος δ' οὖν ὠς ὁλτὶ ὄν ὁπεῖ, ποιήσαι: 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 23, τὸς αὐτὸς ἀρχαῖς δὲ νομίζει περὶ τὸς πολιτείας εἶναι τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ περὶ τὰς μοναρχίας (except that ΓΜ\(^*\) erroneously place τῶν μεταβολῶν before αὐτῶν): 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 33, τὰ μὲν εὐθαμα διακείμενα πρὸς ὑγίειαν: 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 4, περὶ δὲ τὴν ξωὴ κτησιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετριάζουσιν.


\(^5\) E.g. 7. (5). 10. 1311 a 33, τῆς δ' ὀβρεος ωσπέρ πολυμεροῦς, ἔκαστον αὐτῶν αὐτίκον γίνεται τῆς ὀργῆς.

\(^6\) E.g. 3. 13. 1283 b 16, δῆλον
or roughnesses\(^1\) of style, and even positively bad writing\(^2\) are faithfully reproduced\(^3\).

We have seen, however, that the complete MSS. fall into two families, and here the question arises—what is the origin and the extent of the distinction between them? We know that in parts of the de Anima and of some other writings of Aristotle two texts exist, which have been thought by some to represent two separate issues or editions, both from the hand of Aristotle, while others have held one of the texts to be a réchauffé due, not to Aristotle, but to some expositor who has rewritten the original with slight alterations in the language, not often affecting the meaning. Has the distinction between the two families of manuscripts in the case of the Politics originated in either of these ways? The question is an important one, for if the distinction between them had this origin, it would obviously be altogether improper to blend the readings of the two families together and to form a composite text out of them, as all editors have hitherto sought to do. There is no doubt that the differences existing between the two families are in part of a similar nature to those which exist between the two texts of the second book of the de Anima. As in the de Anima, so in the Politics, we note variations in the order of words, variations in the use of the article, variations in particles and the like. But these variations are far less frequent in the Politics than in the portions of the second book of the de Anima in which a second text exists. In one or two places of the de Anima, again, we trace some slight divergence of

\(^1\) γὰρ ὡς εἰ τις πάλιν εἰς πλουσιώτερον ἀπόπτων ἐστι, δηλοῦ ὁτι κ.π.λ.: 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33, ἐστι δὲ ἔργων τοῦ νομαθέτου καὶ τῶν βουλευόμενων συν-ιστάναι τινα τοιαύτην πολιτείαν ὥς τὸ κατοστήσας μέγιστον ἔργων οὕδε μέ-νον, ἀλλὰ ὅπως σάρκηι μᾶλλον.

\(^2\) E. g. 2. 6. 1264 b 39-40 (cp. de Gen. An. 2. 7. 746 b 7-9): 1. 10. 1258 a 24.

\(^3\) Some of their mistakes seem to be due to their ultimate derivation from an archetype in which words were neither separated nor accentuated: thus we have ἡ δὴ instead of ἢ δὴ in 1252 b 28, ἀρισταιρεῖν instead of ἀρωτοῖρεῖν in 1273 b 5, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἔστιν instead of ἀλλοῦ δὲ ἔστιν in 1254 a 15, Χάρης δὴ instead of Χαρηρίδη in 1258 b 40.
meaning\(^1\), and this we hardly find in the Politics. And then again, we note that variations in the order of words occur even within the first family, the order followed by M\(^a\) P\(^1\) being often different from that followed by \(\Gamma\), which is in these cases commonly the same as that of the second family. It seems, therefore, hardly necessary to have recourse to the supposition of a double text to account for variations of order\(^2\). The same thing may be said as to variations in the use of the article and others of the same kind. Besides, many of the differences between the readings of the two families are of a sort which is not equally conspicuous in the two texts of the de Anima. One family uses one form of a word, the other another: the first has ὑφοποιητική, the second ὑφοποιητική: the first commonly uses the form μονάρχης, the second μονάρχος\(^3\), and so forth. The second family occasionally avoids hiatus where the first does not. Differences of this kind are probably due to grammarian revisers of the text; and if this is so, it seems probable that the differences which might be ascribed to a duality of text have also originated in the same way. Many of the differences, again, between the text of Π\(^1\) and Π\(^8\) appear to be due to a misreading of contractions, or to omissions on the part of one set of manuscripts or the other (most often of Π\(^1\)), or to other accidental causes. It does not seem likely that the contrast of the two families runs back (at all events in its present proportions) to anything like so early a date as do the two

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\(^1\) E.g. in de An. 2. 9. 421 a 9, where the received text has— αὐτοῖον ὅτι τὴν αἰσθήσεων ταυτήν οὐκ ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ, ἀλλὰ χεῖρος πολλάν ζῶον, and the second text—αὐτοῖον ὅτι οὐκ ἔχομεν ἀκριβῆ ταυτήν τὴν αἰσθή-σεων, ἀλλὰ χείριστα ὁμάται ἀνθρωπος τῶν ζῶον.

\(^2\) M\(^a\) here and there has an order of its own (e.g. in 1267 b 40). It is easy to see from Susemihl's \textit{apparatus criticus} on 1271 a 25, 36 (Sus.\(^1\), pp. 127, 128), how easily these changes of order might arise, and, if they arose in an archetype, how widely they might be diffused.

\(^3\) The dependent compounds of the stem ἄρχω end in Attic not in -αρχης, but throughout in -αρχος (γυμνασίαρχος, δήμαρχος, ἱππαρχος, τριήμαρχος, etc.) : still in an Attic inscription of B. C. 324 we find certain finance officials of the deme Athmone named μεδάρχου (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, pp. 53–54).
texts of portions of the de Anima. Both families agree in the order in which they arrange the books. In both, the first four chapters of the Sixth Book are little better than a chaos. This last defect, it is true, may have existed in the work as Aristotle left it. All the manuscripts, and the vetus versio also, have the obvious blunder ἐπισκέψις in 2. 12. 1274 b 7: all read ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων in 2. 6. 1266 a 18. The text of the Vatican Fragments is a mixed text, and may possibly belong to a time prior to the rise of a marked contrast between the two families.

It would seem, then, that both families of manuscripts may safely be used in the construction of a text of the Politics. No editor, in fact, has attempted to base his text on one family only and dispensed altogether with the aid of the other. Bekker mainly relies on the second family, but he has adopted several readings from the Vetus Interpres: Susemihl bases his text in the main on the first family, and especially on Γ, but he frequently adopts readings from the second. Editors of the Politics seem to have no option but to make their text more or less a composite text. Ours must be based partly on the first family of manuscripts, partly on the better variety of the second: occasionally perhaps it may be necessary to take a reading from the less good variety of the second. The question whether in a given passage we are to follow the reading given by the first family or the second, which is often a difficult one, must be decided partly by the proba-

1 E.g. in the following passages of the First and Second Books: 1255 a 5, 1259 b 2, 1260 a 39, 1262 a 30, 1264 a 1, 1264 b 3, 1265 a 30, 35 (χρήσις), 1265 b 4, 21, 1266 a 20, 23, 1267 b 40, 1270 a 20, 21, 1271 a 27, 1273 a 10, 1273 b 3. It may be added that Susemihl recognizes in his third edition (praef. p. xvi), how prone the MSS. of the first family are to omit words, and how little they are to be depended on in cases of omission; hence we find him in this edition accepting from the second family not a few words which he had previously eliminated in reliance on the authority of the first family, and generally showing an increased confidence in the second family, though he still prefers the first. Instances of this will be found in the following passages of the first two books, as they stand in Susemihl's third edition—1253 a 25, 1257 b 24, 1260 b 17, 1261 a 22, 1263 b 1, 6, 1264 a 16, 1268 a 26, 1270 a 25; 34, 1273 a 9, b 2, 27, 1274 b 8.
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bilities of the particular case, partly in reference to the known tendencies of either family.

The manuscripts of the second family, for instance, as has been said, avoid hiatus more frequently than those of the first 1: here in all probability the less polished version is the more genuine. In matters of spelling, again, the first family has perhaps occasionally preserved peculiarities which the second has smoothed away (e.g. the form συμφύναι in 1262 b 13, which is all the more likely to be correct because it is found in Κb in Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 22)². When the first family unanimously places words in one order which the second places in another, the order given by the first family is sometimes to my mind more unstudied and more Aristotelian than that given by the second ³. But in graver matters at any rate the advantage seems to me to rest with the second family ⁴. In some cases falling under this head, no doubt, the readings of the first family may well deserve our preference. Thus in 2. 11. 1273 a 41, Π¹ give us ταῦτην οὖν οἶδον τε βεβαιως ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν, and Π² the softened and probably less genuine reading ταῦτην οὖν οἶδον τ' εἶναι βεβαίως ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν: and in 2. 1. 1260 b 28 ἡς Π¹ seems preferable on similar grounds to ἡ, which is the reading of the manuscripts of the second family. So again in 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 13 Π¹ have preserved

¹ E.g. in 1254 b 14: 1255 a 11, b 5, 21: 1256 a 33, b 18: 1258 a 31: 1259 b 7: 1261 b 17, 32: 1263 a 28: 1264 a 37, 38, etc. In these passages, however, the elisions by which hiatus is avoided are of a trivial and obvious kind: serious cases of hiatus are commonly left untouched in both families alike.

² It is not, however, always the case that the spelling of Π¹ is to be preferred. For instance, the form φιλία (Π²) seems preferable to φιλία (Π¹)—see critical note on 1271 a 27. It is hardly likely that in matters of spelling complete reliance can safely be placed on either family. It should be noted that in questions as to hiatus and commonly also in questions of spelling we get no assistance from the Vetus Interpres, and are dependent on Μ² Π¹, so far as the first family is concerned.

³ E.g. in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 20 Π¹ have δ' δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πράττων πολλάκις δι' ἄλλους θετικῶν καὶ δουλικῶν ἄν δόξει πράττειν (where πολλάκις is to be taken with ἄν δόξει—compare the similar displacement of πολλάκις in 1. 6. 1255 b 3), while Π² place πολλάκις after δι' ἄλλου (and also ἄν after δόξειν), thus arranging the words in a more regular and logical, but probably less genuine, order.

⁴ The Vatican Fragments agree far more often with the second family than with the first. See the Preface.
the true reading νενεμήσθαι (Π² almost without exception have μεμήσθαι), and in 4 (7). 1336 b 2 ἀπελαύνειν Π² seems to be undoubtedly wrong. But on the whole it appears to me that Π² less often transmute a puzzling reading into an easier one than Π¹. Thus, for example, in

1. 2. 1252 b 15, ὀμοκάποις, the reading of most MSS. of the second family, is better than ὀμοκάπτους, Π¹ P¹ I¹.
2. 4. 1253 b 27, τῶν ἀληθομικῶν, the reading of almost all the MSS. of the second family, is better than τῷ ἀληθομικῷ, the reading of the first.
3. 9. 1257 b 24, Π² seem to be wrong in omitting οὖτος.
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5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29, τε πασῶν Π², where the place of τε, though not that which we should expect, is justified by many parallel instances (see Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq.), whereas Π¹ reads γε and Μ⁵ omits τε, and possibly Γ also, but of this we cannot be certain, for the Vet. Int. seldom renders τε.

5 (8). 6. 1341 a 13, καὶ, which Π⁵ add, is probably right, though not easy to interpret.

5 (8). 6. 1341 b 1, Π¹ wrongly substitute ἵμβοι for σαμβίκαι.

The manuscripts of the first family seem also, I think, to admit glosses into the text more frequently than the better ones of the second (see, for instance, Susemihl's apparatus criticus on 1. 8. 1256 b 26: 2. 6. 1265 a 21, 22: 2. 7. 1266 a 37: 2. 10. 1271 b 28: 3. 4. 1277 a 23: 3. 10. 1281 a 28, where στοιχεῖα, which is probably a gloss, takes in Π¹ the place of δικαια). Clearly, again, as Dittenberger has remarked, and Susemihl has now fully recognized (Sus. p. xvi), these manuscripts are apt to omit words, probably because their archetypic was somewhat carelessly written. Take the following instances from the Third Book:

1275 a 11, Π¹ om. καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτους ὑπάρχει: 28, Γ Μ⁵ pr. Π¹ om. καίτω — ἄρξης: 1276 a 4, Μ⁵ Π¹, and possibly Γ, om. τὶς: b 3, Μ⁵ Π¹, and possibly Γ, om. ἄν: 36, Γ Μ⁵ pr. Π¹ om. ἄλλα: 1277 a 20, Π¹ om. ἄρτης after ἡ αὕτη: 24, Γ Μ⁵ pr. Π¹ om. ἠτος: 1278 b 2, om. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων: 20, om. εἰκόν οἰλοττον: 1279 a 2, Π¹ om. ἔνα, though Μ⁵ Π¹ move ἕνα to its place: 34, Μ⁵ Π¹, and possibly Γ, om. τῶν in τὴν δὲ τῶν ἀληθῶν: b 35, Π¹ om. τι.: 1280 b 1, Μ⁵ Π¹, and possibly Γ, om. τοῦ: 5, Γ Μ⁵ pr. Π¹ om. πολιτικῆς: 1282 a 7, Π¹ om. καὶ: 17, om. ἡ before βελτίων: 40, Μ⁵ Π¹, and probably Γ, om. τὸ before τούτων: 1283 a 10, Π¹ om. καὶ, and in the next line in πᾶσαν ἄνωτέρτ Γ Μ⁵ pr. Π¹ omit the second of the two syllables αὐ, making ἄνωτέρτι into ἄνωτέρτι or ἄνωτέρτα: 17, Μ⁵ Π¹, and possibly Γ, om. τ': 32,

1 Gött. gel. Anz., Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1359. If we examine the discrepancies between Π¹ and Π² in the first two books of the Politics, we shall find that in a large proportion of cases they arise from the omission of words in Π¹.

2 Omissions also occur in Π², and some of them are on a more extensive scale than those of Π¹ (see, for example, 1307 b 32-34, 1334 a 37-38, 1336 b 18, 1337 b 16-19, 34-35), but they fortunately occur less frequently, and they give rise to no critical doubts. They are often obviously due to homoeoteleuton.
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Ms P¹, and possibly r, om. τὰ: b 2, Π¹ om. τί: 1284 b ΠΙ, om. τί (perhaps rightly): 1285 a 6, Ms P¹, and possibly r, om. τοῦ: 1286 b 31, Π¹ om. καὶ before κατά: 1287 a 16, om. τούτων: 25, Π om. ἐπίνεις παιδεύσας, Ms P¹ om. παιδεύσας: b 38, Π Ms pr. Π¹ om. καὶ ἀλλο βασιλικῶν: 1288 a 6, Π¹ om. ἡδύ: 16, om. τινὰ: 29, om. τοῦτων (as they omit οὗτος in 1257 b 24 and οὗτοι in 1273 a 9).

In his third edition, Susemihl adopts the reading of the first family in only four of the passages which I have just cited. A similar array of passages might be adduced from the Sixth Book, and a somewhat shorter one from the First and Second. I am far from saying that in every one of these passages the sin of omission can be positively brought home to Π¹—on the contrary, in more than one of them it is not clear whether Π¹ omit or Π² add—but I am inclined to think, as Susemihl now thinks (Sus. p. xvi), that Π² add a good deal less often than Π¹ omit. At all events, it is evident that omissions in Π¹ must be carefully scrutinized before we can safely accept them.

It has already been said that most of the discrepancies between Π¹ and Π² seem to be due to errors of transcription or to have originated in some other easily intelligible way; but there is a certain percentage of which this cannot be said. In the First and Second Books the following variations may be cited under this head:—

A. 1. 7. 1255 b 26, τούτων Π² is replaced by τῶν τοιοτῶν in Π².
B. 2. 1. 1260 b 28, τίς Π¹, ἡ Π².
C. 2. 8. 1267 b 26, κόμης Π Ms pr. Π¹, κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ Π².
D. 2. 9. 1269 b 21, τοιοῦτος ἐστίν Π¹ (so accentuated in Ms Π¹), φανερῶς ἐστὶ τοιοῦτος δὲ Π².
(Cp. 1269 b 26, where Π Ms pr. Π¹ om. φανερῶς.)
E. 2. 9. 1271 b 28, κρήτες Π Ms pr. Π¹ (all other MSS. Αὐκτιοι).
F. 2. 11. 1273 a 41, ταύτην οὐχ οἶν τε βεβαιῶς ἀμιστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν Π¹: ταύτην οὐχ οἶν τ' εἶναι βεβαιῶς ἀμιστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν Π².

In E there can be little doubt that a gloss explanatory of Αὐκτιοι has taken the place of this word in Π Ms pr. Π¹. Of B and F something has already been said. A, C, D
remain, and these are less easy to classify or account for, but it is noticeable that in all these three passages Π¹ abbreviate, just as elsewhere they omit.

So far we have been considering cases in which Π¹ and Π² are at issue¹, and these are the most difficult and perplexing with which we have to deal. It often happens, however, that the three texts of the first family—three, if we include the original of the verus version—do not agree. Ms and P¹, and also Γ and Ms, often stand apart by themselves, and Γ and P¹ occasionally do so². When Ms P¹ stand alone, we usually find that Γ agrees with the second family, and the same thing may be said of P¹ when Γ Ms stand alone. Against the union of Γ Π² not much weight commonly attaches, as it seems to me, to that of Ms P¹, and Γ Ms have also, I think, little weight when matched against P¹ Π².

The following passages from the Second Book will illustrate this in reference to Ms P¹, though some of the readings referred to are far better than others, and I would not pronounce positively against all:—

1260 b 32, Ms P¹ om. τ': 1261 a 6, Ms P¹ εν τῇ Πλάτωνος πολιτείᾳ: the other MSS. have εν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ (some τοῦ) Πλάτωνος: 17, Ms P¹ οὐ for οὕτω wrongly: 1261 b 25, Ms P¹ om. τοὺς in τοῖς γυναικὶ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις: 28, Ms P¹ om. τίς: 1262 a 35, Ms pr. P¹ om. εἶναι: 1262 b 6, Ms P¹ om. οὕτωs wrongly: 7, Ms P¹ om. τε: 1263 b 32, Ms pr. P¹ έσται wrongly: 1264 a 1, Ms pr. P¹ εκοινώνησε wrongly: 1264 b 20, Ms pr. P¹ δισσάρεω wrongly: 39, Ms P¹ om. λόγος: 1265 a 18, Ms P¹ μὴ for μηδὲν wrongly: 36, Ms P¹ add μὲν after πρᾶως: 1265 b 27, Ms P¹ place μὲν not after βοῦλεται like the rest, but after άθη, not probably rightly: 1266 b 28, Ms P¹ τάξει instead of τάξεω: 1268 a 14,

¹ It is possible that the contrast of the two families of MSS. would be less strongly marked, if we possessed a larger number of good MSS. of the Politics. We might probably in that case possess MSS. occupying an intermediate position between the two. This hardly any of our MSS. can be said to do. [My surmise has been verified by the discovery of the Vatican Fragments.]

² We find Γ and P¹ standing together alone far less often than Γ and Ms, or Ms and P¹. The remarks in the text were written before I became acquainted with Susenilhi’s third edition, in which I find that they are to some extent anticipated.
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M\(s\) pr. P\(i\) om. καί ἑξικάων: 37, M\(s\)P\(1\) γεωργεύων wrongly: 1268 b 23, M\(s\)P\(1\) γενεάσθαι for γίνεσθαι: 1269 a 18, M\(s\)P\(1\) add τοις before κωνήσας (wrongly, I think): 1269 b 28, M\(s\)P\(1\) πρῶτος in place of πρῶτος: 32, M\(s\)P\(1\) διώκτο wrong for διώκτητο: 1270 a 1, M\(s\) pr. P\(i\) om. τῶν αἰκείας wrongly: 8, M\(s\)P\(1\) γνωμόμενων wrongly for γενομένων: 17, M\(s\)P\(1\) om. λαῶν before οὐσίαν: τῶν M\(s\), τῶν P\(i\) wrongly for τοὺς: 26, M\(s\)P\(1\) om. ἡ before καί wrongly: 1270 b 2, M\(s\)P\(1\) om. τῶν πολιτῶν wrongly: 8, M\(s\)P\(1\) om. ἐστίν: 26, M\(s\)P\(1\) ἕδη wrongly for ἐδὲ: 1271 a 16, M\(s\)P\(1\) om. ἄν wrongly: 1271 b 22, M\(s\)P\(1\) τε wrongly for δὲ: 1272 b 31, M\(s\)P\(1\) om. ἔχουσαν (wrongly, as I think), and om. ἐν wrongly: 1273 b 25, M\(s\)P\(1\) κρήτης wrongly for κρητικής: 37, M\(s\)P\(1\) om. γὰρ wrongly.1

Changes in the order of words peculiar to M\(s\)P\(1\) occur not unfrequently; the following instances may be adduced from the Second Book:

1260 b 41, 1261 b 7, 1263 a 22, b 16, 17, 1264 a 9, 1265 b 15, 1267 a 38, 1268 a 39, 1271 a 36, b 7, 1272 b 24.

It would be rash to alter the order of words on the authority of these two manuscripts unsupported by others.

As to the readings peculiar to Γ M\(s\), not many of them, I think, possess merit. Take the following list from the Second Book:

1261 a 21, Γ M\(s\) om. καί before διώκτας (wrongly, I think): 33, Γ M\(s\) read δὲ for γὰρ wrongly: 1264 a 19, Γ M\(s\) παοῦστες (P\(1\) P\(ii\) μαθοῦστες): b 9, Γ M\(s\) εἰποῦσιν δὴ wrongly for ἔποικον δὴ: 1267 a 2, Γ pr. M\(s\) om. καί wrongly: 1268 b 9, Γ M\(s\) om. καί wrongly: 1269 a 25, Γ M\(s\) om. καί before κωνήσα: 1270 a 12, Γ M\(s\) om. ἐσκεν wrongly: b 8, Γ M\(s\) om. αὐτῇ wrongly: 1271 a 18, Γ M\(s\) om. διὰ: b 7, Γ M\(s\) om. μὲν: 1272 b 1, Γ M\(s\) have διαφεροῦσαν wrongly for διαφεροῦσιν: 1273 a 40, Γ M\(s\) have πολιτεῖαν wrongly for πολιτῶν: b 4, Γ M\(s\) have ἄν wrongly for ἄν: 1274 a 8, Γ M\(s\) om. τὰ—Περικλῆς (homooteleuton): 28, Γ M\(s\) om. μαντικὸν: b 20, Γ M\(s\) om. γὰρ wrongly.2

1 M\(s\)P\(1\) perhaps diverge rather more frequently from the other texts in the Second Book than in the First and Third, but the readings peculiar to these two MSS. in the First, Third, and Sixth Books seem to me to be of even less value than in the Second.

2 The record of these two MSS. is no better in the First, Third, and Sixth Books.
Readings resting on the authority of only one of the manuscripts of the Politics possess, as a rule, but little weight. 'Such readings,' remarks Dittenberger (Gött. gel. Anz., Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1362), 'should only be adopted after convincing proof, (1) that the reading unanimously given by the other MSS. and probably inherited from the archetype is on internal grounds untenable, and (2) that the emendation offered by the single MS. in question is the easiest, simplest, and most satisfactory that can be offered.' M is a carelessly written manuscript, and very little importance can be attached to its unsupported testimony. We have already seen that not a few tempting readings peculiar to P¹ are probably conjectural emendations of its learned transcriber, and we must beware of attaching too much importance to its unsupported testimony¹. The same thing may be said of P², and also of P³.

When, however, we ask what value is to be attached to the unsupported testimony of the text followed by the Vetus Interpres, we are on more debatable ground. Susse-mihl still attaches much importance to it, though, as has been said, considerably less in his third edition than in his previous ones. But even he accepts only a moderate proportion of the many readings which rest on its unsupported testimony. Dittenberger unhesitatingly applies to Π the rule which we have just cited from him. 'From this rule,' he says (Gött. gel. Anz. p. 1363), 'no exception should be made even in favour of the translation of William of Moerbeke. No doubt it is quite true that it represents the best of all the manuscripts of the Politics, but even the testimony of the best single manuscript, as it is not the sole representative of a family, has from a diplomatic point of view no weight whatever in opposition to the concurrence of all other manuscripts of both families.'

The question, however, arises, as we have seen, how far the translation faithfully reproduces the Greek text (or texts)

¹ Its value may be studied in the following passages from the Sixth Book:—1289 a 10, 15, b 1: 1297 b 16: 1298 a 7, 18: 1299 a 30: 1294 a 3, 12, b 13: 1293 a 30: 1294 a 3, 12, b 8, 23, 24: 1296 a 16, b 7, 10: 1290 a 1: 1291 b 31: 1292 a 1, 30: 1300 a 3, 5, b 13, 18.
used by the translator. Susemihl recognizes even in his first edition that in some matters it is not rigidly faithful to its original. ‘Denique, quamvis omnia ad verbum vertere soleat Guilelmus, cavendum tamen est, ne, ubicunque paulo liberiores ratione utatur, semper aliud quid in eius exemplo scriptum fuisse credamus atque in nostris hodie legitur. Nam non solum idem vocabulum Graecum non eodem semper reddit Latino, verum sunt etiam parvulae voces, quas contra codicis sui auctoritatem aut addiderit aut omiserit, velut copulam saepissime adiecit, ubi deest in exemplaribus Graecis, praepositionem cum plurium nominum casibus copulatam ante unumquodque eorum repetere solet, τε et γε particulas plerumque non vertit, in diōπερ et aliis vocabulis cum περ compositis modo hoc περ quidem voce exprimit, modo silento transit. Quae cum ita sint, etiam verba quaedam in omnibus aut paene omnibus codicibus omissa, quae Guilelmi auctoritate fretus Aristotelis reddidi, velut 2. 3. 1262 a 12 ἦ, 2. 5. 1263 a 35 ὡς, b 34 ἐσταυ, 2. 6. 1265 a 34 Ἐν, 3. 3. 1276 a 25 τόπον, 4 (7). 17. 1337 a 7 εἴναι (cf. 2. 7. 1267 b 18 ὡς, 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 30 χρῶμω), in dubium posse vocari, utrum revera in exemplo suo invenerit an Latine tantum reddiderit sententia et sermonis Latini ratione permotus, eo libertius concedo, quo minus aliis locis tale quid factum esse potest negari, velut vix i. 9. 1257 b 38 τέλος post αὐξησις legisse censendus est, quamquam vertit huius autem augmentatio finis’ (Susī, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv).

This list, however, is far from exhausting the laxities

1 I regret that Busse’s excellent dissertation ‘de praevidis Aristotelis Politica emendandi’ (Berlin, 1881) did not come to my knowledge till some months after my remarks on the Vetus Interpres and my critical notes had been written. I find that he has anticipated several of the criticisms which I have ventured to make on the thirteenth-century translation as an authority for the text of the Politics. Perhaps however the fact that we have independently arrived at many similar results on this subject may lend some additional weight to our common conclusions.

2 He adds est in the following passages of the first two books —1253 a 16, 1255 b 7, 31, 1256 a 21, 1261 a 2, 1264 a 34, 1271 a 5, 1274 b 9: esse in 1260 b 37, 1264 a 9: erit in 1263 b 34, 1266 b 27.

3 See 1258 a 1, 1262 b 3, 1269 a 10, 1274 b 8. So too ut, 1253 b 16 (in most MSS.).
which the worthy translator permits himself. He omits μεν without support from any extant manuscript (so far as they have been examined) in twelve passages of the first two books, καὶ in sixteen, δὲ in eight, γὰρ in three, ἀν δὲ in four. He fails to render οὕτω in 1253 b 38, τὸ in 1253 b 32. He often reads γε (1254 a 9, 1266 b 34, 1269 b 9) or δὲ (1268 b 41, 1271 b 15) for τε, though sometimes τε for γε (1254 b 34, 1273 b 7, 1274 a 15) or for δὲ (1258 a 26), and γε for δὲ (1252 b 8, 1268 b 16). He renders ἥ by et in 1252 a 13, 1253 b 34, 1256 a 37, 1258 b 19, and καὶ by aut in 1262 a 8. He occasionally adds words—scilicet in 1266 b 1, seclicet in 1274 a 1, eorum in 1258 a 5. His voices, moods, and tenses often fail to reproduce the voices, moods, and tenses of the original. Thus we find him substituting the passive for the active, the active for the passive, the indicative for the subjunctive, the subjunctive for the indicative, the present for the past, the past for the present. He sometimes, though not very often, omits words of some length, or even two or three words together. This is probably the result of accident. He usually adheres to the order of the words

1 1252 a 27, 1257 a 7, 1258 b 11, 1259 a 28, 1265 a 9, 1266 b 3, 1270 a 4, b 11, 37, 1273 a 26, 1274 a 26, b 15. The omissions noted in the text may be due in part to errors committed by copyists of the translation, but they appear in all Susemihl's MSS. of it.

2 1252 a 29, 1253 a 31, 1258 a 2 (z adds et here), 1259 a 33, b 8, 29, 1260 a 31, 1262 a 18, 1263 b 34, 1264 a 15, 1266 b 28, 1267 b 24, 1269 a 38, 1270 a 26, 1274 a 25, b 17.

3 1252 a 13, b 23, 1254 b 24, 1256 b 33, 1262 a 38, 1266 a 11, b 2, 1269 a 19.

4 1264 a 36, 1268 b 13, 1274 b 21.

5 1254 b 1, 1256 a 4, 1265 a 30, 1269 b 26. I am far from saying that the Vet. Int. always makes these omissions without MS. authority, but their frequency makes it pro-

bable that they are largely his own.

6 E.g. in 1256 b 41, 1259 a 3, 1262 b 25, 1264 b 14, 1265 b 7, 1266 b 20, 1267 a 38, b 5, 1268 b 21, 1271 b 5, 1274 a 7. Busse makes the same remark (p. 25).

7 E.g. in 1262 a 5, 1265 b 10, 1266 a 11, 1269 a 18, 1271 a 22.

8 E.g. in 1270 a 27.

9 E.g. in 1253 a 22, 1265 b 15, 1288 b 36.

10 E.g. in 1265 a 27, 1266 a 37, b 3, 7, 27, 1268 b 38, 1269 b 16, 1271 b 4, 22, 1272 b 32, 1273 b 17, 1274 a 3.

11 E.g. in 1262 b 6, 1273 b 39.

in the Greek, but not unfrequently he makes slight changes in it, which do not probably for the most part correspond to anything in the text before him. Here and there (e.g. in 1257 a 30–31) these changes are forced on him by the difference between Latin and Greek. We must remember that, however useful this translation may be to us for textual purposes, its author never dreamed of its being thus used. He never designed it to serve as a substitute for a manuscript.

In addition to the minute inaccuracies we have been noting, blunders in translation often occur, and also apparently blunders in the decipherment of the Greek text. Of the former class of blunders a few specimens have already been given; it would be easy to add to their number indefinitely. The last chapter of the Second Book offers some remarkable examples. It is hardly likely that so poor a Greek scholar can have been perfect as a decipherer of Greek writing; it is perhaps owing to this, that he renders ἀνέστιος as ἀνώσιος in 1253 a 5, τοῦ δεόντως as τοῦ δεόντως in 1262 a 3, ἔθελεν as μέλλεως or ὅφελεως in 1267 a 34, ἀριστην as ἀριστής in 1269 a 32, ἐπίκειται as ὑπόκειται in 1271 b 34, and γέρας as γῆρας in 1272 a 37, unless indeed we suppose his Greek text to have been exceptionally defective in these passages. We can sometimes account for errors in the vetus versio by the supposition that the translator used a manuscript in which ambiguous contractions similar to those found in Mε occasionally occurred, for in one or two places where Mε has a contraction of this kind we find the translator going astray: thus in 1335 a 27, where instead of πληθων Mε has a contraction which might be taken to stand for πλῆθος, the rendering of the Vet. Int. is multum, and in 1337 a 28 under similar circumstances Vet. Int. has ipsorum where we expect ipsum. Here and there, again, as Busse has pointed out (pp. 14–28), the translator would seem to have sought to mend defects in his Greek text by conjectures of his own: one of the clearest cases of this is to

1 His plan is, according to Busse (p. 13), 'ea quae forma ac sensu cohaerent etiam collocati one arctius coniungere.'
be found in 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 2 sqq., where the omission of some words in the translator's Greek text (and in M*) makes nonsense of the sentence, and he has sought to remedy this by rendering τάξιν ordinis, as if it were τάξως. So too in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 6, finding probably in his text the same meaningless fragment of βανσικόν (νασικόν) which appears in M*, the translator renders it nautica to make sense, and in 1. 8. 1256 a 30 he has multís for the same reason, though the reading he found in his text was in all probability the blunder τολλόλ.

It is evident that, however good the manuscript or manuscripts used by the Vetus Interpres may have been¹, we have only an imperfect reproduction of them in his translation. Before, therefore, we can accept a reading which rests on its unsupported authority, we must in the first place make sure that he has manuscript authority for it, and that it has not originated in some error or inaccuracy or conjecture of his own. It is only of a certain number of the readings peculiar to the Vetus Interpres that we can assert this with confidence. The following are instances of readings too remarkable to have originated with the translator:—

2. 1. 1260 b 41, εἰς ὀ τῆς in place of ἱαονῆς II.
2. 7. 1266 b 2, δ' ἱδη.
3. 12. 1283 a 7, ὑπερέχει.
4 (7). 17. 1336 a 6, εἰσόγειαν.
1. 2. 1253 a 7, πετευσαῖος for πεττοῖος.

In the first four of these passages I am inclined to think that the translator's Greek text preserved the true reading. In the fifth he may probably have translated a marginal

¹ They seem to have suffered from the incorporation of glosses with the text (e.g. in 1254 b 1, φαύλας appears to be a gloss, μοι-θηρᾶς the true reading; glosses have found their way into the Greek text followed by the Vet. Int. in 1259 b 14 and 1287 a 10; and in 1291 b 29, δούοια, which is probably a gloss intended to explain τὰ τούτους λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διαφοράν, has been added to these words). We must also credit the text followed by the Vet. Int. with the many erroneous readings common to it with M*.
correction, for the correction περευόσις appears in the margin of more than one extant manuscript.

So far as to varieties of reading; but manuscripts are liable to still graver defects—to interpolation, chasms in the text, displacement of words, clauses, and paragraphs, and the like. In the text of Aristotle's treatise de Generatione Animalium, for instance, a chasm is thought to be traceable in 2. 1. 735 a 11 (after θεωρώντας), and whole paragraphs in more cases than one seem to be out of their true place. How has it fared with the Politics in respect of these matters?

As to interpolation, I have elsewhere pointed to more than one passage in which it may reasonably be suspected. Susemihl, as is well known, holds that chasms in the text of the Politics occur not unfrequently, and that in many cases the transposition of clauses and paragraphs is called for. There would be nothing surprising in this. We occasionally find sentences obviously displaced in manuscripts of the Politics, and here and there we seem to trace a minute but indubitable chasm (there is a chasm of this kind in the better manuscripts in 1285 a 19). The question is one on which I would rather not express a definitive opinion, till I have completed my commentary, but so far as I can judge at present, I doubt whether Susemihl has made out his case. Problems of this kind, however, are best discussed in notes on the particular passages in reference to which they arise.

The question whether double versions occur is also an interesting one. This, again, is one for discussion in detail. I will only say that they need to be very clearly established, and that I am inclined to doubt whether they are really traceable in many of the cases in which they have been supposed to be so. The double inquiry into the cause

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1 So think Aubert and Wimmer: see their edition of the de Gen. An., p. 140.
3 E. g. in 1264 b 3, 1287 b 18, 1290 a 32.
of the existence of a multiplicity of constitutions contained in the first four chapters of the Sixth Book is, however, certainly suspicious\(^1\), and, as I have said elsewhere, these four chapters are in a condition the origin of which it is difficult to penetrate.

But here we find ourselves in face of those broader problems in relation to the state of the text of the Politics, as to which something has already been said.

\(^1\) Attention has been called to this both by Susemihl and by Mr. J. C. Wilson.
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α'.

'Επειδή πάσαν πόλιν ὁρῶμεν κοινωνίαν τινά οὖσαν καὶ πάσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐνεκεν συνεστηκών (τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες), δὴ-

λον ὃς πάσαι μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς στοχάζονται, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου πάντων ἦ πασῶν κυριωτάτη καὶ πάσας 5

περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστιν ἡ καλομένη πόλις

καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ οἰκονομικῶν καὶ δεσποτικῶν εἶναι τὸν

αὐτὸν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν· πλὴθει γὰρ καὶ ὀλγότητι νομί-

ζοῦσι διαφέρειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐδεί τούτων ἐκαστὸν, οἷον ἂν μὲν τὸ

ὁλίγων, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλεῖόνων, οἰκονόμου, ἂν δ' ἔτι

πλεῖόνων, πολιτικοῦ καὶ βασιλικῶν, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσαν

μεγάλην ὀἰκίαν ἢ μικρὰν πόλιν, καὶ πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ

βασιλικῶν, ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκη, βασιλικῶν, ὅταν δὲ

κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῆς ἐπιστήμησις τῆς τοιαύτης κατὰ μέρος 15

ἀρχῶν καὶ ἀρχήμενος, πολιτικῶν· ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλθῆ

3 δὴ λοιπὸν δ' ἐσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκόποτα στὴν ὑφη-

γημένην μέθοδον. ὁσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθε-

τον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαίρειν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλά-

χιστα μόρια τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται 20

σκοπούσθεν ὠψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τὶ τε διαφέ-

ρουσιν ἄλλης, καὶ εἰ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβέιν περὶ

ἐκαστὸν τῶν ῥηθέντων.

Εἰ δὴ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέ-

ψειεῖν, ὁσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἄν 25

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άλληλοιν μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἵον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἐνεκεν (καὶ τούτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοι καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφέσθαι,

30 οἶον αὐτῷ, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἐτερον), ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προοράν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον τῷ σώματι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενοι καὶ φύσει δούλοιν: διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δοῦλον ταῦτα συμφέρει. φύσει μὲν 3

1252 ἄνω διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δούλου (οὕδεν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἶον χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πενηχρῶς, ἀλλ’ ἐν πρὸς ἐν οὖτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελότοι κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἐκαστὸν, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ’ ἐνὶ 5 δουλείαιν). ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὸ θῆλυ καὶ δούλουν τὴν 4 αὐτῆς ἐχεῖ τάξει. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ’ γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δούλης καὶ δούλου. διὸ φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ “βαρβάρων δ᾽ Ἔλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκὸς,” ὡς ταῦτα φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δούλου δν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦ 5

10 τῶν τῶν δύο κοινωνιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὅρθως Ἡσίοδος εἰπε ποιησας “οἶκοι μὲν πρώτιστα γυναῖκα τοῖς θηλῶν τ' ἀροτῆρα”.· ὁ γὰρ θηλὼς ἀντί οἰκετὸν τοῖς πενήθει ἔστων, ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰς πάσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυία κοινωνία κατὰ φύσιν οἰκὸς ἔστων, οὕς Χαρόνδας μὲν καλεῖ ὁμοσπόνδους, Ἐπιμενήδης

15 δὲ ο Κρῆς ὁμοκάπτως· ἡ δ᾽ ἐκ πελεύνων οἰκίων κοινωνία πρῶτη χρήσεως ἐνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρον κόμη, μάλιστα δὲ ἐκ κατὰ φύσιν ἐοικεν ἡ κόμη ἀποκινέων οἰκίας εἶναι· οὐς καλοῦσιν τίνες ὀμογλάκτας παιδᾶς τε καὶ παιδῶν παιδᾶς. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἐτὶ τὸ

20 ἐθνὸν ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνήλθον· πάσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὡστε καὶ αἱ ἀποκινεῖ διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τούτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ λέγει “Ὁμηρος, “θεμιστεβεί 7 δὲ ἐκαστὸς παιδῶν ἥδ’ ἀλόχων”· σποράδας γάρ· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἄρχειον φίκουσι· καὶ τοῦς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ
βασιλεύεσθαι, ὦτι καὶ αὐτὸι οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν, οἱ δὲ τὸ 25 ἄρχαίον ἐβασιλεύοντο, ὦσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰδὴ ἑαυτοῖς ἄφο-
8 μοιοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν. ἢ δὲ ἐκ
πλειόνων κομῶν κοινωνία τέλειοι πόλεις ἤδη, πάσης ἔχουσα
πέρας τῆς αὐτάρκειας ὡς ἔτοσ εἰσιν, γνωμένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ
ξῆν ἐνεκεν, ώσα δὲ τοῦ εὖ ξῆν. διό πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστὶν, 30
ἑπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἑκείνων,
ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστὶν· οἷν γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶ τῆς γενέσεως
tελεσθείσης, ταῦταν φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἰναι ἑκάστου, ὦσπερ
9 ἄνθρωπον ἔπτων ὄικίας. ἔτι τὸ οὖ ἐνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλ-
τιστων· ἢ δὲ αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστων. ἐκ τούτων 1253 a
οὖν φανερὸν ὦτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ, καὶ ὦτι ἄνθρωποι
φύσει πολιτικῶν ἥφαι, καὶ ὦ ἀπολιθ σια φύσιν καὶ οὐ διά
τόχην ἤτοι φαύλως ἐστὶν ἢ κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωποι, ὦσπερ
καὶ ὦ ὄψ' Ὀμήρου λοιποντείς "ἄφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστων". 5
10 ἀμὰ γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτο καὶ πολέμου ἐπιθυμητής, ἀτε περ
ἀξιόν ὦν ὦσπερ ἐν πεπτίσ. διότι δὲ πολιτικῶν ὦ ἄνθρωποι
ἥφαι πάσης μελίτης καὶ παντὸς ἄγελαίου ἥΦαι μάλλον,
δήλον. οὐδὲν γὰρ, ὦς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις·ποιεῖ, λόγον
11 δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωποι ἔχει τῶν ἥφαι· ἡ μὲν οὖν φονή τοῦ ἱο
λυπηροῦ καὶ ἱδέος ἐστὶ σημείων, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρ-
χει ἥφαι· μέχρι γὰρ τοῦτο ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε τοῦ
ἔχειν αἰσθήσειν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἱδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν
ἄλλοις· ἢ δὲ λόγος ἐτὶ τοῦ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ
12 τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ 15
πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἥφαι τοῖς ἄνθρωποι ἰδίουν, τὸ μόνον ἄγαθον
καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων
ἔχειν· ἢ δὲ τοῦτον κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν. καὶ
πρότερον ὅθε τῇ φύσει πόλις ἡ οἰκία καὶ ἐκάστος ἡμῶν ἐστὶν.
13 τὸ γὰρ ὄλον πρῶτον ἀναγκάιον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους· ἀναιροῦ- 20
μένου γὰρ τοῦ ὄλου οὐκ ἔσται ποῦς οὐδὲ κείρ, εἰ μὴ ὄμοιόμοισ,
ὦσπερ εἰ τις λέγει τὴν λιθύνην· διαφθαρείσα γὰρ ἔσται
τοιαύτη, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργῳ ὀρισται καὶ τῷ δυναμεί, ὧστε
B 2

1252 a 26—1253 a 23.
μηκέτι τοιαύτα ὅντα οὐ λεκτέον τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὀμό-
25 νυμα. ὅτι μὲν ὅν ἡ πόλις καὶ φῶσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ ἐκα-
στος, δῆλον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ αὐτάρκης ἢ ἐκαστος χωρισθεῖς, ὣμοιως
tοὺς ἄλλους μέρεσιν ἔξει πρὸς τὸ ὄλον· ὃ δὲ μὴ δυνάμε-
νος κοινωνεῖν, ἢ μηδὲν δεόμενος δ' αὐτάρκειαν, οὔθεν μέρος
πόλεως, ὥστε ἢ θηρίων ἢ θέδω. φῶσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὅρμη ἐν 15
30 πᾶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν· ὃ δὲ πρώτος συστήσας
μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν αἰτίου. ὃπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτι-
στον τῶν ἔρωτος ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὔτω καὶ χωρισθὲν νόμον καὶ
δίκης χείριστον πάντων. χαλεπώτατη γὰρ ἀδίκια ἔχουσα 16
όπλα· ὃ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὀπλα ἔχων φύτει φρονήσει καὶ
35 ἄρετῆ, οἷς ἐπὶ τάναντι ἐστι χρῆσθαι μᾶλλοντα ἐκ ἀνοσιώ-
τατον καὶ ἀγριώτατον ἃνευ ἄρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς ἀφροδίσια καὶ
ἐδωδὸν χείριστον. ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικῶν· ἡ γὰρ δίκη
πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστὶν· ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

1253 b. 3 Ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν εἶ δὲ μορίων ἢ πόλις συνεστηκέν,
ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰπεῖν· πᾶσα γὰρ σύγκειται
πόλις εἰς οἰκίων. οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, εἴ δὲ πάλιν οἰκία
συνεστηκέν, οἰκία δὲ τέλειος ἐκ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων. ἐπεὶ
5 δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐλαχίστοις πρῶτον ἢ ἐκαστον χείριστον, πρῶτα δὲ
καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκίας δεσποτῆς καὶ δότος καὶ πόσις
cαὶ ἄλοχος καὶ πατὴρ καὶ τέκνα, περὶ τριῶν ἄν τούτων
σκέπτεσθαι εἰ οἱ τὰ ἢ ἢ καὶ ποῖον δὲι εἰναι. ταῦτα δὲ 2
ἐστὶ δεσποτικῆς καὶ γαμικῆς (ἀνάξιον γὰρ ἢ γυναικὸς καὶ ἀν-
10 δρός σύμβεις) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητικῆς καὶ γὰρ αὐτῇ ἢκ
ἀνόμασται ἱδίω ἀνόματι. ἑστοσι δ' αὐτὰ τρεῖς δ' εἶπο-
μεν. ἑστὶ δὲ τὶ μέρος δ' δοκεὶ τοῖς μὲν εἰναι οἰκονομία, 3
τοῖς δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῆς· ὅπως δ' ἐξει, θεωρητέον.
λέον δὲ περὶ τῆς καλομένης χρηματιστικῆς. πρῶτον δὲ
15 περὶ δεσποτῶν καὶ δούλων εἴπωμεν, ἕνα τα τε πρὸς τὴν
ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν ἰδαμεν, κἂν εἰ τι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ
αὐτῶν δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν βέλτιον τῶν νῦν ὑπολαμβανομέ-
νων. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεὶ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἰναι δεσποτελα, 4
καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ὁἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτική καὶ βα-
σιλική, καθάπερ ἔπομεν ἀρχόμενον τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν 20
τὸ δεσπόζειν. νῦμα γὰρ τὸν μὲν δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν δὲ ἐλεύ-
θερον, φύσει δ' οὐδὲν διαφέρειν. διότι οὖν δίκαιον βίαιον
γάρ. ἐπει τὸν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ 4
μέρος τῆς ὁἰκονομίας (Ἀνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον
καὶ ξῆν καὶ εὖ ξήν), ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ἀρισμέναις τέχναις 25
ἀναγκαῖον ἄν εἰ ὑπάρχειν τὰ ὀλεθρία ὀργανὰ, εἰ μὲλλεί
2 ἀποτελεσθήσεσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὔτω καὶ τῶν ὁἰκονομικῶν, τῶν
δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄγυχα τὰ δ' ἐμψυχά, οἷον τῷ κυ-
βερνῆτι οὐ μὲν οἰαξ ἄγυχον, δ' ὡς προφέρεις ἐμψυχον (ὁ
gὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνων εἰδείς ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὔτω καὶ 30
τὸ κτίμα ὀργάνων πρὸς ἕως ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ κτήσις πλῆθος
ὁργάνων ἐστί, καὶ οὐ δοῦλος κτήμα τι ἐμψυχον, καὶ ὥσπερ
3 ὀργάνων πρὸ ὀργάνων πᾶς ὁ ὑπηρέτης' εἰ γὰρ ἢδυνατο
ἐκαστόν τῶν ὀργάνων κελευσθέν ἢ προαιρεθανόμενον ἀποτε-
λειν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον, ὥσπερ τὰ Δαιδάλου φασίν ἢ τοὺς τοῦ 35
Ἁφαῖστον τρίποδας, οὓς φησίν ὁ ποιήτης αὐτομάτως θείουν
dύσθαι ἄγωνα, οὕτω σε αἱ κερκίδες ἑκέρκιζον αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ
πλῆκτρα ἑκιδάριζον, οὐδὲν ἄν ἔδει οὔτε τοῖς ἀρχιτέκτοσιν
4 ὑπηρετῶν οὔτε τοῖς δεσπόταις δούλων. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα 1254 a
ὁργανα ποιητικὰ ὀργανὰ ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ κτίμα πρακτικὸν' ἀπὸ
μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἔτερον τί γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν
αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθήτος καὶ τῆς κλίνης ἡ χρῆσις μέ-
νον. ὡς δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποίησις εἰδείς καὶ ἡ πράξις, 5
καὶ δέονται ἀμφότεραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτα τὴν
5 αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν' ὃ δὲ βίος πράξεις, οὐ ποίησις ἐστίν.
διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πράξιν. τὸ δὲ
κτίμα λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μύριον τὸ γὰρ μόριον οὐ
μόνον ἄλλον ἐστὶ μόριον, ἄλλα καὶ ὅλος ἄλλον' ὡμοίως δὲ 10
καὶ τὸ κτίμα. διὸ οἱ μὲν δεσπόταις τοῦ δούλου δεσπότης μό-
νον, ἐκείνου δ' οὐκ ἐστίν· ὃ δὲ δοῦλος οὐ μόνον δεσπότην δοῦλος
6 ἐστιν, ἄλλα καὶ ὅλος ἐκείνου. τὸς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῦ δοῦλου

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1253 a 24—1254 a 13.
καὶ τίς ἡ δύναμις, ἐκ τούτων δήλον· ὁ γὰρ μὴ αὐτοῦ φύς
15 σεῖ ἀλλ’ ἄλλου, ἄνθρωπος ἄν, οὗτος φύσει δούλος ἔστιν, ἄλλου δ’ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἂν κτήμα ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἄν, κτήμα δὲ
5 ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστόν τὸτερον δ’ ἔστι τις φύσει
toisútos ἢ οὗ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιον τινὶ δουλεῖν ἢ οὗ, ἀλλὰ πάσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἔστι, μετὰ ταῦτα
20 σκέψεων, οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ
tῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι 2
οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἔστι, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἐνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι
tὰ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν, καὶ εἶδο πολλὰ καὶ ἄρχοντων καὶ
25 ἄρχομένων ἔστιν, καὶ αἰ δελβετίων ἡ ἄρχη ἡ τῶν βελτίων ἄρχομένων, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἡ θηρίων τὸ γὰρ ἀποτελούμενον 3
ἀπὸ τῶν βελτίων βέλτιον ἔργον, ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει
tὸ δ’ ἄρχεται, ἔστι τι τούτων ἔργον, ὅσα γὰρ ἐκ πλείονος
συνεστήκη τις καὶ γίνεται ἐν τὶ κοινῷ, εἰτε ἐκ συνεχῶν εἰτε ἐκ
30 διηρημένων, ἐν ἀπασίν ἐμφαίνεται τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἄρχο-
μενον. καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς 4
ἐμψύχωσι καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ὡς ἔστι τις
ἀρχῆ, οἷον ἀρμονίας, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἵσως ἐξωτερικοτέ-
ρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως, τὸ δὲ ἥρων πρῶτον συνεστήκην ἐκ ψυχῆς
35 καὶ σώματος, ὅν τὸ μὲν ἄρχον ἔστι φύσει τὸ δ’ ἄρχο-
μενον. δεὶ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον 5
τὸ φύσι, καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν βέλ-
tιστα διακελέμενοι καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ ψυχῆν ἄν-
θρωπον θεωρητέον, ἐν δὲ τούτο δήλου τῶν γὰρ μοιχηρῶν ἡ
1254 ἡ μοιχηρῶς ἐχόντων δόξειν ἂν ἄρχειν πολλάκις τὸ σῶμα
τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τὸ φαύλως καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἐχεῖν. ἐστὶ 6
δ’ οὖν, ὅσπερ λέγομεν, πρῶτον ἐν χρίσθησαι καὶ δε-
σποτικὴν ἄρχην καὶ πολιτικὴν ἢ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ σώ-
5 ματος ἄρχει δεσποτικὴν ἄρχην, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τῆς ὑρέξεως πο-
λιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν ἐν οἷς φανερόν ἔστιν ὅτι κατὰ φύ-
σιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυ-
χής καὶ τὸ παθητικὸ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγου ἔχουσιν, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἰσου ἢ ἀνάπαλιν βλασφερὸν πάσιν.

7 πάλιν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔφοις ὑπαύτως: τὰ 10 μὲν γὰρ ἡμερὰ τῶν ἀγρίων βελτίω τὴν φῶσιν, τοῖτοι δὲ πάσι βέλτιον ἀρχέσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων τυγχάνει γὰρ σω- τηρίας ousos. ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ φύσει τὸ μὲν κρείττων τὸ δὲ χείρον, τὸ μὲν ἄρχων τὸ δὲ ἀρχόμενον. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. 15

8 πως. ὁσοὶ μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστάσων ὅσον ψυχῇ σώματος καὶ ἀνθρώπους θηρίων (διάκεινται δὲ τούτων τὸν τρόπον, ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον), οὕτωι μὲν εἰσὶ φύσει δοῦλοι, οἳ βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἀρχέσθαι ταῦτῃ τὴν ἄρχῃν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἐστὶ 20 γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλος εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστὶν) καὶ ὁ κοινώνων λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐχεῖν τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ἔμα τὸ λόγον αἰσθανόμενα, ἀλλὰ παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. καὶ ἡ χρείᾳ δὲ παραλλάττει μικρὸν ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τάναγκαία τῷ σώματι βοήθεια γίνεται παρ' 25 ἀμφότερον, παρὰ τὰ τῶν δοῦλων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμέρων ἐσιον.

10 βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέρουν ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δοῦλων, τὰ μὲν ἱσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δὲ ὥρα καὶ ἐχρῆστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρῆσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν ἄν 30 βίον (οὕτως δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἰς τῇ πολεμικῇ χρείᾳ καὶ τῇ εἰρηνικῇ), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ του- ναντίων, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἑπὶ τοῦτο ἄφηνε, ὡς ἐὰν τοσοῦτον γένοιτο διά- φοροι τὰ σώμα μόνον ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπὸ 35 λειπομένους πάντες φαίνειν ἂν αξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν.

11 εἴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτο ἀληθεία, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι ἄλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως μέδιαν ἤδιν τὸ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος. ὅτι μὲν τοῖς εἰσὶν φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλευθεροὶ οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φα-
νερῶν, οὐς καὶ συμφέρει τὸ δουλεύειν καὶ δίκαιον ἔστιν: 

6 ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τάναντια φάσκοντες τρόπον τινὰ λέγουσιν ὅρθως, οὐ χαλεπῶν ἰδεῖν· διχῶς γὰρ λέγεται τὸ δουλεύειν. 

5 καὶ οἱ δοῦλοι: ἐστὶ γὰρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον δοῦλος καὶ δουλεύων· ο γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τῆς ἔστιν, ἐν ὧν τὰ κατὰ πόλεµον κρατοῦµεν τῶν κρατούντων εἶναι φασιν. τούτο δὲ 2 τὸ δίκαιον πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόµοις ἄσπερ ἤτορα γραφόται παρανόµοι, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ τοῦ βιάσασθαι δυναµένου

καὶ κατὰ δύναµιν κρειττόνοις ἐσται δοῦλον καὶ ἀρχόµενον τὸ βιασθεῖν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν οὗτω δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ἐκεῖνως, καὶ τῶν σοφῶν. αἰτίων δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ δὲ 3 ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅτι τρόπων τινὰ ἄρετὴν τυγχάνουσα χρηγγια καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ

15 ἔστιν δὲ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἁγαθοῦ τινὸς, ὡστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βιαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβητήσεως· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν εὐνοίαι 4 δοκεῖ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον, τὸ τὸν κρειττόνα ἄρχειν, ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὔτε ἵππυρον οὔτε ἔξοχους οὔτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ᾽ ἄρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν. διὸς 5 δὲ ἀντεχόµενοι τινες, ὡς οἴονται, δικαῖον τινὸς (ὁ γὰρ νόµος δίκαιον τι) τὴν κατὰ πόλεµον δουλείαν τιθέασι δικαίων, ἀµα δὲ οὐ φασιν· τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρχὴν ἐνδέχεται μὴ δι- 

25 καὶ καὶ εἰναι τῶν πολέµων, καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἃν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, συμβήσεται τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας δοῦλους εἶναι καὶ ἐκ δοῦλων, ἐὰν συμβῇ πραθήναι ληφθέντας. διὸσπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βουλέουται 6 λέγειν δοῦλους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βαρβάρους. καὶ τοῖς ὅταν τοῦτο λέ- 

30 γοσιν, οὔθεν ἄλλο ξηποῦσιν ἢ τὸ φύσει δοῦλον, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπομεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναι τινάς φάναι τοὺς μὲν πανταχοῦ δοῦλους τοὺς δὲ οὐδαμοὶ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ 7 περὶ εὐγενείας αὐτοὺς μὲν γὰρ οὐ μόνον παρὶ αὐτοῖς εὐγε- 

νείς ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ νοµίζουσιν, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οἶκοι μή-
νον, ὡς δὲν τι τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς εὐγενεῖς ἐλεύθερον, τὸ δὲ σὺν 35 ἀπλῶς, ὡσπερ καὶ Ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἐλένη φησὶν
θείων δ' ἀπ' ὁμοίων ἐγγονοὶ μεριμνῶν τὰς ἀν προσεπιών ἀξίωσειν λάτρεις;

8 ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο λέγωσιν, οὐδενὶ ἄλλῃ ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ κακίᾳ διο-
ρίζουσι τὸ δοῦλον καὶ ἑλεύθερον καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς καὶ τοὺς 40
δυσγενεῖς. ἀξιοῦσι γὰρ, ὡσπερ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἀνθρωπον καὶ 1255 b
ἐκ θηρίων γίνεσθαι θηρίων, οὕτω καὶ ἐὰν ἀγαθῶν ἄγαθον ἢ
δὲ φύσις βουλέται μὲν τούτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις, οὐ μέντοι

9 θύσιν πρὸς θεοῦ νομοῦ, ὅτι μὲν οὐν ἐχεῖν τινὰ λόγον ἢ ἀμφισβήτησιν,
καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δὲ ἑλεύθεροι, δῆλον 5
καὶ ὅτι ὑπὸ τινὶ διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, δὲν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν
δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν
ἀρχεσθαι τῷ δ' ἀρχεῖν, ἐν πεφύκασιν ἄρχῃν ἀρχεῖν, ὡστε

10 καὶ δεσπόζειν. τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἔστω ἄμφοιν' τὸ
γὰρ αὐτὸ εἰσὶν τὸν μέρει καὶ τὸ δλοφ καὶ σῶματι καὶ τὸν
ψυχῇ, ὃ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐν ἐμψυχὼν τῷ
tοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος. διὸ καὶ συμφέρον
ἐστί τι καὶ φιλία δοῦλφ καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοῖς
φύσει τοιούτων ἢξιομένοις· τοῖς δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον τὸν τρόπον,
ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθεῖσι, τοῦναντίον.

15 Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐ ταύτων ἔστι δεσποτεία 7
καὶ πολιτική, οὐδὲ πάσαι ἀλλήλαις αἱ ἀρχαὶ, ὡσπερ τινὲς
φασιν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἑλευθερία φύσει ἢ δὲ δοῦλων ἔστιν, καὶ
ἡ μὲν οἰκονομικὴ μαναρχία (μαναρχεῖται γὰρ πάσα ὁικος),

2 ἡ δὲ πολιτικὴ ἑλευθερία καὶ ἐσών ἁρχῆς. ὃ μὲν οὖν δεσπό-
της οὐ λέγεται κατὰ ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοίοσοι εἶναι,
ὅμοιος δὲ καὶ οὐ δοῦλος καὶ ὁ ἑλευθερός· ἐπιστήμη δ' ἂν
eἰς καὶ δεσποτικὴ καὶ δουλική, δουλικὴ μὲν οὖν πέρ ὁ ἐν
Συρακοῦσαις ἐπαλθενε· ἐκεῖ γὰρ λαμβάνον τις μισθῶν

3 ἐδίδασκε τὰ ἑγκύκλια διακονήματα τοὺς παίδας. εἰπ' δ' 25
ἀν καὶ ἐπὶ πλείον τῶν τοιοῦτων μάθησιν, οἷον ὃψοποική
καὶ τέλλα τὰ τοιαύτα γένη τῆς διακονίας· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐτερα
ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Α'. 7-8.

"Оλος δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν υφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἢν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορρέσειν ἀν τις πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἡ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ ἐστίν 5 ἢ μέρος τι ἡ υπηρετικὴ, καὶ εἰ ὑπηρετικὴ, πότερον ὡς ἡ κερκίδοσουκή ἡ υφαντική ἢ ὡς ἡ χαλκουργική τῇ ἀνδριαντοποιῇ οὐ γὰρ ὀσιότατοι ὑπηρετοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ὁμοίως γανα παρέχει, ἢ δὲ τὴν ἔλεγο δὲ ἔλεγο τὸ ὑποκεί-2 μενον, ἐξ οὐ τι ἀποτελείται ἔργον, οἷον ὑφάντη μὲν ἔρια, 10 ἀνδριαντοποιῷ δὲ χαλκῶν, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ, δὴν τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσα-σθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρησασθαῖ τῆς γὰρ ἐστι η χρησμονένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικῆς πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστί τι ἣν ἐτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν. 15 εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ 3 κτήσεως ἐστι, ἢ δὲ κτήσις πολλὰ περιέλθη μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος, ὅστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργική πότερον μέρος τι τῆς χρη-ματιστικῆς ἢ ἐτέρον τι γένος, καὶ καθόλου ἢ περὶ τὴν τρο- φὴν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτήσεις; ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶδη γε πολλὰ τρό-4 20 φής, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
1255b 28—1256b 12.

εἰσίν· οὐ γάρ οἶδ' τε ζῆν ἀνευ τροφῆς, ὡστε αἱ διαφοράτι τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποίηκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ψών. 5 τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἄγελαία τὰ δὲ σποραδικά ἐστιν, ὡστερός συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν ἰζοφόραγα τὰ δὲ καρποφόραγα τὰ δὲ παμφόραγα αὐτῶν εἶναι, ὡστε 25 πρὸς τὰς ραστάνας καὶ τὴν αὔρεσιν τὴν τούτων ἡ φύσις τοὺς βίους αὐτῶν διάφορες, ἐπεί δ' οὐ ταύτα ἐκάστα ἢδυ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλὰ ἐτέρα ἐτέρους, καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἰζοφόρων καὶ τῶν 6 καρποφόρων οἱ βλοὶ πρὸς ἀλλῃλα διεστάσειν όμολος δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄνθρώπων· πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρουσιν οἱ τούτων βίοι. 30 οἱ μὲν οὖν ἁργότατοι νομάδες εἰσίν· ὡς γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμέρων τροφῆς ὑπὸ ἀνευ πόνου γίνεται σχολάζονται, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ὄντος μεταβάλλειν τῶν κτήνεων διὰ τὰς νομᾶς καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀναγκάζονται συνακολουθεῖν, ὡστερ γεωργίαν ἔσωσιν 7 γεωργοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι ζωῆς, καὶ θήρας ἐτέρους ἐτέρος ἐτέρα, ὡς ἀπὸ θηρήματα ἡ μητέρα, ἡ μητέρα τοιαύτην προσοκαίνων, οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι θηρίων ἀγρίων· τὸ δὲ πλεῖστον γένος τῶν ἄνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ζῆν καὶ τῶν ἡμέρων καρπῶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν βλοὶ τοσοῦτοι σχεδὸν εἰσίν, ὡςοι γε ἀυτῷ 40 φυτῶν ἔξομεν τὴν ἐργασίαν καὶ μὴ δὲ ἀλλαγής καὶ καπηλείας πορίζονται τὴν τροφῆν, νομαδικὸς γεωργίκος ληστρικός ἀλλειπτικός θηρευτικός· οἱ δὲ καὶ μουσών ζῳζευσάκην καὶ ποιητών ἤδεως ὑπὲρ προσαναπληροῦντες τὸν ἐνδεέστατον βίον, ἢ τύγχανει ἐλλείπον πρὸς τὸ αὐτάρκης εἶναι, οἴον οἱ μὲν νομαδικῶν ἄμα καὶ ληστρικῶν, οἱ δὲ γεωργικῶν καὶ θηρευτικῶν ὑπὸ τούτων ὦστε τὸν καλὸν καὶ τὸν καλόν καὶ νομαδικὸν, ὦστε τὸν καλὸν καὶ τὸν καλὸν. 1256b 5 9 τικῶν ὑμολογεῖ παρακαλοῦν οἱ δὲ χρεῖαν συναγαγάζῃ, τούτων τὸν τρόπον διάγονον. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτης κτήσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαινεῖται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πάσιν, ὡστερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθὺς, οὗτοι καὶ τελεωθεῖσιν. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν τὰ μὲν συνεκὸς τίτικτει τῶν ψών τοιαύτην τροφήν ὡς ἱκανῆν εἶναι μέχρις οὗ ἤν δύνηται αὐτῷ αὐτῷ πορίζειν τὸ γεννηθὲν, οἷον ὅσα
σκωληκοτοκεί ἡ φοτοκεί· οὔσα δὲ ἡ ψοτοκεί, τοῖς γεννυμένοις ἐξεὶ τροφὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς μέχρι τινὸς, τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν. ὡστε ὁμολογὸς ἦλθον ὅτι καὶ γενομένοις οὐ—

20 ταῖς τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζῴων ἐνεκεν εἶναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζώα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἠμερὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν χρήσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφὴν, τῶν δὲ ἀγρῶν, εἶ μὴ πάντα, ἄλλα τὰ γε πλείστα τῆς τροφῆς καὶ ἄλλης βοσθείας ἐνεκεν, ἦν καὶ ἔσθης καὶ ἄλλα ὀργανα γίνεται εἰς αὐτῶν. εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μηδὲν μὴτε ἀτέλεις ποιεὶ μὴτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεκεν αὐτὰ πάντα τεποιηκάνει τὴν φύσιν. διὶ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσις κτητικὴ που ἐσται, ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, ἡ δὲ χρήσις πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ 25 τῶν ἀνθρώπων δοσὶ πεφυκότες ἀρχεσθαί μὴ θέλουσιν, ὡς φύσις δίκαιον τοῦτον ὕπτα τῶν πόλεμον. ἐν μὲν οὖν eidos 13 κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστὶν· δὲ δεῖ ἦτοι ὑπάρχειν ἡ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ, ὥν ἐστὶ θηρευτικαὶ συνεργίας χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ χρησίμων 30 εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἐοικεν ὁ γὰρ ἄληθινος 14 πλοῦτος ἐκ τοῦτον εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἀπειρός ἐστιν, ὡσπερ Σώλων φησὶ ποιήσας "πλούτου δ' οὔδεν τέρμα πεφασμένων ἀνδράσι κεῖται." κεῖται γὰρ ὡσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις 15 35 οὐδὲν γὰρ ὀργανον ἀπειρον οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης οὔτε πλήθει οὔτε μεγέθει, ὃ δὲ πλοῦτος ὀργάνων πλήθος ἐστίν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν ἐστὶ τῆς κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δὲ ἦν αἰτίαν, ἦλθον

9 ἦ ἐστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἢν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν, χρηματιστικῆς, δι' ἓν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ 1257 α' πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως· ἢν ὡς μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ λευχείᾳ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν ἐστι δ' οὔτε ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένη οὔτε πόρρω ἐκεῖνης. ἐστι δ' ἢ μὲν φύσει ἢ δ' οὐ φύσει αὐτῶν, ἄλλα δ' ἐμπειρίας
2 τινὸς καὶ τέχνης γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς 5 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτῆματος διττῇ ἡ χρήσις ἐστίν, ἀμφότερα δὲ καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὀμοίως καθ’ αὐτὸ, ἀλλ’ ἢ μὲν οἰκεία ἢ δ’ οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος, οὐν υποδήματος ἢ τε ὑπόδεις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. ἀμ-
3 φότεραι γὰρ υποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττό-10 μενος τῷ δεομένῳ υποδήματος ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς χρήσις τῷ υποδήματι ἢ υπόδημα, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν χρήσιν οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἐνεκεν γέγονεν. τοῦ αὐτὸν δὲ 4 τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ 15 κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείον τὰ δ’ ἐλάττω τῶν ἰκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσις τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἡ κατηλική: ὅσον γὰρ ἰκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγ-
5 καῖν ἢν ποιεῖτοθα τὴν ἀλλαγήν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τούτῳ δ’ ἐστίν οἰκία) φανερῶν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστιν ἔργον 20 αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’ ἢδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὔσης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνουν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεκυρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἑτέρως· διὶ κατὰ τὰς δεησεῖς ἀναγκαίων ποιεῖ-
σαι τὰς μεταδόσεις, καθάπερ ἐτί πολλὰ ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν 6 βαρβαρίκων ἔθνων, κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγήν. αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ 25 χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλλάττονται, ἐπὶ πλείον δ’ οὐδὲν, οἰνον οἰνον πρὸς σῶτον διδόντες καὶ λαμβάνοντες, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐκαστον. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη μεταβλη-
τικὴ οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν εἴδος οὐδὲν, 7 εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν γὰρ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας ἢν’ ἐκ 30 μέντοι ταύτης ἐγένετ’ ἐκείνη κατὰ λόγον. ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γινομένης τῆς βορθείας τῷ εἰςάγεισθαι ὡς ἐνδείξει καὶ ἐκ-
πέμπειν ὡς ἐπελεύναι, ἢς ἀνάγκης ἢ του νομίσματος ἐπο-
8 ρίσθη χρήσις. οὐ γὰρ εὐβάστακτον ἐκαστὸν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀναγκαίων διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀλλαγὰς τοιούτων τι συνεβεντο 35 πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, δ’ τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ δὲ εἰχε τὴν χρεῖαν εὐμεταχείριστον πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, οἶον
σίδηρος καὶ ἄργυρος κἂν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἐτερον, τὸ μὲν πρῶ-
τον ἀπλῶς ὄρισθεν μεγέθει καὶ σταθμῷ, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον
καὶ χαρακτῆρα ἐπιβαλλόντων, ἢ ἀπολύσῃ τῆς μετρῆ-
σεως αὐτοῦ· ὁ γὰρ χαρακτὴρ ἔτηθε τοῦ ποσοῦ σημείων. τοῦ-

στοιχείου τὸν ἀναγκαίον ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ
μὲν ὁποιοῦ ἀπλῶς ἵσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δὲ ἐμπείρας ἢ ἁπατο-
κότερον, πωδεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον

ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματιστικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ

νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἐργόν αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι πό-

θεν ἔσται πλῆθος χρημάτων· ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ πλοῦτο

καὶ χρημάτων. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νο-

μίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τούτ̄' εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν

καὶ τὴν καπηλικὴν. ὅτε δὲ πάλιν λήρος εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ

νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι, φύσει δ' οὐδέν, ὅτι μετα-

θεμέλιων τῶν χρωμένων οὐδένος ἄξιον οὔτε χρήσιμον πρὸς

οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἑστὶ, καὶ νομίσματος πλοῦτων πολλά-

κις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καὶ ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον

εἶναι πλοῦτον οὐ εὐπορῶν λίμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθὸ καὶ τὸν

Μίδαν ἔκεινον μυθολογούσι διὰ τὴν ἀπληστίαν τῆς εὐχῆς

πάντων αὐτοῦ γιγαντιῶν τῶν παρατιθεμένων χρυσῶν. διὸ

τὸν ἐτέρων τῷ πλοῦτῳ καὶ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ, ὁρθῶς

ἔστησε· ἵνα γὰρ ἐτέρα χρηματιστικὴ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ

κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ αὕτη μὲν οἰκονομικὴ, ἢ δὲ καπηλική,

ποιητικὴ χρημάτων οὐ πάντως, ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ χρημάτων με-

ταβολῆς. καὶ δοκεῖ περὶ τὸ νόμισμα αὕτη εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ

νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς ἑστὶν. καὶ ἀπει-

ρος δὴ οὕτως ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς

φῶσερ γὰρ ἡ λατρικὴ τοῦ υἱιοῖς εἰς ἀπειρόν ἐστὶ καὶ

ἐκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρόν (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ

ἐκεῖνο βούλονται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπει-

ρον (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσαις), οὕτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς

χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἐστὶ τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος
14 πλοῦτος καὶ χρημάτων. κτήσις τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς, υφ' ἡρημοτοτικῆς, ἐστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἐργον. διὸ τῇ μὲν φαίνεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι παντὸς πλοῦτον πέρας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γινομένων ὅρῳ (μεν) συμβαίνουν τοιοῦτον· πάντες γὰρ εἰς ἀπειρον ἄπυκνοι οἱ χρηματιζόμενοι τὸ νόμισμα.

15 αἰτίων δὲ τὸ σύνεγγυς αὐτῶν· ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρήσις τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὐσία ἐκατέρα τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ χρήσεως κτήσις, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταύταν, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἐτέρου τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ αὐξῆσις. ἀδειν' δοκεῖ τινὶ τοῖς ἑαυτῷ εἶναι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἐργον, καὶ διατελοῦσιν ἡ σάξειν οἵμενοι

16 δὲν ἡ αὔξειν τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος οὔσιαν εἰς ἀπειρον. αἰτίων δὲ ταύτης τῆς διαθέσεως τὸ σπουδάζειν περὶ τὸ ζῆν, ἀλλ' μὴ τὸ εὑ ζῆν εἰς ἀπειρον οὐν ἔκεινος τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὗσι, 1258 α καὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ἀπείρων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. δοσι δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὗ ζῆν ἐπιβάλλονται, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς ζητοῦσιν, ὡστ' ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτῆσι φαίνεται υπάρχειν, σᾶς ἡ διατριβή περὶ τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ 5

17 ἐτέρον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τούτων ἐκληθεν. ἐν ὑπερβολῇ γὰρ οὕσις τῆς ἀπολαύσεως, τῆς ἐκ τῆς ἀπολαυστικῆς ὑπερβολῆς ποιητικῆς ζητοῦσιν· καὶ μὴ διὰ τῆς χρηματιστικῆς δύνανται πορίζειν, δι' ἀλλ' αἰτίας τοῦτο πειρῶσαι, ἐκάστη χρόνειν τὸν δυνάμενον οὐ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνδρίας 10 γὰρ οὐ χρήματα ποιεῖν ἐστίν ἀλλὰ θάρσος, ὅπερ στρατηγικής

18 καὶ ἱατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκην τῆς δ' ὑγιείαν· οἱ δὲ πᾶσας ποιοῦσι χρηματιστικάς, ὡς τοῦτο τέλος δι' ἀπολαύσεως, πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀπαντά οὖν ἀπαντάν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίας χρηματιστικῆς, καὶ τῆς, καὶ δ' αἰτίαν τών ἐν 15 χρέας ἐσμέν αὐτῆς, εἴρηται· καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναγκαίας, ὅτι ἐτέρα μὲν αὐτῆς οἰκονομικῆ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ περὶ τῆς τροφῆς, οὐχ ὡσπερ αὐτῇ ἀπειρο., ἀλλὰ ἔχουσα δρόνι. δηλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορροφημεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πότερον τοῦ 10 οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστική ἡ οὖ, ἀλλὰ 20 δεὶ τοῦτο μὲν υπάρχειν· ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ ποιεῖ
Διὰ τῆς φύσεως χρήται αὐτοῖς, οὔτω καὶ τροφὴν τὴν φόσιν δεῖ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἢ θάλατταν ἢ ἄλλο τὸν ἐκ δὲ τούτων ὡς δὲ ταῦτα διαθεῖ-25 ναι προσήκει τῶν οἰκονόμων. οὐ γὰρ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς ἐρίας 2 ποιήσαται, άλλα χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς, καὶ γνῶναι δὲ τὸ ποιόν χρηστόν καὶ ἐπισίτειον ἢ φαῦλον καὶ ἀνεπισήμην. καὶ γὰρ ἀπορήσειν ἂν τῆς τί ἡ μὲν χρηματιστικὴ μόριον τῆς οἰκονομίας, ἡ δ' ἱατρικὴ οὐ μόριον· καίτοι δὲ γυναίκες τοῖς 30 κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, ὡσπερ ἥν ἢ ἄλλο τί τῶν ἀναγκαίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦστι μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου καὶ τοῦ ἄρχοντος καὶ περὶ 3 οὐσίας ἢδεῖν, ἦστι δὲ ὡς οὖ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἱατροῦ, ὡστὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ἦστὶ μὲν ὡς τοῦ οἰκονόμου, ἦστι δὲ ὡς οὖ, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς· μάλιστα δέ, καθάπερ εἰρηταὶ πρότερον, δεὶ 35 φύσει τούτῳ ὑπάρχειν· φύσεως γὰρ ἦστιν ἐργὸν τροφὴν τῷ γεννηθέντι παρέχειν παντὶ γὰρ, εἴ όδ γίνεται, τροφὴ τὸ λειπόμενον ἦστιν. διὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἦστιν ἢ χρηματιστικὴ 4 πάσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν φῶν. διπλῆς δ' οὕσης αὐτῆς, ὡσπερ εἰπομεν, καὶ τῆς μὲν καπηλικῆς τῆς δ' οἰκο-40 νομικῆς, καὶ ταύτης μὲν ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπαινομένης, τῆς 1258 β δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψευδομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστὶν), εἰσφοράται μισεῖται ἢ ὅβολο- στατικὴ διὰ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν καὶ οὐκ ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐπορίσθη· μεταβολῆς γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν, 5 δ' ὡς τόκος αὐτὸ ποιεῖ πλέον. θέσον καὶ τοῦνα τοῦτε ὡληφευν· ὅμοια γὰρ τὰ τικτόμενα τοῖς γεννώσων αὐτὰ ἦστιν, δ' ὥς τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα νομίσματος· ὡστε καὶ μάλιστα παρὰ φύσιν ὡτὸς τῶν χρηματισμῶν ἐστίν. 11 Ἐπει δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γυνῶν διωρίκαμεν ἰκανῶς, τὰ 10 πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεὶ διελθεῖν. πάντα δὲ τὰ τωαῖτα τὴν μὲν θεωράν ἐλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δ' ἐμπείραν ἀναγκαίαν. ἦστι δὲ χρηματιστικῆς μέρη χρήσιμα τὸ περὶ τὰ κτήματα ἐμπείρον εἶναι, ποία λυσιτελέστατα καὶ ποὺ καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἵππων κτήσις πολὰ τις ἢ βοῶν ἢ προβάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
2 τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων (δεῦ γὰρ ἐμπειρον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλληλά 15
tε τούτων τίνα λυσιτελέστατα, καὶ ποιὰ ἐν ποίοις τόποις·
ἀλλα γὰρ ἐν ἄλλαις εὑθνεῖ χώραις), εἶτα περὶ γεωργίας,
καὶ ταύτης ἡδη ψηλῆς τε καὶ πεφυτευμένης, καὶ μελι-
tουργίας, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν πλοτῶν ἤ πτηνῶν, ἀφ’
3 ὅσων ἐστὶ τυγχάνειν βοηθείας. τῆς μὲν οὖν οἰκειοτάτης χρη-20
ματιστικῆς ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρώτας, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς
μέγιστον μὲν ἔμπορία (καὶ ταύτης μέρη τρία, ναυκληρία
φορτήγα παράστασις· διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἐτέρων τῷ
τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἰναι, τὰ δὲ πλεῖον πορίζειν τὴν ἐπι-
4 καρπίαν), δεύτερον δὲ τοκισμὸς, τρίτον δὲ μισθαρνία·
ταῦ-25
tης δ’ ἢ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν, ἢ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων
καὶ τῷ σώματι μόνον χρησίμων· τρίτον δὲ εἴδος χρημα-
tιστικῆς μεταξύ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πρώτης (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τῆς
κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρους καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς
καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δὲ, 30
5 οἷον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὐτή δὲ πολλὰ
ἡδὴ περιελθείς γενή· πολλὰ γὰρ εἶδο τῶν ἐκ γῆς μετα-
λευμένων ἐστίν. περὶ ἐκάστον δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν ἐρηται
καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρησίμων μὲν
6 πρὸς τᾶς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. εἰσὶ δὲ 35
τεχνικῶταται μὲν τῶν ἐργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τόχης,
βαναυσῶται δ’ ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λοιθώνται μάλιστα,
δουλικῶταται δὲ ὅπου τοῦ σώματος πλειστα χρήσεις, ἀγενε-
7 σταται δὲ ὅπου ἐλάχιστον προσδεῖ ἄρετής. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶν ἐνεὶς
γεγραμμέναι περὶ τούτων, οἷον Χαρητίδη τῷ Παρίῳ καὶ 40
Ἀπολλοδόρῳ τῷ Λημνῷ περὶ γεωργίας καὶ ψηλῆς καὶ 1259 a
πεφυτευμένης, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις περὶ ἄλλων, ταύτα
μὲν ἐκ τούτων θεωρεῖται ὅτι ἐπιμελέσ’ ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ λε-
γόμενα στοράδην, δ’ ὁν ἐπίτευχθήκασιν ἐνοῦ χρηματιστώ-
8 μενοι, δε’ συλλέγειν πάντα γὰρ ὀφέλιμα ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ τοῖς 5
τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικήν, οἷον καὶ τὸ Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου
τούτο γὰρ ἐστὶ κατανόημα τι χρηματιστικῶν, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνος
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μὲν διὰ τὴν σοφίαν προσάπτουσι, τυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι δν. ὅνειδιζόντων γὰρ αὐτὸ διὰ τὴν πενίαν ὡς ἀνωφελοῦσ· 10 τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὀόσης, κατανοησαντά φασιν αὐτὸν ἐλαιῶν φοραν ἐσομένης ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας, ἐτί χειμώνος ὄντος εὐπορησάντα χρήματος ὄλγοιν ἀρραβώνας διαδοῦναι τῶν ἐλαιουργείων τῶν τ’ ἐν Μιλήτῳ καὶ Χίῳ πάντων, ὄλγον μεθοσάμενον ἅτ’ οὑδενός ἐπιβάλλοντος· ἐπειδὴ δ’ ὁ καίρος ἦκε, 15 πολλῶν ζητομένων ἄμα καὶ ἐξαιρήθη, ἐκμισθοῦντα διὶ τρόπων ἱβοῦλητο, πολλὰ χρῆματα συλλέξαντα ἐπιδείξα λα ὡς ῥαδίων ἔστι πλούτων τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν βούλωνται, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦτ’ ἔστι περὶ ὁ σπουδάζονσιν. Θαλῆς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τοῦτον 10 τὸν τρόπον ἐπίδειξιν ποιήσασθαι τῆς σοφίας· ἐστι δ’, ὡσπερ 20 εἴπομεν, καθόλου τὸ τοιοῦτον χρηματιστικὸν, ἐὰν τις δύνηται μονοπωλίαν αὐτῷ κατασκευάζειν. διὸ καὶ τῶν πόλεως ἐναι τοῦτον ποιοῦται τὸν πόρον, ὅταν ἀπορώσι χρημάτων· μονο- πωλιαν γὰρ τῶν ἀνίων ποιοῦσιν. ἐν Σικελίᾳ δὲ τις τεθέντος 11 παρ’ αὐτῷ νομίσματος συνεπριάτο πάντα τὸν σύδηρον ἐκ 25 τῶν σιδηρείων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὅς ἀφίκοντο ἐκ τῶν ἐμπό- ριῶν οἱ ἔμποροι, ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβο- λὴν τῆς τιμῆς· ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις ἐπέλαβεν ἐκατὸν. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν ὁ Διονύσιος αἰσθόμενος τὰ 12 μὲν χρήματα ἐκέλευσεν ἐκκομίσασθαι, μὴ μέντοι γε ἐτί 30 μένειν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὅς πόρους εὐρίσκοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ πράγμασιν ἀσύμφοροι· τὸ μέντοι ὁδρα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο ταύτων ἔστιν ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἑαυτὸς ἑτέρουσαν γενέσθαι μονοπωλίαν. χρήσιμον δὲ γνωρίζειν ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολι- 13 τικοῖς· πολλαίς γὰρ πόλεσι δεῖ χρηματισμοῦ καὶ τοιοῦτων 35 πόρων, ὡσπερ οἰκίαι, μάλλον δὲ, διὸ πολὺς καὶ πολιτεύονται τῶν πολιτευμένων ταύτα μόνον. 12 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς ὑιοκομομικῆς ἦν, ἐν μὲν δε- σποτικῇ, περὶ ἃς εἴρηται πρόστερον, ἐν δὲ πατρικῇ, τρίτον δὲ γαμικῇ· καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἁρχεῖν καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέ- 40 ρων μὲν ἀμφοῖ, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἁρχῆς, ἀλλὰ
γυναίκος μὲν πολιτικός, τέκνων δὲ βασιλικός τὸ τε γὰρ ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικότερον, εἰ μὴ ποὺ συνέστηκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ ἀτελοῦς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς πλείοντες μεταβάλλει τὸ ἀρχόν καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον (ἐξ ἰσού 5 γὰρ εἶναι βούλειται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηδέν), ὅμως δὲ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἀρχῆ τὸ δὲ ἀρχηταί, ἕστει διαφοράν εἶναι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ λόγοις καὶ τιμαῖς, ὅσπερ καὶ "Αμασίς 3 εἴπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδανιπτήρος λόγον" τὸ δ' ἀρρεν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ τούτῳ ἐξεῖ τὸν τρόπον, ἢ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἁρχὴ τοῦ βασιλικῆς τὸ γὰρ γεννηθαν καὶ κατὰ φιλίαν ἀρχον καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστὶν, ὅτε ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς ἐδόθα ἁρχῆς. διὸ καλῶς "Ομηρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν "πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε," τὸν βασιλεὰ τούτων ἀπάντων. φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ, τῷ γένει δ' εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν 15 ὅπερ πέπονθε τὸ πρεσβύτερον πρὸς τὸ νεωτέρον καὶ ὁ γεννηθας πρὸς τὸ τέκνον.

Φανερῶν τοίνυν ὅτι πλείων ἡ σπουδὴ τῆς οἰκονομίας 18 περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἢ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀσφάλειών κτήσιν, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἄρετὴν τοῦτων ἢ περὶ τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, διὶ καλομέν 20 2 πλούτων, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ὧ δοῦλων. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δοῦλων ἀπορρέουειν ἂν τις, πότερν ἐστὶν ἄρετὴ τῆς δοῦλου παρὰ τὰς ὄργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἀλλὰ τιμωτέρα τοῦτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεων, ἡ οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς 25 3 σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας. ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἄμφοτέρως· εἶτε γὰρ ἐστὶ, τὶ διοίκουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων· εἶτε μὴ ἐστὶν, διὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγον κοινωνοῦντων ἄτοπον. σχεδὸν δὲ ταῦτα ἐστὶ τὸ ἕντομον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδὸς, πότερα καὶ τοῦτον εἰσὶν ἄρεται, καὶ δεὶ τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι 30 σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρεῖαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκόμα 4 λαστὸς καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὐ; καὶ καθὼς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἀρχοντος, πότερον ἡ αὐτὴ
ἀρετὴ ἡ ἐτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλο-35 καγαθίας, διὰ τὶ τῶν μὲν ἄρχειν δεόι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ; οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον οἴδον τε διαφέ-20 ρεις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν εἴδει διαφέρει, τὸ25 δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μή, 5 θαυμασθῶν. εἶτε γὰρ ὁ ἄρχων μὴ ἔσται σώφρον καὶ δι-40 καίος, πῶς ἄρξεί καλῶς; εἴθε δ’ ἄρχόμενος, πῶς ἄρχθη-
1260 α σεταί καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ ὄν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει τῶν προσηκόντων. φανερὸν τοῖνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἀρετῆς, ταύτης δ’ εἶναι διαφοράς, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἄρχομενών, καὶ τούτο εὐθὺς ὑφήγηται περὶ τὴν 65 ψυχῆς· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ’ ἄρχόμενον, ὅν ἐτέραν φαμὲν εἶναι ἀρετῆν, οἷον τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου. δήλον τοῖνυν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὡστε φύσει τὰ πλείον ἄρχοντα καὶ ἄρχόμενα· ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλεύθερον τοῦ δούλου 710 ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θέλεος καὶ ἄνὴρ παιδὸς· καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ’ ἐνυπάρχει δια-40 φερῶντος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὄλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν, τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ’ ἀκυρόν, ὃ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ’ ἀτελές. ομοίως τοῖνυν ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς 115 ἡθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, δειν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ’ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸν ἔργον. διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστίν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἄρχιτεκτονος, ὃ δὲ λόγος ἄρχιτεκτον), τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἐκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει 20 αὐτῶς. ὡστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων 9 πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἄνδρος, οὐδ’ ἄνδρα καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ἠτε Σωκράτης, ἀλλ’ ἢ μὲν ἄρχικη ἄνδρα, ἢ δ’ ὑπηρετική. ὁμοίως δ’ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δήλον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον 10 25 ἐπισκοποῦσιν· καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἐαυτοὺς, ὅτι τὸ εὗ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι
1259 b 34—1260 b 18.

τῶν τοιούτων οὖν ᾧ ἀμείνον λέγοντι οἱ ἐξαιρεθμοῦντες
11 τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὄρισμένων. διδ δὲι, ὥσπερ ὁ ποιητὴς ἐνεκεῖ περὶ γυναίκος, οὗτο νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων, "γυναικὶ κόσμῳ ἡ στιγμὴ φέρει,” ἀλλ’ ἄνδρι 30 οὐκετί τούτο. ἐπεὶ δ’ ὁ παῖς ατελής, δῆλον δὴ τούτου μὲν καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος
12 καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δοῦλων πρὸς δεσπότην. ἔθε-μεν δὲ πρὸς τάναγκαια χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον, ὥστε δὴ-λον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δὲείαι μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μῆτε 35 δι’ ἀκολούθιαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἥλλειψη τῶν ἔργων. ἀπο-ρήσει δ’ ἐν τις, τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον εἰ ἄλληθες, ἀρα καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας δῆσει ἔχειν ἀρετῆν πολλάκις γὰρ δι’ ἀκολούθιαν
13 ἥλλειπον τῶν ἔργων. ἡ διαφέρει τούτῳ πλεῖστον; ὃ μὲν γὰρ
dοῦλος κοινώνος ζωῆς, ὃ δὲ πορρότερον, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπι-40 βάλλει ἀρετῆς ὅσον περὶ καὶ δουλείας; ὁ γὰρ βάναυσος τεχ-νίτης ἀφορισμένη τινα ἔχει δουλειαν καὶ ὁ μὲν δοῦλος 1260 b
tῶν φύσει, σκυτότους δ’ οὖδείς, οὖδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν.
14 φανερὸν τούνων ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αὐτίων εἶναι δεὶ τῷ
doūlo τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῆν διδασκαλικὴν ἐχόντα τῶν
erγῶν δεσποτικῆν. διδ λέγοιον οὐ καλῶς οὐ λόγον τοῦς δοῦ-5
λους ἀποστεροῦτες καὶ φάσκοντες ἐπιτάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον-
nουθετητέων γὰρ μάλλον τοὺς δοῦλους ἢ τοὺς παῖδας.
15 ἄλλα δὲ περὶ μὲν τούτων διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτου. περὶ
d’ ἄνδρος καὶ γυναῖκος καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρὸς, τῆς τε περὶ
eκατότων αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτοῦς ὡμιλίας, 10
tὶ τὸ καλὸς καὶ μὴ καλὸς ἑστὶ, καὶ πῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ διω-
κειν τὸ δὲ κακὸς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγ-
καίων ἐπελευθέρωσεν ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἰκία μὲν πάσα μέρος πόλεως,
tαῦτα δ’ οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὴν τοῦ δόλου δεὶ βλέ-
piein ἀρετῆν, ἀναγκαῖον πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας παῖ-15
dεῖν καὶ τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, ἐπερ οὶ διαφέρει πρὸς
tὸ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι σπουδαῖαν καὶ τὸς παῖδας εἶναι σπουδαίος
16 καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας σπουδαίας. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ διαφέρειν αἱ μὲν
γὰρ γυναῖκες ἡμισοῦ μέρος τῶν ἐλευθέρων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν παιδῶν οἱ
20 κοινωνοὺς γίνονται τῆς πολιτείας. ὥστε ἐπεὶ μὲν τούτων
dιώρισται, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐν ἀλλοις λεκτέον, ἀφέντες ὡς
tέλος ἔχοντας τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ἀλλὰν ἀρχὴν ποιησάμενοι
λέγομεν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψόμεθα περὶ τῶν ἀποφηματέων
περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀριστης.

"Επεὶ δὲ προαιρούμεθα θεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς
πολιτικῆς, τῆς κρατάσης πασῶς τοῖς δυναμένοις ζῆν ὁτι ἀλλα-
30 στα κατ' εὐχήν, δεῖ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπισκέψεις την πολι-
τείαν, ἂς τε χρόνων τίνες τῶν πόλεως τῶν εὐνομειώθαι
λεγομένων, καὶ εἰ τίνες θέτεις τυγχάνωσιν ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρή-
μέναι καὶ δοκοῦσι καλῶς ἔχειν, ἵνα τὸ τὸ θρῆσιμον, ἐτί δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ' αὐτῶς θέτειν μὴ
dοκῇ πάντως εἶναι σοφίζοντος βουλομένων, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ
35 καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχοῦσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην
dοκομεν ἐπιβαλεῖς τὴν μέθοδον. ἀρξῆν δὲ πρῶτον ποιη-
2 τέον ἢ περὶ πέφυκεν ἄρχῃ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως. ἀνάγκη
gὰρ ἦσοι πάντας πάντων κοινωνεῖ τοὺς πολίτας, ἡ μηδὲνος,
ἡ τιμῶν μὲν τιμῶν δὲ μὴ. τὸ μὲν οὖν μηδὲνος κοινωνεῖν φα-
40 νερὸν ὡς ἀδύνατον· ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τίς ἐστι, καὶ
πρῶτον ἀνάγκη τοῦ τόπου κοινωνεῖν· ὃ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἰς ὁ τῆς
1261 οἱ μιᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολίται κοινωνοὶ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως·
ἀλλὰ πότερον δος ἐνδέχεται κοινωνήγει, πάντων βέλτιον ἀ
κοινωνεῖ τὴν μέλλουσαν οἰκήσεις πόλιν καλῶς, ἡ τιμῶν
μὲν τιμῶν δὲ οὐ βέλτιον; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυ-
ναίκων καὶ κτημάτων κοινωνεῖ τοὺς πολίτας ἀλλήλοις, ὡς-
περ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης
φησὶ δεῖν κοινὰ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας εἶναι καὶ τὰς
kτήσεις. τούτῳ δὴ πότερον ὡς νῦν οὔτω βέλτιον ἔχειν, ἡ κατὰ
2 τὸν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ γεγραμμένον νόμον· ἔχει δὴ δυσχερείας
αλλας τε πολλας το παντων ειναι τας γυναικας κοινας, το
και δι ην αιτιαν φησι δειν νεομοθετησθαι τον τροπον τοιτον
ο Σωκρατης, ου φανεται συμβαινον εκ των λογων· ετι δε
προς το τελον ο φησι τη πδει δειν υπαρχειν, ως μεν ειρη-
2 ται νυν, αδυνατον, πως δε δει διελειν, ουδεν διωρισται. Λεγω
δε το μιαν ειναι την πολιν ως αριστον ον οτι μαλιστα πασαν 15
λαμβανει γαρ ταυτην υποθεσιν ο Σωκρατης. και τοι φανε-
ραν έστιν ης προιοντα και γινομενη μια μαλλον ουδε πολις
εσται πληθος γαρ τι την φυσιν έστιν η πολις, γινομενη τε
μια μαλλον οικια μεν εκ πολεως, άνθρωπος δε εις οικαι
εσται μαλλον γαρ μιαν την οικιαν της πολεως φαιμεν εν,
και τον ένα της οικιας· ος ει και δυνατος τις ειη τοιτο
3 δραν, ου ποιητεον αναιρησει γαρ την πολιν. ου μονον δε
εκ πλειονων ανθρωπων εστιν η πολις, αλλα και εις ειδε δια-
φεροντων· ου γαρ γινεται πολις εξ ομοιων. έτερον γαρ συ-
μμαχια και πολις· το μεν γαρ το το ιγραμενον, και η 25
το αυτο τοι ειδε (βοθηιας γαρ χαριν η συμμαχια πεφυ-
κειν), οποσερ αν ει σταθησε πλειον η έλκυση η διοισε δε το
τοισαντο και πολις εθνους, ηταν μη κατα κωμας ως ιαχωρι-
σινον το πληθος, αλλα οινον Άρκαδες· εξ ειν δε δει εν
4 γενεσθαι, ειδε διαφερει. διοπορ το ισον το άντιπεπυνθος 30
σαζει τας πολεις, οποσερ εν τοις ηθικοις ειρηται προτερον
επει και εν τοις έλευθεροισ και ισοις αναγκη τουτ' ειναι· άμα
γαρ ουν οιν τον παντας άρχειν, αλλα η κατ' εναιτων η
5 κατα των άλλην ταξιν η χρονον. και συμβαινει δη τον
τροπον τοιτον οστε παντας άρχειν, οποσερ αν ει μετεβαλλον
35 οι οσκεις και οι τεκτονει και μη οι αυτοι αει σκυτοτορι
και τεκτονει ήσαν· επει δε βελτιων ουτος έχειν και τα περι
την καυνωνιαν την πολιτικην, δηλον οσ τοις αυτοις αει βελ-
τιων άρχειν, ει δυνατον εν οδς δε μη δυνατον δια το την
φυσιν ισους ειναι παντας, άμα δε και δικαιον, ειτ' αγαθον 1261 b
ειτε φαβλον το άρχειν, παντας αυτοι μετεχειν, το τουτο δε
μενται το εν μερει τοις ισους εικειν το δε ου ομοιον ειναι εξ

ἀρχής ἰ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχοῦσιν οἱ δ᾽ ἀρχοῦνται κατὰ μέρος, 7 ὅστερα δὲ ἀλλοι γενόμενοι. καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχόντων ἐτεροὶ ἔτερας ἀρχοῦσιν ἀρχᾶς. φανερὸν τοινῦν ἐκ τοῦτον ὡς οὔτε πέφυκε μιᾶν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ὅσπερ λέγουσι τινες, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν ὡς μέγιστον ἄγαθὸν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπὸ τὰς πόλεις ἀναρεῖ· καὶ τοῖς το γε ἐκάστων ἄγαθῶν σαξεῖ ἐκαστον. 10 ἔστι δὲ καὶ κατ᾽ ἄλλων τρόπον φανερὸν διὶ τὸ λίαν ἐνοῦν ξη- 8 τεῖν τὴν πόλιν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀμείνων. οἰκία μὲν γὰρ αὐταρκέστε- 20 ρον ἐνός, πόλις δ᾽ οἰκίας καὶ βούλεται γ᾽ ἣδη τότε εἶναι πό- λις, ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίνῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλῆθους. εἰπέρ οὖν αἱρετἀστερον τὸ αὐταρκέστερον, καὶ τὸ ἱστον ἐν τοῦ 15 μᾶλλον αἱρετάστερον.

3 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔ ἐν τούτῳ ἄριστον ἔστι, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μά- λιστ᾽ εἶναι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὔτε τούτῳ ἀποδικυνθῶς φαίνεται κατὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐὰν πάντες ἄμα λέγωσι τὸ ἔμνι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔμνι τοῦτο γὰρ οὔτε ὁ Σωκράτης σημείων εἶναι τοῦ τὴν 20 πόλιν τελεώς εἶναι μιᾶν. τὸ γὰρ πάντες διιτόν, εἴ μὲν οὖν 2 ὡς ἐκαστος, τάχ᾽ ἀν εἰς μᾶλλον ὁ βούλεται ποιεῖν ὁ Σω- κράτης, ἐκαστος γὰρ ὑπὸν ἐαυτοῦ φήσει τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ γυ- ναίκα δὴ τὴν αὐτήν καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου δὴ τῶν συμβαίνοντων ὁσαύτως· νῦν δ᾽ οὐχ οὖτω φήσουσιν οἱ 25 κοιναῖς χρόμενοι ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις, ἀλλὰ πάν- τες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἐκαστος δ᾽ αὐτῶν. ὅροις δὲ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν 3 πάντες μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἐκαστος δ᾽ αὐτῶν. ὅτι μὲν τοῖν παρα- λογισμός τίς ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν πάντας, φανερὸν· τὸ γὰρ πάντες καὶ ἀμφότερα καὶ περίττα καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διιτόν καὶ 30 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐριστικοὺς ποιεῖ συλλογισμοὺς· διδ ἐστὶ τὸ πάν- τας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὁδὶ μὲν καλὸν, ἀλλ᾽ οὗ δυνατὸν, ὁδὶ δ᾽ οὐδὲν ὁμονοητικὸν πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι ἐτέραν ἔχει βλάβην τὸ 4 λεγόμενον. ἦκιστα γὰρ ἐπιμελείας τυχανεί τὸ πλείστων κοινῶν· τῶν γὰρ ἱδιῶν μάλιστα φροντίζουσιν, τῶν δὲ κοινῶν 35 ἱστον, ἢ ὅσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς ἐτέρου φροντίζοντος διλαγωροῦσι μᾶλλον, ὅσπερ ἐν ταῖς οἰκε-
τικαίς διακονίας οἱ πολλοὶ θεράποντες ἐνίστε χείρον ὑπηρε-
5 τοῦ τῶν ἐλαττώνων. γίνονται δ’ ἐκάστῳ χίλιοι τῶν πολιτῶν
υἱῶν, καὶ οὖντι οὖχ ὡς ἐκάστου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ τυχόντος ὁ τυχόν
όμοιος ἐστὶν νῦν: ὥστε πάντες ὁμοίως ὀλιγορθοῦσιν. έτὶ 1262 α
οὕτως ἐκαστός ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὐ πράπτοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ
κακῶς, ὡστὸς τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν, οὗν ἐμὸς ἡ τοῦ δεῖνος,
tοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγων καθ’ ἐκαστὸν τῶν χιλίων, ἡ ὅσων
ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο διαστάζων ἀδηλον γὰρ ὃ συνεβη γενε-5
6 σαί τέκνον καὶ σωθῆναι γενόμενον. καίτοι πότερον οὕτω
κρείττον τὸ ἐμὸν λέγειν ἐκαστὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προσαγορεύον-
tας διαχιλίων καὶ μυρίων, ἡ μᾶλλον ὡς νῦν ἐν ταῖς πόλεισι
7 τὸ ἐμὸν λέγουσιν; ὃ μὲν γὰρ νῦν αὐτοῦ ὃ δ’ ἄδελφον αὐτοῦ
προσαγορεῖ τὸν αὐτόν, ὃ δ’ ἀνεψιόν, ἡ κατ’ ἄλλην τινὰ 10
συγγένειαν, ἡ πρὸς αἴματος, ἡ κατ’ οἰκείοτητα καὶ κηδεῖαν
αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτερον φράτορα
φυλήν· κρείττον γὰρ ἰδιον ἀνεψιόν εἶναι ἢ τὸν τρόπον τοῦ-
8 τὸν νῦν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ οὖδὲ διαφυγεῖν δυνατόν τὸ μὴ τινας
ὑπολαμβάνειν ἑαυτῶν ἀδελφοὺς τε καὶ παιδὰς καὶ πατέρας 15
καὶ μητέρας· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ομοιότητας αἰ γίνονται τοῖς
tέκνοις πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας, ἀναγκαῖον λαμβάνειν περὶ
9 ἄλληλων τὰς πίστεις. ὃπερ φασὶ καὶ συμβαίνειν τινὲς τῶν
tάς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευόμενον· εἶναι γὰρ τις
tῶν ἀνω Διβόνων κοινὰς τὰς γυναίκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα 20
τέκνα διαφημίζαται κατὰ τὰς ομοιότητας. εἰσ’ δὲ τινές καὶ
gυναίκες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔφοι, οἰον ὕπποι καὶ βόδε, αἱ
σφόδρα πεφύκασιν ὁμοία ἀποδίδονται τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γυναι-
σιν, ὃπερ ἡ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ κληθείσα Δικαία ὕππος. ἔτι δὲ 4
καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δυσχερείας οὐ ράδιον εὐλαβηθῆναι τοῖς 25
ταύτην κατασκευάζουσι τὴν κοινωνίαν, οἰον αἰκίσας καὶ φόνον
ἀκουσάς, τοὺς δὲ ἐκουσίως, καὶ μάχας καὶ λοιδορίας· δὲν
οὐδὲν δοιον ἔστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς
μὴ πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας δυνατές, ὃπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἀποθεμὴ
ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείον συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀγνοοῦντων ἢ γνω-30
1262 b

ποικίλων, καὶ γενομένων τῶν μὲν γυνορίζόντων ἐνδέχεται τὰς
νομισμένας γίνεσθαι λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν. ἀτοπον δὲ αὐτὸς
καὶ τὸ κοινὸς ποιήσαντα τοὺς νόμους τὸ συνείναι μόνον ἀφε-
λεῖν τῶν ἔρωταν, τὸ δ’ ἐράν μὴ κωλύσαι, μηδὲ τὰς ἥρα-
26
35 σεις τὰς ἀλλὰς, διὸ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν εἶναι πάντων έστιν
ἀπρεπέστατον καὶ ἀδελφὸν πρὸς ἀδελφὸν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔραν
μόνον. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς συνουσίας ἀφελεῖν δι’ ἄλλην 3
μὲν αἰτίαν μηδεμίαν, ὡς λαῖν δὲ λογυρᾶς τῆς ἡδονῆς γυνο-
μένης· ὅτι δ’ ὁ μὲν πατὴρ ἦν υἱός, οἱ δ’ ἀδελφοὶ ἅλλοιν,
40 μηδὲν οἶσθαι διαφέρειν. ἔοικε δὲ μᾶλλον τοῖς γεωργοῖς 4
εἶναι χρήσιμον τὸ κοινὸς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τοὺς παῖ-
δας ἢ τοῖς φίλαξιν ἤτοι γὰρ ἐσται φιλία κοινῶν ὄντων
τῶν τέκνων καὶ τῶν γυναῖκῶν, δει δὲ τοιούτως εἶναι τοὺς ἀρ-
χομένους πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μὴ νεωτερίζειν. δὴν δὲ 5
συμβαίνειν ἀνάγκη τοναντίων διὰ τὸν τοιούτον νόμον δὲν
5 προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους αἰτίας γίνεσθαι; καὶ
ὅτι ἐν αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὔτως οἴεται δεῖν τάτειν τὰ περὶ
tὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας· φιλίαν τε γὰρ οἶδε θέσιν μέγιστον 6
εἶναι τῶν ἄγαθῶν ταῖς πόλεσιν (οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἦκεστα στασιά-
ζονες), καὶ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τὴν πόλιν ἔπαινει μάλιστ᾽ ὁ Σω-
κράτης· δὲ καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεινος εἶναι φησὶν τῆς φιλίας ἔργον,
καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἦσσεν λέγοντα τὸν Ἀρι-
στοφάνην ὅτι τῶν ἔρωταν διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμοῦν-
tῶν συμφυίσῃ καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ δῦο ὄντων ἀμφοτέρους ἔνας
ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἀνάγκη ἀμφοτέρους ἐφόδιασθαι ἢ τὸν ἔνα· ἐν 7
15 δὲ τῇ πόλει τῆς φιλίας ἀναγκαίον ὕδαρν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν
κοινωνίαν τὴν τοιαύτην, καὶ ἦκεστα λέγειν τὸν ἔμον ἢ υἱὸν
πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἱόν. ὁσπερ γὰρ μικρὸν γλυκὸ εἰς πολὺ 8
ὑδρω ἡμῖθαν ἀναίσθητον ποιεῖ τὴν κράσιν, οὕτω συμβαίνει
καὶ τὴν οἰκείστητα τὴν πρὸς ἅλλους τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὅνομά-
20 τῶν τοίων, διαφοροῦσιν ἦκεστα ἀναγκαίον δὲ ἐν τῇ πολι-
tελέα τῇ τοιαύτῃ, ἢ πατέρα ὡς υἱόν ἢ υἱόν ὡς πατρός, ἢ ὡς
ἀδελφοῦς ἅλλους. δύο γὰρ ἐστιν δὲ μάλιστα ποιεῖ κήδεσθαι 9
τούς ἀνθρώπους καὶ φιλεῖν, τὸ τε ἵδιον καὶ τὸ ἀγαπητὸν· ὅπως δὲ ὑδέτεροι εἶναι τῶν συνο οἱ πολεμεωμένοι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν τὰ γινόμενα τέκνα, τὰ μὲν ἐκ 25 τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τεχνιτῶν εἰς τοὺς φύλακας, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων εἰς ἐκείνους, πολλήν ἔχει ταραχὴν, τίνα ἐσται τρόπων καὶ γινώσκειν ἀναγκαίον τοὺς διδύνας καὶ μεταφέροντας 10 τοῖς τίνας διδάσκειν. ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα μάλλον ἐπὶ τούτων ἀναγκαίον συμβαίνειν, ὅπως αἰκίας ἐρωταὶ φόνους. 30 οὐ γὰρ ἔτι προσαγορεύουσιν ἄδελφοι καὶ τέκνα καὶ πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τοὺς φύλακας οἱ τε ἐκ τούς ἄλλους πολλές δοθέντες καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοὺς φύλαξ τοὺς ἄλλους πολλές, ὅστε εὐλαβεῖσθαι τῶν τοιούτων τι πράττειν διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς 35 γυναίκας κοινωνίας διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον· Ἐξόμενον δὲ τούτων ἔστιν ἑπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς κτῆς 5 σεως, τῶν τρόπων δὲ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοὺς μέλλουσι πολιτεύεσθαι τήν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, πότερον κοινῆν ἢ κυρίων 2 εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν. τοῦτο δὲ ἄν τις καὶ χωρίς σκέψαι ἀπὸ 40 τῶν περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας νενομοθεμένων, λέγω δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν πότερον κἂν ἡ ἐκεῖνα χωρίς, καθ’ 1263 a ὅν νῦν τρόπον ἔχει πάσι, τάς τε κτήσεως κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις, οἴνον τὰ μὲν γῆπεδα χωρίς, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς εἰς τὸ κοινὸν φέροντας ἀναλίσκεσιν (ὅπερ ἕνια ποιεί τῶν ἐθνῶν), ἡ σωματίων τῆν μὲν γῆν κοινῆν εἶναι καὶ χειρ- 5 γειν κοινῆν, τοὺς δὲ καρποὺς διαφεύγεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἱδίας χρήσεις (λέγονται δὲ τίνες καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κοινωνεῖν τῶν 3 βαρβάρων), ἡ καὶ τὰ γῆπεδα καὶ τοὺς καρποὺς κοινοῖς. ἐτέρων μὲν οὖν δυνατῶν τῶν γεωργοῦντων ἄλλος ἀν εἰς τρόπος καὶ βάλειν, αὐτῶν δὲ αὐτοῖς διαπονοιώντων τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ιο πλείον ἀν παρέχοι δυσκολίας· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐργοῖς μὴ γυνομένων ἵσων ἀναγκαίον ἐγκλη- ματα γίνεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολαύσεις μὲν [ἡ λαμβάνοντας] πολλά, ὀλίγα δὲ πονοῦντας, τοῖς ἐλάττω μὲν λαμβάνοντι,
ΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β’. 5.

15 πλείω δὲ πονοῦσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ συζήν καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἀν- 4
θρωπικῶν πάντων χαλεπόν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν τοιούτων.
δηλοῦσι δ' αἱ τῶν συναποδήμων κοινωνίαι σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ
πλείστοι διαφέρομεν έκ τῶν ἐν ποιτὶ καὶ έκ μεγάλων προσ-
κρούοντες ἀλλήλοις. ἐτι δὲ τῶν θεραπούντων τούτως μάλιστα
20 προσκρούομεν, οἳ πλείστα προσχρώμεθα πρὸς τὰς διακονίας
tὰς ἑγκυκλίων. τὸ μὲν οὖν κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις ταύτας 5
τε καὶ ἀλλὰς τοιαύτας ἔχει δυσχερεῖς, διὸ δὲ νῦν τρόπον
ἔχει καὶ ἐπικοσμηθεῖν ήθεσι καὶ τάξει νόμων ὅρθων, οὐ μι-
κρὸν ἀν διενέγκαι: ἔχει γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἁγαθῶν.
25 λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἐκ τοῦ κοινᾶς εἶναι τὰς κτή-
σεις καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίας. δεῖ γὰρ πῶς μὲν εἶναι κοινὰς, ὅλως
δ' ἰδίας· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι διηρημέναι τὰ ἑγκλήματα 6
πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐπιδιώκουσιν ὡς πρὸς
ἰδιὸν ἐκάστον προσεδρέουντος· δ' ἀρετὴν δ' ἔσται πρὸς τὸ χρη-
30 σθενα κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν κοινὰ τὰ φίλαν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ νῦν
τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐν ἐνίαις πόλεσιν οὕτως ὑπογεγραμμένον
ὡς οὐκ ἀν ἀδύνατον, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς καλῶς οἰκουμέναις
τὰ μὲν ἔστι τὰ δὲ γένοιτ' ἀν ἰδιαν γὰρ ἐκαστός τὴν κτήσιν 7
ἔχων τὰ μὲν χρὴσιμα ποιεῖ τοῖς φίλοις, τοῖς δὲ χρηται
35 κοινοῖς, οἷον καὶ ἐν Δακεδαλῷ τοῖς τε δούλοις χρώναι
τοῖς ἀλλήλων ὡς εἰπεῖν ἰδιοῖς, ἔτι δ' ἔποιοι καὶ κυσίν, καὶ
δεψάουσιν ἐφοδιάν ἐν τοῖς ἀγρόις κατὰ τὴν χώραν. φανερὸν 8
τούτων ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρῆ-
σει ποιεῖν κοινᾶς· ὅπως δὲ γίνονται τοιοῦτοι, τοῦ νομοθέτου
40 τοῦτ' ἐργον ἰδιῶν ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀμύθητον ὅσον
dιαφέρει τὸ νομίζειν ἰδιῶν τι· μὴ γὰρ οὖ ματὴν τὴν πρὸς
αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἔχει φιλίαν ἐκατοστό, ἀλλ' ἐστι τοῦτο φυσικὸν.
τὸ δὲ φίλαντον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως· οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ 9
φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἥ δεῖ φιλεῖν, καθάπερ
καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλοῦσι γε πάντες ὡς εἰπεῖν
5 ἐκαστὸν τῶν τοιούτων. ἀλλὰ μὴ καὶ τὸ χαρίσασθαι καὶ
βοηθῆσαι φίλοις· ἥ εἶνος ἡ ἐταίροις ἡδίστον· δ γίνεται τῆς
10 κτήσεως ἑιδίας ὑσῆς. ταῦτα τε ἐς οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς λίαν ἐν ποιοῦσι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἀναίρεσθαι ἔργα δυὸν ἀρετῶν φανερῶς, σωφροσύνης μὲν τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας (ἔργον γὰρ καλῶν ἀλλοτρίας ὑσῆς ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ σωφρο- 10 σύνην), ἑλευθερίατος δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις· οὔτε γὰρ ἐσται φανερῶς ἑλευθερίαν ὅν, οὔτε πράξει πρᾶξιν ἑλευθερίαν οὐδε- μίαν ἐν τῇ γὰρ χρήσει τῶν κτημάτων τὸ τῆς ἑλευθερίατη- τος ἔργον ἐστὶν.

11 Εὐπρόσωπος μὲν οὖν ἠ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάν- 15 θράσους ἀν εἶναι δόξειν· ὁ γὰρ ἀκροάμενος ἄσμενος ἀποδέ- χεται, νομίζων ἐσέσθαι φιλάν τινα θαυμαστὴν πάσι πρὸς ἀπαντὰς, ἄλλους τε καὶ διὸν κατηγορή τις τῶν νῦν ύπαρ- χόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὡς γνωμένον διὰ τὸ μὴ κοινῆν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ δίκαι τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους 20 περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ψευδομαρτυρίων κρίσεις καὶ πλουσίων
12 κολακείας· ὃν οὖν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνίαν ἀλλὰ 25 διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοι- νονοῦντας πολλοὶ διαφερομένους μᾶλλον ὅρωμεν ἢ τοὺς χωρίς 30 τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντας· ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν ὅλγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοι- 25 νοιῶν διαφερομένους πρὸς πολλοὺς συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτη- 30 τοὺς κτήσεις. ἐτι δὲ δίκαιον μὴ μόνον λέγειν ὅσων στερήσονται κακῶν κοινωνήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν φαίνεται δὲ εἶναι πάμπαν ἄδονατος ὁ βίος, αἰτίων 35 δὲ τῷ Σωκράτει τῆς παρακρούσεως χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπόθε- 30 σιν οὖν οὕτω ὄρθιν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ποσὶ μίαν καὶ τὴν 35 ὁικίαν καὶ τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ’ οὕτω πάντως. ἐστι μὲν γὰρ ὡς οὐκ ἐσται προϊόνσα πόλις, ἐστι δ’ ὡς ἐσται μὲν, ἐγγὺς δ’ οὕσα τοῦ μη πόλις εἶναι χείρων πόλις, ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ τις τὴν 40 συμφωνίαν ποιήσειν ὁμοφωνίαν ἢ τὸν ρυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν. 35 15 ἀλλὰ δεὶ πλῆθος δν, ὥσπερ εἰρηται πρὸτερον, διὰ τὴν παι- δείαν κοινῆν καὶ μίαν παιεῖν· καὶ τὸν γε μέλλοντα παιδείαν εἰσάγειν, καὶ νομίζοντα διὰ ταύτης ἐσέσθαι τὴν πόλιν σπου- δαίαν, ἄτοπον τοῖς τοιούτοις οἶλοθαι διορθοῦν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς
40 ἔθεσι καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, ὡσπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Δακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συνστίτοις ὁ
1264 αὐτοῖς ἐκοινωσε. δεὶ δὲ μηδὲ τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἀγγείῳ, ὅτι χρὴ ἐν
προσέχειν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἑτέοι, ἐν οἷς
οὐκ ἐξαιτεὶ εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς ἐχεῖν πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν εὐρήται μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοῖς δὲ οὐ χρῶνται
5 γινώσκοντες. μάλιστα δὲ ἄν γένοιτο φαινοῦν, εἰ τίς τοῖς ἐρ-17
gοις ἴδοι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν κατασκευαζομένην· οὐ γὰρ
δυνήσεται μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιήσαι τὴν πό-
λιν, τὰ μὲν εἰς συσσίτια, τὰ δὲ εἰς φρατρίας καὶ φυλᾶς,
ὥστε οὐδὲν ἀλλὸ συμβῆσαι νευομοθετημένον πλὴν μὴ γεωρ-
10 γεῖν τοῦς φύλακας· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Δακεδαίμονι ποιεῖν ἐπι-
χειροῦσιν. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ᾽ οὔδε ὁ τρόπος τῆς δῆς πολιτείας τῆς
18 ἔσται τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν, οὔτ' εἰρήκεν ὁ Συκράτης οὕτω βέβαιον
εἰπεῖν. καὶ τοῖς σχεδὸν τὸ γε πλῆθος τῆς πόλεως τὸ τῶν ἄλ-
λων πολίτων γίνεται πλῆθος, περὶ δὲν οὖν διόρισται, πότε-
15 ρον καὶ τοῖς γεωργοῖς κοινὰς εἶναι δεὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ καὶ
καθ' ἑκαστὸν ἴδιας, ἔτι δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παιδὰς ἴδιους
ἡ κοινός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον κοινὰ πάντα πάν-19
των, τὶ διοίσουσιν οὕτοι ἑκείνοι τῶν φυλάκων; τὴν ἐπὶ
πλείου τοὺς ὑπομένουσι τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν; τὴν μαθώντες ὑπομενοῦσι
20 τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἦν μὴ τὶ σοφοῦσιν τοιοῦτον οὖν Κρήτης;
ἐκείνου γὰρ τᾶλλα ταῦτα τοῖς δοῦλοις ἐφέστε μονὸν ἀπει-
ρήκασι τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄπλων κτήσιν. εἰ δὲ, κα-
20 θάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεις, καὶ παρ' ἑκείνοις ἔσται τὰ
tοιαύτα, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῆς κοινωνίας; ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ πό-25
λεῖ δύο πόλεις ἀναγκαίον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα ὑπεναντιᾶς
ἀλλήλαις· ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οὖν φρουροὺς, τοὺς δὲ
γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας. ἐγκλή-21
ματα δὲ καὶ δίκαι, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα ταῖς πόλεσιν ὑπάρχειν
φημι κακά, πάντ' ὑπάρξει καὶ τούτοις. καίτοι λέγει ὁ Σω-
30 κράτης ὡς οὐ πολλῶν δείχνονται νομίμων διὰ τὴν παιδείαν,
oίον ἀστυνομικῶν καὶ ἀγορανομικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν
22 τοιούτων, ἀποδίδοις μένον τήν παιδείαν τοῦ φύλαξιν, ἑτεὶ δὲ κυρίως ποιεὶ τῶν κτημάτων τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἀποφορὰν φέροντας ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι χαλεποὺς καὶ φρονημάτων πλῆρεις ἢ τᾶς παρ’ ἐνώσις εἰλωτεῖας τε καὶ πενεοτεῖας
23 καὶ δουλείας. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εἰτ’ ἀναγκαῖα ταῦθ’ ὅμοιος εἶτε μή, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διάφρηται, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων, τίς ἢ τούτων τε πολιτεία καὶ παιδεία καὶ νόμοι τῆς. ἐστι δ’ οὔτε εὑρείν ῥᾴδιον, οὔτε τὸ διαφέρον μικρὸν, τὸ ποιεῖσθαι τίνας εἶναι
24 τούτων πρὸς τὸ σάξεσθαι τήν τῶν φυλάκων κοινωνίαν. ἀλλὰ 4ο
μὴν εἰ γε τὰς μὲν γυναίκας ποιῆσει κοινὰς τᾶς δὲ κτήσεις
25 ἀνδράσιν, οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν. ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ὡς καθίστησιν ὁ Σωκράτης ἀεὶ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀρχοντας, τοῦτο δὲ στάσεως αἰτίων γίνεται καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μηδέν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοις, ἡπουθεν δὴ παρὰ γε θυμηθῇ καὶ πολεμικὸς ἀνδράσιν. ὅτι δ’ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ 1ο
ποιεῖν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀρχοντας, φανερῶν οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἄλλοις ὅτε δὲ ἄλλοις μέμικται τοῖς ψυχαῖς ο παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ χρυσός, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. φησὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐθὺς γνωμενοῖς μίξει χρυσῶν, τοῖς δ’ ἀργυρῶν, χαλκὸν δὲ καὶ σίδηρον
26 τοὺς τεχνίτας μέλλουσιν ἔσεσθαι καὶ γεωργοῖς. ἑτεὶ δὲ καὶ 15
τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀφαιρούμενος τῶν φυλάκων, δὴν φησὶ δεῖν εὐδαιμονια ποιεῖν τὴν πόλιν τὸν νομοθέτην, ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖ δὴν, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἡ μὴ πάντων μερῶν ἡ τινῶν ἐχόντων τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖ ὀντερ τὸ ἁρτιον τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τῷ δ回合 2ο
ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δὲ μερῶν μηδετέρον, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ οἱ φύλακες μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖς, τίνες ἔτεροι; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἱ γε τεχνίται καὶ τὸ πλήθος τὸ τῶν βαναύσων. ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία περὶ ἢς ὁ Σωκράτης εἶρηκεν,
25 ταύτας τε τὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ τοῦτων οὐκ ἐλάττουσ ἐτέρας.

6 Ἐλκιδών δὲ παραπλησίως καὶ περὶ τοὺς νόμους ἔχει τοὺς ὑστερον γραφέντας· διό καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐνταύθα πολιτείας ἐπίσκεψασθαι μικρὰ βέλτιον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ ὀλγών πάμπαν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, περὶ τε γνωσιῶν καὶ τέκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἔχειν δεί, καὶ περὶ κτήσεως, καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὴν τάξιν· διακρινόμενος δὲ εἰς δύο μέρη τὸ 2 πλῆθος τῶν οἰκουντών, τὸ μὲν εἰς τοὺς γεωργούς, τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ χρήσιμον μέρος, τρίτον δὲ ἐκ τοῦτον τὸ βουλευμένον καὶ κύριον τῆς πόλεως· περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνών, 3

35 πότερον οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μετέχουσι τινος ἀρχής, καὶ πότερον ὅπλα δεῖ κεκτῆσαι καὶ τοῦτος καὶ συμπολεμεῖν ἢ μή, περὶ τοῦτων οὐδεν διώρικεν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ τὰς μὲν γνωσιάς ὁμοίως δεῖ καὶ συμπολεμεῖν καὶ παιδείας μετέχειν τῆς αὐτῆς τοῖς φύλαξιν, τὰ δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἔξωθεν λόγοις πεπλήρωκεν τὸν ἐν λόγον καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδείας, πολλαὶ δεὶ γίνεσθαι τῶν φυλάκων. τῶν δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλείστων μέρος νόμοι 4

τυγχάνον εἰς τρίτης πολιτείας εἰρήκεν, καὶ ταύτην βουλήμενοι κοινοτέραν ποιεῖν ταῖς πόλεσι, κατὰ μικρὸν περιέχει πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἐτέραν πολιτείαν· ἔστω γὰρ 5 τῆς τῶν γνωσιῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κτήσεως, τὰ ἄλλα ταύτα ἀποδίδουσιν ἀμφοτέρας ταῖς πολιτείαις· καὶ γὰρ παιδείαν τὴν αὐτήν, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐργῶν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπεχομένους ἐξ, καὶ περὶ συσσίτων ὁσαυτῶς· πλὴν ἐν ταύτῃ φησὶ δεῖν εἰς αὐτῆς καὶ γνωσιῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν χιλίων τῶν ὀπλα κεκτημένων, ταύτην δὲ πεντακοσικιλίων. τὸ μὲν 6 ὁμοί του τετρακοσίων πάντως οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομψὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ ἑπτατικόν, καλῶς δὲ πάντα ὕσον χαλεπῶν, ἑπεὶ καὶ τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον πλῆθος dei μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι χώρας δεῦσει τοῖς τοσούτοις Βαβυλωνίας 15 ἔν τινος ἄλλης ἀπεράντου τὸ πλῆθος, ἐξ ἦς ἄργοι πεντακισ- χίλιοι θρέψονται, καὶ περὶ τοῦτος γνωσιῶν καὶ θεραπόν-
7τῶν ἐτερος ὀχλος πολλαπλάσιος. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ὑποτίθεσθαι κατ' εὐχήν, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον. λέγεται δ’ ὡς δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην πρὸς δύο βλέποντα τιθέναι τοὺς νόμους, πρὸς τὴν χώραν καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. ἐτὶ δὲ καλὸς ἔχει προσθεῖ-20 ναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιάτας τόπους, εἰ δεῖ τὴν πόλιν χίν βίον πολιτικόν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀναγκαίως ἔστιν αὐτὴν τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ὀπλοῖς ἢ χρήσιμα κατὰ τὴν 8 οἰκεῖαν χώραν ἑστὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω τόπους. εἰ δὲ τὶς μη τοιοῦτον ἀποδέχεται βίον, μήτε τὸν ἰδίον μήτε τὸν 25 κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως, ὅμως οὐδὲν ἤτον δεῖ φοβερὸς εἶναι τοῖς πολεμίωσι, μηδὲν ἑλθοῦσιν εἰς τὴν χώραν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπελθοῦσιν. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὄραν δεί, μῆποτε βέλτιον ἐτέρως διορίσαι τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον, τοσαύτην γὰρ εἶναι φησὶ δεῖν ὅστε ζῆν σωφρόνως, ὅσπερ ἄν εἰ τίς εἶπεν 30 ὅστε ζῆν εὖ (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον· ἐτὶ δ’ ἐστὶ σω- φρόνως μὲν ταλαιπώρως δὲ ζῆν). ἀλλὰ βελτίων ὅρος τὸ σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίας (χωρὶς γὰρ ἐκάτερον τὸ μὲν τῷ τρυφῶν ἀκολούθησει, τὸ δὲ τῷ ἐπίπόνως), ἐπεί μόναι γ’ εἰσίν ἔξεις ἀιρεταὶ περὶ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας χρήσιν αὐταῖ, οἷον 35 οὐσία πράως ἢ ἀνδρείος χρῆσθαι οὐκ ἐστίν, σωφρόνως δὲ καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἑστῖν, ὅστε καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαίοι περὶ αὐτῆν 40 εἶναι ταύτας. ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἵσαζοντα τὸ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ’ ἀφεῖ- ναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀδριστον ὡς ἰκανός ἄν ὁμαλοθεσμομένην 45 εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὰς ἀτεκνίας ὀσωνου ἄνωμον ῥομαπαράξυνας μηδὲν ἔχειν, εάν τε ἐλάττους ὥσι τὸ πλῆθος εἀν τε 50 ὑπολάβους τις ἀν ὄρισθαι τῆς οὐσίας τὴν τεκνοποιίαν, ὅστε ἀριθμοῦ τινὸς ἡ πλείονα γεννᾶν· τούτῳ δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέποντα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἄν

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syμβαίνη τελευτάν τινάς τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρὸς τὴν
10 τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν. τὸ δ’ ἀφεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς 13
πλείσταις πόλεσι, πενίας ἀναγκαίον αὐτίνι γίνεσθαι τοῖς πο-
λίταις, ἢ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καὶ κακουργίαν. Φειδών
μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ἂν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς
οἶκους ἱσοὺς φόβη θεὶν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν,
15 καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνύσους εἰξον πάντες κατὰ μέ-
γεθος· ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις τοὐναντίον ἑστίν. ἀλλὰ περὶ 14
μὲν τούτων πῶς οἴμεθα βέλτιον ἢ ἐξείν, λεκτέων ὑπέρον·
ἐλλέλεπται δὲ τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀρχον-
tας, ὅπως ἐσονται διαφέροντες τῶν ἀρχομένων· φησὶ γὰρ
20 δείν, ὡσπερ εἷς ἑτέρον τὸ στημίδιον ἐρίου γίνεται τῆς κράσης,
οὐτω καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐξείνοι δεῖν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχομένους. ἐπεὶ 15
δὲ τὴν πᾶσαν σύσιαν ἑφίσης γίνεσθαι μείζονα μέχρι πεντα-
πλασίας, διὰ τέ τούτ’ οὐκ ἂν εἶχ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς μέχρι τινός;
καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δεὶ σκοπεῖν, μὴ ποτ’ οὐ
25 συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν· δύο γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἐκάστῳ ἔνειμε
διελῶν χωρίς, χαλεπῶ δὲ οἰκίας δύο οἰκεῖν. ἢ δὲ σύνταξις 16
ἑλε βουλέται μὲν εἶναι μῆτε δημοκρατία μῆτε ὀλιγαρχία,
μέσῃ δὲ τούτων, ἢ καλοῦν πολιτείαν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὀπλι-
tευόντων ἑστίν, εἰ μὲν οὖν ὡς κοινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκεύα-
30 ζει ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν, καλῶς εἰρήκεν ἱσως,
εἰ δ’ ὡς ἀριστήν μετά τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, ὦ καλῶς· τάχα
γὰρ τήν τῶν Δακών ἀν τὰς ἐπανείσειε μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ
35 ἄλλην τυα ἀριστοκρατικωτέραν. ἐνιοὶ μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν ὡς δεὶ 17
τὴν ἀριστήν πολιτείαν εἰς ἀπασῶν εἶναι τῶν πολιτειῶν μεμ-
γμένην, διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων ἐπανοῦσιν εἶναι
γὰρ αὐτήν οἱ μὲν εἰς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημο-
κρατίας φασῶν, λέγοντες τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν μοναρχίαν, τὴν
δὲ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, δημοκρατεῖσθαι δὲ
30 κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχὴν διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ δῆμου εἶναι τοὺς
ἐφόρους· οἱ δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐφορεῖαν εἶναι τυραννίδα, δημοκρα-
teίσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν συνόσιτια καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βίον τῶν
18 καθ' ἡμέραν' ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἰρηταὶ τοῦτοι ὡς δἐν συν- 1266 a
κεῖσθαι τὴν ἀριστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννι-
dos, ὡς ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἀν τις θείη πολιτείας ἢ χειρίστας
tασῶν. Βέλτιον οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πλείους μυγύνετε· ἡ γὰρ ἐκ
πλείων συγκειμένη πολιτεία βελτίων. ἔπειτα οὖθ' ἔχουσα 5
φαίνεται μοναρχικὸν οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγαρχικὰ καὶ δημοκρα-
tικὰ· μᾶλλον δ' ἐγκλίνειν βούλεται πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.
19 δὴλον δὲ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀρχώντων καταστάσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
ἐξ αἰρετῶν κληροτοὺς κοινὸν ἀμφότερον, τὸ δὲ τοῖς μὲν εὐσπορο-
tέροις ἐπάναγκες ἐκκλησιάζειν εἶναι καὶ φέρειν ἄρχοντας 10
ἡ τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τῶν πολιτικῶν, τοὺς δ' ἀφεῖσθαι, τούτο δ' ὀλιγαρχικὸν, καὶ τὸ πειρασθαὶ πλείους ἐκ τῶν εὐσπόρων εἶναι
tοὺς ἄρχοντας, καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμη-
tων. ὀλιγαρχικὴν δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ τὴν τῆς βουλῆς αἱρεσίν· αἱροῦν-
tαι μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμῆ-15
ματος, εἰστα πάλιν Ἰουσ ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἰτ' ἐκ τῶν τρίτων·
πλὴν οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες ἢν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριτῶν ἢ τετάρτων,
ἐκ δὲ [τοῦ τετάρτου] τῶν τετάρτων μόνοις ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρῶ-
tοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις. ἐξ' ἐκ τούτων ἴσον ἢφ' ἐκάστου τιμῆ-
ματος ἀποδειχεῖ φησί δεῖν ἀριθμὸν. ἔσονται δὴ πλείους οἱ 20
ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους διὰ τὸ ἐνώσις μή
22 αἱρεῖσθαι τῶν δημοσίων διὰ τὸ μη ἐπάναγκες. ὡς μὲν οὖν
οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύ-
tην πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερῶν καὶ τῶν οὐστερὸν ῥηθησομέ-
νων, ὅταν ἐπιβάλλῃ περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἢ σκέψις· 25
ἐχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἱρέσιν τῶν ἀρχώντων τὸ εξ αἰρετῶν
αἰρετοῦς ἑπικύνδυνον· εἰ γὰρ τινὲς συντηναὶ θέλουσι καὶ μέτριοι
tὸ πλῆθος, αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἱρεθήσονται βούλησιν, τὰ
μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τούτον ἐχεῖ
tῶν τρόπον· 30

Ἠλεί οὖν τινὲς πολιτείαι καὶ ἄλλαι, αἰ μὲν ἴδιωτῶν αἱ 7
δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν, πάσαι δὲ τῶν καθεστηκινών
καὶ καθ' ἂς πολιτεύονται νῦν ἐγγύτερον εἰς τούτων ἀμφο-

D 2
36 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β'. 7.

tέρων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὗτε τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς
35 γυναῖκας ἂλλος κεκαινοτόμηκεν, οὗτε περὶ τὰ συστήτα τῶν
γυναικῶν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαλῶν ἀρχονται μᾶλλον.
δοκεῖ γὰρ τισὶ τὸ περὶ τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι μέγιστον τετάχθαι 2
καλῶς· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι φασὶ τὰς στάσεις πάν-
tας. διὸ Φαλέας ο Ἡρακλῆδος τούτω εἰσήγηγεν πρῶτος·
40 φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν ἤςασ εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις τῶν πολιτῶν. τοῦτο 3
1266 δὲ κατοικισμέναις μεν εὐθὺς οὐ χαλεπῶν φετο ποιεῖν, τὰς
8' ἡδὴ κατοικουμένως ἔργῳ δεστέρον μὲν, ὅμως δὲ τάξιστ' ἐν
ἀμαλοῦναι τῷ τὰς προίκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν
λαμβάνειν δὲ μή, τοὺς δὲ πένητας μὴ διδόναι μὲν λαμβά-
5 νείν δὲ. Πλάτων δὲ τοὺς νόμους γράφων μέχρι μὲν τινος 4
φέτο δεῖν ἐάν, πλεῖον δὲ τοῦ πενταπλασίων εἶναι τῆς ἐλα-
χίστης μηδείν τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξουσίαν εἶναι κτήσεασθαι, καθά-
περ εἰρῆσθαι καὶ πρότερον. δεὶ δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο λανθάνειν τοὺς 5
οὕτω νομοθετούντας, δ λανθάνει νῦν, οτι τὸ τῆς οὐσίας τάττον-
10 τάς πλῆθος προσήκει καὶ τῶν τέκνων τὸ πλῆθος τάττειν
ἐάν γὰρ ύπεραίρῃ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ μέγεθος ὁ τῶν τέκνων ἄριθ-
μός, ἀνάγκη τὸν γε νόμον λύσθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς λύσεως
φαίλων τὸ πολλοὺς ἐκ πλουσίων γίνεσθαι πένητας· ἔργον
γὰρ μὴ νεωτεροποιοῦσι εἶναι τοὺς τοιούτους. διότι μὲν οὖν ἔχει 6
15 τινὰ δύναμιν εἰς τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν ἡ τῆς οὐσίας ὑμα-
λότης, καὶ τῶν πάλαι τινές φαίνονται διεγνωκότες, οἷον καὶ
Σέλων ἐνομοθέτησεν, καὶ παρ' ἄλλοις ἐστὶ νόμος δὲ κωλύει
κτάσθαι γην ὅποιν ἀν βούληται τις' ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν
οὐσίαν πολεῖν οἱ νόμοι καλοῦσιν, δόσπερ ἐν Δοκρίδος νόμος
20 ἐστὶ μὴ πολεῖν, ἐὰν μὴ φανερὰν ἄτυχίαν δείξῃ συμβεβή-
κυίαν· ἐτὶ δὲ τοὺς παλαιοὺς κλήρους διασώζειν· τούτο δὲ λυθὲν 7
καὶ περὶ Δευκάδα δημοτικὴν ἐστάσεις λαῖν τὴν πολιτείαν
αὐτῶν, οὐ γὰρ ἐτὶ συνέβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρισμένων τιμημά-
tων εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐστι τὴν ισότητα μὲν
25 ὕπαρχειν τῆς οὐσίας, ταῦτα δὲ ἡ λίαι εἶναι πολλήν, ὡστε
τρυφάν, ἡ λίαι ὁλίγην, ὡστε ζῆν γλαύχρως. δὴλον οὖν ὡς
οδ' ἰκανὸν τὸ τὰς οὖσιν ἵσας ποιῆσαι τῶν νομοθέτην, ἀλλὰ 8 τοῦ μέσου στοχαστῶν. ἔτι δ' εἰ τις καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειν οὖσιαν πάσιν, οὐδὲν ὅφελος· μᾶλλον γὰρ δεῖ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀμαλλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὖσιας, τούτῳ δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ παιδευομένοις 30 ικανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων. ἀλλ' ἵσως ἃν εἴπειεν ὁ Φαλέας ὅτι ταῦτα πυγχάνει λέγων αὐτός· οἴεσαι γὰρ δυνὸν τούτων ἱστήτιτε δεῖν ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, κτήσεως καὶ παιδείας. 9 ἀλλ' τὴν τε παιδείαν ἥτις ἐσται δεῖ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐδὲν ὅφελος· ἕστι γὰρ τὴν αὐτήν μὲν 35 εἶναι καὶ μίαν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην εἶναι τοιαύτην ἐξ ἂς ἔσονται προαιρητικοὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τιμῆς ἢ συναμφοτέρων. ἔτι στασιάζουσιν οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα τῆς κτήσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν τιμῶν· τούναντὶν δὲ περὶ ἐκάτερον οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τᾶς κτήσεως ἄνει, 40 σον, οὐ δὲ χαρίεστες περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἴσαί· ὅθεν καὶ “ἐν 1267 a 11 δὲ ἦν τιμῆ ἤμεν κακὸς ἢδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός.” οὐ μόνον δ' οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ διὰ τὰναγκαία ἀδικοῦσιν, ἄν ἄκος εἶναι νομίζει τὴν ἱσότητα τῆς οὖσίας, ὡστ' ἂμη λασποδιεῖν διὰ τὸ μιγόν ἢ πεινήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅποις χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν ἐὰν 5 γὰρ μείζω ἔχοσιν ἐπιθυμίαι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, διὰ τὴν 12 ταύτης ἱστρείας ἀδικήσουσιν ὡς τούνων διὰ ταύτῃ τὸν ὑμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἀνεῦ λυπῶν ἡδονάς. τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τιμῶν τούτων; τοῖς μὲν οὖσία βραχείᾳ καὶ ἐργασίᾳ, τοῖς δὲ σφοροσύνη τρίτην δ', εἰ τινες οὐ 15 βούλουσιν δ' αὐτῶν χαίρειν, οὐκ ἄν ἐπιζητοῦσι εἰ μὴ παρὰ 13 φιλοσοφίας ἄκος, αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι ἀνθρώπων δεόνται· ἐπεὶ ἀδικοῦσι γε τὰ μέγιστα διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὰ ἀναγκαία, οἷον τυραννοῦσι οὐχ ἵνα ἂμη μιγόσιν. διὸ καὶ 14 αὐτοὶ μεγάλαι, ἢν ἄποκτειν τις οὐ κλέπτην ἀλλὰ 15 τύραννον. ὡστε πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθητικὸς μόνον τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. ἐτὶ τὰ πολλὰ βουλεῖται κατασκευάζειν ἐξ όν τὰ πρὸς αὐτοῦς πολιτεύουσι καλῶς, δεὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνιώντας καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πάντας.
20 ἄναγκαίων ἄρα τὴν πολιτείαν συντετάχθαι πρὸς τὴν πολεμικὴν ἱσχύν, περὶ ἣς ἔκεινος οὐδὲν εἰρήκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 15 περὶ τῆς κτήσεως· δει γὰρ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς χρήσεις ἴκανὴν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξωθεὶς κινδύνους. διόπερ οὔτε τοσούτων δει πλῆθος ὑπάρχειν δὲν οἱ 25 πληθοῦν καὶ κρείττους ἐπιθυμήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἔχοντες ἀμύνειν οὐ δυνάσκονται τοὺς ἐπιώντας, οὐθ’ οὔτως ὅλην ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι πόλεμον ὑπενεγκεῖν μηδὲ τῶν ἱσων καὶ τῶν ὠμοίων. ἔκεινος μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν διώρικεν, δει δὲ τούτο μὴ λανθάνειν, δητι 16 συμφέρει πλῆθος οὐσίας. ἵσως οὖν ἄριστος ὅρος τὸ μὲν λυσι- 30 τελείω τοῖς κρείττους διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν πολεμέων, ἀλλ’ οὔτως ὃς ἀν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαυτὴν οὐσίαν. οἶον Εὐβοῦν- 17 λος Αὐτοφραδάτου μέλλοντος Ἀταρνέα πολιορκεῖν ἐκέλευ- σεν αὐτὸν, σκεψάμενον ἐν πόσῳ χρόνῳ λήψεται τὸ χρόνιον, λογίσασθαι τοῦ χρόνου τούτου τὴν διάπανην· ἐθέλει γὰρ 35 ἐλαττὸν τοῦτον λαβὼν ἐκλιπεῖν ἢ δὴ τῶν Ἀταρνέα· ταύτα δ’ εἰπὼν ἐποίησε τὸν Αὐτοφραδάτην σύννοις γενόμενον παύσασ- θαι τῆς πολιορκίας. ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὶ τῶν συμφερόντων τὸ 18 τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι ἵσως τοῖς πολιταῖς πρὸς τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ μὴν μέγα οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἄν οἱ 40 χαρίεντες ἀγανακτοῦειν ἃν ὅσοι ίσον δυτεῖς ἄξιοι, διδ καὶ φαίνονται πολλάκις ἐπιτιθέμενοι καὶ στασιάζοντες· ἔτι δ’ 19

1267 b ἡ πονηρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπληστοῦ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἱκανὸν διαβολιὰ μόνον, ὅταν δ’ ἦδη τοῦτ’ ἦ πάτριον, αἰεί δεόν- ται τοῦ πλείονος, ἐως εἰς ἄπειρον ἠλθον· ἄπειρος γὰρ ἡ ἔπιθυμία φύσις, ἂς πρὸς τὴν ἀναπλήρωσιν οἱ πολλοὶ 5 ζῶσιν. τῶν οὖν τοιούτων ἄρχη, μάλλον τοῦ τὰς οὐσίας ὡμ- 20 λίζειν, τὸ τοῦτο μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς τῇ φύσις τοιούτου παρασκευά- ζειν ὡστε μὴ βούλεσθαι πλεονεκτεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φαίλουσ ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι· τοῦτο δ’ ἔστιν, ἂν ἦττοις τε δοι καὶ μὴ ἀδικών- ται. οὐκαλὸς δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἵστοτητα τῆς οὐσίας εἰρήκεν· περὶ 21 10 γὰρ τὴν τῆς γῆς κτήσιν ἱσάξει μόνον, ἔστι δὲ καὶ δοῦλων καὶ βοσκημάτων πλοῦτος καὶ νομίσματος, καὶ κατασκευὴ
πολλή τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων. ἢ πάντων ὁδοιπόρων ἤπε ἐκ τῆς νομοθεσίας κατασκευάζον τὴν πόλιν μικράν, εἰ γ' οἱ τεγνίται πάντες δημόσιοι ἐσονται καὶ μὴ 15
23 πλήρωμα τι παρέξονται τῆς πόλεως. ἀλλ' εἰπέρ δεὶ δημοσίους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ κοινά ἐργαζόμενους, δεὶ καθάπερ ἐν ἑπιδάμον τε, καὶ Διδάφαντος ποτε κατεσκεύαζεν 'Αθήνης, τοῦτον ἐξειν τὸν τρόπον. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας σχεδὸν ἐκ τούτων ἄν τις θεωρήσειεν, εἰ τι τυγχάνει 20 καλῶς εἰρηκὼς ἢ μὴ καλῶς.

Ἰππόδαμος δὲ Ἐυρυφόντος Μιλήσιος, δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν 8 πόλεως διαίρεσιν ἔδρε καὶ τὸν Πειραιά κατέτεμεν, γενόμενος καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίων περιττότερον διὰ φιλοτιμίαν οὕτως ὡστε δοκεῖν ἐνίοις ζήν περιεργότερον τρίχων τε πλήθει καὶ 25 κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ, ἐτί δὲ ἐσθητὸς εὐτελοῦς μὲν ἀλειευής δὲ οὐκ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι μόνον ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τοὺς θερινοὺς χρόνους, λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὄλην φύσιν εἶναι βουλόμενος, πρῶτος τῶν μὴ πολιτευομένων ἐνεχείρησε τι περὶ πολιτείας 2 εἰπεὶν τῆς ἀρίστης. κατεσκεύαζε δὲ τὴν πόλιν τῷ πλήθει 30 μὲν μυριάνδρον, εἰς τρία δὲ μέρη διηρμημένην ἐποίει γάρ ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἐν δὲ γεωργούς, τρίτον δὲ τῷ προ- 3 πολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὁπλα ἐχον. διήρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη τὴν χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἰεράν, τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν, τὴν δ' Ἰδιαν' οἴεν μὲν τὰ νομίζόμενα ποιήσοντι πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἰεράν, ἀφ' ἄν 35 δ' οἱ προπολεμοῦντες βιώσονται, κοινήν, τὴν δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν 4 ἱδίαν. φιτοὶ δ' εἶδο καὶ τῶν νόμων εἶναι τρία μόνων' περὶ δὲ γὰρ αἱ δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταύτ' εἰναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ὦβριν βλαβήν ἄνατον. ἐνομοθέτει δὲ καὶ δικαστήριον ἐν τῷ κύριον, εἰς 5 τὰς ἀνάγεσθαι δεῖν τὰς μὴ καλῶς κεκρί-40 σθαι δοκοῦσας δίκαια· τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκεύαζεν ἐκ τίνων γε- 5 πάντων αἵρετῶν. τὰς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ διὰ 1268 ἡ ψηφοφορία φέτοι γίνεσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν ἐκαστον πυ- νάκιον, ἐν ὑ γράφειν, εἰ καταδικάζοι ἀπλῶς τὴν δίκην, εἰ
δ' ἀπολόγοι ἄπλως, κενῶν· εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μὴ, ταύτῳ 5 διορίζειν. νῦν γὰρ οὐκ ἔτεκτο νενομοθετήσθαι καλῶς· ἀναγκα-ζεῖν γὰρ ἐπιορκεῖν ἡ ταῦτα ἡ ταῦτα δικαζομαι. ἐπὶθεὶ δὲ 6 νόμον περὶ τῶν εὐρισκόντων τι τῇ πόλει συμφέρον, ὅπως τυγχάνοσι τιμῆς, καὶ τοῖς παισὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τε-λευτῶν ἐκ δημοσίου γίνεσθαι τὴν τροφὴν, ὡς οὖν τοῦτο 10 παρ' ἄλλοις νενομοθετήσειν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἀθηναῖς οὕτως 15 τὰ μάλιστα ἀξίωσα τῆς 'Ἰπποδάμου τάξεως ταύτ' ἐστὶν, ἀπορθεὶς δ' ἄν τις πρῶτον μὲν τὴν διαίρεσιν τοῦ πλήθους τῶν πολιτῶν, οἱ τε γὰρ τεχνὶται καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ καὶ οἱ 20 τὰ ὑπλα ἔχοντες κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας πάντες, οἱ μὲν γεωργοὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ὑπλα, οἱ δὲ τεχνὶται οὕτε γῆν οὕτε ὑπλα, 25 δοτε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὑπλα κεκτημένων. μετ' 9 ἔχειν μὲν οὖν πασῶν τῶν τιμῶν ἄδυνατον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ 15 τῶν τὰ ὑπλα ἔχοντων καθιστασθαι καὶ στρατηγοὺς καὶ πο-λιτοφύλακας καὶ τὰς κυριωτάτας ἀρχὰς ὥς εἰσεῖν ἐν 30 τής πολιτείας πῶς οὕτω τοις νυκτὶς ἔχειν 25 πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν; ἀλλὰ δεὶ κρεῖττους εἶναι τοὺς τὰ ὑπλα 30 γε κεκτημένους ἀμφότεροι τῶν μερῶν· τούτῳ δ' οὐ μέξιον μὴ 35 πολλοὺς ἄνωτα· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἔσται, τὶ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους μετέχειν 10 τής πολιτείας καὶ κυρίους εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἀρχῶν τακτά-σεως; ἐτὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ τὶς χρήσιμοι τῇ πόλει; τεχνίται μὲν 40 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι (πάσα γὰρ δεῖται πόλις τεχνιτῶν), καὶ δύνανται διαγίνεσθαι καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πόλε-σιν ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης· οἱ δὲ γεωργοὶ πορίζοντες μὲν τοῖς τὰ ὑπλα κεκτημένους τὴν τροφὴν εἰλήγοις ἀν ἦσαν τῇ τῆς 45 πόλεως μέρος, νῦν δ' ἰδίαι ἔχουσιν, καὶ ταῦτα ἰδίᾳ γεωρ- 50 γήσουσιν. ἐτὶ δὲ τὴν καινήν, ἀφ' ἣς οἱ προπολεμοῦντες ἐξουσι 11 τὴν τροφὴν, εἶ μὲν αὐτοῖς γεωργήσουσι, οὐκ ἄν εἴη τὸ μά-
χικον ἔτερον καὶ τὸ γεωργοῦν, βοηθεῖ τι δ' ὁ νομοθέτης· εἶ δ' ἔτεροι τινες ἐσονται τῶν τε τὰ ἑδια γεωργοῦντων καὶ τῶν μαχίμων, τέταρτον αὖ μόριον ἔσται τοῦτο τῆς πόλεως, οὔδε
12 νός μετέχοι, ἀλλὰ ἀλλότριον τῆς πολιτείας. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶ 40
tις τοὺς αὐτοὺς θήσει τοὺς τε τὴν ἔδια καὶ τοὺς τὴν κοινὴν
gεωργοῦντας, τὸ τε πλῆθος ἄπορον ἔσται τῶν καρπῶν εἰ δὲν
ἐκαστὸς γεωργῆσε δύο ὀκίσιας, καὶ τίνος ἑνεκεν οὐκ εἴδος 1268 b
ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κλήρων αὐτοῖς τε τὴν τροφήν
λήψουνται καὶ τοῖς μαχίμοις παρέξουσιν; ταῦτα δὴ πάντα
13 πολλὰν ἔχει παραχῆν. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ τῆς κρίσεως
ἔχει νόμος, τὸ κρίνειν ἄξιον διαιροῦτα τῆς δίκης ἀπλῶς 5
γεγραμμένης, καὶ γίνεσθαι τῶν δικαστῆς διαιτητῆς, τούτῳ δ'ἐν
μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείσσων ἔνδεχεται (κοινολογοῦνται
γὰρ ἀλλήλοις περὶ τῆς κρίσεως), ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐκ
ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τονωτίν τούτῳ τῶν νομοθετῶν οἱ πολλοὶ
παρακενάζουσιν ὅπως οἱ δικασταὶ μὴ κοινολογοῦνται πρὸς 10
14 ἀλλήλους. ἐπειτὰ πῶς οὐκ ἔσται παραχῶδης ἡ κρίσις, ὅταν
οφείλειν δ' ὁ μὲν δικαστὴς οὔται, μὴ τοσοῦτον δ' ὅσον ὁ δι-
καζόμενος; ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰκοσι μυᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρίνει
dέκα μυᾶς, ἢ ὁ μὲν πλέον, ὁ δ' ἔλασσον, ἄλλος δὲ πέντε,
ὁ δὲ τέτταρας· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον δήλον ὅτι μεριοῦ· 15
15 σιν· οἱ δὲ πάντα καταδικάζουσιν, οἱ δ' οὐδέν. τὸς οὖν τὸ τρό-
πος ἔσται τῆς διαλογῆς τῶν ψήφων; ἐτὶ δ' οὔδεις ἐπιορκεῖν
ἀναγκάζει τὸν ἀπλῶς ἀποδικάσαντα ἢ καταδικάσαντα, εἰ-
περ ἀπλῶς τὸ ἐγκλῆμα γέγραπται δικαίως· οὐ γὰρ μη-
δὲν ὁφείλειν ὁ ἀποδικάσας κρίνει, ἀλλὰ τὰς εἰκοσι μυᾶς 20
ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἦδη ἐπιορκεῖ ὁ καταδικάσας μὴ νομίζων ὁφεί-
16 λεν τὰς εἰκοσι μυᾶς. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τοῖς εὑρίσκονσι τῇ τῇ πό-
λει συμφέρον ὅς δὲι γίνεσθαι τινα τιμῆν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφα-
λὲς τὸ νομοθετεῖν, ἀλλ' εὐόφθαλμον ἀκούσαι μόνον· ἔχει
gὰρ συκοφάντας καὶ κινήσεις, ἀν τῷ χρή, πολιτείας. ἐμ- 25
πάπτει δ' εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἑτέραν ἀποροῦσι
gὰρ τινες πότερον βλαβερὸν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ
κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἀν ἂν τις ἄλλος βελτίων. διότι περὶ 17 
οὗ βάρδιον τῷ λεχθέντι ταχύ συγχαρεῖν, εἰπερ μη συμφέ- 
30 ρεῖ κινεῖν. ἐνδέχεται δι' εἰσηγεῖσθαι τίνας νόμων λύσιν ἢ 
πολιτείας ὡς κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πεποιημέθα μνεῖαν, 
ἐτι μικρὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαστελλασθαί βελτίων. ἔχει γὰρ, 18 
ἀπερὶ εἴπομεν, ἀπορίαν, καὶ δόξειν ἂν βελτίων εἶναι τὸ 
κινεῖν ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τούτῳ συνενήσχεν, 
35 οἰον λατρικὴ κυνηθείσα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικὴ 
καὶ δόλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὡστ' ἐπεὶ μίαν 
τοῦτον θετέων καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν, δήλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύτην 
ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν. σημείον δ' ἂν γεγονέναι φαίη τις 19 
ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων: τοὺς γὰρ ἄρχαίους νόμους λιαν ἀπλοὺς 
40 εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικοὺς· ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο τε γὰρ οἱ Ἑλλη- 
νεῖς, καὶ τὰς γυμναίκας ἑωνυντό παρ' ἀλλήλων, ὅσα τῷ 20 
λοιπῇ τῶν ἄρχαίων ἐστὶ ποιμένων, εὐθήνει τάμπταν ἑστίν, 
1269 αὖν ἐν Κύμη περὶ τὰ φωνικὰ νόμους ἑστὶν, ἂν πληθὸς τῷ 
παράσχηται μαρτύρων ὁ διώκων τῶν φόνων τῶν αὐτοῦ συγ- 
γενῶν, ἐνοχὸν εἶναι τῷ φόνῳ τῶν φεύγοντα. ξητούσι δὲ 21 
δόλως ὅτι τὸ πάτριον ἄλλα τάγαθὼν πάντες· εἰκὸς τε τοὺς 
5 πρῶτους, εἰτε γηγενεῖς ἢσαν εἰτ' ἐκ φθορᾶς τινὸς ἐσώθησαν, 
ὁμοίως εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους, ὁπερὶ καὶ 
λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν, ὁστ' ἄτοπον τὸ μέειν ἐν τοῖς 
τοῦτον δόγμασιν, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι οὐδὲ τοὺς γεγραμμένους ἐάν 
ἀκινήτους βελτίων. ὁσπέρ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, 22 
10 καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἄδυνατον ἀκρίβως πάντα γραφή- 
ναιν καθόλου γὰρ ἄναγκαιον γραφῆναι, αἰ δὲ πράξεις περὶ 
τῶν καθ' ἐκαστὸν εἶσιν. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦτον φανερὸν ὅτι κυνη- 
tέοι καὶ τινὲς καὶ ποτὲ τῶν νόμων εἰσίν, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον 
ἐπισκοποῦσιν εὐλαβεῖας ἂν δόξειν εἶναι πολλῆς. ὅταν γὰρ 23 
15 ἂν τὸ μὲν βελτίων μικρῶν, τὸ δ' ἐθισεῖν εὐχέροις λύειν τοὺς 
νόμους φαύλον, φανερὸν ὡς ἐκεῖνον ἐνίατο ἀμαρτίας καὶ τῶν 
νομοθέτων καὶ τῶν ἄρχωντων· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ἄφθεσθαι 
κινήσας, ὅσον βλαβῆσεται τοῖς ἄρχοντοι ἀπειθεῖν ἐδιωθεῖς.
24 ψεύδος δὲ καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὐ γὰρ ὅμοιον τὸ κινεῖν τέχνην καὶ νόμον, ὃ γὰρ νόμος ἵσχυν 20 ὁδικοι μὲν ἐξει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἐθος, τοῦτο δὲ οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος, ὡστε τὸ ράβδιος μεταβάλλει ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἑτέρους νόμους.

25 καὶ νοῦς ἀσθενή ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν. ἐτὶ δὲ εἰ καὶ κινητέω, πότερον πάντες καὶ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἡ 25 οὐ; καὶ πότερον τοῦ τυχόντος τις; ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν. διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφῶμεν ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἄλλων γὰρ ἔστι καιρῶν.

Περὶ δὲ τῆς Δακεδαίμονιδος πολιτείας καὶ τῆς Κρήτης, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείας, δύο εἶσιν 30 αἱ σχέσεις, μία μὲν εἰ τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην νεομοβείσηται τάξιν, ἑτέρα δὲ εἰ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν ἄρχον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς 2 πολιτείας. ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τῇ μελλούσῃ καλῶς πολιτεύεσθαι τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὑπάρχειν σχολήν, ὁμολογούμενον 35 ἐστιν τίνα δὲ τρόπον ὑπάρχειν, οὐ βάδιον λαβεῖν. ἢ τε γὰρ Θεταλῶν πενετεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θεταλοῖς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Δάκωσιν οἱ εἰλότες (ὅσπερ γὰρ ἔφεδροι 3 ρεύντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελοῦσι) περὶ δὲ τοὺς Κρήτας οὐδὲν ποιοῦσθεν συμβέβηκεν αὐτίνιον εὗ ἵσως τὸ τᾶς γειτνιάδι 40 σας πόλεις, καὶ πολεμούσας ἀλλήλαις, μυθέμαν εἶναι 1269 b σύμμαχον τοὺς ἀφισταμένοις διὰ τὸ μὴ συμφέρειν καὶ αὐταῖς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους τοῖς δὲ Δάκωσιν οἱ γειτνιῶντες ἐχθροὶ πάντες ἤσαν, Ἀργείοι καὶ Μεσσήνιοι καὶ Ἀρκάδες ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς Θεταλοῖς καὶ Ἀρχαῖοι ἀφισταντο διὰ 5 τὸ πολεμεῖν ἐτὶ τοῖς προσχώροις, Ἀχαίοι καὶ Περραβίοις καὶ Μάγνησιν. ἐξεικε δὲ καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ γε 7 ἔστι εἰμι λέγοντας ἐργάζονται εἶναι, τίνα δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὁμιλῆσαι τρόπον ἀνείμενοι τε γὰρ ὅβριζον καὶ τῶν ἵσων ἀξιοῦσιν εὐαυτοῦς τοῖς κυρίοις καὶ κακοπαθός δέντες ἐπιβουλεύοντοι 10 καὶ μισοῦσιν. δήλον οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐξευρίσκοντο τὸν βελτιστον.
τρόπον, οίς τούτο συμβαίνει περί τήν ειλωτείαν. έτι δὲ ἢ 5
περί τάς γυναίκας ἀνέσθη καὶ πρὸς τήν προαιρέσιν τῆς πο-
λιτείας βλασθέρα καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. ὀσπερ γὰρ
15 οἰκίας μέρος ἀνήρ καὶ γυνὴ, δήλων ὧτι καὶ πόλιν ἐγγύς
τοῦ δίχα διηρήσθαι δεὶ νομίζειν εἰς τε τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν πλη-
θος καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν, ὅστε ἐν ὅσις πολιτείαις φαύλως
ἐχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναίκας, τὸ ἦμισι τῆς πόλεως εἰναι δεὶ
νομίζειν ἀνομοθέτηται. ὀσπερ ἐκεὶ συμβεβηκεν' ὅλην γὰρ 6
10 τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἰναι βουλήμενος καρτερικὴν, κατὰ
μὲν τοὺς ἀνδρας φανερός ἔστι τοιοῦτος ὁμιλητὴς ἐν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γυναι-
κῶν ἐξημέληκεν' ξοςι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς ἀπάσαν ἀκο-
λασίαν καὶ τρυφερῶς. ὅστε ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολι-
7 τελα τιμᾶσθαι τὸν πλούτον, ἀλλως τε καὶ τύχουσι γυναι-
25 κορπατούμενοι, καθάπερ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ
πολεμικῶν γενῶν, ἔξω Κελτῶν ἢ καὶ εἰ τινὲς ἐτεροι φα-
νερῶς τετιμήκατο τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας συνούσιαν. ἔοικε 8
γὰρ ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος οὐκ ἀλόγως συζεύξει τὸν Ἀρη
πρὸς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρρένων ὁμιλίαν
30 ἢ πρὸς τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν φαίνονται κατακώχιμοι πάντες οἱ
τοιούτοι. διὸ παρὰ τοῖς Δάκωσι τοῦθ' ὑπήρχεν, καὶ πολλὰ
διαφέρεται ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχης αὐτῶν. καίτοι 9
τί διαφέρει γυναικας ἄρχειν ἢ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ὑπὸ τῶν
γυναικῶν ἄρχεσθαι; ταῦτα γὰρ συμβαίνει. χρησίμου δ' 10
35 οὖν τῆς ἀρσάτητος πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἐγκυκλίων, ἀλ' εἴτε,
πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, βλασθέρωται καὶ πρὸς ταῦθ' αἱ τῶν
Δακώνων ἦσαν. ἔδηλοσαν δ' ἐπὶ τῆς Θηβαίων ἐμβολῆς 10
χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦσαν, ὀσπερ ἐν ἑτέραις πόλεσιν,
θήρυβον δὲ παρείχοι πλείω τῶν πολεμίων. εἰς ἀρχής μὲν
40 οὖν ζεικε συμβεβηκέναι τοὺς Δακώσιν εὐλόγος ἢ τῶν γυ-
1270 ανακών ἀνέσθη. ἔξω γὰρ τῆς οἰκείας διὰ τὰς στρατείας 11
ἀπεξενοῦντο πολὺν χρόνον, πολεμοῦντες τὸν τε πρὸς Ἀργείους
πόλεμον καὶ πάλιν τὸν πρὸς Ἀρκάδας καὶ Μεσοποτήνους
σχολάσαντες δὲ αὐτοῖς μὲν παρείχοι τῷ νομοθέτῃ προω-
δοπεποιημένους διὰ τὸν στρατιωτικὸν βίον (πολλὰ γὰρ ἔχει 5 μέρη τῆς ἁρετῆς), τὰς δὲ γυναίκας φασί μὲν ἄγειν ἐπι-
χειρίσαι τῶν Δικοῦργον ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους, ὡς δ' ἀντέκρουν,
12 ἀποστήναι πάλιν. ἀιτίας μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὐτὰ τῶν γενομέ-
νων, ὥστε δήλου ὅτι καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀμαρτίας. ἀλλὰ ἥμεις
οὐ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τίνι δὲ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν, ἵνα
13 ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυ-
ναίκας ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς εὔοικεν, ὡσπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρό-
tερον, οὐ μόνον ἀπρέπειαν τίνα ποιεῖν τῆς πολιτείας αὐτῆς
καθ' αὐτὴν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαι τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρη-
ματίαν, μετὰ γὰρ τὰ νῦν ρηθέντα τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμα-
14 λίαν τῆς κτήσεως ἐπιτιμηθεὶσειν ἀν τις· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν
συμβέβηκε κεκτῆσαι πολλὴν λίαν οὐσίαν, τοῖς δὲ πάμ-
tειν μικρὰν διόπερ εἰς ὀλγύσεις ἢκεν ἡ χώρα. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ
dιὰ τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως· ἀνείσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἢ
πωλεῖν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐποίησαν οὐ καλῶν, ὀρθῶς ποιήσας, 20
διδόναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν ξεούσαι ἔδωκε τοῖς βουλομένοις·
καίτω ταῦτα συμβαίνειν ἀναγκαῖον ἑκεῖνος τε καὶ οὕτως.
15 ἠστι δὲ καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν σχεδόν τῆς πάσης χώρας τῶν
πεντε μερῶν τὰ δύο, τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων πολλῶν γινομένων,
καὶ διὰ τὸ προίκας διδόναι μεγάλας. καίτω βέλτιον ἢν 25
μηδεμάν ἢ ὀλγυνὴ ἢ καὶ μετριὰν τετάχθαι· νῦν δ' ἐξεατι
δοῦναι τε τὴν ἐπικληρον ὅτι ἂν βουλήται· καὶ ἀποθάνη
μὴ διαθέμενος, ὅν ἂν καταλήπῃ κληρονόμον, οὕτως ὥς ἂν
16 θέλη διδόσων. τοιγαροῦν δυναμένης τῆς χώρας χιλίους ἱπ-
πεῖσ τρέψειν καὶ πεντακοσίους καὶ ὀπλίτας τρισμύριους, οὐδὲ 30
χίλιον τὸ πλῆθος ἔσεν. γέγονε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν
δήλου ὅτι φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἴχε τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτης.
μίαν γὰρ πληγήν οὐχ ὕπνευγεν ἢ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἀπάλετο
17 διὰ τὴν ὁλιγανθρώπιαν. λέγοιοι δ' ὡς ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν προτέ-
ρων βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολιτείας, ὡστ' ὡς γίνεσθαι 35
τότε ὁλιγανθρώπιαν πολεμουόντων πολῶν χρόνον· καὶ φασών
εἶναι ποτὲ τοῖς Ἡπαρτισταῖς καὶ μυρίους· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐίτ'
46 ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ Β’. 9.

есть ἀληθὺς ταῦτα εἶτε μὴ, βέλτιον τὸ δίὰ τῆς κτῆσεως ὀμαλίσκενης πληθίεν ἀνδρῶν τὴν πόλιν. ὑπεναντίος δὲ 18
40 καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διάρθω-
1270 βιολόμενος γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης ὅς πλείστους εἶναι τοὺς
Ἀπαρτιάτα, προάγεται τοὺς πολίτας ὅτι πλείστους ποιεῖσθαι
παίδας· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοὶς νόμος τὸν μὲν γεννήσαντα τρεῖς
νιύος ἀῥφούρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ τέτταρας ἀτελῆ πάντων. καὶ 19
5 φανερῶν ὅτι πολλῶν γινομένων, τῆς δὲ χώρας οὕτω διηρη-
μένης, ἀναγκαῖον πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πέντεστας. ἀλλὰ μὴν
καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορείαν ἔχει φαύλως· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ κυ-
ρία μὲν αὐτὴ τῶν μεγίστων αὐτοῖς ἐστὶν, γίνονται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ
δήμου πάντες, ὡστε πολλάκις ἐμπίπτουσιν ἀνθρώποι σφόδρα
10 πέντες εἰς τὸ ἀρχεῖον, οἱ διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅνων ἦσαν.
ἐδήλωσαν δὲ πολλάκις μὲν καὶ πρότερον, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐν 20
τοῖς Ἀνδρίοις διαφθαρέντες γὰρ ἀργυρῷ τινὲς, δῶσον ἐφ' ἐαυτοῖς, ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπόλοσαν, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρ-
χὴν εἶναι λίαν μεγάλην καὶ ἰσοτύρανον δημαγωγεῖν
15 αὐτοὺς ἡγαγάκαζοντο καὶ οἱ βασιλεῖς, ὡστε καὶ ταῦτῃ συν-
επιβλάπτεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν· δημοκρατίᾳ γὰρ ἐξ ἀριστο-
κρατίας συνέβαινεν. συνέχει μὲν οὖν τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ ἀρ-
21 χεῖον τούτο, ἡσυχάζει γὰρ ὁ δήμος διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς
μεγίστης ἀρχῆς, ὡστ' εἴετε διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην εἶτε διὰ τῆς
20 χρῆς τούτο συμπέπτωκεν, συμφερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμασιν,
δεὶ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μέλλουσαν σώζεσθαι πάντα βοῦ-
22 λεσθαί τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἰναι καὶ διαμένειν [ταύτα]·
οὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχουσιν, οἱ
25 δὲ καλοὶ κάγαθοι διὰ τὴν γερουσίαν (ἀθλον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ)
ἀυτὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἑστὶν), ὃ δὲ δήμος διὰ τὴν ἐφορείαν (καθ-
20 ἵσταται γὰρ ἐξ ἀπαντῶν), ἀλλ' αἱ ἀρετῆν ἔδει τὴν ἀρχὴν
23 εἶναι ταὐτὴν ἐξ ἀπαντῶν μὲν, μὴ τὸν τρόπον δὲ τοῦτον ὅν
νῦν παιδαριώδης γὰρ ἐστί λίαν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ κρίσεων εἰσὶ
μεγάλων κύριοι, ὄντες οἱ τυχάντες, δίσπερ οὐκ ἀυτογνώμο-
30 νας βέλτιον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς
24 νόμους. ἦστι δὲ καὶ ἡ δίατα τῶν ἐφόρων οὐχ ὡμολογουμένη τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως: αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀνειμένη λίαν ἔστιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ὑπερβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ σκληρόν, ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι καρτερεῖν ἀλλὰ λάβρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντας ἀπολαῦειν τῶν σωματικῶν ἥδωνων. ἔχει 35 δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχην οὐ καλὸς αὐτοῖς.

25 ἐπιεικῶν μὲν γὰρ δύναται καὶ πεπαιδευμένων ἡκανὸς πρὸς ἀνδραγάθιαν τάχα ἂν εἰπεῖ οὐτὶ συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει, καὶ τοῦ τὸ γε διὰ βίου κυρίου εἶναι κρίσεων μεγάλων ἀμφιβολίας, ἐστι γὰρ, ὡσπερ καὶ σώματος, καὶ διανοίας 40 γῆρας τὸν τρόπον δὲ τούτων πεπαίδευμένων ὡστε καὶ τὸν 1271 αὐτοῖς ἀπιστεῖν ὅσον ἀγαθὸς ἀνδράσιν, οὐκ

26 ἀσφαλές. φαίνονται δὲ καὶ καταδιωκοῦμένοι καὶ καταχαριζομένοι πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν οἱ κεκοιμηθηκότες τῆς ἀρχῆς ταύτης. διόπερ βέλτιον αὐτῶς μὴ ἀνευθύνων εἶναι· 5 νῦν δὲ εἰσίν. δόξηι δ' ἂν ἡ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχη πάσας εὐθύνει τὰς ἀρχάς· τοῦτο δὲ τῇ ἐφορείᾳ μέγα λίαν τὸ δῶρον, καὶ τὸν τρόπον οὐ τούτων λέγομεν διδόναι δεῖ τὰς εὐθύνας.

27 ἦτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀιρέσιν ἢν ποιοῦνται τῶν γερόντων, κατὰ τὲ τὴν κρίσιν ἦστι παιδαριώδης, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν ἀιτεῖσθαι τὸν 10 ἀξιοθαυμάσμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλήμενοι καὶ μὴ βουλήμενοι ἀρχεῖν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς.

28 νῦν δ' ὡσπερ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτείας ὁ νομοθέτης φαίνεται ποιῶν· φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολιτειάς τούτως κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν ἀιρέσιν τῶν γερόντων· οὔτεὶ 15 γὰρ ἂν ἀρχεῖν αἰτήσαιτο μὴ φιλότιμος ὡς. καίτι τοῖς γ' ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκοισών τὰ πλείστα συμβαίνει σχεδόν

29 διὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ διὰ φιλοχρηματίαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. περὶ δὲ βασιλείας, εἰ μὲν μὴ βέλτιον ἐστιν ὑπάρχῃ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἢ βέλτιον, ἄλλος ἐστιν λόγος· ἄλλα μὴ βέλτιον 20 γε μὴ καθάπερ νῦν, ἄλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον ἐκάστου 30 κρίνεσθαι τῶν βασιλέων. ὦτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἴεται δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καλὸς κάγαθος, δῆλον· ἀπιστεῖ γοῦν ὅσον οὖκ
οὗτοι ἰκανοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἀνδράσιν διόπερ ἐξέτειμον συμπρεσ-
25 βευτὰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, καὶ σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει εἶναι
tο στασιάζειν τοὺς βασιλεῖς. οὐ καλῶς δ' οὐδὲ περὶ τὰ συν-
σέτια τὰ καλούμενα φιδίτια νεομοθέτηται τῷ καταστήσαντι
πρῶτον· ἔδει γὰρ ἀπὸ κοινῷ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὴν σύνοδον, 31
cαθάπερ εἰς Κρήτη· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Δάκωσιν ἐκαστὸν δεῖ
30 φέρειν, καὶ σφόδρα πενήτων ἔνιον ὄντων καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἀνά-
λωμα οὐ δυναμένου δαπανᾶν, ὡστε συμβαίνει τού ναυαντίουν
τῷ νομοθέτῃ τῆς προαιρέσεως. βούλεται μὲν γὰρ δημοκρα-
τικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῶν συσσιτίων, γίνεται δ' ἥκιστα δημοκρατικὸν ὄντω νεομοθετημένων· μετέχειν μὲν
35 γὰρ οὐ βέβουν τοῖς λίαν πένησιν, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας
οὕτως ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτριος, τῶν μὴ δυνάμενον τοῦτο τὸ
tέλος φέρειν μὴ μετέχειν αὐτής. τῷ δὲ περὶ τοὺς ναυάρ, 33
χως νόμῳ καὶ ἐτεροί τīνες ἐπιτετιμήκασιν, ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμώ-
τες, στάσις γὰρ γίνεται αἵτις· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεύων
40 οὕτω στρατηγοῖς αἵδοιος ἡ ναυαρχία σχέδον ἔτερα βασιλεία
καθέστηκεν. καὶ ὅδι δὲ τῇ ὑποθέσει τοῦ νομοθέτου ἐπιτιμήθη. 34
1271 b σειειν ἄν τις, ὅπερ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἐπιτετίμηκεν·
πρὸς γὰρ μέρος ἄρετῆς ἡ πᾶσα σύνταξις τῶν νόμων ἔστι,
tὴν πολεμικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν. τοι-
γαροῦν ἐσώζοντο μὲν πολεμιώντες, ἀπάλλυντο δὲ ἄρξαντες
5 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασαθαι σχολάζειν μηδὲ ἴσοκεκάνει μηθε-
μίαν ἄσκησιν ἐτέραν κυριωτέραν τῆς πολεμικῆς. τούτου δὲ 35
ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐλαττών νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τά-
γαθά τα περιμάχητα δι’ ἄρετῆς μᾶλλον ἡ κακίας, καὶ
tοῦτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταῦτα κρείττῳ τῆς ἄρετῆς
10 ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς. φαίλως δὲ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ 36
κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Σπαρτιάταισι· οὕτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ
tῆς πόλεως ἐστὶν οὐδὲν πολέμους μεγάλους ἀναγκαζομένους
πολεμεῖν, εἰσφέρουσι τε κακῶς· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τῶν Σπαρ-
tιατῶν εἶναι τὴν πλείωσιν γῆν οὐκ ἐξετάζουσιν ἀλλὰ λόγω τάς
15 εἰσφοράς. ἀποβέβηκε τε τοῦναντίον τῷ νομοθέτῃ τοῦ συμ-
37


'Ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία πάρεγγυ μὲν ἕστι ταύτης, ἔχει δὲ μικρὰ μὲν οὐ χείρον, τὸ δὲ πλείον ἤττον γλαφυρός. καὶ γὰρ ἐοικε καὶ λέγεται δὲ τὰ πλείστα μεμιμήσατο τὴν Κρητικὴν πολιτείαν ἢ τῶν Δακώνων, τὰ δὲ πλεῖον 2 στὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἤττον διήρθρωται τῶν νεωτέρων. φασὶ γὰρ τὸν Δυκούργον, ὅτε τὴν ἐπιτροπεῖαν τὴν Χαρίλαου τοῦ 25 βασιλέως καταλατρίων ἀπεδήμησεν, τότε τὸν πλείστων διατρόφησε χρόνον περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγενείαν ἅποικον γὰρ οἱ Δύκτιοι τῶν Δακών ἦσαν, κατέλαβον δὲ οἱ πρὸς τὴν ἀποικίαν ἑλθόντες τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς τότε κατοικοῦσιν. διᾶ καὶ νῦν οἱ περιοικοὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρόπον χρώματι αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντος Μίνω πρώτου τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων. δοκεῖ δὲ η νῆσος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς περικέναι καὶ κεῖσαι καλὼς πάση γὰρ ἑπίκειται τῇ θαλάσσῃ, σχέδον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἱδρυμένων περὶ τὴν θάλασσαν πάντων ἀπέχει γὰρ τῇ μὲν 35 τῆς Πελοποννήσου μικρῶν, τῇ δὲ τῆς Ἀσίας τοῦ περὶ Τριόσιον τόπου καὶ Ῥόδου. διᾶ καὶ τῆς τῆς θαλάσσης ἀρχῆν κατέχειν ὁ Μίνως, καὶ τὰς νῆσους τὰς μὲν ἐχειρώσατο τὰς δὲ φιλισκές, τέλος δὲ ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ τῶν βιῶν ἐπελευτήσεν ἐκεῖ περὶ Κάμικον. ἔχει δὲ ἄναλογον ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις- τὸ πρὸς τὴν Δακωνικήν γεωργοῦσί τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν ἐλευθεροίς τοῖς δὲ Κρητικοῖς περιοικοῖς, καὶ συστίται παρὰ ἀμφο-20 40 5 ἔτεροι ἐστίν καὶ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλοντο τῶν Δάκων ὁμοίως οὐ φιλιστεῖ ἀλλὰ ἀνδρείᾳ, καθάπερ οἱ Κρήτες, ἦ καὶ δῆλον ὑπί 6 ἐκείνην ἐλήλυθεν. ἔτι δὲ τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοροὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ 5 καλομείνοις κόσμοις, πλῆθι οἱ μὲν ἐφοροὶ πέντε τῶν ἀριθμοῖς οἱ δὲ κόσμοι δέκα εἰσίν οἱ δὲ γέροντες τοῖς γέροντες, Τοῦ Ἡρακλείου τῆς Κρήτης τῆς Ἑλλάδος.
οὐς καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρῆτες βουλῆν, ἵσθι· βασιλεὰ δὲ πρότερον μὲν ἢν, εἶτα κατέλυσαν οἱ Κρῆτες, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οἱ τοί κόσμοι τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔχουσιν. ἐκκλησίας δὲ μετέχουσιν 7 πάντες, κυρία δ’ οὐδένας ἔστιν ἀλλ’ ἡ συνεπιφύσσαι τὰ δόξαντα τοὺς γέρουντα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους. τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν συστιτῶν ἔχει βέλτιον τοὺς Κρήσιν ἢ τοῖς Δάκωσιν· εὖ μὲν γὰρ Δακεδαίμονι κατὰ κεφαλὴν ἐκατοστὰ εἰσφέρει τὸ τε-15 ταχύνον, εἶ δὲ μῆ, μετέχειν νόμον κωλὺς τῆς πολιτείας, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, εὐεὶ Κρήτη κοινοτέρως, ἀπὸ πάντων γὰρ τῶν γυνομένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημά-10 τον ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ φόρων οὐς φέρουσιν οἱ περι-οικοι, τέτακται μέρος τὸ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὰς κοι-20 νὰς λειτουργίας, τὸ δὲ τοῖς συστιτίοις, ἀστὶ ἐκ κοινού τρέ-φεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παιδίας καὶ ἄνδρας· πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὁλογοσείαν ἂς ὀφέλιμον πολλὰ περίφο-9 ὁδηγηκένδος νους, καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάξειν τῶν γυναι-κῶν, ἰᾶ καὶ πολυτεκνῶσι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἄρρενας ποιήσαι 25 ὁμιλίαν, περὶ δὴ ἔτος φανάς ἢ μῆς φαύλως, ἔτερος ἀπέται τοῦ διασκέψασθαι καïρός. ὅτι δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰ συστίτα βέλ-15 τοίον τέτακται τοῖς Κρήσιν ἢ τοῖς Δάκωσι, φανερῶν. τὰ δὲ περὶ τοὺς κόσμους ἔτει χεῖρον τῶν ἐφόρων ὃ μὲν γὰρ10 ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτοις γί-30 νοῦν γὰρ οἱ τυχόντες· δ’ δ’ ἔτει συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν πολι-τείαν, ἐνταῦθα οὔτε ἔστιν. ἔκει μὲν γὰρ, διὰ τὴν ἀίρε-11 σιν ἐκ πάντων εἶναι, μετέχουν ὁ δῆμος τῆς μεγίστης ἀρχῆς βουλεῖται μένειν τὴν πολιτείαν· ἐνταῦθα δ’ οὐκ ἔξ ἀπάντων ἀροίνηται τοὺς κόσμους ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν γενῶν, καὶ τοὺς γέρον-35 τας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμημένων, περὶ δὴ τῶν αυτῶν ἂν τις εἰ-11 πείει λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Δακεδαίμωμι γυνομένων τὸ γὰρ ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ τὸ διὰ βίων μεῖζον ἔστι γέρας τῆς ἀξίας αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἀρχεῖν ἀλλ’ αὐτογνώμονας ἐπισφαλεῖς, τὸ δ’ ἁπατάζειν μῆ μετέχοντα 1240 τῶν δὴμον οὐδὲν σημείον τοῦ τετάχθαί καλῶς· οὐδὲν γὰρ


1272 a 8—1272 b 32.

Λήμματός τι τοῖς κόσμοις ὀσπερ τοῖς ἐφόροις, πόρρω γ’

13 ἀποκοιμηθεὶς ἐν νήσῳ τῶν διαφθεροῦντων. ἂν δὲ ποιοῦνται τῆς 1272 b ἀμαρτίας ταύτης λατρείαν, ἀτόπος καὶ οὐ πολιτικὴ ἄλλα δυναστευτικὴ πολλάκις γὰρ ἐκβάλλουσι συστάντες τινες τοὺς κόσμους ἢ τῶν συναρχῶν ἀυτῶν ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ἐξεστὶ δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ τοῖς κόσμοις ἀπειπεῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. ταύτα δὲ πάντα βέλτιον γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρώπων

14 βούλησιν’ ὁ γὰρ ἀσφαλὴς ὁ κανὼν. πάντων δὲ φαυλότατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν, ἢν καθιστάσι πολλάκις ὅταν μὴ δίκα βούλωται δοῦναι ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅσ ἔχει τι πολιτείας ἢ τάξις, ἀλλ’ οὐ πολιτεία ἐστὶν ἄλλα δυναστεία 10 μᾶλλον. εἰλάθοι δὲ διαλαμβάνοντες τὸν δήμον καὶ τοὺς φίλους μοναρχίαν ποιεῖν καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ μάχεσθαι πρὸς

15 ἀλλήλους. καίτοι τί διαφέρει τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ διὰ τίνος χρόνου μηκέτι πόλιν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην, ἄλλα λύεσθαι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν; ἐστὶ δ’ ἐπικίνδυνον οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις, 15 τῶν βουλομένων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυναμένων, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ εἰρηται, σώζεται διὰ τῶν τόπων ξενηλασίας γὰρ τὸ

16 πόρρω πεποίηκεν. διὰ καὶ τὸ τῶν περιοίκων μένει τοῖς Κρη-

σῶν, οἱ δ’ εἰλοτες ἀφίστανται πολλάκις. οὔτε γὰρ ἐξωτερι-

κὴς ἀρχῆς κοινωνίαν οἱ Κρῆτες, νεοστὶ τε πόλεμος ἐξεικὸς 20 διαβέβηκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον, ὅπερ πεποίηκε φανερὰν τὴν ἀσθέ-

νειαν τῶν ἐκεί νόμων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ταύτης εἰρήσθω τοσαθ’ ἢμῖν τῆς πολιτείας

Πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ Καρχηδόνωι καλῶς καὶ 11 πολλὰ περιττὸς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, μάλιστα δ’ ἔνια παρα-25 πλησίον τοῖς Δάκοισιν αὕται γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι τρεῖς ἀλλήλαις τε συνεγγύσ πῶς εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολὺ δια-

φέρουσιν, ἢ τε Κρητικὴ καὶ ἡ Δακωνικὴ καὶ τρίτῃ τούτων ἡ Καρχηδόνιων καὶ πολλὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἔχει παρ’ 2 αὐτοῖς καλῶς. σημείων δὲ πολιτείας συντεταγμένης τὸ τὸν 30 δήμῳ ἔχοσαν διαμένειν ἐν τῇ τάξει τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ μήτε στάσιν, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον εἶπεῖν, γεγενησθαι μήτε τῷ

Ε 2
πολιτικών Β’. 11.

...ραννον. ἔχει δὲ παραπλησία τῇ Δακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ 3 μὲν συστατικά τῶν ἑκατομάων τοῖς φιλιτοῖς, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἑκα-35 τῶν καὶ τεττάρων ἄρχην τοῖς ἐφόροις (πλὴν οὐ χεῖρον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν τυχόντων εἰσὶ, ταῦτῃ δὲ ἀφρούνται τὴν ἄρχην ἀριστίνθην), τοὺς δὲ βασιλείας καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἑκεί βασιλεύσαι καὶ γέρουσιν καὶ βέλτιον δὲ τοὺς βα-4 σιλείς μήτε κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος, μηδὲ τούτο τὸ τυ-40 χόν, εἴ τε διαφέρον, ἐκ τούτων αἴρετος μᾶλλον ἢ καθ’ ἥλι-κίαν’ μεγάλων γὰρ κύριοι καθεστώτες, ἂν εὐτελεῖς ὤσι, 1273 α μεγάλα βλάπτουσι καὶ ἐβλασφήν ἥδη τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Δακεδαίμων. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἃν 5 διὰ τὰς παρεκβάσεις κουλὰ τυγχάνει πάσαις ὅταν ταῖς εἰρημέναις πολιτείαις τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τῆς ἀρι-5 στοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὰ μὲν εἰς δήμον ἐκκλίνει μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μὲν προσ-άγειν τὰ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν δήμον οἱ βασιλείς κύριοι μετὰ τῶν γερόντων, ἄν ὁμογένεως πάντες, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τούτων ὁ δήμος· ἃ δὲ ἀν εἰσφέρωσιν οὕτω, οὐ 6 10 διακόσιαι μόνον ἀποδόθασι τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς ἄρ-χεσιν, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνειν εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις ἀντετειν ἔξεστιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἔτεραις πολι-τείαις οὐκ ἔστην. τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κυρίας οὕσας πολλῶν 7 καὶ μεγάλων υφ’ αὐτῶν αἰρετάς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἑκα-15 τῶν ταύτας αἱρείσθαι τὴν μεγίστην ἄρχην, ἔτι δὲ ταύτας πλεύσαν ἄρχεσιν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων (καὶ γὰρ ἐξελήνυθοτες ἄρχουσι καὶ μέλλοντες) ὀλιγαρχίκοι τὸ δὲ ἀμίσθους καὶ μή κληροτάς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετέον, καὶ εἰ τι τοιούτου ἔτε-ρον, καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν ἄρχεσιν δικαζεσθαι τά-20 σεις, καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ’ ἄλλων, καθάπερ ἐν Δακεδαίμον. παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ἢ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδο-8 νίων μάλιστα πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατὰ τινα διάνοιαν ἢ συνδοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστίνθην ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτίνθην οἴονται δεῖν αἱρείσθαι τὸς ἄρχοντας· ἀδύνατον
9 γὰρ τὸν ἀποροῦντα καλῶς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολάζειν. εἰπέρ οὖν 25
tὸ μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι πλουτίσθην ὀλιγαρχικῶν, τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἀρε-
tὴν ἀριστοκρατικῶν, αὕτη τίς ἂν εἰπὶ τάξις τρίτη, καθ’ ἑν-
περ συντέτακται καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τὰ περὶ τὴν πο-
lιτείαν· αἰροῦται γὰρ εἰς δύο ταύτα βλέποντες, καὶ μά-
λιστα τὰς μεγίστας, τοὺς τε βασιλεῖς καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς. 30
10 δεὶ δὲ νομίζειν ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρέκβασιν εἰναι
τῆς ἀριστοκρατίας ταύτην ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθ’ ὅραν ἑστὶ
tῶν ἀναγκαιότατων, ὅπως οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνωνται σχολάζειν καὶ
μὴδὲν ἁσχημονεῖν, μὴ μόνον ἁρχοντες ἀλλὰ μὴδ’ ἰδιωτεύοντες. εἰ δὲ δεὶ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὐπορίαν χάριν 35
σχολῆς, φαίλων τὸ τὰς μεγίστας ἀνωτάς εἰναι τῶν ἄρχων.
11· τῆς τε βασιλείας· καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν· ἐντιμον γὰρ ὁ νόμος
οὗτος ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρέτης, καὶ τὴν πόλιν
όλην φιλοχρήματον· ὅτι δ’ ἂν ὑπολάβῃ τίμιον εἰναι τὸ
κόριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἀκο- 40
λουθεῖν τούτοις· ὅπου δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἀρετὴ τιμᾶται, ταύτην
12 οὐχ οἷον τε βεβαιώς ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. ἐβίζε—1273 b
σθαί δ’ εὐλογον κερδαίνει τοὺς ὀνομένους, ὅταν δαπανη-
σαντες ἁρχωσιν· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ἄν ἐπιεικῆς δὲ
βουλῆσεται κερδαίνει, φαυλότερος δ’ ὅν οὐ βουλήσεται δαπα-
nήσας. διδ δεὶ τοὺς δυναμένους ἄριστ’ ἄρχειν, τούτοις ἄρχειν. 5
βέλτινον δ’, εἰ καὶ προεῖτο τὴν εὐπορίαν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ὁ νο-
μοθέτης, ἀλλὰ ἁρχώντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς.
13 φαίλων δ’ ἂν δόξειν εἰναι καὶ τὸ πλεῖον ἄρχας τὸν αὐτὸν
ἀρχεῖν· ὅπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἐν γὰρ
ὑφ’ ἐνὸς ἔρχον ἁριστ’ ἀποτελεῖται. δεὶ δ’ ὅπως γίνηται τοῦτο 10
ὅραν τὸν νομοθέτην, καὶ μὴ προστάτιεν τὸν αὐτὸν αὐλεῖν
14 καὶ σκυτοτομεῖν. ὅσθ’ ὅπως μὴ μικρὰ πόλις, πολιτικότερον
πλεῖονας μετέχειν τῶν ἄρχων, καὶ δημοτικότερον· κοινό-
tερόν τε γὰρ, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἐκαστὸν ἀπο-
tελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ θάττον. δὴλου δὲ τούτο ἐπὶ τῶν 15
πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἀμφοτέροισ
διὰ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν διελήλυθε τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι. ὁλιγαρχικής δ' οὖσα τῆς πολιτείας ἁρίστα ἐκφεύ-15 γοσί τῷ πλουτείν, αἱ ἐς τὸν δήμον μέρος ἐκπέμψατονς ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις, τούτῳ γὰρ ἴδονται καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τὴν πολιτείαν. ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐςτὶ τάχης ἔργον, δει δὲ ἀστασιάστους εἶναι διὰ τῶν νομοθέτην. νῦν δὲ, ἣν ἄτυχία γένηται τις καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀποστῆ τῶν ἀρχομένων, οὐδὲν ἔστι φάρμακον διὰ τῶν νόμων τῆς ἡσυχίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Δακεδαίμονος τῆς πολιτείας καὶ Κρητικῆς καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων, αἴπερ δικαίως εὐδοκιμοῦσιν, τούτων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον

12 Τῶν δὲ ἀποφημακένων τι περὶ πολιτείας ἔνιοι μὲν οὖκ ἐκοινώνησαν πράξεων πολιτικῶν οὐδ' ἀντινοων, ἀλλὰ διετέλεσαν ἴδιωτεύοντες τὸν βίου, περὶ δὲν ἐὰς αἱ ἀξιώονες, εἰρή-30 ται σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων, ἐνιοὶ δὲ νομοθέται γεγόναν, οἱ μὲν ταῖς οἰκεῖαις πόλεωι, οἱ δὲ καὶ τῶν ὀθνεῶν τις, πολιτευόντες αὐτοὶ καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν νόμων ἐγένετο δη-μιουργοι μόνον, οἱ δὲ καὶ πολιτείας, οὗν καὶ Δυκοῦργος καὶ Σέλων οὕτω γὰρ καὶ νόμους καὶ πολιτείας κατέστησαν. 35 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς Δακεδαίμονος ἔρηται, Σέλων δ' ἐνιοὶ 2 μὲν οἴονται γενέσθαι νομοθέτην σπουδαίον ὁλιγαρχίαν τε γὰρ καταλύσαι λίαν ἀκρατον οὖσαν, καὶ δουλεύοντα τὸν δήμου πᾶσαν, καὶ δημοκρατίαν καταστήσει τὴν πάτριον, μίζανα καλῶς τὴν πολιτείαν, εἶναι γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ 40 πάγῳ βουλῆν ὁλιγαρχίκοι, τὸ δὲ τὰς ἄρχας αἴρεται ἅρι- στοκρατικῶν, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια δημοτικῶν. ἔσχε δὲ Σέλων 3

1274 α ἐκεῖνα μὲν ὑπάρχοντα πρότερον οὐ καταλύσαι, τὴν τε βου-λῆν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄρχων αἴρεσιν, τὸν δὲ δήμον καταστήσαι, τὰ δικαστήρια ποίησαι ἐκ πάντων. διὸ καὶ μέμφοταί τινας αὐτῷ λῦσαι γὰρ θάτερον, κύριον ποιήσατα τὸ δικα-5 στήριον πάντων, κληροτὸν δὲν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τούτῳ ἔσχεν, ἀσπερ 4 τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βου-λῆν 'ΕφιάλΤης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς, τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια
μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς, καὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν τρόπων ἐκαστος τῶν δημαγωγῶν προῆγαγεν αὐξών εἰς τὴν νῦν δή 
5 μοκρατίαν. φαίνεται δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σῶλωνος γενέσθαι τούτω προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ συμπτώματος (τῆς ναυαρ-
χίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ὁ δήμος αὐτίοις γενόμενοι ἐφρο-
νματισθῆ, καὶ δημαγωγοὺς ἔλαβε φαύλους ἀντιπολιτευο-
μέναν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν), ἐπεὶ Σῶλων γε ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαῖο-
10 τάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρε-
σθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τούτων κύριος ὁ δήμος ὁ ἀρχὴ ὁ
6 δοῦλος ἀν εἰ ἡ καὶ πολέμιος), τὰς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρι-
μῶν καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πεντακο-
σιομεῖδιμων καὶ ζευγιτῶν καὶ τρίτων τέλους τῆς καλουμένης 20 ἱππάδος· τὸ δὲ τέσσαραν θητικῶν, οἷς οὐδεμίας ἀρχῆς μετῆν.
νομοθέται δὲ ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκός τε Δοκροὺς τοῖς ἐπιζευ-
ρίοις, καὶ Χαράνθαις ὁ Καταναῖος τοῖς αὐτῶν πολῖται καὶ
tαῖς ἄλλαις ταῖς Χαλκιδικαῖς πόλεσι ταῖς περὶ Ἰταλιαν
7 καὶ Σικελίαν. πειρώνται δὲ τίνες καὶ συνάγεις ὁς ὀνο-
25 μακρίτου μὲν γενομένων πρώτων δεινοὶ περὶ νομοθεσίαν, γυμνα-
σθήναι δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν Κρήτῃ Δοκρόν ὄντα καὶ ἐπιδημοῦντα
cατὰ τέχνην μαντικῆν τούτων ὁ δὲ γενέσθαι Θάλητα ἑταῖρον,
Θάλητος δὲ ἀκροατὴν Δικοῦργον καὶ Ζάλευκον, Ζαλεύκο
8 δὲ Χαράνθαις. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν ἄσκεπτότερον τῷ ἀκρο-
30 χρόνῳ λέγοντες, ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορινθιός νο-
μοθέτης Ἡθβαιος. ἦν δὲ ὁ Φιλόλαος τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν
Βακχιαδῶν, ἐραστὴς δὲ γενόμενος Διοκλέους τοῦ νικήσαντος
'Ολυμπίασιν, ὡς ἐκεῖνος τὴν πόλιν ἐλπιὸν διαμισθήσας τῶν
ἐρωτα τὸν τῆς μητρὸς Ἀλκιώνης, ἀπῆλθεν εἰς Ἐθβας, κακεὶ ἐν
9 τὸν βίον ἐτελεσθησαν ἀμφότεροι. καὶ νῦν ἐτι δεικνύουσι τοὺς
tάφους αὐτῶν ἀλλῆλοις μὲν εὐσυνόπτους ὤντας, πρὸς δὲ τὴν
tῶν Κορινθίων χάραν τὸν μὲν συνόπτου τοῦ δὲ οὐ συνόπτου
μυθολογοῦσι γὰρ αὐτῶν οὕτω ταξισθαί τὴν ταφῆνα, τὸν μὲν
Διοκλέα διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους, ὅπως μὴ ἀποστεί 40
Ὁστι Ο Κορινθία ἀπὸ τοῦ χάματος, τὸν δὲ Φιλόλαον, ὅπως
1274 b ἀποτοσ. ἤφησαν μὲν οὖν διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν παρὰ 10
tοῖς Ἡθβαιοῖς, νομοθέτης δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο Φιλόθαος περὶ
t' ἄλλων τινῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδοποιίας, οὐς καλοῦσαι
ἐκεῖνοι νόμους θετικοὺς· καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἰδίως ὅπ' ἐκείνου νεο-
5 μοθητημένων, ὅτι ὁ ἄριθμὸς σάζηται τῶν κλήρων. Χα- 11
ράονδου δ' ἰδιόν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν πλὴν αἱ δίκαι τῶν ἰευδομαρ-
tόρων (πρῶτος γὰρ ἐποίησε τὴν ἐπίσκηψιν), τῇ δ' ἀκριβεῖς
tῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν.
[Φαλέου δ' ἰδιόν ἢ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀνομάλωσι, Πλάτωνος δ' ἢ 12
τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδών καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινῆς καὶ
τὰ συνοσίτια τῶν γυναικῶν, ἔτι δ' ὁ περὶ τὴν μὲν ἴδιως, τὸ
tοῦς νηφοντας συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοὺς πολεμι-
κοῖς ἀσκήσει διότι οὗτοι ἀμφιδέξιοι γίνονται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην,
ἂν δὲν μὴ τὴν μὲν χρῆσιμον εἶναι τοῖς χερῶν τὴν δὲ
15 ἀξίωσιν]. Ἀράκωντος δὲ νόμοι μὲν εἰσὶ, πολιτείᾳ δ' ὑπαρ- 13
χοῦση τοὺς νόμους ἔθηκεν ἰδιόν δ' ἐν τοῖς νόμοις οὖν ἐστὶν
ὁ τι καὶ μενεῖς ἐξιόν, πλὴν ἡ χαλεπότης διὰ τὸ τῆς ζημίας
μέγεθος. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόμων ἰδιωμοργὸς ἀλλ'
οὐ πολιτείας νόμοι δ' ἰδίος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς μεθύοντας, ἀν
20 τι πταίσωσι, πλεῖον ζημίαν ἀποτύπωσαν τῶν νηφόντων· διὰ γὰρ
τὸ πλεῖον ὑβρίζει μεθύοντας ἢ νηφόντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συν-
γνώμην ἀπέθελεν, ὅτι δὲι μεθύονται ἔχειν μάλλον, ἀλλὰ
πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας Ἐργύνος 14
νομοθέτης Χαλκιδεύσι τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης, οὗ περὶ τε τὰ φο-
25 νικὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπικλήρους ἔστιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἰδίον γε οὖθεν
αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἔχοι τῆς ἂν. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας,
tὰς τε κυρίας καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰρήμενας, ἐστὶ τεθεωρη-
μένα τὸν τρόπον τούτον.
CRITICAL NOTES.

The following notes are intended to be used in conjunction with the *apparatus criticus* of Susemihl's editions, and especially that of 1872. It is in these editions alone that the MSS. and their readings, and also the version of the Vetus Interpres, can be fully studied. In those cases, indeed, in which I have been obliged to choose between a reading supported by the whole of one family of MSS. and one supported by the whole of the other, and the choice was attended with doubt, I have commonly noted the reading which I have not adopted, and I have taken some pains, in dealing with the readings offered by the first family of MSS., to point out the passages in which we are unable to affirm with certainty that \( \Gamma \) agreed with \( M^a P^1 \), for perhaps even the third and last of Susemihl's editions hardly makes it clear how numerous they are. The student of Susemihl's *apparatus criticus*, in fact, occasionally finds in it readings which Susemihl does not accept ascribed to \( \Pi^2 \), and may naturally infer that \( \Pi^1 \) (i.e. \( \Gamma \) as well as \( M^a P^1 \)) support the reading adopted by him. This is, no doubt, frequently the case, but on the other hand it frequently happens that the reading of \( \Gamma \) is not ascertainable, and of course, when this is so, Susemihl's reading rests only on the authority of \( M^a P^1 \), for we cannot assume without proof that \( \Gamma \) agreed with \( M^a P^1 \) and not with \( \Pi^2 \); on the contrary, \( \Gamma \) often agrees with \( \Pi^2 \) against \( M^a P^1 \). Thus the *indubitable* discrepancies between \( \Pi^1 \) and \( \Pi^2 \) prove on examination to be considerably less numerous than might be supposed. I have seldom

1 Susemihl would seem in the following notes of his third edition, for instance, tacitly or otherwise to attribute to \( \Pi^1 \) a reading which can only be attributed with certainty to \( M^a P^1 \):—\( 1252 \) b 2, om. \( \Pi^2 \): 5, \( \tau \o \) post \( \kappa \alpha \lambda \) om. \( \Pi^2 \): 1253 a 32, \( \delta \) om. \( \Pi^2 \): 1255 b 23, \( \tau \o \) post \( \epsilon \nu \) add. \( \Pi^2 \): 1256 b 8, \( \delta \iota \delta \iota \mu \epsilon \eta \) \( \Pi^2 \): 1258 b 1, \( \mu \varepsilon \tau \alpha \beta \lambda \gamma \nu \tau \iota \kappa \epsilon \) \( \Pi^2 \): 1260 a 31, \( \delta \) ante \( \tau \o \) add. \( \Pi^2 \). In 1260 a 21, the reading \( \alpha \tau \alpha \tau \tau \tau \tau \rho \o \) is ascribed to \( \Pi^2 \), but we cannot tell from Vet. Int. *omnia* whether he found \( \alpha \tau \alpha \tau \tau \tau \rho \o \) or \( \tau \alpha \tau \tau \tau \tau \rho \o \) in his Greek text (see his rendering of 1263 b 17 sq.). These references need not be carried farther than the First Book.
noted variants clearly not supported by the whole of a family, except when I hoped to be able to throw some fresh light on their value. The readings which I have given from O\textsuperscript{1} will at any rate serve to illustrate the character of a manuscript which, though belonging to a well-known variety, does not always agree with P\textsuperscript{4}, the MS. to which it is most nearly allied. I have drawn more largely on the Vetus Interpres, noting freely any renderings which seemed to call for remark. I have sought by a study of his method of translation to contribute to the solution of the important question, in what cases we can safely infer from his renderings a variation in the Greek text used by him. Here and there, but not often, I have noted renderings to which Susemihl has omitted to call attention. I have also occasionally indicated passages in which the text of the translation appears to be by no means certain, and recorded any readings found in the MSS. of it consulted by me which seemed to deserve mention. But my main object in these notes has been to discuss the copious data furnished by Susemihl, and especially to throw light on the characteristics of the MSS. and the Latin translation, in the hope of contributing to the ascertainment of the correct text of the Politics.

My quotations from the Latin translation of Leonardus Aretinus (Leonardo Bruni of Arezzo) are based on a comparison of the beautiful MS. of this translation in the possession of New College, Oxford (MS. 228), which belongs to the middle of the fifteenth century, with a Bodleian MS. (Canon. Class. Lat. 195). I have drawn attention in the following notes to one or two passages in which these MSS. do not support readings ascribed by Susemihl to Aretinus; I do not know what is the cause of this discrepancy, but I may refer to Susemihl’s remarks in his first edition of the Politics, p. xxix sq., as to the supposed existence of two versions of Aretinus’ translation, for it is possible that the discrepancy is thus to be accounted for.

The conjectures by which scholars have sought to emend the text will be found fully recorded in Susemihl’s editions.

I have already (above, p. xlviii, note 1, and p. xlix, note 2) explained the symbols which I have adopted from Susemihl. A full account of the MSS. of the Politics and the Vetus Interpres consulted by Susemihl will be found in the Prolegomena to his first edition (that of 1872), and also a full account of the corrections in P\textsuperscript{1}, P\textsuperscript{2}, and P\textsuperscript{4}. As to the Vatican Fragments, see the Preface.

I add some remarks on the MSS. consulted by me.

MS. 112 belonging to Corpus Christi College, Oxford (O\textsuperscript{1}) is a
fifteenth century manuscript containing the Politics together with
other writings of Aristotle, or ascribed to him (see for its contents
Mr. J. A. Stewart, The English Manuscripts of the Nicomachean
Ethics, Anecdota Oxoniensia, vol. i, part i, p. 5), and bearing at
the foot of its first page the following inscription:—Orate pro anima
Joannis Claimondi collegii corporis Christi primi presidis, qui hunc
librum eidem condonavit. (Mr. Stewart mentions, p. 6, that Claim-
mond was President of Corpus from 1517 to 1537.) Its text of
the Politics is written in a very legible hand, but there are not a
few corrections both between the lines and in the margin, and these
corrections are made partly by the writer of the MS. himself, partly
by a corrector (corr.1), whose handwriting is in many cases easily
distinguishable from that of the writer of the MS., but in some not so,
and especially in those in which the correction is between the lines
and consists of a single letter only, or two or three. The ink used
by this corrector is often very similar to that of the MS. One or
two corrections in the first two books are apparently due to a second
corrector. The text of the Politics in O1 is nearly akin to that of
the P4 of Susemihl (MS. 2025 of the Bibliothèque Nationale at
Paris: see as to P4 Sus.1, p. xxiii), though neither of these MSS.
is copied from the other, but the corrections from a MS. of the first
family which lend a special interest and importance to P4 are
wanting in O1: the corrections in O1 which are due to corr.1 are
mostly derived from a MS. of the second family, though a few of
them (for instance, the expunged addition of ἄρχοντων καὶ in 1260 a
4) may be derived from the Vetus Interpess or possibly from some
gloss. The following passages (to which it would be easy to add
indefinitely) will suffice to establish its close kinship with P4:—
1255 a 24, ἀμα—δικαίαν om. pr. P4 pr. O1: 1256 a 14, μέρος om. P4
pr. O1: 1257 a 13, γέγονε P4 O1: 32, εἰσόδημα pr. P4 pr. O1: 1257 b
O1: 16, χρία P4 O1. On the other hand, O1 often differs from P4:
thus in 1253 a 7 O1 omits ἄγετος ὑπὲρ P4 only ὑπὲρ: in 1253 b 35 O1 has
τοῖς, which P4 omits: its reading differs from that of P4 in 1254 a
15 sq.: in 1257 a 33-34 it is free from the blunders found in P4:
in 1258 a 38 pr. O1 omits καρπῶν καὶ τῶν, pr. P4 only καὶ τῶν: in
1259 a 12 pr. O1 has λόγων, P4 λόγον: in 1261 a 1 pr. P4 omits
several words, not so O1: in 1262 b 13 O1 has συμφωνά, not so P4.
Here and there we find O1 agreeing with P3 (thus in 1257 a 16 it
has ὅτι ἐλλήνη, in 1263 b 31 πῶς, in 1264 b 14 μέγα, in 1271 b 12
ἀναγκαζόμενον), or with P2a Tb (1264 a 35, πενευτέλεια: 1267 b 28,
λόγοι); more rarely with MS P1 (as in 1264 b 13, εἴδος: 1266 a 5,
I pass on to MSS. of the Vetus Interpres. MS. Phillipps 891 (z) is a parchment MS. in quarto form, containing the translation of the Politics together with that of the Oeconomics and an unfinished fragment of the commencement of the translation of the Rhetoric, and written at Zara in Dalmatia in the year 1393. This appears from the following inscription on a blank page at its commencement, which is in the same handwriting as the MS.:—Liber politicorum et yconomicorum Aristotelis in hoc volumine depurat (deo volente) ad usum mei Jacobini quondam [6=condam] Alberti de magnitibus (=de maynentibus=dei Maynenti) de Vic. [Vincentia or Vicentia=Vicenza] quem scripsi in civitate Jadre 1393 cum ibi forem ab illius civitatis communitate pro fisico opere medicine salariat us et habitus. Laus et honor deo. (For the interpretation of Vic. and of the contraction for quem scripsi I am indebted to the kind aid of Mr. F. Madan, Sub-Librarian of the Bodleian Library. The interpretation which I have given above of the symbol 9 is that of Mr. E. Maunde Thompson, Keeper of the MSS. in the British Museum, to whom, no less than to Mr. Madan, my best thanks are due for valuable and ready help. Mr. Maunde Thompson explains the meaning of quondam Alberti to be 'formerly son of Albertus' or 'son of the late Albertus.' Having found the form Patricii de Piccolominihus in the title of a book published in 1485 ('Pontificale A. Patricii de Piccolominibus, Romae, 1485'), I thought it likely that maynentibus was a family-name, but the word remained a puzzle, till Mr. Maunde Thompson solved the problem by discovering the name Mainenti in a list of families belonging to Vicenza contained in the 'Historia di Vicenza, by G. Marzari, Venice, 1691.' I shall be glad if the publication of this inscription should lead to the communication of further particulars respecting the writer, Jacobino dei Maynenti.) At the commencement of the MS., prefixed to the translation of the Politics, are the words to which attention has already been called (above, p. xlii); they are in red letters but in the hand of the writer of the MS.:—Incipit liber politicorum Aristotelis a fratre Guilielmo ordinis praedicatorum de greco in latinum translatus. At the close of the translation, the words quod decens (answering to το πέρον, 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 34) are not followed either by the sentence—reliqua huius

1 For other MSS. transcribed at Zara, see Schenkl, Ausonius, pp. xxiii, xxvii. I owe this reference to Mr. Robinson Ellis, whom I have also to thank for informing me some years ago of the existence of a MS. of the Vetus Interpres in the Phillipps Library.
**PRELIMINARY REMARKS.**

operis in greco nondum inveni—which succeeds them in all the MSS. but a, or by the sentences which are here found in a and rec. a (see Sus. ad loc.), but simply by the words—Explicit liber politicorum Aristotilis. At the top of the pages of this MS. and in the margins and in a large blank space purposely left at the foot copious annotations are inserted, and the text itself is interspersed with corrections and explanatory additions. Here and there we meet with corrections which are in the same hand and ink as the MS. and have obviously been made by the writer of it, but most of them and all the annotations are in a far smaller hand than that of the MS., and one which, perhaps for this reason, differs a good deal from it. Some, however, of these annotations and corrections are apparently in the same ink as the MS., and as these are in the same handwriting as others which are in a darker ink, it seems probable that all the annotations and corrections were added by the writer of the MS. If so, he was evidently a diligent student of the Politics in William of Moerbeke’s Latin Translation. I have given in the following Critical Notes those of the various readings of z in the first two books which seemed to possess most importance, and have added in Appendix C a complete list of its variations in these books from the text printed by Susemihl, with the exception of unimportant errors of spelling. It will be seen that its omissions and blunders are many, and that here and there the original reading has been erased and an incorrect one substituted; nevertheless, it has in not a few passages either alone or in conjunction with a preserved the true reading. It has no doubt likewise done so in the books which I have not as yet collated, for in glancing at a passage in its text of the Seventh (4 7. 13. 1331 b 31) I found the word ἐκθέω, which is rendered in the other MSS. λακτ, rendered (rightly in all probability) ἱατ. It is worthy of notice that as z was written at Zara in Dalmatia, so the allied MS. a was ‘written in Italy’ (Sus.1, p. xxxiv). It is possible that a search among Venetian MSS. of the Vetus Interpres, if such exist, might bring to light other MSS. belonging to the same family and superior to a and z. We might then be less in the dark than we are at present as to the origin of the marked difference between the two families.

MS. 112 belonging to Balliol College, Oxford (o) is ascribed by Susemihl (Sus.1, p. xxxviii) to the earlier part of the fourteenth century, and is the oldest of the MSS. of the Vetus Interpres yet collated. Its text of the translation of the Politics is evidently

1 I might be able to speak more positively as to this, if I had read more of these annotations than I have as yet found time to do.
nearly allied to that of Susemihl's c, a far later manuscript, but c is not copied from o.

MS. Bodl. Canon. Class. Lat. 174 (y) is a beautifully written Italian manuscript, belonging to the fourteenth century, and, in Mr. Madan's opinion, to the latter half of it. Each page contains two columns. The text of the translation of the Politics contained in it has been tampered with in places by an ingenious corrector, who has here and there contrived with the aid of a penknife to convert the original reading into an entirely new one: thus in the rendering of 1256 b 13 we find parientes over an erasure, the original reading having probably been pro genitis, and in 1258 a 7 again we find iam over an erasure, the original reading having probably been non. These erasures, however, are readily discernible, and they do not seem to occur very often. This MS. is allied, not to a or z, but to the bulk of the MSS. of the translation.

BOOK I.

1252 a 2. ἐνεκεν] 'Only the forms ending in -α are Attic (ἐνεκα, ἐνεκα, ἐνεκα) . . . the form ἐνεκεν does not occur in Attic Inscriptions till after about 300 B.C.' (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 103). Aristotle's frequent use of ἐνεκευ deserves notice. 8. ἐναί om. Γ P1 pr. Ms; a later hand adds it in Ms after τον. Sus. brackets it, and refers (ed. 1) to 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 2, οὐ δίκαιον δολουται ἐναί ἵσον μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως τοῦς κεκτημένους μηδὲν τοῖς κεκτημένοις, where Ρ18 Π2 read ἐναί and Γ Ms omit it (probably wrongly, as they stand alone), and to 2. 7. 1266 b 1, οὐ χαλεπῶν ἀρτέ ποιέων, where Γ Π om. ἐναί: he also gives a reference to Schanz, Nov. quaest. Platon. p. 33 sq. The question whether ἐναί should be retained here is a difficult one, for though Π2 are somewhat prone to omit, and more than once omit ἐναί where it seems to be required (e.g. in 1257 b 7), yet they occasionally omit it where it can be dispensed with (e.g. in 1298 b 36), and Aristotle is well known to be sparing in his use of ἐναί (see Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3. 330, and his edition of the Poetics, p. 243 sqq.: see also Bon. Ind. 239 a 9 sqq.). On the other hand, its omission causes a harshness here, which it does not cause in 1266 b 1. In 1. 9. 1257 a 1, again, the verb is νομιζεῖν, not οἴσσεσαί, and the construction is softened by the use of ὁς. Meteor. 1. 14. 352 a 25, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον τῶν αὐτῶν οὐ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου γένεσιν οἴσσεσαί χρή, however, is a nearer parallel. τῶν αὐτῶν] Vet. Int. idem (τὸ αὐτό 17)? 15. τοῦς om.
pr. O¹ (with Π²) ; it is added in the margin by a corrector. But Π² often omit the article—e.g. in 1269 a 7, 1291 a 1, b 3, 1297 a 35. 24. δὲ] enim Vet. Int., but we often find enim in Vet. Int. where we expect another word—e.g. in 1253 a 23, 1256 a 31, 1272 a 41. Enim does not always stand for γάρ in Vet. Int. (see critical note on 1271 a 23). 25. ὀπιστὴρ ἐν τοῖς θηλασίοις] Vet. Int. quemadmodum et in aliis, but he probably did not find καὶ in his Greek text any more than it there in 1335 b 30, where he translates καβάπερ τὰ τῶν νεωτέρων sicut et iuniorem (see Busse, p. 30). See also below on 1262 a 29. 26. συνδιάγεσθαι] ζάχαρε or obinare in o, not (with Sus.) obinari.

1252 b 2. Ms P¹ add ὁ at before χαλκορύπαιοι: we cannot tell from aeris figuratores what Vet. Int. found in his Greek text: Π² omit it, and they may well be right in doing so: see Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 3, 340 sqq., and Bon. Ind. 109 b 36 sqq. 5. Ms P¹ add τὸ before δοξάνων: about the reading of Γ we cannot be certain: a similar difference of reading occurs in 1261 b 25. See on the subject Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq.: Vahlen, Beitr. 4, 409. The reading of Γ being doubtful, it seems better to follow π². 8. βαρβάρων δ' ] Vet. Int. barbaris quidem. But the Vet. Int. occasionally substitutes γε for δε (e.g. in 1268 b 16). 14. Χαρώνδας μὲν ] Ms P¹ ο μὲν Χαρώνδας: Vet. Int. Charondas quidem, which may represent Χαρώνδας μὲν, the reading of π². Charondas is nowhere else in the Politics honoured with the prefixed article by any MS. 15. ὑμωκάτους] ὑμωκάτους 'Π³ Σσ Λε corr. M²b' (Sus.), also O¹: as to Ms, however, see Sus.¹ p. xii. note 20. The New College MS. of Ar. has homotapos, but Bodl. homocapnos. 17. Vet. Int. domum for aeiας, but he probably found aeiαs, not aeiαων, in his Greek text, for in 1259 a 35 he has domibus for aeiαq. 20. αὐνηλθον om. Γ Ms pr. P¹: not so Ar., who has nam ex his qui suberant regno accreverunt. 28. ἂδη] ἂ δὲ is the reading of O¹ and of all known MSS. except P¹, which has ἂδη, and two others which have ἂ δὲ (Ar. quae quidem): Vet. Int. iam. 29. μὲν οὖ] οὖν om. Ms P¹, and perhaps Ar. (constituta quidem gratia vivendi), but μὲν οὖ is undoubtedly right: it is a common fault in the MSS. to drop οὖ after μὲν (see 1257 b 3, 1294 b 1, 1300 b 24, 1303 b 15, 1314 a 25). 31. αὐτῇ] Vet. Int. ἰψα (αὐτῇ Γ).

1253 a 1. I follow Π² in adding καὶ before τῆλον (so O¹): Π¹ omit it, but the presumption is against this family of MSS. in cases of omission. 2. Ms P¹ add ὁ before ἀνθωποσ (Sus.¹), just as they do in the corresponding passage, 1278 b 19, and in 1253 a 32; we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found the article in
his Greek text or not: π² omit it in all these passages, probably rightly: see above on 1252 b 2 and the authorities there referred to. 5. Susemihl omits to call attention to the fact that Vet. Int. has sceleratus for ἀνέστιος: Vet. Int. would seem to have misread ἀνέστιος as ἀνόσιος—cf. 1253 a 35, where he translates ἀνοσίωτα τον by sceléstitùm. 6. ἄτε πέρ ἄξιμος ἄν ὡπερ ἐν πετοῖς] See Susemihl's apparatus criticus for the various readings of the MSS. in this passage. O¹ omits ἄξιμος ἄν, leaving however a lacuna where these words should stand. O¹ here differs from P⁴, for pr. P⁴ omits only ἄν. Vet. Int. sine iugo existiens, which is no doubt a translation of ἄνεν ζυγοῦ τυχόνων (for τυχόνων is often rendered by existere in Vet. Int.—e.g. in 1260 b 31, 1269 b 24), and this is probably a gloss explanatory of ἄξιμος ἄν. Ar. does not render ἄτε πέρ—πετοῖς, but this does not prove that the clause was wanting in his Greek text; it may well have been imperfect and incomprehensible. All the MSS. may be said to have πετοῖς (πετοῖς Mb), though πετοῖς appears in the margin of P¹ P⁴ and Sb. Vet. Int. sicut in volatilibus, but he may possibly be here translating a conjecture added in the margin of the MS. used by him. There can be little doubt that πετοῖς is the right reading. 10. τῶν ζηων] Vet. Int. supra animalia, but he seems now and then to add prepositions without finding an equivalent for them in his Greek text—thus in 1263 a 37 he renders ὑποδέων ὑπο viaticis, in 1263 b 41 τοῖς συναντόσαν ὑπο conviviis, in 1316 b 2 τῆς σόλεως περ civilatem, and in 1273 a 28 τῶν καρχιστόν ἀμιd Calchedonios. See also below on 1273 b 15. 12. For ἐλξο�ε τοῦ ἐξειν αἰσθήσαν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἥδεος, the Aldine text has ἑλξουδεν, P⁴ Mb Ub L⁵ (and O¹) προοξδεν, followed in all these MSS. (which belong to the less good variety of the second family) by ὡπερ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἥδεος. Compare the deviation of P⁴ Q Mb Ub L⁵ Ald. from the text of other MSS. in 1253 b 2–4, and of P⁴ Q L² in 1258 a 32 sqq., and of P⁴ Ub L⁵ Co in 1286 b 25, where they read ἀλλ' οὐ καταλεῖσθαι τοῦ νῦν διαδόχουν ἐ̂ βασιλεῖς ἐν' ἐξουσίαν ἐξων τοῦτο ποιήσαι (an evident gloss), and of P⁴ L² Ald. in 1260 a 32, where τῶν τέλεων takes the place of τῶ τέλος in these MSS. O¹ agrees with P⁴ in all these passages. In the passage before us, as in some of the others referred to, a gloss seems to be substituted for the text, for it is not likely that we have to do with traces of a double version. See also the readings offered by P⁴ L² Co in 1301 b 33 and 1309 b 2, and by P⁴ Ub Vb L² in 1302 a 28. 22. τις λέγει] Vet. Int. si quis dicat, but this is no proof that he found λέγει (which P² alone has) in his Greek text, for in 1288 b 36 he trans-
lates καὶ ἐλάττων λέγοντι καλός ἐστι αἰτία dicant bene.  23. πάντα
δὲ] All MSS. of Vet. Int. but k have omnia enim.  25. Π omits καὶ
before φόσει: P² omits καὶ before πρότερον, and most MSS. of Vet.
Int. (but not a or z) omit et here.  Vet. Int. has prior, and several
of the less good MSS. of the Politics have proporta.  O¹ (like P¹) has
καὶ φόσει καὶ πρότερον.  28. μηδὲν δεδομένον] Vet. Int. has nullo
indigens, but he probably found μηδειν in his Greek text.  30.
πρῶτος] O¹ has πρῶτον, with ∂ however superscribed above the
final ν—I think by the writer of the MS., though it is difficult to
be certain.  32. Ms P¹ add ∂ before ἀνθρώπος: we cannot tell
whether Vet. Int. found it in the text: see above on 1253a 2.  36.
πρὸς ἄφροδισια καί ἔως ἐπίνυ] Sus.¹: 'ad post venera et add. ο,' but this
ad is expunged in o by dots placed beneath it.  z adds ad here.
'Praepositionem cum plurium nominum casibus copulatum ante
unumquodque eorum repetere solet Guilemrus' (Sus.¹, p. xxxiii).

1253b 2–4. The reading followed in the text is that of
the first family of MSS. and the better variety of the second,
except that Ms P¹ read ἡ οἰκία πᾶλιν in place of πᾶλιν οἰκία (Vet.
Int. rursus domus), and that Γ in 3 had οἰκίας in place of οἰκο-
νομίας, unless indeed domus is a conjecture due to the translator.
The reading of P⁴⁴ Q M¹ U¹ L⁸ (and also of O¹), on the other
hand, is as follows:—ἀνάγκη περὶ οἰκονομίας εἰσεὶ πρότερον πᾶσα γὰρ
πᾶλιν εἰς οἰκίων συνήκτησι, οἰκίας δὲ μήρη, εἰ δὲ νῦν αὐθίς οἰκία συνίσταται.
Bekker follows the reading of these MSS., substituting however
αὐχαγαλῶν for ἀνάγκη, and in his second edition περὶ οἰκίας for περὶ
οἰκονομίας. But see above on 1253a 12. Οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη (not
οἰκίας δὲ μέρη) appears to be the true reading, for οἰκονομίας here
corresponds to οἰκονομίας 2 (which is the reading of all extant MSS.
and of Γ) and is confirmed by ἔστι δὲ τὶ μέρος (sc. οἰκονομίας) 12.
Besides, if οἰκίας δὲ μέρη be read, the tautology in 3 seems excessive.
Cp. also 1. 12. 1259a 37, ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομίας ἐν.
17. δυναίμεθα] δυνάμεθα Ms P¹ C⁴;  Vet. Int. et utique . . . poterimus, which
represents καν . . . δυναίμεθα (the reading of almost all the MSS.
of the second family), for in 1252a 26 Vet. Int. renders βεβηρὸμεν ἐν
utique contemplabitur, in 1253b 8 σκεπτόμεν ἐν ἐν considerandum utique
erit, in 1253b 26 ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἐν necessarium utique erit, and so
generally. In 1253b 38 οὖν ἃν οὐκ ἢ θείοις is nihil utique opus esset, in
1264a 3 οὐκ ἢ θέλειν non utique lataet.  19. οὐ γάρ renders πολιτική
by политика (πολιτικα), which is preferable to politia, the reading
adopted by Susemihi.  23. z adds manifestum quod after pars
domus est, perhaps introducing into the text a conjectural emenda-
ment in the margin of its archetype, the object evidently being to
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obtain an apodosis. 24. ἀδύνατον καὶ [ἡπὶ] est after impossible om. z, perhaps rightly. 25. ὅπερ δὲ τὰις] ὅπερ τὰις pr. O1 (corr.1 in marg. γρ. ὅπερ δὲ ἐν), but neither of these readings is probably the correct one, for the former is that of P4.6 Ub L8 Ald. (see as to these MSS, above on 1253 a 12 and 1253 b 2–4), and the latter, though adopted by Bekker, is found only in MSS. of little authority: Ar. (who translates ut vero in artibus) perhaps found it in his text. The best MSS. have ὅπερ δὲ τὰις. 26. μὴλλει] Vet. Int. defeat, but this is no proof that he found μελλω in his Greek text (see above on 1253 a 22). 27. τῶν οἰκονομικῶν] Π1 τῷ οἰκονομικῷ, but in 1256 b 36 Vet. Int. has yeconomico et politico (οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν Π) wrongly beyond a doubt, and perhaps here the three texts of the first family are affected by a similar error. Ο1 τῶν οἰκονομικῶν: Ar. sic etiam in re familiaris τῶν οἰκονομικῶν;]. 33. ‘ὁ om. Μ8 del. Π’ (Sus.). We cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found it in his text. Ο1 has ὥθωνατο] ‘Eta as syllabic augment in βοίλωμαι, δίνυμα, μέλλω does not appear [in Attic Inscriptions] till after 284 b.c.’ (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 78). All the MSS. have ὥθωνατο here and ἡδολυστο in 1259 a 16, but in 1307 a 31 Μ8 Π1 have ἡδύναντο, the reading of Π is uncertain, and Π2 have ἀδύνατο. 37. δύσθαι] ὑπόδυσθαι Π Μ8, possibly rightly, for Aristotle may not have preserved the metre in his quotation (compare the various readings in 1328 a 15 and 1338 a 25): Ο1 δύσθαι: Ar. prōdίisse (δύσθαι;). οὐνωσ αἱ κερκίδες εἰκέρατον] Vet. Int. sic si pectines pectinarent, but it is hardly likely that he found ei in his Greek text after οὖνως.

1254 a 5. δ?] z om. autem (so Μ8). 6. Here again Bekker in reading δέονται δ’ follows the less good MSS.; the better MSS. of both families have καὶ δέονται. Ο1 has δέονται δ’, but καὶ has been added above the line with a caret before δέονται, and then crossed out. τὴν αὐτὴν] hanc before eandem om. z (with a g n), perhaps rightly. 9. τὸ τε γὰρ μᾶριν] quod quidem enim pars, the reading of o as well as of several other MSS. of the Vet. Int., may perhaps be correct, and not quae quidem enim pars (Sus.), for in 1257 b 28 quod finis stands for τὸ τέλος. 10. δῶς] Vet. Int. simpliciter (i.e. ἀπλῶς, cp. 7 (5). 1. 1301 a 29–33): ἀπλῶς δῶς Μ8 Π1. See Susenhmih's apparatus criticus. Susenmih holds in his third edition, in opposition to a marginal remark in Π2, that δῶς is a gloss on ἀπλῶς and not ἀπλῶς on δῶς, and that ἀπλῶς is the true reading. It seems strange, however, if that is so, that all the authorities for the text should read ἀπλῶς in 13. 14. αὐτοῦ] So Ο1. 15. The reading ἀνθρωπος ἄν γ Μ8 pr. Π1 etc. is supported by Alex. Aphrodis. in
Aristot. Metaph. p. 15, 6 (Bonitz), τῶν γὰρ δοῦλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἶναι εἶπεν δὲ ἄνθρωπος δὲν ἄλλον ἐστὶν, where, however, the Laurentian MS. of Alexander (L) has τῶν γὰρ δοῦλον ἐν τοῖς Πολιτικοῖς εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν ἄλλον δυνα καὶ μὴ ἕκαστον: ἄνθρωπος δὲ P² and probably P³ (for there is an erasure here in P³), and also most of the less good MSS. O¹ has ἄνθρωπος, followed by δὲ expunged by dots placed beneath it, but whether these dots were placed under δὲ by the writer of the MS. or by a corrector, it is impossible to say. Ar., as Sus. notes, probably read δὲ, not δὲν, but this is not quite clear, for his rendering is—qui enim sui ipsius non est secundum naturam, sed (ἀλλὰ;) alterius homo, hic natura est servus. 'Lectio ἄνθρωπος δὲν unice vera videtur, si quidem est natura servus non is, qui quamquam natura alienus hominis tamen ipse homo, sed is, qui quamquam homo tamen natura alienus hominis est' (Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 341). Passing on to ἄλλον δὲν οὐσίων κτ.λ., we find in Vet. Int. alterius aulem est homo, quicunque res possessa aut servus est. He would therefore appear to have found in his text δὲ ἂν κτήμα ἄλλος ή, or perhaps δὲ ἂν κτήμα ἄλλος ἄν, which is the reading of MS: the better MSS. have δοῦλος δὲν, those of less authority ἄνθρωπος δὲν. O¹ has ἄλλος δὲν, those of less authority ἄνθρωπος δὲν, for O¹ is without iota subscript) δοῦλος δὲν, and in the margin, added by the writer of the MS., γρ. ἄνθρωπος δὲν. Ar. has—alterius aulem est qui possidetur homo existens instrumentum ad acquirendum activum et separabile. He probably read ἄνθρωπος δὲν. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus for the various readings: he adds in his second or explanatory edition—'we must regard either δοῦλος οὐσίων or (which is less probable) ἄνθρωπος δὲν as the reading from which the other readings have arisen, but in either case this reading has proceeded from a mere dittography' (i.e. a repetition of ἄνθρωπος δὲν or δοῦλος οὐσίων in 15). Hence Susemihl reads [δοῦλος οὐσίων]. Busse, however (De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 22), attaches little importance to the est of the Vet. Int., who, he thinks, found, not δοῦλος οὐσίων, but δοῦλος δὲν (which can hardly be a dittography) in his Greek text, and rendered it freely by servus est (compare the renderings noticed above, p. lxv): he holds δοῦλος δὲν, however, to be 'hoc loco omni sensu destitutum,' and falls back on the reading ἄνθρωπος δὲν. This is, as has been said, the reading of the less good MSS., but by adopting it we escape the difficulty of supposing Aristotle to have used the word δοῦλος in his definition of the φύσει δοῦλος. Susemihl's latest remarks on this passage will be found in Qu. Crit. p. 340 sq. (1886). 39. τῶν γὰρ μοχθρῶν κτ.λ.] Vet. Int. pestilentium enim et prave (the equivalent for φάυλος in 1254 b 2)
se habentium. I know not what pestilentium stands for in Vet. Int., but μαχητα is rendered in 1303 b 15 by malitia, and in 1314 a 14 by malignias. Vet. Int. omits to render αυ, but this he occasionally seems to do (e. g. in 1256 a 4, 1265 a 30).

1254 b 14. Πι add και after χειρον, in which they are probably wrong: see below on 1260 a 26. 18. Ο (like π) has και τοις ἕστιν ἐπὶ ἀντών. 23. λόγος Πι. Ar. nam cetera quidem animalia rationem non sentiunt: he would seem therefore to have read λόγον, as does Ο1. 34. γένους is rendered in most MSS. of Vet. Int. by finiunt. The reading of ο is not sint (as Sus. with a query), but finiunt.

1255 a 5. και before καρά om. Πι pr. Πσ, etc., and Pseudo-Plutarch De Nobilitate. As to the De Nobilitate, if Volkmann's account of it (Leben Schriften und Philosophie des Plutarch, i. 118) is correct, no weight can be attached to its testimony. See also Bernays, Dialoge des Aristoteles, pp. 14, 140, and Wyttenbach's notes (Plutarch, Moralia, tom. 5; pars 2, p. 915 sqq.). But in fact the passages quoted from Aristode were not given in the MS., and were inserted by J. C. Wolf, the first editor of the work (see Volkmann and Wyttenbach), so that the text of them in the De Nobilitate possesses no sort of authority. 14. z adds et before violentiam pati, thus giving an equivalent for και βωίζοθα, which none of the MSS. of the Vet. Int. known to Sus. appear to do. 16. Susemihl gives violentia as the equivalent in Vet. Int. for τὴν βλαυν, but he notes that violentiam is found in α: it is also found in ο γ ζ and may probably be the correct reading. 29. ὅταν τοῦτο λέγωσαν] Vet. Int., according to Susemihl's text, cum hos dicunt, but ο γ ζ have cum hoc dicunt. Is hos a misprint? 35. I follow Πι (and O1), which omit και before ἐλέεθερον: cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 15, δὴ ἀνωτενοῦμενα κατατοκισθέναι γίνονται πέντε (so Π), and other passages collected by Vahlen, Poet. p. 216 sq. Et before liberum is omitted in z, but probably through an oversight. 37. No MS. gives ἐκγονον, except Π1, which removes the iota of ἐκγονον (sic) by placing a point under it, nor was ἐκγονον found by Vet. Int. in his Greek text. This reading, like some other good ones peculiar to Π1, may well be due, as Susemihl points out (Sus.3 pp. xiii–xiv), to the emending hand of Demetrius Chalcondylas, the writer of the MS.

1255 b 2. γένεσθαι] γενεσθαι Ms Π14 Ο1, etc.: Vet. Int. fieri, which may represent either γένεσθαι or γενέσθαι (or indeed other forms, as it stands for γεγονώνα in 1268 b 38, and for γεγενήσθαι in 1272 b 32). 12. Γ Ms pr. Π1 add τοῦ σώματος after μέρος: Sus. thinks that
this may have been the original position of these two words, but it is possible that they may have been added in the margin to explain κεχωρισμένον ἕπερ, and then have found their way into the text. Additions which may thus be accounted for occur occasionally in P4s L (see Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* in 1309 b 2, 1313 b 32, 1316 a 1), and also, though less often, in the first family of MSS. (e.g. in the passage before us, in 1259 b 14, in 1268 a 37, and possibly in 1335 a 37: see also below on 1263 a 12). 14. τοι-τῶν ἧδιωμένων Π: qui natura tales significantur Vet. Int., but it is doubtful whether he found τοιῶν in his text, for, as Busse remarks (p. 42), he translates rīvēs by quales in 1264 a 38: nevertheless, it is true that in 1284 a 9 he renders ἄξιωμεν τῶν ἕων significati aequalibus, and that this is his usual way of rendering phrases of this kind, so that we expect his here rather than tales. Ar. quapropter aliquid est quod simul pro sit et amicitia servò et domino invicem secundum naturam ita dispositis. 18. ἤ μὲν γὰρ . . . ἤ δὲ] Z haec quidem enim . . . haec (or hoc) autem (not hic quidem enim . . . hic autem, like almost all the other MSS.). 24. M's P1 add ταῖς before Συρακούσαις: whether Vet. Int. found ταῖς in his text, we cannot tell from in Syracusis. ἐπαιδευε] So O1: M's P1 ἐπαιδευεν: Vet. Int. erudivit, which might represent either ἐπαιδευε or ἐπαιδευεν, for in 1267 b 18 κατεσκευαζεν is constili, in 1267 b 30 construxit: in 1267 b 31 ἔστει is fecit, though in 33 ἰδεῖ περὶ is divi-debat. 26. πλεῖον Π: see Bon. Ind. 618 b 13 sqq., and Liddell and Scott, s. v. Meisterhans (Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 68) observes—*before long vowels we find throughout in Attic Inscriptions -ei (πλεῖον, πλεῖον, πλεῖος): before short vowels in the classical period (till 300 B.C.) -e (πλέονον, πλέονων, πλέονιν)—in the post-classical period, on the other hand, -ei (πλειωνον, πλειονων, πλειονιν): the neuter singular, however, even after 300 B.C. usually retains the simple vowel.' τῶν τοιῶν] so Π2 (and O1): Π1 τούτων. ὄψοψικη] ὄψοψικη rests only on the authority of M's P2, for it is of course impossible to say whether Vet. Int. found ὄψοψικη in his text or ὄψοψικη. O1 (like P4) has ὄψοψικη (or rather ὄψοψικη), which probably points to ὄψοψικη, for in 1258a 37 pr. O1 has χρηματιστηκε. The same MSS. which here read ὄψοψικη, read (if we allow for clerical errors) κερκιδοσικη in 1256 a 6, where M's P1 (about Γ we cannot be certain) read κερκιδοσικη. All MSS. have τεκνοσικη in 1253 b 10. 'In Plato ὄψοψικη is now restored from MSS.' (Liddell and Scott). In Eth. Nic. 7. 13. 1153 a 26 and Metaph. Ε. 2. 1027 a 4 ὄψοψικη is the form used, but in the latter passage the MSS. are not quite unanimous. In Metaph. K. 8.
1064 b 21, Bekker, Bonitz, and Christ read ὑποστοική, but two MSS. (one of them Ab) have ὑποστοικική. In Eth. Nic. i. i. 1094 a 11 pr. K (the best MS.) has χαλινοποική. See explanatory note on this passage. Corr. 2 P² (i.e. the writer of P² in darker ink than that of the MS.), followed by Bekk., adds ἦ before οἰκονομική, but Sus.¹ (p. xviii.) says of the corrections thus classed—‘maximum partem coniecturas sapienti, etsi vix eas ex ipsius librarī ingenio haustas esse crediderim,’ and the erroneous additions of ἦ before οἰκονομική in 1257 b 20, and σκοτίων before προσηκεῖ in 1258 a 25, rest on the same authority. 12. τίς γὰρ] Most MSS. of Vet. Int. quod enim (o quid enim), but τίς, like a, has quae enim. 16. πολλά] o multas rightly: is multae (Sus.) a misprint? 23. z, like a, has bestiarum et enim, answering to τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων. 30. πόλ] πολλαὶ pr. O¹ (with P⁴, etc.), πολλ ἐκ τῶν τε γὰρ. 31. οἱ μὲν ὅν] Vet. Int. quae quidem enim: he seems, therefore, to have read οἱ μὲν γὰρ, unless enim is a blunder, which is very possible. Three MSS. of Vet. Int. om. enim. 40. τοσοῦτοι σχεδὸν] z tot fere, retaining the order of the Greek text, and quaeacunque for ὅσοι γε, not quicunque, like the MSS. examined by Susemihl.

1256 b 1. πορίζοντα] κομίζοντα: Ms P¹, and Γ if ferunt (Vet. Int.) represents κομίζοντα, not πορίζοντα, which perhaps is the case, for acquirere stands for πορίζων in 1256 b 28, 1268 a 32, etc., though we have emerunt for πορίσαι in 1285 b 7. Πορίζοντα, however, seems the more probable reading, for we have πορίζωντας τὴν τροφὴν in 1268 a 32, and πορίζοντας τὴν τροφὴν occurs in De Gen. An. 3. 1. 749 b 24 and Hist. An. 1. 1. 487 b 1. No instance of κομίζοντα τὴν τροφὴν is given in the Index Aristotelicus of Bonitz. O¹ πορίζοντα. Ar. sib. praeparant (= πορίζοντα?). 6. ὃς ἂν ἡ χρεία συναναγήκῃ quaeacunque modo et opportunitas compellat o (where et may possibly be intended to represent suv- in συναναγήκῃ). 8. ἰδιομένη] ἰδιομένη Ms P¹ and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. data), but data is just as likely to stand for ἰδιομένη, for facta represents γνωμένης in 1262 a 38 (cp. 1263 a 12, b 19, 1270 a 24, 1272 a 17), ladata ἐπαναφέρεται in 1258 a 40, transmutatum μεταβαλλόμενον in 1257 b 4, vocatam καλουμένου in 1256 b 14. O¹ ἰδιομένη. 9. τελευθείαν] Vet. Int. secundum perfectionem or secundum perfectam (sc. generationem), for the reading is doubtful (yz secundum perfectam, and, if I am right,
o also, not secundum perfectionem, as Sus. with a query). Ar. sic etiam ad perfectionem deductis. 13. τοίς γενομένοις] τοίς γενομένοις Π¹ (O¹) Bekk.¹: τοίς γενομένοις Μ⁵ P¹ Bekk.² Sus. Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. have genitis (so z), or what probably stands for genitis, but Sus. finds generalis in two of them (k o): I must confess that after looking at o I feel doubtful whether the contraction found in it stands for generalis; still k remains. Genitis, however, is probably the true reading; but this may just as well stand for τοίς γενομένοις (cp. 1258 a 35, where genito stands for τῷ γενομένῳ) as for τοῖς γενομένοις or τοῖς γενομένοις. It is not impossible that Ar. found the last-named reading in his Greek text, for his translation is ad natorum educationem, and he renders τῶν γενομένων in 1335 b 22 and τὰ γενόμενα in 1336 a 16 by naios; but no MS. of the Politics has τοῖς γενομένοις. If we read τοῖς γενομένοις (=τοῖς τέκνοις, as in 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 18), there is a good deal of harshness in the use of γενομένοις in two different senses in 13 and 15, and γενομένοις 15 loses something of its point; it seems probable also that in 1335 b 18 the true reading is τὰ γενόμενα Π¹, not τὰ γενόμενα Π² (so in De Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 24 τῷ γενομένῳ has apparently in some MSS. taken the place of the true reading τοῖς γενομένης, which is found in Z and accepted by Aubert and Wimmel). I incline on the whole to adopt the reading which may well be that of Π¹, and to read τοῖς γενομένοις. Cp. Menex. 237 E, πάν γάρ τὸ τεκόν τροφῆν ἔχει ἑπιτηδεῖαν φίλον τέκνη φίλην καὶ γυνή δήλη τεκούσα τε ἀδηθής καὶ μή, ἀλλ' ὑποβαλλόμενη, εἰών μή ἑκατη τροφῆν τῷ γενομένῳ. In Plato, Laws 930 D τὸ γενομένον, τὸ γενομένην, καὶ τὸ γενομένον are all used close together. 14. τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γιάλακτος φύσιν] Vet. Int. vocatam lacticis naturam (τὴν καλουμένην?). 15. γενομένοις] 'τελειωθείσων Ar. Sus.¹ ² forsitan recte,' Sus.³, who now places [γενομένοις] in his text; but I find in the New College MS. of Ar., and also in Bodl., quare similiter est genitis quoque existimandum plantisque animalium esse gratia et cetera animalia hominum causa. O¹ γενομένοις: Vet. Int. genitis. 20. γίνεται] γίνεται Μ⁺ P¹ and possibly also Γ (Vet. Int. fiant). 26. The text of Π¹ and especially of Μ⁺ has suffered here from the intrusion of glosses: see Susemihl's apparatus criticus. Vet. Int. hoc prae dativum bellum et primum (z however omits et with Μ⁺ P¹). Ar. ut natura id bellum iustum existat. 28. o y z have quaram est for ὅν εἰσὶ (in agreement with rerum). 32. ἄγαθην pr. O¹, but dots are placed under -ἀν and ὅν is written above, probably by corr.¹ 36. οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν] οἰκονομικό καὶ πολιτικό Γ: see note on 1253 b 27. Ar. multitudo instrumentorum rei familiaris et rei publicae.
1257 a 3. Vet. Int. either misread ἐκέλισα as κεμένη or found κεμένη in his text, for he translates posita. Ar. sed neque est idem neque valde remotum. He fails to render ἐκέλισα, but then he also fails to render τῇ εἰρημένῃ. 6. κτίματος] χρήματος Ms and probably also Έ, for Vet. Int. has rei, not rei possessae (rei, however, stands for πρόγματος in 8). 10. Sus.2 by a misprint omits γάρ after καί. 17. ἡ] quae o rightly: y z quare (with most MSS. of Vet. Int.). 38. καὶ εἶ] καὶ εἶ P3, and possibly Έ also (Vet. Int. et si?); Vet. Int., however, occasionally fails to render ἕν (see above on 1254 a 39). 40. ἐπιθαλάσσων] ἐπιθαλάσσων P3, Bekk.3, Sus. (Vet. Int. impressimibus might stand for either reading). For ἀπολύσῃ the MSS. of Vet. Int. have absolutae: so y z, and also Ω, though Susemihl gives its reading (with a query) as absolutae.

1257 b 7. εἰςαι om. Π1: see note on 1252 a 8. Here it can hardly be spared. 11. καὶ νόμος] Ο1 καὶ εἶς νόμος, but the breathing over εἰς has been struck through, and corr.1 has written something ending in -os (probably καὶ νόμος) in the inner margin, where the binding partly conceals the correction. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus on this passage. 12. οὗτε] So Ο1 (with Π1): οὐδὲ Bekk. Sus.: but cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 8, ὥστε παλλάξας ὑπὸ καμινοῦσα τῆς ἐκκλησίας οὗτε (so Π1: οὐδὲ Bekk. Sus.) τοῦ δικάζειν: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 7, ἐν μῇ (so Π3 Bekk.: μήτε Π1 Sus.) ἐβρίζῃ τις αὐτοῦς μήτε αὐθαίρηται μηδὲν τῆς οὔσιας. 15. ἀπολείται] Vet. Int. perit, cp. 1263 b 28, where he renders στερήσονται by privantur, and see below on 1262 a 2. 20. ἦ δὲ κατηλικῇ, πωμητῇ κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. campśoria autem factā pecuniarum, etc., which shews how he interpreted the passage and punctuated it. 21. ἀλλ' ἦ] Vet. Int. sed, not sed aut, as in 1305 b 15, or nisi, as in 1272 a 11 and 1286 a 37. 24. οὗτος om. Π1: compare, however, 2. 11. 1273 a 9, where Π1 om. οὗτος. 3. 17. 1288 a 29, where Π1 om. τοῦτον, and 8 (6). 4. 1319 b 11, where Π1 omit τοῦτο. It is of course possible that Π2 are wrong in adding these words in the four passages, but the use of οὗτος in the passage before us at any rate, followed by the explanation ὁ ἀπὸ ταῦτα τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, is characteristically Aristotelian (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 32-34: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 23). See also 1258 b 8. We must bear in mind that Π1 are prone to omit words. Ο1 has οὗτος. 33. ὃρῳ Π1, and so Ο1: z has videmus, but the symbol for -mus is over an erasure; y, however, has videre (the first two letters of this word in y project slightly into the margin and may have been tampered with), and though Ω has video, the last two letters are over an erasure, the original reading having apparently occupied less space than video, for the last letter of this word is in actual
contact with the first letter of accidens, a perpendicular line being
drawn to separate the two words. Possibly therefore the original
reading of o was vide (= videmus). ‘Oró is not perhaps impossible,
for we find λέγω, Pol. 3. 13. 1283 b 1: 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 19: τίθημι,
Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 23: ὁθάμων, Phys. 8. 5. 257 b 22: μὲν δικαί
σημαίνειν; Meteor. 1. 3. 339 b 23 (where, however, Blass—Rhein.
Mus. 30. 500—suspects that Aristotle is quoting from one of
his own Dialogues): διειλόμεν MS P133 Qb Vb Ls Ald. (divisinus Vet.
Int.: διειλόμεθα P1 Bekk.) in Pol. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 2, but perhaps
Göttling and Sus. (following corr. P1) are right in reading διειλομεν
in this passage, for in 1290 a 24 the MSS. and Vet. Int. agree in
reading διειλομεν. The emendation δρομεν dates as far back as
Sepulveda and Victorius, and indeed earlier, for it appears, as we
have just seen, in one or two MSS. of Vet. Int.: Bekker adopts it
in both his editions, as does also Susemihl, though he brackets the
termination. 35. ἐπαλλάττει] variatur z (not variat) probably
rightly, for variari, not variare, is the equivalent for ἐπαλλάττειν in
the vētus versio (cp. 1255 a 13, 1317 a 2). 36. ἐκατέρα] ἐκάτερα
‘vetusta et emendatoria exemplaria’ mentioned by Sepulveda (see
p. 19 of his translation); three MSS. also of the Vet. Int. (b g h)
have utrique pecunia vectae, and ἐκάτερα is the reading translated by
Leonardus Aretinus (variatur enim usus eiusdem existens utriusque
acquisitionis, eiusdem enim est usus acquisitio, sed non secundum idem);
but all known MSS. of the Politics have ἐκατέρα, and most of the
MSS. of the Vet. Int. have uterque (agreeing with usus). z has uterque,
altered into utrique, not, I think, utrique altered into uterque. If we
read ἐκατέρα, two uses of χρηματιστική are referred to, and this seems
to suit better with ἐπαλλάττει than ἡ χρησις ἐκάτερα τῆς χρηματιστικῆς: if
ἐκατέρας, two kinds of χρηματιστική are referred to, whose ‘use’ (not
‘uses’) ‘overlaps’ (ἐπαλλάττει). Perhaps we rather expect to hear of
two uses than of one use. Hence on the whole ἐκατέρα seems
preferable, but ἐκατέρα might so easily take the place of ἐκάτερα
that the true reading is doubtful. 38. τῆς δ’ ἡ αδέχοντι] Vet. Int.
adds finis after augmentatio, but probably without any equivalent in
his Greek, as Sus. remarks (Sus.1 p. xxxiv).

1258 a 2. z adds et before ἵπσις (answering to καὶ before τοῦ et
ζῆν). Sus.1: ‘et post autem librariorum culpa excidisse quam a
Guilelmo omnissum esse verisimiliori duco.’ As to ἵπσις, it should
be noted that, as Dittmeyer has shown (‘Quae ratio inter vetustam
Aristotelis Rhetoricorum translationem et Graecos codices inter-
cedat,’ p. 34), William of Moerbeke in his translation of the Rhetoric
often renders the article by ἵπσε—e. g. in Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 16,
where for ἰδονὶς καὶ τοῦ ζῷ we find delectationis et ipsius vivere. 7. ọṣọṇṣ] z rightly omits non before existente: all the MSS. known to Sus. add it: y probably had non before existente originally, though iám occupies its place now over an erasure. 32–34. Pr. O' has here—ἀλλὰ τῆς ἱατρικῆς, αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶ μὲν ἐς τοῦ ὕπονομον ἐστὶ δ' ὡς αὖ, ἀλλὰ τῆς κέρδους ὑποτεκτικῆς, but corr.¹ adds in the margin γρ. ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἱατρου, αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, and κέρδους is expunged by dots placed beneath. For the various readings offered by Π⁴ & Q L⁵ in this passage, see Susemihl's apparatus criticus. See also above on 1253 a 12. These MSS. perhaps follow some gloss or paraphrase.

1258 b 1. μεταβλητικὰς μεταβολικῆς M⁸ P¹, here alone, for in 1257 a 9, 15, 28, 1258 b 21, 29 these MSS. (like P⁳) have the form μεταβλητικη, nor is the word used elsewhere by Aristotle apparently. We cannot tell from translatio whether Vet. Int. found μεταβολικής or μεταβλητικάς in his Greek text, for he translates τῆς μεταβλητικῆς in 1258 b 21, 29 by translata. 4. ἐφ' ἵππον ἐπορίαθή] So P² (and O¹) with Ar. (et non ad quod inductus est): ἐφ' ἵππον ἐπορίσαμεθα Π¹ (Vet. Int. super quo guidem acquisivimus). 7. Π¹ add ἐκ before νομόμαρος, which P² (and O¹) omit. 10. ροῖας] Vet. Int. quibus, but he has quales for τίνες in 1264 a 38. 27. τρίτον] τέταρτον Γ M⁸ pr. P¹, apparently a mistaken attempt at emendation. 30. τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς γνωμονῶν] ὡς ex a terra genitis, z ex altera genitis. 33. περὶ ἐκάστον] Here, as Sus. has already noted, o alone among the MSS. of the Vet. Int. has preserved the true reading—de uno quoque. 36. O¹ (with Π⁴ and some other MSS. which Bekker follows) adds τῆς before τύχης: see below on 1270 b 19. 40. Χαρίτηδη] Χάρηθι (χάριτι M⁸) δή Π Bekk. Many of the MSS. of the Vet. Int., however, and z among them, have karitide. Ar. a caritie (Bodl. charite) pario.

1259 a 10. In the fourth century B.C. the forms ἀλαίας, ἀλάς, ἀλῶν take the place of ἀλαία, etc., in Attic inscriptions (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 14), but here all the MSS. seem to have ἀλαϊάν, as all have Πειραιὰ in 1303 b 11, though some have πειραιά in 1267 b 23. 18. Most of the MSS. have ἔλαιωργῶν, though some spell or accentuate it wrongly: Π³ has ἐλαιωργίων: Π⁴ has ἔλαιωργον, Ο¹ ἔλαιωργόν, and so Γ apparently, for Vet. Int. has olivarum cultoribus. ἔλαιωργεία is the word used in the citation from Hieronymus Rhodius in Diog. Laer. 1. 26, which may possibly be a reproduction of the passage before us, and Liddell and Scott adopt this form of the word (not ἔλαιωργον). In 1295 b 17 Π³ has διδακαλεῖος, Π⁴ Ald. διδακαλεῖος, Π¹ (probably
wrongly) διδασκάλους. 16. ἡδολετο] See above on 1253 b 33.
28. ἐτέλαβεν] O¹ has ἐτέλαβεν with ô superscribed over â, apparently by the writer of the MS.: no other MS. gives this reading, which is no doubt wrong: see, however, Schneider ad loc. τοῦτον] τοῦτο (Bekk.) is found only in one MS. and that an inferior one. δ Διωνίσιος] δ om. M⁸ P¹: whether γ omitted it also, it is of course impossible to say. In 1252 b 14 M⁸ P¹ give the δ to Charondas, which here they deny to Dionysius.
31. τὸ μέντοι δραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτον] Vet. Int. quod vero visum fuit Thali et huic (o quod vero iussum fuerit Thali et huic). Sus. suspects that the translator found τὸ μέντοι δραμα Θάλη καὶ τοῦτο in his text: more probably he found τὸ μέντοι δραμα Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτον (unless he misread τοῦτο as τοῦτον). This is a possible reading, but all MSS. have τοῦτο. See note in Sus.³, who now reads Θάλεω καὶ τοῦτο. ὁραμα has been variously emended, but Mitchell (Indices Graecitatis in Orat. Att. 2. 581) gives it as occurring, apparently in a similar sense to that which it bears here, in [Demosth.] Procem. 55. p. 1460, 26, δραμα τοῦτο ἐπωνείτο ὁ δήμος αὐτοῦ καλῶς, ὁ ἄθροι Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ λυσιτελές τῇ τόξει, and it suits well with κατανόημα γ and κατανόησαν το. 37. μέρη om. P⁺⁺⁺⁺, etc. (also O¹). It is not perhaps quite certain that P¹ are right in adding it. 39. Almost all MSS. of Vet. Int. (including o y) have praest, but ἀρχεῖω is undoubtedly right: z has praesse, which appears to be found in only one of the MSS. known to Sus. (b).
1259 b 16. τὸ νεώτερον] z has iuvenius rightly: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. iuvenem. 28. σχεῖδην δέ] The weight of manuscript authority is in favour of δὲ in place of δέ, for of the better MSS. only pr. P² has δé: Vet. Int., however, has autem. δé seems to be right, answering to μὲν οὖν 21. 31. καὶ before δικαιαστὸς om. P¹.
35. δεῖ δὲ] o oportaret utique, but oportebit utique, the reading of the other MSS., is probably right (see above on 1253 b 17).
1260 a 3. διαφοράς] διαφορᾶs Ρ (Vet. Int. huius autem esse differentiae), and so probably pr. O¹, for the accent of διαφορᾶs is over an erause: yz have huius autem differentiae, omitting esse (in z, however, differentiae is over an erause). ἄσπερ καὶ τῶν φῶν ἅρχο-μένων] Susemihi's text of the Vet. Int. here runs, quemadmodum et natura principiantium et subiectorum, and he thinks that the Vet. Int. found ἅρχοντα καὶ added in his Greek text between φῶνει and ἅρχομένων. But it would seem from the apparatus criticus to his text of the Vet. Int. (Sus.¹ p. 53), that of the nine MSS. used by him (a b c g h k l m o), one (o) omits et natura principiantium, making the passage run quemadmodum et subiectorum, and seven (b c g h k l m) read quemadmodum natura et subiec-
torum (so y), except that later hands add principantium after natura in b and the margin of l. Thus the reading adopted by Susemihl was apparently found by him only in a. I have found it, however, in z, which gives the passage thus—huius aulem (esse om. z) differentiae, quemadmodum et natura principantium et subiectorum. Whether Vet. Int. found ἀρχόντων καὶ in his Greek text is, however, quite another question. Ar. quemadmodum in his quae natura obediunt. O1 has ὀπτηρ καὶ τῶν φύσεων ἀρχαμένων, but corr.1 has inserted a caret after φύσει and adds in the margin ἀρχόντων καὶ (a dot, however, has been placed under each of these words to expunge it—by whom, it is impossible to say). It is conceivable that Vet. Int. found a similar correction in the margin of the Greek text used by him, and translated it. 4. ὑφήγητα] ὑφηγεῖται Π1 (Vet. Int. exemplificatur : exemplificabitur a z). 15. Ar. is said by Sus.12 to add δὲ after ἵπποληπτῶν, but his translation runs in the New College MS. and in Bodl.—eodem modo se habere necesse est circa morales virtutes, putandum est omnes participes esse oportere sed non eodem modo, sed quantum cuiqueopus est. 20. ἐστὶν] o z have est, in place of et, before moralis rightly (Susemihl reads et and does not mention that 0 has ἐστὶν). 21. πᾶσαν] Ms P1 have ἐπὶ πᾶσαν: we cannot tell from Vet. Int. omnium, which reading he found in his text. 22. ὕστερον Σωκράτης] O1 ὄστερον Σωκράτης (P4 οὗτο καὶ Σωκράτης). 26. ὑπερ] Vet. Int. has virtute (= ὑπερη, which is the reading of pr. Mας), τὸ ὑπερπραγματικὸν I follow P1S Σb Τb (z has est in place of aut after virtute, but over an erasure) in omitting ἦ before τὸ ὑπερπραγματικὸν: see Vahlen, Poet. p. 136 and Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. 1. p. 52, where among other passages the following are referred to—Poet. 8. 1451 a 20, Ἡρακλῆδα Θησείδα καὶ τὰ τακτὰ παράδονα: Rhet. 2. 12. 1388 b 33, ὕπεργν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα (in the passage before us we have ἦ instead of καὶ). Cp. also 2. 3. 1362 a 12, ψάκτερα ψυλλήνθην, where Π om. ἦ (see Vahlen, Poet. p. 216): Eth. Nic. 1o 10. 1180 b 34, ἀνὴρ ἀπαθητικὸς (Mb Ob): Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 23, ἁδοὺς θριὲ ὁτιῶν Κb O1 8 (θριὲ ὁτιῶν ὁτιῶν Λb Ob), where other MSS. have ὁτιῶς ἦ θρηὲ ὁτιῶς: Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 10, ἄνου ἰπαρχεῖν ἰπαρχεῖν, οὐ τραγιγοῦντα καὶ ταξιαχίλονσα καὶ λαψαγγείαν (where no MS. has καὶ before στρατηγεῖν, though Vet. Int. has καὶ before his equivalent for it): 6 (4). 4. 1291 b 23—25, where δὲ is absent after προβηκῶν, though Vet. Int. has autem: 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 1, where Γ Ms P 3 om. δὲ: 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 27, λέγω δ ἀντικείσαι τοῖς ἐπικεῖσί τῷ πλῆθει, τοῖς ἀπόροις ταῖς εἰσφόροις Ms P1 (other MSS. add καὶ before τοῖς ἀπόροις). 31. ᾧ ποίσ] ὁ 0ms Ms P1: we have no means of knowing whether Vet. Int. found it in his text. 32.
τὸν τέλειον καὶ (in place of τὸ τέλος καὶ) P4 6 Ald. Ar. (sed ad perfectum et ducem) Bekk. O1 has τὸν τέλειον καὶ, but in the margin, probably added by corr.1, τὰ τέλα καὶ. See above on 1258a 32 and 1253a 12. Here also perhaps these MSS. follow a gloss or paraphrase: Aristotle’s language in i. 12. 1259 b 3 may well have suggested it. 36. ἐλλείψη] O1 ἐλλείψει (or rather ἐλλείψει), and so too pr. P4: all other MSS. apparently have ἐλλείψη: Vet. Int. deficiat, which may possibly represent ἐλλείψη, but we cannot be sure of this, for after tanta ut he could use nothing but the subjunctive. Bekk.1 ἐλλείψη: Bekk.2 Sus. ἐλλείψει. 37. ἀρα] ἀρα pr. O1, changed into ἀρα probably by a corrector, for the circumflex is in darker ink than that used in the MS.

1260 b 17. O1 adds καὶ before τοὺς παιδὰς (with Π4). 18. corr.1 O1 adds εἴναι in darker ink after γυναῖκας: a m z add esse after mulieres. 19. οἱ κώνωναὶ] Vet. Int. has dispensatores: Sus. thinks he found οἷκονομοι in his text in place of οἱ κώνωναὶ, and adopts this reading. All MSS., however, have οἱ κώνωναὶ, and is it not, to say the least, possible that Vet. Int. here as elsewhere has misread the Greek?

BOOK II.

1260 b 27. Ἐπεὶ δὲ] Π4 om. δὲ, but omissions in Π4 are not infrequent, and δὲ, which hardly suits the present ending of Book I., may possibly be a survival from some earlier state of the text. 28. τίς] ἢ P4 3 pr. P4, etc. (so O1): τίς Π4 P1 and possibly Γ (Vet. Int. quae). Perhaps ἢ is more likely to have been substituted for τίς here than τίς for ἢ. Cp. Metaph. Z. i. 1228 b 6, διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μόνον ὡς εἰπέων περὶ τοῦ ἄνω χρόνος θεωρητῶν τέσσερα. 31. κἂν εἰ των ἑπεταὶ τυγχάνωσιν] καὶ εἰ Μ6: about Γ we cannot be certain, though Vet. Int. has et si quae aliae existant, for he occasionally fails to render ὅν (see above on 1254 a 39). Nor does existant in Vet. Int. enable us to pronounce with certainty that he found τυγχάνωσιν in his Greek text, for in 1270 a 27 he renders κἂν ἀποθεώη et si moritur. As to τυγχάνωσιν, see explanatory note. 36. ἐπιβάλλεται] So O1: ἐπιβάλλεσθαι Π4: inserere (Vet. Int.) may represent either. 40. πολείτα Π: z civilitas (with g h l o, y civilitas with dots under l): most MSS. of Vet. Int. civitas (and so Ar.). The same contraction ‘may stand for πόλις, πολύς, πόλεμος, πολέμιος, πολίτης, and even πολείτα, though the last word is most often expressed by another contraction’ (Gardthausen, Gr.
CRITICAL NOTES.

Palæographie, pp. 246, 256). This perhaps explains the occasional interchange of πολίστα, πολίτης, and πόλις: thus πολίστα takes the place of πόλεως in Πν 1294 b 39, πολίσταων of πολίτων in Πν etc. 1292 a 9, and πολίτων of πολιτείων in Γ Πn 1265 b 34, while in 1318 a 9 Πn have πόλει, Πn πολιτεία. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus in 1326 b 5, 1333 a 11 also. I retain πολιτεία here, though not without hesitation. See explanatory note. Sus.12 πόλις, Sus.3 πολιτεία. 41. Here Vet. Int. alone has preserved the true reading εἰς ὑπότις (unus qui unus): ἱσόντις Π (Ar. paritas). Only a fraction, however, of the MSS. of Vet. Int. give this reading. Of those used by Sus. only one (g) has unus as its original reading (in four, a b k l, a later hand has substituted unus): nullus pr. a b, alius c h and pr. k l, illsus m. Qui again is quod in c g h m and pr. k l. Hence it is important to note that z has unus qui unus as its original and only reading. The reading of o is alius quod unus: in y eius quid unus has been first written, but eius has been erased by dots placed beneath it and unus written above, apparently in the same ink and handwriting as the MS.

1251 a 2. Vet. Int. fails to render πάτον, but see above, p. lxiii, note 12, for other cases in which he omits words or phrases. 6. ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος] So Ο1, but τῇ after πολιτεία is added above the line with a caret—whether by the writer of the MS., is uncertain. Vet. Int. in politia Platonis. Π234 have the reading adopted in the text. 11. δι' ἄν αἰτίαν] z perhaps rightly has causa, not causam. 15. ἦν ἀριστον ὅτι μάλιστα πάσαν] So Πn 1: the order is different in Πn (and Ο), which reads πάσαν ὅτι ἀριστον ὅτι μάλιστα in place of ἦν ἀριστον ὅτι μάλιστα πάσαν: the latter order, however, though more rugged, is perhaps more Aristotelian. These MSS. also, as will be noticed, omit ἦν, probably because ἀριστον precedes it, just as Μσ Πn omit ἦν after δοῦλον in 1252 b 9. 18. ἵστιν ἡ πόλις] ἵστι πόλις Μσ Πn: whether Vet. Int. found the article in his text, we cannot say. All MSS., however, have ἡ πόλις in 23. 27. ἐξωστή] ἐκώσα Pn 1: Vet. Int. quemadmodum utique si pondus amplius trahet, but it is not by any means certain that trahet represents ἐκώσα. It may represent ἐκώσει or ἐκώσα (cp. 1253 b 16, where κἀν εἴ τι δυναμεῖα is rendered in Vet. Int. by εἴ utique si quid poterimus): on the other hand, in 1263 b 34 δασπερ κἀν εἴ τις ποιήσων is rendered quemadmodum utique si quis factiat. With the exception of Πn and the possible exception of Γ, all the MSS. here read ἐκώση, and I have retained it, marking it however as strange, for we look rather for the optative. There is some harshness about ἐκώσει. Ar. εἴ τι pondus magis attrahat. 30. γενέσθαι] Ο1
γίνεσθαι (Sus. 3, in note, γίνεσθαι i). 35. μετέβαλοι] μετέβαλο M
P 1: quemadmodum utique si transmutarentur (Vet. Int.) leaves the reading of Γ uncertain.

1261 b 2 sq. Here P 2 reads: ἐν τούτοις δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τοῦ Ἰσοῦ εἰκέν (so O 1: οἴκειν two or three MSS.) ὁμολογοῦσα (so P 23: ὁμολογεῖν Π 2 C 4 Bekk., also O 1) τοῖς ἐξ αρχῆς. M 8 P 1: τοῦτο δὲ μιμεῖται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοῦ Ἰσοῦ εἰκέν τὸ δ' ὡς ὁμολογεῖν εἰναι ἐκ αρχῆς. Vet. Int. hoc autem imitat urb scilicet in parte aequales cedere hoc (τῷ Π Γ) tanquam similis sint a princípio: scilicet here probably represents τὸ, as in 1261 b 16, 1274 a 16, b 12, and it is also probable, though not absolutely certain, that tanquam similis sint stands for ὡς ὁμολογεῖν εἰναι. Ar. et in eo imitari vicissim aequales cedendo invicem alios aliis. See explanatory note. 4. κατὰ μέρος om. P 1, but these MSS. are somewhat prone to omit. 5. καὶ om. P 2 Bekk. So O 1, which adds τῶν before ἀρχώνων with P 4. Ar. eodem modo illorum qui regunt alii alios gerunt (so New Coll. MS.: regunt Bodl.) magistratus. 7. οὗ for οὗτε P 1: οὗτε followed by καὶ occurs, though rarely, in Aristotle—e.g. in De Part. An. 4. 14. 697 b 16 οὗτε is followed by καὶ οὗ. Cp. also Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 18 sq. P 3, it must be remembered, are prone to omit, and in 1264 a 1 they have μὴ for μὴ δὲ, just as in 1265 a 18 M 8 P 1 have μὴ for μὴ δὲν and in 1268 b 16 Γ M 8 pr. P 1 have οὖ for οὐδὲν. 19. οὗ om. M 8 P 1 (about Γ we cannot be certain), but wrongly. 'In addition to this passage Socrates is referred to in the Second Book as one of the interlocutors in the "Republic" of Plato 13 times (1261 a 6, 12, 16: b 21: 1262 b 6, 9: 1263 b 30: 1264 a 12, 29: b 7, 24, 37: 1265 a 11), and in not one of these passages is the article absent; its authenticity in 1261 b 19 is thus placed beyond doubt, especially as the reason why it is added is not far to seek; the reference, in fact, is not to the historical Socrates, but to Socrates as one of the dramatis personae of the dialogue' (Dittenberger, Gött. gel. Anz. Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1359). It is, however, true that all MSS. omit the article in 5 (8). 7. 1342 b 23, where the Platonic Socrates is apparently referred to. 25. τοῖς om. M 8 P 1: about Γ we cannot be certain. 35. πρὸς... τοῖς ἀλλοίς] Vet. Int. apud alios (πρὸς misread παρά ?).

1262 a 2. λέγει] Vet. Int. dicet (and Ar., following as he often does in his wake, dicent), but in 1281 a 19 he has corrumpet for φθέρει, and in 1257 b 15 perit for ἀπολείπει, in 1263 b 28 privantur for στεφάνωσαι. It is very doubtful whether these variations of tense in Vet. Int. represent variations in Γ (see above, p. lxiii, notes 10 and 11). 3. τὸν ἄριστον] After τὸν ἄριστον P 1 add ὅν (Bekker and St. Hilaire, but not Sus., also find ὅν in pr. P 3):
perhaps, however, it may well be dispensed with in the passage before us (compare such phrases as ὀποίαι τινες ἐτυχον 3. 15. 1266 b 24, and see Bon. Ind. 778 b 4 sqq.). "Ων additum ab aliquo qui Phrynichi praecepta sectabatur: sed vide Lobeck. ad Phryn. p. 277, ad Soph. Aj. 9' (Göttl. p. 311). τοῦ δείων] Vet. Int. huius filius, possibly misreading τοῦ δείως as τούδε ιῶς. 12. ἔτερον] See explanatory note. As to φράτωρ, see Liddell and Scott s. v.: the form used in Attic Inscriptions is φράτηρ, not φράτωρ (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 63). Vet. Int. has aut before contributem, but see above on r260a 26. 20. γενόμενα] O1 γενόμενα. 21. καὶ γυναῖκες et (not etiam) femellae o.z. om. P3, probably owing to homecoteleuton, and o omits hasc autem voluntaria, probably from the same cause. 28. γνώσθηι is altered to γενόςθηι in O1 (by whom, I cannot say). 29. δοσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἄποθεν] Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. have quemadmodum et eos qui longe, but a z substitute et ad for et. For the addition of et by Vet. Int., see above on r252a 25. ἄποθεν Ms P1*L5 Ald.: cp. 1280 b 9, ἄποθεν Ms P834 Q1 T1 Ald., and 1280 b 18, ἄποθεν Π (the Vatican Palimpsest has ἀπωθὲ in 9 and ἄποθεν in 18). "Ἀπωθὲν seems to be the reading commonly found in the MSS. of Aristotle, but ἄποθεν is the Attic, or at least the old Attic, form (Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 60: Liddell and Scott, s. v. ἄποθεν). 30. ἀλλὰ] ἀ τ Μ5 pr. P3.

1262 b 7. τε om Ms P1: Vet. Int. quidem, which probably represents γε. Ar. has enim only, but may well have found τε γερ in his Greek text. 8. τοῖς πάλεσιν] z adds in before civitatibus (in 1261 b 8 we have μέγαταν ἄγαθον ἐν τοῖς πάλεσιν). 13. συμφυόνα] συμφύονα π2 τ2 etc. Bekk. (also O1), but συμφήναι Ms P1 (συμφυόνα pr. P4, συμφυόνα corr. P4) may not impossibly be what Aristotle wrote (though Plato in the passage referred to, Symp. 191 A, has of course συμφύονα). Peculiar verbal forms are occasionally used by Aristotle; we have, for instance, πρωδιοπαινομένων in 1270 a 4, πεισθαι in Rhet. i. 11. 1370 b 18. 21. ιόν] So O1, though P4 (with Π1) has ιόν: Ar. vel patrem ut filii. 32. τῶν φίλακας] om. Ms P1 (so Sus.18: P1 only according to Sus.1). Vet. Int. places his equivalent for these words (custodes) after δεθήνεις: custodes may of course represent either τῶν φίλακας or οἱ φίλακες, but it is hardly likely that Vet. Int. found the latter reading in his text. 33. In reading φίλαξί Ι follow Π1: φίλαξίν εἰς Π2 Bekk. (and O1). Almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int., however, have for καὶ πάλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φίλαξί τοῖς ἀλλοις πολίται et rursum qui apud alios cives: Sus. follows a,
which adds custodes after apud, probably rightly (so too Z). Ar. translates 

31 sqq., οὐ γὰρ ἐτι κ.τ.λ., nam non amplius appellant custodes fratres et filios et patres et matres qui (here the New College Ms., but not Bodl., adds ab) aliis civibus deduntur et rursus qui ex custodibus aliiis civibus. 40. χωρίς κ.τ.λ.] seorsum ex legum statuto o, but the last letter of statuto is over an erasure.

1263 a 2. πᾶσι] Vet. Int. omnes: M5 πασῶν. This variation, like that in 1266 a 4, was probably occasioned by an ambiguous contraction. 12. Π4 add ἀλλ' ἀνίσων after ἵσων, and these authorities may possibly be right, for cases of 'abundantia contraria copulandi' are not rare in Aristotle (Vahlen, Aristot. Poet. p. 88), and ἀλλ' ἀνίσων might easily drop out after ἵσων through homoeoteleuton, but perhaps it is more likely that ἀλλ' ἀνίσων is a marginal remark which has crept into the text: see above on 1255 b 12 and cp. 1268 a 37, where Γ M5 add ἔτερον ἐναὶ after βοδιλείᾳ δ' ὁ ναιοβέτης. 13. πρὸς τοὺς ἀπολλάντας μὲν [ἡ λαμβάνοντας] πολλά] Vet. Int. ad fruientes quidem, sì (εἰ for ἦ) accipientes quidem multa: λαμβάνοντας or λαμβάνοντας μὲν may possibly be an alternative reading which has crept from the margin into the text, together with the ἦ introducing the suggestion (see Vahlen on ἦ ναι, Poet. 4. 1449 a 7). 23. καὶ before ἐπικοσμηθεῖν om. Π4. θεσεί] So O1 (with Π5), rightly in all probability (see explanatory note): ἠθεοὶ Π4. 29. ἐκάστῳ προσεδρέωντες ι M5 Sus. 34. χρήσαι κωνωίς] Vet. Int. utitur tanquam communibus. 36. κἀν δεθώσων κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. si indignant pro viaticis in agris per regionem (a z rec. b per regionem: the other MSS. peregrinationem, except y which has peregrinationum). As to the addition of ἐπρο, see above on 1253 a 10 and below on 1263 b 41. Vet. Int. appears to read ἄν instead of κἂν, but then he often omits to render καὶ.

1263 b 4. καὶ τῷ] 'καὶ τῷ Π4 Ar.' (Sus.)—very possibly only a conjectural emendation, like some other readings peculiar to Π4 Ar. (see Sus.3, p. xiv). The rendering in Ar. is quemadmodum et amatio pecuniarum, which probably represents καθάπερ καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματος, or possibly τὸ φιλοχρήματος ἐϊναι, for τὸ φιλαντρόπος ἐϊναι is rendered a line or two above by amatio sui. 6. τῆς κτήσεως . . . οὖν] a z omit ἐν before possessione perhaps rightly. 7. οὐ om. Π4. 9. and 11. τὸ om. M5 Π4: Vet. Int. temperantiae quidem circa mulieres (so in 11 liberalitatis autem circa possessiones), but we cannot tell from what he found in his text, for he sometimes renders the article and sometimes does not. 18. ἀλλοι τὲ καὶ διὰν] 2 aliterque et cum, answering to the Greek more closely than the reading of Susemihl's MSS. aliterque cum (cp. 1269 b 24, where aliterque et si

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stands for ἄλως τε καὶν). 21. ὑποδομήρημών] So all MSS. here, though in 1274 b 6 all have ἑποδομηρίδρων: even here, however, two MSS. of Vet. Int. (a 2) have falsorum testium, not falsorum testimoniorum. 28. στερήσωσαι] Vet. Int. privantur: see above on 1262 a 2. 32. πάντως] Ms pr. P1 πάντες: Vet. Int. omnino, which represents πάντως in 1257 b 21, πάντες in 1302 a 3. 34. χείρων πόλεις] Vet. Int. adds erit before deterior civitas, and it is perhaps on his authority that Vict. and Bekker read ἦστα χείρων πόλεις, but ἦστα is omitted in all the MSS., and, as we have seen (above, p. lxii, note 2), Vet. Int. occasionally adds the auxiliary verb without support from MSS. Aristotle is sparing in its use. 41. τοῖς συνοπτίους] Vet. Int. pro conivivis: see above on 1253 a 10 and 1263 a 36.

1264 a 1. μηδε] μη Π1: but see above on 1261 b 7. 8. Susemihl has apparently adopted the form φαρσία throughout his third edition, and it is true that in 1300 a 25 and 1309 a 12 all the MSS. examined by him, and in the passage before us nearly all of them, and in 1280 b 37 the best MSS., have this form. So again, in 1319 b 24 all the better MSS. except P4 have φαρσία. See however Liddell and Scott s.v.

9. Vet. Int. adds ei after his equivalent for ὄντες, but, as Busse points out (p. 29 sq.), he does this in 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 17 also, in both cases probably without warrant. 15. kal before καθ' έκαστον is not rendered either by Vet. Int. or by Ar., who translates—vel proprietis singularum. 21. ἐφίνετε] Vet. Int. dimitentes, which may perhaps stand for ἐφίνετο, the reading of some of the less good MSS. ἀπεφίηκατο] ἀπεφίηκατι: Ms P1: Vet. Int. negat, which perhaps represents ἀπεφίηκατο, for ἀπεφίηκατο, in 1272 b 5 is abnegare, and the Vet. Int. occasionally renders the perfect by the present—e.g. in 1273 b 17, 1268 b 38, 1272 b 32, 1266 a 37. If this is so, ἀπεφίηκατο has only the authority of Ms P1 in its favour. Perhaps also ἀπεφίηκατο corresponds better to ἐφίνετο. 26. παι] Vet. Int. factum. 38. ἄρισ] Vet. Int. quales, just as in 1258 b 16 he has quidus for ποῖος. 39. ποῖον τινα] ποῖον τινας Ο1 (so Ms P1 apparently): Sus.3 ποῖον τινα.

1264 b 7. δει Π, not δει: so too in 1254 a 25 and 1264 b 13, but δει in 1296 a 24, 1299 a 1, 1333 a 21 etc. See Bon. Ind. 11 a 47 sqq. ‘The form δει prevails in Attic inscriptions from 361 B.C. onwards’ (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, pp. 14, 64). 9. ἡπιουθεν δη] ἡ ποιουθεν δή Ο1. See explanatory note. 13. εθομ] So Ο1, with Ms pr. P1: about γ we cannot be certain: the rest εθος. ‘Εθός is properly used of Time, εθος of Place’ (Liddell and Scott).

14. μιθα] So Ο1: μιθα Ms P1 Πσ Bekk., at v. Classen ad Thuc. 2. 84. 5' Sus.1 Classen's note
will be found among his critical notes, Bd. 2, p. 192. 19. τῶν αὐτῶν] All Susemihl’s MSS. of Vet. Int. have eorum, not corundem: z, however, has corundem (τῶν αὐτῶν Π.). 26. τά is added in Π before περὶ (Vet. Int. here translates the article—quaer circa leges). 31. τίνι τάξιν] z (with a and pr. k) has ordinem rightly. γὰρ] δὲ Π. 40. τῶν λόγων is not rendered by Vet. Int., but this may well be an oversight, similar to those pointed out above, p. lxxiii, note 12. Ar. also gives no equivalent for it—cetera vero extraneis peregiti sermonibus. See note in Sus.³.

1265 a 4. els] So Ms Π: πρὸς Ο¹ (with Π²): Vet. Int. ad, which may represent els as in 1265 a 41, b 3, 1270 a 18, but may also represent πρὸς, as in 1254 b 13, etc. Perhaps πρὸς is more likely to have been substituted for els than els for πρὸς. 12. τά is omitted before ξητητικῶν in Ms Π: whether it was omitted in Π also, we cannot tell. 14. Vet. Int. translates as if he found the words arranged in the following order—χάρας Βασιλείας ἢ τῶν Ἀλλής ἀπεράντων δεῖμνε τοῖς τουσωτοῖς τὸ πλῆθος, but his intention probably is to make it clear that he (wrongly) takes τά πλῆθος with τοῖς τουσωτοῖς: see Busse, p. 14 n. He might have remembered χάρας πλῆθος, 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28. 16. περὶ] Vet. Int. almost alone seems to have found παρὰ in his text, for he has praeter. For περὶ with the acc. in the sense in which it is used here, cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 b 25. 21–22. For the glosses which deform the text of Π¹ here, see Susemihl’s apparatus criticus. 24. Almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int. fail to render καὶ before πρὸς: a z alone have el ad. 29. διορίσας τῶν σοφῶν μᾶλλον] Vet. Int. determinetur plane magis, but, as has been pointed out elsewhere, he occasionally substitutes the passive for the active. 30. ὅσπερ ἂν el τις εἰτεν] Sus. is apparently in error when he says that Π¹ omit el. Vet. Int. has quemadmodum si quis dicit. What he omits is ἂν, but this he is rather apt to omit (see above on 1254 a 39). He did not probably find εἰτεν in his text, but εἰτεν, for non utique lateat (1264 a 3) stands for ὅσον ἂν λαβέν. 33–34. See Susemihl’s apparatus criticus for the various readings here. Π¹ are not quite unanimous in favour of τῶν μὲν τά and τῶν δὲ τά, nor indeed are Π² in favour of the reading adopted in the text, for P⁴ etc. (and O¹) have τά δὲ τά in 34 in place of τῶν δὲ τά, but Π Π agree in reading ἐκάτερον: hence it seems probable that the reading in the text is the correct one, as otherwise ἐκάτερον has to be altered without MS. authority to ἐκάτερα. τῶν ἀποτέλεσιν] Vet. Int. adds vivere after laborioso, but it is very doubtful whether he found an equivalent for it in his Greek text. 35. ἔξεις αὑτοῦ] ἔξεις ἄρτα διδέα [Ar. virtutes habitus]: Vet. Int. quoniam G 2.
solii habitus sunt virtutes circa habitudinem (riv—so P1) substantiae. Probably Victorius' conjecture is right and ἀπεραῖ should be ἀπεραῖ: cp. 1285 a 16, where Ms Ald. have ἀπεραῖ for ἀπεραῖ. 40. ὀμαλότησιμον] Vet. Int. respondente. ὀμαλίζεων is usually represented by regularare in Vet.Int. (e.g. in 1266 b 3, 16, 1274 b 9).

1265 b 3. ἀπορέω] Vet. Int. dubitât (probably only a mistranslation, in which, however, he is followed by Ar.). 4. παράξυνας] περὶξυνας Ms P1 and according to Sus. r also, but almost all his MSS. of Vet. Int. have deiectos (so o y), and we cannot be certain what Greek word this represents: a χ have ιυγαρίος (z in marg. aliter deiectos), and this again is hardly a correct rendering either of περὶξυνας or παράξυνας. Ar. has δισπαρει. 13. τῶν ἄρχωντας] Vet. Int. antiquorum, but degrees of comparison are often inexact rendered by Vet. Int. (see below on 1270 b 1, 1271 b 6, 21, 1272 a 8). 19. ὅπως] πῶς Ms P1: Vet. Int. quomodo, which may represent either πῶς or ὅπως. 20. All Susemihl's MSS. of the Vet. Int. but one (l) have sil for γίνεται (so o y): z fil. 21. δὲ] om. pr. O1, but it is added above the line with a caret, in darker ink than the MS. but probably by the writer of it. 25. συμφέρει] For the various readings see Susemihl's apparatus criticus. Vet. Int. expediat: O1, with some of the less good MSS., συμφέρει. See explanatory note. Ar. has videndum est . . . ne non prosil. 30. πολιτείαν] πολιτείων Π1, possibly rightly. 35. Sus.3 τῶν om. Π1': Π1, however, would seem to be a misprint for P1 (see Sus.1 2). 39. ἔφορων] Vet. Int. plebeiorum. In the next line he has ἔφορος for ἔφορων. Dittmeyer (op. cit. p. 36) observes of William of Moerbeke's translation of the Rhetoric—"hic quoque universus interpretis usus respiciendus est: ut verbum Graecum saepe non mutatum versioni inserit, ita idem verbum hic illic sive apto sive inepto vocabulo Latino interpretari conatur.'

1266 a 3. χειρίστας παιδών] Vet. Int. pessimás omnibus. See above on 1263 a 2. 5. ἐπεστ] So O1 (with Ms P1). 18. On τῶν τετάρτων τῶν τετάρτων, see explanatory note. Here probably two alternative readings have both been admitted into the text, as in some MSS. in 1266 a 37, 1273 a 35, 1254 a 10. In O1, after ἡ δὲ τῶν τετάρτων τῶν τετάρτων, the words ἡ δὲ τῶν τετάρτων τῶν τετάρτων are added, but they are crossed through and dots placed beneath them, probably by the writer of the MS. 23. συμφέραν] So O1: συμφεράν Π1 (Vet. Int. constare), and also pr. Π3.

1266 b 1. τὰς δ' ἔφοι] Vet. Int. eae aulem quae iam habitabantur (δ' ἔφοι r?), which Schneider adopts, rightly followed by Bekker and Susemihl), 'δ' Π1 Π2, & Ms Ar.' (Sus.), but it is not perhaps very clear
what Ar. found in his text, for his translation is — postquam vero condita foret, difficilium quidem. O 1 originally had τὸς δῆς, but δῆ has been altered into δῆ—by whom, is uncertain. 3. τὸς om. Ms P¹: as to Γ we cannot be certain. 11. Vet. Int. multitudinem for τὸ μεγέθος. 18. ὤποσὴν] ὤποσὴν P 23 and some of the less good MSS. (so O 1): δὴν Ms P¹ Sus.: Vet. Int. quantamcumque, which leaves it uncertain whether he found ὤποσὴν or δὴν in his text: ὤποσὴν Ald. Bekk. 26. δὴνῳ οὖν] All the MSS. of Vet. Int. used by Sus. except a have palam igitur, quod non sufficiens substantias aequales facere erit legislator (so o y): a z, however, have legis- latori. 28. τάξειν] τάξει Ms P¹: Vet. Int. ordinaverit, which probably stands for τάξειν, for in 3 4. 1277 b 22 et οὖν ἀνθρῶπος εἶν is rendered by the Vet. Int. si sic foris fuerit, and in 1 2. 1252 a 24 εἰ τοι βῆθευεν is rendered si quis viderit. 31. εἴπον is probably the true reading here, as in 1270 b 38, 1272 a 35, 1339 a 14. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus on these four passages and Bon. Ind. 222 a 4 sqq.

1267 a 5. ἀλλὰ καὶ] a z sed etiam (n sed et): the rest wrongly sed. 8. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖν] Vet. Int. sed et si desiderent, probably a mistranslation of these words. So Ar: verum etiam si concupiscat ut molestia careant et voluptate fruantur. See explanatory note on 1267 a 5. 17. βοιλαντο] Vet. Int. possint (δυναντο Ms). 11. βοιλεται κατασκευάζειν] Vet. Int. opus est constituî, where constituî may well stand for κατασκευάζειν, but it is less easy to account for opus est. 24. δὲ] Vet. Int. quam, referring to multitudinem (πλήθος). 25. ἐπιθυμοῖσον] See Susemihl's apparatus criticus for the reading of Ms P¹; it finds support in two MSS. of Vet. Int. only (c y), which read concupiscant: most have concupiscant, one or two concupiscient (so z), either of which, however, may stand for ἐπιθυμοῖσον—cp. 1268 a 41, where θεοὶ is rendered by θονατ, and see below on 1267 b 35. ἀμώμεω] Vet. Int. sufferre (=认真学习?). 28. δὲι 'Γ Π Ar. Bekk.’ (so Sus.):; but Ar. has oportet autem neque id latere quantas facultas habere conducat. Stahr δ τι: Sus. 8 [8] τι. 29. τὸ μὴ λυσσελεῖν] Vet. Int. ut non pro levi habeat (so z and most MSS. of Vet. Int.: o ut non praet levi habeat: Sus., however, reads, with g (so also y), ut non prolem habeat): in 1279 b 9, on the other hand, τὸ λυσσελεῖν is rendered id quod expedit. Should ut non pretium habeat be read (cp. 1258 b 16, where λυσσελε- σταρα is pretiosissima)? 34. ἐδελεῖν] Vet. Int. ἐδερε (＝κέλελεν or ὁδελεῖ? cp. 1253 b 26, 1268 b 12). 35. ταῦτα] z has haec (hec): Susemihl finds hoc in his MSS. 40. ἄν om. Π¹, probably wrongly, just as they are probably wrong in adding ὅν in 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 33
(cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 15, where Π om. Ar, and see Bon. Ind. 41 b 6 sqq.).

1267 b 1. ἀνέλητον] Vet. Int. irreplebilis. Sus.¹ 'nonne irreplebile?' and it is true that in 1253 a 37 we find ἢ δὲ δικαιούντων πολτικῶν translated by the Vet. Int. iustitia autem civilis; but see Dittmeyer, op. cit. p. 34, who shows that the practice of William of Moerbeke in his translation of the Rhetoric is to make the predicate agree in gender with the subject—thus in Rhet. 1. 3. 1359 a 5 τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τούτων θάνατος κάλλιον is rendered hic autem talis mors pulchrior. 14. κατασκευάζων] constituentes o, perhaps rightly: the other MSS. constructwens. 23. Περαία] περεά O.² 26. κόμης (in place of κόμης πολυτελεῖ) Π.² Ar. ornatu sumptuoso. 'Quibusdam exemplaribus' (i.e. probably MSS., not printed editions: see above on 1257 b 36) 'illud fīt δὲ, quod in ceteris habetur, abest, ut prolixitas ad capillos, sumptus ad vestem duntaxat referatur' (Sepulveda, p. 51). 'Fīt δὲ is, in fact, omitted in Tυ. 33. All the better MSS. and some of the inferior ones have here τὸ ὀπλα ἔχου (so O²): only one MS., and that of little authority, has τὰ in place of τὸ as its original reading. The phrase commonly is οἱ τὰ ὀπλα ἔχουσε, κεκτημένοι (see e.g. 1268 a 18, 22: 1297 b 2 : 1268 a 20, 25), though not quite invariably (see 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 36 : 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 29), and here the τὸ seems better away. See explanatory note. 35. πούρον] Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. have faciant, and in 36. for βιώσοντα vivant, but this does not imply that the translator did not find the future in his Greek text: see above on 1267 a 25. 37. ἐλθῃ καὶ τῶν νόμων] Vet. Int. et species legum: Busse (p. 27) notes a similar change of order in the version given by Vet. Int. of 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 22.

1268 a 3. καταδικάζον] See Susemihl’s apparatus criticus here and in the next line. The MSS. which have καταδικάζει seem mostly to have ἀπολύον in 4. O¹ has καταδικάζει and ἀπολύθει, the last two letters of ἀπολύθει being however expunged and oι superscribed, probably by the writer of the MS. All the MSS. of Vet. Int. known to Sus. have condempnetur for καταδικάζοι (so o y): z, however, has condempnet—rightly in all probability, for absolvat, not absolvatur, follows in all the MSS. Ar. si condempnaret...sin absolveret. There seems to be little doubt that καταδικάζει and ἀπολύον are correct (see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 77). τὴν δικὴν om. Π, possibly rightly, for the words may be only a gloss, but Π is somewhat given to omitting words. Ar. si condempnaret simpliciter sententiam. 12. αἰπεροῦς εἶδοι] Vet. Int. eligi. 17. οἱ before γεοργοῖ om. Μσ Π and possibly of course Π (Vet. Int.
agricolae). 25. Π¹ add καλ before κρινότως. 26. Μς Π¹ om. γε: about Γ we cannot be certain, for Vet. Int. often fails to render γε. 34. γεωργήσωσιν] Bekker's reading γεωργήσωσιν rests only on the authority of Ar., who has colunt. 39. αἰ] Π³ οὖν, Ο² οὖν with αὐ superscribed, whether by corr.¹ or by the writer of the MS., is not certain, but very possibly by the latter, for the ink is quite that of the MS., and οὖν is neither expunged by dots placed beneath nor crossed through. οὖν, though probably not the true reading here, is used in a similar way in Magn. Mor. 2. 9. 1207 b 31 and, 2. 11. 1208 b 37, and even in writings of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. 540 b 32 sqq.).

1268 b 1. γεωργήσει δύο οικίας] Vet. Int. ministrabiti duas domos: hence some have thought that he found σπουργήσει δύο οικίας in his Greek text, but ministrare in Vet. Int. answers to διακονεῖν (cp. 1280 b 5. 1333 a 8). He may here render a marginal gloss. Διαπονῆσει would be better than Διακονήσει, but see explanatory note. 5. See explanatory note. διαμορφώτα Π² etc. (so Ο¹) seems better than δια- ροώτα Π¹ (cp. τὸν δικάστην 6). On διής, see explanatory note. 9. διὰ καὶ τοῦτον τοῦτον] Vet. Int. sed contrarium huius: hence it is probable, though not certain, that Γ omitted καλ with Μς and read τοῦτον with Μς Π¹. 12. ο μὲν] μὲν ο Μζ Π¹: about Γ we cannot be certain, for some MSS. of Vet. Int. have quidem iudex (so z), and others (so o y) iudex quidem. See explanatory note. 13. κρινεί (Bekk.² Sus.) is probably right (cp. 16 καταδίκασονωσ), though Γ Π have κρίνει (so Ο¹). 15. δῆ] Ο¹ has δῆ with δῆ superscribed, probably, but not certainly, by the writer of the MS. See explanatory note. 19. Ar. does not render δικαίος (si simpliciter petaatur). 21. For the omission of ήδη here by Π¹, cp. 1288 a 6 and 1336 b 36, where they omit it also. Ar. does not render it. 32. μικρά] μικρῶν Π¹. 35. iatrikη] c o medicinalis rightly: the rest medicinali (for the reading of z, however, see Appendix C, 112. 3). 40. ἐσοπροφοροῦντο τῇ γῇ] Vet. Int. farrum enim portabant tune Graeci (ἐσοπροφόροι τότε γάρ;).

1269 a 11. γραφήμας] γράφειν Π¹, possibly rightly. 12. φανε- ρόν] Vet. Int. videtur. 16. καὶ τῶν νομοθέτων καὶ τῶν ἀρχιτέτων] Vet. Int. et legislatoribus et principibus (apparently after sinendum). Busse (p. 27 note) compares voluntari for προσωπικέος in 1271 a 32. 18. τις is added in Μς Π¹ before κωνήσας: Vet. Int. qui mutaverit (perhaps = ο κωνήσας: see however his version of 1340 b 24): Ar. qui corrigere perget (ο κωνήσας?). See explanatory note. 19. ψεῦδος δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. mendax quoque exemplum quod ab artibus (ab probably stands for παρά): ψεῦδος, here mendax, is falsum in
1287 a 33. 21. πλήν, which is written in P² instead of παρά, is probably intended as an alternative reading for παρά: see 1274 b 9, where φαλέων is written above φαλολάον in P². Bekker, however, reads πλήν παρά in both his editions. 25. καὶ, which Bekker adds before πάντες, is found in O¹ and in P⁴ etc., but not in the best MSS. 38. οὗ before ἐξοτεριοὶς is omitted in MS P¹ L⁸: we cannot tell whether Vet. Int. found it in his Greek text or not. 40. πῶν] Vet. Int. unquam.

1269 b 5. τοῖς Θεσσαλίοις] c o om. a before Thessalìs in Vet. Int. 11. ὀν τοῖς Θεσσαλίοις quasi instead of quod o, perhaps rightly, for Vet. Int. takes οὕτως κατακόψασθαι as a participle. 19. ἀνυμοθάντων inordinatum in lego o. 21. φανερὸς ἄττι τοιοῦτος δῶν] I follow here the reading of P² (which is, except in matters of accent, that of O¹, and also of Ar., who translates—in viris quidem id fecisse constat): τοιοῦτος ἄττιν P¹. The reading of P² appears to me to be probably the true one, especially as in 26. T M² pr. P¹ omit φανερὸς, wrongly, it would seem, cp. 1263 b 9, 1311 a 16. 26. See note on 21. 28. Ἀρη] O¹ has ἀρην with M² P⁴, etc.: we cannot tell which form Vet. Int. found in his text, for he has Ἀρην. *Ἀρη is the Attic form according to Liddell and Scott. Vahlen reads *Ἀρη in Poet. 21. 1457 b 21, where Bekker had read Ἀρην. 30. κατακόψαμαι] Cp. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 8. 'Forma κατακόψαμος in duobus Politicorum locis [also in Hist. An. 6. 18. 572 a 32] exhibetur sine varia lectione, Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 9 κατακόψαμον [Kb Ald.] Bekk., sed κατακόψαμον codd. Lb Mb Oⁱ' (Bon. Ind. 371 a 8). I retain the reading of the MSS.: Liddell and Scott, however, remark (s. v. κατακόψαμαι):—'the corrupt forms κατακόψη, κατακόψαμαι, must be corrected, except perhaps in late writers: cf. ἀνοκόψη, συνακόψη.' 35. ἀλλ' εἰπερ, πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον] Vet. Int. nisi ad bellum. 36. ταῦθα] All Susenmihi's MSS. of Vet. Int. have hoc, but y has hec (= haec).

1270 a 11. καὶ μὴ ἄρθρος] Almost all MSS. of Vet. Int. (including z) have aut before non recte, but aut appears to represent καὶ in 1262 a 8. 13. See Susenmihi's apparatus criticus for the various readings here: I follow him in reading αὕτη καθ' αὐτὴν. O¹ has αὕτην καθ' αὐτὴν. 21. καταλείπειν] καταλείπειν M² P¹: Vet. Int. derelinguere, which may represent either καταλείπειν, as in 1252 a 30, or καταλείπειν. 22. ταυτὰ] So P¹ (ταυτά P¹): O¹ (with P²) and Bekk. τοῦτα less well (cp. 1269 b 34). 27. ὑμ. ωs P¹: about ὑμ. we cannot be certain, for the Vet. Int. hardly ever renders τε. καὶ ἀποθήνη] Here o agrees with pr. a in omitting (no doubt erroneously) et si moritur—voluerit. 28. ὅν ἄν καταλείπῃ] z quem utique derelinguas, perhaps rightly. 37. Vet. Int. here renders oὐ μὴν ἄλλα by at-
tamen, as in \(1274\) a \(25\): he often renders it by *quin immo sed* (e.g. in \(1262\) a \(14, 1264\) a \(11\)), and \(\text{οδόν} \; \muῆν\) by *attamen* (e.g. in \(1267\) a \(39\)).

**1270 b 1.** *βουδόμενος γὰρ κτ.λ.\] Vet. Int. *volens enim legislator ut plures sint Spartanitae, provocat cives quod plures faciant pueros:* but though *plures* is his rendering, he probably found *πλεῖοντος* in his text in both places, for he is not always exact in rendering degrees of comparison: see above on \(1265\) b \(13\). 3. *ἐστι γὰρ* The MSS. of Vet. Int. have *est autem, not est enim.* 8. *αὐτῇ* *αὐτῇ\] Ar. (*hic enim magistratus*): om. \(\Gamma\) \(M^q\) (so \(\text{Sus.}^1\): \(\text{Sus.}^3\), by a misprint apparently, \(M^q\) \(P^1\)).

12. *'Ανδριάοι* See Susemihl's *apparatus criticus* for the various readings. As to the substitution of \(\tau\) for \(\delta\) here in \(P^1\), it should be noted that this was an error to which Egyptian scribes were especially liable: see Blass, *Hyperidis orationes quatuor*, praef. p. xvii. I know not whether there are any other indications in \(P^1\) that the archetype of these MSS. was of Egyptian origin.

14. *δημαγωγεῖν κτ.λ.* Vet. Int. *regere populum* (i.e. *δημαγωγεῖν*, cp. \(1274\) a \(10\)) *se ἵπσος cogebant rages:* he evidently does not understand *δημαγωγεῖν*, and he is quite capable of construing *ἡγαγόντο κατ' ἱσαρίαν* cogebant (cp. \(1269\) a \(18\), where *βραβίσσερα* is rendered *necobit*, and \(1271\) a \(22\), where *κρισὺδοι* is rendered *indicaret*). Perhaps, as Busse remarks (p. 25), \(\Gamma\) had *αὐτοῦ* in place of *αὐτοῦ*. All the MSS. read *αὐτοῦ* *ἡγαγόντο καὶ αἱ βασιλεῖς.* 15. *ταύτα* \(O^1\) *ταύτα:* *ταύτη,* however, is added in the margin, probably by corr.*

19. On *διὰ τόχυν* see explanatory note. \(M^q\) \(P^1\) add *τὴν* before *τόχυν*, just as in \(1332\) a \(32\) they add *τῆς* before *τόχυς*: as to the reading in \(\Gamma\) we cannot of course be certain. In \(1323\) b \(29\) all the MSS. have *ἀπὸ τόχυς* o'ddē *διὰ τὴν τόχυν.* 21. On this passage see explanatory note. 32. *αὐτῇ* *αὐτῇ\] \(P^1\), but see explanatory note. 33. *μᾶλλον ἐπερβάλλει* *magis superexcédit o* (perhaps rightly): other MSS. *magis excédei.* 38. *ἐπείδε* Susemihl reads *ἐποίη*, which is, however, apparently only found in \(P^1\), for \(M^q\) has *ἐποίη*, and the reading of \(\Gamma\) is unknown. See his *apparatus criticus* for the varieties of reading.

**1271 a 15.** *ταύτα* \(O^1\) (with \(P^2\)). \(\text{Ar. *illís utitur.}^7\) 17. *τῶν after ἀδικημάτων* om. \(P^2\) \(O^1\) Bekk.\(^1\): Bekk.\(^2\) adds it in brackets. Whether Vet. Int. found this *τῶν* in his text, it is of course impossible to say; but after *ἀδικημάτων* it might easily be omitted: cp. \(1283\) a \(11\), where in *πᾶσιν ἀνάστησα* \(\Gamma\) \(M^q\) pr. \(P^1\) make *ἀνάστησα* into *ἰσότησα*, and \(1284\) a \(3\), where in *τῶν bław τῶν κατ' ἄρετήν* two or three MSS. omit the second *τῶν.* 18. *φιλοτιμάω* \(\circ\circ\) *have amorem honorum:* Susemihl's MSS. *amorem honoris.* \(\text{διὰ}^3\) Neither Vet. Int. nor \(\text{Ar. *per ambitionem et avartiam* renders *διὰ* before *φιλοχρη-
μαριαν, and Ms omits it. But compare for the repetition of διὰ, 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 25. 19. In Π1 μὴ is omitted here and placed between ἦ and βελτιον (20). 20. ἀλλά μὴν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. sed et si melius, non sic ut nunc, sed per ipsius vitam unumquamque (o here adds nunc est) iudicare regum (o z regnum). Hence Sus. reads ἀλλά καὶ βελτιων, * * γε μὴ καθάπερ νῦν, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. and supposes a second βελτιων to have dropped out before γε, or else διὰ or something similar; but μὴν may easily have been corrupted into καὶ in Π or misread by the translator. Ar. attamen melius non ut nunc guider, sed pro vita cuiusque regis iudicare. 23. Enum here as elsewhere in the vetus versio (1268 b 34, 1280 a 38) represents γοίν. 27. φιδίηα] In this passage, probably, as in others, we may ascribe the reading φιδίηα to Π1, for though almost all the MSS. of Vet. Int. omit the word, two of them (a z) have amicabilitia. Compare Susemihl’s apparatus criticus on 1272 a 2, b 34. The form φιλετεωσ occurs in the Herculanean papyri on which the fragmentary remains of the work of Philodemus de Musica are preserved (fragm. 30: p. 18 Kemke). Plutarch, however, it is evident, used the form φιδίηα (see Lycurg. c. 12 init.). Dicaearchus, Phylarchus, and Antiphanes (ap. Athen. Deipn. pp. 141, 143) also use either this form or that of φιδίηα (see Meineke on Athen. Deipn. 143 a). Bekker reads φιδίηα both in the Politics and in the Rhet. 3. 10. 1411 a 25, though in the latter passage (see Roemer ad loc.) no MS. has preserved the true reading, nor yet the Vetus Interpres. So too C. F. Hermann (see Gr. Ant. 1. § 28. r) and Schömann (Gr. Alterth. 1. 280 n.). 31. συμβαίνει ] So Ο1: Bekker reads συμβαίνειν, but without support from the better MSS. Quare accidit in Vet. Int. leaves it uncertain what reading he found in his text. 32. τὸ νόμοθετή τῆς προαρίστεως] Almost all MSS. of Vet. Int. have legis- latoris voluntati (a m z have legislatori voluntati, y legumatorī voluntati). See above on 1269 a 16. 37. ἀπῆς Π1 Bekk. Sus. seems to be correct (cp. 1272 a 15, τῆς πολείας): for the readings of other MSS. see Susemihl’s apparatus criticus. Ο1 ἀπὸν. 40. ἁδιὸς] διός Π2 Ar. (praefectura illa perpetua) Bekk. (αἱδιός Ο1). 41. Vet. Int. does not render καθότητιν, but see above, p. lxiii, note 12, for other instances in which he fails to render words. Ar. fere alterum est imperium. ἀδιός] Vet. Int. hoc. 1271 b 5. Vet. Int. adds ad virtutem after his equivalent for μῆς. Similar additions appear in his version in 1254 b 20 and 1287 a 30. Ar. omits these words—nec quicquam aliud exercere sciebant praes- stabilius quam rem militarem. 6. τοῦτον] So Ο1, though Π4 with some other MSS. has τοῦτο. Vet. Int. would seem to have
found τοῦτο in his Greek text, for he has—hoc autem peccatum non modicum. He probably found ἐλαστον in his text, though his translation is modicum, for he is often inexact in rendering degrees of comparison (see above on 1265 b 13). Ar. illud quoque erratum non sane minus, quod putant (om. μὴν with Τ M's) bona illa quae ad bellum pertinent (he blindly follows Vet. Int. bona quae circa res bellicas) ex virtute magis quam ex vitio fieri. To omit μὴν with Τ M's would be a mistake: 'interdum oppositio perparticulam μὴν indicata et inchoata non accurate continuatur' (Bon. Ind. 454 a 17 sqq.). See Vahlen on Aristot. Poet. 6. 1450 a 3 sqq. and b 16 sqq. (Poet. pp. 118, 127). 21. τὸ δὲ πλέον] Vet. Int. plurimum autem, but see above on 1265 b 13, 1271 b 6. 22. καὶ λέγεται δὲ] Vet. Int. et dicitur quidem (καὶ λέγεται γε;?), τε Μ's P1. 25. Χαράλλον Π, but in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 Π have Χαράλλον. This variation may possibly date back to an uncial archetype. See Sus.1 p. xiv on the confusion of οὖνων and θυσίων in 3. 14. 1285 b ro, 16. 27. ἄπονα is here rendered by Vet. Int. domestici: see above, p. xlv, note 1, for other renderings of the word in Vet. Int. 28. κατέλαβον] Vet. Int. susceperunt. οἱ...ἀλώνες] ο qui venerunt: other MSS. qui venerant. 31. ἀς κατασκευάσσατο] Vet. Int. ut instituit. 34. ἐπικεῖται] Vet. Int. supponitur (ἐπικεῖται;?). 35. ἀνέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Ο1 δύον τῆς πελαπωνήσου (P4 δύον τῆς πελαπωνήσου). Vet. Int. distat enim quidem a Polopo insula modicum, versus Asiam autem ab eo loco qui circa Triopium et a Rhodo (μέδου Π1, perhaps rightly). Ar. read ῥόδον. 39. ἐπιθέμενος τῇ Σικελίᾳ] Vet. Int. appositus Siciliae: cp. 1305 a 14, where ἐπιθέμενα is translated superponentur. 40. Κάμων is the reading of all the better MSS. (so Ο1 and of Τ (καμων without accent Π2): Vict. substituted Κάμωκι, and either this or Καμωκί (the true accentuation of the word is, according to Sus., a disputed point) seems to be the correct reading. It is easy to understand how the commoner word took the place of the less common one. 41. τε om. Μ's P1: Vet. Int. agriculturae enim opus factum, but Vet. Int. hardly ever renders τε, hence the reading in Τ is uncertain.

1272 a 3. ἄνδρείᾳ] Ο1 (with П1) ἄνδρα. Ephorus ap. Strab. p. 480, and Dosiadas and Pyrgion ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 143 have ἄνδρείᾳ, not ἄνδρᾳ. C. F. Hermann (Gr. Ant. 1. § 22. 5) is for ἄνδρείᾳ. 8. πρότερος] Vet. Int. primo, but see above on 1265 b 13, 1271 b 6, 21. 16. ἐν δὲ Κρήτῃ κ.τ.λ.] Ar. at in creta communiter est, ex cunctis enim quae a terra proveniunt vel armenitis ex publicis et iis quae afferunt periici (so New Coll. MS.: Bodl. periici: neither have periš, as Schn., Pol. vol. 2. p. 134) divisio fit.
Thus Ar. omits, with all the better MSS., the καλ which Bekker adds before ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων. Most of the MSS. of Vet. Int. omit et before ex publicis, but a adds it, and so does z. 24. ποιήσας] a z have fecit: the other MSS. of Vet. Int. facit. 28. χείρων τῶν ἐφόρων] Vet. Int. deterius quam quae ephororum, but whether he found χείρων ἢ τα τῶν εφόρων in his Greek text, may well be doubted. ὁ μὲν γὰρ] Here pr. O1 (cp. P4) has ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὰ περὶ τοὺς κόσμους οὐ καλάς ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἄρχειον ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτων, but corr.1 adds in the margin—γρ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει κακὸν τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἄρχειον ὑπάρχει καὶ τούτων. Evidently a marginal remark τὰ περὶ τοὺς κόσμους οὐ καλὰς has found its way into the text of these two MSS. 29. τοῦτοι τοῦτων Π2 O* Bekk., but the genitive seems doubtful (cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 29). Ar. id est et in illis, which probably implies that he found τούτων in his text: cp. 1253 b 27, where sic etiam in re familiarí in Ar. probably stands for οὗτοι καὶ τῶν οἰκουμενίων. 36. τῶν] δὲ Π, evidently repeated from περὶ δὲ 35. Vet. Int. de his quae in Lacedaemonia fiunt. 40. οὐδὲν γὰρ] οὐδὲ γὰρ Γ (Vet. Int. neque enim) is adopted by Bekker, but probably wrongly. All the MSS. have οὐδὲν. 'Τι secludendum esse ci. Buecheler, μέτατι Coraes, sufficeret ἕτοι, sed nihil mutandum est' Sus.1. οὐδὲν τι is common enough used adverbially, but it does not seem to be often used as it is here. 41. πάρων γ' ἀπουκούσων] Vet. Int. longe enim peregrinantur, but, as Susemihl sees in his third edition, this is no proof that Vet. Int. found γὰρ in his Greek text.

1272 b 5. καλ μετοιχί] o etiam (not et) intermedie. 8—9. See explanatory note. δίκαιος] Vet. Int. sententias, as in 7 (5). 3. 1302 b 24. 16. τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπιτίθεσθαι καὶ δυνατές Π1: Sus. adopts this reading in all his editions, but holds in his third that some word is wanting before τοῖς βουλομένοις. Ar. est autem periculosus hic reipublicae status, si qui velint possintque invadere. 28. ἡ before διωκώμενη is omitted, not surely by M8 Π1 only (as Sus.3 holds), but by Π1, for Vet. Int. translates—quae Cretensium et Lacedaemonica et tertia ab his quae Calchedoniorum. 30. σημείων δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Ar. signum est reipublicae bene institutae quod (so Bodl.: New Coll. MS. wrongly quod) populus in suo permaneat (so Bodl.: New Coll. MS. permanet) loco. Thus he does not render ἔχουσαν, which M8 Π1 omit, but probably wrongly. 36. γὰρ after μὲν om. P82 etc., followed by Bekker, but the reading of Π4 (and Ο1), which is adopted by Susemihl, seems preferable. Ar. praeter quam quod non deterior: nam illi ex contingentibus sunt. The same doubt as to the exclusion or insertion of γὰρ recurs.
in 1291 a 29 and 1331 b 34, but in 1291 a 29 Π¹ are supported by the Vatican Palimpsest in adding it. 37. ἀριστίνθαν] Vet. Int. virtuosum: so again in 1273 a 23, and πλουτίνθαν in 1273 a 24 divitem. 38. τοῖς ἐκεί βασιλεύσαν] Susemihl's MSS. of Vet. Int. have ἦς quae iver regibus; z rightly ἦς qui iver regibus. 39. See explanatory note on 1272 b 38. 40. εἰ τε] εἰ τε Sus., who takes si quid to be the true reading in Vet. Int., but a alone has si quid (z si quod)—the rest of Susemihl's MSS. having sed quod, sed quae (so o), or se que—and probably we should read sique in Vet. Int., the reading adopted by Susemihl in 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 16: εἰτε Ο¹, εἰτε M² Π² Bekk.: Ar. melius quod imperatorum non secundum genus neque ex vili aut precelenti magis eligunt quam secundum virtutem: εἰ τε is probably right, cp. 1338 b 16.

1273 a 7. τὸ δὲ] τὸ δὲ P²₃₄ etc. Bekk. (so Ο¹), but the same MSS. have τὸ μὲν in 6, where Bekker's reading τὸ μὲν rests only on a conjecture of Morel's. 9. οὐδεὶς om. Π¹, but see above on 1257 b 24. 15. τοῖς αὐτέρθαν] τοῖς tauerθαν pr. Ο¹ (so Π²), but corr.¹ adds τοῖς in the margin. Both Ο¹ and Π² have τοῖς at the end of the line. Vet. Int. has ής in both places. 16. See the various readings for πλείων in Susemihl, and see above on 1255 b 26. 19. ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων] Vet. Int. a principibus (ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχώνων?). 22. ἡ συνοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοίς] Vet. Int. ut (? ἡ) videtur multis. 39. δέ τι δέ] Here z alone among the MSS. of Vet. Int. which have been examined has enim (quicunque enim instead of quodcumque autem), but it has enim instead of igitur for οὖν in 1273 a 25, and not a few other blunders are to be found in it in this part of the Second Book (8 ΠΠ). Ar. nam quicquid apud civilitatis princiipes habetur in pretio, necesarium est et aliorum civium opinionem subsequi: but Ar. has enim in 1268 b 6 also, where ΠΠ have δέ. It is not likely that Ar. found anything but δέ in his Greek text in either passage: Sus., however, follows him against ΠΠ in both.

1273 b 1. οὐχ οὖν τε κ.τ.λ.] οὐχ όὖν τε εἶναι βεβαιός ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν Π² Bekk. See on this reading the explanatory note on 1273 b 1. 5. ἀριστ' ἀρχεῖν] ἀρισταρχέων ΠΠ Bekk. (a word which occurs nowhere else in Aristotle or perhaps anywhere), ἀριστ' ἀρχεῖν Spengel, Sus. 6. προείρεν] Vet. Int. praeserret, but προείρεθαι is no better translated in 1307 b 4, 1314 a 37 sq. εὐπόρειαν] ἐπορεύον Γ M³, but this kind of mistake often occurs—so in 1278 a 32 Γ M³ have ἐπορεύστες wrongly for ἐπορεοῦστες, in 1288 a 15 Π² Π² pr. P² have ἐπορόσως wrongly for ἐπορούσα: see also the readings in 1300 a 2, 1302 a 2, 1303 a 12. 7. εἰδεὶ ἀρχώνος γε] Vet. Int.
sed et principium. Did he read τε for γε, as he seems to have done in 1274 a 15? 15. τῶν αὐτῶν] Vet. Int. ab eisdem, but we have already seen (above on 1253 a 10) that he occasionally inserts prepositions without authority, and here he had a special motive for doing so, for, as Busse (p. 21) points out, he seems to have taken τῶν αὐτῶν with ἀποτελεῖνα. 18. καί is added before τῆς πολιτείας in Ο¹, as in Π² etc. 25. Κρητηκής] M⁴ P¹ Κρήτης: Vet. Int. Cretensium. 27. τι om. Π². Ar. eorum autem qui de republica aliquid tradiderunt. τι is absent in 1. 13. 1260 b 23, in 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35, and in 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 14 (see Bon. Ind. 88 a 36 sqq.), but we have εἰτειν τι in 2. 8. 1267 b 29. 28. οὖδ' ἀνατυπων] Vet. Int. nullis. ἀλλά διεξελεσαν κ.τ.λ.] Vet. Int. sed perseverarunt singulari vita vives. 32. αἱ μὲν—μένον] αἱ μὲν ἐγένετο δημοφιλον τόμων Π¹. 39. μὴλασα] Vet. Int. miscuisseque, but this does not prove that he read μὴλα τε: see his rendering of 1259 a 10 sq. εἰνα] Vet. Int. fuisse. 41. τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια] τὸ δὲ δικαστήριον Π¹, which Sus. prefers, comparing 1274 a 4, but we have τὰ δικαστήρια in 1274 a 3.

1274 a 2. τῶν ἄρχων] Ο¹ τῶν ἄρχων. 4. θάτερον Ο¹, with Π² Ar. (alterum). 5. Ἰσχύσεων M⁴ P¹: we cannot tell from invaluit which reading Vet. Int. found in his text, for he often renders the imperfect by the perfect (e.g. in 1267 b 18, 30, 31). Ἰσχύσεων, however, which Sus. adopts, seems preferable to Ισχύσεων Π² O¹ Bekk.: cp. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 23. 13. Μηδείσα] o mediis. See Susemihl's critical note on Medis (Sus.¹ p. 145). ἐφρωματισθῇ] Vet. Int. astute concepit (the same misapprehension of the meaning of the word appears in his renderings of it in 1284 b 2, 1306 b 28, 1341 a 30). 15. ἐνεὶ Ἐλαμον γε] Vet. Int. quoniam et Solon: see above on 1273 b 7. 19. Ο¹ εἰσώρων, but ἐμ' is written over the first syllable, probably by the writer of the MS. 21. Π² add το before δητικῶν, perhaps rightly (Vet. Int. quantum autem quod mercurarium). But I incline to think it is better away: cp. Aristot. Fragm. 350. 1537 a 36 sq. and Pol. 6. (4). 4. 1291 a 4. 24. τὰς Χαλκι- δικαίας] Vet. Int. Chalcidiae (τῆς Χαλκιδῆς Τ?). 25. δὲ τινὲς] δὲ καὶ τινὲς Ο¹, but καὶ has been expunged by a dot placed beneath it —by whom, is uncertain. Π² add καὶ before τινές. 27. ἐπιδη- μοῦσα] Vet. Int. praefectum populo (perhaps, however, praefectus populo, which I find in o, may be the true reading). 29. In Ο¹ δ' is expunged by a dot placed beneath it, and δ' λο superscribed—I do not feel certain by whom. 34. ὀλυμπιάσαμ] The true reading of the equivalent for this word in Vet. Int. is probably (as Busse points out, p. 9) that of a and pr. b (also pr. 2) olimpiasem.
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1274 b 5. Vet. Int. has Charondi autem nihil est proprium, and this is the order of the words in P1 (and Ms?). 6. μέν om. O1 with P2. ψευδομαρτήρων ἔπι Ar. (falsorum testium), ψευδομαρτηρίων Scaliger, Bentley, Bekk., Sus.: cp., however, Rhet. ad Alex. 16. 1432 a 6, ἐν ἄποφασίᾳ ψευδομαρτηρήσας ψευδομάρτυρος δειν ὁμίχ ψήφει. In 2. 5. 1263 b 21, where the MSS. of the Politics have ψευδομαρτηρίων, two MSS. of the Vet. Int. (a) have falsorum testium, not falsorum testimoniorum. 7. έπίσκηψιν Scaliger and Bentley, έπίσκηψιν ἔπι (Vet. Int. considerationem). 9. On the passage bracketed see explanatory note. All the MSS. (and Vet. Int.) read φιλόλογον: P23, however, have the alternative reading φιλέων superscribed in the same ink, it would seem, as the MS. (Sus1, p. xviii). ἀνωμάλωσι Bekk., ἀνωμάλωσις P1 (Vet. Int. irregularitas, which represents ἀνωμαλία in 1270 a 15, and here probably ἀνωμάλωσις). 13. γίνονται] So P1: pr. O1 had, I think, γίνονται (with P2), but it has been dexterously altered into γίνονται. 14. τὴν μὲν κ.τ.λ.] Susemihl's MSS. of Vet. Int. have ἅc quidem manum utile esse, hac autem inutile, but z has hoc quidem manum utilem (utile pr. manus?) esse, hanc autem inutilem. τῶν] So O1 with P23 etc.: P14 τῶν. 20. τὴν πταίσωσι, though found only in L8—a manuscript known to Camerarius, however, had τι πταίσωσι (Politicalorum Interpretationes, p. 109)—is probably right. See Susemihl's apparatus criticus for the readings of the other MSS.: most of them read τυπήσωσι (so O1). The word used in the law seems to have been ἀμαρτάνειν, which τι πταίσωσι approaches much more nearly than τυπήσωσι. Camerarius refers to [Plut.] Sept. Sap. Conv. 13, νόμον, ἐν φέργαφας, Ἐκ τῶν ὄντων μεθών ἀμάρτητα, διαλατών ἢ τῶ νήφων τὴν ζημίαν: to which reference may be added Aristot. Rhet. 2. 25. 1402 b 9 sqq. and Diog. Laert. 1. 76 (ἀμαρτάνειν is the word used in both these passages). Schn. τι πταίσωσι (see his note): Bern. Sus. τι πταίσωσι: Bekk. τυπήσωσι. πλείω ζημίαν amplius damnum (not damm) c o z, perhaps rightly. ἀποτίνεν] ἀποτίνεν probably pr. O1, for after τι there is an erasure leaving a blank, in which ε may once have stood (ἀποτίνεν P2, the rest ἀποτίνεν): Vet. Int. ferre. 'In the older [Attic] inscriptions τῶν always forms τεῖσα, ἕτεια, ἕτεισθην' (Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 88). Here the ει finds its
way into the infinitive ἀπορείειν. 25. τὰς ἐνυληψος] Vet. Int. 
heredationes: his rendering of the word is no better in 1304a 4, 10, where he translates it hereditatibus and hereditatione. He certainly does not shine in his version of this twelfth chapter.
NOTES.

BOOK I.

1. The view that the πάλισ is a κοινωνία had an important bearing on Greek political speculation; Plato already asserts it by implication (Rep. 371 B: 462 C: 369 C), but Aristotle seems to have been the first to fix the conception of κοινωνία and to define its meaning. See vol. i. p. 41 sqq.

2. ἀγαθοῦ τινός. Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 2, and Pol. 1. 6. 1255 a 15, where the expression recurs, and also Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 b 15, τέλος τι. In Pol. 3. 12. 1282 b 15 we have—ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐν πάσαις μὲν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καὶ τέχναις ἄγαθον (not ἀγαθὸν τι) τὸ τέλος. The ends which the various κοινωνίαι seek to attain are described in Eth. Nic. 8. II. 1160 a 8 sqq. In the passage ‘before us, however, ἀγαθὸν τι is explained by τοῦ ἐκαίνιον ἀγαθοῦ, though in strictness this need not be a good at all. On ‘seeming good’ as the aim in action, see Eth. Nic. 3. 6 and the commentators. Sepulveda (p. 3) refers to de An. 3. 10. 433 a 27, ἐὰν δὲι καὶ νῦν τὸ ἀρετόν, ἄλλα τὸν ἑοτίν ἂν ἄν ἄγαθον ἂν τὸ φανήμενον ἄγαθον, οὐ παν ἄν, ἄλλα τὸ πρακτὸν ἄγαθον. Τὸ ἐκαίνιον ἄγαθον = τὸ ἐκαίστῳ ἐκαίνιον ἄγαθον, οὐ τὸ φανήμενον ἄγαθον (Eth. Nic. 3. 6. 1113 a 20–24).

4. πάσαι μὲν κ.τ.λ. These words repeat the second of the two premisses (1252 a 2); they do not contain the conclusion. Μὲν is ‘while,’ as in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 15 and 5. 1340 a 1. Bonitz remarks on Metaph. Θ. 2: 1046 b 15: ‘in apodosi duo quidem membra, τὸ μὲν ἑνικόν—πυρήνη etc. δὲ ἐπιστήμων ἀμφω, quasi eodem ordine iuxta se posita sunt, sed ipsa apodosis unice in posteriore membro continetur; prius grammaticae coordinatum, re vera subjectum est alteri membro. Cf. de hoc abusus partt. μὲν—δὲ Xen. Cyr. 1. 1. 4 et Bornem. ad h. l.’

Aristotle omits to prove that the aim of κοινωνίαι is not the avoidance or mitigation of evil, which is according to some modern inquirers the end of the State.


VOL. II.
Cp. also Eth. Nic. 10. 4. 1174 b 21–23 and 5. 1175 a 30 sq., referring to which latter passages Teichmüller (Aristoteles Philo-
sophie der Kunst, p. 177) says: 'der Eifer geht immer parallel
mit den erstrebten Gütern: je höher das Gut, desto grösser die
Bemühung darum.' It is not certain, however, that μάλιστα here
means more than 'above all' (Sus. 'ganz vorzugsweise').

5. κυριωτάτη, 'most sovereign.' Cp. 2. 9. 1271 b 6.

πάσας περιέχουσα τὰς ἄλλας. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 8, αἱ δὲ
κοινωνίαι πάντα μαρτιαν̄ ἔστεκε τῇς πολιτικής, and 21, πάντα δὲ αὖτα (αἱ
κοινωνίαι) ἐπὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐδικασίαν εἶναι, οὗ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέ-
ρωτος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφιέται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἄπαντα τὸν Βίον, and also Plato,
Parmen. 145 B, πάντα δὲ τὰ μέρη ἐπὶ τὸν διὸν περιέχεται. These
passages explain the sense in which the words of the text are used.
Aristotle is not thinking of the size of the κοινωνία here compared,
for there were κοινωνίαι in Greece, especially of a religious kind—
festival-unions, for instance—which extended, as our Churches
often do, beyond the limits of the State, but of the more com-
prehensive end pursued by the πόλις—an end as wide as human
life—which makes it stand to all other κοινωνίαι as a whole stands
to its parts. Thus the end of the πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη is said in Eth.
Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 6 περιέχειν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. See other references
given in Bon. Ind. 581 a 41 sqq.

7. The addition of ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πολιτικὴ serves to facilitate the
transition to the subject discussed in the next sentence.

ὡσαί μὲν οὖν. Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3. 4. 12: 3. 6. 14): Plato
(Politicus 259). Aristotle himself had dropped one or two expres-
sions in the last chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics (1180 b 1–2:
1180 b 24), which might be interpreted as lending some counten-
ance to the view that the contrast of household and πόλις is a
contrast of numbers. Common opinion is said in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b
32 to identify διαιστοτήκη and πολιτική. It appears to be implied that
if the difference lay only in the numbers of those ruled, the four
characters would be the same: cp. de Part. An. 1. 4. 644 a 16 sqq.,
Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 34, 38 (referred to by Eucken, Methode der
Aristotelischen Forschung, p. 50. 4), where a numerical difference
is treated as an insufficient basis for a distinction of species, and
also Pol. 1. 13. 1259 b 36. "ὡσαί 'acerbius dictum est, ut fere
nos: "wie gewisse Leute sagen"' (Ideler, Aristot. Meteor. vol. i.
p. 363). Μὲν οὖν here introduces an inference from what precedes
(which is not always the case: see Bon. Ind. 540 b 58 sqq.)— 'the
πολιτικὴ κοινωνία is the supreme κοινωνία, and makes the supremest
of goods its aim; hence it is a mistake to hold that the πολιτικὸς,
1. 1. 1252 a 5—13.

βασιλείως, αἰκονομικὸς, and δεσποτικὸς are the same.' The μὲν seems to be taken up, if at all, by δ' 17, but, owing to the long parenthesis which begins in 9 with πλὴθει γὰρ, the paragraph is perhaps not completed quite as Aristotle originally intended to complete it.

πολιτικὸν ... εἶναι τῶν αὐτῶν. The Vet. Int., Sepulv., and Lamb. (unlike Vict.) rightly make πολιτικὸν κ.τ.λ. the subject and τῶν αὐτῶν the predicate. The article is omitted before πολιτικὸν, as in Xen. Mem. i. 1. 16, τὶ πολιτικὸς, to give the word an abstract meaning: cp. also i. 2. 1252 b 9, ὡς ταύτα φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δούλων δὲ.

11. ὄλγων, sc. ἄρχη, νομίζοντι εἶναι. The omission of ἄρχη is quite in the Aristotelian manner. See Bon. Ind. 239 a 52 sqq.

12. ὡς οὔθεν διαφέρουσαν. On this construction with ὡς, cp. Poet. 20. 1457 a 12 and Vahlen's note, p. 214 of his edition. Plato (Politicus, 259 B) limits his assertion by adding the words πρὸς ἄρχην, 'in the matter of rule.'

13. καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικὸν κ.τ.λ. Giph. 'et de politico quidem atque rege,' and so Bern. ('und bezüglich des Verhält-
nisses zwischen dem verfassungsmässigen Staatsmann und dem König')—an interpretation in support of which Eth. Nic. 7. 4. 1146 b 11, καὶ τὸν ἐγκρατὴ καὶ τὸν καρπηροῦ, πότερον δ ἄντω δ ἐτερῶ ἐστὶν might be quoted; but perhaps it is more likely that the sentence is framed on the model of that which precedes it (πλὴθει γὰρ 9—βασιλείως 12), and would run, if completed, καὶ πολιτικὸν δὲ καὶ βασιλικὸν [οὔ εἶθε (ἢ οὔτω;?) νομίζουσι διαφέρειν’ αὖν] ὅταν μὲν αὐτὸς ἐφεστήκη, [νομίζουσι εἶναι] βασιλικὸν. The insertion of διαφέρειν νομί-
ζουσι (Schn.), or of οὔτω διαφέρειν ὄντα (Göttl.), or even of οὖν εἶθε νομίζουσι διαφέρειν (Rassow, Bemerkungen über einige Stellen der Politik, p. 4, followed by Sus.), does not suffice to complete the sentence. The distinction drawn by the inquirers here referred to between the βασιλείως and the πολιτικὸς fell short, in Aristotle's opinion, of the truth. They rested the distinction between them on the extent and duration of the authority possessed by them re-
spectively, regarding the βασιλείως as a permanent autocratic ruler and the πολιτικὸς as one who exchanged his authority from time to time for subjection to rule, and exercised it in subordination to the precepts of the kingy or political science. This distinction between the βασιλείως and the πολιτικὸς is not, so far as I am aware, to be found totidem verbis in the Politicus of Plato, but Aristotle probably gathers it from Polit. 294 A, 300 E sqq., though Plato seems to draw it rather between the ideal βασιλείως and the actual πολιτικὸς, than between the ideal βασιλείως and the ideal πολιτικὸς,
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whom he does not appear to distinguish (300 C). Plato, however, declines in the Politicus (292 E) to refuse the character of βασιλικός to one who, without actually ruling, possesses the kingly science, so that, if the Politicus is referred to here, the reference would seem to be not altogether exact. Aristotle, as has been said, holds that those who distinguished in the way he describes between the βασιλικός and the πολιτικός underrated the difference between them. The βασιλεύς, according to him, differs in nature from those he rules (Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 14: cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 3 sqq.)

he is not their equal like the πολιτικός (Pol. 1. 7. 1255 b 18 sqq.). Nor is it the case, in Aristotle's view, that an interchange of ruling and being ruled occurs in all forms of πολιτική άρχη (cp. Pol. 1. 12. 1259 b 4, ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαίς άρχαις ταῖς πλείοναις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἀρχαν καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον).

14. αὐτῶς (cp. Plato, Rep. 557 E, ἐὰν αὐτῶ σοι ἐπίη) here seems to unite the meanings of 'alone' (cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 25) and 'uncontrolled' (cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 8), and to stand in opposition both to κατὰ τῶν λόγων τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης and to κατὰ μέρος ἀρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενων. So Schn., who however translates 'solus et semper,' which hardly brings out the complete meaning.

ότι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Ἰεροστήρης should probably be supplied here.

15. κατὰ τῶν λόγων κ.τ.λ. The ideal king, and indeed the ὀντὸς πολιτικός (300 C), of the Politicus of Plato rules μετὰ τέχνης (300 E), not in subordination to (κατὰ) the written precepts of his art (compare the contrast of μετὰ τοῦ ὅρθου λόγου and κατὰ τῶν ὅρθων λόγων in Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 26 sqq. and Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 a 17 sqq.), just as a training-master who happened to return to his pupils from abroad sooner than he expected, would not feel himself bound by the written directions given them by him for their guidance during his absence (294 D, τὰς τῶν τεχνῆς γυμναζόντων ἐπιστήμες). The ideal ruler, like the captain of a ship or a physician, should rule over those committed to his charge, 'not in subordination to the laws, but with plenary authority' (299 C, μὴ κατὰ νόμους, ἀλλ' αὐτοκράτορας). Cp. 301 E, θευμάζομεν δὴ τοῦτο τοὺς τοιαύτας πολιτείας ὅσα ἐμφασιάζει γίγνονται κακὰ καὶ δόσα ἐμφασίζονται, τοιαύτης τῆς κράτεως ὕπακείμενης αὐτίκη τῆς κατὰ γράμματα καὶ ἔθνη, μὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης, προτούσης τῶν πράξεως; For the expression τῶν λόγων τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιαύτης, cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 5. 1147 a 18, τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης: Polyb. 1. 32. 7, καὶ τὶ καὶ κυνὲς τῶν μερῶν ἐν τάξει καὶ παραγγέλλει κατὰ νόμους ('ex artis legibus iussa dare,' Schweighäuser) ἠρετο. Cp. also Marc. Antonin. Comment. 6. 35, ὅχι ὅρασι, τῶν οἷς βάναισοι τεχνοῦται... ἀντέχουσι τοῦ λόγου τῆς τέχνης, καὶ τούτου ἀπο-
somewhat we T's we 735'i the erroneous. 16), probably Rassow Against loi simplest compound 3) (3) /lev In Cam-eq.s. I. 1252 somewhat different meaning in this passage, and also in that last quoted.

tis touauths, i.e. tis basileiai. Rassow (Bemerkungen, p. 3) and Susemihl (Sus. note 3) are probably right in thus explaining tis touauths, which must apparently refer back here as elsewhere to something already mentioned. Plato, as Rassow points out, identifies the basileikai episthemia with the politikai episthemia (Polit. 259 C).

16. toata δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἄληθῆ. These words refer to the whole series of opinions described in 9–16, and especially to that which sums them up, that the politikes, basileikes, oikonomikes, and deisotypikes do not differ in kind. Compare the still blunter expression used in criticising the Platonic Socrates (7 (5), 12. 1316b 17), τοῦτο δ' ἐστι ψεύδος.

17. τὸ λεγόμενον, i.e. Aristotle's assertion in 9 (repeated in 16), that the doctrine criticised is erroneous. Mr. Congreve, however, and Prof. Tyrrell (Herathena, 12. 22) take the reference to be to 1252 a 3–7. Against this view it may be urged, that (1) it seems more natural to refer τὸ λεγόμενον to that which immediately precedes, especially as otherwise ὅσοι 7—ἄληθῆ 16 becomes a long parenthesis, introduced, strangely enough, by μὲν οὖν, and without any δὲ to answer to μὲν οὖν: (2) the word δῆλον has already been applied to the conclusion arrived at in 3–7: (3) if we take τὸ λεγόμενον to refer to the assertion that the πόλις aims at the supreme good, we expect to be told in 21 sqq.—that fresh light will be thrown on this subject, not that we shall better understand the nature of the differences existing between the parts of which the πόλις is composed, and it is thus that these scholars explain τοῦτων 21.

τὴν ὀφθαλμημένην μέθοδον. Cp. de Gen. An. 3. 9. 758 a 28. 'Camerarius viam et rationem quasi praeuentem et ducentem ad certam cognitionem interpretatur' (Schn.); we find, however, κατὰ τὸν ὀφθαλμημένον τρόπον in Pol. r. 8. 1256 a 2, where the metaphor seems to fall into the background. Still ὀφθαλμησθαί is probably used in both passages in a middle, and not, as Bonitz takes it (Ind. 807 b 46 sqq.), in a passive sense. The same plan of inquiry—that of dividing a compound whole into its simplest elements and examining these—had been followed in the Nicomachean Ethics in the case of εὐθαμον, and so again in the Third Book of the Politics, the πόλις being πολιτῶν τι πλῆθος, the πολιτης is first studied. Cp. de Part. An. r. 4. 644 a 29, ἦ μὲν γὰρ οὕσιν τὸ τῷ εἰδεὶ ἄτομον,
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κράτιστον, εἰ τις δύνατον περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἑκαστὸν καὶ ἀτόμων τῷ εἶδει θεωρεῖν χαρίς, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, ὧν καὶ περὶ ὅρμος, where the best method is said to be to examine the ultimate species separately, but the remark is added that it is better not to apply this method to fishes and birds, for the species under these genera are not far apart (οὐ πολὺ διεστῶτα), and much repetition would result if it were employed in relation to them. So in the de Anima (see de An. 2. 3) it is through studying the δινάμεις of the soul successively—τὸ ὑπερτικὸν, τὸ αἰσθητικὸν, and so forth—that we obtain a real knowledge of the soul. And so again in the History of Animals Aristotle’s first step is to study the parts of which animals are made up, and in the treatise on the Parts of Animals to study the homogeneous parts, which are simpler, before the heterogeneous, which are more complex. The method of rising from the parts to the whole was a tradition from Socrates: see Grote, Plato t. 384 sq., who refers to Hipp. Maj. 301 B, and notes the objection of Isocrates to it (ad Nicocl. § 52). Cp. also ad Nicoclem, § 9, πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκέψεων τί τῶν βασιλευόντων ἔργων ἐστίν ἐάν γάρ ἐν κεφαλαίοις τὴν δύναμιν ἄλλο τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς περιλαβομεν, ἐνταῦθε ἀποβλέπουμεν ὀμησθεν καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν ἔρουμεν. In de Anima t. 1. 402 b 9 sqq. we find Aristotle discussing whether it is better to begin with ἡ δὴ ψυχή οijing τὰ μόρια οij τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν. His review of the parts of the State in the Politics, indeed, quickly reveals to him its ἔργον.

20 sqq. καὶ πόλις answers to ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, 18. By arriving at the simple elements of the πόλις, which are, as the State consists of households (c. 3. 1253 b 2), the simple elements of the household—husband and wife, father and child, master and slave—we shall not only come to understand the nature of the πόλις, but shall also learn what is the difference between the δεσποτικὸς, ὀικονομικὸς, πολιτικὸς, and βασιλικὸς, and also how far it is possible to arrive at a scientific account of each of these personages. Some take both τούτων and ἑκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων to mean ‘the parts of which the πόλις is composed,’ but if τὸ λεγόμενον 17 refers, as seems probable, to 7–16, we look rather for an inquiry with regard to the δεσποτικὸς, ὀικονομικὸς, etc. than for one respecting the parts of which the πόλις is composed. Besides, ἑκαστὸν τῶν ῥηθέντων reminds us of τούτων ἑκαστον 10, words clearly referring to the δεσποτικὸς, etc. Sepulveda, on the other hand, takes τούτων to mean ‘the parts of which the πόλις is composed,’ though he explains ἑκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων as ‘quae pertinent ad regem, ad civilem hominem, ad dominum et patrem familias.’ Our attention, however, has been specially
drawn in 7-16 to the question as to the nature of the difference existing between the δεσποτικός, αλονυμικός, and the rest, and it seems likely that διαφέρουσι 21 takes up διαφέρειν 10; perhaps, therefore, on the whole it is most probable that both τούτων and ἕκαστον τῶν ἰδίων refer to the δεσποτικός, αλονυμικός, πολιτικός, and βασιλικός. Cp. i. 7. 1255 b 16, φανερῶν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι σὺ ταύτων ἐστι δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτική, οὖδὲ πᾶσαι ἄλληλαι αἱ ἀρχαί, ἄσπερ τεῖνες φασίν. We shall find that the analysis of the πάλιν into its simple elements (which is described in c. 3. 1253 b 1 sq. as completed) does throw light on the difference between the δεσποτικός, the αλονυμικός, and the ruler of a State, and ultimately to some extent also on the difference between the πολιτικός and the βασιλικός, for we learn to distinguish the rule exercised by the head of the household over his wife, which is a πολιτική ἀρχή, from that which he exercises over his child, which is a βασιλική ἀρχή. As to τεχνικῶν, cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 180 b 20, οὖδὲν δ' ἴσως τού γε βασιλευόντος τεχνικὰ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικὸ ἐπὶ τὸ καθολον βασιλεύειν εἶναι διάβειεν δὲν, κάκειν γνιστικὸν ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἐνρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθα εἶναι εὐτυχίαν, and also Pol. i. 11. 1258 b 33 sqq.: 1259 a 8, 20. For εὖ διὸν 20 (not ἐκ τῶν), cp. i. 3. 1253 b 1, ἐπεί δὲ φανερῶν εὖ διὸ μορίῳ ἡ πάλιν συνέστηκεν, and see Jelf, Gr. Gr. 2. § 877. a. Obs. 3, 4.

24. Εἰ δὴ τις κ.π.λ. Δὴ introduces the first step in the inquiry C. 2. just announced: cp. de An. 1. 2. 403 b 26: Pol. 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 14: 6 (4). 14. 1297 b 37. The first question as to this sentence is, does ἄσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις form part of the protasis or the apodosis? Bernays connects the words with the protasis. Sepulveda, Vict., and Lamb. take them with the apodosis, and, it would seem, more naturally: cp. above 18-21. Proposals to transfer αὖτω 26 to before καὶ 25 are negatived by the usage of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. 546 b 18 sqq., who refers among other passages to Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1110 b 9, εἰ δὲ τις τὰ ἧδα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βιαία εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἑξο δύνα), πάντα δὲν εἰ ἐν ἑντω βιαίω, no less than by the intrinsic objections to taking this liberty with the MS. text. The meaning of αὖτω seems to be not 'as follows' (Bern.), but 'by watching the process of growth from the beginning.' Andrew Schott, in some notes appended to D. Heinsius' Paraphrase of the Politics (p. 1042), takes εὖ ἀρχής with φιλόμενα, and there is, no doubt, some strangeness in the expression εὖ ἀρχής βιέσειν: still these words are probably to be taken together. 'Εὖ ἀρχήσ means, 'beginning at the beginning': see Waitz on Anal. Post. 2. 8. 93 a 16. For the genetic method here employed, cp. Meteor. 4. 12. 389 b 24 sqq., and Isocr. De Antid. § 180. In
tracing the growth of the πόλις from its earliest moments, Aristotle follows Plato's example both in the Republic (369 A) and in the Laws (678 sqq.). Plato's object, however, is different from Aristotle's. In the Republic his object, or nominal object, is to find justice—in the Laws it is to discover τὶ καλὸς ἢ μὴ κατακλίσθη κ.τ.λ. (Laws 683 B); whereas Aristotle's object is to distinguish the διατυπωμένος, οἰκονομικὸς, βασιλικὸς, and πολιτικὸς, and still more to prove that the πόλις is by nature and prior to the individual, and the source of αὐτὰρχεία to the latter. His substitution of this method of watching the growth of the πόλις from its smallest elements is not a desertion of the method of division (διαρέιν, 19) announced just previously; it is, on the contrary, its best application. The same plan is followed in c. 9 to distinguish the sound and the unsound χρηματιστική. The growth of χρηματιστική both within and beyond the limits prescribed by Nature is carefully traced. For τὰ πράγματα, cp. Rhet. i. 7. 1364 b 8.

28. ἀνάγκη δὴ κ.τ.λ. Society begins in Necessity (that which is necessary always comes first, that which is for well-being afterwards, 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27), and its earliest form is συνδύσιμος, the union in pairs of human beings who are indispensable to each other. Aristotle lays stress on the origin of the household in Necessity and the needs of every day, partly in order to differentiate the οἰκονομικὸς and the πολιτικὸς, partly because by tracing the household to Necessity, or in other words Nature, he obtains the means of proving that its outgrowth the πόλις is by Nature. He finds the origin of the Household and the πόλις in Necessity and Nature, not προαίρεσις (for this contrast Bonitz, Ind. 837 a 46, compares de Part. An. 2. 13. 657 a 37, καὶ τοῦτο ὥσπερ ἐκ προαίρεσιων, ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις ἐποίησε). Plato had seemed in the Republic (369 B: cp. 371) to regard the πόλις as originating in the exchange of products and labour. Even in the Laws, where the household is treated as the germ of the πόλις (680), no such attempt is made to trace its origin and to resolve it into its constituent elements, as is here made by Aristotle. In the view of the latter, human society originates not in the διαλακτική κοινωνία (which begins only in the κόμη or Village, c. 9. 1257 a 19 sqq.), but in the relations of husband and wife, and master and slave. The starting-point of the process that gives birth to the πόλις is to be sought in a pair of powerful instinctive desires—that of reproduction, which brings male and female together, and that of self-preservation, which draws the slave to his master, the master also gaining in completeness by having the slave's physical strength placed at his disposal. Else-
where, however, we are told that human society originates in the aim to live (τοῦ ζήν ἑνεκεν, c. 2. 1252 b 29: 3. 6. 1278 b 24: cp. Plato, Rep. 369 D) and ultimately to live nobly and well (1252 b 30: 1278 b 21 sqq.), for which purposes men stand in need of ἡ παρ’ ἄλληλον βοίνεα (1278 b 20). This account of the origin of society is set by the side of that which traces it back to the instincts which lead to the formation of the household; we are not taught how to weave them together. There is, besides, a further source of human society—simple ὑπεξις τοῦ συζήν (3. 6. 1278 b 21): man is so endowed by nature—endowed with speech and perceptions of the good and bad, the just and unjust, the advantageous and disadvantageous—as to seek society irrespective of all needs of βοίνεα: he is, in fact, a πολιτικόν ζωόν in an especial degree. Without these endowments the instincts of reproduction and self-preservation would not suffice to give birth to the household and the πόλεις, for these instincts are possessed by the lower animals, which nevertheless do not form households or πόλεις.

τοὺς ἀνεύ ἄλληλων κ.τ.λ. Cp. de Gen. An. 2. 4. 741 a 3 sqq., 2. 5. 741 b 2 sqq., and Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 101:

Οἰκείων οὐτος οὐδέν ἔστιν, δὲ Δάχης,
ἐὰν σκοπῇ τις, ὡς ἀνήρ τε καὶ γυνή.

Perhaps τῆς γενεσίου ἑνεκεν 27 is intended to qualify not only ανουδωζέοθαι, but also τοὺς ἀνεύ ἄλληλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι. For this purpose they cannot dispense with each other, and for this purpose they must pair.

27. θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρην. It would seem from ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴους 29, that in this passage, as occasionally elsewhere (e. g. i. 13. 1260 a 10, 13), these words are used of the male and female human being.

τῆς γενεσίου ἑνεκεν, the origin, but not, in Aristotle’s view, the end of wedlock: see Eth. Nic. 8. i. 1162 a 19 sqq. The household, like the πόλεις, comes into existence for one end, but subsists for another. Γενεσίς is a wider term than γεννησίς: ‘et ipsum τὸ γέρνωθαι et γεννᾶσθαι significat, et universam eam seriem mutatio-

num complectitur quibus conficitur generatio’ (Bon. Ind. 148 b 4).

28. ἄλλ’ ῥοσπέρ . . . ἑτερον. Cp. Democrit. Fragm. 184 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. i. 351: Stob. Floril. 76. 17), referred to by Lasaulx (Ehe, p. 91): Aristot. de Anima, 2. 4. 415 a 26, φυτικότα-

tων γὰρ τῶν ἑργῶν τούς ζῴους (all things that partake of life, whether animals or not—de An. 3. 12. 434 a 27), ἃς τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα, ἢ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτομάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιήσαι ἑτερον οὖν αὐτὸ, ζῷον μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ ἰδίου καὶ τοῦ θείου μετέχωσιν ἢ δύνανται πάντα γὰρ.
NOTES.

ekéinou ὄρηγεται, κάκεινον ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει κατὰ φύσιν: and the
following passages in the de Generatione Animalium—2. r. 735 a
17 sq.: 2. r. 731 b 24 sqq.: i. 23. 731 a 24—b 8 : 3. 10. 760 a
35 sqq. (where Nature is said to design that species shall be
perpetual). Plato had already pointed to marriage as a mode
of attaining immortality (Laws 721 B—C: see Lasaulx, Ehe, p. 93),
and the writer of the so-called First Book of the Oeconomics,
who is fond of blending the teaching of Aristotle with that of
Plato’s Laws and the writings of Xenophon, reproduces the view
(c. 3. 1343 b 23 sqq.). Eth. Eud. 2. 6. 1222 b 15 sqq. should
also be compared with this passage. This impulse of reproduction
can hardly be an ὄρεξις, for it is shared by plants, and plants have
not τὸ ὀρεκτικόν (de An. 2. 3. 414 a 31 sqq.): it may, however, pos-
sibly be an ὄρμη (Pol. r. 2. 1253 a 29). It seems scarcely to find a
place in the enumeration of τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένεσαι (Eth. Nic. 2.
4. 1105 b 19 sq.) as παθῆ δινάμεις εἴρει, probably because it belongs
to τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, with which an ethical treatise has nothing to do.
Aristotle does not enter into the question why the union of man
and wife is more than a momentary union, or why it is more
lasting than that of male and female among other animals; but
his answer may probably be inferred from Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a
19 sqq., which may be contrasted with Locke on Civil Government,
2. §§ 79, 80.

29. φυτοίς. There is no assertion in this passage (as Schn. thinks)
of a sex in plants. Aristotle, in fact, holds that though plants
share in the male and female principle (otherwise they could not
be said to live)—de Gen. An. 2. r. 732 a 11—yet these powers
are mingled in them and not separated the one from the other (de
Gen. An. r. 23. 73 l a 1). All he says is that plants, like animals,
are actuated by an impulse to produce a being like themselves:
how this is done, is not here noticed.

30. ὃρχων δὲ κ.τ.λ. Sc. ἀνάγκη συνθάξεσθαι. Aristotle is prob-
ably speaking here only of that form of the relation of ruler
and ruled which is exemplified in master and slave. Wherever on
one side there is intelligence and on the other brute force only, it is
to the interest of both parties to combine, the master supplying
what the slave needs and the slave what the master needs. Euri-
pides (Herc. Furens 1235) makes his hero refuse to believe that
one god can ever have made a slave of another, as some assert:

Δείται γὰρ ὁ θεός, ἐπερ ἐστίν ὄρχως θεός,
οὐδεὶς.

Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery is already indicated here.
For the thought that it is διάνοια which makes the master, cp. de An. i. 5. 410 b 12 sq., τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναι τε κρείττον καὶ ἄρχων ἀδύνατον ἀδυνάτωτερον ὅτι τοῦ νοῦ εὐλογον γὰρ τούτον εἶναι προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν. In 4 (7). 7. 1328 a 6 we read—καὶ τὸ ἄρχον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀπὰ τῆς δυνάμεως τάσης ὑπάρχει πάσιν, ἄρχικων γὰρ καὶ ἅμτησιν ὀ ψυμάς, but yet ψυμα by itself and severed from διάνοια confers freedom rather than the capacity to rule others (4 (7). 7. 1327 b 23—33). The slave is throughout regarded by Aristotle as in the main a creature of them and sinew and nothing more. His function is the use of his body, and this is the best to be got from him, i. 5. 1254 b 17 sq.: he shares in reason sufficiently to apprehend it, but has it not (1. 5. 1254 b 22): he is wholly without the deliberative faculty (τὸ Βουλευτικῶν, i. 13. 1260 a 12), and hence is no partaker in life according to moral choice or happiness (3. 9. 1280 a 33). Plato, on the other hand, had described men possessed of muscular strength and little intelligence as born to be hired labourers (Rep. 371 E).

32. προορᾶν. Cp. Plato, Laws 690 B, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὡς τοιχε, ἀξίωμα ἐκτὸς ἄν γλυκτα, ἐπεσαθι μὲν τῶν ἀνεπιστήμων κελεύον, τῶν δὲ φρανώντα ἡ νεώντα τε καὶ ἄρχειν: Isocr. (?) ad Demonicum § 40, πειρώ τῷ μὲν σάματο εἰναι φιλόπονοι, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ φιλόσοφος, ὥσ τῷ μὲν ἐπιτελείν δύνη τὰ δόξαντα, τῇ δὲ προορᾶν ἐπίστη τὰ συμφέρουν; the same thought recurs in the undoubtedly authentic de Antidosi of Isocrates (§ 180). Cp. also Posidonius ap. Athen. Deipn. 263 c-d, and Democritus ap. Stob. Floril. 44. 14, κρέσσων ἄρχεσθαι τοῖς ἀνακόμους ἢ ἄρχειν. Aristotle has evidently in view in his account of master and slave the contrast commonly drawn between soul and body.

33. ταύτα, 'that which the other has designed.' For a similar roughness in the use of the word, cp. τοῦτο, de Gen. An. i. 22. 730 b 11.

34. διό, because the one completes the other. Cp. Stob. Ecl. Eth. 2. 6. 17 (tom. 2. p. 92 Meineke), νοηθὶ δὲ καὶ καθ ἑαυτὸν ἀδύνατον διαζηθ., φι τὸ ἄρχεσθαι συμφέρειν. The sketch of the political teaching of the Peripatetics here given (tom. 2. p. 91 sqq. Meineke) deserves study, as being in the main a résumé, though a brief one, of the teaching of the Politics.

ταύτο συμφέρει. In the Third Book, on the other hand, the rule of the master is said only accidentally to aim at the advantage of the slave, οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται φθειρομένων τοῦ δούλου σάξεσθαι τῷ δεσποτεῖαν (3. 6. 1278 b 32). Thus it would seem that even in becoming, as the First Book (c. 13. 1260 b 3) requires him to become, a
source of ethical virtue to his slave, the master will have his own interest in view. We are not told this in the First Book.

34–b 9. In mentioning two κοινωνίαι and not one, Aristotle has implied that a distinction exists between them, and he now draws attention to the fact, in order that he may remove a difficulty in the way of the acceptance of his view. By nature, then—he in effect says—the female is marked off from the slave (for Nature designed them to serve different purposes), and if this is not so among barbarians, the reason is that among them the element destined by nature for rule is not forthcoming. Μέν οὖν here, as often elsewhere, introduces a renewed reference to a subject on which increased precision is desirable. Cp. 1253 a 10, where, after the fact has been mentioned that language is peculiar to man, μέν οὖν introduces an admission that this is not true of voice, and an explanation of the difference between voice and language. The existence of a distinction between women and slaves is implied in Poet. 15. 1454 a 20 sqq. (a reference given in Bon. Ind. 204 b 45). The practice of buying wives, which seems to be referred to in Pol. 2. 8. 1268 b 39 sq. as common among the barbarians, may have often tended to reduce wives to the level of slaves (see Prof. Robertson Smith, Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia, p. 76 sq.). Plato had remarked already on the treatment of women as slaves in barbarian communities (Laws 805 D–E). Their toils were in some degree compensated by easier child-bearing (Aristot. de Gen. An. 4. 6. 775 a 32 sqq.). Even among the poor of a Hellenic State the true form of the household cannot be quite realized: cp. 8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5, τοῖς γὰρ ἀπόροις ἀνόηται καὶ γυναῖκι καὶ παιδὶ διασπέρασθαι διὰ τὴν ἀθανασίαν. The fact noted by Plato and Aristotle as to barbarians has been often remarked upon by later writers: so Darwin (Voyage of the Beagle, p. 216) says of the Fuegians, ‘the husband is to the wife a brutal master to a laborious slave’; and even as to Montenegro we read—‘How can you expect beauty from women who are used as beasts of burden by the men? . . . The well-grown handsome men who are playing at ball before the palace of the Prince are the husbands and brothers of the poor creatures who are carrying wood and water to their homes’ (Letter from Montenegro in the Times, Oct. 11, 1882). On the other hand, Aristotle elsewhere notes the frequency of γυναικοκρατία among barbarians (2. 9. 1269 b 24 sq.). Both observations are probably true, however we may choose to reconcile them. It should be added that though Aristotle here contrasts that which prevails among the barbarians with that which
is natural, he is well aware that legislators may learn much from them (Rhet. i. 4. 1360 a 33 sqq.); in fact, he occasionally mentions with approval in the Politics practices prevailing among them (for instance, their way of rearing infants, 4 (7). 17. 1336 a 5 sqq.), and often draws attention to their customs (in relation to communism, for example, 2. 5. 1263 a 3 sqq.). Plato had spoken in the passage of the Laws to which reference has been made (805 D–E) of 'the Thracians and many other races,' but Aristotle speaks as if the wife were virtually a slave among the barbarians generally.

1. οὐδὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The limits within which this holds good 1252 b. are more fully expressed in de Part. An. 4. 6. 683 a 22, ὅτι γὰρ ἐνδέχεται χρήσας δυσὶ ἐπὶ δυ’ ἑργά καὶ μὴ ἐμποδίζει πρὸς ἄτερον, οὐ- δὲν ἢ φύσις ἐκωθε ποιεῖν ὥστε ἡ χαλκευτικὴ πρὸς ἐνελευθερίαν ὀδηλασκο- λύχων· ἀλλ’ ὅτι γὰρ ἐνδέχεται, καταχρῆται τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπί πλείω ἑργά. Thus Aristotle says of magistracies in small States, Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 7', ὥστε οὐδὲν κολώτει πολλὰς ἐπιμελείας ἀμα προστάτευσ, οὐ γὰρ ἐμποδίζονται ἀλλήλαις, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀληθερωτίαν ἀναγκαίω ἡ ἁρχεία οἶον ὀδελασκολύχων ποιεῖν. For instances in which Nature uses an organ designed for one purpose for certain other side-purposes, see de Part. An. 2. 16. 659 a 20: 3. 1. 662 a 18. There were some conspicuous exceptions in the human economy to the rule of ἐν πρὸς ἐν: cp. de Gen. An. 5. 8. 789 b 9, ὅτι γὰρ ἐκα πολύχρωστά ἐστι τῶν περὶ τὰς τέχνας, ὥστε ἐν τῇ χαλκευτικῇ ἡ σφύρα καὶ δ ἄκρων, οὐνκα καὶ τὸ πνεύμα ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνεστῶσιν, and de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 19, ἡ δὲ χείρ ᾠκείν εἶναι αἷς ἐν ὑπάρχων ἄλλα πολλὰ ἐστι γὰρ ὥστε περὶ ὑπάρχων πρὸ ὑπάρχων τῷ οὖν πλείστωσ δυναμένω δέξασθαι τέχνας τοῦ ἐν πλείστων τῶν ὑπάρχων χρήσιμω τὴν χεῖρα ἀποδίδοντι ἡ φύσις . . . ἡ γὰρ χείρ καὶ δυναὶ καὶ χρήκα καὶ κῆρα γίνεται καὶ δόρω καὶ ἔφοδο καὶ ἄλλο ὅπωσιν ἐπὶ καὶ ὑπάρχων. Whether the various uses of the hand interfere with each other, must be left to physiologists to determine.

2. τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν. See Sus.², Notes 8 and 1353. Vict. appears to have been the first to draw attention to de Part. An. 4. 6. 683 a 22 sqq. (quoted in the last note) and to the important passage from the comic poet Theopompos quoted by Julius Pollux 10. 118, τὸ δὲ ὀδελασκολύχων στρατιωτικόν μέντα (aliter μὲν τι) χρῆμα, εἰρηται δὲ ὑπὸ Θεοπόμπου τοῦ κομικοῦ ἐν Εἰρήνη—

'Ἡμάς δ’ ἀπαλαχθέντας ἐπ’ ἀγαθὰς τέχνας ὀδελασκολύχων καὶ ἐξομαχαίρα τικράς.

Vict. says in his note on 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 9 sq., 'Pollux quoque mentionem ipsius fecit, qui narrat militare instrumentum id fuisset. Hoc autem, ut opinor, excogitatum fuerat, ne milites
nimis premerentur duobus gravibus instrumentis ferendi, cum ex uno ita conformato valerent eundem fructum capere.' The proverb *Δελφική μάχαρα* (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Paroem. Gr. 1. p. 393) seems to throw no light on the passage before us. We see from Athen. Deipn. 173 c sqq. that the Delphians were famous for their knives and their turn for sacrificial feasting and cookery, and they may very well have used and sold to pilgrims nothing loth to avoid expense (683 a 23 sqq.) a knife which might be used not only for killing the victim but also for flaying it and cutting it up. Contrast Eurip. Electr. 743–769 (Bothe), where Aegisthus first kills the victim (a kid) with a *σφαγία*, and then Orestes after flaying it with a Dorian *κονίς* asks for a large Phthian *κονίς* to cut it up. We need not suppose with Göttling (de Machaera Delphica, p. 10) that the Delphic knife was a combination of a knife and a spoon. The passage he quotes from Hesychius—*Δελφική μάχαρα ἀπὸ κατασκευῆς λαμβάνουσα ἐμπροσθεν μέρος σιδήρου, ὡς Ἄριστος τοτέλης*—deserves notice, but leaves us much in the dark.

3. πενδρόσ. Vict. 'aptē ad usus pauperum'—a rendering probably suggested by πρός εὐτέλειον in the parallel passage from the De Partibus Animalium quoted above (note on 1252 b 1)—but the meaning apparently is 'in a spirit of stint' (Lamb. 'parce tenuiter et anguste').

οὖς. Cp. 1252 a 24 sqq., though here the clause which explains it, μη πολλοὶς ἔργοις διὰ ἐνι δουλεῖον, follows and does not precede it. The use of *δουλεῖον* in the passage before us seems to be a somewhat uncommon one.

ἀποτελεῖται. Vict. 'effici fabricarique poterit.' Cp. 2. 11. 1273 b 9, ἐν γὰρ ὑφ’ ἐνὸς ἔργων ἀμιτ’ ἀποτελεῖται, and 13, καυτερῶν τε γάρ, καθάπερ εἶπομεν, καὶ κάλλων ἑκατὸν ἀποτελείται τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ βαττῶν.

6. τάξιν. Cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 34. 1194 b 15, ἄραν ἠδὴ λάβην (ἀ νῦς) τῆν τοῦ ἄνδρος τάξιν. Vict. compares Virg. Aen. 2. 102:

> Si omnes uno ordine habetis Achivos.

τὸ φύτει ἄρχον. What this is appears from 1252 a 31 sq. and 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 23–33. According to Aristotle, the relation between the barbarian husband and wife assumes an unnatural form, because that which is naturally the ruling element is wanting. If the wife is a slave, it is because everybody is so. She is no worse off than her husband. Cp. Eurip. Hel. 246, where Helen says—

> Τὰ βαρβάρων γὰρ δοῦλα πάντα πλὴν ἐνὸς,

and see Hug, Studien aus dem classischen Alterthum, p. 60. When in 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 25 Aristotle speaks of the barbarians of cold
climates as tending to be free, he must be referring to political independence.

7. γίνεται, ‘comes to be.’ See notes on 1264 a 14: 1254 b 31.

ή κοινωνία αὐτῶν refers probably to the conjugal union among the barbarians (so Bern. and Sus.).

8. οἱ ποιηταὶ. Euripides, Iph. Aul. 1266:

Barbáron δ' Ἐλλήνων ἀρχεῖν εἰκός, ἀλλ' αὐ διμοῦραν,

μῆτερ, Ἐλλήνων τὸ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλον, αὐτὴ ἐλεύθερον.

Lecturers, we are told in Metaph. a. 3. 995 a 7, were often expected by their audience to produce a poet as a witness to the truth of their statements.

9. εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The two κοινωνίαι are those of husband and wife, master and slave (the latter being here implied to be a κοινωνία, though the name κοινωνία is apparently denied to master and slave in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.). That of father and child arises after the foundation of the household. Translate: ‘from these two unions, then, proceeds first the household,’ ‘Πρώτη is by no means meaningless or pleonastic, for the further societies of the village and State consist of men and women, masters and slaves, but only mediately (mittelbar), inasmuch as they consist of households and households consist of these members. The next paragraph offers a striking analogy (1252 b 15, ἡ δ' εἰ πλείωνοι ὁκίαιν κοινωνία πρώτη 

κρήσεως ἐνυκέν μὴ ἐφημέρου κόμη): the State also, it is implied, consists of a plurality of households, but only mediately, inasmuch as it is composed of a number of villages which are themselves made up of households’ (Dittenberger, Gött. Gel. Anz., Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1373). Some have been tempted to explain ὁκία πρώτῇ as ‘the simplest form of the household’ (cp. πρώτη πόλις, 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 17: 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7), considering the complete form to be realized when children have come into being. But, as Dittenberger observes (p. 1373), there is no confirmatory trace elsewhere in Aristotle’s treatment of the household of this distinction between the ὁκία πρώτῃ and δεύτερα. An ὁκία τέλειος is indeed mentioned in 1. 3. 1275 b 4, but as consisting of slave and free, both of which classes find a place in the household from the first. No doubt, in the third chapter Aristotle adds to the two κοινωνίαι spoken of in 1252 b 10 a third (that which exists between father and child), but the τέλειος ὁκία does not seem to be connected with the appearance of this relation. The parallel of 1252 b 15 also points to the other interpretation, and the absence of any δὲ to answer to μὲν οὖν 9 (if indeed the second δὲ in 15 does not answer both to μὲν οὖν 12 and to μὲν
οῦν 9) is not uncommon in the Politics (see Sus. 1, Ind. Gramm. μέν), and affords no ground for the surmise of a lacuna after ἔστων 12.

10. καὶ ὅρθως κ.τ.λ. The word πρῶτη suggests the quotation from Hesiod, which Aristotle seems to interpret as making the wife and the ox the elements of the household, and thus supporting his own view, for the ox, he says, is the poor man’s slave (cp. Aelian, Var. Hist. 5. 14). If the line which follows (Hes. Op. et Dies 406),

Κηρή, οὐ γαμετή, ήτις καὶ βουσιν ἔστω, is genuine, the meaning which Aristotle attributes to Hesiod is even further from his real meaning than in the contrary case.

13. εἰς πᾶσαν ἡμέραν συνεστηκυῖα κατὰ φύσιν, ‘existing by nature for the satisfaction of daily recurring needs,’ (compare the phrase which stands in contrast to this, χρήσεως ἔνεκεν μὴ ἐφήμερον, 16). So we have κατὰ τὰ συστήτα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βιῶν τό ἱμέραν (2. 6. 1265 b 41), πρῶτο τῷ καθ’ ἡμέραν ὄστες (7 (5). 1. 1313 b 20); and τὰ ἐφήμερα are conjoined with τὰ ἀνυπκαί τοῦ βιῶν in Strabo 7. p. 311. The κώμη (or γέως), on the contrary, exists to satisfy necessities less incessantly recurring, and as to the πόλις, cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 21, οὐ γὰρ τοῦ παρόντος συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτική (κοινωνία) ἔφεσα, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀπαντα τῶν βιῶν. The view implied here of the aim of the household seems somewhat to differ from that of 1252 a 26–34, where reproduction and self-preservation are said to bring it into being.

14. οἶκος . . . οὖς. Cp. 3. 13. 1283 b 33, τὸ πλῆθος . . . οὖς ὡς καθ’ ἐκα- στόν ἂλλ’ ὡς ἄβρονς. Aristotle takes up the word οἶκος from Hesiod in place of the more usual οἰκία. As to the ordinary difference in meaning between οἶκος and οἰκία, see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, E. T. p. 142, note 680, and Shilleto on Demosth. de Falsa Legatione, § 279. It is in order to show that the household originates in the needs of daily life that Aristotle addsuces the names given to its members by Charondas and Epimenides.

ὁμοσιτόως. The σιπην was a bread-chest: Vict. refers to Aristoph. Plut. 802.

15. ὁμοκάπως. Κάπη is ‘a manger.’ Gottling’s argument that as Epimenides belonged to Crete, where syssitia prevailed, he would not be likely thus to designate the household, seems of the least possible weight. As Dittenberger says (ubi supra, p. 1357), we do not know for certain that the work of Epimenides which Aristotle here quotes was authentic, or that, if it was, he was speaking of Crete. ὁμοκάπως (with the penult short, at any rate), as Sus. 1 (Note 17) says, would not fit into an hexameter verse, and Epimenides wrote in hexameters, but we learn from Diog. Laert. 1. 112 that a prose treatise on the Cretan Constitution passed under his
name, and the term may have occurred in this work. The words κόμματα, κάττεν, καρφατίδες seem to be old-fashioned words used in connexion with the common meals at Sparta (Nicocl. ap. Athen. Deipn. 140 d). For Ζεύς καπατός, see Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. p. 58: cp. Ζεύς ἐταφέος, ibid. 4. p. 384. 'Ομοκάπτων is more likely to be a corruption from the less familiar ὁμοκατόν τον ὁμοκάτσων from it,' observes Mr. Ridgeway (Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc. vol. 2. p. 125), who however suggests ὁμοκάπτων with the penult long, Dor. for ὁμοκάτσων, 'those who have a common plot of ground.' Giphanius, who prefers ὁμοκάπτων, explains ὁμοκάπτως in this way (p. 21: Schneider, Pol. vol. 2. p. 9). But perhaps ὁμοκάπτως with the penult short better expresses that community in sustenance and in the satisfaction of daily recurring needs to which Aristotle, as Dittenberger remarks (ubi supra, p. 1358), points as the characteristic feature of the household. 'Ομεττον is used in the sense of a member of the household' (Polyb. 2. 57. 7, referred to by Vict.), but not ὁμοκάπτως. The word ὁμοκάπτως does not necessarily imply that the free and slave members of the household took their meals together, but the practice would be quite in harmony with the simplicity of early Greek life (cp. Theopomp. fragm. 243: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 319).

ἡ 8᾽ ἐκ κτλ. Πρώτη agrees with κοινοια: for its position in the sentence, cp. Metaph. 1. 3. 1054 b 1, αἱ ἵσαι ὑφακμαί εὐθεῖαι αἱ αὖται (‘are the same’): de Part. An. 2. 14. 658 a 28, καθ' ἀλλ' τὰ σώμα πρώτα: Phys. 4. 5. 212 b 19: Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 23: and still nearer, Phys. 4. 4. 212 a 20, τὸ τοῦ περιέχωντος πέρας ἁκίνητον πρώτον, τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὁ τότος, where the post-position of the adjectives seems to be for emphasis on the point desired to be pressed, and also to secure the juxtaposition of ἁκίνητον and πρώτον. Πρώτη in the passage before us qualifies ἐκ πλείων ὁμιῶν, and perhaps also χρήσων ἐνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέροι. ‘The first society to be formed out of more households than one, and to exist for the satisfaction of needs not daily recurring, is the village.’ See note on 1252 b 9.

16. μάλιστα κτλ. Vict. nec tamen omnem pagum talem esse affirmat, unus namque venire potest, et sane contingit aliquando, ut e variis locis homines non coniuncti inter se sanguine veniant in eandem sedem, atque illic domicilia sibi constraint tot numero iam ut pagum ex ipsis conficiant. For the relation of the κόμη to the deme, see Poet. 3. 144 b 35 sq. Perhaps the κόμη and the rural deme continued to feel as a gens, and to obey a gentle authority, longer than is often supposed, and hence in part the preference of oligarchs and of the Lacedaemonians for village-residence and their

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dislike of large cities, which had a natural tendency to democracy. The purchaser of land in an Athenian deme to which he did not belong paid something for ἐγκήρεις (Boeckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens, E. T. p. 297 n.: Haussoullier, Vie Municipale en Attique, pp. 68, 78): hence the land probably tended, in rural demes at all events, to continue in the hands of the members of the deme. The villages founded by the Teutonic conquerors of Britain were to some extent peopled by kinsmen. ¹ Harling abode by Harling and Billing by Billing, and each “wick” and “ham” and “stead” and “tun” took its name from the kinsmen who dwelt together in it. In this way the house or “ham” of the Billings was Billing-ham, and the “tun” or township of the Harlings was Harlington’ (Green, The Making of England, p. 188).

17. ἀποκία οἰκίας. A similar expression is used by Plato, Laws 776 A. Cp. also Laws 680 A sqq., a passage which was probably present to Aristotle’s mind throughout this part of the second chapter (see vol. i. p. 37, note 1). Plato appeals to the same passage of Homer as is cited in 22, and for the same purpose, to prove the early prevalence of Patriarchal Kingship, or, as he terms it, ἀναστεία. Both Plato and Aristotle regard kingly rule as characteristic of early society and trace it to the government of the household by the father.

οδὸς . . . παῖδας. Aristotle’s object in mentioning these names for members of the same village is to show by an appeal to the use of language that the village is an extension of the household. He has proved that the household is necessary and natural, and if he can prove that the village is an outgrowth of the household and the πόλις of the village, then the πόλις will be shown to be natural. Cp. Photius, Lexicon (quoted by Schn.), ὁμογάλακτος, οἱ τῶν ἀδελφῶν γάλακτος, οῖς καὶ γεννήτας ἐκάλουσι, and see Liddell and Scott, s. v. Plato had used the expression τῶν παῖδων καὶ παῖδων παῖδας δ λέγομεν in the passage of the Laws referred to in the last note (681 B), and Homer before him (I. 20. 308). Had Cicero the First Book of the Politics in his mind when he wrote (de Offic. i. 17. 54)—nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium ut habeant lubidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso coniugio est; proxima in liberis (in Aristotle master and slave); deinde una domus, communia omnia (cp. i. 9. 1257 a 21). Id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae. Sequuntur fratrum conjunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque, qui cum una domo iam capi non possint in alias domos tanquam in colonias exequunt. Sequuntur connubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures propinqui.
Quae propagatio et soboles origo est rerum publicarum? There is no express mention of the village, however, here, though a reference to it may be intended in the words 'alias domos.' Compare Demosth. in Macart. c. 19, καὶ πάιδες ἐγένοντο αὐτῷς ἁπατι καὶ πάιδων παῖδες, καὶ ἐγένοντο πέντε οἶκοι ἐκ τοῦ Βουσιλου οἶκου ἕως ἄνως.

19. Διὸ . . . φίκου. The fact that the village is an offshoot of the household enables Aristotle to account for the early prevalence of Kingship. Compare with the passage before us a quotation from Theophrastus peri βασιλείας in Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 5. 73, καὶ ἀρχῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀπάσα πόλις 'Ελλάς ἐβασιλεύετο, πλὴν οὗ ὀστερ πόροι πόλεως ἔθνη δεσποτικῶς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ νόμους τυνάς καὶ εὐσωμοῦς πατρίως (cp. Pol. 3. 14. 1285 a 16-b 12).

τὰ έθνη ('opp. ιτ. 'Ελληνες,' Bon. Ind. 216 b 51) are here regarded as preserving the traditions of the village (cp. i. 9. 1257 a 24.: 2. 8. 1268 b 39). The customs of the early Hellenes are thought both by Thucydides (ι. 5-6) and by Aristotle (Pol. 2. 8. 1268 b 39) to have had much in common with those of the barbarians of their own day.

20. ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνήλθον, 'for they were formed of persons governed by a king,' i.e. of members of households. Cp. Plato, Laws 680 D, μόν ὁδὲν ὁδὲ ἐκ τούτων τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἰκίαν καὶ κατὰ γένους διεσπαρμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν φθοράς (sc. τοιαίτερ πολιτείας γέγοναι), ἐν αἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἀρχεί διὰ τὸ τήν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι, οἷς ἐπόθεμεν καθέπερ ὀρνίθες ὑγείαν μίαν ποίησαν, πατρωνομούμενοι καὶ βασιλεύον Ποσών δικαιοτήτης βασιλευόμενοι; If συνήλθον is here said of the έθνη as well as the πόλεις, both έθνος and πόλις are implied to owe their origin to the household. 'It is worth noting that Aristotle gives us three distinct reasons for the prevalence of kingly rule in early times—here, 3. 15. 1286 b 8 sqq., and '7. 13. 11' (is 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq. meant?)—without hinting in any one of the passages that he knew of those specified in the others' (Mr. Postgate, Notes, p. 1). The second of these passages, however, is apparently aporetic; Aristotle is seeing whether the argument in favour of Kingship derivable from the prevalence of it among the men of a former day (οἱ πρότεροι) may not be met; may they not have rested content with it, because they had no choice, not many men of high excellence being then forthcoming? We observe, moreover, that almost every discussion in the Politics takes less account of preceding ones, and makes less use of their results, than one might have expected, so that we are not much surprised if Aristotle seems in this passage of the Third Book to forget that he has already accounted otherwise for the preva-
lence of Kingship in early times. Locke remarks (Civil Government, 2. § 106)—‘It is plain that the reason that continued the form of government in a single person was not any regard or respect to paternal authority, since all petty monarchies—that is, almost all monarchies near their original—have been com-
monly, at least upon occasion, elective.’ The etymology of the word ‘King,’ however, appears to make in favour of Aristotle’s view. ‘It corresponds with the Sanscrit ganaka. . . . It simply meant father of a family’ (Prof. Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, 2. 282, 284, quoted by Dr. Stubbs, Const. Hist. of England, 1. 140).

πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία κ.τ.λ. Camerarius (Politicorum et Oeconomorum Aristotelis Interpretationes et Explicationes, p. 25) applies Hom. Od. 1. 397, where Telemachus says,

Λυτὰρ ἐγών οἶκοι ἀναξ ἐσμύ' ἁμετέρω καὶ ἰδων, οὐς μοι λησσατο διὸς Ὀδυσσεύς.

21. ὅπλα τὴν συγγένειαν recurs in 2. 10. 1271 b 24 sq., there also in reference to a colony—φασὶ γάρ τὸν Δυκάργην . . . τὸ τὸν πλεῖστον διατρύψαν χρόνιν περὶ Κρήτην διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν ἀποκείμεν γὰρ οἱ Δυκάριοι τῶν Δυκάριων ἡσύν. Just as in that passage the relationship of the Lyctians to the Laconians is referred to, so here the reference probably is to the relationship of the ἀποκείμεν to the οἰκία. So Sus. (Qu. Crit. p. 333): ‘propter propinquitatem, id est quia nihil nisi colonia domus sive familia dilatata vicus est.’ The words, however, are often explained to refer to the mutual relationship of the members of the ἀποκείμεν, Kingship being especially in place among relatives (cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 14 sqq.), and this is a possible interpretation.

22. καὶ τοῦτ ἀστὶν ὃ λέγει "Ομήρος. What is the meaning of τοῦτο? What is the quotation from Homer held by Aristotle to prove? The commentators are not agreed. Giph. ‘Homeri versiculus eo pertinere videtur, ut doceat Aristoteles domesticum imperium esse velut regium’ (p. 24); he would seem therefore to refer τοῦτο to πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύσαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβύτατον 20 exclusively, as does also Susemihl (Qu. Crit. p. 333). But it is not altogether easy to refer τοῦτο to this particular clause only, and we hardly expect Aristotle to appeal to the practice of the Cyclopes in order to justify a general statement respecting the household of all times. The explanation of Vict. is—‘uitur etiam auctoritate summi poetae, qui idem ostendit, priscos scilicet, ut ipsis commodum erat, solitos regere suam familiam,’ and perhaps it is in some such way as this that we should understand the quotation. Aristotle has been
saying that πόλεις and ζήτη had their origin in the coming together of human beings who had been previously ruled by kings, and he uses Homer's account of the Cyclopes to prove the existence in the earliest times of a household form of Kingship—a form in which the king was the husband and father, and the subjects were the wives and children. To Plato (cp. Laws 680 D, τὸ ἀρχαῖον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα διὰ μυθολογίας ἐπανενεγκών, and Strabo, p. 592, ταύτας δὲ τὸς διώκομας ὑπογράφει φησί τῶν ποιητῶν ὁ Πλάτων, τῆς μὲν πρώτης πολιτείας παράδειγμα τιθέντα τῶν τῶν Κυκλόπων βίων), and probably also to Aristotle (Pol. i. 2. 1252 b 23, σποράδες γὰρ, καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον φῶν), the Homeric picture of the Cyclopes is a mythical picture of the rude beginnings of human society. Plato had already used the same quotation from Homer in Laws 680 A sqq. to prove that Patriarchal Kingship (which he terms δυναστεία) existed in early times, and the fact that the words with which he prefaces his quotation seem to find an echo in those with which Aristotle prefaces his makes it all the more likely that they quote it for a similar purpose. The passage in the Laws is as follows— ἈΘ. Πολιτείας ἐδέ γε ἦδη καὶ τρόπος ἐστὶ τις ὡστός. ΚΛ. Τίς; ἈΘ. Διακούσι μοι πάντες τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χάριν πολιτείαν δυναστείαν καλεῖ, ἢ καὶ γιὰ τί πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν "Ελληνικά καὶ κατὰ βαρβάρους ἐστὶ λέγει δ' αὐτήν ποι καὶ ὁμορροι ἑυγενέστερη περὶ τὴν τῶν Κυκλόπων οἴκησιν, εἰτῶν τῶν δ' αὐτὴ ἄγαρ βουλήφραος, οὕτε ἡμισπέρας,

πάντων ἡ' ἀλόχων, σοῦ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουνας.

ΤΕΜΠΕΣ ἐν κ. τ. π. Ὀδυσ. 9. 114. Τεμπεστεὺς implies kingship: it is used of Minos in Hom. Odys. 11. 569, quoted by Plato, Gorgias 526 D. The society of the Cyclopes is referred to in Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 28, as a typical case of the household standing by itself, not supported or directed by a State. It is in order to account for the independence of the Cyclopian household and its head that Aristotle adds σποράδες γὰρ: this would have been clearer, if he had quoted the concluding words of the second line, οὗτ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν, but the passage was evidently well-known. Plato also mentions the scattered way in which the habitations were distributed in these early days of human society, and is bold enough to give as the reason for it the difficulty of finding subsistence just after the deluge (ἐκ ταύτων τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἴκησιν καὶ κατὰ γένος—cp. the κώμῃ of Aristotle—διεσπαρμένων ὡπό σπορᾶς τῆς εὐ ταῖς φθορᾶς, Laws 680 D), but on this Aristotle is judiciously silent. This 'sporadic' existence of primitive man is also recognized in
the myth of Protagoras (Plato, Protag. 322 A) and by Philochorus (Fr. 4: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 384): cp. also Plutarch, Theseus c. 24, and Paus. 2. 15. 5. Some savage races still live thus: "the Abors, as they themselves say, are like tigers, two cannot dwell in one den," writes Mr. Dalton, "and the houses are scattered singly or in groups of two or three" (Mr. Herbert Spencer, Fortn. Rev. Jan. 1881, p. 5).

24. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Nay, the fact that men were at the outset ruled by kings has led them universally to assert that the gods also are so ruled.' Διὰ τούτο is explained by δεικνύει.

26. ἀφαιρομοιοῦν. Cp. Metaph. B. 2. 997 b 10: Λ. 8. 1074 b 3 sqq. (where it is said that the gods are sometimes assimilated in form to men, sometimes to certain of the lower animals): Poet. 25. 1460 b 35.

27 sqq. ἡ δὲ ἐκ . . . ἐδέξειν. Bonitz (Ind. 751 b 21) and apparently Bernays take tèleios with πόλις, and a πρώτη πόλις is no doubt mentioned in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 17 and 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 7, but not in the First Book, unless indeed the village is to be viewed as an imperfect and inchoate πόλις, which is nowhere stated. Nor would the mere union of more villages than one be enough of itself, in Aristotle's view, to constitute a tèleios πόλις. Tèleios seems to qualify κοινωνία, not πόλις, and its place in the sentence is explained (see note on 1252 b 15) by the fact that κοινωνία is qualified both by ἐκ πλειόνων κομίων and by τέλειος. The fem. form is more often τελεία or τελέα in Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 751 b 56 sqq.).

On μὲν οὖν occurring as it does here in the middle of a sentence, see Vahlen's note on Poet. 22. 1458 a 24 (p. 226 sqq. of his edition). He compares (among other passages) the following from the Politics — 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 9: 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 2 sq.: 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 6 sqq.: to which 1. 9. 1257 b 2 sqq. (μὲν οὖν, π. l.) may be added. See also Bon. Ind. 540 b 42 sq., 'μὲν οὖν saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur': of this, besides the present passage and 1. 9. 1257 b 2 sq., Poet. 22. 1458 a 23 sqq. is a good instance. Μὲν οὖν thus used seems to introduce a comment on what has just been said, whether by way of modification or confirmation or otherwise. So here, after attributing to the πόλις complete αὐτάρκεια, Aristotle remembers that there is an epoch in its history at which this is not its aim; he therefore slightly corrects what he had just said, but only to confirm it subject to that correction. In de Part. An. 4. 11. 691 a 28, however, μὲν οὖν in the middle of a sentence seems merely intended (in the sense of 'while,' cp. Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a
i7) to prepare the way for the sentence introduced by the δέ which follows, and to impart greater emphasis to the latter.

γινομένον τοῦ ἕν τὸν ἐνεκεν. Cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 24: Plato had said the same thing (Rep. 369 D: 371 B). In Aristotle's view the necessary is first sought and then higher things (Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27). In Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11 sq., however, the πάλι is said to be commonly thought both to be formed and to exist τοῦ συμφέροντος χάριν, and in Pol. 3. 6. 1278 b 21 sqq. it seems to be implied that bare existence is not always the aim with which men form it.

πάσης τῆς αὐτάρκειας, 'entire self-completeness'—cp. πᾶς δ' ὑπηρέτης, i. 4. 1253 b 33, and πᾶσαι τῆν ἀρχήν, 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 21—both αὐτάρκεια ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις, 4 (7). 4. 1326 b 4, and αὐτάρκεια in respect of τὸ ὑπ' ὅς, 3. 9. 1280 b 34. Cp. also i. 8. 1256 b 31.

ηδή, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 16, ἕστι γὰρ ὠσπέρ δήμος ἢδη οἱ ἄρμων: Eth. Nic. 6. 10. 1142 b 13, ἢ δόξα οὐ ζητείται ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἢδη (has, as it were, 'reached the level' of assertion): and cp. also Pol. 2. 1. 1261 b 12, καὶ βούλεται γ' ἢδη τότε εἶναι πάλις, ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαίνῃ τήν κωνωπίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλήθους.

For the attainment of the πέρας by the πάλις (the third κοινωνία in the order of genesis), cp. de Part. An. 2. 1. 646 b 8, ταύτα γὰρ ἢδη τὸ τέλος ἔχει καὶ τὸ πέρας, ἐπὶ τοῦ τρόπου λαβόντα τὴν σύστασιν ἀρίθμου, καθάπερ ἐπὶ πολλῶν συμβαίνει τελειώνθη τὰ γένεσις: de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 a 34, εν τῷ τρίτῳ ἀριθμῷ πέρας ἢδη τὸ γένεσις: Probl. 26. 9. 941 a 24, τελειώτα 6' ἐν τρισὶ πάντα: de Caelo, i. i. 268 a 1 sqq.

30. διὰ, 'because it is the completion of societies existing by nature.'

πάσα πάλις. Cp. οἰκία πᾶσα, i. 13. 1260 b 13. Aristotle does not, however, mean that the deviation-forms of State are by nature: they are, indeed, expressly declared to be παρὰ φύσιν, 3. 17. 1287 b 39.

αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι, i.e. πρῶται γενέσει.

34. ἀνθρώπων ὑπ' οίκαις. For the asyndeton, cp. 2. 4. 1262 b 30, οἰκίας ἐργατος φόνου, and see Vahlen's note on Poet. 20. 1457 a 22.

ἐτί . . . 1253 a 1, βελτίστων. 'Further, that for which things exist and the end is best, and self-completeness, the end of the State, is both the end and best'; hence the State brings which is best; hence it exists by nature, for nature brings the best. Cp. Eth. Eud. 1. 7. 1218 b 10, τοῦ 6' ὃν ἐνεκεν ὡς τέλος ἄριστου καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸ καὶ πρῶτον πάντων ὧστε τοὺς ἀνὴρ ἀτό, τὸ ἀγαθὸ τὸ τέλος τῶν ἄνθρωπων προκύπτων: 2. 1. 1219 a 9, φανερῶν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων ὅτι βελτίστως τὸ ἐργαν τῆς ἐξεσοτ. τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἄριστον ὡς τέλος ὑπόκειται γὰρ τέλος τὸ
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βελτιστων καὶ τὸ ἐσχατον, οὐ ἕνεκα τὰλλα πάντα : Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 38, βούλεται οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἐσχατον τέλος, ἄλλα τὸ βελτιστον. A new proof is here adduced of the naturalness of the State, drawn not from the fact that it is the completion of natural societies like the household and village, but from the fact that its end is the best, the end which Nature pursues: cp. de An. Incessu 2. 704 b 15, ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἄλλ' ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τῇ οὐσίᾳ περὶ ἐκατον γένος χών τὸ ἄριστον' διόπερ εἴ βελτιστον ὁδί, οὕτως καὶ ἔχει κατὰ φύσιν.

1253 a. 3. ὁ ἀπόλις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην. Aristotle perhaps has in his mind the Μονότροπος of the comic poet Phrynichus. 'Nomen fabulæ inditum ab homine tristi et moroso, qui Timonis instar solitariam vitam sequeretur et lucem aspectumque hominum fugeret. ... Sed quidn i ipsum audiamus in loco apud Grammat. Seguer. p. 344 haece dicentem:

"Ονομα δὲ μοιετὶ Μονότροπος * * * * * ζὸ δὲ Τίμωνος Βίον, ἀπρόσοδον, ἀξύθυμον, ἄγαμον, ἄγυγον, ἀγέλαστον, ἀδικέλετον, ἰδιαγώμονα.'

(Meineke, Historia Critica Comicorum Graecorum, p. 156, who however emends the third line otherwise in Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 587 sq.: the MSS. have

ἀγαμον, ἄγυγον, ἀξύθυμον, ἀπρόσοδον.)

There were, however, Cynics who took for their motto the lines—

"Ἀπόλις, ἀικος, πατρίδος ἑστηρημένος, πτωχός, πλανήτης, βίον ἔχων τοὐθ' ἡμέραν"

(Diog. Laert. 6. 38 : Bernays, Theophrastos' Schrift üher Frömmigkeit, p. 162 : compare Athen. Deipn. 611 C): these men were ἀπολιδεῖς by choice, and this saying of Aristotle's would, therefore, reflect on them, whether it was intended to do so or not. Aristippus, again, had said (Xen. Mem. 2. 1. 13, referred to by Camerarius, Interpretationes p. 28)—ἄλλ' ἐγὼ τοι ... οὐθ' εἰς πολιτείαν ἐμαυτῶν κατακλῆμα, ἄλλα ξένοι πανταχοῦ εἰμί. Philoctetes, on the other hand (Soph. Philoct. 1018), was an ἀπόλις διὰ τύχην, and so were Themistocles, when Adeimantus applied the epithet to him (Hdt. 8. 61), and Aristotle himself, when Stageira was in ruins. Vict. compares with the passage before us Cic. Philipp. 13. 1: nam nec privatos focos nec publicas leges videtur nec libertatis iura cara habere, quem discordiae, quem caedes civium, quem bellum cive delectat, eumque ex numero hominum eiicendum, ex finibus humanæ naturæ exterminandum puto ... Nihil igitur hoc cive, nihil hoc homine taetrius, si aut civis aut homo habendus est, qui cive bellum concupiscit.
4. ὀσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ. II. 9. 63—

Ἀφρήτωρ, ἄθεμος, ἀνέστις ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος,
ὡς πολέμου ἐρατὰ ἐπιθημίον ἀκριβεῖτον.

The lover of civil war is said by Homer to be 'clanless, lawless, hearthless'; Aristotle, however, seems to conceive him to say that the 'clanless, lawless, hearthless' man is a lover of civil war. But to say of a man that he is a lover of war for the sake of war was, in Aristotle's view, to say that he is either φαῖλος or, like Ares, more than man: compare Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 b 9, οὐδὲς γὰρ αἱρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἑνεκα οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον δόξαι γὰρ ἄν παντελῶς μαυφόνος τις εἰναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίου σοιοίτο, ἣν μάχαι καὶ φῶνα γίγνοντο, and the indignant words addressed by Zeus to Ares in Hom. II. 5. 890 (cp. Polyb. 12. 26). For Mr. Jackson's view of this passage, see Journ. of Philology, 7. 1877, p. 236 sqq. I translate ὀσπερ κ.τ.λ. 'like the clanless, lawless, hearthless man reviled by Homer.' It is perfectly true that it is the lover of civil war whom Homer reviles, but Aristotle is often inexact in his use of quotations. Mr. Jackson's proposal to place ὀσπερ—ἐπιθυμηθέν in a parenthesis and to connect ἄτε περ κ.τ.λ. 6 with the words which precede the parenthesis seems to me to involve an awkward severance of ἄτε περ κ.τ.λ. from the words which this clause is conceived to illustrate, and to be also unnecessary (see below on 6).

6. ἀμα γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Sepulv. ' nam simul ac talis quisque natura est, bellandi cupidus est ': Lamb. 'non enim potest quisquam talis esse, quin uno eodemque tempore sit et belli cupidus.' Prof. Tyrrell (Hermathena, 12. 26)—'no sooner is he such (clanless, lawless, hearthless) by nature than his hand is against every man': but is not φόσει τοιοῦτος = φόσει ἀπόλις? For the construction, cp. Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 7. 30 (p. 60 Blass), ἄμα γὰρ εἰς τὰν τόν ποιου ἄθρωσθησονται καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἄρετῆς μμαθήσονται[ai].

ἄτε περ ἄξις ἀν ὀσπερ ἐν πετοῖς. The term ἄξις is used in the well-known epigram of Agathias (Anthol. Pal. 9. 482), where the game described is evidently that which the Romans called ' ludus duodecim scriptorum' (resembling our ' backgammon') : Plato, according to M. Becq de Fouquières (Jeux des Anciens, p. 358), refers to this game in Rep. 604 C. The epigram has been ingeniously explained both by Mr. H. Jackson (Journ. of Philology, loc. cit.) and by M. Becq de Fouquières (p. 372 sqq.), but until more light has been thrown on the meaning of line 26, which has been variously emended, we cannot be quite sure that we know the meaning of the term ἄξις even in this game, though it would seem to be 'a solitary, unprotected piece'; it is, however, by no means certain that
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Aristotle here refers to this particular game. The term πεττεία in its wider signification included a variety of games—all games, in fact, in which πεττεία were used (Becq de Fouquières, p. 303, 385)—but it was especially applied, in a narrower sense, to a game resembling our ‘draughts’ (ibid. p. 391), which was played on five lines instead of twelve, and in which each player sought to surround and cut off his antagonist or to reduce him to inactivity (Polyb. i. 84. 7: Plato, Rep. 487 B—both passages referred to by Becq de Fouquières, p. 397-8). In this game the term ἄξον may well have borne a different meaning from that which it bore in backgammon, and one more in harmony with its use in the passage before us, but what this meaning was, we can only vaguely conjecture from the connexion in which it is here used. Is ἄξον an isolated piece pushed by itself far in advance from the ‘sacred line’ (see Becq de Fouquières, p. 402 sqq.), and therefore alone in the midst of foes? There seems to be no reason for supposing with Becq de Fouquières (p. 398–9) that some game other than the ordinary πεττεία is here referred to.

7. διότι. Vict. ‘quare,’ with many other translators, but as the fact that man is a political animal in a fuller sense than bees or other gregarious animals has not yet been mentioned, it is perhaps better (with Lamb. Bern. and others) to translate it here by ‘that.’

8. ἀγελαίου ζῷου. ‘His in verbis Platonis ἀγελαίατροφική vel ἀγελαιοκομική, quam legimus in Politico, p. 267 B sq., 276 A, significari videtur’ (Engelhardt, Loci Platonici, p. 3). The connexion conceived by Plato to exist between this art and πολιτική may possibly be here glanced at. In Hist. An. i. i. 487 b 34 sqq. man is spoken of as both ἀγελαίοι and μοναδικοί, and we have the following account of πολιτικά ζώα in 488 a 7—πολιτικά δ’ εἶστι ἄν ἐν τι καὶ κοινῶν γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον. ἄπερ αὐ πάντα πουεὶ τὰ ἀγελαία. ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀνθρώπος, μέλιτα, σφής, μύρμης, γέρανος. καὶ τούτον τὰ μὲν ἴδι’ ἱγμᾶν ἐστὶ τὰ δ’ ἀναρχα, αὐτὸν γέρανος μὲν καὶ τὸ τῶν μελιτῶν γένος ἴδι’ ἱγμάτα, μύρμης δὲ καὶ μυρία ἄλλα ἀναρχα.

μάλλον. For higher faculties are brought by man into the common stock—the power of perceiving that which is good and evil, just and unjust, advantageous and disadvantageous, and of expressing those perceptions—and the higher the faculties brought into the common stock, the fuller the union: cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 11, τούτο δὲ γίνοντ’ ἄν ἐν τῷ συζύγῳ καὶ κοινωνίας λόγων καὶ διαινάς αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ συζύγῳ ἐπὶ τῶν ανθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸ δαπέρ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι. On language as special to man, cp. Isocr. de Antid.
§§ 253–7 and Nicocl. § 5 sqq., passages which Aristotle perhaps had in view here. Socrates had anticipated Isocrates in speaking of language as the condition of political life (Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 12, τὸ δὲ καὶ ἑρμηνείαν δοῦναι, δὴ ἥ σῶμα τῶν ἁγαθῶν μεταδίδομεν τὸ ἀλλῆλοις διάδοκτον καὶ κοινωνικόν καὶ νόμως πλῆθεμα καὶ πολιτευόμεθα;). According to Plato, Tim. 47 C, λόγος (which he fails to mark off from φωνή) is given us ἔσεχα ἄρμονίας and to regulate the disorderly movements of the soul. It may be questioned whether, as Aristotle seems to imply, language would be useless to a solitary animal.

10. ἄνθρωπος. Articulus ubi genus aliquod universum significatur non raro omititur, Bon. Ind. 109 b 36: cp. 1253 a 31, ὀσπερ γὰρ καὶ τελεωθὲν βέλτιστων τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπός (so Π') ἔστιν: on the other hand, all MSS. have ὁ ἄνθρωπος in 1253 a 7, 34.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ κ.π.λ. Language has just been said to be peculiar to man, and μὲν οὖν ('it is true') introduces an admission that this does not hold of voice, in order that an account of the nature of language may be added. It implies a capacity to form households and πόλεις. As to φωνή, see de Gen. An. 5. 7. 786 b 21, where it is said to be τὸ λόγων δή, and de An. 2. 8. 420 b 32, σημαντικὸς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ψόφας ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναπνευσμονάς ἀδέος, ὀσπερ ἡ βίβεξ (contrast Plutarch, de Anima Procreatione in Timaeo, c. 27, p. 1026 A, ὅς ἐν πᾶς τῆς ἐστὶν ἄλογος καὶ αἰσχρόντος, λόγος δὲ λέξει ἐν φωνῇ σημαντικῇ διανοίᾳ): so the words σημείων and σημαίνειν are used in 11 and 13 in contrast to δηλοῦν 14 (Vic. 'signa'), haec enim notio est verbi σημαίνειν: homines autem oratione declarant aperientique, hoc enim valet verbum δηλοῦν'). The full force of δηλοῦν appears in Pol. 3. 8. 1279 b 15: σημεία are distinguished from διαμέτρα in 5 (8). 1340 a 33. As to the limitation to τὸ λυπηρόν καὶ ἤδω, cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 b 30 sqq. and de An. 2. 9. 421 a 10, φαινός γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἀποταίρεται καὶ ὀδύνως ἄπραξεν τῶν ἀπεφρατῶν ἀνευ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἤ τοῦ ἤδεος, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἄκριβου τοῦ αἰσθητήριου. Aristotle implies here that animals can only indicate to each other feelings of pleasure and pain (cp. Lucr. 5. 1059 sqq., referred to by Giph.), but in de Part. An. 2. 17. 660 a 35—b 2 and Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 a 17 sqq. he speaks of some of them as receiving μάθησις καὶ διδασκαλία from their likes. See on this subject Dr. Ogle's note 5 on Aristotle's Parts of Animals, 2. 17. Not all animals possess φωνή (Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 a 32).

14. ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν. See Bon. Ind. 268 b 13.

τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν. Giph. (p. 31) draws attention to the fact that Aristotle denies to the lower animals a sense of the advantageous and the harmful.
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16. οὔστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. Cr. 3. 12. 1282 b 16, ἦστε δὲ πολιτικῶν ἡγαθόν τὸ δίκαιον, τοῦτο δὲ ἦστι τὸ κοινῆς συμφέρον. Epicurus went farther and traced the just back to utility: cp. Diog. Laert. 10. 150 and the well-known line of Horace (Sat. 1. 3. 98) to which Giph. refers:

Atque ipsa utilitas, insti prope mater et aqui.

16. μόνον is pleonastic, as in 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 11. For the change of number from τοῖς ἀνθρώποις to μόνον, Vahlen (Poet. p. 103) compares τούτῳ διαφέρουσιν (οἱ ἀνθρώποι) τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μυθικώτατον ἐστὶ (sc. τῶν ζῴων), Poet. 4. 1448 b 6. Φρόνησις, however, is allowed by Aristotle to some animals (Hist. An. 9. 1. 608 a 15: Gen. An. 3. 2. 753 a 12: Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 a 26), but in a sense other than that in which it is ascribed to man, as appears from the last-named passage—διὰ καὶ τῶν θηρίων ἐνα ἰσόμετρα φαινεῖν εἰναι, ὅσα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν βλον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικήν.

17. αὐθήσην. 'Latiore sensu ἐξεἰν αὐθήσην των ἑαυτῶν idem quod usum habere alicuius rei, novisse aliquid' (Bonzit, Ind. 21 a 1, who compares Eth. Nic. 6. 12. 1143 b 5 and Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 35, and refers to Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 504. 2, ed. 2, =650. 2, ed. 3). See also Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 238. 2 (ed. 3), who explains αὐθήσην in the passage before us by the word 'Bewusstsein,' adding that an immediate kind of knowledge is meant, in contradistinction to ἐπιστήμη. According to Polybius (see above, p. xiii), the ἐννοια τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδικοῦ, τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀθυροῦ is the fruit of human society, not that which is prior to human society and makes it possible.

18. ἢ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία. Some translate 'the association of beings possessing these perceptions,' but it seems more natural to take τούτων here as neuter than as masculine, and besides an association of this kind would hardly be said to produce, but rather to be, the household and πόλις. Giph. and Bern. are probably right in translating these words 'community in these things'—i.e. in the good and the bad, the just and the unjust—cp. 3. 9. 1280 b 5, περὶ δ' ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν δόναι φρονίζομεν εὐνομίας et sqq.: i. 2. 1253 a 37 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 31, ἢ γὰρ δίκη κρίσεις τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδικοῦ: Plato, Rep. 484 D, τὰ ἐνδεδή νῦμμα καλῶν τε πέρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἁγαθῶν: Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2, πολιτικὴ δὲ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμονοία ... περὶ τὰ συμφέρατα γὰρ ἔστι καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βλεόν ἀνῆκοντα. Some societies are formed for pleasure (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 19), not so the household or the πόλις. These are ethical unities. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 4 sqq.: Plato, Politicus 309 C–E: and the myth of Protagoras (Protag. 322 C), in which in answer to the inquiry of Hermes—καὶ
ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἦ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω;—Zeus replies—Ἐπὶ πάντας, καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο πόλεις, εἰ ἄλλως αὐτῶν μετέχουσι. διοτέρ πάλλων τεχνῶν. In 1. 2. 1252 a 26—34 the origin of the household, and therefore of the πόλις, had been traced to instincts common to all animals or even to animals and plants, but here we learn that household and πόλις can only exist for human beings, inasmuch as their existence implies endowments which Nature has given only to man. In 3. 9. 1280 a 31 sq., ἐπὶ ὁ μήτὲ τοῦ ζῆν μόνον ἑνεκεν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἐδ ζῆν (καὶ γὰρ ἂν δαιλαμ καὶ τῶν ἀλλών ζῴων ἐν πόλις μόνον δ' ὄντα διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μὴν τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προσώρέσων) κ.τ.λ., a somewhat different reason is given why animals other than man do not form πόλεις.

καὶ πρῶτερον δὴ. ὅπως καὶ . . . δὴ see Bon. Ind. 173 a 12 sqq.: conjoined, the two particles seem to indicate a step taken in advance from one point to another by way of inference. Cp. for example Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1120 a 6 sqq. ‘Maxime quidem philosophus illa dicendi ratione utitur, si re quadam pertractata significare vult idem quod de ea etiam de alia vel in universum valere’ (Eucken, de Partic. usw. p. 44): see 1. 13. 1259 b 32. Aristotle had pointed out that the individual and the household are prior γενέσει to the πόλις; hence he is naturally careful to add that the πόλις is prior φύσει. This is in conformity with the principle—τὸ τῆ γενέσει ὑστερον τῇ φύσιν πρῶτερον (Phys. 8. 7. 261 a 14).

The argument in 18—29 seems to be as follows:—The πόλις is prior to the individual, for the whole is prior to its part. And the whole is prior to its part, because, when severed from the whole, the part loses its capacity to discharge its function, or (which is the same thing) loses its identity. Here Aristotle sums up—we see then, that the πόλις exists by nature and is prior to the individual, for if the individual is not self-complete when severed from the πόλις, he will be posterior to it just as any other part is posterior to its whole, and the individual, if a man and not a god or a brute, is not self-complete when severed from the πόλις. Aristotle might have stopped at the words ‘prior to the individual’ without adding the words which follow, but he adds these words in order to prove what he assumed in 20, that the individual stands to the πόλις in the same relation of posteriority in which other parts stand to their wholes. In strictness, γὰρ 26 only introduces a proof that the πόλις is prior in nature to the individual, not that it is by nature, but of course, if it is prior by nature to the individual, it exists by nature itself. No proof is given that the πόλις is prior to the household, probably because the same reasoning is applicable both to the household
and to the individual. It is possible that here Aristotle has in his mind the verse of Sophocles (Philoct. 1018), in which Philoctetes calls himself

\[ \text{ἀφιλον ἕρμον ἀπολιν ἐν ξάσιν νεκρόν.} \]

As to the validity of the argument, the fact that the individual is not αὐτάρκης without the πᾶλιν does not prove that he stands to it in the relation of a part to its whole. Man is not αὐτάρκης, for example, without the aid of other communities besides his own; yet he is not necessarily a part of those other communities. And even if we accept the conclusion, it does not follow that all parts of all wholes stand in the same relation to those wholes. A limb stands in a far more intimate relation to the body of which it is a part than a wheel does to a cart, or a portion of a rock does to that rock. The Stoics, in fact, recognized this distinction, for they went on to say that the individual is a limb (μέλος, not μέρος) of the whole to which he belongs. This whole they commonly (cp. Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 14. 37 sq.) found in the Universe, but not always, for Epictetus (Arrian 2. 10) speaks of the individual as part of the πᾶλιν. Plato also sometimes found it in the Universe (e. g. in Laws 903). We observe that in the Timaeus (68 E: 69 C) he applies to the Universe similar epithets to those applied by Aristotle to the πᾶλιν (τέλειος, αὐτάρκης, πᾶσας περιέχουσα τὸς ἄλλος κοινωνίας). The Republic, on the other hand, recognizes the πᾶλιν as the whole of which the individual, or rather perhaps the class, is a part (Rep. 552 A). As to the sense in which a human being is a member of a community, see a letter of Shelley's (dated August 12, 1812), which is published in the Academy for July 31, 1886. 'A human being,' he says, 'is a member of the community, not as a limb is a member of the body, or as what is a part of a machine, intended only to contribute to some general joint result.... He is an ultimate being, made for his own perfection as his highest end, made to maintain an individual existence, and to serve others only as far as consists with his own virtue and progress.' Aristotle, however, would say that he asks nothing from the individual that would not redound to his own perfection and the perfection of his life.

20. τὸ γάρ διὸν κ.τ.λ. No notice is here taken of the principle laid down in Metaph. Z. 10. 1035 b 4 sqq., where some parts—parts of the Essence or Form—are said to be prior to τὸ σύνολον—a principle which, applied to the πᾶλιν, might have suggested a different theory of the relation of some at all events of the individuals composing the πᾶλιν to it—but in other respects there is a close resemblance between the two passages: cp. especially 1035 b
14–25. See also Metaph. Z. 11. 1036 b 30 sqq. and 16. 1040 b 5 sqq. For the account of τὸ πρῶτον implied in the passage before us, cp. Phys. 8. 7. 260 b 17, λεγέται δὲ πρῶτον, οὐ τε μὴ ὁντος οὐκ ἦσται τὰλλα, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἀνευ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ τὸ τῷ χρῶμα, καὶ τὸ κατ' οὕσιν: Metaph. Δ. 11. 1019 a 1, τὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτω λεγέται πρῶτον καὶ ὅστερα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὕσιν, διὰ εὑρέθηται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἀνευ ἑκεῖνων μη' ἦ διαρέσει ἐχρῆσται Πλάτων. Much the same account is given by Aristotle of the ἀρχή (Metaph. K. 1. 1060 a 1, ἀρχή γὰρ τὸ συναναφοῦν) or the οὕσια of a thing (de An. 2. 1. 412 b 18 sqq.: cp. Alex. Aphrod. on Metaph. Z. 16. 1040 b 5, οὕσια εἰκείνα φαίνει δόσα καθ' αὐτὰ ἄντα δύναται τὸ ὁικεῖον ἔργον ἀποστελέων οὕσια γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τὸ ἐκάστον ἔργον ἐκπληροῦσαι). Severance from the Whole, in fact, involves the loss of the Form or οὕσια, and the loss of this involves 'destruction' (cp. διαφθαρεῖσα 22, and φθορέντα, de Gen. An. 2. 1. 734 b 24 sqq.: 735 a 7 sqq.: 1. 19. 726 b 22 sqq.), but a hand destroyed is a hand unfitted to discharge the functions of a hand, or in other words is not a hand at all. Thus we may almost say that in Aristotle's view the πόλις is the οὕσια or ἀρχή of the individual. In the Topics, however, a question is raised (6. 13. 150 a 33), εἰ τὸ ἄθω συμβεβείται τὰ μέρη ἀπίστως γὰρ δεὶ συμβαίνειν, τῶν μερῶν φθαρέστων, φθάρεσθαι τὸ ὄλον τοῦ δ' ὄλον φθαρέντα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ μέρη ἐφθαίρειν. But here the object seems merely to be to arm a disputant with a tenable objection.

22. διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἦσται τοιαύτη, 'for a hand when destroyed' (by being severed from the soul, which is its οὕσια) 'will be no better than a stone hand.' Giph. ('haec enim interiit') and others make διαφθαρεῖσα the predicate, but it is clear that τοιαύτη (=probably λιβίσι, not ὀμωνύμιος λεχθεῖσα) is the predicate, if we compare de Gen. An. 2. 1. 734 b 24, οὗ γὰρ ἦστι πρόσωπον μὴ ἔχον ψυχὴν, οὐδὲ σώφρε, ἀλλὰ φθαρέντα ὁμωνύμιος λεχθεῖσα τὸ μὲν εἶναι πρόσωπον τὸ δὲ σῶφρε, ὅσπερ κἂν εἰ ἐγένετο λίθων ἡ ξίλων: cp. also Meteor. 4. 12. 389 b 31, μᾶλλον γὰρ ὄντος ὅτι οὐ νεκρὸς ἀνθρώπος ὁμωνύμιος, οὗτο τοῖνυν καὶ χεὶρ τελευτήσατος ὁμωνύμιος, καθάπερ καὶ αὐτῷ λίθῳς λεχθεῖσαν. Dr. R. Schöll (Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 334) has anticipated me in calling attention to the above passage of the De Generatione Animalium.

the same thing, Soph. 247 D, λέγω δὴ τὰ καὶ ὑπακοόν ἐκτεταμένων δύναμιν εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐτερων ὑποκυός εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ συμψυχήν ὑπὸ τοῦ φαινότατον, κἂν εἰ μάνων εἰσάγαγε, τὰν τοῦτο ἄντως ἡ τείνει γὰρ ὄρων ὀρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὧς ἦτοι αὖ ἀλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις. On the other hand, Aristotle seems in Pol. 3. 3. 1276 b 7 to view τὸ εἶδος τῆς αὐθεντείας as constituting the identity of an object, and in de Gen. An. 1. 18. 722 b 30 we read—τὰ μέρη τὰ μὲν δυνάμει τὰ δὲ πάθει διώρισται, τὰ μὲν ἀναμομυρῷ τῷ δύνασθαι τι ποιεῖν, ὥσ κἄτα καὶ χεῖρ, τὰ δ’ ὀμοιομερῇ σκηνρότητι καὶ μαλακότητι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τακτῶν πάθειαν.

24. μηκέτι τοιαῦτα ὄντα, 'if no longer fit for performing their destined work': cp. βάλλων τοιαύτην, 'fit for fishing,' i. 8. 1256 a 37, and ὅπως δὲ γίνομεν τοιαύτη, 2. 5. 1263 a 39.

25. Μὲν οὖν is here again, as in 1252 b 9, caught up by a second μὲν οὖν before any δὲ appears.

27. One would expect here δὲ αὐτάρκης χωρίσεις, but Aristotle substitutes δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος καυνωνίδ, ὡς de δεδεμένοι δὲ αὐτάρκης, as the case of the former, who cannot be called αὐτάρκης and yet does not want the State, occurs to him and, characteristically enough, is kept in view at whatever cost of trimness. Μηδὲν δεδεμένος, sc. καυνωνίδ or possibly καυνωνίδιον.

28. ἐν πᾶσιν, 'in all human beings.'

30. δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the turn of the sentence, compare a fragment from the Κυκλεύς of Antiphanes (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 66)—

"Οστίς τέχνην κατεδείξει πρῶτος τῶν βοῶν, οὕτως μέγατον εὑρεν ἀνθρώποις κακόν.

Cp. also ibid. 4. 75. At Argos men looked back to Phoroneus as having been the first to found a city (Paus. 2. 15. 5). Cicero (De Inventione 1. 2) looks back to some 'magnus vir et sapiens.' Camerarius (p. 3 r) quotes these two passages, and adds—'Epicurus hoc fortuito factum, ut alia quoque, censet, quemadmodum Lucretius exposuit libro quinto.' The comic poet Athenio makes one of his characters claim the credit for the art of cookery (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 558).

31. On ὄψερ καὶ . . . οὖτω καὶ, see Sus. 1, Ind. Gramm. ὁσπέρ. τελεωθέν. Aristotle uses both τελεωθέν and τελεωθέν (de Gen. An. 1. 1. 715a 21), and both τέλεος and τέλεω καὶ, see Bon. Ind.). We find both forms together (τελεωθέρα, τελεωθέν) in de Gen. An. 2. 1. 733b 1 (Bekker). The meaning of τελεωθέν, which is here used in contrast to χωρίσεως νόμων καὶ δήμης, may be illustrated by Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 23, οὖτ' ἄρα φύσει οὕτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται.
ai ápetai, ἀλλὰ πειρακόμενοι μὲν ἦμιν δεξασθαι αὐτός, τελειομένους δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους, and Phys. 7. 3. 246 a 12 sqq. For the gender of τελειοθεῖναι and χωρισθεῖν, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1322 b 4, ἄνθρωπος δὲ καὶ λύῳ, μόνον γὰρ ἔχει λόγων.

33. κείριστον πάνων. Cp. Hesiod, Op. et Dies 275 sqq.: Hdt. 4. 106, Ἀνδροφόγοι δὲ ἄφηλιστα πάνων ἄνθρώπων ἔχουσι ἡθεία, οὕτε δίκην νομίζωντες οὕτε νόμοφ σώκεν χρεώμενοι: Plato, Laws 765 E, ἄνθρωπος δὲ ὁς φαίμην ἡμερον, ὁμος μὴν παυείας μὲν ὀρθής τιχών καὶ φύσεως εὔτυχώς θείσατον ἥμερωτατῶν τε ζωὴν γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ, μη ἰκανῶς δὲ ἡ μὴ καλῶς τραφέν ἄγριότατον ὅποσα φέει γῆ: Protag. 327 D—E. See also Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1150 a 1—5. Plutarch demurs to the saying in the mouth of the Epicurean Colotes (adv. Colot. c. 30), on the ground that in the absence of law men would still be left the teaching of such philosophers as Parmenides, Socrates, Plato, and Heraclitus, and that this would save them from living like beasts.

ἄνδρισία ἔχουσα ὁπλα. Cp. Rhet. 2. 5. 1382 a 34, καὶ ἄνδρισία δύναμιν ἔχουσα (is to be dreaded) τῇ προαρέσθαι γὰρ ὃ ἄνδρισι ἄνδρισι. Giph. (p. 37) compares Plutarch, Cicero c. 46, οὕτως ἐξέπεσον ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ λύσιν τῶν ἄνθρωπίνων λογισμῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀπεδίηξαν ὡς οὔτε ἄνθρωπον θηρίον ἐστίν ἄγριότερον ἔξουσιν πάθει προσαλβάντως, which seems to echo Eth. Nic. 7. 7. 1150 a 7, μυρωπλάσσα γὰρ ἄν κακά ποιήσειν ἄνθρωπος κακός θηρίον.

34. ὃ δὲ ἄνθρωπος κ.τ.λ. Vict. with others explains φρόνησις and ἀρετή as the ὁπλα here referred to, but in that case why have we the dat. φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ and not the acc.? and how can it be said of φρόνησις and ἀρετή that they can be used for opposite purposes? Cp. Rhet. 1. 1. 1355 b 2, εἰ δὲ ἐγγάλαθαι ἀλλ᾽ ὃ χρῆμενι ἄνδικος τῇ τοιαῦτῃ δύναμιν τῶν λόγων, τούτῳ γε κοινών ἐστι κατὰ πάνων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴρη ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, ἄλων ἰσχύων ἐγκεῖοι πλούσιου στρατηγίας, and Pol. 3. 10. 1281 a 19. And if it be said that virtue is here used in a lower sense than in these passages, it seems strange that in the very next line (36) it should be used in its ordinary sense. Besides, as Holm (de ethicis Politicorum Aristotelis principiis, p. 39 n.) remarks, ὑσιτάτα apud Aristotelem dicendi formula ἀρετή καὶ φρόνησις virtutes semper significat ipsas, ethics et dianoeticas: exempla hæc sint—Pol. 3. 11. 1281 b 4: 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 22, 33'. The phrase was known even to the comic poets as one current among philosophers (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 22). Montecatinius (quoted by Schn.) seems to come much nearer to the truth in rendering these words ' arma homini data sunt ad prudentiam et virtutem'; and so Bern. 'geschaffen
mit einer Rüstung zu Einsicht und Tugend,’ and Holm (ibid.) ‘ad virtutes exercendas.’ There is, however, some strangeness in the use of the dative in this sense, and Aristotle does not seem to regard the ὀϕλα as means for the attainment of ἄφθονησις καὶ ἄρετη, or as instruments for their exercise, but rather as powers on which they are to impress a right direction (cp. ἀδεν ἄρετης, 36). May not the words mean ‘having arms for prudence and virtue to use’ (or ‘guide in use’)? We have had just before ἀδικία ἔλεος ὀϕλα, and it is not surprising to find Prudence and Virtue also spoken of as using arms or guiding their use. As to the dative, cp. Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Præc. c. 28, δεύτεραν δε, ὥσ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλέας καὶ ποιητικὰ ὀϕλα ἢ παρὰ τῶν πᾶλλων ἐννοια τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἡγεῖτο. *Orphæan, which resembles ὀϕλα in meaning and is sometimes conjoined with it (de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 b 2–4), often takes this dative (de Gen. An. 4. 1. 765 b 36: Pol. 1. 4. 1253 b 28). Holm refers to Cic. de Orat. 3. 14. 55 sub fin. as supporting his interpretation, but this passage perhaps makes quite as much in favour of that just suggested. The next question is, what are the ὀϕλα referred to? Bernays (Wirkung der Tragödie, note 16) quotes Seneca de Ira, 1. 17 (1. 16 Didot): Aristoteles ait affectus quosdam, si quis illis bene utatur, pro armis esse, quod verum foret, si, velut bellica instrumenta, sumi deponique possent induentis arbitrio. Haec arma, quae Aristoteles virtuti datur, ipsa per se pugnant, non expectant manum, et habent, non habentur. Hence he explains the ὀϕλα here mentioned as ‘die Affecte’ (the emotions). Aristotle, however, only speaks of ‘affectus quosdam’ (he is thinking no doubt especially of anger), and there is nothing to show that these ‘affectus’ are viewed by him as the only ὀϕλα at the disposal of ἄφθονησις καὶ ἄρετη. Language, for instance, may well be another. The words ‘haec arma quae Aristoteles virtuti datur’ (compare those a little lower down, ‘rationem ab iracundia petere præsidium’) seem to support the view taken in this note of the dative ἄφθονησις καὶ ἄρετη. If, as is probable, the ‘affectus quidam’ of the de Ira are among the ὀϕλα referred to in this passage, Aristotle, like Seneca himself (de Ira, 1. 3), would appear to have regarded them as peculiar to man.


37. ἐδωδήν. Plutarch, ibid. c. 8. Philemon (Fragm. Ἀγρίππης, p. 107 Didot) does not go quite so far as Aristotle, and the good Pheraulas (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 3. 49) is of the opposite opinion.

ἡ δὲ δικαίωσὺν ... δικαιοῦ κρίσις. Here ἡ δὲ δικαίωσὺν takes up
1. 2. 1253 a 36—3. 1253 b 4.

And we have the proof that whoever first instituted the πώλις conferred great benefits on men. He, in fact, gave them virtue. 'Justice is bound up with the State, for adjudication, which is the determination of that which is just, is the ordering of political society.' So Bernays, followed by Susemihl, 'is nichts als die Ordnung der staatlichen Gemeinschaft.' Sus.\(^3\) (Note 28 c) refers to 3. io. 1281 a ii—21. Cp. also 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 5, ἄνωγκαία δ' ἐστὶν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄφεσις γίνεσθαι μὲν δίκαια περὶ τῶν δικαίων, ταύτα δὲ μὴ λαμβάνειν τέλος, ἀπὸ' εἰ μὴ γεγορέμονον κοινωνεὶν ἀδύνατον ἀλλόθιος, καὶ πράξεως μὴ γεγορέμονον. In 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 13 judicial institutions are reckoned among those things which are most necessary in a State (πάντων ἄνωγκαιότατον). The interpretation just given of the words πολιτικὴς κοινωνίας τάξις is perhaps the one which is most likely to be correct, yet another may be mentioned as possible. These words may mean 'an institution of political society' (cp. 4 (7). io. 1239 b 5, τῶν συνεστίων ἡ τάξις). Plato had already said (Laws 937 D)—καὶ δὴ καὶ δίκη ἐν ἀνθρώποις πῶς οὐ καλῶν, ὅ πῶνα ἡμέρωκε τὰ ἄνθρωπα; But perhaps Aristotle had a saying of Pindar in his mind: cp. Plutarch, Praec. Reip. Gerend. c. 13. 807 C, ὅ δὲ πολιτικὸς, ἀριστερέχας τις ὄν κατὰ Πινδαρίων, καὶ δημιουργός εὐνομίας καὶ δίκης. The words ἡ δὲ δίκη τοῦ δικαίου κράτει seem to be a necessary link in the reasoning, though some would omit them: similar expressions occur in Eth. Nic. 5. io. 1134 a 31 and Rhet. 2. 1. 1377 b 22 (cp. Menand. Inc. Fab. Fragm. 56). An ἀδίκης τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἄδικου is a condition precedent of the πώλις (1253 a 15 sqq.), but this is not the same thing as justice.

2. πρῶταν, i.e. before going on to speak of-πολιτείᾳ. Thus we are referred back in 3. 6. 1278 b 17 to the πρῶτα λόγοι, ἐν οἷς περὶ οἰκονομίας διαφοράς καὶ διεκτέσεως, and the First Book itself refers forward at its close to τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας (1. 13. 1260 b 12).

3. οἰκονομίας κ.τ.λ. 'The departments into which household management falls are concerned with,' (or possibly 'correspond to') 'the parts of which the household is composed.' The ellipse is no doubt considerable, but not more so than that in 1. 11. 1258 b 27, τρίτων δὲ εἶδος χρηματιστικῆς μετάξυ ταύτης καὶ τῆς πράττει (ἐξεῖ γὰρ καὶ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν τι μέρος καὶ τῆς μεταβλητικῆς), ὅσα ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γενομένων . . . οίνῳ ὑλοσκοτία τε καὶ πάση μεταλλευτικῆ. See as to constructions of this kind Bon. Ind. 533 b 6—13, and Waitz on Anal. Pr. i. 46. 52 a 29, to whom Bonitz refers.

4. οἰκία δὲ τελείως. Lasaulx (Ehe bei den Griechen, p. 7 n.), after referring to δόμαι ἰματισεῖς (II. 2. 701), quotes Antipater ap. Stob. Flor. 67. 26, τελείως οἰκός καὶ βίος οὐκ ἄλλως δύναται γενέσθαι ἡ μετα

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Aristotle holds the household to be incomplete without slaves. Contrast Locke, Civil Government, 2. § 86: 'the family is as much a family, and the power of the paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his family or no.' In 3. 4. 1277 a 7 we find the somewhat careless expression—'αλκία εξ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός καὶ κύριος ἐκ δεσπότου καὶ δοῦλου—in, it is true, an aporetic passage: a similar looseness of statement is observable in Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 9, where wealth is said to be the end of ὀικονομική, teaching which rather resembles that of the first book (so-called) of the Oeconomics (cp. Oecon. 1. 1. 1343 a 8) than that of the Politics.

7. περὶ τριῶν τοιῶν, 'de his tribus copulis' (Vict.).
8. τί ἕκαστον καὶ ποῖον δει εἶναι, 'what each is and how each ought to be constituted.'
9. δεσποτική, sc. κοινωνία or some such word.

ἀνώνυμον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The word ἀνώνυμος is especially used by Aristotle, 'ubi generis alicuius non exstat unum quo contineat nomen' (Bon. Ind. 69 b 3): hence we read in de An. 2. 7. 418 a 27, δ λόγῳ μὲν ἐστιν εἰσεῖν, ἀνώνυμω δὴ τυχάνει ὃν. Cp. also 10, καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἀνὰ ἀνώνυμα τὸ ὀνόματα ἴδει ὀνόματα, i.e. with a name which exactly fits it: see Rhet. 3. 5. 1407 a 31, where τὰ ᾿ενα ὀνόματα are contrasted with τὰ περιέχοντα. The words γαμκή and τεκνοποιητική are probably felt by Aristotle not to describe the nature of the ἄρχη in the same clear way in which the word δεσποτική describes the ἄρχη of the master over his slave. We are told in the de Anima (2. 4. 416 b 23) that 'everything should be named in reference to the end it realizes.' The words γαμκή and τεκνοποιητική certainly do not give us this information. Πασρική is substituted for τεκνοποιητική in 1. 12. 1259 a 38.

11. ἔστοσαν Σ' αὕταί κ.τ.λ. 'Let the three relations of which we spoke' as needing to be investigated 'be these' (for the absence of αί before τρεῖς, see Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq.) ; 'but there is a part of Household Management which seems to some to be the whole, and to others the most important part of it, and we must inquire what is the truth about this.' For the imperative ἔστοσαν, which closes the business of naming the three relations and asks content with such terms as are forthcoming, cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 29: Eth. Nic. 2. 7. 1108 a 5 sq.: Metaph. Z. 8. 1033 a 25 sq.: Plato, Soph. 231 A. Aristotle does not at this early point of the discussion think it necessary to mention that the claims of χρηματιστική to be a part of ὀικονομία are open to much question, but, as is often his practice, provisionally adopts a view which he will hereafter reconsider and correct.
12. τοῖς μὲν... τοῖς δὲ. Who these were, is not known. Xenophon goes some way in this direction (cp. Oecon. 6. 4, οὐκώς, ἤφη ὁ Σακράτης, ἐπιστήμης μὲν τίνος ἦδον ἡμῖν ὄνομα εἶναι ἡ οἰκονομία· ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη αὐτὴ ἐφαίνετο ἢ οὐκ οὕνειν αὐξεῖν ἀνθρώποι· οὐκ ἦμιν ἐφαίνετο ὅπερ κτήσεις ἡ σύμπασα· also Oecon. 7. 15 and 11. 9). He has, however, as great a dislike as Aristotle for most branches of ἡ καλομενή χρηματιστική, and he thinks throughout of husbandry as the vocation of his οἰκονομικός.

14. πρῶτον δὲ περὶ δεσπότου κ.τ.λ. Aristotle investigates the relation of master and slave before he examines χρηματιστική, probably because he started with the aim of determining whether the δεσποτικός is the same as the οἰκονομικός, πολιτικός, and βασιλικός, but also perhaps because the slave is a part of κτήσεις (c. 8. 1256 a 2), and the part should be studied before the whole. The two aims which he proposes to keep in view in studying this subject reappear in c. ii. 1258 b 9, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὴν γράσιν διωρίκαμεν ἱκανόν, τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δὲ διελθὼν, and in 3. 8. 1279 b 12, τὸ δὲ περὶ ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦσι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποθέλειν πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. So again in 2. 1. 1260 b 32 the aim is ἵνα τὸ τῇ ὀρθώς ἔχων ὀρθή καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35 sqq. The aim of the Politics is from the first twofold—partly scientific accuracy, partly utility. The eleventh chapter of the First Book is intended to be useful, not only to the χρηματιστικός and to the οἰκονομικός, but also to the πολιτικός (1259 a 33).

15. τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν. Cp. c. 5. 1254 b 29, τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν.

16. καν ἐκ κ.τ.λ. See Bon. Ind. 41 a 4 sqq. Carry on ἦδομεν.

18. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Some rate δεσποτεία too high, counting it as a science, and identifying the rule of the δεσπότης with household management and political and kingly rule (for with πολιτική and βασιλική—as Bonitz points out, Ind. 614 b 31—ἀρχή must be supplied, as in 1. 7. 1255 b 17): language to this effect is put into the mouth of Socrates both by Xenophon in the Oeconomicus and by Plato in the Politicus. This was one extreme. Others go to the other extreme, and regard the distinction of master and slave as resting only on convention, not on nature, and therefore as based on compulsion and consequently unjust. Aristotle here as elsewhere first sets before his reader two or more opposite views, and then seeks a view which will harmonize their contrariety (λύσει τὰς ἐναντίωταις) and make either of them seem to possess a basis of plausibility (εὐλόγως δικαίωτα) by showing that each is in a sense true and in a sense not true: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1235 b 13, ληπτέος.
NOTES.

δὲ τρόπος ὅστις ἦμιν ἄμα τὰ τε δοκοῦντα περὶ τοῦτον μᾶλλον ἀποδώσει ('plene explicare, explicando exprimere,' Bon. Ind. 80 b 18 sqq.), καὶ τὰς ἀπαρίας λύσει καὶ τὰς ἐναντίωσεις τοῦτο δ' ἦσσαι ἐὰν εἰλόγος φαίνηται τὰ ἐμνητικὰ δοκοῦντα μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀμολογομένος τὸ τοιοῦτο ἐσται λόγος τῶν φαινομένων συμβαίνει δὲ μένειν τὰς ἐναντίωσεις, εἰσὶ ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ἄλλαθεν γὰ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐστὶ δ' ὡς ὑπ' ἄλλοις, τοὺς ἀναστήσατε πάντα, γιὰ τὸν ὁμώσας οἷα —Such we learn, as the discussion goes on, that there is a δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη (c. 7. 1255 b 22—39), though it has nothing great or impressive about it (1255 b 33), but that the master is not a master by virtue of science but by virtue of character (1255 b 20); he can, in fact, do without the δεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη (1255 b 35); it is no part of his essence and therefore no part of his definition. So again, the other side are only partially right (c. 6. 1255 a 3); their objection to slavery holds of one kind of slavery only.

Something has been said already (vol. 1. p. 139 sqq.) as to the question who these objectors to slavery were, who stigmatized it as not based on nature but only on convention, and therefore the offspring of force and consequently unjust. The notions 'conventional,' 'based on force,' and 'unjust' hang together in their contention significantly enough. The connexion which Aristotle traces (Phys. 4. 8. 215 a 3, and often elsewhere) between τὸ βίανον and τὸ παρὰ φύσιν is inherited by him from Plato (Tim. 64 D) and from still earlier inquirers (cp. Plato, Protag. 337 D, ὃ νόμος, τύραννας ἐὼ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, σαλλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βαδίζειν— the words of the sophist Hippias). So Glaucon in his statement (Rep. 359 C) of the view of Thrasymachus and others about Justice contrasts φύσις with νόμος καὶ βία (ὁ παρὰ φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν, νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἱσοῦ τιμὴν). On the other hand, we trace the notion of a connexion between force and injustice in a well-known line of Hesiod, Op. et Dies 275—

καὶ νῦ δίεσθ ἐπάκων, βίης δ' ἐπιλάθεο πάμπαν, and in a view referred to by Aristotle, Pol. 4 (7). 2. 1324 a 35 —νομίζοντε δ' οἷ μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν, δεσποτικὸς μὲν γνώμενον μετ' ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγάτης, πολιτικός δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀδικον οὐκ ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.: cp. 3. 3. 1276 a 12, where we find that some constitutions (e.g. tyranny) were popularly contrasted with others (democracy is probably meant) as founded on force, not on the common advantage. So again in 3. 16. 1287 a 10 sqq. that which is by nature and that which is just are tacitly identified. We hear later on (c. 6. 1255 a 8 sq.) that 'many of those versed in laws' impeached enslavement resulting from war, at any rate when based on a bare superiority of Might, but the persons referred to in the passage
before us seem to have regarded slavery of all kinds and under all circumstances—even, it would seem, when imposed by Greeks on barbarians—as contrary to nature and unjust. This sweeping protest against slavery is certainly remarkable. We see from Plato, Laws 777 B sqq., how much difficulty was experienced in the practical maintenance and working of the institution.

28. ἐπεί οὖν κ.τ.λ. The object of the long sentence which C. 4. begins here, and which, like many other long sentences in Aristotle introduced by ἐπεί, is ill-constructed enough, is (as we see from 1254 a 13) to commence an investigation into the nature and function of the slave. It is evident that if Aristotle can show that the slave fills a necessary place in the household as an instrument of household science, raised above and somewhat dissimilar to instruments commonly so called, yet, like them, an instrument and an article of property, he will have gone far to solve the twofold question just raised, whether rule over the slave is the same thing as οἰκονομική, παλικεία, and βασιλική ἀρχή, and whether the slave exists by nature, for the naturalness of the slave will result from his necessity, and rule over the slave will be clearly seen to be a less noble thing than rule over those who are not ἄργα. Socrates (Xen. Mem. 3. 4. 12), in asserting a close similarity between the management of private and public concerns, had used the following argument—οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις τισιν ἀνθρώποις αἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελεῖμαι χρώται ἢ οὕς-περ αἱ τὰ ἄλλα οἰκονομοῦντες. Aristotle, on the contrary, holds that to rule over slaves is one thing and to rule over freemen is another (c. 7), for slaves, unlike freemen, are mere animate instruments.

ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας κ.τ.λ. As often happens at the outset of an inquiry, Aristotle accepts propositions which he will afterwards correct (see note on 1253 b 11). His definitive view is that property is rather a sīne quā nōn (οὐ οἰκ ἄνω) of the household than a part of it, and that the same is true of the relation of κτήσις or χρηματική (of the sound sort) to οἰκονομία: cp. c. 10 (which, it would seem, must be taken to be the passage before us and also c. 8. 1256 b 26–27), and see 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq., where property is denied to be part of the πῶς, though necessary to it (1328 a 33 sqq.). Not a few translators and commentators—among them, one MS. of the Vet. Int. (z, which inserts 'manifestum quod' before its equivalent for καὶ ἡ κτήσις) and Leonardus Aretinus—make καὶ ἡ κτήσις κ.τ.λ. an apodosis, but Aristotle often introduces with ἐπεί a long string of protases, and perhaps it is better to begin the apodosis at oὗτος 30 and to avoid interrupting the continuity of the argument, which seems to me to be as follows:—Without necessaries
men can neither live nor live well, hence property is essential to the household, and the science of acquiring it is a part of the science of household management, the end of which is life or good life; but instruments, whether animate or inanimate, are also essential to this science: hence an article of property is an instrument for the purpose of living, and property is a mass of instruments, and the slave is an animate article of property [and therefore an animate instrument for the purpose of living]. The proof, however, that articles of property are instruments for the purpose of living seems unsatisfactory, and Aristotle omits to show that the animate instruments of which Household Science stands in need must be, if human beings, slaves and not free. Sus. brackets the words καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας as having no bearing on the conclusion drawn in 30 sqq., but Aristotle’s object seems to be to show, first the necessity of Property, and next the necessity of instruments, to Household Science. I am not convinced by Susemihl’s arguments (Qu. Crit. p. 339 sqq.), that a rearrangement of the paragraph is called for.

25. τοῖς ἀρισμέναις τέχναις, ‘arts with a definite end’: Bonitz (Ind. 524 a 29) compares Metaph. M. 10. 1087 a 16, ἦ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ὁς ὁλη τοῦ καθάλου οὐδα καὶ ἄριστος τοῦ καθάλου καὶ ἄριστον ἐστίν, ἦ δ’ ἐνέργεια ἀρισμένη καὶ ἀρισμένου τάδε τι οὐδα τοῦδε τιμὸς, but Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 5, τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων ἐνίοτε δυνάμεις εἰσὶν αἱ ποιητικαί, τῶν δὲ ὀὐδεμιᾶ τέχνη ὑδεῖ δύναμιν ἀρισμένην γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὅτι ἢ γνωσίμων καὶ τὸ αὐτόν ἐστιν κατὰ συμβεβηκάς comes still nearer, and here the opposition is between a cause which works for a definite end and one which works κατὰ συμβεβηκώς—cp. Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 a 32, ἦς τῆς ἀπὸ τύχης μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα γεγονότα, ὅσον ἦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἄριστον καὶ μὴ ἔνεκα τοῦ γέγονεν καὶ μὴτε ἐλε ἐμὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μὴτε τεταγμένως; and Metaph. E. 2. 1027 a 19, ὅτι δ’ ἐπιτόμην οὐκ ἦς τοῦ συμβεβηκότος φανερών ἐπιτόμη μὲν γὰρ πάσα ἡ τοῦ ἐλ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πῶς γὰρ ἢ μαθήτηε τῇ διδαγῇ ἄλλων; δι’ γὰρ ἀρίστηται τῇ ἐλ τῇ τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀλλ’ ὃ ἐφέλευμον τὸ μελικρατον τῇ πυρετᾶντι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. It is not clear whether Aristotle regards οἰκονομική as ἀρισμένη: at any rate it is hardly a τέχνη—rather a πρακτικὴ ἐπιτόμη, or part of one. For the thought, cp. Plutarch, An Vitiostias ad infelicītam sufficiat c. 2, ἢ κακὰ ... αἰτοτέρες τις οὐδα τῆς κακοδαμονίας δημομυγῆς οὕτο γαρ ὀργάνων οὕτε ὑπηρετῶν ἔχει χρεῖαν.

26. ἀναγκαῖον ἢν εἶν ... εἰ μέλλει. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 853. 2. b.

27. οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν. Not to be completed by τέχνων, nor is τῶν οἰκονομικῶν masc., as Göttling, who supplies τὰ οἰκεῖα ὀργανα, would make it; the word to be supplied is probably ὀργάνω. It comes to the surface; as it were, immediately after in τῶν δ’ ὀργάνων,
and the translation ‘the same thing will hold good of the instruments of household science’ seems to be justified by the use of the gen. in Phys. 8. 8. 263 a 1, καὶ τῶν κυβερνητῶν ἄρα ὡσαίτως: Pol. i. 8. 1256 a 29, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων (‘ebenso ist es nun auch bei den Menschen,’ Bern.: cp. 1256 b 6, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους). Riddell (Plato, Apology p. 126) apparently interprets the passage before us thus, though he does not explain what substantive he would supply.


30. ἐν ἀργάνω εἰδεῖν. See Liddell and Scott s. v. εἰδεῖν.

ταῖς τέχναις. Vict. ‘in omni arte, quaecunque illa sit,’ and so Bern. Sus. ‘für die Künste,’ but cp. ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, 1256 b 34.

οὕτω καὶ τὸ κτῆμα. Here at length begins the apodosis. For οὕτω introducing the apodosis after a protasis introduced by ἐπεί, Eucken (de Partic. usu, p. 30) compares i. 10. 1258 a 31–34.

31. τὸ κτῆμα . . . ἀργαίων ἐστί. Contrast Xenophon’s account of κτήσεως in Oecon. 6. 4, κτήσεως δὲ τούτο ἔφαμεν εἶναι ὧ τί ἐκάστῳ ἀφέλμαν εἰ ἐἰς τὸν βιόν, ἀφέλμα δὲ ὅσα εἰρήκετο πάντα ὁπόσα τίς ἐπίστατο χρήσαι—so that friends, for instance (c. i. 14), come under the head of property, and enemies too, if a man knows how to use friends and enemies. Xenophon’s definition seems far too wide. Aristotle avoids this fault by treating property as an appendage of the household and as consisting of ἄργαν, but then there is such a thing as State-property, and his final definition of a κτῆμα in 1254 a 16 as an ἄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χαρακτῖν σems to imply that an ἄργανον πρακτικὸν (a shuttle, for example) is not an article of property, so that his definition of κτήσεως appears to be as much too narrow as Xenophon’s is too wide. His definition of wealth, however (c. 8. 1256 b 27 sqq.), is not open to these objections.

32. ὡστερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργανον. For this term cp. de Part. An. 4. 10. 687 a 19 sq., ἦ δὲ χείρ ἐσολεκν εἶναι οὐκ ἐν ὄργανῳ ἄλλα πολλά, ἢτιν ὡστερ ὄστερον ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργανον (the expression is somewhat unusual, and is therefore introduced by ὡστερον, ὡστερον) τῷ οὖν πλείστου δυναμένῳ δέξαμαι τέχναι τὸ ἐπὶ πλείστου τῶν ὄργανων χρήσιμαν.
NOTES.

τὴν χείρα ἀποθέωσεν ἡ φύσις. Many have taken ὄργανον πρὸ ὁργάνων in this passage of the De Partibus Animalium as being equivalent in meaning to οὐχ ἐν ὀργάνοιν ἀλλὰ πολλά, but this is not apparently its meaning in the passage before us. In Probl. 30. 5. 955 b 23 sqq. we read ἡ ὁτι ὁ θεός ὄργανα ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἡμῖν δέδωκε δύο, ἐν οἷς χρησάμεθα τοὺς ἐκτὸς ὁργάνοις, σώματι μὲν χείρα, ψυχῇ δὲ νοῦν, and in de An. 3. 8. 432 a 1 sq. the soul is said to be like the hand, καὶ γὰρ ἡ χείρ ὀργάνων ἔστιν ὁργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἴδως εἴδων καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις εἴδως αἰσθητῶν, where Trendelenburg explains ‘manus, qua tanquam instrumento reliqua instrumenta adhibentur, instrumentum instrumentorum dici potest; eodem fortasse sensu νοὺς εἴδως εἴδων, i.e. ea species et forma quae reliquas suscipit, iisque, velut manus instrumentis, utitur.’ Cp. also for the relation of the hand to other ὄργανα, de Gen. An. 1. 22. 730 b 15 sqq. Bonitz collects the uses of πρό in Aristotle (Ind. 633 a 34 sqq.), and, like Vict. before him, compares Pol. 1. 7. 1255 b 29, δῶλος πρὸ δῶλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου, interpreting πρό both here and in the De Partibus Animalium as meaning ‘praeserit alteri alterum.’ (So Vict. ‘instrumentum quod praestat et antecellit ceteris instrumentis’: Lamb. ‘instrumentum instrumenta antecedens.’) Perhaps, however, something more than this may be meant—’an instrument which is prior to other instruments and without which they are useless.’

33. πᾶς ὁ ὑπηρέτης. Sus. brackets δ, following M* and corr. P, and πᾶς ὑπηρέτης (like πᾶς σόκος, i. 7. 1255 b 19) is a commoner expression, but the meaning is ‘the class of assistants as a whole’—cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 9. 1150 b 30, ὁ δὲ ἀκράτης μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς: Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 28, πᾶσης τῆς αὐταρκείας: 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 21, πᾶσαν τὴν ἀρχὴν. The slave is included under the wider term ὑπηρέτης (1254 a 8: Plato, Politicus 289 C, τὸ δὲ δὴ δῶλων καὶ πάντων ὑπηρετῶν λαοῦν).

35. τὰ Δαεδάλου . . . ἡ τοῦ τοῦ Ηφαίστου τριτόδας. The article is used before Ἡφαίστου, but not before Δαεδάλου. Should we compare the examples collected by Vahlen (Poet. p. 105) in his note on Ἡλίας καὶ ἡ ὄδυνεια, Poet. 4. 1449 a 1? As to these works of Daedalus, cp. de An. 1. 3. 406 b 18: Plato, Meno 97 D: Euthyphro 11 B: Eurip. Fragment. 373 (Nauck). The poets of the Old Comedy delighted to imagine the utensils of the kitchen and the household themselves doing what they were bidden, the fish cooking himself and so forth, and slaves thus becoming unnecessary. See the lively lines of Crates and others, Athen. Deipn. 267 e. The Greeks, in fact, as appears from these verses, looked back to a golden age when there were no slaves.

36. δ ποιητῆς. Homer (II. 18. 376). The term, however, is
used by Aristotle of others than Homer—Sophocles (Pol. 1. 13. 
1260 a 29): an unknown poet (Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 30). Homer 
refers to them as ‘of their own accord entering the assembly of 
the gods.’

35-37. ὁσπερ . . . οὕτως αἱ κερκίδες. For the construction of 
this sentence Rassow (Bemerkungen, p. 5) compares 3. 4. 1277 a 
5, ἐπεὶ εὐ ἀνομοίων ἡ πόλις, ὁσπερ ζῷων εἰδῶν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σῶματος καὶ 
ψυχῆς ἐκ λόγου καὶ ἄρεξεως . . . τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ πόλεις εὐ ἀπάντων 
tε τούτων κ.τ.λ., and Sus. adds 3. 15. 1286 a 31, ἐπεὶ μᾶλλον ἀδιάφρον 
tὸ πολὺ, καθάπερ ὅπως τὸ πλεῖον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὀλγῶν ἀδιάφρο 
thερότερον. In all these passages, after a similar case or cases have 
been adduced, the original proposition is reverted to and reasserted, 
perhaps in more distinct and vigorous language—the whole forming, 
however cumbrly, an undivided sentence. Neither καὶ before 
ὁσπερ nor εἰ before αἱ κερκίδες is correct.

37. αὐταί, ‘of themselves’: cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 8.

38. οὐδὲν ἐν ἐσεὶ. This is in the main true, but slaves might 
evén then be needed as ἀκόλουθοι (8 (6). 8. 1323 a 5 sq.), a purpose 
for which they were largely used.

1. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has been speaking of the slave as 1254 a. 
an ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργανον made necessary by the inability of shuttles or 
combs to do their work by themselves, but now he remembers that 
the word ὄργανον was commonly used of instruments of pro-
duction; he feels, therefore, that what he has just said may 
be misleading and may suggest the idea that the slave is a mere 
instrument of the textile art, a mere complement of the comb, 
whereas in fact he is a humble auxiliary in life and action, which 
are higher things than weaving; hence he guards himself by point-
ing out that the slave is not an ὄργανον in the usual sense of the 
word—i. e. a ποιητικὸν ὄργανον (cp. Plato, Polit. 287 E, οὐ γὰρ 
ἐπὶ γενέσεως αὐτία πήγαντα, καθάπερ ὄργανον)—but a πρακτικὸν ὄργανον, 
for (1) he is a κτήμα, (2) he is an ὄργανον πρὸς λόγον, and life is πρᾶξις, 
νοτ πόιησις. When he has added the further trait that the slave is, 
like any other κτήμα, wholly another’s, we know exactly what the 
slave is, and are prepared to deal with the further question whether 
a natural slave exists. The slave is a πρακτικὸν καὶ ἐξωφυλῶν ὄργανον, 
and, though a human being, wholly another’s. As to the use of μὲν 
οὖν here, see note on 1253 a 10.


5. ἐπὶ δ’ ἐπεί κ.τ.λ. Aristotle now points out, further, that the 
difference between ὄργανα of πόιησις and πρᾶξις (and the slave is an 
ὄργανον of πρᾶξις) is a difference of kind.
NOTES.

8. καὶ ὁ δοῦλος. Cp. καὶ ταῦτα 6: life (βίος) is action, and the slave is an ἄργανον πρὸς ζωήν, 1253 b 31, therefore the slave also (as well as life) has to do with action. Mr. Postgate (Notes on the Politics, p. 1) notices the substitution here of βίος for ζωή.

tὸ δὲ κτήμα κ.τ.λ. Cp. δ. 1. 1337 a 27, ἀμα δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομί-ζειν αὐτῶν τινα ἐκ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως, μόνων γὰρ ἐκαστὸς τῆς πόλεως, and Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b. 10 sq. The slave is also a part of his master (c. 6. 1255 b 11 sq.: Eth. Eud. 7. 9. 1241 b 23).

9. τε γὰρ ἀπὸ Aristot. saepe ita usurpatur, ut particula τε manifesto praeparativam vim habeat, eamque sequatur καί' (Bon. Ind. 750 a 2). Here ἕκαστος δὲ follows.

10. δῶμα, i.e. without the limiting addition of μόριον. 'Opponitur δῶμα iiis formulis, quibus praedicatum aliquod ad angustiorem am- bitum restringitur' (Bon. Ind. 506 a 10).

14. φύσει. Vict. 'hoc autem addidit, quia usu venit aliquando ingenuum hominem amittere libertatem, nec saeae potestatis esse, cum scilicet capitur ab hostibus: is enim quoque eo tempore non est sui iuris, sed instituto quodam hominum, non natura.' For the definition of the slave here given, cp. Metaph. A. 2. 982 b 25, ὡστερ ἀνθρωπός φαμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτῷ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου δι', οὖτω καὶ αὐτὴ μόνη ἐλεύθερα ὡσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν' μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ἑνεκέν ἔστιν.

The popular use of language implied quite a different view of freedom and slavery: see Pol. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 2-13, and contrast the well-known passage, Metaph. A. 10. 1075 a 18 sqq.

15. See critical note.

C. 5. 17. πότερον δ' ἑστί τις κ.τ.λ. Aristotle passes from the question ἕν ἑστι to the question εἰ ἑστι: cp. Metaph. E. 1. 1025 b 16 sqq. He has discovered that there is a niche in the household needing to be filled, but he has not yet discovered whether there are any human beings in existence who are gainers by filling it, and whom it is consequently just and in accordance with nature to employ as slaves.

20. οὐ χαλεπῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. It is not easy to disentangle in what follows the two modes of inquiry, or to mark the point at which the one closes and the other begins. We see that the relation of ruling and being ruled satisfies all tests of that which is natural; it is necessary, and therefore natural (de Gen. An. 1. 4. 717 a 15)—it is for the common advantage, and therefore natural (Pol. 1. 2: 1252 a 34: 1. 5. 1254 b 6, 12: 1. 6. 1255 b 12-14)—the distinction of ruler and ruled, again, appears in some cases immediately after birth (εἴθις ἐκ γενετῆς), and this is a further evidence of naturalness (Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 4-6: Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 7 sq.: Eth. Eud:
2. 8. 1224 b 31 sqq.). Aristotle continues—'and there are many kinds of ruling and ruled elements, and if one kind of rule is better than another, this is because one kind of ruled element is better than another, for ruler and ruled unite to discharge a function, and the function discharged rises as the level of that which is ruled rises.' Aristotle is careful to point out that the lowness of the rule exercised by the master over the slave is due to the lowness of the person ruled, and that the rule of a natural master over a natural slave no more involves an infraction of nature or justice or the common advantage than the rule of the soul over the body.

21. καταμαθείν is used of things perceived at a glance without any necessity for reasoning: cp. 3. 14. 1285 a 1. So ὑπό is occasionally opposed to λόγος (e.g. in Meteor. i. 6. 343 b 30–33).

23. ἄν. Soul and body, man and brute, male and female.


26. οὐδὲν ἄνθρώπου ἡ θηρίου, 'as for instance over a man than over a brute.'

27. ἄρα is probably used in preference to ὑπό, because its signification is more comprehensive—the 'source' (cp. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 19) rather than the 'agency'—and covers the contribution of the ruled to the common work as well as that of the ruler. 'In the genuine works of Aristotle ἄρα is never found in the sense of ὑπό with the passive, but all cases in which we find it conjoined with a passive verb may easily be explained by attaching to it its ordinary meaning; in many of the spurious writings, on the other hand, we find passages in which ἄρα is used in the sense of ὑπό—e.g. Probl. 7. 8. 887 a 22: Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 15, 27' (Eucken, Praepositionen, p. 9). See also Bon. Ind. 78 a 9 sqq.


28. ὡς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Camerarius (Interp. p. 35) quotes Cic. De Nat. Deor. 2. 11. 29. Γὰρ introduces a proof of the statement in 24 that there are many sorts of ruling elements, and also of ruled, and many kinds of rule. Given the fact of the existence of many compound wholes, each compounded of many constituents, it is not likely that all those constituents will be similarly related to each other and will deserve to be ruled in the same way. Sus. (following Dittenberger, ubi supra p. 1376) places καὶ ἐν κ.τ.λ. ὡς γὰρ κ.τ.λ. is intended to
support this assertion as well as that which precedes it, and out of
which it grows.

29. ἐν τῷ κοινῷ. See Bon. Ind. 399 a 28 sqq., where Metaph.
H. 3. 1043 a 31 is referred to, in which passage ὁ κοινόν is used as
equivalent to ἡ σύνθετος οὐσία ἐξ ἥλιως καὶ ἐδώει, and such a σύνθετος
οὐσία may be composed not only of ἄνωτα, but also of ἄνωτα, like
τὸ δῶε in 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 21 sqq. For a definition of τὸ ἄνωτα
Bonitz (Ind. 728 a 33) refers to Phys. 5. 3. 227 a 10—b 2. Vict.:
'sive, inquit, ipsae illae partes continentes sunt, ut contingit in
corpora hominis, quod constituent membra quae sibi haerent, sive
seiunctae, partibus non concretis, ut fieri videmus in civitate, quae
constat e civibus distinctis, cohorte militum,' etc.

31. καὶ τούτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως κ.τ.λ. Bonitz (Ind. 225 b 10)
seems inclined to explain ἐκ in this passage as used ' pro genetivo
partitivo,' but cp. de Part. An. 1. 1. 641 b 14, aitia toas ἵν ἔχουσι
καθάπερ τὸ βερμοῦ καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν ἐκ τοῦ παντός: ‘and this (i.e. ruling
and being ruled) comes to things possessed of life from nature as
a whole’ (ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως, cp. perὶ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, 2. 8. 1267 b
28). Cp. also de An. 3. 5. 430 a 10, ἐπεὶ δ' ὡσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει
ἐστὶ τῷ τῷ μὲν ὅλῃ ἔκδασφ χένει (τούτῳ δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκείνη), ἐπεροῦ
δὲ τῷ αὐτίκῳ καὶ ποιητικῷ, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὅλην
πέτωκεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχουσα τούτῳ τᾶς διαφορᾶς: Plato,
Phileb. 30 A: Phaedrus 270 C: Meno 81 C, ἄτε τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης
συγγενοῦσα ὁμολογεῖται. Ὑπὸ τὸ ἄνωτα is prior γενέσει, though not ὅσοι, to τὸ
ἐνένχρων (Metaph. M. 2. 1077 a 19). Inanimate nature shades
off almost imperceptibly into animate (Hist. An. 8. 1. 588 b
4 sqq).

33. οὗν ἄρμονίας. Bern. 'z. B. in der musikalischen Harmonie'—
Sus.³ 'wie z. B. (die des Grundtons) in einer Tonart': the latter
suggests that ἐν ἄρμονίᾳ should be read instead of ἄρμονίας, and
certainly, if the word is used in this sense, the genitive seems strange
and in need of confirmation from parallel passages. Bonitz,
on the other hand (Ind. 106 b 37 sq.), groups this passage with
Phys. 1. 5. 188 b 12—16, where ἄρμονία appears to be used in
a sense opposed to ἀναρμοστία—διαφερεται ὅθεν ἐπὶ ἄρμονίας ἐπὶ ἅ
τάξεως ἢ συνθέσεως φαινεται γὰρ ὅτι ὁ αὐτός λόγος (15—16)—cp.
Fragm. Aristot. 41. 1481 b 42: the meaning would thus be 'a rule
as of order and system.' But Aristotle may possibly have in his
mind the Pythagorean tenet referred to in Metaph. A. 5. 986 a 2, τῶν
ὁλων οὐρανοῦ ἄρμονίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀρμονίαν: cp. Strabo 10. p. 468, καθ'
ἄρμονίαν τῶν κόσμου συνεστάναι φασί: Plutarch, Phocion c. 2 sub fin. :
Plato, Tim. 37 A: Philolaus, Fragm. 3 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2.
1): Plutarch, de Procreatione Animae in Timaeo c. 7. i015 E, c. 28. i027 A, c. 33. i029 E sqq.: Stob. Floril. i03. 26 (p. 555.
27 sqq.). Compare also the famous saying of Heraclitus (Fr. 45, ed.
Bywater) as to the παλίντροπος ἀρμονίη [κόσμου] διωκότερ τάξιν καὶ
λόγος. If the Pythagorean views are present to Aristotle’s mind,
some notion of musical harmony may be included in his meaning.

ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Compare the similar dismissal of a physical parallel
in Eth. Nic. 8. 10. i159 b 23.

34. πρώτον, ‘in the first place.’ Cp. i254 b 2, ἐστὶ δ’ οὖν, διότι
λόγοι, πρῶτον ἐν ἐξή ὑπερήφαναι καὶ δεσποτικὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν, καὶ
i0, πάλιν.

Antid. § 180.

36. δεὶ δὲ σκοπεῖν. Sus. (Qu. Crit. p. 342): ‘orationem inter-
rumpendo refellit quae quis de hac re contradicere possit.’ For
the rule here laid down, cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. i170 a 22 sqq. In
the next line καὶ before τῶν βελτιστα διακείμενον seems to assert it not
only of other things but also of man.

39. τοίτερον, the rule of the soul over the body.

τῶν γὰρ μοιχητρῶν τὸ μοιχητρῶς ἐχόντων. Cp. de An. 3. 4.
429 b 13, ἐὰν ἄλλο τὸ ἄλλω ἐχόντης: de An. 3. 4. 429 b 20 sqq.: de
Gen. An. 1. 18. 725 a 8, τοῖς κάκιστα διακείμενοι δι’ ἡλικίαν ὁ νόσον ἢ
ἐξίν (ἐξίν Z: om. Bekk.)—ἐξίν being a more permanent and διάθεσις
a less permanent state (see Mr. Wallace on de An. 2. 5. 417 b 15,
who refers to Categ. 8. 8 b 28). Μοιχητρῶς ἐχόντων includes both,
and relates to individuals who, though not μοιχήτρος, are, more or
less temporarily, in an unsatisfactory state.

3. δ’ οὖν seems to be especially used by Aristotle when a tran-
sition is made from a disputable assertion to one which cannot be
zu Aristot. Poet. 1. 46), ei μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα ὑπάρχει, ἄφεσθω,
συμβαίνει δ’ οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεγέσθαι. See also Meteor. 1. 13.
350 b 9: Poet. 4. 1449 a 9. ‘Be that as it may, at any rate.’

4. ἀ τοίτερον κ.τ.λ. It will be noticed that Aristotle conceives
the soul to exercise δεσποτικὴ ἀρχὴ over the body even in the case of
the lower animals, at any rate when they are healthily and naturally
constituted. Plato (Phaedo 80 A) had already spoken of the soul
as ruling the body despotically, and Aristotle follows in his track.
We might ask whether Aristotle holds that the soul rules the body
primarily for its own advantage, and only accidentally for that of the
body (cp. 3. 6. i278 b 32 sqq.), or whether the disparity which he
conceives as existing between a natural master and a natural slave
exists between the soul of an insect and its body. Aristotle's meaning, however, is that the body should be the ὅργανον and κτήμα of the soul. But he does not always draw this sharp line of demarcation between the soul and the body: in Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 14, for instance, he relates the body rather closely to the emotions.

5. πολιτικὴν καὶ βασιλικὴν. Ἡ δὲ perhaps here means 'or,' as in the passages referred to by Bonitz (Ind. 357 b 20). Πολιτικὴ and βασιλικὴ ἄρχῃ have this in common, that they are exercised over free and willing subjects (cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 7–9: and see notes on 1259 a 39–b 1). Perhaps the word βασιλικὴ is added to enforce the inequality of νοῦς and ὅρξεις, and to exclude the notion that an alternation of rule between νοῦς and ὅρξεις is ever in place, such as is found in most πολιτικὰ ἄρχαί (1. 12. 1259 b 4: 1. 1. 1252 a 15). For the relation of νοῦς (i.e. δ ὑπακοήν νοῦς) and ὅρξεις in moral action, see Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 17 sqq. "Ὅρξεις does not stand to νοῦς in the relation of a mere ὅργανον—the relation described in Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.—but is to a certain extent akin to it; see Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 30 sqq., and esp. 1103 a 1, εἰ δὲ χρῆ καὶ τούτῳ (sc. τὸ ὅρκετικῶν) φάναι λόγον ἕχειν, διήπτων ἐσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίων καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ᾽ ὅπερ τοῖς πατρὸς ἀκουστικῶν τι, where the relation of ὅρξεις to full reason is conceived as that of a child to its father, and a father, we know (Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 10 sqq.), is not far from a king. On the other hand, in Eth. Nic. 5. 15. 1138 b 5 sqq., the relation of the rational to the irrational part of the soul is apparently construed differently, and compared to the relation of a master to his slave or to that of a head of a household to his household; we do not learn how it can be comparable to each of these two dissimilar relations. When Cicero (de Rep. 3. 25. 37) says—nam ut animus corpori dicitur imperare, dicitur etiam libidini, sed corpori ut rex civibus suis aut pares liberos, libidini autem ut servis dominus, quod eam coercet et frangit—he probably means by 'libido' something different from ὅρξεις. His notion of the relation of soul and body contrasts, we see, with Aristotle's.

6. ἐν οἷς. Cp. 1254 a 39, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ δῆλον: 1254 b 3, ἐν ζῷῳ θεωρήσατα: 1254 a 36, οἰκοπέων ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι: and Plato, Soph. 256 C, περὶ δὲν καὶ ἐν οἷς προδέμεθα οἰκοπέων. Ἐν introduces the objects (ψυχῇ, σῶμα, νοῦς, ὅρξεις) in which the relations are exemplified. Ἐν is sometimes used in the sense of 'as to': see Vahlen, Poet. p. 188 (note on 17. 1455 b 14), who compares (among other passages) Plato, Rep. 2. 376 B, βαρβαρίτες τιβόμεν καὶ ἐν ἄνθρωπῳ ... φύσιν φιλόσοφον αὐτῶν δεῖν εἶναι, but this does not seem to be its meaning here.
8. τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος. That which is usually called τὸ ὀρεκτικόν is here termed τὸ παθητικὸν μόριον, and the term recurs in 3. 15. 1286 a 17, κρείττον ὁ δὲ μὴ πρόσειτι τὸ παθητικὸν ὀρέκτης ἢ δὲ συμφύς τῷ μὲν οὖν νόμῳ τούτῳ οἷς ὑπάρχει—cp. 3. 16. 1287 a 32, ὅπως ὁ ὀρέκτης ὑπάρχει. In the passage before us τὸ ὀρεκτικόν is distinguished from τὸ λόγον ἔχον, though Aristotle is sometimes not unwilling to treat it as part of τὸ λόγον ἔχον (see Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1103 a 1 sq., quoted in the last note but one), and in the de Anima (3. 9. 432 a 24 sqq.) he speaks of the division of the soul into τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν and τὸ λόγον ἔχον as not his own and not satisfactory. He evidently, however, accepts this division in the Politics; this appears still more distinctly in Pol. i. 13. 1260 a 6 and 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 17 sq. An accurate treatment of psychological questions would in fact be out of place in a political treatise: see Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1102 a 23 sq. It is not clear whether in the passage before us Aristotle regards νοῦς as the ἐξω of τὸ λόγον ἔχον, as in Pol. 4 (7). 15. 1334 b 17 sqq.

10. ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις, 'in man taken in conjunction with the other animals.' It is because the relation of ruling and being ruled appears elsewhere than περὶ ἀνθρώπων, that Aristotle expressly limits his inquiries in 3. 6. 1278 b 16 to the question, τῆς ἄρχης ἐδή πόσα τῆς περὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς ζωῆς.

11. βελτίων. Cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 3 sqq.: Probl. 10. 45. 895 b 23 sqq.: Oecon. i. 3. 1343 b 15. Being better, their example is to be studied as illustrating the true relation of animals to man (cp. 1254 a 37).

τούτως δὲ πάσιν. Vict. 'mansuetis omnibus.' Cp. Theophr. Caus. Plant. i. 16. 13 (quoted by Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 826. 1).

13. ἐπὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Φόσει is added because this is not always the case (cp. i. 12. 1259 b 1). Κρείττον is probably not 'stronger' (as Sus. and Bern.), but 'better,' as in 3. 15. 1286 a 17: compare as to the relative excellence of male and female de Gen. An. 2. 1. 732 a 5 sqq.: Metaph. A. 6. 988 a 2–7. Aristotle is apparently speaking here, as in 1259 b 1, 1260 a 10, of the male and female human being.

15. ἐπὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων. Cp. 3. 10. 1281 a 17, πάλιν τε πάντων λαθρείων, where the meaning seems to be 'taking men as a whole, irrespective of wealth and poverty'; so here 'in the case of human beings as a whole, irrespective of sex.'

16. ψυχή σώματος καὶ ἀνθρώπου θηρίου. One would expect ψυχής σώμα καὶ ἀνθρώπου θηρίου, and Thurot (see Sus.) is inclined to alter the text thus, but the inversion is characteristic: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 27,
where one would expect διαίσει δή τῷ τωτῷ καὶ ἔθνος πόλεως, instead of ἔθνος πόλις.

18. η τοῦ σώματος χρήσις. The same criterion of a slave is indicated in 1.2.1252 a 31 sqq.: 1.11.1258 b 38: 1254 b 25. The slave is here defined by his ἵππος, and in 21 by his δίωμισ (like the citizen of the best State, 3.13.1284 a 2): cp. 1.2.1253 a 23. And the end of a thing is the best to which it can attain (cp. 4 (7). 14.1333 a 29, αἱ ἐκάστῳ τοῦθεν ἀἱρετῶτατον οὗ τυχεῖν ἔστω ἄκροτάτου).

19. Μέν seems (as Thurot remarks: see Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 343) to be followed by no δή. But this often occurs in the Politics (Sus.1, Ind. Gramm. μέν), and here, as Susemihl observes, 'μέν praeparat quodammodo quaestionem de ceteris servis, qui non item natura sed lege tantum servi sint, sequente demum in capite instituendum.' It is taken up by μέν τοῖσιν, 1254 b 39, and then the δή which introduces c. 6 answers this μέν, and consequently in effect μέν 19 also.

οὐς introduces the reason why these are slaves by nature; they are so because it is better for them to be slaves, unlike some who will be mentioned presently. For this pregnant use of the relative, cp. de Part. An. 1.1.641 b 22.

20. ταύτην τὴν ἄρχην, sc. δεσποτικὴν ἄρχην, for τὰ εἰρημένα seem to be σῶμα and σήμι (mentioned in 16–17). For (Aristotle in effect continues) the natural slave is very near to a brute in capacity, use, and bodily make, though there is a certain difference between them.

γὰρ (21) justifies what precedes: the slave has just been mentioned as on a level with the brute, and now facts are adduced which show how nearly they approach each other. The natural slave is a being who can be another’s, just as any article of property can, but who differs from brutes in this, that he shares in reason to the extent of apprehending it, though he has it not. The slave seems to resemble in this τῶν ὀρκοτοῦν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς (cp. Eth. Nic. 1.13.1103 a 1 sq.), rather than the body, and we are inclined to ask why the rule exercised over him is not to be a kingly rule, like that of νοῦς over ὅψεις. It is because the slave can apprehend reason that he should be addressed with νουθέτησις (1.13.1260 b 5), and not with commands alone, as Plato suggested.

23. τὰ ἄλλα ἱψά. Usually used where ἄνθρωπος has gone before (as in 1254 b 10), but here apparently in contradistinction to δοῦλος, as in 3.9.1280 a 32.

αἰσθανόμενα. For the part in place of the finite verb, cp. 2.5.1263 a 18 and 4 (7). 14.1333 a 18, though it is possible that here
some verb should be supplied from ὑπηρετεῖ. Cp. also ὁσιοὶ μὴν πλοῦσιοι μὴ ἄξια χρώσων ἀρετῆς μηδεν, 3. 11. 1281 b 24, and see Vahlen's note on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7 (p. 243).

24. παθήμασιν. 'Usus Aristotelicus vocis πάθημα ita exponetur, ut apparente inter πάθημα et πάθος non esse certum significationis discrimen, sed eadem fere vi et sensus varietate utrumque nomen, saepius alterum, alterum rarius usurpari' (Bon. Ind. 554 a 56 sqq.). For the expression παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ, cp. 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 30, τοῖς θυμοῖς ἀκολουθεῖν, and for the thought 4 (7). 13. 1332 b 3, τά μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῶν ζῴων μᾶλλον μὲν τῇ φύσει ξύ, μικρὰ δ' ἐνα καὶ τοῖς ἐθεσιν, ἀνθρώποι δὲ καὶ λόγοι, μόνον γὰρ ἐχει λόγον,

καὶ ἥ χρήστι. The use made of the slave, no less than his capacity. The use made of tame animals for food is not taken into account: cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 17, καὶ διὰ τὴν χρήσιν καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφὴν.


25. τοῦ σώματι, 'with the body,' is to be taken with βούλεια and not made dependent on τάναγκα, as Vict. makes it; cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 33: 1. 11. 1258 b 38.

27. θεολεια μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has implied in what he has just been saying that there is a difference between the souls of the free and the slave, and now he continues—'Nature's wish, indeed, is to make the bodies also of freemen and slaves different, no less than their souls, but' etc. He evidently feels that he may be asked why the bodies of slaves are not more like those of the domestic animals than they are. He hints in ὑθαθ 29 that the crouching carriage of slaves marks them off from man, and allies them to the horse or ox. Aristotle attached much importance to the erect attitude of man: cp. de Part. An. 2. 10. 656 a 10, εἰδὼς γὰρ καὶ τὰ φύσει μόρα κατὰ φύσιν ἔχει τούτῳ μόνῳ, καὶ τὸ τούτου ἄνω πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ὄλου ἔχει ἄνω· μόνον γὰρ ὑρθὸν ἐστὶ τῶν ζῴων ἀνθρώπος: 4. 10. 686 a 27, ὥρθος μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ μόνον τῶν ζῴων διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰναι θειαν ἔργον δὲ τοῦ θεοτάτου τὸ νοεῖ καὶ φρονεῖ· τούτῳ δ' οὖ ῥέδουν πολλοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπικεκλάθων σώματος· τὸ γὰρ βάρος δυσκόλητον ποιεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ τὴν καταγή αἰσθήσεων. As to the failure of nature to give effect to her purposes, perhaps she was thought by Aristotle to miss her mark more often in respect of the body than the soul: cp. de Gen. An. 4. 10. 778 a 4, θεολεια μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσει τοῖς τούτων ἀριθμοῖς ἀριθμεῖν τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς τελευτάς, οὐκ ἀκρυβοὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ τὴν τῆς ὕλης

L 2.
31. If this parenthesis is more than a marginal remark which has crept into the text, it is probably intended to draw out the contrast between πολιτικὸς βίος and ἀναγκαῖος ἐργασίαι: the mere mention of all that is implied in the former will suffice to show the unfitness, physical no less than mental, of the slave for it. For γίνεται διηρμένον (‘comes to be divided’), see Top. 7. 5. 154 b ii, 22: 155 a 9; Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 24, and notes on 1252 b 7, 1264 a 14. The contrast of πολεμικαὶ and εἰρηνικαὶ πράξεις, as constituting the work of the citizen, is familiar enough to us from 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 30 sq., though πολεμικαὶ ἀσκήσεις are distinguished from πολιτικαὶ in 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 8. Cp. [Plutarch] De Liberis Educandis c. 13. 9 c, δοτέον ὅν τοις παισίν ἀναποφη τῶν συνεχῶν πόνων, ἐνθυμομένους ὅτι τὰς ὁ βίος ἡμῶν εἰς ἄνευ καὶ σπουδὴ διήρηται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο αὐτῷ μόνῳ ἐγρήγοροι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτις εὑρέθη, οὕτῳ πόλεμος, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰρήνη.

33. τῶν μὲν ... ψυχῶς. Vict. explains, ‘ut servi scilicet natura corpora habeant liberorum hominum, liberis autem animos servorum.’ But we can hardly supply ‘of slaves’ after τὰς ψυχῶς, and besides, if a freeman had the soul of a slave, that would be no illustration of the failure of Nature to give effect to her purpose in respect of the bodies of freemen and slaves, and this alone is in question. Nor would such a freeman be a freeman by nature; yet, as Giphanius says (p. 63), ‘de natura et servis et liberis agimus, non de iis qui lege et instituto.’ These two latter objections also apply to the translation of τῶν μὲν—τῶν δὲ as ‘some slaves’ and ‘other slaves.’ If a slave had the soul of a freeman, the failure of Nature would be in respect of his soul, not his body, and he would not be a natural slave. Two interpretations seem open to us. 1. We may refer τῶν μὲν to slaves, like τὰ μὲν 28, and τῶν δὲ to freemen, like τὰ δὲ 29, and translate, ‘but the very contrary often comes to pass’ (cp. 1. 9. 1257 b 33), ‘that (the body does not match the soul, but that) slaves have the bodies of freemen and freemen the souls.’ Aristotle might have said ‘and freemen the bodies of slaves,’ but what he wishes to draw attention to is the occasional disjunction of a freeman’s body from a freeman’s soul. This resembles the interpretation of Bernays. Or 2. we may adopt the rendering of Sepulveda—‘saepe tamen accidit oppositum, ut alii corpora, alii animos ingenuorum habeant’—that one set of people have the bodies of freemen and another the souls, or, in other words, that bodily excellence is parted from
excellence of soul. I incline on the whole to the former interpretation. It should be noted that Antisthenes had said that souls are shaped in the likeness of the bodies they dwell in (fr. 33. Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 279, ἐντέθην Ἀντισθένης ἰδιόσχήμων φήσιν τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς περιέχοντι σώμασιν εἰναῖ): his remark, however, seems to have referred, primarily at any rate, to the souls of the dead.

34. επει ... γε justifies what precedes by pointing out what would result if the contrary were the case (cp. 1255 a 19: Meteor. i. 4. 342a 15—if the γένεσις of lightning-bolts were not ἐκκρίσις but ἔκκανεις, they would ascend instead of descending as they do). So here, to prove that Nature sometimes fails to make the bodies of slaves and freemen different, the argument is that ‘if it were not so—if all freemen were far superior in physical aspect to slaves—no one would be found to dispute the justice of slavery.’ The argument shows how keenly the Greeks appreciated physical excellence and beauty: here the same thing is said of physical excellence as is said of excellence of body and soul together in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq. and Plato, Polit. 301 D–E. We also note that the Greek statues of gods were evidently in respect of physical beauty much above the Greek average: compare Cic. de Nat. Deor. i. 28. 79, quotus enim quisque formosus est? Athenis cum essem, e gregibus epheborum vix singuli reperiebantur, and see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiq. 3. § 4, who also refers to Dio Chrys. Or. 21. 500 R.

35. τοὺς ὑπολειτομένους, ‘inferiores’: so Bonitz (Ind. 800 a 35), who traces this signification to the simpler one, ‘tardius aliis moveri, remanere in via.’

37. ει δ' εἰπὲ κ.π.λ. Aristotle wins an unexpected argument in favour of his doctrine of slavery from the appeal which he has just made to Greek sentiment. ‘But if this holds good of a difference of body’—i. e. if a vast physical superiority confers the right to hold as slaves those who are less well endowed in this respect—‘with much more justice may it be laid down in the case of a difference of soul,’ on which Aristotle has rested the distinction of master and slave.

38. For the thought, cp. Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1102 b 21 sq., and (with Giph.) Plato, Symp. 216 D–217 A: Cic. de Offic. i. 5. 15. Aristotle hints that as it is not easy to discern superiority of soul, we need not wonder that the right of the natural master should be disputed.

39. ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν εἰσὶν φύσεω τυνεὶς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι. Cp. c. 6. 1255 b 6, καὶ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς διάφοροι τὸ τοιοῦτον, δὲν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεύειν, τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν, a passage which seems to make
in favour of the view according to which \( \alpha i \mu e \nu \) and \( \alpha i \delta e \) (1255 a 1) are subdivisions of a class designated by \( \tau i v \dot{a} \). Of, 1255 a 2, is carelessly made to refer to \( \alpha i \delta e \) only (cp. \( \beta i a s \delta e i o i \) in 1255 b 15).

C. 6. 1255 a. 3 sqq. The following summary will explain the way in which I incline to interpret the much-disputed passage which follows. The view that slavery is contrary to nature is true \( \tau \rho o i o u \tau i v \dot{a} \)—i.e. if limited to the enslavement of those who are slaves only by convention. For in fact there are such slaves: the law by which captives of war are accounted the slaves of the victors is nothing but a convention. (Aristotle does not necessarily imply that this was the only way in which slaves by convention came into being. They might evidently come into being in other ways—through descent, through debt, through sale by parents and the like. Into these minutiae he does not enter.) This provision (he proceeds) is dealt with by many who concern themselves with the study of laws, just as any peccant public adviser might be dealt with—they impeach it for unconstitutionality; they exclaim against the idea that anyone who may be overpowered by superior force is to be the slave of the person who happens to possess that superior force. Some are against the law, others are for it, and even accomplished men take different sides. (It appears to me that the \( \pi o l l \lambda i \tau o w \varepsilon n \tau o i s \nu \theta o i o i s \) who are here represented as objecting to slavery based on a mere superiority in might must be distinguished from the authorities mentioned in 1253 b 20 as holding that all slavery is conventional and contrary to nature. The \( \pi o l l \lambda i \tau o w \varepsilon n \tau o i s \nu \theta o i o i s \) do not seem to have objected to slavery based on a superiority of excellence as distinguished from a mere superiority of might. Hence they probably did not object to the enslavement of barbarians in war by Greeks: we see, indeed, that not all the defenders of the law were prepared to defend its application to Greeks. In c. 2. 1252 b 9 the barbarian and the slave, not the conquered person and the slave, are said to be identified by the poets.) Now what is it that alone makes this conflict of view possible? It is that the two contentions 'overlap' in a common principle accepted by both, which affords them a common standing-ground, relates them to each other, and limits their antagonism. They both in fact appeal to the common principle that 'Force is not without Virtue.' Thus they differ only on the question what is just in this matter, not as to the relation between Force and Virtue. The one side pleads that, as Force implies Virtue, Force has a right to enslave: the other side pleads that as Virtue goes with Force and Virtue conciliates good-will, good-will will exist between those who are right-
fully masters and slaves. Thus the one side rests just slavery on good-will between master and slave, and condemns slavery resulting from war, when good-will is absent, while the other side rests just slavery simply on the presence of superior Force. (We are not told that those who held slavery resulting from war to be unjust in the absence of good-will between the enslaver and the enslaved also held that good-will must necessarily be absent in all cases of enslavement through war. Their contention rather was that it was not safe to make Force of one, unaccompanied by good-will, the test of just slavery.)

This conflict of opinion is, as has been said, evidently due to the fact that both parties make an appeal to the common principle that Force is not without Virtue,' for suppose that they gave up this common standing-ground, ceased to shelter their claims under those of Virtue, and thus came to stand apart in unqualified antagonism, then the other line of argument (ἀρέσος λάγος) on which they must necessarily fall back—the contention that superiority in virtue confers no claim to rule—is so wholly devoid of weight and plausibility, that no conflict would arise. (Those who connect the right to enslave with superior force, and those who connect it with the existence of mutual good-will between master and slave, are regarded as having two lines of argument open to them: either they may derive the claims of force and good-will to be the justifying ground of slavery from the claims of virtue, and thus shelter themselves under the latter, or they may impugn the claims of virtue; but if they impugn them, their own contentions lose all weight and cease to produce any serious debate.)

We see then that the solid element in this pair of contending views, if we take them in the form which they assume when they possess any weight at all, is to be found in the principle that superiority in virtue confers the right to rule and to rule as a master rules. We shall arrive at exactly the same result if we examine another view on the subject.

We have hitherto had to do with those who discuss the law in question on its merits; but there are those who support slavery arising through war on the broad ground that it is authorized by a law and that that which is so authorized is ipso facto just. But a law, though a justifying ground, is not everything in this matter. For the war may be an unjust one, and either on this ground or on grounds personal to himself, the man enslaved through war may be undeserving of his fate: injustices of this kind the law will not avail to make just. In fact, these inquirers admit as much them-
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selves, and contradict their own plea. For they say that Greeks are not to be enslaved, but only barbarians, since barbarians are slaves everywhere (πανταχού δοῦλοι) and Greeks nowhere slaves. They make the same distinction in reference to nobility. They say that Greek nobility is nobility everywhere and in an absolute sense, but barbarian nobility is only local. Thus they hold that there are such beings as πανταχοῦ, ἀπλῶς δοῦλοι—πανταχοῦ, ἀπλῶς ἐλεύθεροι and εὐγενεῖς: Theodectes, in fact, connects the latter quality with descent from the gods. What else then do they do but mark off slave and free by a reference to virtue and its opposite? For descent from the good is, they imply, equivalent to goodness, and so it generally is, though not invariably, since Nature sometimes misses her aim.

3. οἱ τάναυτία φάσκοντες. For φάσκειν used of philosophers or others laying down a dogma, cp. c. 13. 1260 b 6.

6. οἱ γὰρ νόμοι κ.τ.λ. As I understand the passage, it is only this particular law that is here said to be an ἡμολογία. The law enacting the slavery of captives taken in war, ἄνων πολεμοῦντων πώλει ἀφ', is said to be a νόμος ἀθίος by Xenophon (Cyrop. 7. 5. 73: cp. Thuc. 1. 76. 2, quoted by Camerarius). Aristotle does not notice the limits commonly imposed on the exercise of this right in wars between Greek States: see as to this C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 12, who notes that, as a rule, captives taken in war were enslaved only when the cities to which they belonged were razed, and that they were commonly reserved by the State which captured them for exchange or ransom. The reference of law to an ἡμολογία seems to have been a commonplace: see Plato, Rep. 359 A: Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 42 (where it is put in the mouth of Pericles): Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 13 (where Socrates adopts the view). Aristotle himself not only reproduces the popular view in Rhet. 1. 15. 1376 b 9, but speaks in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 14 of friendships which rest on ἡμολογία (πολιτικαί, φιλετικαί, συμπλοκαί) as appearing to be of a καυνονική type. In Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 10, however, we find an emphatic assertion that those theories of the πώλει which reduce it to an alliance, and the law to a συνθήκη, are wrong (cp. Rhet. 1. 13. 1373 b 8, where καυνονία is tacitly distinguished from συνθήκη). This does not prevent particular laws being based on convention, e. g. that which constitutes a medium of exchange (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 29). The object, it may be added, with which the law enacting enslavement through war is here stated to be an ἡμολογία is to justify the assertion ἦστι γὰρ τις καὶ κατὰ νόμον (convention) δοῦλος καὶ δουλεύων, which immediately precedes. For ἐν δὲ ... φασιν,

7. τοῦτο ... τὸ δίκαιον, 'this plea,' 'this justifying ground of claim': cp. Philip of Macedon's Letter to the Athenians, c. 21 (Demosth. p. 164), ὑπάρχει μιᾷ καὶ τούτῳ τὸ δίκαιον, ἐκπαλαιορήσας γάρ τούτω ὑμᾶς μὲν ἐξαλάτωσα, ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων δὲ κατοικισθέντας, ἐλαθὼν τὸ χωρίον: Demosth. adv. Androt. c. 70, οὖν προσήγγυε ταύτῳ δίκαιον ταύτα: adv. Conon. c. 27, ἔπιστευον τῷ δίκαιῳ τούτῳ, and c. 29, καὶ τούτῳ τὸ δίκαιον ἔχων.

8. τῶν εἰς τοῖς νόμοις. Cp. Metaph. θ. 8, 1050 b 35, οἱ εἰς τοῖς λόγοις ('dialecticians,' Grote, Aristotle 2. 366): Rhet. 2. 24. α. 401 b 32, οἱ εἰς τοῖς πολιτείαις. Camerarius (Interp. p. 40) quotes Eurip. Hippol. 430, αὐτοί ἡ εἰσὶν εἰς μοῖσας δεῖ. We see from Plato, Gorgias 484 C–D, with how much favour those who studied the laws were commonly regarded, and how much was thought to be lost by persons who continued to study philosophy after they had attained a certain age, and were thus led to neglect the study of the laws.

ἄντερ ἥττορα. Cp. Antiphanes, Σαπφώ Φραγμ. 1 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 3. 112)—

πῶς γὰρ γένοιτ' ἄν, ὥς πάτερ, ἥττωρ * *

ἀφεῖτος, ἂν μὴ ἀλὸς τρεῖς παραπόλων;

10. κατὰ δύναμιν κραίττωνος. Contrast τὰ βελτίων κατ' ἀρετήν, 21. Katà δύναμιν is added because κραίττων is sometimes (e. g. in c. 5. 1254 b 14) used in the sense of better. It is, on the other hand, distinguished from βελτίων in 3. 13. 1283 a 41.

11. καὶ τῶν σοφῶν. As Sus, points out (Qu. Crit. p. 344), not all of those included under the designation οἱ εἰς τοῖς νόμοις (8) would deserve to be called σοφοί. Σοφοί are constantly contrasted with οἱ πολλοὶ by Aristotle: philosophers are not perhaps exclusively referred to here, but rather 'accomplished men' generally; even poets would be σοφοί, and it is just possible that there is a reference to Pindar (see note on 1255 a 18). It is still more likely that Aristotle remembers the saying of Heraclitus (Fragm. 44, ed. Bywater)—πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πάντων ἐστὶ πάντων ἰδιότερος, καὶ τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς ἔδειξε τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους, τοὺς μὲν δουλοὺς ἐποίησε τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους. So we learn (Plato, Laws 776 C), that there were those who pronounced the Helot slavery of the Lacedaemonian State (ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰλατεία), which confessedly originated in conquest, to be εἰ γεγονότα.

13. ἐπιλλαττένων. The following are some of the more prominent uses of this word in the writings of Aristotle. It is used by him (1) of things adjusted to each other, fitting into each other,
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dove-tailing—e. g. of teeth that fill each other's intervals, de Part. An. 3. 1. 661 b 21, ἐναλλάξει ἐμμύτιστουσιν (οἱ δὴ δύνατες), ὅποιοῦ μὴ ἀμβλύνον- 
tας τριβόμενοι πρὸς ἄλληλους, or of two bodies adjusted to one another, de Gen. An. 1. 14. 720 b 10: (3) of two things joined so as to be 
one, e. g. of hybrid constitutions, Pol. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 2, where ἐπαλλάττειν is used in connexion with συναγωγαί, συνυδάξεσθαι (so in 
Plato, Soph. 240 C, ἐπιδαλάῖς seems used in a similar sense to συμπλοκή): (3) of two or more things united not by joining, but 
by the possession of a common feature or a common standing-
ground, and yet different—things which overlap, or shade off into 
each other, or are σύνεγγυς to each other. So of a thing which 
unites attributes of two genera, and in which accordingly these 
two genera overlap—e. g. the pig, which is both πολυτύχων and yet τελειωτοκόν (de Gen. An. 4. 6. 774 b 17, μὸνον δὲ πολυτύχων δὲ ἢ ἦν 
tελειωτοκεῖ, καὶ ἐπαλλάττει τοῦτο μούνον)—or of a thing which possesses 
many of the attributes of a genus to which it does not belong, as 
the seal does of fishes (Hist. An. 2. 1. 501 a 21, ἢ δὲ φώκη κορχα-
ρίδουν ἐστὶ πάσι τοῖς ὀδοὺσιν ὡς ἐπαλλάττουσα τῷ γένει τῶν ἱχθύων). So 
here the arguments of those who plead that good-will is a test of 
just rule and of those who plead that Force by itself without the 
presence of good-will confers the right to rule are said ἐπαλλάττεων 
—i. e. to overlap each other (Mr. Heitland, Notes p. 11) and to 
approach each other—because both start from a common principle 
though they draw contrary deductions from it. The antithesis 
το ἐπαλλάττεων comes in διαστάσεις χαρίς τούτων τῶν λόγων 19, where 
the λόγοι are supposed to draw apart, and no longer to overlap or 
occupy common ground: cp. κεχώρισται in Πειρ. μακροβιόττον καὶ 
βραχυβιόττον, 1. 464 b 27, ἢ κεχώρισται καὶ τὸ βραχύβιον καὶ τὸ νοσόδες, 
ἂν' ἦνας μὲν νόσοις ἐπαλλάττει τὸ νόσοδη τὴν φύσιν σῶματα τοῖς βραχυ-
βίαις, καὶ ἔνιας δ' οὖδὲν κωλίει νοσόδεις εἶναι μακροβίους δυνατα. With 
the use of ἐπαλλάττεων in the passage before us compare its use 
in Pol. 1. 9. 1257 b 35, where differing uses of the same thing are 
said ἐπαλλάττεως, or to be σύνεγγυς, because they differ only in not 
being κατὰ τάδιάν, and are otherwise identical and of the same 
thing.

τρόπον τινὰ is used in opposition to κυρίως in de Gen. et Corr. 
1. 4. 320 a 2 sqq. (Bon. Ind. 772 b 22) and to ἀπλάδας in Metaph. Θ. 
6. 1048 a 29. Is the meaning this, that it is the tendency of Virtue 
to win willing compliance (Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 10), but that incident-
ally, when provided with the requisite external means, it has the 
power of using force with surpassing effect? Cp. Plato, Polit. 294 A, 
τρόπον μέντοι τινὰ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς βασιλικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ νομοθετική· τὸ δ' ἄριστον
ou τοὺς νόμους ἐστὶν ἱσχύειν, ἀλλ' ἄνδρα τῶν μετὰ φρονήσεως βασιλικῶν, and Pol. 1. 8. 1256 b 23, διὸ καὶ ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσις κτητικὴ πᾶς ἐστιν. Whatever may be the exact meaning of τρόπον τωδε here, it seems, like our phrase 'in a way,' to soften and limit the assertion made, as in de An. 3. 5. 430 a 16, τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ἄντα χρώματα ἑνεργεία χρώματα. For the thought conveyed in this sentence, cp. Solon, Fragm. 36 (Bergk)—

ταῦτα μὲν κράτει,

δόμοι βίου τε καὶ δίκην συμναμόσας,

ἐρέα:

Aeschyl. Fragm. 372 (Nauck)—

ὅτων γὰρ ἵσχύς συζυγοῦσι καὶ δίκης,

ποίᾳ ἔννοιᾳ τῶν δικαιοσύναις;

Aristot. Rhet. 2. 5. 1382 a 35, καὶ ἄρετὴ ὑπριθυμίαν δύναμιν ἔχουσα (is to be dreaded) δίδυμο γὰρ ἃτι προσέρχεται μὲν, ὅταν ὑβρίζῃται, αἰεὶ, δύναται δὲ νῦν: Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 32: Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 17, μάλιστα δὲ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αὖτιν ἐγχειροῦσιν οἱ τὴν φύσιν μὲν βρα-

σεῖς, τιμὴν δὲ ἔχουσε πολεμικὴν πάρα τοῖς μανίρχουσι' ἄνδρια γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχουσα βραϊσος ἐστὶν, δι' ὡς ἀμφιτρεῖας, ὡς βαθίως κρατησόντες, ποιοῦται τὰς ἐπιθέσεις. Perhaps also Eth. Nic. 10. 1180 a 21, δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ should be compared. Giph. (p. 68) compares Plutarch, Dion c. 1, δεῖ φρονήσει καὶ δικαιόσυνη δύναμιν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τύχην συνελθεῖν, ἐνα κάλλος ἀμα καὶ μέγεθος αἰ πολιτικα πράξεις λάβωσιν.

14. καὶ βιάζεσθαι, 'to compel by force as well as to conciliate': cp. Isocr. Philip. § 15, καὶ πλαίτον καὶ δύναμιν κεκτημένον ἄστιν οὐδέθεν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἃ μόνα τῶν ὀστῶν καὶ πείθεω καὶ βιάζεσθαι πέφυκεν—a passage which exhibits the contrast of πείθεως and βιάζεσθαι, and one which Aristotle may possibly intend here tacitly, as is his wont, to correct.

15. ἀγαθοῦ τυχός. Cp. 1. 1. 1252 a 2, and 3. 9. 1280 a 9, where δικαίων τε is contrasted with τὸ κυρίως δίκασιν. As the ἀγαθοῦ τε which Force implies may be quite other than ἄρετὴ (cp. Rhet. i. 1. 1355 b 4 sq., where τὰ χρησιμότατα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, such as physical strength, health, etc., are contrasted with ἄρετῇ), the inference that Force is not without Virtue is incorrect. This appears also from Pol. 3. 10. 1281 a 21—28, where Force is conceived separate from Virtue: cp. 3. 12. 128a b 23 sqq. Eth. Nic. 4. 8. 1124 a 20—31, again, throws light on the passage before us: men claim respect from others on the strength of any good, κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὡς ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμηθέν.

16. μὴ δὲντ ἄρετῆς εἶλαι τὴν βιαν. It will be observed that the inference drawn is that Force is not without Virtue, which does not
necessarily imply that the possessor of superior force is superior in virtue.

ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 b 27, ἐπὶ δὲ οὖν περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἡ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, and 31, ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ποτέρων δίκαιον ἀμ-
φισβητοῦσιν: also Pol. 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 26, διὰ ὁμολογεῖται μὲν, ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου. Here it is conceded on both sides that 'force is not without virtue,' and the only subject of dispute is, whether it is just for force to enslave not only the willing but also the unwilling.

17. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. διὰ τοῦτο appears to refer to ὅπι 13—
βίαν 16, and especially to διὰτε δοκεῖς μὴ ἄνει ἄρετῆς εἶναι τῦν βίαν. One side argues from this, that, force being accompanied by virtue, and virtue attracting good-will, slavery is just only where there is good-will between master and slave, and that consequently the indiscriminate enslavement of those conquered in war is unjust; the other side argues that as force implies virtue, wherever there is the force to enslave, there is the right to enslave. For the power which virtue has of attracting good-will, cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 5. 1167 a 18, δλως δὲ ἡ εὐνοια διὰ ἄρετὴν καὶ ἐπικείμενα τινα γίνεται, ὅταν το φανῇ καλὸς τῇ ἀλ-
δρείᾳ ἢ τοιοῦτον, καθόπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν εἴσημαν: Eth. Eud. 7. 1.
1234 b 22, τῆς τε γὰρ πολιτικῆς ἐργῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ μᾶλλον τοιχαίον φιλιῶν, καὶ τῆν ἄρετὴν διὰ τοῦτο φασιν εἶναι χρήσιμων οὐ γὰρ ἐνδεχομένως φιλοὺς ἐαυτὸς εἴναι τοὺς ἀδικομένους ἢ τὰ ἀληθιῶν: Xen. Mem. 3. 3. 9, ἐν παντὶ πράγ-
ματι οἱ ἀνθρώποι τοῖς ταῖς μᾶλλον θεῖσαι πείθομαι, ὅσον ἢ γίνεται βελ-
τίστου εἰναι. Those who argued against slavery unaccompanied by good-will between master and slave were probably among those who glorified rule over willing subjects, in contradistinction to rule over unwilling subjects. We trace the idea in Gorgias' praise of rhetoric as the best of all arts—πῶς γὰρ ἡ ὕποι ὁκλη τοῦλα δι' ἐκδήλων ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιωτο (Plato, Phileb. 58 A–B). The doctrine was perhaps originally Pythagorean: cp. Aristox. Fragm. 18 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), περὶ δὲ ἀρχὸνων καὶ ἀρχομένων οὖτος ἐφράσοντ' τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄρχοντας ἑφασκον οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλοσοφο-
πους δεῖ εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς ἄρχομενον οὐ μόνον πειθρίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλάρ-
χονας, and Cic. de Legibus 3. 2. 5, nec vero solium ut obtem-
perent oboediantique magistratibus, sed etiam ut eos colant dili-
gantque praescribimus, ut Charondas in suis facit legibus (which shows that what passed for the laws of Charondas in Cicero's day or in that of the authority he here follows had a Pythagorean tinge).
Compare also an oracle quoted by Porphyry, de Abstinentia 2. 9
(Bernays, Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 59):—
Xenophon is especially full of the idea that a ruler should rule so as to win willing obedience from the ruled and so as to make them ἑστρωεῖ to him (see e.g. Mem. i. 2. 10: Cyrop. 3. 1. 28: 8. 2. 4). One of the γνῶμαι μοναχικῶς ascribed to Menander (116) runs—

Δουλαὶ πενθωκὲς εὐνάει τῷ διστάζῃ: cp. also the words of the attendant in Eurip. Androm. 58 (quoted by Camerarius, p. 42)—

and Plutarch, Cato Censor, c. 20, where we read of Cato's wife—

παλλακεὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν δουλῶν παιδάρια τῷ μαστῷ προσεμείη κατασκεύαζεν εὐνωιαν ἐκ τῆς συντροφίας πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸν. But the ruler, it would seem, should also feel εὐνωια for the ruled: cp. Democrit. Fragm. Mor. 246 (Mullach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. i. 356), τῶν ἀρχηγῶν δὲ ἥχει πρὸς μὲν τοὺς καρποὺς λογισμόν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόλμαν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὑποτεγαμένους εὐνωιαν: Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praecepta, c. 28. 820 F—821 B (where εὐνωια is used both of the ruler and the ruled): and Dio Chrysost. Or. 2. 97 R, where it is implied that the king, unlike the τύραννος, ἀρχὴ τῶν ὀμοφύλων μετ’ εὐνωιας καὶ ηθικομοιας. Aristotle holds that not merely good-will but friendship (c. 6. 1255 b 13) will exist between the natural slave and his natural master, but, unlike these inquirers, he rests natural slavery, not on the existence of mutual good-will, but on the existence of a certain immense disparity of excellence between master and slave. (It is some years, in writing this commentary, I was led to take the view I have here taken of the meaning of εὐνωια in this passage, and I am glad to find from a note of Mr. Jackson's (Trans. Camb. Philol. Soc. vol. ii. p. 115) that he has independently arrived at a nearly similar conclusion. Sepulveda, in his note on 'Quibusdam benevolentia ius esse videtur' (p. 12 b), long ago explained εὐνωια of the good-will of the ruled to their rulers and their willing consent to be ruled, but this escaped my notice till recently. See also Giphanius' note, p. 68 sq.).

18. αὐτά, 'by itself,' without any addition of good-will; cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 24, συνέφθεται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἔνεκεν αὐτῶν (as contrasted with τὸ τὴν καλῶς): i. 9. 1257 a 25, αὐτὰ γὰρ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς αὐτὰ καταλάττομαι, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ ὀδύν. Findar had implied that the rule of the stronger (Plato, Laws 690 B) and of βία (ibid. 714 E: cp. Gorg. 484 B) is in accordance with nature, but is reproved for this by Plato (Laws 690 C). A confusion or identification of the stronger and the better, as Socrates remarks (Gorg. 488 B—D), pervades
the address of Callicles in that dialogue (see esp. Gorg. 483 D). It is, in Aristotle's view, from a confusion of this very kind that the doctrines of the advocates of Force derive whatever plausibility they possess. Athens had already, according to Isocrates, learnt that Might is not Right; cp. Isocr. De Pace, § 69, ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὗ δίκαιων ἕστι τοῦς κρείττους τῶν Ἡττῶν ἁρχεῖν, ἐν ἑκείναις τε τοῖς χρώμοις τυγχάνο-μεν ἐγρωκότες, καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς παρ' ἥμιν καθεστηκίας.

19. ἔπει ... γε, as in 1254 b 34 (see note), confirms what has been said by introducing a supposition of the contrary: here it confirms διὰ τοῦτο: 'it is owing to the fact that the disputants start from a common principle—the principle that Force is conjoined with Virtue—that a contention between them is possible; for suppose Force and Good-will claimed respectively to be the basis of just slavery, without resting their claims on Virtue, no conflict of opinion would arise; the two claimants would neither of them have a case.' "Ατέρως λόγος, 20, I take to be the line of argument which the two contending parties would have to adopt, if they ceased to shelter their claims under the claims of virtue, and argued in effect that not superiority in virtue, but something else (force or good-will) confers the right to rule. If these words meant 'the one of the two views,' one would rather expect ἀτέρως λόγος.

Διαστάτων ... χωρίς τούτων τῶν λόγων, 'severed from the ground which they occupy in common and set opposite the one to the other' (for χωρίς seems to mean 'apart from each other,' not 'apart from other arguments'), or, in other words, no longer 'overlapping' (ἐπαλλαγότων): cp. peri μακροβιάτητος, i. 464 b 27, where κεχώρισται is used in opposition to ἐπαλλάττει, and Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 15, where διαστάτως is opposed to συνενάζεσθαι, a word used to explain ἐπαλλάττεις in Pol. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 1.

21. ὅλος seems to qualify δικαίων in contrast to δικαίων τινός: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 21, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ λέγειν μέχρι τινός ἐκατέρως δικαίων τι νομίζουσι δικαίων λέγειν ἀπλώς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ, ἐν κατὰ τι ἄνω τι δοσιν, οἷον χρήματι, ὅλος ἀνταναι ἄνωτι ἑβαι, and 3. 9. 1280 a 9, where δικαίων τι is contrasted with τὸ κυρίος δίκαιον. Resting on a ground of right (for such the law in question is: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 3. 1129 b 12, and Pindar, Fragm. 146 (Bergk), quoted by Plato, Gorg. 484 B, Laws 714 E), not on τὸ ὅλος δίκαιον, they argue that slavery in war is universally just, but they contradict themselves in the same breath. ὅλος seems to be placed where it is for the sake of emphasis: for the distance at which it stands from δικαίων, cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 15, where τὴν πόλιν is similarly severed from πάσαν, if we adopt the reading of πῆλ, and see below on 1265 b 15.
26. τοὺς ἐυγενεστάτους. Ἐυγενεία was commonly viewed as akin to ἀληθεία and a kind of superlative degree of it (3. 13. 1283 a 33 sqq.). Hence the transition here and in 32 from the one to the other.

28. αὐτοὺς, i.e. Greeks. It is the way with people to do to others what they would not think of allowing to be done to themselves (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 32 sqq.).

32. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κ.τ.λ. It is interesting to learn from Aristot. Fragm. 82. 1490 α 10 sqq., that the sophist Lycophron had challenged the reality of the distinction between the noble and the ill-born, for the ideas of freedom and nobility lay so close together in the Greek mind, that he or some other sophist may well have gone on to challenge the justifiability of slavery.

33. τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους οίκοι μόνον. Cp. Theophrast. Charact. 31 (Tauchnitz), ἡ μέντοι μήτερ εὐγενὴς θράτα ἐστὶ: τὸ δὲ τοιαύτας φασὶν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι εὐγενεῖς εἶναι, and contrast the saying which Menander puts in the mouth of one of his characters (Inc. Fab. Fragm. 4: Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4. 229):—

ὅς ἄν εὖ γεγονὼς ἡ τῇ φύσει πρὸς ταύτα, κἂν Δίθυνος ἡ, μήτερ, ἐστὶν εὐγενῆς;

Σκύθης τις θλεθρος; ὁ δ’ Ασάχαρις οὐ Σκύθης;

See also Dio Chrysost. Or. 15. 451 R. Isocrates, on the other hand, bluntly refers to the δυσγενεία of the Triballi (De Pace, § 50). The contrast between τὸ ἀνόος εὐγενεῖς and τὸ ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις which the view mentioned by Aristotle implies reminds us of the contrast between natural society and society among the barbarians, which is implied in 1. 2. 1252 a 34—b 6. In 3. 13. 1283 a 35, however, we have ἡ δ’ εὐγενεία παρ’ ἑκάστοις οἴκοι τίμιοι, where no difference is made between barbarians and Greeks.

36. καί is commonly used when an example is adduced: cp. 1. 12. 1259 b 8, ὠπερ καὶ Ἀμασίς.

39. ἄριστη καὶ κακία. A remark of the great Eratosthenes is referred to by Strabo (p. 66) thus: ἐπὶ τέλει δὲ τοῦ ὑπομνήματος ὁ Ἐρατοσθένης οὐκ ἐπανεύρα τοὺς δίχα διαφορώτας ἀπαν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλῆθος εἰς τε Ἑλλήνας καὶ βαρβάρους, καὶ τοῖς Ἀλέξανδρος παραινεύοντας τοῖς μὲν Ἑλληνικῶν ὑπὸ φίλοις χρήσαντα, τοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους ἃς πολεμίους, βέλτιτον εἰναι φησιν ἄριστη καὶ κακία διαφερέω ταῦτα. This may possibly be a comment on some communication of Aristotle's to Alexander (cp. Plutarch, de Fort. Alexandri 1. 6); but Isocrates had said much the same thing in his address to Philip (§ 154: cp. Panath. § 163). Plato had already (Polit. 262 D) found fault with the division of mankind into Greeks and barbarians, and the passage of the Politics
before us shows that Aristotle is really quite at one with Eratosthenes. The fragment of Menander quoted above is in the same spirit. Cp. also Menand. "Ἡρως, Fragm. 2 (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 4, 128),

'Εξρήν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ καλὸν εὐγενεστάτου,
tυδεῦκερον δὲ πανταχοῦ φρονεῖν μέγα.

1255 b. 2. ἡ δὲ φύσις κ.τ.λ. Πολλάκις appears to qualify βούλεται, οὐ μὲντοι δύναται, which words hang together and mean 'wishes without succeeding.' See Dittenberger, Göll. Gel. Anz. Oct. 28, 1874, p. 1371. We find πολλάκις, however, out of its place in 5 (8) 2. 1337 b 20, if we adopt the reading of Π¹, which is probably the correct one, and it may possibly be simply out of its place here. For the thought, cp. de Gen. An. 4. 4. 770 b 3 sqq.: 4. 3. 767 b 5 sq.: Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 22-31: Pol. 1. 2. 1252 a 28 sqq.: 2. 3. 1262 a 21 sqq.: 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 28-30: also Eurip. Fragm. 76, 166, 167 (Nauck), and Plato, Rep. 415 A, ἀτε οὖν ἐννενέεις ὅτες πάντες τὸ μὲν πολὺ ὁμοίους ἄν ύμν αὐτοῖς γεννήσει.


5. καὶ οὖκ εἰσίν κ.τ.λ. These words have been interpreted in many different ways. Bern. (followed by Sus. and others) takes the meaning to be that 'not all actual slaves and freemen are so by nature': Mr. Congreve translates—'it is true that some are not by nature slaves, others by nature free, if you interpret aright the some and the others (οἱ μὲν, οἱ δὲ).' But does not οἱ μὲν mean 'οἱ ἄντροι, as such' (τὸ βιασθεῖν, 1255 a 11: cp. 1255 b 15, τοῖς κατὰ νόμον καὶ βιασθείσι), and οἱ δὲ 'οἱ κρατίτους, as such' (cp. τοῦ βιασθείσιν ὁνομασίαν καὶ κατὰ διόμοις κρατίτους, 1255 a 9)—unless indeed we prefer to explain οἱ μὲν as meaning 'those who are enslaved by force without deserving it,' and οἱ δὲ 'those who enslave others without possessing the superiority of virtue which makes the natural master'?

6. τῷ μὲν . . . τῷ δὲ, neut. (as appears from τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ, 7-8).

9. τὸ δὲ κακὸς, sc. δεσπότειν: 'but a wrongful exercise of this form of rule is disadvantageous to both,' and then follows (τὸ γὰρ ἄντο κ.τ.λ.) the reason why both suffer together from a wrongful exercise of it. This is that master and slave stand to each other as whole and part.

11. μέρος τὴν δεσπότου, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 10 sq.

12. διὸ καὶ συμφέρον κ.τ.λ. 'There is something advantageous to both in common,' 'there is a community of interest': cp. 1. 2. 1252 a 34, διὸ δεσπότη ταῦτα συμφέρει, and Isocrit. Epist. 6. 3, μὴ κανοῦ δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἄντος, οὐκ οὖν ὥσπερ ἄν ἀμφισβήτων.
The test of τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον ( = τὸ δίκαιον, 3. 12. 1282 b 17), which is here applied to slavery, is the proper test to apply to any political institution, for τὸ κοινῆ συμφέρον is a condition of πολιτικῆ φιλία (Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 2 sqq.), and the end of the political union (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 11). Cp. Plato, Rep. 412 D, καὶ μὴν τούτα γάρ ἄν μᾶλλον φιλοί, ὥς εὐμφέρει τῷ γγόνῳ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ οὖν μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνον μὲν εἶ πράπτωντος σίμπα συμβαίνει καὶ ἑαυτῷ εἶ πράπτειν, μὴ δὲ, τούτων. Plato is perhaps thinking of political rule of a despotic kind, rather than of the private relation of master and slave, when he says (Laws 756 E), δοῦλοι γὰρ ἄν καὶ δεσπόται οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο φίλοι. Aristotle himself, however, finds some difficulty in explaining in Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32 sqq., how friendship is possible between an animate instrument like the slave and his master, there being no κοινωνία between them (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 28 sqq.), but here, in the First Book of the Politics, no notice is taken of this difficulty: on the contrary, in Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 30 the slave is termed κοινωνίς (εὐφίλας (where perhaps εὐφίλας and βίος should be distinguished). Compare with the passage before us Xen. Cyrop. 8. 7. 13, τοὺς πιστοὺς τίθενται δὲi ἐκαστὸν ἑαυτῷ ἢ δὲ κηρύσσει αὐτῶν ἄστιν οὐδαμῶς σὺν τῇ βίᾳ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον σὺν τῇ εὐεργεσίᾳ.

14. τοῦτων, i.e. δεσποτείας καὶ δουλείας. Busse (De praesidiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 42) compares such phrases as ἄξιανθα τὸν ὀμοίων, τῶν ἰσαν (2. 9. 1269 b 9, etc.).

15. βιοσθείσι. Aristotle has by this time forgotten that his dative plural agrees with δοῦλο καὶ δεσπότης, and that βιοσθείσι, which suits only with δοῦλος, should have been replaced by a word which would have applied to δεσπότης also.

16. καὶ ἓ τοῦτων. The fact had been already proved (cp. 1252 a 17) by tracing the development of κοινωνία: it had already been shown that δεσποτεία and πολιτικῆ ἀρχῆ belong to different κοινωνίαι: now it is shown that both the ruled and the mode of rule differ in the two cases.

17. ἄλληλας, sc. ταῦτών. With his usual economy of words, Aristotle makes ταῦτών do here, though it fits in somewhat roughly.

19. ἣ μὲν οἰκονομικῆ, sc. ἀρχῆ. The household seems to be here viewed as under a μονορχία (the three forms of which are βασιλεία, τυραννία, αἰσχρημνία, 3. 14. 1285 a 17, 30: 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 18), because, though the rule of the husband over the wife is a πολιτικῆ ἀρχῆ (1. 12. 1259 b 1), the rule of the father over the child is a βασιλικῆ ἀρχῆ (ibid.), and that of the master over the slave is
NOTES.

Perhaps, however (cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 37 sq., where οἰκονομικῆς ἄρχης is distinguished from δεσποτεία), the relation of master and slave may not be included under οἰκονομικῆς ἄρχης. In that case οἰκονομικῆς ἄρχης will be a rule over free persons, but not over free and equal persons, like πολιτικῆς ἄρχης. It must be remembered that the equals over whom πολιτικῆς ἄρχης is said to be exercised are not necessarily ἵστοι κατ’ ἄρθρῳν, for they may be only ἵστοι κατ’ ἀναλογίαν (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 27).

20. ὁ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Φανερὸν δὲ, 16 ... ἄρχη, 20, is parenthetical, and μὲν οὖν introduces a reaffirmation of what had been already implied in the definition of master and slave (1255 b 6 sqq.)—that a master is a master by virtue of his nature—in order that a transition may be made to δεσποτικῆς ἐπιστήμης and βουλευκῆς ἐπιστήμης, and that these sciences, and especially the former, which Plato and Xenophon and Socrates had set on the level of βασιλικῆς, πολιτικῆς, and οἰκονομικῆς, may be replaced on the humble level which is really theirs. Xenophon had said (Oecon. c. 13. 5), ὅσις γὰρ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύναται ποιεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι οὖσα καὶ δεσποτικοίς ἀνθρώποις δύναται διδάσκειν ὅσις δὲ δεσποτικοῖς, δύναται ποιεῖν καὶ βασιλικοῖς, and again (Oecon. c. 21. 10), διὸ ἐὰν ἰδοὺς [οἱ ἔργαται] κινηθῶσι, καὶ μένοι ἐκάστῳ ἐμπέσῃ τῶν ἐργάτων καὶ φιλονεκρία πρὸς ἄλλους καὶ φιλοσοφεῖ τοιοῦτον οὔτε ἐκάστῳ τούτοις ἑωφιν ἐκ τινων βασιλικοῦ. This is just what Aristotle wishes to contest here and elsewhere in the First Book of the Politics. His way is to trace everywhere in Nature the contrast of the conditionally necessary (τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεων ἀναγκαῖον) and the noble (τὸ καλὸν), and he makes it his business to distinguish carefully between the two. His work on the Parts of Animals is largely taken up with the inquiry, 'what share Necessity and the Final Cause respectively have in their formation' (see Dr. Ogle’s translation, p. xxxv). To mix up the δεσποτικῆς ἐπιστήμης with πολιτικῆς or βασιλικῆς is to lose sight of this contrast. The management of slaves has for him nothing of τὸ καλὸν (4. 7). 3. 1325 a 25, οὐδὲν γὰρ τὸ γε δοῦλον, ἤ δοῦλος, χρῆσας σεμνὸν ἢ γὰρ ἑπτάζως ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδὲν μετέχει τῶν καλῶν. Ας τὸ τούσδε εἶναι, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 13. 1127 b 15, κατὰ τὴν ἐξίν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τούσδε εἶναι ἀλαζῶν ἐστιν, and 6. 13. 1143 b 24-28. Aristotle’s object is to correct Plato, who had said (Polit. 259 B), ταύτην δὲ (sc. τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐπιστήμην) ὁ κεκτημένος οὐκ, ἀν τε ἄρχον ἀν τε ἰδιώτης ἄν τυχόν, πάντως κατὰ γε τὴν τέχνην αὐτήν βασιλικὸς ὄρθως προσφηγήσηται; Δίκαιον γὰρ. Καὶ μὴν οἰκονόμος γε καὶ δεσποτής ταύτων. The possession of the science of directing slaves in their work is not of the essence of the master (cp. c. 13. 1260 b 3 sq.), and
therefore he is not defined by it. The master may dispense with such knowledge by employing a steward (35).

25. τους παιδας, 'the slaves.' Camerarius (Interp. p. 45) aptly refers to the Δουλαδιδάσκαλος of the comic poet Pherecrates. 'Ex ea fabulae parte, in qua ministrandi praecepta servo dabantur, petita suspicor quae leguntur apud Athenaeum, xi. p. 408 b—

νυνι δ' ἀπανίζειν τὴν κύλικα δᾶς ἐμπειν ἐγχειν τ' ἐπιθεὶς τὸν ἠθόπον,

et xv. p. 699 f—

ἀνυών πον' ἐξελθὼν, σκότας γὰρ γίγνεται,
καὶ τὸν λυχναῖον ἐκφέρ' ἐνθεὶς τὸν λύχνου'


εἶ ὅ τιν κ.τ.λ. We rather expect ὀφσοποιήσε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν τὴν διακονίας, but this slight looseness is characteristic. Perhaps with ὀφσοποιήμενοι we should supply 'might be taught.' The example introduced by οἷς is sometimes put in the nom.—e. g. in 7 (5). i. i. 1313 b 12, ἄλλ' εἶναι κατασκάπτως, οἷν περὶ διακονίας αἱ παταγωγίδες καθιόμεναι. It would seem that the teacher at Syracuse confined his instructions to a portion only of the services needful to the household; Aristotle suggests that other and higher kinds of service should also be taught, such as cooking. For ἐπὶ πλεῖον, see Ast, Lexicon Platon. 3. 113: 'cum v. εἶναι et δύνασθαι est plus valere vel latius patere'—the latter here. Socrates had recognized a right and a wrong in ὀφσοποίμα (Xen. Mem. 3. 14. 5), but Plato counts ὀφσοποιοῖ ή καὶ μάγευμα among the accompaniments of a φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις (Rep. 373 C): Aristotle's not unfriendly reference to the art in the passage before us illustrates his substitution (4 (7). 5. 1326 b 31: 2. 6. 1265 a 31 sqq.) of σωφρόνως καὶ σωφρείρως as the ideal standard of living for the Platonic σωφρόνως. He was himself charged by Timaeus the historian and others with being an epicure (see Polyb. 12. 24. 2, where Timaeus is quoted as saying that writers disclose by the matters on which they dwell frequently, what their favourite inclinations are—τὸν δ' Ἀριστοτέλην, ὀφσφροντα σωφρικὰς ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν, ὀφσφράγιοι εἶναι καὶ λύχνοι: see also Grote's note, Aristotle 1. 24). Rational ways of living needed to be upheld against the savagery of the Cynics and the asceticism of some other schools. Besides, if the household slave could be taught to cook better, there would be all the less need to have recourse, in accordance with a common Greek practice, to the services of outside professionals. 'With the Macedonian times came in the fashion, continued by the Romans, of having cooks among the slaves of their
household, a custom apparently unknown to the earlier Athenians. . . . The reader will here again notice the curious analogy to the history of medicine, for among the late Greeks, and among the Romans, the household physician was always a slave attached to the family’ (Mahaffy, Social Life in Greece, p. 287, ed. 1).

27. γὰρ introduces the reason why instruction on these subjects should be extended, as Aristotle suggests.

29. πρό, according to Suidas (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 17) properly meant ἀντὶ in this proverb, but Aristotle quotes it in a different sense. Another proverb may be compared (Strabo 8. p. 339):

ἔστι Πύλος πρὸ Πύλου. Πύλος γε μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλος,
or in a slightly varied form (Leutsh and Schneidewin, Paroemiogr. Gr. 2. 423):

ἔστι τόκως πρὸ τόκων. τόκος γε μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλος.

32. τοὺς δούλους, yet in 33 δούλους: see below on 1259 b 21.

33. οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδὲ σεμνόν. Cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 25 sqq.: 3. 4. 1277 a 33 sqq.: and contrast the tone of the Oeconomicus of Xenophon, who, as we have already seen (above on 1255 b 20), finds in the direction of farm-work, and the winning of cheerful and vigorous service from slaves, a good school of political and even kingly rule (cc. 13, 21).

36. ἐπίτροπος. For the absence of the article, see Bon. Ind. 109 b 36, and cp. Eth. Nic. i. 4. 1097 a 8, ἀπορον δὲ καὶ τὶ ἀφελήθησαι ὑφάντησι ἡ τέκτων κ.τ.λ. Vict. compares Magn. Mor. i. 35. 1198 b 12 sqq., where φρόνοις is described as ἐπίτροπος τις τῆς σοφίας, for the ἐπίτροπος, though managing everything, οὐδεὶς ἀρχεῖ πάντων, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζει τῷ δεσπότῃ σχολήν, διότι ἂν ἔκεινοι δὲ κωλυόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνεμακαίρων ἐκκλείσαντο τού τῶν καλῶν τι καὶ προηγηκότων πράττετοι: cp. also the story of Pheraulas and Sacas (Xen. Cyrop. 8. 3. 39–50).

The ἐπίτροπος would be himself a slave ([Aristot.] Oecon. 1. 5. 1344 a 25 sq.), though one would think that it would not be easy to find a φύσει δούλος fit for the position. Contrast the tone of this passage with that of Oecon. 1. 6. 1345 a 5, ἐπισκεπτέον ὅυν τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν (τὸν δεσπότην), τὰ δὲ τὴν γυναῖκα, ὅσο ἐκατέρως διαφερεῖται τὰ ἔργα τῆς οἰκονομίας καὶ τούτο πουτέρου ἐν μικρὰς οἰκονομίοις διαλέκτοις, ἐν δὲ ἐπιτροπευμέναις πολλάκις κ.τ.λ. This is more in Xenophon's tone.

For a similar contrast between the teaching of this book of the Politics and the so-called First Book of the Oeconomicus, see note on 1256 a 11.

37. ἦ δὲ κτητική, sc. δούλων, takes up ἐν τῷ κτάσει, 32. ὀμφατέρων τούτων, i. e. δεσποτική καὶ δουλική ἐπιστήμη.
38.ὅλων here, as Bonitz points out (Ind. 502 a 7 sqq.), is explanatory (= 'nempe, nimirum, scilicet'), as in 3. 13. 1283 b 1 and other passages, rather than illustrative by instance or comparison.

ἡ δικαία. Cp. i. 8. 1256 b 23 sq. and Isocr. Panath. § 163: also 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 38-1334 a 2. The just and natural way of acquiring slaves is by raids of a hunting or campaigning type on φόνες δεινοὶ. Πολεμικὴ τις οὐσα ἡ θερετικὴ is added in explanation of ἄτρα ἀμφιέρων τούτων, and to show that this science is neither identical with δουλικὴ nor with διεσποτικὴ ἐπιστήμη. Being allied to war and the chase, it is more worthy of a freeman than the other two.

I. χρηματιστικής. This word is of frequent occurrence in cc. C. 8. 1256 a. 8-10, and also in c. 11, and the sense in which it is used varies greatly. Taking cc. 8-10 first, we shall find that, apart from passages in which the word is used in an indeterminate sense (such as 1256 a 1, 1257 b 5, 9, 18), it is used

(1) like κτητική (1256 b 27, 40), in a sense inclusive of both the sound and the unsound form (1257 a 17, b 2, 36, 1258 a 6, 37):

(2) of the unsound form (1257 a 29, 1258 a 8), which is also designated ἡ μᾶλλον χρηματιστική (1256 b 40 sq.), ἡ κατηκολλημένη χρηματιστική (1257 b 20), ἡ μὴ ἀναγκαία χρηματιστική (1258 a 14), ἡ μεταβλητική χρηματιστική (1258 b 1):

(3) of the sound form (1258 a 20, 28), which is also designated χρηματιστικὴ κατὰ φόσων (1257 b 19), ὀικονομικὴ χρηματιστικὴ (1257 b 20), ἡ ἀναγκαία χρηματιστική (1258 a 16).

In c. 11, on the other hand, ἡ χρηματιστική is made to include not two forms, but three (1258 b 12 sqq.), and these three forms are—A. ἡ ὄικεστικὴ χρηματιστικὴ (1258 b 20), referred to as ἡ κατὰ φόσων in 1258 b 28: B. ἡ μεταβλητικὴ χρηματιστικὴ (1258 b 21): C. a kind midway between the two (1258 b 27 sqq.). In τοῖς τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν (c. 11. 1259 a 5) the word seems to be used in an unfavourable sense.

2. κατὰ τὸν ὑφήγημένον τρόπον. Cp. c. i. 1252 a 17, τὴν ὑφήγημένην μέθοδον. Either the transition from the slave (the part) to κτήσις (the whole) is here said to be in conformity with Aristotle's accustomed mode of inquiry, or the plan is foreshadowed by which the nature of κτήσις and χρηματιστική is ascertained through an analysis of them into their parts (cp. 1256 a 16, ἡ δὲ κτήσις πολλὰ περιελήφθη μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος), or again the meaning may be that Aristotle will continue to follow τὰ πρώτα μακάρια φύμενα, as he in fact does in the sequel. Probably the first of these interpretations is the correct one.
NOTES.


10. χαλκός. Some MSS. have χωλός (for the nom. in sentences introduced by οἶνον, see above on 1255 b 25).

11. τῆς μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Contrast Oecon. 1. 1. 1343 a 8, ὡστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἀν εἶναι καὶ κτῆσασθαι οἶκον καὶ χρησασθαι αὐτῷ: Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 a 9, οἰκονομικὴς δὲ (τέλος) πλῶτον: and indeed Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 24, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἐτέρα ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτᾶσθαι, τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἐργὸν ἐστίν, which agrees with Oecon. 1. 3. 1344 a 2. Probably in these passages of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics οἰκονομία as it actually is, not as it ought to be, is in view. For Aristotle seems not only here but elsewhere to make 'using' the proper business of οἰκονομία (see c. 7. 1255 b 31 sq.: c. 10. 1258 a 21 sq.: 3. 4. 1277 a 35: Sus.² Note 68).


14. ἐστὶν, sc. ἢ χρηματιστική. The change of subject strikes us as strange, but a similar one occurs in Metaph. Γ. 2. 1004 b 22—25, περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἢ σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προορίσει. Aristotle reverts to the nominative with which he started (3—4) on his inquiry.

15. εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Vahlen, in his note on Poet. 6. 1450 b 18, holds that εἰ γὰρ is here used in the same sense as in Rhet. 3. 17. 1418 a 35, where he reads with the best MS. λέγουν (not λέγει, as Bekker). The meaning will then be—'for this is so' (i.e. 'a dispute may arise on this subject'), 'if, for example,' etc. He therefore places a comma only after διαμφισβητήσειν. (For Susemihl's view see Sus.³ and Qu. Crit. p. 350 sq.) But the passage resembles so closely other passages in Aristotle introduced by εἰ, in which a kind of apodosis begins with ὡστε, that it seems better to interpret εἰ γὰρ as commencing a new sentence, and to place a colon or full stop after διαμφισβητήσειν.
The following passages will serve as illustrations—Metaph. I. 4. 1055 a 22, δῶς τε ἐν ἡ ἐναριστής διαφορά, ἢ δὲ διαφόρα δυσών, ὡστε καὶ ἡ τέλεως: Phys. 6. 1. 232 a 12, ἐλ οὖν ἀνάγκη ἢ ἥρμην ἢ κατάθαλ πάν, ἥρμην δὲ καθ' ἐκαστὸν τῶν ΑΒΓ, διὸ ὡστε οὐκ ἦσταν τι συνεχώς ἥρμηνον ἁμα καὶ κυστόμενον. (See Vahlen’s note on Poet. 9. 1452 a 10: Bon. Ind. 873 a 31 sqq.: Bonitz, Aristotel. Studien, 3. 106–124. This use of ὡστε may have been common in conversational Greek.) Whichever view we take of the passage, the doubt whether χρηματιστική is a part of οἰκονομική, or something quite different, will be said to arise from the multifariousness of the forms of acquisition falling under χρηματιστική. (This is no doubt more neatly expressed, if with Vahlen we take εἶ γάρ as — εἴπερ.) It is implied to be easier to imagine χρηματιστική a part of οἰκονομική if it comprises agriculture and sound modes of acquisition of the same kind, than if it has to do with less natural modes, exclusively or otherwise. This is quite in harmony with the subsequent course of the inquiry, which results in the two-fold conclusion that agriculture and other similar ways of acquiring necessaries do form a part of χρηματιστική, and that this part of χρηματιστική is a part of οἰκονομική (cp. c. 8. 1256 b 26 and 37). To mark off the sound section of χρηματιστική from the unsound is, in fact, the first step towards relating χρηματιστική to οἰκονομική.

17. πρῶτον. Σκεπτέων, or some such word, is dropped. The omission of words which will readily be supplied is characteristic of Aristotle’s style.

19. καὶ κτήσις is added, it would seem, because ἐπιμέλεια does not clearly convey what is meant by κτήσις τροφῆς. What this is, appears from Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1120 a 8, χρῆσις δ’ εἰσίν δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἢ δὲ λήψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτήσις μᾶλλον. We find χρημάτων κτήσις mentioned in Pol. 1. 9. 1257 b 30.

ἀλλὰ μὴν, ‘but further there are many kinds of nutriment’—not only many kinds of property (16), but many kinds of nutriment, and articles of subsistence are only one sort of property.


23. τε γάρ is here taken up by ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ, 29, as in 1254 a 9, 2. 9. 1269 a 36 sqq., Hist. An. 8. 1. 588 b 24, etc. See Eucken de Partic. usu, 17–20. The classification here adopted (ζωοφάγα, καρποφάγα, παμφάγα) is not probably offered as absolutely exhaustive, for in Hist. An. 8. 6. 595 a 13–17 we find παμφάγα and μιξοφάγα ζώα distinguished in addition to καρποφάγα, and in Hist. An. 1. 1. 488 a
14, in addition to σαρκαφάγα, καρπαφάγα, and παμφάγα, we hear of ἰδιότραφα, αἰών τὸ τῶν μελιττῶν γένος καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρεχρῶν. Bernays understands Aristotle to connect gregariousness with an exclusively vegetable diet, and it certainly is not quite clear how he intends to class omnivorous animals. So far as they are carnivorous, we must suppose that they will be solitary. As to carnivorous animals, cp. Hist. An. i. i. 488 a 5, γαμψάφωνυχαν δ’ οἴδεν ἄγελαιον. Vict. remarks—' nam aquilae, si gregatim volarent, longe viserentur, quare aves quibus aluntur se abderent; nunc autem solae, ideoque non conspectae, inopinantes illas capiunt: neque etiam invenirent simul tantos ipsarum greges, ut possent ipsis vesci.' I am informed that 'true as what Aristotle says is upon the whole, still there are many exceptions: e.g. nearly all Canidae, some seals, sand-martins, and some vultures are gregarious and yet carnivorous. Hares and some other rodents are grain-eating but not gregarious.' Fish are often gregarious, yet piscivorous. The carrion-eating condor is 'in a certain degree gregarious' (Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle, p. 183). As to the hearing of the food of animals on the duration of pairing, see Locke, Civil Government, 2. § 79.

28. πρὸς τὰς ῥαστῶνας, 'ad commoditatem victus' (Bon. Ind. s. v.).

αἴρεσις is perhaps used here and nowhere else by Aristotle in its simplest sense of 'taking' or 'getting'; it is thus that Bonitz would seem to interpret the word here (Ind. 18 b 38), for he marks off this passage from others in which it bears its usual meaning of 'choice.' Aristotle needed a word applicable at once to ζώα, καρποῖ, etc., and he finds it in αἴρεσις. So Vict.: 'Natura tribuit singulis rationem eam, qua commode copioseque vivant, et sumant non magno labore quibus pascantur.' Sepulveda, however, translates—'itaque Natura, prout ratio postulat facile parandi cibum quem genus quodque animantium consortatur, vistas eorum distinctit,' and I do not feel certain that he is wrong (Lamb. 'harum rerum electionem': Giph. 'delectu earum').

τοῦτον, 'the different kinds of food.'

27. ἐκάστῳ, not 'each individual member of the three classes of animals,' but 'each of the species contained in a class' is probably meant.


29. ὀμοιώς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. These words apparently answer
to τῶν τε γὰρ θηρίων (see above on 23). If so, we have here a further illustration of the remark made in 21–22, αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τῶν βίων πεποιήκασι διαφέροντα τῶν ζῴων. It would indeed be easy to supply οἱ διόι πρὸς ἄλληνος διεστάσων from the previous sentence, and the tautology of πολὺ γὰρ διαφέροντας κ.τ.λ. is not decisive against this, but there are other cases (as has been pointed out above) in which τε γὰρ is answered by ὁμοιός δὲ καὶ, and irrespectively of this it seems likely that the genitive is of the same kind as in 1253 b 27, or in 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 30, δημοκρατία τε γάρ οὐ μία τῶν ἄριθμῶν ἐστι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοιός, or in Phys. 8. 8. 263 a 1, καὶ τῶν κυνήσεων ἄρα ὁμοιότατον: cp. 1256 b 6, ὁμοιός δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. The translation will then be, 'the same thing holds good of men too'—i.e. their mode of life also differs according to the food on which they live. Pastoral nomads live on tame animals (31), hunters on fish or wild birds or beasts, brigands on their booty, whatever it may be, husbandmen on the produce of the soil and the fruits of domesticated plants and trees.

31. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄργαται. Μὲν οὖν (which is taken up by οἱ δὲ 35) introduces a confirmation in detail of what has just been said (‘saepe usurpatur, ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur,’ Bon. Ind. 540 b 42). For ἄργαται, cp. ἄρστάνας 26, and Herodotus' account of the Thracians (5. 6, ἄργαν ἔως κάλλιστον [κάρκιται], γῆς δὲ ἄργατην ἀτιμῶσαν τὸ ζῆν ἀπὸ πολέμου καὶ ληστῶν κάλλιστον). The remark illustrates the effect of men's food on their mode of life. Is there a hint that the nomads live most like the golden race, who are described by Hesiod (Op. et Dies 112 sqq.) as living νόσθων ἄτερ τε πάνω καὶ ἄξιοι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ θηρίων ἔχουσι (compare the 'table of the sun' among the Ethiopians, Hdt. 3. 18)—most like the infant who simply draws on the stores of nature? It is possible, but it would be rash to assert this. For races are apparently held by Aristotle to take a step in advance, when they exchange the wandering pastoral life for the hard-working life of tillers of the soil (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 14). The leisure of nomad life may be too dearly purchased. On the merits of a pastoral (not nomad) population, see Pol. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 19 sqq. For the contrast of Aristotle's views as to the natural mode of life with those of Dicaearchus, see vol. i. p. 128, note 2.

32. ἄναγκαιον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. de Part. An. 4. 6. 682 b 6, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν πτημῶν διὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ βίος ναμαδικός καὶ διὰ τὴν τροφῆν ἄναγκαιον ἐκποίησιν κ.τ.λ. Their way of moving about is enforced on them; their mode of life is none the less on the whole lazy and effortless, because they cannot avoid changing pastures from time to time.
36. ἀγορεύεις. In treating ἀγορεύεια as a form of hunting (like Plato, Laws 823 B) and a natural way of acquiring food, Aristotle is not thinking of the pickpocket or highwayman of civilized societies —this kind of ἀγορεύς is called by him ἀδικοποιηθείς and ἀδελειδερος (Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1122 a 7) and ἀδικος (Eth. Nic. 5. io. 1134 a 19)— but of ἀγορεύεια as he meets with it in the pages of Homer, or of the wild ἀγορεύομαι ἔθνη mentioned by him in Pol. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 23. The Etruscans were 'even more pirates than traders' (Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, i. 169), and practised piracy not only in the Western Mediterranean but even in the Adriatic (see Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, vol. i. p. 184) at the very time at which Aristotle was writing. Mr. C. T. Newton (Contemp. Rev. Dec. 1876) mentions a bronze plate recording a treaty between two cities of Locris, Oianthe and Chalion, which stipulates that it shall be lawful for the citizens of both States to commit piracy anywhere except within their own or their ally's harbours. 'The date of this inscription,' he adds, 'is probably not earlier than B.C. 431.' Cp. also Cic. de Rep. 3. 9. 15: vitae vero instituta sic distant, ut Cretes et Aetoli latrocinari honestum patent. The Western Mediterranean was a scene of piracy down, probably, even to the time of Aristotle and later (Meltzer, Gesch. der Karthager, i. 342 sqq.). The Greeks, after all, felt that the robber had something of the warrior about him. Both Plato (Laws 845 C) and Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. 2. 6 sq.) approve the Spartan tolerance of adroit theft of necessaries. Aristotle makes ἀγορεύεια a kind of hunting, and hunting a kind of war (1256 b 23). We ourselves look back on the Vikings with admiration; yet, as Mr. Burton says (History of Scotland, 3. 232), the Vikings 'got their capital by force.' It should be noticed, however, that in c. 11 ἀγορεύεια is passed over in silence, and indeed ἐθνευτική in general. Aristotle apparently regards ἀγορεύαι as plunderers for the sake of subsistence, for in 1256 a 19—b 7 he seems to be concerned with the provision of τροφή: he may perhaps also regard them as in the main appropriators of articles of food—grain, cattle, and the like. He does not explain how a brigand or pirate's mode of life is marked off from others by a difference of nutriment, and it is not clear how it can be called αὐτόφυος.

37. τοιαύτης, 'suitable for fishing': cp. τοιαύτα 1253 a 24, where the sense is 'possessed of the power of performing their appointed work'—so here 'possessed of the power of supplying fish.' See on τοιαύτα Riddell, Plato's Apology, p. 137.

39. τῶν ἡμέρων καρπῶν. Aristotle does not include in his
enumeration those who live on the fruits of wild trees, like the 'acorn-eating Arcadians' (Hdt. r. 66: Alcaeus, Fragm. 91) of early days, before Demeter and Dionysus had given men corn and wine (Leutsch and Schneidewin, Parosm. Gr. r. 42).

40. ὁ τοῖς γε αὐτόφυτον κ.τ.λ. Giph. 'vitae genus quod naturae instinctu agat et actionem habeat naturalem': Bern. 'diejenigen (Lebensweisen), welche auf Ausbeutung von Naturerzeugnissen beruhen': Sus. 'welche eine unmittelbar-natürliche Thätigkeit betreiben.' Vict., however, translates 'vitae quaeque suam e seque natam culturam habent,' and explains the words in his commentary 'vita quae pariat ipsa vi sua sineque alius auxilio quod alat'; and Liddell and Scott interpret αὐτόφυτον ἐργαία here as = αὐτουργία, a rendering not far removed from that of Vict., which is probably right — compare such words as αὐτόπτως (Soph. O. C. 696), αὐτοτέλεστος, αὐτογένεθλος. The meaning will then be 'lives whose work is self-wrought,' and not achieved with the help, or at the expense, of others, like the life of ἄλλογη καὶ καπηλεία. Cp. r. 10. 1258 a 40, τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψευδομένης δικαίως (οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλα ἀπ᾽ ἄλληλων ἑστίν), Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 a 21, διὸ τοὺς ἀλευρίους καὶ τοὺς ἄνθρωπος τιμῶν καὶ τοὺς δικαίους· τοιούτους δὲ ὑπολαμβάνωσι τοὺς μὴ ἀπ᾽ ἑτέρων ἔστιν· τοιούτῳ δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔργασθαι, καὶ τοιῶν οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα, and [Plut.] Inst. Lac. c. 12.

41. δι᾽ ἄλλαγῆς καὶ καπηλείας. Καπηλεία is perhaps meant to explain and limit ἄλλαγῆ, for ἄλλαγη up to a certain point is natural (1257 a 15, 28). Still even the simplest form of ἄλλαγη may possibly not deserve the epithet αὐτόφυτον.

3. προσαναπληροῦστες κ.τ.λ., 'eking out the shortcomings of one 1256 b. mode of life, where it falls short of completeness of provision, by adding on some other.' The superlative ἐνδεέστατον is perhaps used because men may be ἐνδεεῖς not only εἰς τῶν θηραίων, as in the case before us, but also εἰς ἐπεροχήν ἢ εἰς ἀπόλαυσιν (Rhet. r. 12. 1372 b 24 sq.); or else it is used here, as elsewhere by Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. 403 a 3 sq.), in a sense in which the use of the comparative would seem more natural. 'Ἡ τυχανεί τ.τ.λ. implies that the added mode of life must be one which will supply the deficiencies of the other: thus when brigandage is added to the nomadic life, or hunting to agriculture, it is because brigandage and hunting fill up gaps which the pastoral and agricultural modes of life leave unfilled. Compare Strabo, p. 833. 27 sqq.: Dio Chrysostom's picture (Or. 7. 224 R) of the life of the rude Euboean mountaineers, ἔμεθεν δὲ ἀπὸ θηρας ἀπὸ τὸ πολὺ, μικρὸν τι τῆς γῆς ἐπεργαζόμενοι: Diodorus' picture of the Ligurians (5. 39. 3, κυρ-
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γίας δὲ ποιοῦνται συνέχεια, εν αἷς πολλὰ τῶν θηρίων χειρούμενοι τὴν ἐκ τῶν καρπῶν σπάνυ διαφθονται: and Leyden's of the Border people (Scenes of Infancy):—

'The Scott, to rival realms a mighty bar,
Here fixed his mountain home: a wide domain,
And rich the soil, had purple heath been grain;
But what the niggard soil of wealth denied,
From fields more blessed his fearless arm supplied.'

'The Shetlander is a fisherman who has a farm; the Orkneyman a farmer who has a boat' (Tudor's Orkneys and Shetland, quoted in the Saturday Review for July 14, 1883).

4. αὐτάρκης, i. e. ἐν τοῖς ἄνογκαίους (cp. 4 (7), 4. 1326 b 4), which is a very different thing from αὐτάρκεια τοῦ εὖ λυν (3. 9. 1280 b 34).

6. συναναγκάζεται. Bernays: 'wie das Bedürfniss zum Verbinden verschiedener Lebensweisen treibt' (compels them to combine different modes of life). But if we look back to 1256 a. 27, we shall see that it is taste (τὸ ἕδος) that leads men to select this or that mode of life, though necessity may force them to eke it out with some other: will not the meaning therefore be—'as necessity in conjunction with taste may compel'? Cp. Rhet. 2. 7. 1385 b 2, where it is pointed out that a service may be explained away by the plea that those who rendered it did not render it out of kindness alone, but were in part compelled (συνηγαγόσθησαν): [Demosth.] adv. Aristog. 2. c. 10, ἡ προσαρμομένος ἡ συναναγκαζόμενος: and Xen. Hiero 3. 9.

7. τοιαῦτη, that which is necessary for sustenance, and which is αὐτόφυτος. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 13. 1118 b 18, ἀναπληρώσει γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἡ φυσικὴ ἐπιθυμία.

8. φαίνεται διδομένη, 'is evidently given.'

πάνυ, here not 'all human beings' (as in 1253 a 30), but 'all animals.'

9. κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν. We have the proof of this in 10—15, and οἱ τελειωθέντων in 15—20, as Prof. Jowett has already remarked. The expression κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐν τῇ μητρί γένεσιν occurs in Eth. Eud. 1. 5. 1216 a 7.

11. τοιαῦτην . . . ὡς. Eucken (de Partic. usu, p. 51—52) finds in Aristotele's writings only one other instance of this use of ὡς—Pol. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32. He adds—'paullo saepius in libris pseudo-Aristotelis particula ὡς eo modo usurpatur.'

of the contents of the egg is intended only to serve as nutriment for the young creature; it is used for that purpose and there is an end of it: the lower part of the σκώλης, on the contrary, though in Aristotle's view it furnishes in the first place nutriment to the upper and thus aids its growth, begins itself, after it has done this, to grow and receive articulation; and thus no part of the σκώλης can be said, as a part of the egg can, to be set apart simply and permanently for the sole purpose of nutriment. This is explained in de Gen. An. 3. 11. 763 a 9–16, "πωσύναι δὲ καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν ὁμοίας τοῖς σκώλησιν ἑπὶ τὰ ἀνω γὰρ καὶ τὴν ἄρχην αὐξάνονται οἱ σκώλησες ἐν τῷ κάτω γὰρ ἢ τροφῆ τοῖς ἄνω· καὶ τοῦτο γε ὁμοίως ἦκε τοῖς ἐκ τῶν φώων, πλὴν ἐκεῖνα μὲν καταλαίησαν πάν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς σκώλησισκοκυμένωσιν, ὅταν αὔξησθ' ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ κάτω μορίῳ συντάσσω τὸ ἀνω μόριον, οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἐντολοῦσα διαφορώσεται τὸ κάταβην.

On the σκώλης and τὰ σκώλησισκοκυμένα (i.e. Insects, Hist. An. 5. 19. 550 b 26), see Dr. Ogle's translation of Aristotle on the Parts of Animals, p. xxvii sqq. I can find space only for the following quotation. 'It has been supposed that Aristotle had in some extraordinary way overlooked the eggs of insects, and fancied that these animals produce primarily grubs or maggots. This, however, was not so. He says that there are two kinds of scolex, one capable of motion, in other words a grub or maggot, the other incapable of motion, and so excessively like an ovum in shape, size, and consistency, as to be indistinguishable from it, excepting by considering its ulterior changes (de Gen. An. 3. 9. 758 b 10 sqq.).' The only difference between the case of σκώλησισκοκυμένα and φυτοκούντα on the one hand and ἐγγεγοιτηθέντα on the other is, that τὸ λειπόμενον (1258 a 36)—i.e. the surplus material beyond that which is drawn upon in the process of generation—is in the former case severed from the mother, inasmuch as it forms a part of the egg or σκώλης, while in the case of ἐγγεγοιτηθέντα it is retained within the person of the mother in the form of milk. Cp. de Gen. An. 3. 2. 752 b 19 sqq., ἡ γὰρ φύσις ἄμα τὴν τε τοῦ ζύζου ὑπὸ ἐν τῷ φώῳ δῖλθη καὶ τὴν ἑκαρν ἐπεὶ τῷ τροφῆν πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὗ δύναται τελεύων ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ ὁρμή, συνεκτίκει τὴν τροφῆν ἐν τῷ φώῳ τοῖς μὲν γὰρ σκώλησισκοκυμένωσιν ἐν ἄλλω μορίῳ γίνεται ἡ τροφή, τὸ καλουσανόν γάλα, ἐν τοῖς μαστοῖς τοῖς δ' ὑφισθείπτων τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις ἐν τῷ φώῳ τοὺς κατανεύοντας μόνον ἡ οὐ τε ἄνθρωποι οἰσται καὶ Ἀλκμαίων φησὶν ὁ Κροτονικάτης, οὗ γὰρ τὸ λευκόν ἐστι γάλα, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀλφρόν τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τροφή τοῖς νεοτοῖς. In the case of many kinds of fish, indeed, and among them the Salmonidae, provision is made.
for the sustenance of the young even after they have left the egg. This has long been known to naturalists. ‘When the little fish emerge from the eggs, they have a large bag, the umbilical vesicle, attached to their stomachs; this contains the nourishment which is to serve them for several (three to eight) weeks’ subsistence, and they do not commonly take in any food by the mouth until it is absorbed’ (from a Paper on Salmon; by F. Day, Esq., F.L.S.). On milk as an evidence of the providence of Nature, see Plutarch de Amore Prolis, c. 3, an interesting passage already noticed in vol. i. p. 30, note 2.

13. τοῖς γενναμένοις. See critical note.

15. φύσις. Cp. ἡ φύσις τῶν φλεβῶν, Hist. An. 3. 2. 511 b 20, where ‘notio vocis φύσις adeo delitescit, ut meram peripherasin nominis esse putes,’ though this is not really quite the case (Bon. Ind. 838 a 9 sq.). Cp. also ὁμοίωματα παρὰ τὰς ἄλλους φύσις, 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 18. ‘Thing’ or ‘object’ seems to approach the sense of φύσις used in this way. So Bern., ‘den Stoff, den wir Milch nennen.’

ὡστε. The argument is that if there is a provision of nutriment for the creature in process of birth, it is not likely that nutriment should not be forthcoming for it when past that early stage. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1237 a 29, ὅτε ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄτελη (τὰ ἄμα ἄλληλοι χαίρει), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τελειωθήτα. Aristotle, however, carries his inference further, and argues that not only nutriment but ἄλλο ἄργαμα will be forthcoming. We see how large is the superstructure which he raises on the fact that in every species of animal a provision of nutriment is made for the earliest moments of existence.

γενναμένοις, which Sus. places within brackets, may well bear somewhat the same meaning as τελειωθεῖσιν, which he substituted for it in his first and second editions (cp. Meteor. 4. 2. 379 b 20, ὅταν γὰρ πεφῆ, τετελεισάτε τε καὶ γέγενεν: Metaph. B. 4. 999 b 11). Геноменос may perhaps be used as a more comprehensive term than τελειωθεῖσιν, for γένεσις in the sense of ἡ πρώτῃ γένεσις 9, or ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσις ἐστιν, does not necessarily involve τελειώθης. The meaning will be ‘when the πρώτῃ γένεσις is over.’ Thus milk is said (de Part. An. 2. 9. 655 b 26 sq.) to be τροφὴ τοῖς γενομένοις: τροφὴ τοῖς γενομενοῖς is something different. Prof. Jowett quotes Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 6, τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφήναι ἄντι (sc. οἱ γονεῖς) καὶ γενομένοις τοῖς παιδευθέναι. As to the dative, see Bon. Ind. 166 b 26 sqq.

20. εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις κ.τ.λ. The inference seems to be as follows—‘plants exist for the sake of animals, and the lower animals—all tame ones and most of the wild—for the sake of men; [but the lower animals are made by Nature] and Nature makes nothing in-
complete [in the sense of lacking an end] or in vain, therefore (οὖν) all of them must necessarily be made by Nature for the sake of men.' άληθ ἐνάρχαι has been variously interpreted 'all plants and animals,' 'all wild animals' (Sepulveda, 'ipsas omnes feras'), and 'all animals.' I have explained the expression in the first of these ways in vol. i. p. 128, but perhaps on the whole the third interpretation is the one most likely to be correct, for plants have just been said to exist for the sake of animals generally, so that they would not be 'in vain' if they did not exist for the sake of men; besides, what Aristotle is here especially concerned to prove (cp. θηρία 24) is that the lower animals are made by Nature for the sake of men; he proceeds, in fact, at once to infer from this, that the kind of war which is waged against wild animals and to compel natural slaves, who differ but little from the lower animals, to submit to enslavement is a natural form of Supply. The interpretation of Sepulveda—'all wild animals'—is a possible interpretation (cp. θηρία 24), though the assertion that Nature has made all wild animals for the sake of men seems strange, if we look back to 18, τῶν δὲ ἄγριων, εἰ μὴ πάντα, ἄλλα τὰ γε πλείουσα, where the contrary seems to be implied. It is true, however, that the same assertion is made, though less conspicuously, if we interpret αὐτὰ πάντα 'all animals' or 'all plants and animals.' Aristotle's aim in the passage is to show that just as property in the sense of what is necessary for sustenance is given by Nature to all animals, so the lower animals themselves are made by Nature for the sake of men. Compare Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 10, and Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 14 (referred to by Mr. Eaton) and 2. 62—64 (referred to by Giph.). In the last-named passage Cicero argues that as flutes are made for the sake of those who can use them, so the fruits of the soil exist far more for the sake of men than for the sake of the lower animals, 'tandemque abest ut haec bestiarum etiam causa parata sint, ut ipsas bestias hominum gratia generatas esse videamus.' Cp. also Metaph. Δ. 10. 1075 a. 16, πάντα δὲ συνετακταί πως ἄλλ' ὁφ' ὅμοιος, καὶ πλοιὰ καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτὰ καὶ ὄξιν ὁποῖος έξεῖ διώτε μὴ εἶναι θεατέρῳ πρὸς βάτεραν μηδὲν, ἄλλ' ἐστί τι.

21. ἀτελέσ. In using this word, is Aristotle referring to man or to the lower animals, which are made for the sake of man? He has often been taken to refer to the state of incompleteness in which man would be left, if he were unprovided with sustenance when past the earliest period of existence. Mr. Welldon translates the passage— 'assuming then that none of Nature's products is incomplete or purposeless, [as man requires food and the other animals are
suited to his consumption].’ But looking to the form of the sentence (ποιεῖ...πεπουχείναι), it seems more likely that Aristotle refers in the protasis as well as in the apodosis, and in ἄτελές as well as in μάτην, to the lower animals. ‘ARGVelles may in fact bear the meaning ‘lacking an end,’ and it is thus that Zeller (‘ohne Zweck,’ Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 565. 6), Bonitz (‘οὐκ ἔχειν τέλος sive οὐ ἔνεκα,’ Ind. 119 a 48), and Susemihl in his translation (‘zwecklos’) explain it here. Bonitz mentions no other passage in which the word ἄτελής is used in this sense, but perhaps de Gen. An. 1. 1. 715 b 14, ή δὲ φύσις φεύγει τὸ ἄπειρον τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄπειρον ἄτελές, ή δὲ φύσις δέι ζητεῖ τέλος may be compared: cp. Plato, Phileb. 24 B, δεῖ ταῖνν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει ταύτω μὴ τέλος ἔχειν’ ἅτελη δὲ ὄντε ἄπειρον παντάπασιν ἀπείρω γένεσθαι. But ἄτελής is rarely used in this sense, and I incline on the whole to follow Sepulveda, who translates ‘imperfectum’ and adds in his note the explanation ‘quod non referatur ad aliquem finem, res enim quaeque suo fine perfectionis’ (Metaph. x),’ where Metaph. 1. 4. 1055 a 12, τέλος γὰρ ἔχει ἡ τελεία διαφορά, ὁπτέρα καὶ τέλλα τὸ τέλος ἔχειν λέγεται τέλεια is probably referred to: cp. Metaph. Δ. 16. 1021 b 23, έτι οἷς ὑπάρχει τὸ τέλος σπουδαίον, ταύτα λέγεται τέλεια κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ τέλος τέλεια.


ἄναγκαιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is unaware that many animals existed long before man. We are reminded here of the Socratic teleology, according to which the movements of the sun in summer and winter are arranged with a view to the advantage of man (Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 8, καὶ ταύτα παντάπασιν ἑοκεν ἀνθρώπων ἑνεκα γεγονόμενον). But to Aristotle man is only πῶς τέλος, ότι τὸ ἐκσάτον τέλος (Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 35). He assumes, it will be noticed, that animal food is necessary to man, and thus incidentally pronounces against those scruples as to its use which can be traced back in Greece to very early days. Orphic teaching forbade it (Plato, Laws 782): Empedocles was against it (see Prof. Campbell, Introduction to the Politicus of Plato, p. xxiii sq.): Democritus seems to have allowed the slaughter only of those animals which injure or wish to injure man (Stob. Floril. 44. 16, quoted by Bernays, Theophrastus’ Schrift über Frömigung, p. 149), and in this view he was apparently followed by Theophrastus (Porphyr. de Abstin. 2. 22), who may possibly be alluding to the passage of the Politics before us when he says (ibid. 2. 12), εἰ δὲ λέγοι τις ὅτι οὖχ ἦττον τῶν καρπῶν.
22. οὔτα πάντα. See above on 20.

23. διὸ κ.τ.λ. The following extract from Susenmihl, Qu. Crit. p. 347, will show how variously this passage has been interpreted. Victorius si audimus, cui adstipulati sunt Giphanius, Schneiderus, Boiesenius, αὐτῆς et ἡ ad πολεμικὴ pertinens, ut nihil nisi parenthesis sint ἡ γὰρ θερευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς, qua indicetur cur bellum etiam contra bestias geri quest contendit: sin Lambinum, Schnitzerum, Stahrium, Bernaysium, αὐτῆς ad πολεμική et ἡ ad θερευτική: sin Garveum, Hampkeum, alios, αὐτῆς ad κτητικὴν et ἡ ad θερευτικὴ spectat.' Victorius' commentary refers ἡ to πολεμική, but his translation refers it to θερευτική ("studium enim venatorum pars ipsius [artis bellicae] est, quo decet uti, etc."). Bernays takes αὐτῆς as meaning τῆς πολεμικῆς and refers ἡ to θερευτική, and this seems to be the more natural interpretation, looking to the close sequence in which ἡ stands to θερευτική, but then we hardly expect τὸν τῶν πολέμων 26, though it is true that hunting has just been brought under the head of war (23: cp. 1255 b 38). Those who refer ἡ to θερευτική will point to the use of the word πολέμων in 26, and may also adduce Isocr. Panath. § 163, τῶν δὲ πολέμων ὑπελάμβανον ἀναγκασότατον μὲν εἶναι καὶ δικαιώσατον τῶν μετὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὴν ἀγριωτὰ τὴν τῶν θηρίων γεγονόμενον, δεύτερον δὲ τῶν μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν καὶ φύσει πολεμίως ὁντας καὶ πάντα τῶν χρῶν ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἡμῶν (cp. Plutarch., Demetrius, c. 8: Porphyry. de Abstin. r. 14: and Dio Chrysost. Or. 38. 137 R.); Isocrates here certainly speaks of war, not hunting. But Aristotle has just said that hunting is a part of war, and the sentence seems to run more naturally if ἡ is referred to θερευτική. The words δὲι χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ θηρία κ.τ.λ., in fact, acquire fresh point, if connected with θερευτική: θερευτική is not only to be brought to bear against θηρία, as the name might suggest, but also against men who are like θηρία. The reference of ἡ to θερευτική is still further supported by two passages of Plato
(Sophist, 222 B–C: Laws 823 B), which seem to be present to Aristotle’s memory no less than the passage from the Panathenaic Oration of Isocrates just quoted, for in them Plato speaks of hunting as having to do not only with wild animals but also with men, in language much resembling that of Aristotle here. Άδω draws from the fact that animals are made by nature for the service of man, and that their acquisition is natural, the inference that men who are, like animals, made to be ruled, may be acquired without any infraction of the order of nature. Άδω can hardly mean τῆς κτητικῆς, for the fact that hunting is a part of κτητική is no proof that war is in some sense a part of κτητική, in the absence of a statement that hunting is a part of war. I incline therefore to translate the passage thus: ‘hence the art of war also is in some sense’ (i. e. so far as one kind of it is concerned) ‘by nature a form of κτητική, for of the art of war the art of the chase’ (already said in 1256 a 40–b 2 to be a form of κτητική) ‘is a part, which ought to be used against both wild animals and such human beings as being intended by nature to be ruled refuse to be ruled, seeing that this kind of war is by nature just.’ There were kinds of war which had nothing to do with acquisition (4 (7). 14. 1333 b 38–1334 a 2). The myth of Protagoras had contrasted the art of war with ἡ δημουργικὴ τέχνη (Plato, Protag. 322 B, ἡ δημουργική τέχνη αὐτοῖς πρὸς μὲν τροφὴν ἱκανὴ βοηθῶς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τῶν τῶν θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεικνύειν τέχνην οὕτω εἰχον, ἡ μέρος πολεμική), and Aristotle may wish to point out, in correction of this view, that some kinds of τροφή cannot be obtained without war; he evidently does not agree with Rep. 373 D–E, where the origin of war is traced to the unbounded quest of wealth. On the contrary, he holds that one kind of war (that for the acquisition of φόνευ δοῦλοι) falls within the sound or limited χρηματιστική. Columella (de Re Rustica, Lib. 1. Praefat. c. 7) will not admit war to be a laudable form of κτητική: cp. [Aristot.] Oeon. 1. 2. 1343 a 27, ἡ δὲ γεωργικὴ μάλιστα ὑπὶ δικαίαν οὐ γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώπων, ὀβθ’ ἑκόντων, ὀσπὲρ καπηλεία καὶ αἱ μισθαρικαί, ὀντ’ ἑκόντων, ὀσπὲρ αἱ πολεμικαὶ.

26. ἐν μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. The first question which arises as to this much-debated passage relates to κατὰ φύσιν. Sepulv., Vict. (‘unam rationem quaerendi rem, illam inquam quae naturam sequitur’), Lamb., and Giph. connect κατὰ φύσιν with κτητικῆς, but this seems hardly possible. Bern., who connects κατὰ φύσιν with μέρος ἐστιν, translates ‘is a natural part of Household Science,’ but Susemihl and Mr. Welldon are probably right in translating ‘is naturally a part.’ The remainder of the paragraph (6 δὲι κ.τ.λ.) is thus ren-
dered by Sepulveda—'quae (quaestuaria) vel suppetere debet, vel res ab ipsa comparari, quae condii reponique solent necessariae ad vitam et ad cuititatis aut domus societatem tuendam accommodatae'; he adds in his note the following explanation—'aut haec quaestuaria facultas adesse debet patrifamilias atque homini ciiili, ut per eam res necessariae ab ipsis comparentur, aut certe per eam res necessariae comparari debent ab eo, cuicunque tributur.' He evidently refers autem 28, not to τῆς οἰκονομίκης 27, to which Bern., Sus., Stahr, and others are probably right in referring it, but to εἰδός κτησικῆς 26. There is much more to be said for his view that χρήματα, the suppressed antecedent of δὲν χρημάτων, is the subject of ὑπάρχῃ. It is thus that both Stahr and Vahlen (Aristotel. Aufsätzte, z. 32) interpret the passage. For the case and position of χρημάτων within the relative sentence, see Vahlen υἱὸς συναρτά, who compares 4 (7). I. 1323 b 15: 6 (4). 4. 1290 b 28: 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 8. If we follow these authorities (as I have done in vol. 1. p. 129), we shall translate—'which (form of the Science of Supply) must either be forthcoming, or Household Science must itself ensure that storeable commodities shall be forthcoming,' etc. This interpretation of the passage, however, is open to the objection that it supplies a different subject with the words ὑπάρχειν and ὑπάρχῃ, whereas the sentence certainly reads as if one and the same subject should be supplied with each. I incline, therefore, on further consideration, to suggest a different interpretation. May not there be an ellipse of 'having to do with' before δὲν ἑστι θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων, just as there is in i. 3. 1253 b 3, οἰκονομίας δὲ μέρη, δὲ δὲν πάλιν οἰκία συνέστηκεν, and in i. 31. 1258 b 27 sqq., τρίταν δὲ εἰδός χρηματικῆς . . . δογμ ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γινομένων κ.π.λ. (see above on 1253 b 3)? If we explain the passage thus, δ (εἰδός κτησικῆς) will be the subject both of ὑπάρχειν and of ὑπάρχῃ. On Bernays' proposed substitution of καθό for δ, see Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 352. For other suggested emendations, and for Susemihl's own view of the passage, see notes 2 and 3 in Sus.², vol. 1. p. 116. In strictness the function of οἰκονομίκη is not τὸ παριστάθαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, but τὸ χρήσαται (c. 8. 1256 a ii: cp. διαβείνα, c. 10. 1258 a 24); we are told, however, here (cp. μάλιστα, 'if possible,' c. 10. 1258 a 34), that if κάτα φύσιν κτησική is not forthcoming from the first, οἰκονομίκη must see that it is forthcoming. 'Εστι θησαυρισμός appears to be added because there are things necessary to human life (e.g. light, air, fire) which cannot be stored. On Storeableness as an attribute of Wealth, see Comte, Social Statics, E. T. p. 131, and J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy B. i. c. 3. § 3.
Are slaves and cattle, however, susceptible of ὑποβρυχίαν; and does Aristotle’s definition of wealth include wealth in land? For the various kinds of wealth, genuine and other, see 2. 7. 1267 b 10 sqq. and Rhet. i. 5. 1361 a 12 sqq. J. S. Mill defines wealth (Principles of Political Economy, Preliminary Remarks, and B. i. c. 3. § 3) as ‘useful and agreeable things of a material nature, possessing exchange value.’ Aristotle says nothing here of exchange value, though his definition of χρήμαta in Eth. Nic. 4. i. 1119 b 26: ‘ἀπὸ πάντα δόσων ἡ ἄξια νομίσματι μετρεῖται’ implies this limitation. How far does his account of wealth in the passage before us agree with his account of κτήμαta in c. 4. 1254 a 16, where he seems to exclude ὄργανα ποιητικά from κτήσις? Such ὄργανα are certainly χρήσιμα εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. On Mill’s definition, see Prof. H. Sidgwick in the Fortnightly Review for Feb. 1879. Μόν oὐν is taken up by μεν τοῖν 37, and answered by δὲ 40.

31. ἐκ τοῦτων. ’Εκ is here used of the ‘material’ of which wealth is made, the ‘elements’ which constitute it: cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 22, ἐκ πλεῖστων ἀνθρώπων. γὰρ, ‘for true wealth is not unlimited in quantity (consisting as it does of ὄργανoν, and no ὄργανα being unlimited either in size or quantity), and the wealth of which we speak is not unlimited in quantity.’ Just as a very large or very small shuttle, or too many shuttles or too few, would be in the way and ineffective for the end (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 35 sqq.), so too large or too small a supply of necessary and useful commodities is unfavourable to ἰγαθὴ ζωή. This thought was taken up by Epicurus: cp. Porphyr. de Abstin. 1. 49, ὄρισται γὰρ, φησίν, ὅ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ἐστὶν εὔπορίστος, ὅ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν ἀδριστός τε ἢν καὶ δυστορίστως. Bernays (Theophrastus’ Schrift über Frömmigkeit, p. 145) compares also the fourteenth κυρία δόξα of Epicurus (Diog. Laert. 10. 144). Cp. also Plutarch de Cupiditate Divitiarum, c. 4. 524 E–F. For αὐτάρκεια, cp. c. 9. 1257 a 30.

32. Σώλων. See Fragm. 13. 71 sqq., and Theognis 227 where the lines appear in a slightly altered form. They seem to be present to Isocrates’ memory in De Pace § 7.

33. πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι, ‘made known to men.’

34. ταῖς ἀλλαῖς τέχναις, ‘in the case of other arts.’

35. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον κ.τ.λ. Aristippus appears to have met this argument by anticipation; cp. Fragm. 58 (Mullach, Fr. Philos. Gr. 2. 412), οὐχ ὄσπερ ὑπόδημα τὸ μείζον διάξρηστον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ πλείων κτήσις’ τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ χρήσει τὸ περιττόν ἐμποδίζει’ τῇ δὲ καὶ δλη χρήσασθαι κατὰ καίρων ἔξεστι καὶ μέρει.

36. See J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Preliminary
Remarks, on definitions of wealth which, like that in the text, treat it as 'a mass of instruments.'

38. δι' ἡν αὐτῶν. The reason apparently is that the acquisition of the things assigned by Nature for the service of man is a necessity of human life. For ἡν, see above on 1252 a 20, and cp. de An. 2. 7. 419 a 6.

40. ἡν is affected by attraction to χρηματιστικήν, though αὐτὸ is C. 9. not: the fem. continues to be used in 41—1257 a 5.

41. δι' ἡν. How this happens, we learn in 1. 9. 1257 b 35 sqq.

3. ἐκεῖνης. ‘Pronomen ἐκεῖνος ab Aristotele etiam ad proximas 1257 a. voces trahitur’ (Busse, de præsidiiis Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 24, who refers to Pol. 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 10: Meteor. 2. 6. 364 a 8 sqq.).


7. καθ' αὐτό. On predication καθ' αὐτό, see Anal. Post. 1. 4. 73 a 34—b 24 and other passages collected in Bon. Ind. 212 a 3 sqq. We have here to do with use καθ' αὐτό. A thing is used καθ' αὐτό, when it is used as being what it is and nothing else. Thus the term is explained in 12 by χρήσαι τῷ ὑποδήματι ἢ ἐκδήμα. The μεταβλητική χρήσις of a shoe is an use of it καθ' αὐτό, as much so in fact as the οἰκεία χρήσις, the use of it as an article of wear; it is because the shoe is a shoe that the buyer buys it and the wearer wears it; still the one use is οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος (the use for which the shoe was made) and the other is not. If the shoe were used, on the contrary, for measuring, it would not be used as a shoe, but as being of a certain length. This is explained in Eth. Eud. 3. 4. 123 r 1 b 38 sq, where, however, the writer so far departs from Aristotle’s view that he treats the sale of an article as an use of it καθ’ συμβεβηκός, not καθ’ αὐτό. From the use made of commodities in simple exchange must be distinguished the use made of them by the unsound χρηματιστική, which aims at the indefinite increase of wealth (c. 9. 1257 b 35 sq.).

14. ἡ μεταβλητική, sc. χρήσις, as in 9, or τέχνη? The latter view seems preferable, for we must supply τέχνη with ἡ τοιαύτη μεταβλητική in 28. Perhaps, however, we may translate simply ‘exchange’ (Bern. Sus. ‘Tauschhandel’).

15. μὲν has no δὲ to answer to it, apparently because at ἡ καὶ δῆλον the intended course of the sentence is changed: we expect it to be continued—but later passing the limit of necessity and nature.

ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, ‘from that which is natural’ (Mr. Welldon, ‘from natural circumstances’).

17. ἡ καὶ δῆλον κ.τ.λ. Vict. ‘quo perspicuum etiam est non con-
stare natura pecuniariae genus cauponarium. Lamb. (followed by Bernays and Susemihl): 'ex quo licet intelligere cauponarium (seu mercaturam sordidam quam profistentur atque exercent ii qui ab aliis emunt quod pluris revendant) non esse partem artis pecuniae quaerendae natura.' In favour of Vict.'s rendering, cp. Phys. 2. 2. 194 b 2, τῆς ποιητικῆς ή ἀρχιτεκτονικῆ, and the statement in 3, ἐστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσει δ' ὦ φύσει αὐτῶν: in favour of the other, c. 8. 1256 b 23, διδ καὶ ἡ παλεμικὴ φύσει κτητικὴ πως ἐσται. The interpretation of Lamb. is probably right. Bern. conjectures τῆς μεταβλητικῆς for τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, looking probably to ἡ μεταβλητική 14, but all the MSS. read τῆς χρηματιστικῆς, and in 1257 b 2 we have βάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς... τὸ κατηκέων.

18. δοσον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Sepulveda: 'aliaquin necesse erat ut quatenus eis satis esset, commutationibus uterentur.' For if it were so, those who practise it would necessarily have made use of exchange only to obtain what suffices for themselves [whereas in fact they notoriously purchase not for their own use, but to resell at a profit]. So the commentators generally. Cp. 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 35, οὐ γὰρ δὴ παίδοντας τέλος γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ βιοῦ τὴν παιδίαν ἡμῶν. For the omission of ἀν in phrases like ἀναγκαῖον ἡ, see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 858. 3. 'Ικανῶν takes up τῶν ἱκανῶν. Τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ τὸ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς (cp. 30 and 1256 b 11). It is possible, no doubt, to take ἡ historically, and not as = ἡν ἐν, and to translate 'for it was necessary (and therefore natural) to make use of exchange to obtain what suffices for the persons exchanging (which those who practise κατηκέων do not do),' and this rendering would suit the paragraph which follows, which is historical in purport; ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. would also be used in the same sense as four or five lines below (23); but the ordinary interpretation seems on the whole preferable.

19. Μὲν οὖν introduces a slight correction of what precedes ('true, exchange is not necessary in the household'). It seems to be answered by ἀλλὰ, 21: cp. c. 13. 1260 a 13, and see Sus.1 Ind. Gramm. s. v. μὲν.

tη πρώτη κοινωνία, i.e. the household, though the union of male and female and that of master and slave are spoken of as κοινωνία (c. 2. 1252 b 10), and are of course prior to the household, for the household is formed of them. Cp. αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι, c. 2. 1252 b 31.

21. αὖτης is taken apparently by Sus. to refer to ἀλλαγὴν 19, but I incline to follow Bern. and Mr. Welldon, who refer it to ἡ μεταβλητικὴ 14 (cp. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτῃ μεταβλητικῇ, 28). It is true that in 1257 b 1 the earlier form of μεταβλητική is described as ἡ ἀναγκαία
ἀλλαγή, so that the sense is much the same, whichever view we adopt.

πλεῖόνος τῆς κοινωνίας ὁδής, i.e. ‘extended,’ in opposition to πρότη (Bon. Ind. 618 b 34): cp. 2. 2. 1261 b 12, καὶ βουλεταὶ γ’ ἐδη τοῦτο ἐστιν πόλις, ὅταν αὐτάρκη συμβαλλῃ τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι τοῦ πλῆθους. Ἡ μεταβλητική seems to be regarded as beginning in the κώμη and the πόλις.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.π.λ. As to the phrase πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων, see Bon. Ind. 357 b 8: ‘καὶ interdum duo adiectiva coniungit, quorum alterum definiendo alteri inserviat, non solum ubi prius adiectivum πολὺς est (πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, Eth. Nic. 1. 8. 1098 b 27 al.), sed etiam in aliis.’ It has been much discussed, on what verb the words πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων depend. Schn. would supply ἐδέοντο, while Bern. thinks that no addition is needed, inasmuch as κεχορισμένοι contains the notion of ‘wanting.’ For Susemilh’s view, see his note. Vict., however, would seem from his commentary to supply ἐκοινώνων—certainly the most natural course, and that which best agrees with πλεῖόνος τῆς κοινωνίας ὁδής. Aristotle is commonly chary of words, and often expects us to supply a word from a previous clause which is not altogether suitable—e.g. in 3. 16. 1287 b 28 (θωμ.): 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 40 (πορίζειν): 2. 5. 1264 b 2 (ὁικονομῆσε). Cp. also 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 16–18. Both household and village have a certain aggregate of commodities at their disposal, but whereas in the household what one member has all others have, in the village this is not so; on the contrary, some members of the village have corn and no shoes, others shoes and no corn. The members of the village are described as κεχορισμένοι, i.e. they are no longer ὅμοιοι or ὅμοια, but are parted into a plurality of households. The use of the word κοινωνεῖν in reference both to the household and to the village is of course not fortunate, for the household shares in what it possesses in a different sense from the village.

23. κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις, in contrast to the practice of κάτηλιοι.

ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις... κατὰ τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. Ἡ ἀλλαγὴ here means ‘barter’; μεταδόσεις is the more comprehensive word, including barter as one of its forms.

24. καὶ (in place of which Bern. conjectures καὶ νῦν) probably means ‘no less than the members of the village.’

26. ἐπὶ πλέον δ’ οὐδὲν, i.e. no money, which is here contrasted with τὰ χρήσιμα, not that it is not itself one of τὰ χρήσιμα (36), but because it is not directly useful for subsistence, like corn or wine.

29. χρηματιστικῆς, i.e. τῆς μᾶλλον χρηματιστικῆς, 1256 b 41.

31. κατὰ λόγον, 'in accordance with reason and what one would naturally expect': see the references in Bon. Ind. 368 b 50 sq. It is often used in much the same sense as ἐνδογος (e.g. in Metaph. N. 1. 1088 a 4–6), and the phrase διὰ τῶν αὐτίαν εἰδογοὺ (de Part. An. 2. 17. 660 b 16) may be compared. In Rhet. ad Alex. 9. 1429 a 28 we have—τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων γένεται κατὰ λόγον τὰ δὲ παρὰ λόγον.

ξενικωτέρας γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'For, the supply of men's needs coming to be more drawn from sources external to the State.' Here the origin of money is traced to an increased distance between buyer and seller. Money being more portable than commodities in general, an advantage is found in paying a distant seller in this way. Aristotle perhaps remembers that the Greek coinage had its origin in the commerce of Aegina: cp. Strabo, p. 376, "Εφοροί δ' ἐν Δήλῳ ἄργυρον πρῶτον κοπηλά τίμησαν ὕπο Φειδανίου ἐμπόρου γὰρ γενόσθαι. In Eth. Nic. 5. 8, however, the advantages of money in all commercial transactions, whether between parties near to or distant from each other, are recognized. Again, the purchaser may not for the moment need any commodity in return: in this case money serves as an ἐγγυτήρι ὅτι ἐσται εἰς δεσμὴ (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 b 10 sq.). Still all this is quite reconcilable with the view that what first called money into being was its use in distant transactions. Plato (Laws 742 A) seems to regard the payment of wages and of artisans' remuneration as that which makes some sort of money necessary. Giph. (p. 99) refers to Isocr. Paneg. § 42, which is not without resemblances to the passage before us.

32. δὲν ἐνδεῖς. For the omission of ἐναι and its parts, see Vahlen on Poet. 24. 1459 b 7 (p. 243).

35. διὸ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλαγὰς κ.τ.λ. Cp. 1. 10. 1258 b 4, ὅτι ἐφ' ὑπερ ἐπορφαθή μετάβολη γὰρ ἐγένετο χάριν (τὸ νόμῳμα). The selection of the particular commodity was a matter of convention, so that here for the first time convention stepped in; but even then money was for a space dealt with inartificially by weighing, till the measure of its artificiality was made complete by the ingenious addition of a stamp to denote the value of the coin. With συνέδεντο, cp. κατὰ συνεδήσειν, Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 29.

37. εἰς κ.τ.λ., 'possessed utility of a kind to be easily dealt with and made available for the end of existence'—was, in fact, easily carried, easily stored, easily converted into other commodities, and so forth. Vict. 'unum eorum quae . . . possunt
facile deferri ad alios'; but that is only one of the characteristics present to the mind of Aristotle. Lamb. better: 'usum haberet tractabilem ac facilem ad vitam degendam.' For εἴχε τῷν χρεῖ αν (which takes up τῶν χρησίμων), cp. Sosipater (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 483)—

μεγάληρ χρεῖ αν τῷ εἰς τὸ πράγμα ἔχει.

For τὸ γῆν, cp. 1257 b 41. The Thessalians are said to be ἄνδρες σῶκ εὑμεταχείριστοι (Epist. 2. § 20). Aristotle notices portability and ease in use as characteristics of a satisfactory circulat-

38. σίδηρος κ.τ.λ. Iron, or the dross of iron—τὸ ἄχρειον τοῦ σιδήρου—(by weight) by the Lacedaemonians ([Plato.] Eryxias 400 B): iron coins were also used at Byzantium (see Mr. Ridgeway, Trans. Cambr. Philol. Society, vol. 2. p. 131, who refers to Plato Com., Πελαγιδρος 3—Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 649)—and Ar. Nub. 249): an iron coin of Hermaeus king of Bactria, brought by Sir Douglas Forsyth from the ruined cities of Central Asia, is mentioned in the Academy, Nov. 25, 1876 (p. 527). Cp. also Caesar de Bell. Gall. 5. 12: utuntur (Britanni) aut aere aut taleis ferreis ad certum pondus examinatis pro nummo. As to καὶ εἰ τι ταύτικαν ἐρωτησαμενε, we find in the Eryxias (399 E sqq.) a description of the leather money of Carthage; but, as Mr. Ridgeway says (ibid.), Aristotle may have in his mind 'some such coinage as the electrum money used at Cyzicus.'

41. ὁ γὰρ χαρακτηρ κ.τ.λ. The χαρακτηρ varied with the value. 'The tetradrachm of Syracuse is in early times stamped with a quadriga, the didrachm with a pair of horses, the drachm with a single horse with its rider. Thus the number of horses shows at a glance the number of drachms in any piece of Syracusan money. The obol is marked with the wheel of a chariot' (Prof. P. Gardner, Types of Greek Coins, p. 50). 'On the tetrobol of Athens there are two owls; on the diobol the owl has but one head, but two bodies; on the triobol the owl is facing the spectator, and so forth... In Thessaly a horseman marks the diobol, a single horse the obol' (ibid. p. 66). But see Mr. Head's remarks, Hist. Numorum, p. lvi.

2. τὸ καπηλικόν. The unsound kind of χρηματιστική is so called, 1257 b.

not because none but κάπηλοι practised it, but because it was exemplified in, and best illustrated by, their way of trading, with which every one was familiar. The κάπηλοι did not himself produce what he sold, but bought it of the producer, and bought to sell again,
not to supply his own household needs. His operations were on a smaller scale than those of the ἐμπορός, and, unlike his, were confined within the limits of a particular State (cp. Plato, Polit. 260 C: Rep. 371 D: Sophist. 223 D: and see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 454–6 and notes). This kind of χρηματιστική comes into existence after the appearance of money on the scene, but its existence is in reality due not to money, but to a radically wrong view of the end of human life (1257 b 40 sqq., and esp. 1258 a 5). Money, however, makes it possible,—how, Aristotle does not directly explain; but he probably means that money facilitates sale and re-sale, is easily stored, and the like, and thus meets the spirit of gain half-way. If trade were carried on by barter, the practices of the κατηλείων would be defeated by the cumbrousness of the operation, and they might suffer more by depreciation of stock.

'The value of money,' says Gibbon (Decline and Fall, c. 9—vol. i. p. 356), 'has been settled by general consent to express our wants and our property, as letters were invented to express our ideas; and both these institutions, by giving a more active energy to the powers and passions of human nature, have contributed to multiply the objects they were designed to represent.' See also the quotation from Xen. de Vectorialibus given in the note on 1257 b 33.

3. μὲν οὖν. See note on 1252 b 27 sqq.


πόθεν κ.τ.λ. Πόθεν seems to depend on τεχνικότερον, which itself seems to be adverbial to γινόμενον. But what is the nom. to ποιησαι? Vict. and Bern. make μεταβαλλόμενον passive, the former supplying τὸ νόμισμα, the latter 'etwas' (i.e. a commodity). Lamb. and Giph. explain μεταβαλλόμενον by 'permutando,' apparently making it middle: Bonitz also would seem to take it as middle (Ind. 458 b 15), for he adds 'i.e. πών γένος τῆς μεταβλητικῆς.' Adopting this explanation of πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον, which makes τὸ κατηλείων nom. to ποιησαι, we are still met by the question, what is the meaning of πόθεν? Does it qualify μεταβαλλόμενον like πῶς, or are the words πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον to be taken together by themselves, so that the meaning will be—'carried on with a more studied skill in devising from what source and by what kind of investment it will win most profit'? Perhaps this is the correct interpretation. Cp. πῶς, c. 11. 1258 b 13.

5. διὸ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes on to describe the effect of the emergence of this kind of χρηματιστική on opinion. It suggests to many the erroneous conclusion that the aim of χρηματιστική is the acquisition of money and of as much money as possible. But
then others by a natural reaction refuse to allow that money is wealth, or that this kind of χρηματιστική is χρηματιστική at all. This conflict of view enables Aristotle to step in, as is his wont, and to say that those who take the latter view are so far right that the καπηλική χρηματιστική is not χρηματιστική κατὰ φύσιν, nor is money natural wealth. The natural χρηματιστική is that which goes hand in hand with the science of household management, and which regards the acquisition of commodities, not as an end, but as a means to τὸ εὖ ζῆν rightly understood, and therefore not to be pursued beyond a certain limit of amount.

7. ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι, sc. δοκεῖ.

τοῦ πλοῦτον καὶ χρημάτων. Vahlen (Aristot. Aufsätze, 2. 13 n.) compares 4 (3). 1. 1232 a 37, πλοῦτον καὶ χρημάτων, and 1. 9. 1257 a 1, πλοῦτον καὶ κτήσεως. Here, as often elsewhere (Bon. Ind. 357 b 13), καί appears to be used in an explanatory sense, just as it is two lines lower in τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικὴν, and in ἀλλαγής καὶ καπηλείας, 1256 a 41. Χρημάτων is an ambiguous word, often meaning money and always suggestive of it (cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 1. 1119 b 26, χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα δοσον ἡ δὲξια νομίσματι μετρεῖται, and [Plato] Eryxias 403 D, quoted below on 11).

8. καὶ γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον κ.τ.λ. These words supply an indispensable link in the argument, which seems to be as follows—χρηματιστική is ποιητική τοῦ πλοῦτον καὶ χρημάτων, πλοῦτος is νομίσματος πλῆθος, therefore χρηματιστική is ποιητική νομίσματος πλῆθος, or in other words, its ἔργαν is τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν πάθει ἀστάν πλῆθος χρημάτων. This word χρημάτων might have been νομίσματος, but the two words do not lie far apart in meaning. In καὶ γὰρ somewhat of the force of καί perhaps survives: ‘they not only misconstrue χρηματιστική and take it to be concerned with money (5), but they also misconstrue πλοῦτος and take it to be abundance of money.’ So we have τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, 18.

11. νόμος, ‘a mere convention’: cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 30, καὶ δὲ τοῦτο τούτων ἔχει νόμισμα, ὅτι οὐ φασίν ἄλλα νόμῳ ἐστίν, καὶ ἕνομιν μεταβαλεῖ καὶ συνήθει· Magn. Mor. 1. 34. 1194 a 21—23: Plato, Laws 889 E: Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 14, νόμοις δ', ἐφι, ὁ Σώκρατης, πᾶς ἂν τις ἢγοσθαι σπουδαίον πράγμα εἶναι ἢ τὸ πείθονται αὐτοῖς, οὐ γε πολλάκις αὐτὸι αἱ θέμεναι ἀποδοκιμάσαντες μετατίθεναι; Νόμος and νόμισμα were both connected in popular etymology with νύμφα. Plato had said in Laws 742 E, πλουσίους δ' ἀδ σφάδρα καὶ ἀγαθοῖς ἀδώντων, αὕς γε δὴ πλουσίους οἱ πολλαὶ καταλέγουσι· λέγοντι δὲ ταῖς κεκτημένοις ἐν ἀδύνα τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλεῖστον νομίσματος ἀξία κτήματα, ἄ κα κακός τις κεκτήτ' ἄν: cp. Rep. 521 A, Laws 736 E,
and Aristot. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 23 sqq. But it is possible
that the Cynics, or some of them, are also here referred to.
The Eryxias, which is included among the dialogues ascribed to
Plato, appears to treat the subject of money and wealth from
a Cynical point of view, and we find in it not indeed the exact
arguments here used, but arguments pointing to the same con-
clusion—e.g. 403 D, τι οὐκ ἐκείνων τῶν λόγων διετέλεσα, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
οὐκ ἐστὶ χρήματα, χρυσίων καὶ ἄργυρων καὶ τάλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; When we
are told (18) that the persons referred to by Aristotle in the
passage before us sought wealth and χρηματιστική in something
other than the things to which these names were commonly given,
we are reminded of Eryxias 403 C, ἐπιστήμην γὰρ των παραδειγμῶν
tὸ ἀνθρώπος ἄμα καὶ πλοῦτον αὐτῶν πετάγη, and Diog. Laert. 6. 68,
who says of the Cynic Diogenes—τὸν παιδείαν ἔπει τοὺς μὲν νῦν
σωφροσύνην, τοῖς δὲ πρεσβυτέροις παραμβίαν, τοῖς δὲ πένησι πλούτον,
toῖς δὲ πλούτου κόμον ἐστί. The Cynics seem to have made out
knowledge how to use things to be real wealth, and its acquisition
true χρηματιστική. Compare the doctrine of the Stoics that ‘the
wise man alone is rich,’ and see Cic. Paradoxa Stoicorum 6. 3. 51.
Zeno of Citium in his ideal polity, which was much coloured by
Cynicism, abolished the use of money altogether (Diog. Laert.
7. 33, νόμισμα δ' οὖν ἄλλα ἔνεκεν οὐσθαί δειν κατασκευάζειν
οὔτε ἀποδημίας ἔνεκεν). The arguments used by the inquirers
here referred to are far from convincing, though Aristotle does not
stop to comment on them: money does not necessarily become
valueless when deprived of the character of money (cp. τῶν χρησ-
μῶν αὐτὸ δὲ, 1257 a 36), and as Lord Macaulay noted on the
margin of his copy of the Politics (Macmillan's Magazine, July
1875, p. 220), ‘a man who has plenty of clothes and drink may die
of hunger, yet you would call clothes and drink wealth.’ Aristotle,
it is true, speaks (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1133 a 31) of money being made
‘useless’ by demonetization, and he also looks upon articles of
subsistence as furnishing the truest type of wealth (ἡ περὶ τῆς τροφῆς,
1258 a 17), but he would hardly go so far as the inquirers he
refers to here. Things which serve for clothing and as ὄργανα are
to him part of true wealth (1256 b 15 sqq.).
μεταβεβλέπων. Mr. Welldon: ‘give up a currency and adopt
another.’ For this use of the word, compare Fragm. Aristot. 508.
1561 b 4, ἔφεσθε ὁ Πέππρος γυναῖκα καὶ συνέχει μεταβεβλέποις τὸν ὅμοιον
Ἀριστολέων, and the use of the word μεταστήσωσιν in 7 (5). 1.
1301 b 8. Cp. also Plato, Laws 889 E.
12. οὔτε. See critical note.
14. ἀπορήσει. For this use of the third person, see Bon. Ind. 589 b 47 sqq.: 763 a 25 sq.
15. ἀπολείται. For the future after τοιοῦτον ὦ, cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 36. Compare also Plato, Euthyd. 299 D–E.
16. τὸν Μίδαν ἔκεινον, sc. ἀπολέσθαι.
20. Bekker reads ἢ δὲ κατηλικὴ ποιητικὴ χρημάτων κ.τ.λ.: thus he evidently, like the Vet. Int., makes ἢ κατηλικὴ the nominative. Sussemihl’s stopping, however, which I have adopted, seems preferable. With this stopping, the translation will be—‘but the other is commercial.’ Cp. 1. 10. 1258 a 39.
21. ἀλλ’ ἢ. All MSS. have ἀλλ’ ἢ or ἀλλ’ ἢ, none ἀλλά. The sentence would have been regularly constructed, if it had run—ὁ ποιητικὸς χρηματίζων ἀλλ’ ἢ διὰ χρημάτων μεταβολῆς, ὁ οἰκονομικὸς χ. ὁ πάνως, ἀλλὰ διὰ χ. μ. μόνον. Instead of adopting either of these forms, Aristotle anticipates in ὁ πάνως the coming exception and employs both ὁ πάνως and ἀλλ’ ἢ: cp. Plato, Protag. 354 B, ἢ ἔχετε τι ἀλλο τέλος λέγειν . . . ἀλλ’ ἢ ἢδονάς τε καὶ λύπος, where Riddell (Apol. p. 175) remarks, ‘the ἀλλο is anticipatory of the exception, and this is also pleonastic.’
22. καὶ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. It is thought to be concerned with money, because it operates through exchange and money is the starting-point and goal of exchange. In reality, however, it deals with κτήσις (37), the same subject-matter as οἰκονομικὴ χρηματιστική deals with, though with a different aim. Στοιχεῖον, ‘id quod est simplissimum, ex quo reliqua conficiuntur’ (Bon. Ind. 702 b 32): cp. παροιμένως οὖν ἢδον νομίματος, 1257 a 41. Πέρας, ‘quia contenta haec ratio rei quaerendae est cum coacervat nummos, nec alius sibi proponit’ (Vct.). Cp. Hegesipp. Fragm. (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 479),

Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πέρας τῆς μαγειρικῆς, Σύρε, εὐρήκειαν πάνως νομίζε μόνον ἐμέ:

and Posidipp. Fr. (ibid. 4. 521),

Τῆς τέχνης πέρας

tοῦτ’ ἔστιν.

Aristotle, however, recognizes a kind of exchange which is carried on independently of money and before money comes into being.
23. καὶ . . . ὅ. See note on 1253 a 18. Here is a further distinction between the κατηλικὴ and the οἰκονομικὴ χρηματιστική. Not only does the former seek wealth by means of exchange alone, but it aims at an unlimited amount. It makes wealth, which is a means, an end,
and as all arts pursue their end to an indeterminate extent, it consequently pursues wealth to an indeterminate extent.

25. eis ἀπειρὸν ἔστι. Cr. 1258 a 1, eis ἀπειροῦν ὁδὸν ἐκεῖνης τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οὖσαν, and Metaph. Γ. 5. 1010 a 22, εἶναι eis ἀπειροῦν, where Bekker conjectures ἑνα without necessity: see Bonitz on the passage.

27. ἐκεῖνο. See above on 1257 a 3.

29. δοιοῦτος κ.τ.λ., i.e. δο χρηματιστικὸς πλοῦτος—'a mass of χρήματα, and especially money, and the quest of this by exchange alone.'

30. τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς κ.τ.λ. It is natural, looking to ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς 28, to explain τῆς οἰκονομικῆς as τῆς οἰκονομικῆς χρηματιστικῆς, and with this view to propose the excision of οὗ, or the substitution of οὗ (Bernays), which the wrong reading of οὗ for αὐτόν by Π in 1268 a 39 might well be used to support. But perhaps no change is necessary, for χρημάτων κτήσεως is very probably that which we are to supply. Transl.: 'but of housekeeping, not money-making, acquisition of commodities there is a measure, for money-making is not the business of the housekeeping acquisition of commodities.' Τοῦτο appears to refer to δοιοῦτος πλοῦτος κ.τ.λ. Contrast 38, ὡστε δοκεῖ τισὶ τούτῳ εἶναι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς [χρήσεως τῆς χρηματιστικῆς] ἔργων—i.e. ή αἰσθήσεις.

32. τῷ μὲν. Vict. 'hac quidem'—'si ita rem attendimus, id est si argumentis ducimur.' The reasoning referred to is that which is set forth in 1257 a 10–31, where we learn that true wealth is that which is necessary to sustenance and for the purposes of the household generally, and that this kind of wealth is limited by the needs of the household (cp. also 1256 b 26–37). Lamb., however, followed by Bernays, translates 'huic quidem'—i.e. for the οἰκονομικὴ χρηματιστική—not rightly, as it seems to me.

33. ἐπὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'but we see the opposite occurring in the experience of life.' For συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ, cp. de Gen. An. 2. 5. 741 b 19, συμβαίνει δ' ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ τελευταῖον γινόμενον πρῶτον ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον τελευταίον. Aristotle is met by a contrariety between ὁ λόγος and τὰ γυμνέα (or τὰ συμβαίνοντα), and we might expect that he would apply the famous principle of de Gen. An. 3. 10. 760 b 27 sqq., ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦ λόγου τὰ περὶ τὴν γένεσιν τῶν μελετῶν τούτων ἔχει τῶν πρῶτων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν συμβαίνων δοκούντων περὶ αὐτῶν· οὐ μὴν ἐξηκταῦ τὸ συμβαίνοντα ἑκατῶν, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ποτε ληφθῇ, τότε τῇ αἰσθήσει μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λόγῳ πιστευτῶν, καὶ τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν ὅμοιον χρήσεως δεικνύοντο τοῖς φαινομένοις. But the question here is what ought to be and not what is, and τὰ γυμνέα are not as decisive as in a problem of
natural history; men's action, as Aristotle proceeds to point out, is in this matter the offspring of mistake.

ὁρᾷ(μεν). See critical note.


35. αὐτῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. What is αὐτῶν? I incline to think, not the two kinds of χρηματιστική, but the two kinds of χρημάτων κτήσεις (30), or in other words, the two uses of χρηματιστική. The reason why men act as if wealth were subject to no limit is the mutual proximity and similarity of the two ways of using χρηματιστική. 'For either use of χρηματιστική, being of the same thing, overlaps the other, so as to seem one and the same; for property—the subject-matter of both (cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 13 sq.)—is applied by both to (or has to do with) the same use, but not with the same aim, the aim of the one mode of using it being its increase and that of the other something quite different.' The two kinds of χρηματιστική are, in fact, only two different uses of the same science, or even an identical use, only with a different aim. 'Εκάτερα, which is the reading of all known MSS., though three MSS. of the Vet. Int. (b g h) have 'utrique pecuniatarum,' seems to be placed where it is to bring out the antithesis to τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὖσα more sharply. Sepulveda appears to have found ἐκάτερα in some MSS. (see critical note on 1257 b 36). There is certainly some strangeness in the immediate sequence of ἐκάτερα ἡ χρῆσις and τῆς αὐτής χρήσεως, and the genitive τῆς αὐτής χρήσεως is perplexing. But if we accept, with Bern. and Sus., Gottling's emendation τῆς γὰρ αὐτής ἐστὶ κτίσεως χρῆσις, we are not quite of our difficulties, for τῆς αὐτής κτίσεως is not a satisfactory expression. Perhaps the reduction of the two uses of χρηματιστική mentioned in 35–36 to the one use not κατὰ ταῦτα of 37 may be no more than the word ἐπαλλάττει prepares us for. For the phrase τῆς γὰρ αὐτής ἐστὶ κτίσεως κτήσις, Soph. El. 11. 171 b 29 may be compared (the passage also illustrates οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα)—καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν ἦσαν οἱ φιλερεῖδες καὶ σοφισταὶ, ἀλλ' ὁ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνος καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐσται σοφιστικὸς καὶ ἐρωτικός, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ἤ μὲν νίκης φαινομένης, ἐρωτικός, ἤ δὲ σοφίας, σοφιστικός. Cp. also Pol. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 33, ὅταν δὸς περὶ κτίσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν οὖσαν εὑρίσκῃ συμβατὴν ποιεῖσθαι μνείαν, πῶς δὲ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν αὐτήν; Ἰν 7 (5). 2. 1302 a 37 we have ὅν διὰ μὲν ἐστι ταὐτὰ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἀλλ' οὔχ ὡσαύτως.

38. ὡστε κ.τ.λ. takes up ἐπαλλάττει: the two uses of χρηματιστική overlap, and so the end of the κατηγορία χρῆσις—the increase of
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property—is taken to be the end of the ἀληθινή θήσεις (for perhaps it is more natural to supply θήσεις here than χρηματιστική).
Householders are thus led to follow the example of οἱ χρηματιστικοὶ in the use of property and to make its indefinite increase their aim.
Aristotle seems, however, after all (40 sqq.) to trace the confusion of the ἀληθινή θήσεις of property with the κατατακτική θήσεις of it to something more than the ἕπαλαξις of the two—to a wrong view of the purpose of life and of the nature of τὸ εὖ ζεῖν. Either men forget everything else for mere existence (τὸ ζεῖν), or they erroneously take τὸ εὖ ζεῖν to consist in bodily enjoyment. The same two contrasted classes of misusers of property appear in 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 36 sqq., and in a saying ascribed to Aristotle by Plutarch (δὲ Κύππιδα Διβίτ. 8. 527 Α.), σὺ δὲ αὐτὸν ἀκούεις, φήσωμεν, Ἀριστοτέλειος λέγοντος, ὅτι οἱ μὲν οὐ χρηστῶν [τῶν χρηστῶν], οἱ δὲ παραχρῶνται (I owe this quotation to an unpublished essay by the late Mr. R. Shute). As to τὸ the former of the two classes, cp. Ἐθ. Νικ. 4. 1. 1120 a 2, δοκεὶ δ’ ἀπλεία τὸς αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ η τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὅτι τοῦ ζεῖν διὰ τότων δύνατον, and Dio Chrysost. Ὀρ. 6. 209 Ρ. As to the misapprehension of τὸ εὖ ζεῖν by the second, cp. Plato, Ἐθ. 329 A, ἀγαπασκοῦντος ὡς μεγάλου τινῶν ἀπετερημένου, καὶ τότε μὲν (while in the enjoyment of the pleasures of youth) εὖ ζωντες, σὺν δὲ οὐδὲ ζωντες: Eurip. Φραγμ. 284. 3–6: Hyperid. Φραγμ. 209 Βλασ, μὴ δύνασθαι καλὸς ζεῖν, μὴ μοῦθων τὰ καλὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ βίω (and these Hyperides notoriously interpreted in this way): Theopomp. Φρ. 260. Our own expression ‘living well’ is, however, illustration enough.

40. τὴν κ.τ.λ., ‘their wealth in money’: see below on 1259 b 19.

1258 a.
1. εἰς ἀπειρον . . . οὐσίας. See note on 1257 b 25.
2. δὲ καὶ κ. τ. λ., ‘and those who do aim at’, or perhaps the sense of καὶ is ‘at all’ (see Riddell, Ἀπολογία of Plato, p. 168).
4. καὶ τοῦτο, i.e. not only τὸ ζεῖν, but also τὸ πρὸς τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις.
6. ἀλήθεια. For this use of the word, see 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 14 sq. and Ἰουν. 288 a 52 sq.
10. τὸν δυνάμεων here seems to include not only arts like ἀρτιστική, but also virtues like ἀνθρώπων: contrast Ἐθ. Νικ. 2. 4. 1105 b 20 sqq. and 5. 1. 1129 a 11 sqq.
οὐ κατὰ φύσιν. Plato (Ῥεπ. 346) had already insisted that pay is the end of the art of payment, not of medicine, or building, or navigation (cp. Ῥεπ. 342 Δ, ὁμολογήσαι γὰρ ὃ ἀκριβὴς ἱατρὸς σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων, ἀλλ’ οὐ χρηματιστικῆς). There is perhaps a reminiscence of the passage before us in Ἑρμ. Ῥο. τ. 25. 1192 α 15 sqq., and possibly in Lucian, Κυνικὸς 454.
11. στρατηγικής. Generals of the type of Chares (see Theopomp. ap. Athen. Deipn. 532 b sq.) were perhaps present to Aristotle’s mind. Aristotle does not refer to the ways of contemporary politicians, but he might well have done so: see Prof. S. H. Butcher, Demosthenes (p. 13), who cites Demosth. Olynth. 3. c. 26 and Isocr. Areopag. § 25. Sophists also used their φανομένη σοφία with a view to χρηματιστική, Soph. El. 11. 171 b 27 sqq.

12. τοῦτο, i.e. τὸ χρηματίζωσθαι, which must be supplied from χρηματιστικάς.

τέλος, ‘the end of all these δυνάμεις.’ Cp. 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 5 sq. for a very similar expression.

15. δι' αὐτῶν τῶν κ.τ.λ. It has been explained (1257 b 40—1258 a 14) that men come to need the unsound kind of χρηματιστική, because they live for τὸ ζήν or for τὸ εὖ ζήν wrongly inter- preted.

17. ἕ περι τὴν τροφήν. The sound form of χρηματιστική is, however, concerned with the acquisition of many things besides τροφή — e.g. ἐσθήσεις, ὀργάνα, δοῦλοι, as is explained in c. 8. 1256 b 15 sqq. Still Aristotle viewed articles of subsistence as the type of true wealth, herein apparently following the inquirers referred to in 1257 b 10 sqq., and trifling inexactnesses are not rare in the Politics, so that this one need not disturb us.

19. έξ ἀρχής, c. 8. 1256 a 4, though there no reference had been C. 10. made to πολιτική. It was evidently a common view not only that the main function of the head of a household was to add to the household income, but also that the statesman’s main business was to provide the State with as large a revenue as possible: cp. c. 1. 1259 a 35, διόπερ τινές καὶ πολιτεύονται τῶν πολιτισμένων ταῦτα μόνον, and see the account given of the πολιτεία ἁγάθος in Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1446 b 33, διότι προσόδους παρακευόμενοι πλεοναστέω, τῶν ἰδιῶν μηδένα δημειώσεις, and Theopompus’ picture of Eubulus (Fr. 96: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 293)—Εὐβοιοῦς . . . δημαγογός ἦν ἐφισφανέστατος, ἐπιμελής τε καὶ φιλόσοφος, ἄργυρων τε συχνῶν παράξεων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις διένειμε—did καὶ τὴν πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς ταύτης πολιτείας ἀναδρομάτην καὶ ῥαβδομάτην συνειδήσατα. Aristotle’s object here is to correct these erroneous conceptions of the office of the Statesman and the head of a household.

20. οὖ, not οὐκ, though preceding ἀλλά, as in 1258 a 33 and 3. 14. 1284 b 39. ‘Οὐ is used before a vowel without the final κ when it stands at the end of a clause and when it is emphatic: cf. Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 2: Cyr. 2. 3. 8, 5. 5. 31, 8. 1. 5: Mem. 4. 7. 7’ (Holden, Oeconomicus of Xenophon, p. 191). For the transition to ἀλλά, cp. 1258 a 33: 3. 7. 1279 b 1: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 2.

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21. τούτο, not probably ἡ χρηματιστική, though this would harmonize well with c. 8. 1256 b 28, but χρηματα as in 35 (μάλιστα δὲ, καβάπερ εἴρηται πράσερον, δὲ φόσοι ταῦτα ὑπάρχων). For the thought that the statesman has not, any more than the weaver, to produce the material on which he exercises his art, cp. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 40 sqq.: 13. 1332 a 28. Cp. also Plato, Laws 889 A. Aristotle speaks somewhat differently in Phys. 2. 2. 194 b 7, ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κατὰ τέκνην ἤμεις ποιούμεν τὴν ὕλην τοῖς ἑργοῦ ἑνεκα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει οὗτος. ἦσσερ γάρ καὶ . . . οὕτω καί. See Sus. 1, Ind. Gramm. ἦσσερ.

23. τροφῆν κ.τ.λ. 'So for sustenance nature must make over land or sea or something else.' Cp. Xen. Mem. 4. 3. 5 sq., and Antiphon, Tetral. 3. 1. 2. For a similar use of τροφῆν, cp. Xen. Oecon. 17. 14, ἀ ἐν ἑκώνια ἐργασάμεναι τροφῆν καταθόνται. For ἀλλο τι, cp. 8. c. 1256 a 37, λίμνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἡ βάλασσα τοιαύτην. The food of animals, indeed, is rather that which comes from earth and water, than earth and water (de Gen. An. 3. 11. 762 b 12); earth and water are food rather for plants (ibid.): still food is said to be a mixture of earth and water in de Part. An. 3. 5. 668 b 11.

24. ἐκ δὲ τοῦτων κ.τ.λ. Schneider, Bonitz (according to Sus. Qu. Crit. p. 356), and Susemihl himself explain ἐκ τοῦτων here as = μερὰ ταῦτα, and there is much to be said for their view, though perhaps this use of ἐκ τοῦτων is more common in Xenophon than in Aristotle (as to Plato, see Riddell, Apol. p. 162). This rendering certainly has the merit of softening the harshness of the juxta-position of τοῦτων and ταῦτα. But I incline on the whole to think that in the context in which it stands ἐκ τοῦτων means 'starting with this provision.' Ταῦτα mean 'food,' not 'land, sea, etc.,' for it is the function of ὀικονομική to deal with the former, not the latter; the word is perhaps in the plural because there are many kinds of food—τροφῆ ἐκ γῆς, τροφῆ ἐκ βαλάντις κ.τ.λ.

26. γνώναι. Cp. Phys. 2. 2. 194 a 36, διὸ δὲ αἱ ἀρχονται τῆς ὕλης καὶ αἱ γνωρίζουσαν τέχναι, ἢ τε χρωμείς καὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἢ ἀρχιτεκτονικῆ. The ship-captain (representing ἡ χρωμείη), ποιῶν τι τὸ ἔλεος τοῦ πηδαλίου, γνωρίζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει: ἀ δὲ (the ἀρχιτέκτων who superintends its construction), ἐκ ποιῶν ξύλου καὶ ποιῶν κυήτων ἔσται. The claims of ὁ χρωμένος to be credited with knowledge are also maintained in Pol. 3. 11. 1282 a 17 sq.

27. καὶ γάρ. 'For, if this were not so.'

31. For ἐπεὶ followed by οὕτω, cp. 1253 b 23—31. The householder must know bad commodities from good, but he need not know even the sound methods of producing or acquiring them. Cp. Cic. de Rep. 5. 3. 5.
33. τῶν χρημάτων. The article is probably added, because the meaning is 'the commodities essential to the household.'

34. The use of the word μάλιστα implies that occasionally the means of subsistence may not φύσει ἑπάρχειν, in which case the householder must provide them as best he can. The territory of the State may be so infertile and the sea so barren of fish, that a resort to other modes of acquiring sustenance than the obtainment of vegetable and animal food from the soil and sea may be inevitable. Aristotle's meaning may be illustrated by the instance of Aegina: cp. Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 376, ἐμπάροιμο γὰρ γενέσθαι, διὰ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῆς χώρας τῶν ἀνθρώπων θαλαττουργοῦστος ἐμπορικῶς.

πρότερον, 1258 a 23.

35. The proof that it is for Nature to supply the animal once brought into the world with food, is that every creature finds its food in the unexhausted residuum of the matter from which it takes its origin, or in other words receives it from the hands of Nature (c. 8. 1256 b 7 sqq.: see note on 1256 b 12). So we read in de Gen. et Corr. 2. 8. 335 a 10, ἀπευθεῖα μὲν γὰρ τρέφεται τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔξ ὑπερ ἔστιν. Not only is the earliest food used by an animal born with him and the gift of Nature, but animals subsist throughout life on the products of the earth and water of which they are made (Meteor. 4. 4. 382 a 6 sqq.). Cp. Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 30, ἐνὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν [ἡ γεωργία]. φύσει γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἡ τρεφὴ πάσιν ἔστιν, ὡστε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, and Lucr. 2. 1156, Sed genuit tellus eadem quae nunc alit ex se:
Aristotle, however, would say 'land and water,' and would speak not of the mother, but of the unused residuum as the true source of food. But, if food is always won from land and water, all other commodities, it is implied, should be sought from the same quarter, and the Science of Supply should thus procure them.

36. πᾶσιν. Cp. c. 8. 1256 b 7, ἦ μὲν οὖν τασαίτητ κτήσει ὅπ' αὐτής φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πᾶσιν (i. e. πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις), though here πᾶσι seems to mean 'for all human beings,' as in c. 2. 1253 a 30.

2. ἀπ' ἄλληλων stands in contrast to ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων. 1258 b. Cp. Rhet. 2. 4. 1381 a 21, διὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τιμῶσι καὶ τοῖς δικαίως τουσώσις δ' ὑπολαμβάνουσι τούς μη ἄφ' ἑτέρων ζωντας ταιοῦτα δ' οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ έργάζεσθαι, καὶ τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοῦ μάλιστα. The idea is still further worked out in Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 27, ἦ δὲ γεωργική μάλιστα [κτήσεως ἐπιμέλεια] ὁτι δικαιαίοις ἢ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων οὐθ' ἑκόντων, ὡσπερ καπηλεία καὶ αἱ μισθοφορικαὶ, οὐθ' ἀκάντων, ὡστερ αἱ πολεμικαί. Here the writer has before him Plato, Soph. 219D.
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ἡ δεβολοστατική, 'the trade of a petty usurer' (L. and S.): see also Büchsenenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 501, n. 7, who quotes from Etymolog. Magn. 725. 13, δεβολοστάτας γονόν οί 'Απτικά τοὺς ὀλίγα δανείζοντας άλεγνον υπερβολικός. Aristotle's objection seems to apply as much to lenders of large sums at usury as to lenders of small; but we find τοκοσταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλὰ single out as objects of obloquy in the Nicomachean Ethics also (4. 3. 1121 b 34). Cp. M. Cato, de Re Rustica, praef.: maiores nostri hoc sic habuerunt, et ita in legibus posuerunt, furem dupli condemnari, feneratorem quadrupli; quanto peiorem civem existimarint feneratorem quam furem, hinc licet existimari. See also Cic. de Offic. 2. 25. 89, and Sandys and Paley on Demosth. contra Steph. i. c. 70.

3. διὰ τὸ κ. ῥ. λ., 'because profit is acquired' (literally perhaps, 'the acquisition of profit results': cp. for κτίσις, 1257 b 30 and 1256 a 19), 'from money taken by itself, and not from exchange, for which money was introduced.' For the ellipse of ἀνὸν τούτον before ἐφε' ὀπερ ἐπομίσθη, cp. i. 3. 1253 b 3: 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 27: 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 29-30. In usury, according to Aristotle here, the profit comes from money taken by itself, not subjected to any process of exchange, nor converted into corn or any other commodity—the use for which it is intended. It was introduced to serve as a medium of exchange, not to grow, but usury makes it grow. It makes money come out of money, and hence the Greek word for interest (τόκος), for as children are like their parents, so is interest money no less than the principal which begets it. Things, however, should be used for the purpose for which they exist (c. 9. 1258 a 10); hence this mode of acquisition is in an especial degree unnatural. Νόμιμα νομίσματος is perhaps, like Δημοσθένης Δημοσθένους, meant to express a filial relation. The nature of Interest on Money seems to be better understood in c. 11 (see below on 21).

C. 11. 9. We now come to a chapter differing both in matter and manner from the chapters which precede and follow it, and for which we can hardly be said to have been prepared in advance. A friend has expressed to me a doubt of its authenticity, and even if we hold it to be Aristotelian, it might be (as some other passages of the Politics appear to be) a subsequent addition, due either to Aristotle himself or to some succeeding editor. The question deserves examination, and it will be well to notice here a few considerations on either side.

The opening words of c. 8 promise an inquiry into all kinds of property and all forms of the Science of Supply. The question
whether the Science of Supply is a part of the Science of Household Management is here indeed singled out as the first question to be discussed, but we gather that other questions also will be treated. Still no reference is made to a division of the inquiry into a part relating to τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν and a part relating to τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν. C. i, however, starts with this distinction. "Επει δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διαρκήσαν ἠκαίνος, τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεῖ διελθεῖν (c. i. init.). We have learnt—this seems to be the meaning—to distinguish the sound and unsound forms of the Science of Supply. We have also learnt how far the οἰκονομικὸν has, as such, to concern himself with the Science of Supply; but we have not yet learnt in any degree how to practise this Science, nor which of its branches are most safe or most profitable or most alien to a freeman, nor generally what are the principles of successful money-making. There is nothing un-Aristotelian in giving advice to lovers of money-making (τοῖς τιμῶσι τὴν χρηματιστικῆν, c. i. 1259 a 5), for Aristotle disapproves of the tyranny and the extreme democracy at least as strongly as he disapproves of a money-making spirit, yet he advises both these constitutions how best to secure their own continuance. Besides, States may find the inquiries of this chapter useful (1259 a 33 sq.). And if to us instruction how to farm and trade seems to fall outside the province of a treatise on Household Management and Politics, this was not the view of Aristotle's time, for Xenophon had sketched in his Oeconomicus how a farm was to be managed; the only novelty in this chapter is that it studies the principles of commercial success.

And then again, if Aristotle does not prepare us in c. 8 or elsewhere in the First Book for a consideration of τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν in relation to the Science of Supply, it is nevertheless the case that in entering on the question of slavery (c. 3. 1253 b 14 sqq.) he had announced his aim to be not only to arrive at conclusions on the subject better than those commonly held, but also to throw light on the use to be made of the slave (τὰ τε πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρείαν ἱδομέν, 1253 b 15), and a similar inquiry respecting χρηματιστικῆ is not unnatural. Throughout the Politics τὸ χρήσιμον, no less than τὸ ἄρβον, is kept in view (see e.g. 2. i. 1260 b 32 sq.: 6 (4). i. 1288 b 35 sqq.).

On the other hand, the account given of χρηματιστικῆ in c. i1 differs in many respects from that given in cc. 8–10. Three kinds of χρηματιστικῆ are now distinguished, not two only as before—the natural kind (or, as it is also now called, ἡ οἰκειοτάτη), ἡ μεταβλητικῆ, and a kind midway between the two of which we have heard
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nothing in cc. 8–10, and we find labouring for hire (μισθαρνία) and lending money at interest (τοκυσμός) ranged under ἡ μεταβλητικὴ χρηματιστική, whereas in cc. 8–10 nothing has been said of μισθαρνία, and ὀθδολοστική has been described as winning money, not from any process of exchange, but from the barren metal itself. The inclusion, however, of the work of the τεχνίτης, as a form of μισθαρνία, under ἡ μεταβλητικὴ χρηματιστικὴ is quite borne out by i. 13. 1260 b 2, where τεχνίται are said not to exist by nature, though it does not seem to agree with the recognition of the τεχνίτης elsewhere (4 (7). 8. 1328 b 21: 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 1 sqq.) as one of the necessary elements of a State. The reference to writers on the subject and to τὰ λεγόμενα στοράδην (1258 b 39 sqq.), again, is in accordance with the advice given in Rhet. i. 4. 1359 b 30 sqq., and this passage of c. xi may well have been present to the mind of the writer of the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics, whoever he was (see Oecon. 2. 1346 a 26 sqq.). Hieronymus of Rhodes, as has been observed elsewhere, may possibly have had a passage from this chapter (1259 a 9 sqq.) before him. The writer of the sketch or epitome of the Political Theory of the Peripatetics which is preserved in the Eclogae of Stobaeus (2. 6. 17) would seem to be acquainted with the earlier part of c. xi down to the notice of μεταλλευτική, for he says, δὲ ὁ καὶ πολλὰν ἐμπειρόν δεῖν εἶναι τῶν ὑκομοίκων, γεωργίας προβατεῖας μεταλλεῖας, ἵνα τὸν λυστελεστάτους ἄρα καὶ δικαιωτάτους καρποὺς διαγωνίσκῃ: he may well have been acquainted with the later part also, though he does not mention anything from it. The following passage from the First Book of the Oeconomics may likewise be based on the teaching of c. xi—κήσεως δὲ πρὸτη ἐπιμέλεια ἡ κατὰ φύσιν κατὰ φύσιν δὲ γεωργικὴ προτέρα, καὶ δεύτεραι δόσαι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, οἷον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἶ τις ἄλλη τοιαύτη (c. 2. 1343 a 25 sqq.).

On the whole, I incline to think that this chapter is Aristotelian, and perhaps coeval with the rest of the First Book.

10. πάντα δὲ τὰ τοιαύτα κ.τ.λ. Stahr translates: ‘auf diesem ganzen Gebiet hat freilich die Theorie eines Spiel, während die Praxis an nothwendige Bedingungen gebunden ist.’ Bern. and Sus. follow him in this translation, and Mr. Welldon’s version is—‘it is to be observed, however, that in all such matters speculation is free, while in practice there are limiting conditions.’ Vict. however translates—‘cuncta autem huiusheodemodi contemplacionem habent libero homine dignam, usum vero necessarium’—and I incline to this view of the passage. We have ἔλευθέρα ἀγαρί, 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 32: ἔλευθέρα ἐπιστήμη, Metaph. Ἀ. 2. 982 b 27.
Prof. Tyrrell (Hermaithena, 12. 28) ‘thinks it will be found that ἐλευθέρος when of two terminations always means “liberalis,” not “liber.” ’ The aim of the remark will then be to distinguish between what is liberal and what is not so in relation to these matters—an aim which appears also below, 1258 b 34—39, as well as in the contrast of ἐντιμότερα and ἀναγκαύοτερα ἔργα, c. 7. 1255 b 28, and in 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 15 sqq. We are told, in fact, that though speculation about matters relating to the practice of χρηματιστική is liberal, the exercise of the arts which fall under the head of χρηματιστική is not so. So in de Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 5 sqq. Aristotle tells us that he will treat of Zoology μηδὲν παραλιπὼν εἰς δύναμιν μήτε ἀντιμότερων μήτε τιμότερων καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαριστέως αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν ζῴων) πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν, κατὰ τὴν δειρίν άμως ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις ἀμφίκοπος ἥδωσε παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰ αὐτία γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσιν φιλοσοφόροις. It appears from Plato, Laws 889 D, that there were those who ranked agriculture very high among the sciences.

12. ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ. Varro in his De Re Rustica (lib. 2. praef. 5) gives a similar account of the qualifications which a farmer should possess:—quoram (sc. agriculturae et pastionis) quoniam societas inter se magna . . . qui habet praedium, habere utramque debet disciplinam, et agriculturae et pecoris pascendi, et etiam villaticae pastionis: ex ea enim quoque fructus tolli possunt non mediocres, ex ornithonibus ac leporarisi et piscinis. Compare also the opening lines of Virgil’s Georgics, and Cicero de Senectute 15. 54. The following passage of Varro, de Re Rustica (2. 1. 16) is very similar to that before us—in qua regione quamque potissimum pascas, et quando, et queis? ut capras in montuosis potius locis et fruticibus, quam in herbidis campis, equas contra; neque eadem loca aestiva et hiberna idonea omnibus ad pascendum. It will be noticed that Aristotle places ‘res pecuaria’ before ‘agricultura,’ perhaps because pastoral farming long prevailed more extensively in Greece than agriculture (Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, pp. 208 sqq., 313), perhaps because it was more lucrative (cp. Cic. de Offic. 2. 25. 89), perhaps because animals like the horse and ox deserve precedence. We hear nothing from him as to the employment of slaves as a source of profit.

χρήσιμα (cp. 30, ἀκάρπων μὲν χρήσιμων δὲ) apparently takes up τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν and bears probably somewhat the same meaning as in Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 15, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθέρα καὶ χρήσιμα· ἄστι δὲ χρήσιμα μὲν μᾶλλον τὰ κάρπημα, ἐλευθέρα δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπολαυσίν κάρπημα δὲ λέγω ἀδ' ὅν αἱ πρόσοδοι, ἀπολαυστικὰ δὲ ἀδ' ὅν μηδὲν παρά τὴν χρήσιν γλύνεται, δ' τι καὶ ἄξιον.
κτήματα is used in 2. 1. 1261 a 5 in the same sense as κτήσεις, 1261 a 8, but here it seems to be used in a sense exclusive of γεωργία (cp. 17), and the illustrations which follow seem to show that its meaning is 'farm-stock' (Vic. 'pecora'). Horses, oxen, sheep, and some other animals (15) are included under κτήματα, but not, it would appear, the water-animals and birds referred to in 19.

13. πῶς. Vic. 'quomodo habita et curata.'

14. κτήσις ποία τις, 'what course should be followed in the getting of horses,' so as to secure the maximum of profit. Κτήσις includes both breeding and purchase: ποία refers to quantity, quality, kind of animal, etc.

15. τῶν λοιπῶν ζῴων, e. g. mules, asses, swine, goats. As to the animals referred to, see above on 12.

πρὸς ἀλληλα. Vic. 'oporet quasi conferre ipsa inter se, videreque ex equorumne gregibus sive armentis boum maiores utilisates capiantur.'

18. ἡδη. Cp. de Gen. An. 2. 6. 742 a 19, τὸ δὲ πρότερον ἡδη πολλαχῶς ἔστιν: ibid. 2. 6. 742 b 33, ἄρξῃ δ' ἐν μέν τοῖς ἀκανθίσεωι τὸ τί ἔστιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς γεωργικοῖς ἡδή πλείους: ibid. 1. 20. 729 a 19, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ συνιστάσεως πρώτου ἐξ ἐνός ἡδη ἐν γίνεται μόνον. These passages may serve to illustrate the use of ἡδη in the text, though the word does not perhaps bear quite the same meaning in all of them. In the passage before us it may be roughly rendered by 'again.'

ψιλής ... πεφυτευμένης. The distribution of the two kinds of cultivation throughout Greece is well described by Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, pp. 293–6. As to Italy, cp. Varro de Re Rustica, 1. 2. 6: contra quid in Italia utensile non modo non nascitur, sed etiam non egregium fit? quod far conferam Campano? quod triicium Appulo? quod vinum Falerno? quod oleum Venafro? Non arboribus consita Italia est, ut tota pomarium videatur? An Phrygia magis vitibus cooperta, quam Homerus appellat ἄμπελοςώσι, quam haec? aut Argos, quod idem poeta πολύπυρον? μελιττουργίας. As Vic. points out, honey was of more importance to the ancients than to us. See Büchsenschütz, p. 228 sq., who remarks that 'though sugar was known to the ancients, they used it solely for medical purposes, so that the only material they possessed for sweetening food was honey.' Plato's citizens in the Laws are to be γεωργοὶ καὶ νομεῖς καὶ μελιττουργοί (842 D).

19. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων. Should we translate 'and concerning the other animals, whether water-animals or winged,' or should we supply 'the management of' before 'the other animals' from the
latter portions of the words γεωργίας, μελιττουργίας? Perhaps we are intended to supply these words. Aristotle seems here to refer, not to fish and fowl in a wild state, but to poultry-houses and fish-preserves. In his time these appurtenances of a farm would be on a simple and moderate scale, wholly unlike that of the 'villatica pastio' in the days when Roman luxury was at its height (Varro, de Re Rustica 3. 3. 6 sqq.). Yet a great ἱεροπροφείων existed at Agrigentum early in the fifth century before Christ (Diod. 11. 25. 4).

20. τῆς . . . οἰκειοτάτης χρηματιστικῆς, 'of the Science of Supply in its most undistorted form.' The word οἰκεῖος is used by Aristotle in connexion with κύριος and with κατὰ φύσιν, and in contradistinction to βίος (see Bon. Ind. s.v.). Cp. also c. 9. 1257 a 12, οὐ τίνι οἰκείων χρησιν, οὐ γάρ ἀλλαγῆς ἑκεν γέγανεν.

21. ταῦτα μόρια καὶ πρώτα. Μόρια is sometimes used, like μέρη (Bon. Ind. 455 b 40 sqq.), of 'ea quae naturam alicuius rei constituant ac distinguunt' (Bon. Ind. 473 b 55 sqq.), and this would seem to be its meaning here. The simplest elements of a thing are often called πρώτα, as in Pol. 1. 3. 1253 b 5, πρῶτα καὶ ἐλάχιστα μέρη οἰκεῖα (see Bon. Ind. 652 b 42 sqq.), but here πρώτα appears rather to mean 'the primary or leading elements' (cp. μέγιστον 22): see Bon. Ind. 653 a 26 sqq., 'πρώτος significat ipsam per se rei notionem et naturam (ut quae iam a principio sit et rem constitut). So we have in 28, τῆς πρώτης χρηματιστικῆς (cp. Oecon. 1. 2. 1343 a 25 sqq.), and in de Caelo 1. 3. 270 b 2, τὸ πρῶτον τῶν σωμάτων. The account now given of the various forms of the οἰκειοτάτης χρηματιστικῆ which is referred to in 28 as ἡ κατὰ φύσιν, is not harmonized with the account given in c. 8 of the βίοι included under the natural χρηματιστικῆ: for instance, we now hear nothing of ληστεία. Aristotle, however, here mentions only τὰ πρώτα.

τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς. Already in c. 10. 1258 b 1 the unsound χρηματιστικῆ has been called μεταβλητικῆ, instead of κατηλικῆ, and here the change is especially necessary, for ἐμπορία could hardly be brought under κατηλικῆ without some sense of strangeness. 'Exchanging' comprises, we are told, the transport and sale of commodities (ἐμπορία), and the letting-out of money (τοιχισμός) or of labour, skilled or unskilled (μετοχαρία). 'This classification,' says Büchsenschütz (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 455), 'nearly approaches that accepted by modern political economy, inasmuch as the first of the three departments has to do with traffic by way of sale, and the second and third with traffic by way of letting, the object let out being in the one case capital (money, land, etc.),
and in the other labour.' Aristotle, however, makes no reference to the letting of land. Büchsenschütz points out that in Plato's Sophist (219 D) οἰκονομίας is already brought under μεταβλητική (Besitz und Erwerb, p. 251 n.). He also compares Plato, Rep. 371 E, οἵ δὲ πωλαῖντες τὴν τής ἱπποδοσίας χρείας κέκλησαν μισθωτοί. In the passage before us Aristotle regards the work of the βάναυσος τεχνίτης as a form of μαθαρνία: in Pol. 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 12 sqq., however, μαθαρνικὰ εργασία are distinguished from βάναυσοι τέχναι.

22. ναυληρία φορτηγία παράστασις. Sus. and others translate the first two words, 'maritime trade,' 'inland trade'; but Büchsenschütz (p. 456 and note 1) explains them otherwise. According to him, ἐμπορία is here resolved into the three elements—the provision of a ship, the conveyance of cargo, and exposure for sale. The ναυληρός lets out a ship, sometimes (Xen. Mem. 3. 9. 11) himself taking passage in it; the merchant transports goods from point to point; and the salesman, wholesale or retail, sets out goods for sale. Ἐμπορία is thus made to include the work of the καπτός, if this interpretation is correct. That φορτηγία does not refer exclusively to land-trade, appears from C. F. Hermann, Griech. Antiqq. 3. § 45. 6 (ed. 2). According to Büchsenschütz (p. 458), the transport of commodities was effected in Greece almost entirely by sea. It should be added that the same individual might often be ναυληρός, φορτηγὸς, and wholesale salesman in one.

23. παράστασις would probably be safer and less remunerative than ναυληρία and φορτηγία. As to the chances of ναυληρία, see Eth. Eud. 7. 14. 1247 a 21 sqq., and for the general ἄρος ἀσφαλείας, Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 19 sqq. A shield-manufactory was safer than a bank (see Sandys and Paley on Demosth. Pro Phorm. c. 11). The remark in the text is interposed to give useful guidance in the practice of χρηματιστική (cp. τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρήσιν δεῖ διεξεῖν, 1258 b 9): we find a similar hint in Oecon. 1. 6. 1344 b 28 sqq.

26. τῶν ἀτέχνων κ.τ.λ. is masc. There is no need to alter τεχνῶν to τεχνητῶν. Similar transitions occur in 1. 10. 1258 a 33–34 (τοῦ οἰκονόμου . . . τῆς ὑπηρεσίας) and 3. 1. 1275 a 23–26. As the labour of the ὅθεσ is of a purely physical kind, he is nearly akin to the slave: cp. 1258 b 38 and 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 21, θητικῶν καὶ δουλικῶν.

27. τρίτων δὲ εἴδος κ.τ.λ. How can this kind be said to possess any of the characteristics of μεταβλητική? Probably because, though the commodities it acquires are acquired from the earth, it does not seek wealth ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων (1258 a 38), but
seeks it from things ἀκαρπα μὲν χρήσιμα δὲ, such as timber-trees, just as μετεβλητικὴ seeks it ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων or from money.

29. δόσα κ.τ.λ. 'Having to do with) things won from the earth and from products of the earth not yielding fruit, but still useful.' For the ellipse, see notes on 1253 b 3, 1256 b 26. Of commodities won ἀπὸ γῆς marble or chalk may serve as an example: timber is an instance of a commodity won ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς γυαλείων ἀκάρπων μὲν χρησίμων δὲ. Metals probably fall under the former head, notwithstanding that they are called, together with some other mineral products, τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ γενόμενα (Meteor. 3. 6. 378 a 19 sqq.).

32. ἡδη, ‘again’ (see above on 18). The indiff erent use of γένος and εἶδος should be noted here. Cp. Rhet. 1. 2–3, 1358 a 33–36.


εἰςι δὲ . . . 39. ἀρετὴς. These remarks come in with singular abruptness, and it is not clear that they are not an interpolation. On the other hand, there is something not quite satisfactory in the sequence, if we omit them and place ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίας κ.τ.λ. immediately after φορτικῶν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. Susemihl places πρὶν ἐκατόν δὲ τούτων 33—τὰ ἐνδιατρίβειν 35 after, instead of before, εἰςι δὲ—ἀρετῆς, but τούτων 33 is thus robbed of its significance and not much is gained in any way. There is this to be said for the passage, that a somewhat similar reference to the varying dignity of different kinds of slave-work is to be found in c. 7. 1255 b 27 sqq.

36. τεχνικῶτατα. According to Eth. Eud. 7. 14. 1247 a 5, στρατηγία and κυβερνητική are instances of arts in which τέχνη ἐστὶν πολὺ μάνται καὶ τύχις ἐνυπάρχει. Agathon, on the other hand, traced a relation between Art and Fortune in the well-known line, quoted in Eth. Nic. 6. 4. 1140 a 19, τέχνη τύχην ἐστερβε καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

37. βασιλεύσώτατα. Those pursuits also are βασιλεύοντα ὁ δεικτορίᾳ sign which de-teriorate the character or the intelligence (τὴν ψυχὴν ἤ τὴν διάνοιαν, 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 8 sqq.), but this does not conflict with what is said here.

λωβόντας. For the third person plural after τὰ σώματα, see Bon. Ind. 490 a 44 sqq.
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38. ὑστικῶταταί. Cp. i. 2. 1252 a 33: 1. 5. 1254 b 18.
39. προεδεί, i.e. in addition to technical skill (cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 a 12).

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἑστὶν κ.τ.λ. According to Varro de Re Rustica i. 1. 8, and Columella i. 1. 7, both Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote on agriculture. See Menage on Diog. Laert. 5. 50. They probably refer to the Θεοργικά, which the list of Aristotle's works given by the Anonymus of Menage names as spurious (No. 189), though in the Arabic list based on Ptolemaeus (No. 72) it is accounted genuine. See Aristot. Fragm. 255 sq., 1525 b 1 sqq., and Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 100. n. 1, who adds—"that Aristotle did not write on agriculture and the cognate subjects, appears from Pol. i. 11. 1258 b 33, 39." The Θεοργικαί are thus probably spurious. Is it possible that Charetides of Paros is the same as the Chartodras, whose opinions as to manures are referred to by Theophrastus in Hist. Plant. 2. 7. 4? A Messenian named Charetidas figures in an inscription (Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscr. Graec. 240. 5, vol. i. p. 346). Apollodorus of Lemnos is mentioned by Varro and Pliny (see Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, s. v.).

1259 a. 3. ἐκ τοῦτων, 'with the aid of their writings': cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 b 17: Rhet. i. 4. 1359 b 30 sq.: de Gen. An. i. 11. 719 a 10: de Part. An. 2. 16. 660 a 7. As to the collection of scattered notices of instances of commercial sagacity and success, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 3, πάντα γὰρ σχεδὸν εὑρηταί μὲν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοὺς δὲ οὐ χρῶνται γνώσκοντες, and Rhet. i. 4. 1359 b 30 sq. An attempt to act on this suggestion appears to be made in the so-called Second Book of the Oeconomics: see Oecon. 2. 1346 a 26 sqq.

6. οἷον κ.τ.λ. 'such as the feat told of Thales.' Cp. Plato, Rep. 600 A, ἀλλ' οἷον δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα σοφοῦ ἰδρῶς πολλαί ἐπίναι καὶ εὐμήχανοι εἰς τέχναις ή τινας ἀλλας πράξεις λέγονται, ὅσπερ αὖ Θάλειο τε περί του Μιλησίου καὶ Ἀμαχάρτου τοῦ Σκύθου; Καὶ here as elsewhere serves to introduce an example. It is not quite clear whether οἷον κ.τ.λ. is adduced in illustration of the sentence immediately preceding or of ἐτί δὲ ... συλλέγειν. Perhaps Sus. is right in taking the former view of the passage—cp. τούτο γὰρ ἐστὶ κατανόημα τι χρηματιστικῶν, which seems to take up πάντα γὰρ ὅψείμα ταῦτ' ἐστι τοῖς τμῶσιν τὴν χρηματιστικὴν, and also 1259 a 33; χρήσιμων δὲ γνωρίζει ταῦτα καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, which seems to refer back to the same words. The passage also gains in point when taken in this way, for it conveys a hint that Aristotle is aware how paradoxical the idea of χρηματιστικὸι learning anything from Thales.
will appear to his readers. Τὸῦ Μιλησίου is added to distinguish him from the Cretan Thales mentioned in 2. 12. 1274 a 28. His ingenuity was proverbial (Aristoph. Aves 946); yet there was also a popular impression that he was σοφός, but not φρόνιμος (Eth. Nic. 6. 7. 1141 b 3 sqq.).


tυγχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι δὲν, i.e. not confined to philosophers like Thales, but generally applicable in commercial transactions. We have not here a σοφὸς devising a novel subtlety, but rather an instance of the use of a recognized weapon from the armoury of χρηματιστική.


11. εἰκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας. The Egyptian priests claimed to be able to predict καρπῶν φθορᾶς ἢ τούναπτων πολυκαρπίας by means of their observation of the stars (Diod. i. 81. 5).


ΔΛΥΩΝ. The point of the story lies in the smallness of the capital. Thales only paid down the earnest-money of the rent of the olive-presses which he hired, trusting to his future profit to pay the rest. If we compare Cic. de Divin. i. 49. 111, non plus quam Milesium Thalem, qui ut obiurgatores suos convinceret ostenderetque etiam philosophum, si ei commodum esset, pecuniam facere posse, omnem oleam, antequam florere coepisset, in agro Milesio comemisse dicitur, we shall see that though this passage is very similar to the passage before us, Cicero’s version of the story, nevertheless, as Vict. remarks, misses the point, for only a large capitalist could have done what Thales is described as doing. Cicero can hardly have had this passage of the Politics before him; still less can Pliny, who tells the story of Democritus (Hist. Nat. 18. 28). The version of Hieronymus of Rhodes, though abbreviated, is nearer to the Politics—φησὶ καὶ ὁ Ρόδιος ἤχρωνιμα ἐν τῷ δεύτερῳ τῶν σπαράξαντα ἐπομεμάτων, διὶ θεολογοῦν ἰδίῳ [ὁ Θαλής] ῥῶν εἶναι πλούτειν, φορᾶς μελλοντὸς ἐλαιῶν ἐκείνῳ, προφητεύσαι ἐμπαθό-σαι τὰ ἁλαστρεία καὶ πάμπλευστα αὐτοῖς ἄρρημα (Diog. Laerct. 1. 26).

We cannot, however, be certain that Aristotle and he were not
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drawing from some common source. If the story is true, it would
seem that a citizen of Miletus was legally capable of renting
olive-presses in Chios. Chios and Miletus both belonged to the
Ionic Confederacy, and a special friendship seems to have existed
between the two States (Hdt. 1. 18 : 6. 5). This may have made
the thing easier.

διαδόθαι is used because the owners of the presses were many.

13. τ' is displaced as elsewhere by being added ‘ei vocabulo quod
utrique membro commune est,’ Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq.: cp.
μεταξύ τε τῶν εἰδών καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, Metaph. K. 1. 1059 b 6: ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὕτω διαγωγή τε παινών ἀρμότει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδεδόθην
taῖς των- 

asiats, Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 a 29: νομίζοντες τὸν τε τοῦ ἑλευθέρου βίον
ἐπέρων τινα εἶναι τοῦ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πάντων αἱρετῶσιν, Pol. 4 (7). 3.
1325 a 19.

16. For the two participles ἐκμαθηθώντα, συλλέξαντα, cp. 8 (6). 5.
1320 b 8, διαλαμβάνοντας τοὺς ἀπόρους ἀφορμὰς διδόντας τρέπειν ἐπ’
ἐργασίας, and Plato, Rep. 465 C, τα δὲ πάντων πολισάμενον βέμενον παρὰ
γυναικὶς τε καὶ οἰκέταις, ταμειεῖν παραδόντες. But here the participles
are in different tenses.


18. μὲν οὖν (‘so then’) is here used as in c. 2. 1252 a 34.

19. ἐπιδείξειν ... τῆς σοφίας. Cp. Plato, Hippias Minor, 368 C,
σοφίας πλείστης ἐπιδειγμα.

‘But, as we said, the plan adopted by Thales—that of trying
to secure oneself a monopoly—is a general principle of the science
of money-making.’ Τὸ τουαῦτον is explained by εὖν τις ... κατασκευά-
ζειν: compare the use of εὖν in Rhet. 3. 5. 1407 b 19, and of ὅταν
in Metaph. M. 1. 1076 a 30.

21. δή. Having said that this plan is not confined to philosophers
but embodies a broad principle of money-making science (χρηματισ-
τικῶν 20), Aristotle points out that some States practise it, when
they are in want of money (χρημάτων 22). See on the subject of
State-monopolies in Greece Büchsenschütz, Besitz un Erwerb,
p. 547 sqq., who traces them at Selymbria (Oecon. 2. 1348 b
33 sqq.), Byzantium (1346 b 25 sq.), and Lampsacus (1347 a
32 sqq.), and refers to the scheme of Pythocles at Athens (1353 a
15 sqq.) and to the measures of Cleomenes, the governor of Egypt
(1352 b 14 sqq). ‘There is no evidence,’ he adds, ‘that mo-
nopolies were anywhere used in Greece, as they have often been in
modern States, as a permanent source of revenue.’ ‘Nay,’
Aristotle continues, ‘in Sicily an individual with whom a sum
of money had been deposited’—he seems to have had a larger
amount at his disposal than Thales—‘resorted to a similar device, but he found that his success aroused the jealousy of the ruler of the State.’ Thus the story incidentally bears out the assertion made in 21–23, that States occasionally seek revenue from sources of this kind. The hero of this story may probably have been a τραπεζίτης: cp. Demosth. Pro Phorm. c. 11, ἦ δ’ ἐργασία (of banking) προσώπους ἠχωνα ἐπικυνδέωσε ἀπὸ χρημάτων ἄλλοποι, and see Büchsenschütz, p. 502.

24. συνεπρίατο. Compare the use of συνωνείσθαι in Theopomp. Fr. 219 and Plutarch, de Cupiditate Divitiarum c. 3. 524 B.

25. τῶν σιδηρείων. Bern. ‘iron-mines’: Sus. ‘iron-works.’ The latter rendering is perhaps the more likely to be correct, as the metal would come from smelting-works, even if the ore was obtained in Sicilian mines, which may possibly have been the case, for iron-ore is still ‘found in the mountains of Sicily’ (A. K. Johnston, Dict. of Geography, art. Sicily). Aetna and the Lipari islands were famed in myth as the scene of the labours of Hephaestus and the Cyclopes (Virg. Georg. 4. 170 sqq.: Aen. 3. 675 sqq.: 8. 416 sqq.: Ovid, Fasti 4. 287 sqq.).

εμπορίων. The merchants are conceived as sojourning at the ἐμπόρια (cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 11 sqq.), which would usually be on the seacoast or not far from it, like the Peiraeus or Naucratis (τῆς Ἀιγύπτου τὸ ἐμπόριον, Aristot. Fragm. 161. 1505 a 14). Not every city was an εμπόριον.

26. ἑπόλει. Note the tense.

27. τῆς τιμῆς, i. e. the usual price charged for iron. His winnings appear to have been due, in part to the advance on the usual price, which though small mounted up in proportion to the large quantity of iron sold, in part to the large returns which even the usual price brought to the merchants.

ἐπὶ τοῖς πεντήκοντα ταλάντως ἐπέλαβεν ἑκάτων. Cp. Matth. 25. 20, Κύριε, πέντε ταλάντα μοι παρέδωκας· ἰδί, ἄλλα πέντε ταλάντα ἐκέρδησα ἐπὶ αὐτῶν, and Strabo p. 701, ὥν τινα κοῦρ καὶ ἄλλοις ἑιδοῖς ἰστήρησαν, ὥς τὸ μακρόβιον ὄστε καὶ τράκματα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκάτων προσλαμβάνειν: The article may be prefixed to πεντήκοντα ταλάντως because the sum originally invested was fifty talents, or it may be added for the same reason for which it is prefixed to δέκα in Xen. Oecon. 20. 16, ἰδίας γὰρ ἰδίαι εἰς παρὰ τοὺς δέκα διαφέρει τῷ ἐν ἄρα ἐργαζόσθαι, on which passage Dr. Holden remarks, ‘where parts of a whole are stated in numbers, the article is sometimes prefixed to the numeral “to denote the definiteness of the relation” (Madvig, § 11, Rem. 6).’ Bernays translates, ‘he gained a hundred talents in addition to the
fifty which he had laid out'. Mr. Welldon, 'he realized 200 per cent. on all his outlay.' Perhaps the passage quoted from St. Matthew makes in favour of Bernays' interpretation, though the article is probably to be explained in the same way as in the passage of Xenophon.

28. τούτων μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. This man brought on himself expulsion from the State, while Thales won applause for his wisdom, but yet the two men proceeded on the same principle. Μὲν οὖν is answered by μέντοι 31.

31. ἀνυμφάρος. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 20, συμφερόντως ἔχει τοῖς πράγμασιν. Dionysius probably objected to the whole available supply of a commodity so important both in war and peace as iron finding its way into the hands of a single private individual and coming to be obtainable only at an enhanced price. He would also hold that a private person had no business with a monopoly; monopolies would in his view be for the State. Besides, tyrants usually sought to keep their subjects poor (7 (5). 11. 1313 b 18) and distrusted the rich (7 (5). 10. 1311 a 15 sqq.).

33. καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, i.e. to statesmen as well as to heads of households (cp. c. 8. 1256 b 37; δὲ μὲν τοῖνυ ἔστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, and Eth. Nic. 6. 5. 1140 b 10) and to those who hold the science of money-making in high esteem (1259 a 5). Γιγαρ χρήσιμον γνωρίζειν, cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 33, χρήσιμων δ' ἔκαστον αὐτῶν γνωρίζειν.

34. πολλαῖς γὰρ πόλεσι κ.τ.λ. A large revenue was essential to the working of the extreme democracy (Pol. 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 sqq.); States frequently at war were also bound to have plenty of money at command (2. 9. 1271 b 11). Households stand less in need of exceptional sources of income.

35. τινὲς καὶ πολιτεύονται, i.e. in addition to those who pursue these aims in private life. See Schneider's note, vol. 2. p. 65, on the πορωταί at Athens, but Eubulus is probably referred to—cp. Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praecepta, c. 15 sub fin., and Theopomp. Fr. 96 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 293). See also Plato, Laws 742 D, and the account of the good citizen given in Rhet. ad Alex. 39. 1446 b 33.

For ταῦτα as the object of πολιτεύονται, cp. 2. 7. 1267 a 18.

C. 12. 37. Ἐπεὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Since we distinguished' (in 1. 3. 1253 b 3 sqq.) 'three parts of ἀλοκονμική' (for ἤν, cp. Metaph. A. 6. 1071 b 3, ἐπεὶ δ' ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, and de Caelo i. 3. 269 b 33), the question arises, with which of them is ἀλοκονμική most concerned? We have seen that the ἀλοκονμικός as such can hardly
be said to be directly concerned with χρηματιστική: but with which of the three relations that make up the household—γαμή, πατρική, δεσποτική—is he most concerned? This is the question which Aristotle apparently intends to raise here (compare the solution given at the beginning of c. 13), but his articulation of it is in unusual disarray. He has no sooner enumerated the three parts of οἰκονομική, than he proceeds to refer to the account which he has already given of δεσποτική, and to distinguish the rule exercised by the husband over his wife from the rule exercised by the father over his children, with the object apparently of showing that the two latter relations represent a higher kind of rule (πολιτική or βασιλική) than the former—the result being that οἰκονομική is more concerned with πατρική and γαμή than with δεσποτική (cp. ι. 5. 1254 a 25, ἂλε βελτίων ἡ ἀρχή ἡ τῶν βελτίων ἀρχαμένων, and 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 27, τοῦ γὰρ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν ἡ τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἀρχὴ καλλιών καὶ μᾶλλον μετ' ἄρετης), and that it is more concerned with δεσποτική than with χρηματιστική.

39. καὶ γάρ. Vict. 'statim autem causam affert, cur distinxyerit copulam patris ac liberorum a copula viri et uxoris; docet enim illa imperia diversa esse.'

ἄρχειν, sc. ἔφαμεν (latent in ἦν, 37) τῶν οἰκονόμων. The reference would seem to be to c. 3. 1253 b 4 sq.

ὁς ἑλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, i.e. τοῦ ἀρχομένου χάρων (4 (7). 14. 1333 a 3 sqq.), or perhaps for the common good of ruler and ruled (3. 6. 1278 b 37 sqq.). Contrast δεσποτική ἀρχή, 3. 6. 1278 b 32 sqq. Πολιτική, βασιλική (3. 7. 1279 a 33), and ἀριστοκρατική ἀρχή (3. 17. 1288 a 11) are forms of ἡ τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἀρχῆς. It may be questioned whether it is quite an adequate idea of ἡ τῶν ἑλευθέρων ἀρχή to make it consist simply in ruling for the benefit of the ruled; Marcus Aurelius (Comment. ι. 14) seems to understand it otherwise.

1. πολιτικάς, 'as a citizen-ruler rules over his fellow-citizens.' 1259 b. Πολιτική ἀρχή is said in 3. 4. 1277 b 7 to be the kind of rule which is exercised over τῶν ὁμιλῶν τῷ γένει καὶ τῶν ἑλευθέρων, but this account seems too wide, for the rule of a father over a child would then fall under πολιτική ἀρχή: in 1. 7. 1255 b 20 it is explained as ἑλευθέρων κοι ἵσων ἀρχῆς, and this seems more exact, but we must bear in mind that under ἵσων are included proportionate, as well as absolute, equals. Πολιτική ἀρχή usually implies an interchange of ruling and being ruled (cp. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.), but it does not necessarily do so (cp. c. ι. 1252 a 15)—it does not do so in the case of the wife, nor does it do so in the case of the rule of

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νοὺς over ἀρετή, which is πολιτική καὶ βασιλική (1. 5. 1254 b 5). The relation of husband and wife is elsewhere described as ἀριστοκρατική (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 32 sqq.: 8. 13. 1161 a 22 sqq.), because it should be such as to assign τὸ ἄρμα αὐτοῦ ἐκάστῳ (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 9, διόκει δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν εἶναι μάλιστα τὸ τῶν ἁπάντων καὶ ἄρετιν). Aristotle holds that though on the whole and as a rule the man is superior to the woman, there is nevertheless work which she can do better than he, and that account should be taken of this fact in determining the position of the wife in the household.

2. εἰ μὴ σου κ.τ.λ. Sus. 'was nicht ausschliesst, dass das Verhältniss sich hie und da auch wider die Natur gestaltet,' and so Mr. Welldon: 'wherever the union is not unnaturally constituted.' Sepulveda, on the other hand, supplies as the nom. to συνέστηκε, not ἦ κοινωνία, but 'mas et femina,' translating 'nisi ubi praefer natu-ram constiterunt,' and Lambinus 'mas,' translating 'nisi forte ita comparatus est, ut a natura desciverit.' I incline, however, to take συνέστηκε as impersonal and to translate 'except where there is a contravention of nature.' See Bon. Ind. 342 b 20 sqq., and for συνέστηκε παρὰ φύσιν, ibid. 731 a 20–27. As to the impersonal use of verbs in Greek, see Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 155 sqq. The following epigram on James I is quoted by the late Mr. Mark Pattison in his copy of Stahr's edition of the Politics (1839):

'Rex fuit Elisabeth, nunc est regina Iacobus.'

4. εὖ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν appears to be answered by 8' 9. In most cases of political rule, indeed, there is an interchange of ruling and being ruled, which does not occur in the case of husband and wife. Free and equal citizens, in fact, aim at being equal in nature and differing in nothing. (I take τὸ ἄρχειν καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον to be the nom. to βασίλεια.) Yet even here differences do not wholly vanish, for the holders of office seek for the time of their magistracy to have their position marked by a distinctive aspect and bearing, a distinctive mode of address and marks of respect; thus if there is an equality of nature, there is a temporary inequality in externals even among like and equal citizens. The relation in which the citizen-ruler stands to those over whom he rules during his term of office is that in which the male permanently stands to the female. (Cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 30 sqq., where the same idea appears that even ἐλέειδεροι καὶ ἰατοὶ are differentiated by the fact of their holding or not holding office.) The husband, we learn, rules his wife as a citizen-ruler rules his fellow-citizens; he is marked off from his wife less by a difference in nature than by a difference σχήματι καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τιμᾷ. The father, on the contrary, is different
in nature from his child (1259 b 14). Aristotle does not, perhaps, always abide by this view of the relation of husband and wife; thus in Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 26 sqq., to πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, which obtains ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βλοῦ πρὸς τὸ εἶσαι αὐτάρκειαν, λευκέρων καὶ ἂνων ἢ καὶ ἀναλογῶν ἢ καὶ ἄριθμῶν, is said not to obtain even between husband and wife, though the conjugal relation comes nearer to realizing it than any other household relation, but only τὸ οἰκονομικὸν δίκαιον—indeed in this very book of the Politics (c. 13. 1260 a 29) he requires from the wife a submissive silence before her husband.

7. ἄταν, 'for the time during which.'


8. σχῆμασι. Lamb. 'vestitu,' Bern. 'die Tracht,' but ἐσθήτα and σχῆματι are distinguished in Eth. Nic. 4. 9. 1125 a 30 (cp. Rhet. 2. 8. 1386 a 32, if ἐσθήτα is the right reading in this passage). Sepulv. and Giph. 'ornatu': Vict. 'vestibus.' Perhaps 'aspect and bearing.'

See Bon. Ind. 739 b 59—740 a 5.

λόγους, 'mode and matter of address.'

καὶ (before 'Ἀμασίς) as elsewhere introduces an instance. Amasis is an instance of 'that which rules after being ruled.' He had been a subject and was now a ruler. He claimed that, like the utensil referred to, which had been recast to form the image of a god and now was an object of veneration to the Egyptians, he should be treated for what he was, not what he had once been. Cp. Hdt. 2. 172. A somewhat similar metaphor is used by Themistocles in Aelian. V. H. 13. 39.

9. δὲ ... τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, 'at all times, not merely for a term, stands to the female in this relation.'

11. τὸ γὰρ γεννῆσαι. Γεννάω is used of the female as well as the male (cp. 4 (7). 16. 1334 b 36: de Gen. An. 2. 5. 741 b 3), but Aristotle is here evidently thinking of the father, not the mother.

ἄρχον ἐστὶν, cp. Metaph. A. 7. 1072 b 10, ἐε ἀνύγης ἀρὰ ἐστὶν ὅν, and Pol. 2. 6. 1265 b 19, ἔστοιχος διαφέροντες. It is not identical with ἄρχοι: the participle is used in an adjectival sense, 'a permanent quality being predicated of the subject' (Holden, Oeconomies of Xenophon, Index p. 36 *).

12. βασιλικῆς εἶδος ἄρχῆς, 'the specific nature of royal rule.' Sus. 'was denn eben die Form einer königlichen Gewalt ergiebt.' Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 24, ἢ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς νεῖς κοινωνία P 2.
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βοσιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα, Pol. 1. 4. 1253 b 30, ἐν ὄργανον ἐδεί, and 3. 15. 1286 a 2 sq.

14. τὸν βασιλεὰ τούτων ἀπάντων. Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 24—27, ἢ μὲν γὰρ πατρὸς πρὸς γυῖς κοινωνία βασιλείας ἔχει σχῆμα, τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῷ πατρὶ μέλει· ένενέθεν δὲ καλ "Ομηρος τὸν θέα πατέρα προσαγιορεύει, πατρικὴ γὰρ ἐργὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. Homer is praised for using the words 'father of gods and men' to designate the Kingship of Zeus over gods and men. For, Aristotle proceeds, the father is the truest type of a King. The King, like the father, 'should surpass those he rules in nature' (‘indole,’ Bon. Ind. 837 a 52, cp. Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 39, διὰ τὰ τὴν φύσιν ἰσόν εἶναι πάντας), 'but be one with them in race.'

15. μὲν should logically have followed φῶνει, but, as Bonitz observes (Ind. 454 a 20), who compares 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12 sqq., 'interdum non ei additur vocabulo in quo vis oppositionis cernitur.'

C. 13. 18. Φανερὸν τοῖνυ. So far as the protasis introduced by ἐπεῖ in 1259 a 37 survives the long series of considerations which break in upon it in 1259 a 39—b 17, it here finds its apodosis, which is introduced by τοῖνυς, as elsewhere by ὅστε (Bon. Ind. 873 a 31 sqq.) or possibly δῶ (Bonitz, Aristotel. Stud. 3. 122 sqq.). For the connexion of the whole, see note on 1259 a 37. Xenophon in the Oeconomicus had described with much zest the mixture of vigilance and geniality with which the thrifty Ischomachus gets everybody connected with his farm, from his wife and his steward downwards, to strain every nerve for the increase of his substance, which is, according to him, the aim of οἰκονομία (cp. Oecon. c. 6. 4, ἢ δὲ ἐπιστήμη αὐτή—i.e. ἡ οἰκονομία—ἐφαίνετο ἡ οἰκονομία δύναται αὐξήμαν ἄνθρωποι). In tacit opposition to Xenophon, Aristotle here presses the consequences of the principle which he has established in the foregoing chapters, that χρηματιστική, and even its soundest part, is in strictness no part of οἰκονομία, but only an auxiliary art (ὑπορετική), and that though οἰκονομία will not be indifferent to the goodness or badness of the property it uses (1258 a 26), its business is nevertheless rather to care for the excellence of the human beings with whom it has to deal, and for that of the free rather than the slave. The original propounder of this view may well have been Socrates (Cleitophon 407 A sq.: see Wytenbach on [Plutarch] de Liberis Educandis c. 7. 4 E), but traces of it appear in Plato, Politicus 261 C and Laws 743 E, and we find doctrines of a similar kind ascribed to Cynics like Diogenes (Aelian, V. H. 12. 56: cp. Diog. Laert. 6. 41). The views of Crassus, who was not unacquainted with the teaching of Aristotle (Plutarch, Crassus c. 3), may possibly have been influenced
by the passage before us (see the account of them given in Crassus c. 2. and above, p. xvii). Cato the Censor is praised by Plutarch (Cato Censor, c. 20) for combining with keenness as an economist care for the welfare of his wife and children. For the relation of the Stoic and Epicurean conceptions of ἀικονιμα to those of Plato and Aristotle, see Schömnn, Opusc. Acad. 3. 234 sqq.

19. την τῶν ἀψφαλῶν κτήσειν, 'inanimate property.' Cp. 2. 7. 1267 b 10, τὴν τῆς γῆς κτήσιν, and 1. 9. 1257 b 40, τὴν τοῦ ναμίματος οὐσίαν.

20. τὴν τῆς κτήσεως, δι’ καλούμεν πλοῦτον. Sus. 'als diesen' (inanimate property) 'in den tüchtigen Stand zu setzen, den man Reichthum und Wohlhabenheit nennt,' δι’ καλούμεν πλοῦτον being explanatory of ἀρετὴ κτήσεως, cp. Rhet. 1. 6. 1362 b 18, πλοῦτος ἀρετὴ γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικῶν ποιλῶν [ἄγαθῶν].

21. τῶν ἐλευθέρων μᾶλλον ἢ δοῦλων. For the addition of the article before ἐλευθέρων and its absence before δοῦλων, see Vahlen's note on Poet. 4. 1449 a 1, where Rhet. 2. 13. 1390 a 16, μᾶλλον εἰς κατὰ λογισμῶν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἄδειον is quoted. It is, however, possible that a slightly depreciatory significance attaches to the omission of the article before δοῦλων, as in Agesil. II. 4, ἥσσει δὲ ἐξομιλεῖν μὲν παντοδαποῖς, χρησθαι δὲ τοῖς ἄγαθοῖς. Cp. I. 7. 1255 b 32—33.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν here as often elsewhere is introductory to a clearer definition of what has just been said. (The μὲν is apparently answered by δὲ 28.) Aristotle has spoken in the preceding sentence of an ἀρετὴ δοῦλων, and the thought occurs to him that there are two senses of ἀρετὴ, and that he may be understood merely to inculcate on the master the communication of technical excellence to the slave (cp. 1260 b 3 sqq.). He therefore loses no time in raising the question, what the virtue is in the case of slaves, which he has said the householder is to care for and promote: is it merely ὀργανικῆ καὶ διακονικῆ ἀρετῆ, or are they capable of ἑθικῆ ἀρετῆ; (For the terms in which the question is raised, cp. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 42, οὗ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητήτων μὴ ποτὲ τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμωτέρα δ’ αὐτῆς ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἐφημερίν χρείαν.) Aristotle had defined the natural slave in the words, ὅσων ἐστὶν ἐργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τούτῃ ἐστὶ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν βέλτιστον, 1. 5. 1254 b 17—words which went farther even than the well-known saying in Homer (Ody. 17. 322), that Zeus in taking away a man's freedom takes away half his virtue—and he feels that a doubt may well be raised whether a slave is capable of moral virtue. The course of the argument on this subject seems to be as follows:—'The answer is not easy, for if the slave has moral virtue, how does he differ from a freeman? Yet if he has it not, the fact is surprising, seeing that he is a man
and shares in reason. The same question, however, arises as to the wife and child, and it is better to put the question in its most comprehensive form—is the virtue of that which by nature rules the same as the virtue of that which by nature is ruled, or different? (It will be seen that Aristotle abstains for the present from raising any question as to that which neither naturally rules nor naturally is ruled.) If we say that both have complete virtue, why should the one rule and the other be ruled? If again we say that their virtue differs in degree, the same question arises, for between ruling and being ruled there is a difference not of degree, but of kind. If, on the other hand, we say that one has virtue and the other not, how can the ruler rule well, or the ruled obey well, without virtue? Both, it is clear, must have virtue, and virtue must have different kinds, just as there are different kinds of that which is by nature ruled. We are familiar with this in the case of the soul; in the soul there is a part which naturally rules and another which naturally is ruled, and to each of these two parts we attribute a virtue of its own. But if these two parts, related to each other as naturally ruling and ruled, exist by nature, then other pairs also, destined by nature to rule and be ruled respectively, exist by nature—the master and slave, the husband and wife, the father and child—and each member of these three pairs has a virtue of its own varying according to the constitution of the soul in each and the work each has to perform.' We must bear in mind that in the Meno of Plato Socrates is made to assert the identity of the temperance and other virtues of women and men, in opposition to the sophist Gorgias, and that Aristotle's object here is to show that virtue varies with social function, the virtue of the ruled not being the same as the virtue of the ruler. It is, however, also his object to show, in opposition to those who confined virtue to the ruler (3. 4. 1277 a 20), that τὸ φύσει ἀρχὸμενον, whether wife, child, or slave, is not without moral virtue, but has a sort of virtue varying with its psychical constitution and the function it discharges. Here therefore, as elsewhere, Aristotle steers a midway course between two extremes—the view of those who denied virtue to the ruled, and the view of those who identified the virtue of women and men.

24. σωφροσύνη κ.τ.λ. These virtues are instanced as those most likely to be found in slaves, more likely than μεγαλοψυχία, φρόνησις, or σοφία.

26. ἔχει ... ἀμφοτέρως. ‘For whichever alternative we adopt, difficult questions arise’ (Lamb. ‘dubitationem habet, utrumcunque dixeris’). "ἔχει is probably here impersonal; see Bon. Ind. 305 b 31 sqq., and Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 155 sq.

πέτρα γάρ ἡτοί, sc. ὑπό τις δεόλου.

32. καὶ ... δή. See note on 1. 2. 1253 a 18.

33. πάτερον ... ἐτέρα. This is not exactly the same question as had been raised about the woman and child just before; perhaps it is already felt to be paradoxical to deny to the ἄρχομένων φύσιν the possession of any kind of moral virtue. Besides, the question now raised is that which Socrates had raised (1260 a 22), and Aristotle is much preoccupied with his view on the subject.

34. γὰρ justifies ἐπισκεπτεῖν by adducing difficulties which arise.

καλοκαγαθίας. The question is put as paradoxically as possible, for καλοκαγαθία is precisely the type of virtue from which slaves and women and children are furthest removed: see L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen i. 333 sq., who refers to Xen. Mem. i. i. 16, περὶ τῶν ἄλλων (διελέγετο Σωκράτης), ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἶδοτα ἣγεῖτο καλοὺς κάγαθοςς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀγνοοῦτας ἀνθρωποδίκεις ἀν δικαίως κεκληθοῖ. Καλοκαγαθία is the virtue of knights and hoplites (Xen. Mem. 3. 5. 18 sqq.). Cp. also Eth. Nic. 4. 7. 1124 a 1, ἢκου μὲν οὖν ὡς μεγαλοψυχία ὡν κάμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἄρετῶν· μείζονε γὰρ αὕτα ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνεν ἐκεῖνον· διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀλήθειᾳ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οὖν τι ἄνεν καλοκαγαθίας; Magn. Mor. 2. 9. 1207 b 20 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1179 b 10 sqq. The conception of καλοκαγαθία is still further worked out in Eth. Eud. 7. 15.

37. τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. i. i. 1252 a 9.

38. οὐδέν, ‘not at all,’ as in Probl. 10. 35. 894 b 13.

40. ἀρχήσηται. The fut. med. ἀρχήσῃ occurs in a passive sense in 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36.


3. ταύτης δ’. ... ἀρχομένων. These words are often translated—‘and that there are different forms of virtne corresponding to the differences between the naturally ruled.’ But then hitherto, as Susemihl remarks (Hermes (1884), Bd. 19. Heft 4), Aristotle has been dwelling on the difference between ruler and ruled, not on the differences between various ruled elements, and if ὅπερ here means ‘corresponding to,’ we certainly expect ὅπερ καὶ τοῦ φύσει ἄρχοντος καὶ ἀρχομένου. Not ὅπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἄρχοντων καὶ ἀρχομένων, the reading to which the rendering found in two MSS. (a, z)
of the *velus versio* points—*quamadmodum et natura principantium et subiectorum*—for hitherto, as Sus. sees, though he accepts this reading, no stress has been laid on the fact of the existence of different forms of ἄρχωντα and ἄρχόμενα: on the contrary, it is on the difference between τὸ ἄρχων and τὸ ἄρχόμενον and their respective ἔργα that the existence of different forms of virtue has been rested. Perhaps, however, ὀσπερ does not here mean 'corresponding to,' but simply 'as indeed'—so that our rendering will run 'and that different types of virtue exist, as indeed differences also exist between the naturally ruled.' Compare the use of ὀσπερ in i. 11. 1259 a 35, πολλαίς γάρ πόλεσι δεί χρήσιμον, ὀσπερ οίκει, μᾶλλον δὲ. Aristotle's meaning will then be, that there is nothing more surprising in the fact of ruler and ruled having different types of virtue than there is in the fact of the naturally ruled differing in character. He has already said in i. 5. 1254 a 24, καὶ ἔδη πολλὰ καὶ ἄρχονταν καὶ ἄρχομένους ἔστιν, καὶ δεί βελτίων ἡ ἀρχή ἡ τῶν βελτίων ἄρχομένων. Perhaps, however, τάς ἀρέτας should be supplied before τῶν φύσεων ἄρχομένων, and the translation should be—'as indeed differences also exist between the virtue of one naturally ruled element and that of another.' Those who take ὀσπερ in the sense of 'corresponding to' will be much tempted to read ὀσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσεων ἄρχονταν καὶ ἄρχομένων, but this reading rests, as has been said, only on the authority of one or two MSS. of the *velus versio,* the rendering found in which may represent nothing more than a conjectural emendation. This change of reading might, indeed, be dispensed with, if an ellipse of πρὸς τὸ φύσει ἄρχων or πρὸς τὰ φύσει ἄρχωτα could be supposed between ὀσπερ καὶ and τῶν φύσεων ἄρχομένων (compare the ellipse of πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν in 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 17). But ὀσπερ need not mean 'corresponding to,' and probably does not. (Since writing the foregoing note, I have become acquainted with the following annotation by the late Mr. Mark Pattison in the copy of Stahr's Politics already referred to (above on 1259 b 2). Stahr translates in this edition—'diese aber ihre Verschiedenheiten hat, so gut wie die, welche von Natur zum Beherrschwerden und zum Herrschen bestimmt sind.' The annotation is—'if the words [ἀρχόντων καὶ] are to form part of the text, surely the meaning is, not 'so gut wie die,' but 'have differences corresponding to the differences between the natural ruler and the natural ruled.' But all the MSS. appear to omit them, and the meaning is—'and in the same way as there are differences between the virtues of the ruler and those of the ruled, so there are differences between the virtues of the different species of the ruled.'

)
4. καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ κ.τ.λ. I take the literal rendering to be—‘and this has at once led the way for us in the case of the soul’ (‘this’ being ‘the existence of a natural ruler and a natural ruled, each with a virtue of its own’). For ὑφήγησαι in this sense, compare Plato, Lysis 217 A, ἄρ’ ἄνω καὶ κάτω ... ὑφηγεῖται ἵμιν τὰ τῶν λεγόμενων; and the use of the word προδοσώσθαι in de Gen. An. 4. 4. 770 b 3. Περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς is perhaps not far removed in meaning from ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (cp. Bon. Ind. 579 a 29 sqq.). The soul is one of the things that lie nearest to us, and on examining it the phenomenon of which we are in quest appears, and thus we are guided to detect it in other cases also. Cp. Plutarch, de Fraterno Amore c. 2 init., καίτοι τὰ παράδειγμα τῆς χρήσεως τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡ φύσις οὐ μακρῶν ἐδήκεν, ἄλλ’ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι τὰ πλείοντα τῶν ἀναγκαλῶν διὰ τὰ κἀδελφά καὶ διδύμη μηχανηματίνη, χειρὰς, πάδας, ὀμματα, ὀτα, ρύμας, έθι- 

dadei στὶ κ.τ.λ. The perfect υφήγησαι may be defended, either as referring to the previous assertion of the existence of a ruling and a ruled element within the soul (1. 5. 1254 b 5), or as implying that the soul affords an already forthcoming and familiar example of the fact—cp. de Part. An. 1. 3. 643 b 10, δει πενιάσθαι λαμβάνειν κατὰ γένος τὰ όζα, ὅπε υφήγησαί οἱ παλαι διορισάντες οὐράνιος γένος καὶ θεῖον. Schütz’ conjectural addition of τα before περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς simplifies the passage, but is perhaps unnecessary. It should be added that Vict. takes υφήγησαι in a passive sense (‘incoptum est’), and that Bonitz also (Ind. 807 b 46) gives it a passive meaning. The correctness of this view, however, is open to doubt. For the thought, cp. 4 (7).

14. 1333 a 16 sqq.

6. οἴον does not seem here to exemplify but to explain, as in
3. 13. 1283 b 1.

8. τῶν ἄλλων, ‘other things besides the rational and irrational elements of the soul.’

ὅστε κ.τ.λ. Thurot (Études, p. 18), with most others, translates the words ὅστε φύσει τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα ‘de sorte que la plupart des êtes commandent ou obéissent par nature,’ and fails, not without reason, to find a satisfactory meaning in the words when thus translated, adding ‘du moins la leçon vulgaire ne se lie pas avec ce qui suit immédiatement.’ Hence he proposes to read ὅστε πλείω τὰ φύσει ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀρχόμενα. But is not another interpretation of τα πλείω possible? May not the meaning of the passage be as follows—‘so that not only is this one case of a ruling element and a ruled natural, but the plurality of cases of the same thing which we observe are natural too—I say “plurality,” for the free rules the slave in one way, and the male the female in another,
and the man the child in a third, and while (μὲν) the parts of the soul exist in all these, they exist differently in each.' The first conclusion drawn is, that in a plurality of cases we find a ruling element and a ruled, both existing by nature. The reason for proving their naturalness is that only τὰ φύσει ἄρχοντα καὶ ἄρχόμενα have a moral virtue of their own; thus the τεχνίτης, being neither φύσει nor fully a slave, has not a moral virtue of his own, except so far as he is a slave. From this first inference Aristotle passes on to a second—that of a diversity of psychological constitution and of moral virtue in every ruling and ruled element subsisting by nature, according as the function discharged in each case is absolute and complete (τὸ ἀπλὸς ἔργον) or falls in various degrees short of being so. For τὰ πλείω ἄρχοντα καὶ ἄρχόμενα, cp. de Gen. An. 2. 7. 746 a 12, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν μονοτόκα, τὰ δὲ πολυτόκα τῶν τουτίων ἐστὶ ζώοιν, καὶ τὰ πλείω τῶν ἐμβρύων ('mehreren Embryen,' Aubert and Wimmer) τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον τὸ ἐνι: de Caeio 1. 8. 276 b 19, ἐν τοῖς πλείοις οὐρανοῖς ('in den mehreren Himmelsgebäuden,' Prantl). So we have οἱ πάλαι σύνθεσμοι ('a multiplicity of conjunctions') in Rhet. 3. 5. 1407 b 12, and οἱ πάλαι θεράποντες in Pol. 2. 3. 1261 b 37: cp. also Dio Chrys. Or. 1. 50 R, τῶλλα οὕτως ἀγαπᾷ τὰ ἄρχόμενα τοὺς ἄρχοντας. Thurot, as has been said, would read ὅστε πλείον τὰ φύσει ἄρχοντα καὶ ἄρχόμενα, but this conclusion seems hardly to be that to which the preceding words point. Bernays avoids this objection in his rewriting of 8–17, as does also Susemihl in his still more sweeping reconstruction of 8–20 (Qu. Crit. p. 359: Hermes 19. 588 sqq.), but no MS. gives them any support, nor am I convinced that any change is necessary.

11. τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, i.e. τὸ ἄλογον and τὸ λόγον ἔχων: cp. de Gen. An. 2. 4. 741 a 2, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς (other than ἡ γεννάσα καὶ θεραπευτικὴ ψυχῆ) τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δ’ οὐχ ὑπάρχει τῶν ζώων. To give the slave τὸ λόγον ἔχων, τὸ παθητικὸν must be counted here (as in Eth. Nic. 1. 6. 1098 a 3 and 1. 13. 1103 a 2) as part of τὸ λόγον ἔχων, not of τὸ ἄλογον, for he has not the more indubitable element of τὸ λόγον ἔχων, τὸ βουλευτικὸν (1260 a 12: cp. 3. 9. 1280 a 32 sqq.), which is apparently identical with that which is called τὸ λογιστικὸν in Eth. Nic. 6. 2. 1139 a 12. Thus in 1. 5. 1254 b 22, he is said κοινωνεῖ λόγον τοσοῦτον διὸν αὐθαίρετοι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν.

13. ἀκυρων, 'imperfect in authority,' 'imperfectly obeyed'—cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 10. 1151 b 15, λυπώντα, ἐὰν ἀκυρῳ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τὸν ἀντιπέρ ἐφθασάματα. In women τὸ βουλευτικὸν is there, but often does not get its own way.

13. 1260 a 11—22.

πηγὴν τοῦ φρακτὸν μὴν κατηρτυμένην, and Rep. 441 A–B. Cp. also Aristot. Phys. 7. 3. 247 b 18 sqq., where the child is described as in a state of φυσικῆ ταραχῆ, which must settle down before it can become φράσιμοι καὶ ἐπιστήμοιν. In Eth. Nic. 3. 4. 1111 b 8 προαίρεσιν, and in Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 b 8 νοῦς, are denied to the child, who is said in Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 b 5 to live καὶ ἐπιστήμοιν. 

δομοίων κ.τ.λ., i.e. the moral virtues, like the parts of the soul, exist in all, but differently. The construction of this sentence seems to be—ὑπολειπέντεν τῶν ἀναγκαίων (ἐνέα) δομοίων ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τάς ἡθικὰς ἀρετάς, δεῖ μὲν κ.τ.λ. For the omission of εἶναι, see Bon. Ind. 43 a 6, 239 a 9 sqq., and cp. c. 9. 1257 b 32. A somewhat similarly constructed sentence occurs in Magn. Mor. 1. 18. 1190 a 15 sqq.: cp. also 28, διὸ δεῖ, διαπέρ οἱ παιδεῖς εἰρήκει περὶ γνωικός, οὕτω νομίζειν ἔχειν περὶ πάντων. Bekker and Sus., however, begin a fresh sentence with ὑπολειπέντειαν.

16. δοὺς κ.τ.λ. Ἑπιβάλλει or some such word needs to be supplied here, but Aristote follows pretty closely the language of Meno in Plato, Meno 72 A, καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡθικῶν πρὸς ἐκατάστασιν ἔγραν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστιν. Compare also for the thought Plato, Rep. 601 D.

17. διὸ κ.τ.λ. 'Hence the ruler must possess moral virtue in its complete rational form, for any function taken absolutely and in its fullness belongs to [and demands] a master-hand, and reason is such a master-hand.' The function of healing, for instance, is predicated ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰατροῦ who directs and superintends the process, and only in a qualified way (πως) of the subordinate who carries his directions into effect: cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 b 21, μάλατα δὲ καὶ πράξεως λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τῶν ταῖς διανοίας ἀρχηγοτέρως. Cp. also Eth. Nic. 7. 12. 1152 b 1, περὶ δὲ ἡθικῆς καὶ λυπῆς θεωρεῖαι τὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφίαν χρησμοῦντος οὗτος γὰρ τοῖς τέλεσι ἀρχηγοτέρως, πρὸς δὲ βλέποντες ἐκατόν τὸ μὲν κακόν τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγομεν, and Marc. Antonin. Comment. 6. 35. As to τελέω... τὴν ἡθικὴν ἀρετὴν, cp. Magn. Mor. 2. 3. 1200 a 3, ἣ τελεία ἀρετὴ ὑπάρχει, ἣν ἡμᾶς μετὰ φρονισμοῦ εἶμαι: Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 18, τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν τῶν ἡθικῶν (ἀρετῶν) κατὰ τὴν φάσισιν: Pol. 3. 4. 1277 b 18 sqq. (especially δὲ φρονήσις ἀρχηγοτέρως ἠλευθερεύει ἀρετὴ μόνη, 25).

21. οὖχ ἢ αὐτὴ κ.τ.λ. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 b 20 sqq. This teaching is anticipated in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 26, ἐστι γὰρ ἐκατέρων ἀρετὴν (i.e. ἀθρόθαν καὶ γνωικός).

22. Σωκράτης. Cp. Plato, Meno 71—73, though the absence of the article before Σωκράτης seems to imply that Aristotle is speaking of the historical Socrates, not of the interlocutor in the Meno. Anti-
sthenes agreed with Socrates (Diog. Laert. 6.12). On the views of Socrates and Plato respectively as to the unity of virtue, see Zeller, Plato, E. T. p. 448 sqq. Plutarch seeks to prove in his De Virtute Muliebri, that though there are differences between the virtue of men and that of women, just as there are differences between the same virtue in different men (e.g. the courage of Ajax and Achilles), yet the virtues of women are not specifically different from those of men.

24. τὰς ἄλλας, sc. ἀρετὰς, i.e. σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη. The word ἀρετή is so easily supplied that it is often suppressed—e.g. in 3. 5. 1278 b 1 and 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 15.

τοῦτο, i.e. the conclusion stated in 20–24. This had been reached through premisses relating to the virtue of φύσει ἀρχοντα and ἀρχήμενα in general, but it might also have been reached by examining the subject more in detail, as for instance by examining the virtue of women, children, and slaves separately and successively (κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦντων). This seems from what Meno says (Plato, Meno 71 E) to have been the method followed by Gorgias.

25. καθίλου. For the place of καθίλου, see Vahlen’s note on Poet. 17. 1455 a 24 (p. 184). The thought is too characteristic of Aristotle and recurs too often in his writings to need much illustration, but reference may be made to Eth. Nic. 2. 7. 1107 a 28 sqq.: Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 31: Rhet. 2. 19. 1393 a 16 sqq.

26. τὸ εὖ ἧξεν τὴν ψυχήν. Plato had said this in Rep. 444 D, ἀρετή μὲν ἀρα, ὥστε οὐκέτα, ὕγιεία τέ τις ἐν εὖ καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς.

τὸ ὀρθόπραγμα. As to the omission of ἂ, see critical note. For this definition of virtue, cp. Plato, Charmides 172 A: Meno 97.

27. ἐξαιρηθοῦντες, as in Plato, Meno 71 E, πρῶτον μὲν, εἷς βούλει ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆς... εἷς δὲ βούλει γυναικὸς ἀρετῆς... καὶ ἀληθὶ ἕτερ παιδὸς ἀρετῆς, καὶ θηλείας καὶ ἀρετῶν, καὶ προσβυτέρου ἀνδρός, εἷς μὲν βούλει, ἐλευθέρου, εἷς δὲ βούλει, δούλου: cp. also 77 A.

28. δὲ seems to introduce an inference from the general tenour of 17–24.

29. ὀ ποιητῆς, here Sophocles (Ajax 293). Cp. Athen. Deipn. 559 a, where the following lines are quoted from the Ὑπνως of Xenarchus:

Ἐὰν εἰσὶν οἱ τέττιγες οὐκ εἰδαίμονες,
ἀπὸ ταῖς γυναικῶν οὐδ' ὁμοίων φωνῆς ἐνί;


For the asyndeton at γυναικί, compare the somewhat similar examples adduced by Vahlen in his note on Poet. 25. 1460 b 23 (p. 261 sqq.).
32. πρὸς τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸν ἡγοδέμενον, 'relative to the fully developed human being' (contrasted with ἄνελής: cp. i. 2. 1252 b 31, τέλος γὰρ αὕτη ἐκείνων) 'and to his guiding authority.' The child is apparently regarded as finding in his father the fully developed type of manhood which he himself is designed ultimately to realize and as accepting guidance from him. Cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1249 b 6, δεὶ δή, δισπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλωσ, πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον ζην καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐξίν κατὰ τὴν ἐνίργειαν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχαντος, οἷον δούλων πρὸς δεσπότου καὶ έκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἐκάστου καθήκουσαν ἄρχην: Eth. Nic. 3. 15. 1119 b 7, and 3. 5. 1113 a 5 sqq.
33. ὅμοιος δὲ κ.τ.λ. For the thought, cp. Menander, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 56:

Ἐμοὶ πῶς ἐστὶ καὶ καταφυγὴ καὶ νόμος
καὶ τοῦ δικαίου τοῦ τ' ἄδικον παντὸς κριτῆς
ὁ δεσπότης' πρὸς τούτον ἕνα δεὶ ζην ἐμε,

and Fragm. 150:

Έλευθερος πᾶς ἐνε δεδουλωται, νόμος,
δυνόν δὲ δούλος, καὶ νόμος καὶ δεσπότης.

ἐθεμεν, e. g. in c. 5. 1254 b 25.
35. The construction of τοσῷος with ὅτι does not seem to be very common. See with respect to it Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 33, who compares Oecon. 1. 6. 1344 b 29, καὶ τὰς ἀργαίας (δεί) αὕτῳ νενεμήθαι ὅτι μή ἁμα κινδυνεύσωμεν ἅπασιν.

ἀπορήσεις δ' ἃν τις κ.τ.λ. It would be possible to take ἄρα (37) and ἃ (39) as in the same construction, and the whole sentence ἄρα—πλεῖστον as dependent on ἀπορήσεις (for ἄρα followed by ἃ in indirect interrogations, see Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. i. 43 sq., and on Poet. 4. 1449 a 7), but ἃ διαφέρει τούτῳ πλεῖστον is probably not a part of the question raised: it is rather Aristotle's own solution of the ἄπορα (see Bon. Ind. 313 a 7 sqq., and compare the very similar passage, 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 8–11). The difficulty raised is—if we allow the existence of an ἀρετὴ δούλου, because the slave needs to possess it, must we not also allow the existence of an ἀρετὴ τεχνίτου?
40. κοινῶνος ζωῆς, 'is a sharer with his master in a common existence': cp. 3. 6. 1278 b 16, τῆς ἄρχης εἴδη πόσα τῆς περὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ τῶν κοινωνίαν τῆς ζωῆς, and other similar phrases collected by Lasaulx, Ehe bei den Griechen (p. 13, note 22). It was only of φύsei ἄρχαμενα that the possession of a form of moral virtue was

ταρρατερον, 'less closely attached to the master.' Cp. 3. 5. 1278 a 11, τών δ' ἀναγκαίων οἳ μὲν ἐνὶ λειτουργοῦντες τὰ τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἳ δὲ κοινὸς δάναις καὶ θήτες.

1260 b. 1. Διφωρισμένην τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν. Sepulveda translates 'determinatae cuidam servitutis addictus est,' and explains in his note that the βάναυσος τεχνίτης is not a slave for all purposes, but only for the performance of a definite servile task. The extent of his slavery is determined by his ἔργων: cp. 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 15, ἢ ἐκ πάντων ἢ ἐκ τούτων ὁ διφωρισμένων, οὗν ἢ τιμήματι ἢ γένει ἢ ἀρετῇ ἢ τινι τοιούτῳ ἀλφ., and Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1159 b 33.

καὶ ὁ μὲν δοῦλος κ.τ.λ. The artisan is not only rather an adjunct of the household than one of its ruled members, but he is also not by nature. He is not a φύτεις ἀρχάγμενος, and all that has been proved in the foregoing is that φύτεις ἀρχάγμενος possess a moral virtue of their own. Nature has indeed provided men with materials for dress and consequently for shoemaking (1. 8. 1256 b 20), but the shoemaker works for hire and practises μισθαρμία, which was brought under the unnatural form of χρηματιστική in 1. 11. 1258 b 25. Yet in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 6 and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 1 sq. artisans are admitted to be a necessary element in a State; it seems strange then that they are not by nature.

2. τῶν ἀλλῶν τεχνίτων. For the gen., see note on 1259 b 24.

3. φανερῶν τοίνυν κ.τ.λ. The reasoning is—we have seen that the slave possesses a certain ministerial form of moral virtue over and above his technical excellences, and that his moral virtue is relative to his master, who is his end and guiding authority; hence it is from the master qua master, and not from the master as possessing the δεσποτική ἐπιστήμη, that the slave must derive the kind of moral virtue which he ought to possess. The concluding part of the sentence, if it were complete, would apparently run—τελέαν ἔχοντα τὴν ἴδικὴν ἀρετὴν, ἄλλ' οὔ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν ἔχοντα τῶν ἔργων δεσποτικὴν. Nothing is gained, as it seems to me, by introducing τῶν (with Bern. Sus. and others) before τὴν διδασκαλικὴν. The point insisted on by Aristotle appears to be that the master should be the source of moral virtue (in a subordinate and ministerial form) to the slave qua master, and as possessing complete moral virtue and reason, not as possessing the δεσποτική ἐπιστήμη: it is not, that the master and nobody else is to be the source of moral virtue to the slave. Aristotle had said at the commencement of the chapter (1259 b 20), that the householder should care for the virtue of his slaves, and
he has now made it clear what sort of virtue he should seek to produce in them. In 1. 7. 1255 b 30 sqq. (cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 23 sqq.) the δεσποτική ἐπιστήμη has already been said to be nothing great and to be in no way of the essence of the master. Socrates and Plato, who had denied the name of δεσπότης to any one not possessed of the science of δεσποτική, are here glanced at; Aristotle perhaps also remembers the picture of the δεσπότης in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, himself training his slaves to be efficient servants. Xenophon, however, had already in the same work depicted the householder as teaching his slaves justice (πειράματα ἐμβαθότειν εἰς τὴν δικαιοσύνην τοῦς ὀικέτας, Oecon. 14. 4: compare his account of the training of a housekeeper, ibid. 9. 13), and in this Aristotle is thoroughly with him.

5. ἤδη λέγοντιν οὗ καλῶς οἱ λόγοι τοῦς δούλους ἀποστεροῦσί τε κ.τ.λ. When Aristotle speaks of ἐπίταξις in connexion with the master of slaves, he has in his mind ἐπίταξις περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα: cp. 4 (7). 3. 1325 a 25, οὐδὲν γὰρ τὸ γε δουλό, ἢ δούλος, χρῆσαι σεμνῶν ἡ γὰρ ἐπίταξις ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων οὐδεμία μετέχει τῶν καλῶν, and 1. 7. 1255 b 33, ἐστι δ’ αὐτή ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲν μέγα ἔχουσα οὐδὲ σεμνον, ἢ γὰρ τῶν δούλων ἐπιστάσθαι δεὶ ποιεῖν, ἐκεῖνον δεὶ ταῦτα ἐπιστάσθαι ἐπιστάσθων. The drift of the passage before us, therefore, seems to be—'the master should be the source of moral virtue to the slave, hence he should not confine himself to commands relating to the slave's discharge of his servile functions.' But then comes the question—what is the meaning of οἱ λόγοι τοῦς δούλους ἀποστεροῦσί; Bern. and Sus. translate 'those who forbid converse with slaves'—Stahr, 'those who withdraw rational admonition (die verhülltige Zurechtweisung) from slaves' (cp. Xen. Oecon. 13. 9, ἀνδρόποις δ’ ἐστι πιθανωτέροις ποιεῖν καὶ λόγος, ἐπιδεικνύοντα δός συμφέρει αὐτοῖς πείθεσθαι); but I incline on the whole, following Bonitz (Ind. 436 b 50) and the earlier commentators, to explain λόγον here as 'reason' (cp. 1260 a 17–19 and Eth. Nic. 1. 13. 1102 b 33, ὅτι δὲ πείθεται ποιεῖ λόγον τὸ δλογον, μηνύει, καὶ ἡ νοοθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτήμησις τε καὶ παράκλησις), though it should be borne in mind that the two senses of the word λόγος, 'reason' and 'reasoning,' often tend to pass into each other. We still have to ask, however, what is the meaning of οἱ λόγοι ἀποστεροῦσί. The earlier commentators explain the words 'those who deny that slaves partake in reason' (cp. 3. 1. 1275 a 28, καίτοι γε λοιῶν τούς κυριαστότως ἀποστερεῖν ἀρχής), but perhaps their meaning rather is 'those who withhold reason from the slave' (by withholding the reasoning which is its source, 1. 5. 1254 b 22). For the relation of λόγος to the moral virtues, see Eth. Nic. 6. 1. With
the teaching of the passage before us may be compared that of Eth.
Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 10, συμμαθώντας ἀρα ἰεὶ καὶ τοῦ φιλοῦ ὃτι ἐστιν,
toùto δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ συζήν καὶ κοινώνει λόγον καὶ διανοιάς' οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξει τὸ συζήν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἀστερ ἐπὶ τῶν βοσ-
kκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νόμεσθαι. What is here said of the intercourse of two friends may hold to a certain extent of the intercourse between master and slave. The reference in οἱ λόγοι τοὺς δουλους ἀποστεροῦντες κ.τ.λ. is to Plato, Laws 777 E: cp. also 720 B sqq. Pallas, one of the favourite freedmen of the Emperor Claudius, 'would not deign even to speak to his slaves, but gave them his commands by gestures, or, if that was not enough, by written orders' (Capes, Early Roman Empire, p. 87). According to Clement of Alexandria (Aristot. Fraggm. 179. 1508 b 7 sqq.), ὀδὴ προσγελάν δούλους Ἀριστοτέλης εἶλ. Is not this writer thinking of what Plato had said in the Laws?

6. φάσκοντες. 'Infinitives following certain verbs (of saying, thinking, etc.) sometimes contain a Dictative force... The governing verb gets a different and a stronger meaning: to "say" becomes to "recommend" or to "pray"' (Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 148). Φάσκειν is used of philosophers setting forth a dogma.

7. νουθετητέον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle does not say why (Vict. wishes that he had), but his reason probably is that the slave's one chance of sharing in reason is to receive it in reasoning from outside. The child (1260 a 13) has τὸ βουλευτικὸν already, though as yet imperfect, whereas the slave has it not; all he has is the power of recognizing reason when set before him by another. One of Menander's characters says, in a fragment which perhaps belongs to the 'Αδελφοί (fr. 2: Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 69)—

Οὐ λυπώντα δεῖ
παῖδάριον ὁρθὸν, ἄλλα καὶ πείθοντά τι.

Aristotle's view would probably strike his contemporaries as a decided paradox, for Pseudo-Plutarch, de Liberis Educandis c. 12. 8 F, most likely expresses the view commonly taken—κακεῖνο φήμη, δεῖν τοὺς παιδας ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἐπετηθεμάτων ἄγεν παρανύσεις καὶ λόγους, μὴ μᾶ Δία πληγαῖς μηδ' αἰκισμοῖς. Δοκεῖ γὰρ πῶς ταῦτα τοὺς δουλοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους πρέπειν ἀνάπολεον γὰρ καὶ φρόντον πρὸς τοὺς πάνως, τὰ μὲν δὲ τὰς ἀληθῶς τῶν πληγῶν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὰς ύπερεις: cp. also Ecclesiasticus 33. 28.

8. περὶ δ' ἀνδρὸς κ.τ.λ. Nothing of this kind appears in the Politics; its inquiries, in fact, seldom assume this delicate ethical character. There are a few words as to the mutual behaviour of
husband and wife in Oecon. i. 4. 1344 a 13 sq. which may possibly reproduce some part of Aristotle’s teaching. See also the Latin translation of a fragment on this subject (which can hardly be from the pen of Aristotle) in Val. Rose, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 644 sqq.

11. τὸ καλὸς. See Bon. Ind. 291 b 25 sqq.

12. ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας. The First Book (οἱ πρῶτοι λόγοι, ἐν οἷς περὶ οἰκονομίας διαιρήσθη καὶ διεσπορεία, 3. 6. 1278 b 17) is here marked off from τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας: cp. ἢ πρῶτα μέθοδοι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν, 6 (4). 2. 1280 a 26. So in Rhet. 2. 24. 1401 b 32, the phrase οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις occurs, and Plato’s Republic seems to have been sometimes spoken of as αἱ πολιτείαι (cp. 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1, ὡσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις: see for other instances Henkel, Studien, p. 10).

14. ταῦτα, i. e. ἄνηρ καὶ γυνὴ, τέκνα καὶ πατήρ, though only παῖδες and γυναῖκες are mentioned in 16; it is perhaps taken for granted that the training of the head of the household will be relative to the constitution.

τὴν δὲ τοῦ μέρους κ.τ.λ. Cp. 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 29, μόριον γὰρ ἐκατός τῆς πόλεως· ἢ δ’ ἐπιμέλεια πέφυκεν ἐκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἄλος ἐπιμέλειαν.

16. πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. The virtue of the part must be adjusted to the virtue of the whole; hence the virtue of the woman and the child must be adjusted to the constitution, for the constitution is the standard of virtue in the πόλις, the whole to which they belong. Cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 12 sqq.: 5 (8). 1. 1337 a 11 sqq. The course followed in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12 sqq. is quite in conformity with this principle, though we are concerned there only with the children, or probably the sons, not with the women; δῆλον γὰρ (says Aristotle in that passage), ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην (i. e. the decision whether the same persons are always to be rulers or not).


19. οἱ κοινωνία τῆς πολιτείας. Cp. 3. 3. 1276 b 1, ἐστι δὲ (ἡ πόλις) κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, and 8 (6). 6. 1320 b 28, ἀεὶ δὲ ἐν παραλυμπάδειν ἐκ τοῦ βελτίωνος δήμου τοῦ κοινωνίων.

20. ὡστ' ἐπεί κ.τ.λ. Birt (Das antike Buchwesen, p. 459. 3) holds that ‘these last five lines are evidently added by the “redaction” to form a transition to the Second Book.’ The opening paragraph of the Second Book, however, accords but ill with the close of the First (see note on 1260 b 27); in fact, καὶ πρῶτον 23 . . τῆς ἀρίστης 24 would be better away, though it certainly is the case that
the designers of ‘best constitutions’ are criticised in the Second Book before actual constitutions like the Lacedaemonian, etc., are criticised. It is possible that the closing words of the First Book were added by a bungling editor, but it is also possible that Aristotle himself may be in fault. The opening paragraph of the investigations which now constitute the Second Book of the Politics may have been imperfectly harmonized by him with the closing sentence of τὰ περὶ αἰκονομίας καὶ δεσποτείας, just as the sequence of the Third and Fourth (Seventh) Books is not absolutely perfect, and the programme of the Politics given at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics is departed from to a large extent in the Politics itself. Or again the opening paragraph of the Second Book may have been an after-thought of Aristotle’s, and the book may have originally begun ‘Αρχὴν δὲ πρῶτων ποιητέων κ.τ.λ. This is perhaps less probable, as ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως 37 seems to refer back to θεωρήσας περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πολιτείας 27. It is impossible to penetrate these secrets of the workshop; one thing, however, should be borne in mind, that the component parts of the Politics are not as closely welded together as they might be, and often look as though they were more or less separate works. This makes defects of ‘callida iunctura’ less surprising.

BOOK II.

C. 1. 27. Ἴπει δὲ κ.τ.λ. The First Book ends, καὶ πρῶτον ἐπισκεψόμεθα 1260 b. περὶ τῶν ἀποφηματέων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης. The Second begins by premising that Aristotle’s aim is to inquire what form of political union is best for those most favourably circumstanced—a fact which had not been stated before—and then proceeds to argue that this involves a preliminary review of ‘other constitutions than that to be propounded by Aristotle’ (τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας), whether actual working constitutions (termed κόραι in 2. 12. 1274 b 27) held to be well-ordered, or schemes in good repute put forward by individual inquirers. The two passages are evidently not in strict sequence. The opening paragraph of the Second Book is not perhaps absolutely inconsistent with the closing words of the First, inasmuch as all that is said at the close of the latter book is that those who have put forward views with regard to the best constitution will be first dealt with, but it appears to ignore them. In c. 12. 1273 b 27 sqq., the plan of the book is still further extended to include a notice of οἱ ἀποφηματεῖοι τὰ περὶ πολιτείας generally, and even of those
who were the authors of laws only and not of constitutions. Isocrates (Nicol. § 24) refers to the Lacedaemonians and Carthaginians as admittedly possessing good constitutions; Polybius (6. 43) adds Crete and Mantinea, and in the opinion of some, Athens and Thebes. Plato (Laws 638 B) speaks of Ceos and the Italian Locri as well-governed. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 599 E and Crito 52 E.

29. τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, ‘others than that which I am about to set forth’ : cp. παρ’ αὐτᾶς ἔτερον, 33. It is possible that these words may be used in the same sense (‘other than my own’) in 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 34.

31. τυγχάνωσιν †. In eleven passages at least of the genuine writings of Aristotle, if the MSS. are to be trusted, we find εἶ followed by the subjunctive. These are as follows:—30 b 14, 66 b 9, 636 b 29, 1261 a 27, 136 a 20, 27, 179 b 22, 343 b 33, 1279 b 22 (συμβαίνει, Vat. Palimpsest), 1447 a 24, and the passage before us. (In 1132 a 11 K b has the subjunctive after καν ἐι: see also 322 b 28, 326 a 6, 645 b 31, and Susemihl’s apparatus criticus on 1323 a 2.) In the first four of these passages the subjunctive is used with καὶ ἐι, ἐι, ὅπερ ἄν ei, and ὅπερ ἄν ei: in the remainder with καν ei. See Vahlen, Beitr. zu Aristot. Poet. i. 35 sqq., Bon. Ind. 217 a 31 sqq. and 41 a 26 sq., and Eucken, de Partic. Usu p. 59 sqq. All the MSS. but pr. P a and possibly Γ have τυγχάνωσιν here, and all except P a and possibly Γ have οἰκύνη in 1261 a 27. Vahlen’s instructive discussion of the question as to the construction of καν ei with the subjunctive in Aristotle’s writings results in the conclusion that its use is ‘very doubtful’ and in Poet. i. 1447 a 24 he substitutes καν ei τυγχάνωσιν for καν ei τυγχάνωσιν, which is the reading of the one authoritative MS. of the Poetics. Bonitz would emend all the passages referred to above, so as to expel from Aristotle’s writings the use of ei with the subjunctive. Eucken remarks (ubi supra, p. 63), that τυγχάνωσιν here, συμβαίνει in 3. 8. 1279 b 22, and τυγχάνωσιν in Poet. i. 1447 a 25 may very easily have arisen from τυγχάνωσιν, συμβαίνει, and τυγχάνωσιν, and that it is only in passages ‘ubi minima mutatione ex indicativo nasci potuit’ that the subjunctive is found after καν ei in Aristotle’s writings. It is easy, however, to lay too much stress on arguments of this kind (see Blass as to Dawes’ Canon, Handbuch der klass. Alterthums-Wissenschaft, i. 252). In Plato, Rep. 579 D the MSS. have καν ei μή τερ δοκῇ, and in Thuc. 6. 21 an ‘indubitable’ instance of ei with the subjunctive occurs (Classen ad loc.). See Stallbaum’s note on Laws 958 C, where other instances of the occurrence of this construction in Attic.
writers are noticed. Aristotle is not a strictly Attic writer, and the fact should be noted for what it is worth that there are other passages of the Politics in which either the one family of MSS. or the other gives the subjunctive where we expect the indicative or else the subjunctive with ἄν: thus in 1301 a 38 Π2 have τυγχάνωσιν, and in 1307 a 37 ὅπως θέλωσιν, while in 1313 a 20 Ρ2 have δοκεῖ γὰρ εὐπτώ- νων ὁμι τύχων. On the whole, I have contented myself with indicating by obelis the grave doubts which attach to the incalculable readings— 
τυγχάνωσιν here and ἀκύσθι in 1261 a 27.

32. ἢνα κ.τ.λ. There is a considerable resemblance between the passage before us and de An. 1. 2. 403 b 20 sqq. With regard to τὸ ὄρθος ἔχων and τὸ χρήσιμον as the two ends of inquiry in the Politics, cp. 1. 3. 1253 b 15 sq. and 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 35 sq.

33. τὸ ᾿ητέειν τι παρ’ αὐτάς ἔτερον very probably refers to Isocr. de Antidosi § 83, ὀδὴν γὰρ αὐτοῦ δεὶ ᾿ητέειν ἔτερουν [νόμους], ἀλλὰ τοῦ παρὰ τοὺς ἀλλοις εὐδοκιμοῦντας πειραθραί συναγαγείν, ὃ ρηδιῶς ἀπείρε ἐν ὦ ἄνοι βαυληθῆς ποιήσει. It is precisely this view that the Second Book is intended to disprove. See the opinion of Isocrates on this subject, de Antid. §§ 79–83. Πάντωσ probably goes with σοφίζεσθαι βαυλομένων in the sense of 'at all hazards.'

35. τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας. Vict. 'significat, ut arbitror, utrumque genus rerumpublicarum (id est, et usurpatas ab aliquibus civitatibus et literarum monimentis proditas), etsi id nomen magis convenire videtur receptis iam, verius enim hae ὑπάρχειν dicuntur.'

ὅλα τοῦτο. Bonitz (Ind. 546 a 47) compares for this use of τοῦτο, in which 'per ubertatem quandam dicendi quae antea exponuntur postea epanaleptice comprehenduntur,' Categ. 5. 2 b 17: de An. 3. 3. 427 b 8–11. Cp. also c. 11. 1273 b 5.

36. ἄρχην ἐν κ.τ.λ. The natural starting-point of an inquiry περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πολιτικῆς (1260 b 27) is the question, in what and how much is there to be κοινωνία? The question put by Protagoras (Plato, Protag. 324 E) reminds us in form of that raised here, but Protagoras is there thinking of virtue as the thing shared.

40. πολιτεία. Cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 29, κοινωνία δ’, ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία, where the meaning of πολιτεία is evidently 'constitution'; thus Bonitz (Ind. 612 b 15) is apparently right in rendering the word here as 'civitatis forma et ordo'; otherwise we might be tempted by τοὺς πολῖτας 38 and ὁ πολίτης 1261 a 1 to explain it here, as in some other passages (see Bon. Ind. 612 b 10 sqq.), as = 'the citizen-body,' especially as in 3. 3. 1276 b 2 the πολιτεία is spoken of rather as the thing shared, than the κοινωνία—a term more usually applied to the πόλεως.
41. Citizenship implies membership of the same city, and membership of the same city implies residence in the same locality. Still residence in the same locality does not amount to much: cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 9. 1170 b 11, ταύτα δὲ γάρ ἂν ἐν τῷ συζήτῃ καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας οὕτω γὰρ ἂν δόξει τῷ συζήτῃ ἐπί τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἥσυχος ἐπὶ τῶν βοσκημάτων τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι.

2. πότερον κ.τ.λ. The question is raised in very similar 1261 a. language to the question about Kingship, 3. 14. 1284 b 37. This is worth remarking, as these correspondences show a certain continuity of treatment.

δοσω. What are the objects which it is implied cannot be shared? This appears from Plato, Rep. 464 D, διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἰδιαν ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δὲ ἅλα καοῖ. In the Laws (739 C) Plato insists with humorous exaggeration, that even hands ears and eyes are to be common.

9 sqq. 'Community in women involves both many other C. 2. difficulties, and this especially, that the object for the sake of which Socrates recommends its establishment by legislation evidently is not borne out (proved to be a desirable object) by the arguments he uses, and then again as a means to the end which he marks out for the State, the scheme set forth in the dialogue is impracticable; yet how it should be limited and qualified, is nowhere definitely explained.' Socrates fails to make out that the aim with which he pleads for a community in women—that of rendering the State as far as possible one—is a correct aim; and the means which he adopts for the realization of his end are—apart from qualifications and limitations of which we hear nothing from him—impossible. The first of these two allegations is developed in c. 2 and the second in c. 3. The Platonic Socrates anticipates a reception of this kind for his suggestion of community in women and children; cp. Rep. 450 C, καὶ γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεσθαι, ἀπιστοῖ; ἂν, καὶ εἰ οὓτε μάλιστα γένοιτο, ὥσ ἀριστή ἂν εἴη τοῦτα, καὶ ταύτη ἀπιστήσεται. Aristotle's criticisms on the Lacedaemonian and other constitutions are grouped under two heads (c. 9. 1269 a 30) in a not very dissimilar way. As to ἀδιάκριται, cp. c. 3. 1261 b 30, διὸ ἐστὶ τὸ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ὡδὶ μὲν καλῶς, ὡλ' οὐ δυνατῶν, ὡδὶ δ' οὐδέν ὀμονοιητικόν, and 1262 a 14 sqq. As to δ' ἄδικα, cp. c. 4. 1262 b 5 sq. For ὅφειναι συμβαίνων in the sense of 'evidently does not result,' cp. 2. 6. 1266 a 5, οὐδ' ἔχουνα φαίνεται, and see Bon. Ind. 808 b 40 sqq. For συμβαίνων ἐκ τῶν λόγων, cp. Top. 8. 1. 156 b 38 (Bon. Ind. 713 b 16), and de Caelo 1. 3. 270 b 11. It seems
better to interpret these words as 'borne out by the arguments used' than with Thurot (Études sur Aristote, p. 19) to explain, 'la communauté n’atteint pas le résultat, en vue duquel Platon établit cette legislation.' The sentence όσ μὲν εἰρήται νῦν appears to be the nom. to ἐστι, which we must supply with ἀδύνατον: cp. c. 5. 1263 a 22, ἄν δὲ νῦν τρόπον ἔχει ... οὐ μερῶν ἀν διενέγκαι. As to πρός, cp. 2. 4. 1262 b 3: 3. 13. 1284 a 1: 4 (7). 17. 1336 b 31 sq.: 5 (8). 3. 1338 a 42. For διδάξει ('explicare,' Bon. Ind. 180 a 23, 29), cp. Eth. Nic. 6. i. 1138 b 20 sqq., and 9. 8. 1168 b 12, ἵσως οὖν τούς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαπείρασε καὶ διορίζειν, ἐφ' ἄσον ἐκάστος καὶ ἡ ἀληθεύσεως: also Metaph. A. 9. 992 b 18 sq.

15. ὅτι μάλιστα qualifies μάν (cp. 1261 b 16, and τελεος, 1261 b 20).

16. ταύτην ὑπόθεσιν, 'this as his fundamental aim.' For this use of αὐτὸς, see Bon. Ind. 546 a 51 sqq. For the gender—ταύτην, not τούτο—cp. 5 (8). 3. 1337 b 32: 4 (7). 7. 1327 b 41.

καίτω κ.τ.λ. For the argument, compare 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 21 sqq.

18. πλῆθος ... τι. Cp. 3. i. 1274 b 41: 1275 b 20: 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 16—passages which explain the addition of τι. Plato had said in Rep. 462 C, καὶ ἔτις δὴ ἐγγύτατα ἐνὸς ἁθρόφου ἔχει (ἀυτή ἡ πόλις ἡ ἱστορία διοικεῖται), but his meaning is that the hurt of one member of the community is to be felt as a hurt by all, just as the hurt of a finger is felt as a hurt by the whole man. He knows well that the State consists both ἐκ πλείονῶν ἁθρότων and ἐξ ἐδει διαφερόντων (Polit. 308 C). Nevertheless there was a real difference of opinion between Aristotle and Plato on this subject. The State is less of a σύμφωνος (2. 4. 1262 b 14 sqq.) to Aristotle than to Plato; the individual counts for more with him, and is less lost and swallowed up in the State.

22. ἀναρίζεις γὰρ τὴν πόλιν. Cp. 1261 b 8 sq. For the future, cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 5. μάλιστα δ' ἂν γένοιτο φανερῶν, εἴ τις τοῖς ἔργοις ἐδοι τὴν τοιοτική πολιτείαν κατασκευασμένην' οὐ γὰρ δυνήσεται κ.τ.λ.

23. ἐξ ἐδει διαφερόντων. Cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 5 sq., and the enumeration of the different γένη of the πόλεως in 4 (7). 8. 1328 b 20 sq. and 6 (4). 4. Especially the broad distinction of rulers and ruled is referred to (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 12); but even among rulers there will be differences (1261 b 5). When we are told in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25 that ἡ πόλις βοῶσα ἐξ ἵσων εἶναι καὶ ὅμοιών ὅτι μάλιστα, the word πόλεως appears to include only the citizens, as in the phrase ἡ πόλις πολιτῶν τι πληθός ἐστιν, 3. i. 1274 b 41. But even like and equal citizens can only be 'as far as possible' like and equal, for some of them will be rulers and others ruled.
25. μὲν is answered by δὲ 29. For the thought expressed in 24—27, cp. Xen. de Vectig. c. 4. 32, ὡσπερ σύμμαχοι, δόξῳ ἐν πλείονι συνίστωμι, ἀλλωστέρους ἀλλήλους ποιώσιμον.

27. ὡσπερ ἐν εἶ κ.τ.λ. It is not quite clear whether the meaning is 'just as a greater weight of anything is more useful than a less,' or 'just as a greater weight depresses the scale more.' Giph. takes the words in the former way, Vict. in the latter. "Ωσπερ ἐν εἶ does not always imply an ellipse after ὡσπερ ἐν (see Bon. Ind. 872 b 55 sqq. and Eucken, de Partic.Usu., p. 60), but it may perhaps do so here, and we may be right in translating (with Giph.)—'just as would be the case, if a weight were to depress the scale more.'

† ἐξίσος+†. See critical note on this word, and also above on 1260 b 31.

dιοικεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The first of the many questions which arise as to this passage is, what is the meaning of τῷ τοιούτῳ? Here as elsewhere it seems to mean 'in the before-mentioned respect,' but it is not quite clear whether it should be explained as = τῷ εἷς εἰς διαφέροντας εἴναι, or 'in being all the stronger for being larger, even though its components are identical.' Probably the latter explanation is the correct one. Κεχωρισμένοι κατὰ κόμισιν, again, may mean either 'scattered (sundered from each other) in villages' (cp. 1. 9. 1257 a 22, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἑτέρων, and Hdt. 1. 96), or 'distributed in villages' (cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 6, οὗ γὰρ διανίκησαν μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων ποιήσαι τὴν πόλιν, and Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1191 b 19). The two interpretations do not lie far apart, but perhaps the former of them is the more likely to be correct (see Liddell and Scott s. v. κόμι). Passing on to discuss the meaning of the passage as a whole, we find that ὅταν μὴ—Ἄρκαδες has been taken by some to be explanatory of πόλις, and has been rendered 'when the members of the πόλις are not scattered in villages, but are concentrated in a city, like the Arcadians (after the foundation of Megalopolis),' but it seems strange that 'the Arcadians' should be selected to serve as an example of a πόλις. It is far more likely that ὅταν μὴ—Ἄρκαδες refers to the members of the ἔθνος, and is intended to explain under what circumstances the difference alleged to exist between the πόλις and the ἔθνος does really exist. But then comes the question, what is the meaning of ὧν Ἄρκαδες? Sepulveda explains, 'gens quae non per castella et vicos distributa est, ut divisos habeat magistratus, sed sparsas per agros domos habitat, ut olim Arcades,' and Lamb., Ramus, and others follow in his track, but Aristotle does not indicate in any way that he is not referring to the Arcadians of his own day, who had long
ceased to live in this fashion. Dittenberger, on the other hand, whose able discussion of the passage in Gött. gel. Anz. 1874, p. 1376 sqq. (see an extract from it in Sus. 3, Note 132) deserves careful perusal, explains the passage thus (p. 1383)—'provided, that is to say, that the nation is not distributed, like most barbarian nations, into non-independent (unselbständige) villages, but, like the Arcadian for instance, into a number of independent (selbständiger) City-States.' He holds that a distinction is drawn in the passage between 'nations forming a political unity (commonly with a monarchical constitution)' and nations composed of a number of City-States. This is a possible view of it, but it must not be forgotten that in Aristotle's day the Arcadians were a confederacy of City-States, and that a general assembly of the nation met at Megalopolis: cp. Aristot. Fragm. 442. 1550 b 6 (Harpocr. p. 280), μύριοι ἐν Μεγάλη πόλει ... συνεχόμενοι ἐκτι κοινῶν Ἀρκάδων ἀπάντων, οὗ πολλάκις μημοιούντων οἱ λατομικοὶ διελεκταὶ δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῇ κοινῇ Ἀρκάδων πολιτείᾳ ἐφράζοντος τοῦ βιβλίου, and see Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 134, who refers to Diod. 15. 59, περὶ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνον Ἀκομῆνης τὸ Τεγεάτης ἔπεις τοὺς Ἀρκάδας εἰς μίαν συντέλειαν ταχθῆναι καὶ κοινὴν ἕξεων σύνθεσιν συναντώσαν εἰς ἄνδρῶν μυρίων, καὶ τούτους ἑξοσύναν ἕξεων περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης θαυμασθαί, as well as to Paus. 8. 27 and some other passages. Cp. also Hyperid. adv. Demosth. col. 16. 14 (p. 10 Blasi), τῶν κοινῶν συλλόγους Ἀχαιῶν τε καὶ Ἀρκάδων. It is to this confederation that Müller (ubi supra) takes Aristotle here to allude, and the writer of some valuable remarks on the passage in the Guardian newspaper for Jan. 27, 1886 explains it in the same way. Is it not likely that Aristotle's meaning is—'a nation also differs from a City-State in being all the stronger for being larger, even though its components are identical, whenever at least the nation is not scattered in villages, as some nations are, but united in a confederacy, like the Arcadian? It will then be implied that the addition of fresh villages to an uncompacted mass of villages brings no accession of strength, whereas the addition of fresh City-States to a confederacy like the Arcadian does so. Αν ἔθνος 'sundered in villages' seems, indeed, to have been little better than a rope of sand: cp. Diod. 5. 6, οἱ δ' ὀνω Σικανοῖ τὸ πολιταῖον κοιμηθέντα γενοῦν, ἕπι τῶν υἱαυτότων λόφων τὰς πόλεις κατασκευάζοντες διὰ τούτου λητότας: οὐ γὰρ ἦσαν ὑπὸ μιαν ἴτεμον κατασκευάζοντος διὰ τούτου, κατὰ πόλιν δὲ ἐκάστην εἰς ἰν ὁ δυναστεύον: Hdt. 1. 96: Dion. Hal., Ant. Rom. 1. 9. Pollux, it may be noted, speaks as if the ἔθνος were always composed of πόλεις—καὶ αἱ μὲν πολλαὶ πόλεις εἰς ἐν συντελοῦσα ἔθνος, αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ κόμαι εἰς ἐν συμφέρουσαι δύναμι πόλις (9. 27, quoted by C. F. Hermann, Gr.
Antiqq. 1. § 11. 10)—but this evidently was not the case. As to the position of καὶ before πόλεως, Dittenberger remarks that though it is surprising; it is not more surprising than much else in Aristotle's collocation of words. See note on 1254 b 16. Certainly καὶ ἐθνῶν πόλεως would be more natural, but perhaps the idea uppermost in Aristotle's mind is, that there is another pair of things between which a similar contrast exists, and he places καὶ before both these two things. Compare the displacement of the negative noticed in Bon. Ind. 539 a 14 sqq.

29. ἕν. The State is a κοινωνία εἷς ἑν τῷ γένος, 4 (7). 8. 1328 a 25: cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 28 sqq. For the various kinds of unity, see Metaph. Δ. 6. 1016 b 31 sqq. Aristotle inherits the thought expressed in this passage to some extent from earlier inquirers—from the Pythagoreans, from Heraclitus (Eth. Nic. 8. 2. 1155 b 4 sq.), and from Plato (Polit. 308 C: Laws 773 C sqq.). Of course he also holds the complementary truth that there should be an unity of ethical conviction as to τὰ ποιητικὰ εὐδαμονίας in the minds of the citizens (4 (7). 8. 1328 a 37 sqq.).

30. διόσπερ κ.τ.λ. For other passages in the Politics in which τὰ ἴδια are referred to, see Bon. Ind. 101 b 19 sqq. It is the reciprocal rendering of an equivalent amount of dissimilar things, not the receipt of an equal amount of the same thing, that holds the State together (σώζει τὰς πόλεις, cp. 1261 b 9 and 3. 12. 1282 b 16 sqq.). Cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1132 b 33, τῷ ἀνταποδότῳ γὰρ ἀνάλαγον συμμένη ἡ πόλις: 9. 1. 1163 b 32 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1423 b 29 sqq. and 1424 b 22 sqq. (In the first of these passages Aristotle includes under ἀνταποδόσεις a return of ill for ill, as well as of good for good, and thus takes a wider view of it than he does in the passage before us: ἀνταποδόσεις is made to include the return of ill for ill, and further (1133 a 4 sq.) the return not only of service for service, but of favour for favour.) The fact that the State rests on τὰ ἴσαν τὰ ἀνταποδοθῆς, and not on the other kind of equality, serves to show that it is composed of unlikes, for if all the members of the State were likes (e. g. shoemakers), there would be no question of equivalence; an absolutely equal share of the one product would be assignable. As it is, the ruler renders to the ruled the offices of a good ruler, and the ruled repay him with the offices of good subjects. It is thus that the State holds together, and that friendship is maintained between its members (Eth. Nic. 8. 8. 1158 b 11 sqq.). This is true even of free and equal citizens, among whom one would least expect any difference in kind to exist, for though here there is no intrinsic difference, yet the impossibility
of all ruling at the same time leads to an ‘imitation’ of, or approximation to, such difference, and breaks them into rulers and ruled, two classes different in kind, even though they interchange their positions from time to time. Hence here too τὸ ἱσον τὸ ἀντιστεονδος is in place.

33. κατ' ἐπαινοῦν, ‘year by year,’ cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 40, ἐν δουλεῖ μὲν πόλεσι τιμῶνται κατ' ἐπαινοῦν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μείζονι διὰ τριετηρίδος ἢ πενταετηρίδος. Mr. Welldon: ‘they must follow a system of yearly rotation.’ Vict. ‘hoc igitur pacto solum id administrari potest, si interposito spatio anni unius id fiat.’

ἡ κατὰ τινα ἄλλην τάξιν ἢ χρόνον, ‘or by some other order of succession’ (Bern. ‘Abfolge’) ‘or official period.’

34. καὶ ... δή, see note on 1. 2. 1253 a 18. For συμβαίνειν ὡστε Bonitz compares Pol. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 12. Cp. also de Sensu 2. 437 b 8.

35. ὀσπερ ἄν εἰ κ.τ.λ., ‘as all would be shoemakers and carpenters, if’ etc. So Giph. p. 154.

37 sqq. οὗτος. Sepulv. ‘ut nunc sese res habet in sutoribus et fabris, ut iidem semper sint suotores, iidem fabri.’ Since it is better that the same men should always rule (cp. for the thought Isocr. Busiris § 16: Nicoccl. §§ 17–18: Aristot. Pol. 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 16 sqq. and 6 (4). 2. 1289 a 39 sq.: Eth. Eud. 7. 10. 1242 b 27 sq.: and contrast Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 25), and that there should be a permanent difference between rulers and ruled, men seek, where this is out of the question, to get as near to this state of things as possible (μειέται), and by alternation of office to create two different classes, rulers and ruled, thus conjuring up a difference where it can hardly be said to exist. For ἐν οἷς δὲ ... τοῖτο δὲ, see Bonitz (Ind. 166 b 58–167 a 12), who points out that in this passage there is not (as in 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 32: 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 11) any preceding sentence introduced by μέν for the first δὲ of the two to answer. The same thing appears in Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 a 32 sqq. and other passages adduced by Bonitz.

1261 b. 1. εἰτ' ἀγαθὸν εἰτε φαύλον τὸ ἄρχειν. Camerarius (p. 76) refers to Plato, Rep. 345 E sqq.: 346 E sqq. Cp. also Pol. 3. 6. 1279 a 8 sqq.

2. ἢ τούτῳ δὲ μειέται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἱσως εἴκειν τὸ δ' ὡς ὁμοίως εἶναι ἢ ἄρχεισ. I place in the text the reading of the first family of MSS., for though it is obviously untenable as it stands, it probably approaches the true reading far more closely than that of the second. See Susemihl’s able note on this passage in Qu. Crit. p. 360. He reads ἄνομοίους for δ' ὡς ὁμοίως, and this conjecture may be correct, but it is of course only a conjecture. Ἐν τούτοις δὲ (Π)
might perhaps with advantage take the place of τούτο δὲ (Π'), but μμείται (Π') appears to suit better with τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄρχουσι κ.τ.λ. than μμείται (Π'), with which βέλτιον must be supplied, for, as Thurot says (Études, p. 24), 'Aristote constate un fait, mais ne donne pas un précepte.' A. Schott, in Heinsius' Paraphrase of the Politics (p. 1044) conjectures τὸ in place of τὸ 3, and Sus. adopts this conjecture, which certainly simplifies the passage if τούτο δὲ is read or if the reading of the second family is adopted, but if we read ἐν τούτοις δὲ μμείται τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ίσους ἐκείν τὸ ἀναμίωσι ἐτίμε ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τὸ—ἐκεῖν will be the nom. to μμείται, and the translation will be, 'in the case of these the alternation of ruling and being ruled imitates an original inequality.' So Thurot (Études, p. 23), 'là où les membres de l'État sont naturellement égaux, l'inégalité naturelle est imitée par l'alternative dans l'exercice du pouvoir et dans l'obéissance. Les citoyens commandent et obéissent tour à tour, comme s'ils devenaient d'autres hommes, c'est-à-dire comme s'ils étaient inégaux.' Cp. i. 12. 1259 b 7, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄρχη τὸ δ' ἄρχησι, εἰπτεί διαφορῶν εἶναι κ.τ.λ. For μμείται in the sense in which it is used here, cp. Isocr. Archid. § 81, ἥν οὖν εἰλικρίνει τούτῳ ποίησαμεν, β μημισπρένου ήμῶν συνήγαγεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον ὅτι βασία τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατήσαμεν, and Plato, Polit. 293 E, 301 A. ἐκεῖν ἄρχησι appears to occur extremely rarely in Aristotle: Bonitz (Ind. 219 b 18) gives no other instance of the pres. infinitive.

5. καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν δὴ τρόπων κ.τ.λ. 'And in the same way, again, even when they rule, one man holds one office and another another [just as if there were a difference between them].' So inseparable is differentiation from the State, that when its members are alike and equal, differences are conjured up not only between rulers and ruled, but even among rulers. It is thus that I incline to understand the passage; I add, however, Mr. Welldon's translation of it—the same principle [of alternation] during the period of their rule regulates the distribution of the different offices among different persons.'

7. On οὕτως, see critical note. As to πέφυκα, see Vahlen's note on Poet. 6. 1450 a 2.

οὕτως. Cp. c. 5. 1263 b 31, δεὶ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι πως μιᾶς καὶ τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τῶν πολιῶν, ἀλλ' οὖν πάντως κ.τ.λ.: 1261 a 15, b 16, ὅτι μάλιστα: 1261 b 20, τελέως: 1261 b 10, λάν.

8. τὸ λεγένην ὡς μέγιστον ἀγαθῶν. Cp. Rep. 462 A. For the pleonastic use of ὡς, cp. Phys. 8. 7. 260 a 25 and the passages collected in Bon. Ind. 538 b 33 sqq. We have ἐν τοῖς πόλεσιν here, but ἐν is absent in the similar passage, c. 4. 1262 b 8.
10. καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον, i.e. by asking, not how the State is composed, but what is most desirable.


16. Ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. Here Aristotle seems to pass to his second point (1261 a 12 sq.), that saying mine and not-mine of the same thing is not a means to the unity of the State. The unity of the State is not 'indicated' (ἀποδεικνυόμεναι, cp. σημείων ἐδωκα, 19) by men's saying mine and not-mine of the same thing.

18. κατὰ τὸν λόγον, 'in connexion with' (or 'in') 'the expression,' i. e. τὸ λέγειν πάντας ἄμα τὸ ἔμων καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔμων.

28. τὸ γὰρ πάντες κ.τ.λ. For the ambiguity of περιτὰ καὶ ἄρης, cp. c. 5. 1264 b 20 sqq.: de Soph. El. 4. 166 a 33 sqq. As to πάντες, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 35 sqq.: 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 36 sq.

29. καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις takes up and justifies παραλογισμὸς: not only do ambiguous terms such as these cause contention in practical life, but in discussions also they generate contentious syllogisms.

C. 3.

31. ὁ δὲ δυνατὸν. 'Jurisconsulti negant fieri posse ut eiusdem rei duo in solidum sint domini; hoc tantum permittunt, ut rei communis dominum quisque se vocare possit, sed pro parte indivisa, non in solidum' (Giph.). Cr. ἀδύνατον, 1261 a 14.

32. τὸ λέγομενον, i.e. (probably) τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ἐμῶν καὶ μὴ ἐμῶν.

34. φροντίζουσιν, 'men care for': cp. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 24, βοϊλουσί: 8 (6). 8. 1321 b 25, καθιστάνων. Plato had claimed (Rep. 463 C-D), that his plan of an extended application of the names of brother, sister, father, mother, son, and daughter would not impair the fulfilment of the duties implied by such relationship. With this Aristotle does not agree.

35. ἢ δὲν ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει. Vict. 'aut quantum suas partes postulare putant.' Men care for matters of common interest less,
or at any rate only to the extent to which they are personally concerned in them.

πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις is added to explain this limitation of attention. Even where there is no other cause for inattention, men may well think that some one else is looking after the matter. Camerarius (p. 78) compares Xen. Cyrop. 5. 3. 49 sq.

38. The argument is—each of the citizens has a thousand sons, and these not exclusively his, for every son is as much the son of one citizen as he is of another; hence all the fathers will alike neglect the sons. The indefiniteness of the relation between father and child and the neglect to which this will lead is here insisted on, as in the next paragraph the fractional character of this relationship and the consequent diminution of αἰκεῖότης. Cp. Rep. 463 C, παντὶ γὰρ, ὃ ἐν ἐντυγχάνῃ τις, ἢ ὅσοι ἀδέλφῳ ἢ ὅσοι ἀδέλφῳ ἢ ὅσοι πατρὶ ἢ ὅσοι μητρὶ ἢ νεικί ἢ θυγατρὶ ἢ τούτων ἐκγόνως ἢ προγόνως νομεῖ ἐντυγχάνειν.

γύνονται,' every citizen comes to have.' Cp. γίνεται, c. 5. 1264 a 14: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 24: 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 5.

πολίτων must be taken here in a sense exclusive of the third class of the Republic, though this class also is included by Plato within the citizen-body.

1. ἔτι κ. τ. λ. Here Aristotle seems to pass from the point of 1262 a. neglect and defect of attention to that of defective αἰκεῖότης. Plato had claimed (Rep. 462 B sqq.) that all the citizens of his State would feel as one man, and would sympathize as keenly with any one of their number who might happen to meet with good or ill fortune, as the physical frame responds to pain or pleasure affecting a limb. Aristotle contends, on the contrary, that they will be connected with any given member of their body only by a fractional relationship varying with the size of the State, and will feel only a fractional joy or sorrow at his prosperity or adversity, nor will they feel even that without doubt and uncertainty, for they will not know whether they ever had a child, much less whether it has survived.

2. οὔτως, i. e. 'fractionally,' or in other words, with the feeling that he has a thousandth share in him, not the whole; οὔτως is explained by ὀπόστοσ τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν, as οὔτω 6 is explained by τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν προσαναρέωτας: cp. Metaph. B. 4. 999 b 33, τὸ γὰρ ἄριθμῳ ἐν ἦ τὸ καθ' ἐκαστὸν λέγειν διαφέρει οὔδεν: οὔτω γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' ἐκαστὸν τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἐν, where τὸ ἀριθμῷ ἐν explains οὔτω (see Bonitz' note on the passage).

3. οἷον ἐμὸς ἢ τοῦ δεῖνος κ. τ. λ., i.e. he will say he is my son, or so and so's, naming in this way each of the thousand fathers or
more who are comprised in the State.' For the case of ἐμὸς, Göttl. compares Soph. Antig. 567, ὀλλ ἕδε μὴν τοι μή λέγε. Cp. also Metaph. θ. 8. 1049 b 5. The Latin idiom is the same: cp. Cic. de Legibus i. 21. 54: ergo adventiris Antiocho familiari meo—magistro enim non audeo dicere.

4. καθ' ἐκαστὸν τῶν χιλίων. Κατά is not 'of' here, for then we should have καθ' ἐκαστὸν (cp. 7 (5)). 7. 1307 b 2, ἐφησον καθα πᾶσιν τῶν πολιτειῶν): we must take καθ' ἐκαστὸν as one word (= singulos): cp. Eth. Nic. i. 4. 1097 a 13, καθ' ἐκαστὸν γὰρ ἰστρεύει, and see Bon. Ind. 226 a 25 sqq. See also Ast, Lexicon Platon. 2. p. 145.

6. κατὶ τὸτερὸν κ.τ.λ. Δια χιλίων καί ('vi non multum ab ἅ distans,' Bon. Ind. 357 b 20) μυρίων is probably gen. after ἐκαστὸν, which is the subject of λέγειν. Plato had hoped that when the whole of the citizens spoke of the same person or thing as 'mine,' the State would be pervaded with a feeling of friendliness and brotherhood. Mέν has nothing to answer to it, but instances of this are by no means rare: see for example 3. 13. 1284 b 13. On μέν solitariurn see Holden, Oeconomicus of Xenophon, Index p. 86n. In the passage before us the reason why μέν has nothing to answer to it probably is that Aristotle in his eagerness hurries on to ἦ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ. without pausing to add, 'but though using the same name, not feeling any clear sentiment of relationship.'

9. The words αὐτὸς... αὐτῶ is emphatic: cp. ἵδιον ἀνεφιλῶν, 13, and Plutarch de Esu Carnium 2. 5. 998 D, ὑπὸ αὐτῶ τῶν κείμενον ἡ διελφῶν αὐτῶ. Though A, B, C, and D call the same man severally by a different name, they nevertheless have that keen sense of something ἵδιον in connexion with him which, in Aristotle's view, the change proposed by Plato would take away or seriously diminish.

11. οἰκειότητα, here included under συγγένεια, while in the Rhetoric (2. 4. 1381 b 33 sqq.) οἰκειότης and συγγένεια figure as two distinct forms of φίλia.

12. ἦ τῶν αὐτῶ. Giph. 'ut si frater uxor em ducat.'

πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι ἐτεροι. All the MSS. read ἐτεροι, but Bern. conjectures ἐτεροι, and Thurot (followed by Sus.) ἐτεροι (Études sur Aristote, p. 26). 'Ἐτεροι,' says Thurot, 'est opposé à πρὸς τούτου, aux parents considérés comme faisant une seule classe: cf. 3. 14. 1285 a 29.' We then have ὃ μὲν—ὁ δὲ—ὁ δὲ—πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι ἐτεροι, and the sentence gains in neatness. And even if we take τοῦτοι not as masc. (with Thurot), but as neut. (cp. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοι, 1261 b 32: 3. 14. 1285 b 10: 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 13, and often elsewhere), and make πρὸς τοῦτοι mean 'besides' or 'again,' the change of
έτερον into ἐτέρος or ἔτερος is attractive. But all the MSS. are against it, and perhaps the point which Aristotle is pressing is not so much the number of persons related to one man as the number of appellatives indicating definite relationship in ordinary use under the actual system. 'Ετέρον, if we retain it, will be added, because the person hitherto spoken of would not be called φράτωρ or φιλέτης by his relatives. It is not quite clear whether πρῶτοι τούτοις should be translated 'in addition to these appellatives,' or simply 'again.' It is to be noticed that Aristotle in defending the family defends also not only the more distant degrees of relationship, but the phratric and tribal relations, which in modern societies do not exist. Cp. 2. 5. 1264 a 8, and the mention of phratries in 3. 9. 1280 b 37.

φράτωρ φιλέτης. For the omission of ἡ, see critical note on 1260 a 26.

14 sqq. Women had the credit in Greece of being especially quick in noticing resemblances between parents and children (Athen. Deipn. 5. 190 e). Athenaeus makes the remark in commenting on Helen's recognition (Odys. 4. 141 sqq.) of Telemachus' likeness to his father, and this passage of the Odyssey may well be present to Aristotle's memory here.

16. κατὰ γὰρ τὰς ὁμοιότητας. Cp. κατὰ τὰς ὁμοιότητας, 21. Διεμ-βάνειν τὰς πίστεις is more usually followed by ἐκ or διὰ, but these resemblances are referred to here rather as the standard by which conclusions as to parentage are arrived at, than as the source from which they are drawn. Compare the use of κατὰ in 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 15, δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἀκόλουθων δεῖσει καὶ τὴν παιδείαν κατὰ τὴν διάφερους ταύτην.

18. καί, 'in fact.' Not only is it likely to happen, but it does happen. Cp. de Gen. An. 1. 20. 729 a 31, ὅπερ καὶ φαίνεται συμβαίνων.

19. τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους. Aristotle dwells in Rhet. 1. 4. 1360 a 33 sq. on the utility of these works in discussions about legislation, and here we have an instance of it. Hdt. 4. 180 is probably Aristotle's authority in this passage, though the Auseans, of whom Herodotus is here speaking, are said by him to be παραβαλλόστην (c. 181: see Camerarius, p. 79). Aristotle refers to Herodotus less respectfully in de Gen. An. 3. 5. 756 b 6 ('Ἡρόδωτος ὁ μυθολόγος), and in Hist. An. 6. 31. 579 b 2. Meltzer (Geschichte der Karthager 1. 69) holds that the Libyans were as a rule monogamists, and that the customs here and elsewhere (4. 172, 176) ascribed to Libyan races by Herodotus were exceptional among them.

21. εἰς δὲ τινς κ.τ.λ. Vet. Int. 'sunt autem quaedam etiam
femellae etiam aliorum animalium’; thus he takes γυναίκες here as = ‘females,’ as do Laminus and many other translators and commentators after him, including Susemihl (also Liddell and Scott, s.v.). Sepulveda however translates, ‘sunt autem mulieres quaedam et in alis animantium generibus foeminae,’ and Bernays, ‘wirklich giebt es Frauen und auch Thierweibchen.’ Γυναίκες is not often used by Aristotle in the sense of ‘females,’ and I incline to follow the rendering of Sepulveda and Bernays, especially as the word seems to bear its ordinary meaning in the very similar passage from the History of Animals quoted in the next note.


’‘Ἀγρῶν ἐνεπέδεστερν γεωργείων οὐδένα οἷμα φέρει γὰρ ὅσα θείαι ἀνθή καλὰ, καττών, δάφην’ κριθάς β’ ἐὰν σπέρμα, πάνυ δίκαιος δὲν ἀπέδωκάν σεαν ἀν καταβάλω. In the land of the just (Hesiod, Opera et Dies, 225–237), as Mr. Evelyn Abbott has pointed out to me, 

Τίκτουσιν... γυναίκες ἐκόκτονα τέκνα τοκεύσι.

Mr. Bywater adds a reference to Hor. Od. 4. 5. 23:

Laudantur simili prole puerperae.


27. τοὺς δὲ ἐκουσίους. Cep. ὀλευόταις τοὺς δὲ ἐποποίοις δυσμάζουσιν, Poet. 1. 1447 b 14, and see Vahlen on this passage (Poet. p. 91), who collects other instances. See also Shilleto on Demosth. de Falsa Legatione c. 200. Aristotle refers to involuntary homicides, and then it occurs to him to add—‘and voluntary ones.’ Plato hoped to prevent outrages of the kind referred to here by his regulations as to relationship (Rep. 461 D: cp. 465 A–B); he holds that younger men in his State will not do violence to seniors, because they will regard them as their fathers. But Aristotle does not think that they will be restrained by consider-
ation for a fatherhood which he accounts unreal, and if they are not, then their violence may chance to fall on their real father or other near relative, and thus they may unwittingly sin against the divine ordinances.

28. ἵσσαι. ‘Herodotus often uses the epithets οὖχ ἵσσαι and ἄνόσος of violations of duty to near relatives, e.g. in 3. 19: 3. 65: 4. 154’ (L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen, i. 400). Aristotle does not neglect in the Politics considerations of τὸ ἱσσαν: cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 25. He writes as a Hellene animated by the religious feelings of his race and time. In his view, ignorance and absence of intention would not remove the lamentableness or even perhaps the guilt of these crimes. Nor would it excuse the absence of λύσεις. So Plato (Laws 865 A–866 B) enforces on the involuntary homicide not only purification but a temporary exile. His procedure in cases of homicide is largely copied from the Attic (Grote, Plato 3. 404–5). See as to the Attic Law on the subject Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 368 sq. In the Hercules Furens Euripides, the hero, though his murder of his wife and children has been committed in the unconsciousness of raving madness, still veils his face before Theseus in order to save him the pollution inseparable from the sight of even an involuntary homicide (1050 sqq.). See also Prof. Jebb’s note on Soph. O. T. 1415. It appears from the Liber Poenitentialis of Theodore, 3. 14 (Thorpe, Ancient Laws of England, 2. 5, cp. Capitula et Fragmenta Theodori, ibid. 2. 74) and from that of Egbert, 2. 1 (Thorpe 2. 183), that even justifiable or unwilling homicide was regarded by the Church as needing to be expiated by penance. So again, under the laws of King Alfred, ‘even in the case of unintentional homicide, it was prima facie lawful and even proper to slay the slayer’ (Sir J. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law in England, 3. 24). Plato, however, set little store by λύσεις (Rep. 364 E), so far as ἀδικήματα are concerned; those to which Aristotle here refers, therefore, would in his view only avail in the case of an ἄκοινον διάρτημα (Laws 860 sqq.). Indeed, if Bernays is right (Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 106), the Peripatetics thought little of expiatory sacrifice, so that Aristotle may here be speaking somewhat exoterically.

30. καὶ does not mean ‘both’ probably, but emphasizes πλείον.

31. τῶν μὲν γνωριζόντων, gen. after λύσεις.


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40. τοῖς γεωργοῖς is in the dative not after χρήσιμον, but after κοινῶς, unless indeed we should compare the use of the dative in c. 7. 1267 a 37, τὸ τῶν σύνασ εἶλαί ὦς τῶν πολίταις.

1262 b. 2. τοιούτους, i.e. ἢττον φίλους: cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 26 sqq.

3. ἕλως δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle has been making a number of objections to this or that feature of the proposed law, and the last of them (ἦττον ἐστιν φίλω, 1) leads up now to a broad impeachment of the law as a whole. ‘Broadly, the law is a bad one; it brings about results the very opposite of those which a law should bring about.’ Compare the transition in Metaph. M. 2. 1077 a 14. For the thought that affection is the end of πολιτεία, cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 1. 1234 b 22.

5. καὶ δὲ ἐὰν αἰτίαν, ‘and of that on account of which.’


τὲ γὰρ is here duly followed by καὶ.

11. ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις. Cp. Plato, Symp. 191 A: 192 D sq.: ‘in the discourses on the subject of love’ contained in the Symposium of Plato. It is not necessary to suppose that Aristotle means to designate the dialogue by this as a second title. See Sus.?, Note 148.

12. For this construction with λέγεω, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 20: Polyb. 6. 46. 9.


14. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. In this case τὸ σφάδρα φιλεῖν is present and the persons are only two in number (contrast μικρὸν γλυκὰν ἐῖς πολὺ ὄντωρ μικρὸν): here therefore a close unity results which involves the absorption and disappearance of the two persons or one of them (cp. μὰ ψυχῆ, Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 7). The case is, in fact, that of a σύμφωνος: cp. συμφώναι 13 (Plato, Symp. 191 A, had already used the word συμφωνεῖ), and Phys. 4. 5. 213 a 9, σύμφωνος δὲ, ὅταν ἀμφοὶ ἐνεργεῖσα ἐν γένεσίσατι. But the measure which Plato is for applying to the State will not produce τὸ σφάδρα φιλεῖν, but only a weak and watery kind of affection, and this watery sentiment will be spread over a whole State. For both these reasons no σύμφωνος will result. Plato’s idea was not entirely novel (cp. Hdt. 4. 104), and it survived him, not only in the πολιτεία of Zeno of Citium (cp. Diog. Laert. 7. 131, and Athen. Deipn. 561 c quoted by Henkel, Studien p. 27), but far later (see Plutarch’s account of the proposition of Hor-
The use of ένθεος, Pass. 156. 7, is that which belongs to oneself, exclusively of all others: ένθεος, 'cum quidem est', 'sed quae significat, Cariss.-cum', TovTav, solantur, in quom spem subitum gaudentem collocatum habeant, which must be connected with ένθεος, not with ένθεος, as δακτυλικος, and J. E. Gr. § 70. 14, to give it absolute interpretation. Also, the particle, as in 'cum quidem est', 'et quae significat, Cariss.-cum', is certainly simpler, is also perhaps Susemihl's interpretation, which is certainly simpler, is also more likely to be correct. For the acc. absol. with the participle, and its compounds, see Dr. Holden's note on Xen. Oecon. 152. 17, 1. 11, 14, 17, 32, who compares Metaph. 5. 170. 134, 'et quam omnes', 'et quae significat, Cariss.-cum', 'et quae significat, Cariss.-cum', as an acc. absolute, or, as TovTav, 'cum quidem est', 'et quae significat, Cariss.-cum', but if interpreted by Susemihl, 'cum quidem est', 'et quae significat, Cariss.-cum', as an acc. absolute, or, as TovTav, 'cum quidem est', 'et quae significat, Cariss.-cum', the question will arise, whether the genitives in 'et quae significat, Cariss.-cum', will then go together (cp. old Kell's interpretation of 'et quae significat, Cariss.-cum', as an acc. absolute, or, as TovTav, 'cum quidem est', 'et quae significat, Cariss.-cum', but if interpreted by Susemihl, 'cum quidem est', 'et quae significat, Cariss.-cum', as an acc. absolute, or, as TovTav, 'cum quidem est', 'et quae significat, Cariss.-cum').
hint that persons incorporated with one class and conscious of being related to the members of another will find themselves in an equivocal position, being neither quite the one thing nor the other.

29. παλαι, above in 1262 a 24 sqq.: so τὸν παλαι λόγον in 3. 11. 1282 a 15 refers to 1281 a 39–b 21.

33. If with Vet. Int. M⁰ and pr. P¹ we read φυλαξί τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας in place of φυλαξιν ἀς τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας, which the sense seems to oblige us to do, we must translate ὁ παρὰ τοῖς φυλαξιν 'those placed among the guardians' (placed among them, but not born among them).

34. δοστε κ.τ.λ. is connected, not with the whole of the preceding clause, but with the word προσαγορεύοντι in it.


40. τούτο ἐν τῇ κ.τ.λ. Τούτο clearly refers to πότερον κοινήν ἢ μή κοινήν εἶναι τὴν κτήσιν, but in explaining it (λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ.) Aristotle does not, as we expect, repeat these words; he substitutes a slightly different topic of inquiry, i.e. whether both property and use ought to be common. He wisely decides to treat the question of community of property apart from that of community in women and children: experience has confirmed his view that the two questions are separable. His feeling appears to be—(1) that a decision in favour of severity as respects women and children does not necessitate a similar decision as to property; (2) that alternatives present themselves for consideration in reference to property which had not presented themselves in reference to women and children. For instance, the ownership of property may be several and its use common, or the ownership common and the use several, or both ownership and use may be common. He thus prepares the way for his own solution, which is, if we take into account the conclusions of the Fourth Book, that while part of the land is to be κοινή and to be set apart for the supply of the common meals and for the service of the gods, other property is to be owned in severity and yet made common in use.

41. λέγω δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and I mean that as to what relates to property (one may inquire) whether,' etc. Susemihl brackets τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν (see his remarks, Qu. Crit. p. 365), and these words may certainly be a marginal note which has crept into the text (see critical note on 1272 a 28 for an instance of this), but the expression λέγω δὲ, which, as Sus. allows, often introduces matter of a somewhat superfluous kind (see Vahlen on Poet. 13. 1453 a 4),
here perhaps applies to the whole of the succeeding sentence, and not to τὰ περὶ τὴν κτήσιν exclusively.

1. ἐκεῖνα, i.e. τὰ τέκνα καὶ οἱ γυναῖκες. For the gender, cp. αὐτὰ, 1263 a. c. 5. 1264 a 7.

2. πᾶσι 'commode opponitur iis quae sequuntur, ὅπερ ἐνα πολικτὸν τῶν ἐθνῶν, et λέγονται δὲ τινες καὶ τοιούτῳ τῶν πρῶτον κυνωνεῖν τῶν βαρβάρων' (Busse, De praesidii Aristotelis Politica emendandi, p. 23).

Yet the Libyans referred to in 1262 a 19 sq. had women in common (for other instances, see below on 1266 a 34). Πᾶσι, however, probably goes with ἐκεῖν, and not with what follows, as Sus. thinks.

3. The words τὰς τοῦτον κτήσεις . . . χρήσεις imply that there is a doubt whether κτήσις and χρήσις need be treated in the same way, and ὅδιν takes up this unexpressed doubt and instances a way (not the only one, nor indeed Aristotle's own) in which κτήσις may be made several and χρήσις common. We might have expected that καὶ τὰ γῆπεδα καὶ τῶν καρπῶν κοινῶς, 8, would have been the first alternative introduced by ὅδιν, but while it suits better the expressed thought of τὰς τοῦτον κτήσεις—χρήσεις, the hint contained in these words that it is better to make a distinction between κτήσις and χρήσις would not have been taken up. Spengel's proposed insertion of τὰς κτήσεις ἡ τὰς χρήσεις ἡ (ἢ τὰς χρήσεις ἢ τὰς κτήσεις ἢ) before τὰς τοῦτον κτήσεις seems to me unnecessary.


5. τῶν ἐθνῶν, Vict. 'intelligit autem barbaras nationes': this appears from καὶ τοῦτον τῶν τρόπον, 7. For τὰ ἐθνη in this sense, cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 19: 6 (8). 2. 1324 b 10. Diodorus (5. 34. 3) says of the Vaccaei of Spain—οὗτοι καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἐτος διαιρούμενοι τὴν χώραν γεωργοῦσιν, καὶ τοῦς καρποὺς κοινωνοῦμεν μεταβάδισαν ἐκάστῳ τὸ μέρος, καὶ τοῖς νοσθαμαμένοις τὴ γεωργία τῆς ἄπαντον τὸ πρόστιμον τεθείσας. Aristotle, however, will hardly have been acquainted with the Vaccaei. He may possibly have the Itali in his mind (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 5 sqq.), and other races practising the custom of common meals (cp. 1263 b 40, ὅπερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Δακεδαίμονι καὶ Κρήτῃ τοῖς συναστίασι ὁ νομοθέτης ἐκοίνωσεν). Κοινῆ ἀναλίσκεια is used in Rep. 464 C of Plato's guardians, who, we know, had common meals (Rep. 458 C). Cp. also Diod. 5. 9. 4, τὰς οὐσίας κοινὰς ποιησάμενοι καὶ ἑαυτεσ κατὰ συναστία, and Strabo, p. 701 sub fin. Aristotle instances only barbarians; we find, however, an approach
to the system he describes in Crete, where the men, women, and children received their maintenance from the State (ἀρστ′ ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεισθαι πάντας, 2. 10. 1272 a 20). ‘Les Syssties existent de nos jours dans les communes kabyles sous le nom de Thimecheret’ (Jannet, Les institutions sociales à Sparte, who refers to Hanoteau et Letourneux, La Kabylie 2. 82 sqq.).

ἡ τοιναύτιον κ.τ.λ. For γεωργεῖν κοινῇ, cp. Plato, Laws 739 E, νειμάσθων μὲν δὴ πρῶτον γῆν τε καὶ οἰκίας, καὶ μὴ κοινῇ γεωργοῦντων. In this scheme the land would be common and cultivation common—i.e. the cultivators would act under the control of some central authority, and their labour would not be confined to a particular piece of land, but applicable promiscuously to the whole cultivable area belonging to the community. This system is hardly less unlike than the preceding one to that of the Teutonic village-community (see for a description of it Sir H. Maine’s work on Village Communities, p. 79 sq.). ‘In some Russian communes the meadow portion of the communal land is mown by all the peasants in common, and the hay afterwards distributed by lot among the families’ (Wallace, Russia i. 208). No mention is made by Aristotle of any barbarian races which treated both land and produce as common, but the partly Greek population of the Liparaean islands appears to have done so for a time; see the remarkable passage of Diodorus (5. 9. 4 sq.) referred to in the last note.

8. ἔτέρων, ‘others than the citizens,’ not, I incline to think, ‘others than the owners,’ though the two meanings do not lie far apart. Aristotle is considering the question in the interest of οἱ μέλλωνες πολιτεύοντες τὴν ἀριστήν πολιτείαν (1262 b 38). For the contrast between ἔτερων ὅτων τῶν γεωργοῦντων and αὐτῶν αὐτοῖς διασποράντων, cp. c. 8. 1268 a 36 sqq. If those who till the soil are not citizens but a separate and subordinate class, like the Helots or the tillers of the soil in Aristotle’s own ideal community (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.), disagreements would be less likely to result from the citizens holding property in common, for, as the citizens would not work themselves, individual citizens would not be in a position to compare their own hard work and small recompense with the easy work and large recompense of others, and thus one main source of disagreement among the citizens would be removed. If this observation is intended as a criticism of Plato’s arrangements in the Republic, it seems to miss its mark, for the guardians cannot be said αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς διασπορᾶν, and though the γεωργοὶ are made citizens by Plato, they are not intended to hold property in
common. It is true, however, that in Laws 739 E Plato uses the expression κοινὴ γεωργεῖν in reference to the Republic.

9. ἀλλὸς ἂν εἰς τρόπος καὶ μᾶζι. Vict. 'alia erit ratio et minus molestiae in se continebit.' Κοινωνίας should probably be supplied with τρόπος (cp. 7), or else τῶν περὶ τὰς κτήσεις (cp. 10).

10. αὐτῶν, i. e. τῶν πολιτῶν—not, as it seems to me, τῶν γεωργών· though this interpretation has the high authority of Bonitz (Ind. 187 a 57) in its favour.

τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις, not (as Lamb.) acc. after διαπονοῦντων, but nom. to παρέχοι.


12. [ἡ λαμβάνοντας]. See critical note. Congreve omits ἡ λαμ-

βάνοντας πολλά· Sus. brackets ἡ λαμβάνοντας.

15. δὲ ἄλλοι, 'but indeed we may say broadly that,' etc. Apart from all intensifying circumstances, living together and sharing in everything is in itself enough to give rise to troubles.

καὶ introduces a limitation and explanation of τὸ συζήν: see Bon. Ind. 357 b 13 sqq., and cp. c. 2. 1261 a 17, προϊόντα καὶ γυναικὴ μία μᾶλλον. The article is omitted before κοινωνίᾳ, as it is omitted before βοηθήσαι in 1263 b 5, τὸ χαρισμαθεῖν καὶ βοηθήσαι (cp. also 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 13 sq., 15 sq.: 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 40—b 18).

τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων. Bonitz (Ind. 57 b 43) gives a reference to Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1112 a 28, ἄλλ' οὖν ἄλλ' περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων (βουλεύονται).

16. τῶν τοιούτων, 'the things of which we have spoken,' i.e. property, which, it is evident from what follows, is classed by Aristotle with ἐγκύκλια, cp. 18, τῶν ἐν ποσὶ ... μικρῶν, and 21, ἐγκυκλίων. So in c. 7. 1266 a 36 sq. τὸ περὶ τὰς οὕσιν explains ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαῖος. Aristotle appears to think that quarrels are more likely to arise over questions relating to ἀναγκαῖα and τὰ καθ' ἴνα ἄρα than over greater matters.

17. τῶν συναποδήμων. Fellow-travellers are perhaps conceived here, as Bernays implies by his translation, to be sharers in a common purse, but this is not quite certain, for the next illustration is taken from a master and his servants, who would not have a common purse. It is enough to cause quarrels, if men κοινωνοῦσι τῶν ἐγκυκλίων.

18. διαφέρομενοι, not διαφέρονται. Sus.1 (Ind. Gramm. s. v. Part.

icipium) compares 1. 5. 1254 b 23. Cp. also 4 (7). 14. 1333 a 18, and see note on 1259 b 11. The participle expresses a habitual fixed characteristic, and means rather more than the indicative.

ἐκ τῶν ἐν ποσὶ ... ἄλληλοι explains how their differences arise.
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20. προσχρόνεθα seems here to be used in a sense (‘utor in aliquam rem’: see Ast, Lex. Platon. 3. p. 213) more common in Plato than in Aristotle.

τὸς διακοινὰς τὰς ἐγκυκλίους. Cp. c. 3. 1261 b 36, ἐν τοῖς ὀκενικαῖς διακοινίας, and Plato, Theaet. 175 E, ἐν ἀνεμέσην εὐήθει δακεῖν καὶ οὐδὲν εἶναι, ὡστε εἰς δουλικά ἐμπέσῃ διακοινίσμα, αὐτον στρατατοδεσμον μὴ επιστάμενον συνεκεννάσσοντα μηδὲ ὑπὸν ἦδυναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους.

22. For ὅν δὲ νῦν τρόπον κ.τ.λ. as the subject of διενέγκα, cp. c. 2. 1261 a 13. But why is ἐπικοσμηθὲν neut.? Does it agree with some neut. latent in ὅν...ἐχει, perhaps τὸ μὴ κανέας εἶναι τὰς κτήσεις?

23. καὶ before ἐπικοσμηθὲν (add. Π2) implies that severity of property is not enough without ἡθη κ.τ.λ. The use of καὶ is somewhat similar in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 22, πέμπτου τὸ περὶ τῶν ἔθειν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ ἐχόντων μέγεθος. We have in 1263 b 39 τὸς ἐθεσὶ καὶ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις, and Π1 read ἔθεσι here, but ἠθεσὶ (Π2) is in all probability the correct reading—cp. Plato, Laws 751 C, ἐπειτα αὖ τοὺς μᾶλλοντας αἰρήσασθαι τεθράφασθαι τε ἐν ἠθεσὶ νόμοιν εἴ πεπαιδευμένους πρὸς τὸ κ.τ.λ.: Rep. 557 C, πᾶσιν ἠθεσὶ πεποικιλήσθην πολιτεία: Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 302, τῶν δικαιοτούς ἠθεσὶ χρωμένων.

24. ἐξεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This implies that there is good in community of property. What this is, is not distinctly stated, but Aristotle probably means that it ensures every one having what he needs. See 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 2 sqq.

26. πῶς, i.e. κατὰ τὴν χρήσιν.

ιδως, ‘broadly, on the whole.’

27. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ‘For when every one has a separate province, one main source of disputes will be removed, and work will prosper all the more, because each man will feel that he is applying himself to business of his own.’ Γὰρ explains and justifies the preceding sentence. Τὰ ἐγκυκλιά, i.e. those mentioned in 12. Αἱ ἐπιμέλειαι appears to be nom. to ἐπιδίωκοσιν (Bon. Ind. 271 a 43). Cp. Soph. El. 33. 183 b 19 sqq., Xen. Hiero 9, 7, ἡ γεωργία αὐτὴ ἄν πολὺ ἐπίδοιχ, and Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 38, καὶ βελτίων ἐκαστὸν ἔργον τυγχάνει τῇ ἐπιμελείᾳ μονοπραγματούσῃ ἢ πολυπραγματούσῃ.

29. δι' ἄρετῆν is here emphatic (cp. δι' ἄρετῆς, 5 (8). 2. 1337 b 19, where the antithesis is δι' ἄλλους, which is not far removed in meaning from δι' ἄνγχης, 1263 b 10, ἔργον γὰρ καλὸν ἀλλοτριάς οὕσεως ἀπέχεσθαι διὰ σωφροσύνης, and 22, ὥστε δὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκοινωνίαν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν μαχητικήν): δὲ answers to μὲν 27. ‘And on the other hand it will be owing to virtue, that according to the proverb,
“friends’ goods” will be “common goods.”’ Virtue will be called forth for the accomplishment of this result, and this will be a gain. Pythagoras was, it would seem, the original author of the saying (Diog. Laer. 8. 10), but Zeller doubts whether he meant it as an injunction to practise communism (Gr. Ph. i. 291. 3). The addition here of πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι (cp. ἐπὶ τὴν χρῆσιν, 8 (6), 5. 1320 b 10) perhaps looks as if Aristotle so understood it. Epicurus certainly did so: cp. Diog. Laert. 10. 11, τῶν τε Ἐπίκουρου μὴ δέξων εἰς τὸ κοινὸν καταγίδεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας, καθάπερ τὸν Πυθαγόραν κοινὰ τὰ φίλων λέγοντα: ἀπιστοῦντων γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἶ δ’ ἀπίστων, οὐδὲ φίλων.

31. εἰναὶς πόλεων. Tarentum (8 (6), 5. 1320 b 9 sqq.): Carthage (8 (6), 5. 1320 b 4 sqq.): the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States (1263 b 40 sq.): Rhodes (Strabo, p. 652). Compare also Isocrates’ picture of the earlier Athens (Areopag. § 35). For the appeal here made to the practice of existing States, cp. Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 a 18, εἰ περὶ πάσας ἡν τὰς κρίσεις καθάπερ εἰναὶς τε τῶν πόλεων καὶ μᾶλστα τὰς εὐνομομένας, οὐδέν ἁν εἰχον δ’ τι λέγοισιν.

ὑπογεγραμμένον. For the meaning of this word, cp. de Gen. An. 2. 6. 743 b 20—25, esp. οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὗ-τος ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρῶμασι τὸ ζῷον: it explains τίπορ διορίζειν in de An. 2. 1. 413 a 10. The fact that the institution of property assumes here and there in outline the form which Aristotle wishes it to assume is taken as an indication that this form is not impracticable.


χρῆσι τοιοῦτος. For the absence of ὡς, cp. 36, Ἰδίοις: c. 3. 1261 b 24, οἱ κοινῶς χρῆσιν ταῖς γνωσίς: Isocr. Paneg. § 181 (quoted in Aristot. Rhet. 3. 1411 a 14). Plutarch, speaking of brothers (De Fraterno Amore, c. 1), uses the expression, καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι κοινῶς τοῖς πατρίδοις χρῆσιν καὶ φίλως καὶ δόησι: cp. ibid. c. 11, χρῆσιν δὲ καὶ κτῆσιν ἐν μέσῳ κείσθαι κοινὴν καὶ ἀνεμένην ἀπαντῶν.

35. ἐν Λακεδαίμονι. See Xen. de Rep. Lac. 6 as to this Lacedaemonian practice. As to slaves, Xenophon there says, ἐποίησε δὲ (ὁ Δυκαύργος) καὶ οἰκέταις, εἰ τις δειθείη, χρῆσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, and he adds the same thing of dogs and horses. The expression ἐν Λακεδαίμονι frequently recurs in the Politics (see Bon. Ind. 421 b 7 sqq.). Λακεδαίμονι is used by Xenophon (Sturz, Lexic. Xenophont. s. v.) and other writers to designate both the city of Sparta
and Laconia. Aristotle perhaps uses *en Δακεδαίμον* here as he uses *en Ἀθήναι* in 2. 8. 1268 a 10, ἕστι δὲ καὶ *en Ἀθήναις οὖσος ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ en ἐπίρας τῶν πάλεων*, where the name of the city seems to stand for the State. He does not seem to intend to contrast *en Δακεδαίμον* with *en τοῖς ἄγροις κατὰ τὴν χώραν*, or to suggest that it was only in the city that men placed their slaves, horses, and dogs at each other’s service. Nothing of the kind is said by Xenophon in the passage of the de Rep. Lac. (6. 3 sq.) which Aristotle seems to have before him here.

36. κἂν δεηθῶσιν ἐφοδίων, i.e. καὶ ἐφοδίωσι, ἃν δεηθῶσι (cp. Xen. Rep. Lac. 6. 4, ὅπω γὰρ ἄν ὑπὸ θήρας ὀψισθέντες δεηθῶσι τῶν ἐπιτη- δείων). The word ἐφοδίως is caught into the construction of the conditional clause and must be supplied from it: cp. χρημάτων, i. 3. 1256 b 29.

37. *ἐν τοῖς ἄγροις κατὰ τὴν χώραν*. This seems at first sight tautological, and many emendations have been suggested: see Susemihl’s critical note (Sus.², vol. i. p. 170). Both Busse (Sus.⁵) and Mr. Welldon suggest, ingeniously enough, the substitution of *ἐν τοῖς ἀγρασ* for *ἐν τοῖς ἄγροις*—a change which agrees well with the passage of Xenophon de Rep. Lac. part of which has been quoted in the last note, for Xenophon makes no mention of *ἀγρασ* and does use the words ὑπὸ θήρας ὀψισθέντες. The passage concludes—

τακτοροῦν οὖσος μεταδέδων τὸν ἄλλον καὶ αἱ τὰ μικρὰ ἔχοντες μετέχουσι πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ, ἀπότας τινὸς δεηθῶσιν. But we find *ἐν ἄγρῳ* in the very similar passage, [Plutarch] Inst. Lac. c. 23, and the meaning of *ἐν τοῖς ἄγροις κατὰ τὴν χώραν* may not improbably be ‘in the farms throughout the territory.’ Sturz (Lexicon Xenophon. s. v. ἄγρος) collects many passages of Xenophon in which ἄγρος = ‘praedia.’ The word may possibly bear this meaning in Pol. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 19, ἐπὶ τῶν ἄγρων ἀικεῖν τῶν ἄριστων ἄγρων ἀναπό τοῖς ἀγρασ. In Plato, Laws 881 C, however, we have *καὶ ἄγροις τῆς χώρας παῖν*, so that there is nothing strange in the conjunction of the two words. The *χώρα*, or district attached to the city, included villages or even towns, as well as woods, fields, and the like (cp. Xen. Hiero 9. 7, καὶ ἄγροις ἢ κατὰ κόμας).

38. For the change of subject from ἐναὶ to τοιείν, see note on 1263 a 3. As to the thought, Plato himself had said, Laws 740 Α (while giving up community of property as impracticable in the absence of a complete reform of marriage, rearing, and education) —*νεμόσθων δ’ οὖν τοιείδε διανοεῖν ποι, ὥς ἄρα δει τῶν λαχῶντα τὴν λήξιν ταύτην νομίζειν μὲν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῆς πάλεως ἐξαισθάνης κ.τ.λ.* But the expression used by Aristotle appears to be derived from Isocrates
(Areopag. § 35)—κεφαλαίων δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀλλήλως ὁμοίως αἱ μὲν γὰρ κτίσεις ἀφοφαλεῖς ἤσαν, οἷστερ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιων ὑπήρξον, αἱ δὲ χρήσεις κοινὰ πάντα τοὺς δεομένους τῶν πολιτῶν. Cp. also Xen. Mem. 2. 6. 23, τῶν δὲ φθόνων παντάπασιν ἀφαιροῦσιν (οἱ καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ), τὰ μὲν εὐαυτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχουσε, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων εὐαυτῶν νομίζουσε.

39. τοιοῦτοι, sc. ὅστε τῇ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινὰς τὰς κτίσεις. For the thought, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 31 sqq.

40. καὶ πρός ἠδονήν, as well as in relation to virtue, cp. 29. But how does the fact of a reasonable degree of self-love is natural prove that to regard something as one's own adds greatly to human pleasure? Perhaps the link is supplied by Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 3, ἀνύγηκε οὖν ἢδω εἵνε τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἱέσαι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, where we learn that pleasure arises from the satisfaction of nature, and Pol. 5 (8). 7. 1342 a 25, ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἠδονήν ἑκάστου τὸ κατὰ φύσιν οἰκεῖον (cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 3, ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μούσική τὴν ἠδονήν φυσικήν, διὸ πᾶσαι ἡλικίας καὶ πάσων ἤθεν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς εστὶ προσφιλής). If so, the complete argument will be 'for the satisfaction of a natural craving brings pleasure, and is not self-love in moderation natural'? Compare also Rhet. 1. 11. 1371 b 18 sqq., and Hist. An. 8. 1. 589 a 8, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἢδω διώκει δὲ πάντα τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἠδονήν. Or should we complete the ellipse thus—'for there is not a purpose, namely pleasure, for which we are so constituted as to feel love for ourselves, and is not this an indication of nature'? Or again—'yes, and natural pleasure too, for is not self-love implanted in us for a purpose and natural'? The first of these ways of completing the ellipse is probably the correct one.

41. νομίζειν ὧδιόν τε, 'to regard a thing as one's own,' for νομίζειν will hardly be used here in the sense which it bears in 3. 1. 1275 b 7, οὖδ' ἐκελησίαν νομίζουσιν ἄλλα συγκλήσουσ.

μὴ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. See on this use of μή, Bon. Ind. 464 b 43 sqq. ('dubitater et modestius affirmantis est'). Eucken (de Partic. Usu p. 57) would read ἐχει for ἔχει in b 1, because Aristotle sometimes uses the subjunctive in this construction (e.g. in 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 9, where all the MSS. have the subjunctive: Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 36 : 10. 10. 1179 b 24), and 'in eodem libro ad eandem sententiam significandam modo coniunctivum, modo indicativum adhibuisse minime verisimile sit.' But the indicative is found under similar circumstances (without various reading) in Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 a 34 and 10. 2. 1173 a 23, and Bekker, whom Susemihl follows, is probably right in retaining this variation of mood.

2. τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ. The connexion just established between affec. 1263 b.
tion for oneself and Nature reminds Aristotle of a fact which seems to conflict with it, that *φιλανθρία* is blamed and justly so, and he proceeds to explain that the epithet *φιλανθρός* is applied to those who are fonder of themselves than they should be. Herein he follows Plato, Laws 731 E sqq. (cp. 732 B, διὸ πάντα ἀνθρωπον χρῆ φιλεῖν τὸ σφάδρα φιλεῖν αὐτῶν), and he repeats the same view in Eth. Nic. 4. 10. 1125 b 16 (cp. 3. 13. 1118 b 22 sqq.: 2. 7. 1107 b 28 sqq.: 4. 10. 1125 b 9 sqq.). In Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 15—23 and 1169 a 20 sq. the unfavourable use of the word is connected rather with the preference of money, honour, and τὰ περιμάχητα ἄγαθα generally to τὸ καλὸν: so too in Magn. Mor. 2. 13. 1212 b 2—6. Affection for oneself is implied in Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 12 to be to a certain extent a preservative against ἀκρασία, though not a complete preservative like virtue.

3. If here we read, with all the MSS. except P¹, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήσταν, we must explain ‘as it is for this that we blame the money-lover,’ *ψέγουν* being supplied from *ψέγουσι* 2. To read τὸ for τῶν undoubtedly makes the sentence far less rugged: its meaning will then be—‘as to be a money-lover is to be fonder of money than one ought to be.’ Cp. Plato, Rep. 347 B, ἢ οὐκ οὕστα, ὦτι τὸ φιλότιμόν τε καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι δυνεῖ δέντα τε καὶ ἔστω;

4. ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ., ‘and it cannot be intended to blame men for loving what all love’ seems to be here suppressed. Cp. δὶ πᾶσι δοκεῖ τοῦτῳ εἶναι φαμεν, Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 36, and Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 3.

6. For the absence of the article before *βοηθησοί* see above on 1263 a 15.

7. τοῦτα, if we read οὗ συμβαίνει, appears to refer to τὸ νομίζειν ἵδιν τι καὶ τὸ χαρίσωσθαι καὶ βοηθήσου φίλους—‘these things do not come to pass for those who,’ etc.: cp. 2. 9. 1269 b 39 sqq., and Xen. Mem. 1. 2. 11, καὶ φονεῶν δὲ τοις τοιούτοις ἤκειστα συμβαίνει.

καὶ δικαιοσύνης. It would seem from Eth. Nic. 10. 8. 1178 a 21—b 1 that both προαίρεσις and πράξεις are necessary to perfect virtue. But the passage before us does not raise this subtle question; it appears to imply (cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 19. 1190 b 1 sqq.: Eth. Eud. 2. 1. 1219 b 11: 2. 11. 1228 a 16), that men may be virtuous without being able to evidence their virtue.

9. φανερῶς, ‘undisguisedly’ or ‘visibly and unmistakably’? Probably the latter (cp. φανερῶς, c. 7. 1266 b 20).

tὸ περὶ τὰς γυναικὰς, sc. ἔργον, which comes to the surface in the parenthesis.

10. καλὸν, and therefore a work of virtue (cp. 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 28.)

ἀλλοτρίας is emphatic: no woman, it is implied, would be another’s in the State described in the Republic.

11. ἐστιν. For the suppression of the subject, cp. de Part. An. 1. 3. 643 b 17: Metaph. Z. 12. 1038 a 13.

13. ἐν τῇ γὰρ. For the place of γὰρ (ἐν γὰρ τῇ, Ald.), cp. διὰ τὸ ἀντὶ περάνες γὰρ, de Part. An. 2. 6. 652 a 18: ἐν ταῖς δεξιαῖς γὰρ, de Part. An. 3. 9. 671 b 35. As to the thought here expressed, cp. Eth. Nic. 4. 2. 1120 b 27 sqq., where we find that ἀλευθερώτης has to do both with δόσεις and λήψις, though more with the former than with the latter (4. 1. 1119 b 25).

15. μέν here seems to have no δὲ to answer to it, because the structure of the sentence is altered at δὲ, 22. If the sentence had been more regularly constructed, it would apparently have run—‘hence, while legislation of the kind proposed wears a plausible look, it will in reality fail to remove the evils which it is designed to remove, it will involve the loss of many goods, and it will require men to live a life which cannot be lived by man.’

ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία. Cp. c. 4. 1262 b 20, ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῇ τοιαύτῃ, and c. 5. 1264 a 6, τῷ τοιαύτῳ τῶν πολιτειῶν.

16. ὃ γὰρ ἀκροωμένος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle is probably thinking here of communism in relation to property: cp. τὴν αὐλὰν, 20. Yet Ephorus seems, if we may judge by his eulogistic remarks on some Scythian races which had women children and property in common, to have been, in their case at all events, well pleased with the institution (Strabo, p. 302), to say nothing of Cynics and half-Cynics, like Diogenes of Sinope and Zeno of Citium (Diog. Laert. 6. 72: 7. 33, 131). Plato had not been sanguine of support (Rep. 450).


21. περὶ συμβολαίων. Compare Strabo p. 702, quoted below on 1267 b 37. These suits would be brought within narrow limits in the State of the Laws (742 C: cp. Rep. 556 A); there were indeed some actual States in which they were not permitted (Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1164 b 13 sqq.). Theophrastus recommended the registration of property and of contracts (συμβολαῖοι) in the hope of avoiding suits on this subject or diminishing their number (Fr. 97). Such a register appears to have existed in some States (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 49. 10). Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, was for getting rid of law-courts altogether in his ideal State (Diog. Laert. 7. 33). It is evident that Greek society had more than enough of litigation. As to actions for false evidence, it is obvious that the adoption of community of property would remove only one of their occasions.

23. καὶ τοὺς κοινὰ κεκτημένους κ.τ.λ. Sus. 'dass gerade Leute welche Etwas gemeinschaftlich besitzen und benutzen...' Here καὶ is perhaps rightly rendered by 'gerade': 'it is just those who possess and enjoy things in common, whom' etc. Among the cases referred to here would be that of brothers holding undivided property, which seems to have been not uncommon at Athens (see Caillemer, Succession légitime à Athènes, p. 34 sqq.) and elsewhere (Jannet, Les institutions sociales à Sparte, p. 88 sqq.). 'Les enfants, après la mort de leur père, au lieu de partager entre eux sa fortune, restaient quelquefois dans l'indivision' (Caillemer, ubi supra). See C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. (ed. Thalheim), Rechtsalt. p. 54. 2.

25. ἀλλὰ θεωροῦμεν κ.τ.λ. 'Θεωρεῖν is here synonymous with ἄφαν' (Bon. Ind. 328 a 36). 'But those who fall out in consequence of owning common property look to us to be few in number, because we compare them with the large number of those who own property in severalty.'

28. στερήσονται. The fut. med. of στερέω, like that of several other verbs (θέψαναι, c. 6. 1265 a 16: ἅρξαναι, 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 36), is often used in a passive sense.

κοινωνίσαντες (cp. κοινωνισοῦντας, 23), 'having made common stock': so we have χρημάτων κοινωνίσαντας, Xen. Oecon. 6. 3. For the tense, see below on 1270 a 4 and 1271 b 4.

29. Vict. 'tot autem tantaque sunt (hona quibus spoliantur), ut plane cognoscatur non posseullo pacto vitam traduci illa lege.' The life which the members of Plato's State are to live is in such flagrant opposition to well-ascertained tendencies of human nature—so starved and poor in pleasure, affection, and virtue, and so wanting in concord—that it will be unliveable.
30. παρακρούσεως is usually rendered ‘error,’ but perhaps Liddell and Scott, who compare Soph. El. 17. 175 b 1, are right in rendering it ‘fallacy.’

31 sqq. Compare the argument in 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 21 sqq.

32. προίδοσα. Cp. c. 2. 1261 a 17, προιούσα καί γνωμένη μία μᾶλλον.

33 sq. Cp. 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 27, οὖ μόνον διαφέρει τῷ βελτίω καὶ χείρο γίνεσθαι τῷ δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μή τῷ αὐτῷ.

34. δεσπερ καὶ εἰ κ.τ.λ. ‘Just as you would spoil a harmony or a rhythm, if’ (Mr. Welldon).

35. τὸν ρυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν. The unit of a rhythm—the ἀσύνθετον of which it is composed—is the βάσις or else the syllable (Metaph. N. 1. 1087 b 36). The βάσις is in dancing the ‘step,’ in verse the metrical foot. Thus to make the State absolutely and in every way one is here compared to dwarfing a long rhythm to one single βάσις, i.e. to one of its component parts: cp. c. 2. 1261 a 19, οἰκία εἰ πόλεως, ἄνθρωπος δ’ ἐξ οἰκίας, where ἄνθρωπος answers to βάσις.

36. πρὸστερον, c. 2. 1261 a 18.

διὰ τὴν παίδειαν. Eucken (Praep. p. 39) explains διὰ with the acc. here ‘by means of’ (‘durch, vermittelst’), comparing de Caelo 3. 2. 301 a 18, σύγκρισιν δὲ ποιῶν διὰ τὴν φιλοσοφία: Meteor. 2. 8. 366 b 5: Phys. 4. 11. 219 b 29, cp. b 23 sq. So Bonitz remarks (Ind. 177 a 45), ‘διὰ cum acc. coniunctum legitur, ubi genetivum expectes,’ instancing this passage and referring to διὰ ταυτῆς, 38.

37. κοινὴν καὶ μίαν. Bern. ‘zum einigen und Einen Staat machen.’ Sus. ‘zur Gemeinschaft und Einheit gestalten.’ Perhaps the latter translation comes nearest to the sense. There is no English word which adequately represents κοινὴν: ‘to make it social and so one’ is an approach to the meaning of the words.


39. τοῖς τοιούτοις, i.e. ‘by the measures which we have described,’ measures which do not unite the State by improving the character of the citizens.

40. τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, distinguished here from τοῖς έθεσι, as from ἀνδρία, καρπεία, and other ethical virtues in 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 23, 32, where Bonitz (Ind. 821 a 6) explains the meaning of the word to be ‘virtus intellectualis’: cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 a 17, ἡ δ’ ἡθική ὁριζέναι εξ έθεσι περιγύνεται. Here perhaps ‘intellectual culture’ (Mr. Welldon) is the meaning.

41. τοῖς συσσίτιοις, adduced apparently as an instance of a law acting on the character. Compare Aristotle’s language as to syssitia in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 1 sqq.
NOTES.

1264 a. 1. τούτο αὐτό, 'this by itself': cp. αὐτὸ τοῦτο, i. 6. 1255 a 18.

2. τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ κ.τ.λ. Plato himself appeals (Rep. 376 E) to the testimony of Time in favour of γνωστικὴ and μονατικὴ. For ἔτσι Bernays (Gesammelte Abhandlungen i. 177) conjectures ἐνθεσιον (comparing Simonides Ceus, Fragm. 193 Bergk: he might have added to his citations Plato, Laws 638 E, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίων ἔθην περὶ αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦσα ὡμίν πόλεσι δυνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχειν ἄν, for the saying of Simonides appears to be present to Plato's mind in this passage of the Laws), and the suggestion of a reminiscence of this bit of Simonides here is brilliant and ingenious, but we find ἐκ πολλῶν ἔτων καὶ παλαιοῦ χρόνου in Aristot. Fragm. 40. 1481 a 41, and tautological expressions are not rare in Aristotle's writings (see Vahlen, Poet. p. 87, on Poet. i. 1447 a 17, ἐτέρως καὶ μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων): besides, ἐν ὦς suits ἔτσιν better than ἐνθεσιον.

4. εὐρήται. Cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 25, ἱχθῶν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεὶ νομίζειν εὐρήτασα πολλάς ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, μᾶλλον δ' άπεφάγεις. Aristotle held that the world existed from everlasting (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 432 sq.) and mankind too (ibid. 508. 1), and that in the infinity of past time everything has been discovered, and, if lost, discovered over again. Hence he advises inquirers rather to avail themselves of what has been already made out and to investigate what has been insufficiently investigated, than to seek to strike out something altogether new (4 (7). 10. 1329 b 33 sq.). There seem, however, to have been subjects on which Aristotle claims to have inherited little or nothing from his predecessors (see Eucken, Methode d. Aristot. Forschung, p. 5, who refers to Phys. 4. 1. 208 a 34: de Gen. et Corr. i. 2. 315 a 34: Meteor. i. 13. 349 a 14).

συνῄσκεται, 'gathered together for scientific use': cp. Metaph. A. 9. 991 a 18 and 5. 986 a 3, δόσε ἐξον διαλογούμενα δεικνύει ἐν τε τοῖς ἄριστοι καὶ τοῖς ἀρμονίαις πρὸς τὰ τοῦ οὐδαμοῦ πάθη καὶ μέρη καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐπή δικάσμους, τοῦτα συνάγομεν επήρροτον. The word is already used by Isocrates, de Antid. §§ 83, 45.

5. μάλιστα δ' ἐν κ.τ.λ. Thurot (Études, p. 28) would supply 'l'impossibilité de l'unité sociale, telle que la veut Platon,' but perhaps it is more natural to supply εἰ ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχει from 3.

7. διήθηται. For this use of the third person 'non addito τις,' see Bon. Ind. 589 b 47. For the future, see above on 1261 a 22. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ant. Rom. 2. 7) Romulus' first step was to effect divisions of the kind here referred to. Cp. also Xen. Hiero c. 9. 5, διήθηται μὲν γὰρ ἀποσαὶ αἱ πόλεις αἱ μὲν
Eratosthenes, aí de kata μόρας, αἱ de kata λόχας. Aristotle probably remembers Herodotus's advice (II. 2. 362)—

Κρίνι ἀνδρας κατὰ φύλα, κατὰ φρήτρας, 'Αγάμεμνον,

φρήτρης φρήτρηαι ἀρχή, φύλα de φύλας,

and the line (II. 9. 63) which associates the ἀφρήτωρ with the ἀδέμοστος and the ἀνόστοι.

αὖτα = 'cives,' Sus. Ind. Gramm. s. v. (who however doubts the correctness of the reading), or perhaps in a somewhat vaguer sense 'the materials of the State': so Camerarius (Schn. 2. 88) 'ea quae Socraticis rationibus contrahuntur et sunt unum.' For the neuter, cp. ἐκεῖνα, 1263 a i.

χυρίζων. Bonitz (Ind. 860 a 10) compares Eth. Nic. 4. 3. 1121 b 19.

8. τὰ μὲν ... τὰ δὲ, 'on the one hand'—'on the other.' Plato, in fact, adopts syssitia in the Republic (416 E: cp. 458 C), and syssitia (Laws 842 B), phratries (785 A), and tribes (745 E) in the Laws. Syssitia differ from phratries and tribes in not being based on relationship: Herodotus also regards them as belonging to τὰ ἐν πόλεμον ἕξοντα (1. 65: see Triber, Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 15, 18 sqq.). Dosiadas (ap. Athen. Deipn. 143 b) says of Lyctus in Crete, δείγρηται δὲ οἱ πολίται πάντες καθ' ἐταιρίας, καλοῖς δὲ ταύτας ἀνδρεία (= συνοικία).

9. ὅστε k.π.λ. ὅστε with the indicative ('and so') draws an emphatic conclusion: cp. c. 8. 1268 a 20. Plato will not succeed in making his guardians an undivided unity; he will only succeed in forbidding them to cultivate the soil. But this is nothing new (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.). Thus what is new in Plato's scheme is not practicable, and what is practicable is not new. The mention of the prohibition of agriculture to the guardians reminds Aristotle that two classes will exist in Plato's State, guardians and cultivators, and he now turns to consider their mutual relations.

10. καὶ νῦν, 'as it is.'

Λακεδαιμόνιοι. For the absence of the article, see Meisterhans, Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 90, who remarks that the article is commonly absent in Attic Inscriptions before names of peoples in the plural, though exceptions to this rule occur even in inscriptions of an early date. Aristotle sometimes omits and sometimes adds the article (see, for instance, 1264 a 20, and c. 9. 1269 a 29—b 7). The references given in the Index Aristotelicus suggest the view that Aristotle uses the word Λακεδαιμόνιοι of the Lacedaemonians in their public capacity as constituting a State,
while he uses Δάκωνες both of the State (as in 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 23; 
i δε Δάκωνες τους δήμους κατέλαβαν) and of the people, but more often 
of the latter. See Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. i. 40. 1.

ἐπιχειροῦσιν, 'attempt to bring about.' Schiller (Sclaverei, p. 21, 
n. 72) remarks on this word. Some Spartans were probably com-
pelled by need to till the soil. Cp. 2. 9. 1270 b 6, πόλλοις πένηται, 
and Plutarch, Agis 5. 3, πενία ἄγχαλαν τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἄνελευθερίαν 
ἐπιφέρουσα. Prof. Jowett points out that ἐπιχειρεῖν is often used 
pleonastically by Plato, though he does not adopt the view that it 
is pleonastic here, but translates 'try to enforce.' Cp. c. 9. 1270 a 
6, ἄγεν ἐπιχειρήσαι.

11. οὗ μὴν ἄλλα. Why 'not but that'? How is this sentence in 
opposition to that which precedes? Perhaps Aristotle's meaning is—'but indeed it is not only in this respect that the constitution is 
in fault, for the whole scheme of it is hard to make out.'

δ τρόπος κ. τ. λ., i.e. the whole σύνθεσις of guardians and culti-
vators, as distinguished from the arrangements as to the guardians 
with which Aristotle has hitherto been occupied. Cp. c. 7. 1267 a 
17, δ τρόπος τῆς Φαλήνος πολιτείας, c. 9. 1271 b 2, ἡ πάσα σύνταξις 
tῶν νόμων, and Polyb. 4. 20. 7, τὴν ἀλήν πολιτείαν. Much pains 
have been taken to secure the internal unity of the guardians, but 
none to secure the harmony of the whole State, which includes 
the third class as well as the two upper ones. Cp. Plato, Rep. 
421 A, ἄλλα τῶν μὲν ἄλλαυ ἀλάτοιν λόγοι κ. τ. λ.

12. τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν, i.e. τοῖς πολίταις: cp. 1. 13. 1260 b 19, οἱ 
κοινωνοί τῆς πολιτείας. Bern. 'für alle Angehörigen eines solchen 
Staates.'

τῷ σμικροστάτῳ ἔθει καὶ μέρει ἑαυτῆς.

14. γίνεται, 'results in being;' cp. i. 2. 1252 b 7: Rhet. 3. 9. 
1409 b 26: Strabo, p. 653, εἰ δ' . . . εἷς Ἀργοὺς καὶ Τίρυνθος ἄπηνεν ὅ 
Τηληπόλεμος, οὔδ' οὔτω Δαρμός γίνεται ἡ ἐκείνην ἀπαικία.

περὶ δὲν κ. τ. λ. 'Immemor fuit Aristoteles locorum, quales sunt 
non constituendas esse communes disertis verbis dixit Plato, et 
profecto per se satis superque apparat uxorum, liberorum, possess-
ionum communem ex eius sententia propriam esse debere 
custodum,' Sus.¹ (cp. Sus.², Note 170). See also Tim. r8 B. As 
Susemihl remarks, Aristotle seems to take it for granted above, c. 
4. 1262 a 40, that community of women and children is to be con-
fined to the guardians.

15. ἦ καλ often means 'or even' (e.g. in Plato, Phileb. 61 A):
elsewhere, however, and perhaps here, it seems to mean 'or also,' 'or again' (e. g. in de Gen. An. i. 18. 723 a 29, εν τῷ σώματον ἢ ἀνώματον εἶναι ἢ καὶ δء ἄλλην τινὰ τουαὶναν αἰτίαν: ibid. i. 18. 724 b 5, πόσερον ὥς ἄλην καὶ πᾶσχον ἢ ὡς εἶδος τι καὶ σοιοῖν, ἢ καὶ ἄμφω).

17. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Three alternatives are considered: 1. the case of the γεωργὸι having women, children, and property in common (17—22): 2. the opposite case (22—40): 3. the case of their having women and children in common but not property (40 sq.). The other case of property being common and women and children not so, is not considered.

18. τί διοίκουσιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 4. 1262 a 40 sqq. If a community in women, children, and property produces close friendship, it will do so among the cultivators no less than among the guardians. The two classes will be, it is implied, on a par in point of unity, and in whatever excellence flows from community in these things. Yet rulers ought to differ from those they rule (cp. c. 6. 1265 b 18), and this is the opinion of Plato. Evidently, however, it does not follow, if women, children, and property are common in both classes, that the two will be absolutely alike, as Aristotle's argument implies.

η τί πλείων κ.τ.λ. The argument seems to be that if the cultivators are in no way dissimilar to the guardians, the former will gain nothing by obeying the latter. In Aristotle's view, the ruled, if inferior to the ruler, profit by their obedience: so the slave, τα 1252 a 30 sqq.—domestic animals, τα 5. 1254 b 10 sqq.—the subjects of the παρβασιλεύς, τα 3. 1284 b 33. Bernays omits η — αὐτὼν, but this clause seems to be in place, and not superfluous.

19. ἢ τί μαθήτες κ.τ.λ. 'Or what is to make them,' etc.? The use of τί μαθήτες perhaps implies that their submission to ὁμοία would be a mistake. 'Τί μαθάων signifies an intentionally, τι παθών an accidentally, wrong action,' Jelf, Greek Grammar, § 872. 2 k.

21. τάλλα ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. Cp. c. 6. 1265 a 5, τά ἀλλα ταῦτα ὅποιδες

For ἐφέντες, cp. c. 6. 1265 b 22, ἐφήνει.

Τοῖς διοικοῖσι probably includes those elsewhere called περίοικοι by Aristotle (e. g. in c. 10. 1272 b 18), though a distinction seems to be made between the terms διοικοὶ and περίοικοι in 4 (7). το. 1330 a 25 sqq. Aristotle's account of the status of the Cretan slaves is confirmed by the tenour of the recently discovered inscription containing a portion of the laws of Gortyna. See Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 64: 'their legal status appears to have been good... they have property of their own (col. 3. 42), a well-developed family-law, are capable of marriage with free women
NOTES.

(col. 7. 3): nay, they even have a remote and contingent right of succession to the property of their master’ (col. 5. 27: see also Bücheler und Zitelmann, p. 144).

άπειρήκασι. Compare the well-known scolon of Hybria the Cretan (Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr.):

*Εστι μοι πλοῦτος μέγας δόρῳ καὶ ξέφος καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαυστίαν, πρόβλημα χρωτός. 

τούτῳ δεισπότας μνοίας κέκλημαι.

Τοι δὲ μὴ τολμῶντ' ἕξειν δόρου καὶ ξέφος καὶ τὸ καλὸν λαυστίαν, πρόβλημα χρωτός, πάντες γὰρ πεπηθότες ἀδόν.

. . . . (προσκενεύτι (με) δεισπόταν καὶ μέγαν βασιλεὰ φωνέωντες.

Compare also 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 29 sqq., and what Xenophon says of Cyrus (Cyrop. 8. 1. 43)—οδὸς δ' αὕτη κατασκέυασεν εἰς τὸ δολεῖαν, τούτων οὐνε μελετῶν τῶν ἐλευθερῶν πώνων οὐδένα παρόρμα οὐδ' ὀπλα κεκτήσας ἐπέτρεπεν ἐπεμελετο δὲ ὅπως μήτε ἄστιον μήτε ἀποτοί ποτε ἐποντο ἐλευθερῶν ἕνα μελετήματον. Plato (Laws 625 D) speaks of bows and arrows as the arms most suitable to Crete, but he no doubt does not intend to imply that the Cretans did not possess and use ὀπλα of a heavier kind.

22. εἰ δὲ, καθάπερ κ.τ.λ. Sepulv. ‘sin autem eodem modo, quo in aliis civitatibus, haec’ (i.e. households and property) ‘fuerint apud ipsos constituta, qui erit communitatis modus?’ It should be noted that the expression, τίς ὁ τρόπος τῆς κοινωνίας, is used by Adeimantus in Rep. 449 C, though in reference to the guardians alone.

25. δῶ νό τόλεις. Aristotle retorts on Plato the charge which he had brought (Rep. 422 E sqq.) against most large States of his own day.

26. ποιεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 419: 415 D–417 B: 543 B–C. φυλάκης was a common euphemism at Athens for the garrison of a dependent city (Plutarch, Solon c. 15): cp. 7 (5). II. 1314 b 16 sqq. Yet the term φυλάκες must have had a somewhat unpleasant sound in the ears of Greeks, for the Athenians gave this name to the officials whom the Lacedaemonians called harmosts (Theophr. Fragm. 129 Wimmer: Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens E. T. p. 156). Πολίτας, 27, is the predicate.

29. καὶ τούτων, to the cultivators and artisans who are the real citizens of Plato’s State, no less than to the citizens of actual States.
δ Ἐωκράτης, Rep. 425 C-D.
32. ἀποθέσσα. Vict. 'cum tamen tribuerit': cp. 1265 a 3, βουλή-μενος. Μόνον qualifies τούς φύλαξιν.

33. ἀποφορά is the technical term for 'the money which slaves let out to hire paid to their master' (Liddell and Scott): see Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb p. 195. The contribution in kind which the Helots rendered to their masters went by this name (Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 8: Inst. Lac. c. 40). Plato's designation for the contribution of οἱ ἄλλοι πολίται to the support of the guardians is, however, not ἀποφορά (for this would imply that they were slaves), but μοσθὸς τῆς φύλαξις (Rep. 416 E).
34. πόλι μάλλον, because they are free and citizens, and have the land in their hands.
35. εἰλοτείαι, 'bodies of Helots,' just as πολιτεία is used by Aristotle occasionally (Bon. Ind. 612 b 10 sqq.) in the sense of 'a body of citizens.' So δουλείαι, 36: cp. Thuc. 5. 23, ἢν ἥ δουλεία ἐπιμαστήται.

36. 'Whether a definite settlement of the question as to property and the family is as necessary in relation to the cultivators as it is in relation to the guardians or not, at present at all events nothing definite has been laid down.'

37. καί, 'nor.'
38. τε here as elsewhere 'ei vocabulo additur, quod utrique membro commune est,' Bon. Ind. 749 b 44 sqq. The meaning of πολιτεία here is not absolutely certain; it might possibly be 'participation in political power'—cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 13, ἀμφότερος ἀποδίδων τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην ('hanc partem reipublicae adminis-trandae,' Bon. Ind. 612 b 47). See Bon. Ind. 612 b 38 sqq. in illustration of the sense 'ius civitatis, potestas in civitate.' But Bonitz does not appear to attach this sense to the word in this passage, and perhaps the ordinary meaning of 'political constitution' is more probable here. Aristotle has been speaking of this class as a separate πόλις (24), and he would like to know what its πολιτεία is to be, because it is essential that its character should be suitable to its position, and the πολιτεία is a main determinant of character.

ἐστι δ' ... ἡδίν, sc. τίς ἡ τούτων τε πολιτεία κ.τ.λ.
39. οὔτε ... κοινωνίαν, 'Nor is their character of slight importance in relation to the preservation of the guardians' society.' For the construction, cp. Ἐρυχίας 394 D, ἢ τίς μὲν οἰκίας ἢ τε χρήσει πόλις τυγχάνει οὔτα καὶ ἀναγκαία, καὶ μεγάλα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὰ διαφέροντα τὰ πρὸς
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tών βίων ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ οἰκίᾳ οἰκεῖν μᾶλλον ἦν συμφέρω καὶ φαύλω οἰκεῖν. τῆς δὲ σοφίας ἦ τε χρεία ὁλίγου ἄξια καὶ τὰ διαφέρουσα συμφέρῃ δὲ σοφὸν ἢ ἀμοβεῖ εἰναι περὶ τῶν μεγαλῶν; Ἡν the passage before us we have τὸ ποιοῦσ τινας εἶναι τοὖτον instead of the simple infinitive οἰκεῖν. Ποιοῦσ τινας (επ. 5 (8). 5. 1340 a 7, 8: 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 18) includes what is often expressed by two alternatives, as (ε. g.) in Rhet. 3. 1. 1404 a 9, διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὰ δηλώσαι ὅτι ὅτι εἶπεῖν.

1264 b. 2. τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄγριων. A verb must be supplied from οἰκονομήσει (see above on 1257 a 21 and 1258 b 19); perhaps, however, οἰκονομήσει itself will do (επ. 3. 18. 1288 a 34).

3. καὶ εἰ... γυναῖκες. ‘And who will keep house, if . . . ?’ This clause has much exercised the commentators (‘secluserunt Sylburgius, Bekkerus, ante τὶς 2 traiecerunt Schneiderus et Coraes, lacunam post haec verba statuit ante Sus. iam Thurotus’ Sus.1), but a similarly constructed sentence is to be found in Phys. 8. 3. 254 a 27, ἐπερ oὸν ἐπὶ δόξα σωφίας ἢ ἄξια δόξα, καὶ κίνησις ἐστί, καὶ εἰ φαντασία, καὶ εἰ ἐτε μὲν οὕτω δικεῖ εἰναι ὅτε δὲ ἐτέρως. Götting: ‘Deinde verba καὶ εἰ καταὶ κ.τ.λ. sic intelligenda sunt: καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπορήσεις ἡν τις (sc. τις οἰκονομήσει αὐτῶν;) εἰ καταὶ αἱ κτήσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναίκες εἰσιν.’ So Vict. ‘idem etiam incommodum illic nascetur, si’ etc. But no fresh apodosis need be supplied: τις οἰκονομήσει is the common apodosis of the whole sentence. (If in the much-debated passage, Soph. Ο. Τ. 227-8, we retain the reading of all the MSS. ἰπεξελῶν αὐτὸς καθ’ αὐτοῦ, the apodosis (κέλευ οὖν τὰ σημαίνειν ἐμοί) must be obtained from the preceding line (226) in much the same way as in the passage before us and in the passage just quoted from the Physics.) If women are common, the question will arise who is to keep house, whether property is also common or not, for ‘nulla certam aut suam domum habebit’ (Giph. p. 187). Whether Aristotle’s objection holds, is another matter.

4. ἀτόμον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cp. Rep. 451 D. In the Laws, however (804 E), Plato appeals to the example of the women of the Sauromatae to show that women’s pursuits should be the same as men’s. Still Plutarch (de Amore Prolis, c. 1) found men even in his day inclined to regard the lower animals as furnishing a standard of that which is natural in matters relating to marriage and the begetting and rearing of offspring; he himself seems to think that they follow nature more closely than man. This short treatise is well worth reading even in the abbreviated and imperfect form in which we have it.

6. οἷς probably refers to ἰπρίων: Bonitz, however (Ind. 500 b 22), refers it to ἰνδράσων. οἷς is here used in a pregnant sense, as in ἰ. 5. 1254 b 19, and Isocr. Paneg. § 123.
7. toûs autóús, i.e. as Vict. points out, not 'eosdem homines,' but 'sundem ordinem.'

8. στάσεως αὐτοῦν. Cp. 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 9 sqq. Sus.² (Note 182) explains the difference between the schemes of Plato and Aristotle in regard to this matter.

9. ἄξιώμα. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 11. 1117 a 22, ἀνδρεία δὲ φανονται καὶ οἱ ἄγοντες, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν ἐυκλείδων, χειρος δὲ σφο ἄξιωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν (i.e. αὐτές έαυτοὺς ἄξιωσιν, Bon. Ind. 70 a 43), εὐχαίρει δὲ.

ἡποὺθεν δή. So πί, except that accentuation varies and Vet. Int. with Μsq reads ἡποὺθεν δή. Ἡ πού γε δή Bekk.¹ (following Vict. Schn. Cor. with some differences of accentuation): ἡποὺθεν δή Bekk.² ἡποὺθεν δή does not appear to occur elsewhere, though ἡποῦν γενέσ&

10. ἰδεῖν. So Rep., except that accentuation varies and Vet. Int. with Μsq reads ἰδεῖν Bekk.¹ (following Vict. Schn. Cor. with some differences of accentuation): ἰδεῖν Bekk.² ἰδεῖν does not appear to occur elsewhere, though ἰδεῖν γενέσ&

11. άλλοις is governed by μέμεθαι: τοῖς ψυχαῖς is added to give the place of mingling: cp. Rep. 415 B, τι τοῖς τούτων ἐν τοῖς ψυχαῖς παραμέμεθαι.

12. φησί, Rep. 415 A.


13. μίξαι, sc. των θεῶν.

14. καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, 'even the happiness of the guardians' (Sus. 'selbst die Glückseligkeit der Wächter'). Is the meaning, 'not only wives and property, but even happiness'? Or is it 'even their happiness. which is the last thing one would expect him to take away'?

15. φησί, 'Rep. iv. p. 419 sq., at immemor fuit Aristoteles alterius loci v. p. 465 sq. neque respexit quae Plato docuit ix. p. 580—592 B, et sic tandem intellexit non eam quam ei tribuit, sed plane contrariam esse veram Platonis sententiam' (Sus.). There is, however, as Zeller observes (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 698. 2) a real difference between the views of Plato and Aristotle on this point, 'for Plato is in principle opposed to the contention of Aristotle that the happiness of the individual as such is to be a decisive consideration in framing the institutions of the State, and he insists
for precisely this reason (Rep. 420 B sqq.) that the individual must find his highest happiness in a self-forgetting (selfblottedzen) devotion to the Whole.'


18. μὴ τῶν πλείστων κ.τ.λ. One expects μὴ πάντων ἡ τῶν πλείστων ἡ τινών, but a not very dissimilar displacement occurs in 4 (7).

11. 1330 b 37, ἐτεὶ δὲ καὶ συμβαίνει καὶ ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ. : cp. also Magn. Mor. 1. 20. 1190 b 19, λέγω δὲ δ' οἱ πολλοί φοβοῦνται ἢ οἱ πάντες. Zeller (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 698. 2) would like to get rid of the second μὴ, but cp. Laws 766 Α, μὴ ἰκανός δὲ ἡ μὴ καλῶς τραφέν κ.τ.λ.

19. οὐ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Cr. 7 (5). 8. 1307 b 35, παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὁπερ οὐ σοφιστικὸς λόγος· εἰ ἔκαστον μικρών, καὶ πάντα, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ μὲν ὅσι, ἐστὶ δ' ὅσι οὖ τὸ γὰρ δλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρῶν, ἀλλὰ σύγκειται εἰκ. μικρῶν, and also Plato, Protag. 349 C.

24. ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτεία (cp. ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ, 28) gives the title of Plato's Πολιτεία (mistranslated 'Republic') as we have it: so τοῖς νόμοις 26 agrees with the title of the Laws. Aristotle's testimony supports not only the authenticity of both dialogues, but also that of their titles: cp. Athen. Deipn. 507 f, οἱ δὲ συνηθέστεροι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ νόμου καὶ τούτων ἐτὶ πρότερον ἡ πολιτεία τῇ πεπουκασειν; The plural, αἱ πολιτείαι, seems, however, to have been sometimes used: see note on 1260 b 12. The object of the criticisms on the Republic which we have been perusing is, we see from this sentence, in the main to point out ἄπορια enough in connexion with the work to show that there is still room for another attempt to depict a 'best constitution' (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 32 sqq.). The same may be said of the somewhat grumbling criticism of the Laws which follows. Aristotle's real opinion of the two works must be gathered from the Politics as a whole; we shall best be able to gather it, if we note, as we have sought to do in vol. i, the points in which his political teaching and method depart from those of Plato.

C. 6. 26. Σχέδον δὲ παραπλησίως κ.τ.λ. ... διό. Giph. 'Reddit initio rationem, cur et in secundam Platonis Rempublicam disserat hanc: quia ut primae, item et secundae sua sint vitia et incommoda.' To study the rocks on which other voyagers, have been wrecked is the best means of avoiding similar disasters. A further reason seems to be introduced by καὶ γὰρ 28.

31. τῆς πολιτείας τῇ τάξιν. Probably not after περί, but acc. after διάρκειαν. The expression seems to refer especially to the
distribution of political power (cp. 2. 10. 1272 a 4: 3. 11. 1281 b 39: 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18); thus in what follows we are told in what hands Plato has placed the supreme authority of the State.

33. τρίτων δ' ἐκ τούτων, 'and third recruited from these last' (i.e. from τὸ προσπολεµοῦν µέρος): cp. Plato, Rep. 412 D, ἐκλεκτέων ἄρ' ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων φυλάκων τοιούτων ἄνδρας, ὡς ἂν κ.τ.λ. For the expression, cp. de Part. An. 2. 1. 646 a 20, δευτέρα δὲ σύστατος ἐκ τῶν πρῶτων ἢ τῶν ὁµοιωµέρων φύσει: Plato, Laws 891 C, ψυχήν δὲ ἐκ τούτων (earth, air, fire, and water) ὑστερον: Phileb. 27 B, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖν ἀπερων λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἐπεισ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτων μικτὴν καὶ γεγενηµένην ὁδόν. For the identification of τὸ βουλευόµενον and τὸ κύριον, cp. 6 (4). 14. 1299 a 1.

34. περὶ δὲ ... µή. 'Reapose haec non praetermissa esse a Platone invitus ipse testatur Aristoteles 6—10 et 31—34.' (Sus.). But perhaps the recognition of the first class as ἄρχοντες and of the second as τὸ προσπολεµοῦν µέρος does not absolutely involve the denial of all office and all share in military service to the third class. That Aristotle did not understand Plato to have pronounced clearly for the denial of ὑπάλα to the third class appears from c. 5. 1264 a 20 sq.

37. τὰς µὲν γυναίκας κ.τ.λ. Plato, Rep. 451 E—452 A. Aristotle hints his surprise that Plato should say so little about the γυναική and τεχνήται, and so much about the women.

39. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κ.τ.λ., 'but for the rest' (for τὰ ἄλλα, cp. 7 (5). 11. 1314 a 39: Plato, Rep. 403 B : Laws 763 E), 'we find that he has filled the dialogue with extraneous discussions' (cp. Demosth. de Cor. c. 9), 'and with discourse about the education of the guardians.' A somewhat similarly constructed sentence occurs in c. 11. 1273 a 9, ἀ δ' ἐν εἰσφέρων ὁδόν, οὐ διακοῦνται µόνον ἀποδιδάσκει τὸ δήµα τὰ διάφανα τοῖς ἄρχονσι. What extraneous matters are here referred to? Among other things perhaps, as Sus. conjectures, 'illa quae 608 C—621 D de animorum immortalitate proponuntur,' but also probably the ethical discussions, such as that on justice, which Aristotle himself deals with in a separate treatise (cp. 4 (7). 1. 1323 b 39, ἔτερας γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐργαν σχολῆς ταῦτα). The same complaint as to extraneous matter in the Republic is made by Dio Chrysostom, Or. 7. 267 R. The juxtaposition of λόγους and τῶν λόγων here is awkward, but not much more so than that of λέγεται and λεχθέναι in de Gen. An. 2. 7. 746 b 7 sqq.

3. ταύτην βουλήµενον κ.τ.λ. 'Though wishing': cp. c. 5. 1265 a 1264 a 32. Κωνστέραν ταῖς πόλεσι probably means, not 'having
more affinity to existing States,’ but ‘more suitable to them’ or ‘more within their reach’: cp. 6 (4). 1. 1288 b 38, where (as Bonitz points out, Ind. 399 b 15 sqq.) τὴν βάσιν καὶ κοινότεραν ἀπάσαις (τοῖς πόλεσι πολιτείαις) is apparently used in the same sense as τὴν μάλιστα πάσαις τοῖς πόλεσιν ἀρμόδιως 34. For the fact, cp. Laws 739 E.

4. εἰς. Cp. 3. 3. 1276 b 14, ὅταν εἰς ἐτέραν μεταβάλλῃ πολιτείαν ἡ πόλις, and 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 14 sq.


7. παίδεων τὴν αὐτήν. The subjects of education prescribed in the two dialogues are much the same—γυμναστική, μουσική, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy; even dialectic reappears, for this study seems to be required in the Laws (965 B sqq.) of the members of the Nocturnal Council, as it is required of select individuals in the Republic. ‘The main principles of education are essentially the same as in the Republic’ (Zeller, Plato E. T. p. 542). But as the education prescribed in the Laws is in the main designed for the whole body of citizens and not for a few of them only, like that of the Republic, it must probably be intended by Plato to be less arduous and exacting.

70 ... Ζην. ‘Plat. Legg. 741 E: 806 D–807 D: 842 D: 846 D: 919 D sq.’ (Sus.1).

8. καὶ ... γυναικῶν. ‘Plat. Legg. 780 D sqq.: 806 E: cf. 842 B’ (Sus.1). We are not expressly told in the Republic that women are to take part in the syssitia, though, as Sus. remarks (Sus.2, Note 153), they are probably intended to do so, but in the Laws this is distinctly insisted upon. Giph., however (p. 194), takes Aristotle’s meaning to be, that while in the Republic men and women are intended to take their meals at the same tables, in the Laws separate mess-tables are instituted for women. The notion of syssitia for women would be all the more surprising to Greeks, as one name for the syssitia was Andreia and the institution was regarded as an essentially military one (Hdt. 1. 65).

9. τὴν μέν. ‘He makes to consist’ seems to be suppressed, unless we suppose φοιτεῖ δεῖν εἶναι to be carried on, which is perhaps less likely.

χιλίων. Cp. Rep. 423 A, ὥς ἄληθες μεγάλης, καὶ ἐὰν μόνον 3χιλίων τῶν προσπολεμοῦσιν. For the total of the citizens of the Republic, the number of the first class and that of the third (far the largest) must be added.

μὲν οὖν, 'it is true that,' as in 17. We pass with μὲν οὖν from description to criticism, as in c. 10. 1272 a 12.

11. περιττῶν, 'uncommon, out of the common,' but no English word adequately translates it. The epithet suggests an aspiring wisdom which follows paths of its own—which has something of greatness, but also of superfluity: cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 42, 2. 8. 1267 b 24, and περιπραγάτερον, 25. So περιττή τῶν ἄλλων, Poet. 24. 1459 b 36 seems to be represented by σεμινόν καὶ αἰθάδες, Rhet. 3. 1406 b 3 (Vahlen, Beitr. zu Poet. 3. 291: Bon. Ind. 585 a 59).

Περιττός is often joined with ἰδιός, but is less wide and more subtle in meaning.

τοῦ Σωκράτους. Aristotle identifies with Socrates the Ἀθηναῖος ἔξων of the Laws. Grote (Plato 3. 301 n.) conjectures that the latter name was preferred by Plato to avoid the difficulty of implying the presence of Socrates in Crete. In c. 7. 1266 b 5 we have Πάτων δὲ τοὺς νόμους γράφων, and in c. 9. 1271 b 1, ἰπέρ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἐπιτείμηκεν.

12. κομψόν, 'clever,' opposed to ἀπλουστέρος in de Caelo 3. 5. 304 a 13: to ἰκανός in Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 11.

καϊνοτόμου, 'novelty of view,' cp. c. 7. 1266 a 35.

ζητητικόν, 'the spirit of inquiry'—love of inquiry and keenness in inquiry.

καλῶς δὲ πάντα, sc. ἔχει: see Bon. Ind. 306 a 16.


πλῆθος. For the acc. cp. c. 9. 1271 a 9, and see Dr. Holden's note on Xen. Oecon. 13. 3. τὰ ἔργα μάθη ὅσ ἐστιν ἐργαστεία. In the criticisms on constitutions contained in the Second Book Aristotle commonly notices first, or at any rate before he has gone very far, their arrangements with respect to what he terms in the Fourth Book the ἐποιήσεις of the State—the number of the citizens and the extent of the territory (cp. 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 38, διὸ δὲ πολλὰ προϊ-ποιεῖσθαι καθάπερ εὐχρισίου, εἶναι μέντοι μηδὲν τούτων ἀδύνατον λέγω δὲ οἷον περὶ τε πλῆθους παλαιών καὶ χώρας).

14. Βαβυλωνίας. Cp. 3. 3. 1276 a 28.

15. Yet the territory of the Spartans (is Aristotle thinking of his own time, when Messenia had been lost?) is said in 2. 9. 1270 a 29 to be capable of supporting 30,000 hoplites and 1500 horsemen, who, if Spartans, would be ἄργοι. But perhaps this is not present to Aristotle's mind. He does not probably mean to assert that it would be capable of supporting 31,500 ἄργοι. See note on 1270 a 29.
16. ἰθρέψοντα. See note on ἰτερθσοντα, 1263 b 28.

17. μὲν οὖν (here answered by μέντοι, as in 1257 a 28 and 1259 a 28) prepares the way for and helps to emphasize the correction introduced by μέντοι. ‘True, it is right to presuppose freely, but one must not presuppose anything impossible.’ Plato had, in effect, said much the same thing (Laws 709 D: 742 E: Rep. 456 C). Aristotle repeats this remark in 4 (7). 4. 1325 b 38, without any indication that he is conscious of the repetition.

18. λέγεται. ‘Expressis quidem verbis non fit in Legibus Platonicis, sed recte hanc sententiam e iv. p. 704–709 et v. p. 747 D eruere potuit Aristoteles’ (Sus. 1). Add 625 C sqq. and 842 C–E. In Laws 705 D–E the Cretan laws are censured for looking only to war (i.e. πρὸς τοὺς γενινώτας τόπους), whereas the Athenian Stranger claims that he legislates looking to nothing but the virtue of his citizens. For this reason he dispenses with a fleet. Aristotle does not approve of this (cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 a 21 sqq.). If, as Susemihl following Schlosser points out (Sus. 2, Note 204), Plato pays regard to considerations of defence against neighbours in fixing the number of the citizens (Laws 737 C–D: cp. 628 D), Aristotle would no doubt ask why he does not keep them in view when dealing with other matters. See also c. 7. 1267 a 17 sqq. and 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6–22.

22. πολιτικόν, i.e. a life of intercourse with other States: cp. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 3 sqq., where we have ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν βίον.

τοιούτως ... ἀ. Cp. c. 7. 1266 b 36: 1267 a 24.

23. ῥπλόιος. Is there not a reference here to Plato, Laws 625 C sqq., where the Cretan lawgiver is said to have chosen for the Cretans such arms as were most suitable to swift runners in a hilly country like Crete—bows and arrows, in fact? Aristotle urges that the arms used by a nation should be such as to enable it not only to cope with its foes in its own territory, but also to retaliate on them in theirs, which bows and arrows would not enable it to do. He dwells elsewhere on the importance of a fleet for this purpose (4 (7). 6. 1327 a 23 sqq.).

28. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος δὲ κ.τ.λ. The connexion of this with what precedes is illustrated by the similar sequence of topics in c. 7. 1267 a 17–27. The amount of the collective wealth, no less than the nature of the ἐπίλα at the command of the State, must be fixed in relation to perils from without. The verb after μῆπατε is suppressed and ‘must be supplied in the indicative, not the subjunctive, as the idea of “warding off” (Abwehr) is here absent’ (Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 17).
29. ἐξάγειν κ.τ.λ. Τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον explains ἐτέρως—'in a way which differs through being clearer': cp. de Part. An. 4. 5. 681 a 18, ἕτερα τουτοῦ ἐν τῇ βαλλάττῃ μικρῶν διαφέρει τούτων τῷ ἀπολελούσθα. Lamb. 'aliter definire, huc est, planius atque apertius.' Bern. however seems to take it as explaining βέλτου: 'ob nicht vielleicht eine andere Begrenzung besser, weil deutlicher, ist.'

30. φησι. Cp. Laws 737 D. Ephorus also (ap. Strab. p. 480) had praised the Cretans for living σωφρόνως καὶ λιτῶς. I do not feel the difficulty which Susemihl follows others in raising (see Sus., Critical Note, and Qu. Crit. p. 368 sq.) with regard to τοῦτο—ζην at all as strongly as he does. Aristotle makes two objections to Plato's δρόσι—1. that it is too vague and fails to enlighten: 2. that it tends to mislead. For other instances in which μᾶλλον is used in the sense of λίαν, see Bon. Ind. 445 a 1 sqq. In de Gen. An. 2. 8. 748 a 7 we have, ὀντας μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος καθάλου λίαν καὶ κενός. Τοῦτο—ζην gives the reason for Aristotle's suggestion in 28 sq. that a clearer definition should be substituted.

33. σωφρόνως καὶ ἐλευθερίως. Cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 30 sqq., a passage which shows that Aristotle intended fully to discuss in a later part of his work the question of the true mode of using property.

χωρίς γάρ κ.τ.λ., 'for if we part the one from the other, liberal living will accompany luxurious life, and temperate living a life of hardship.' For ἀκαλουθῶν as here used, Bonitz (Ind. 26 a 44) compares 3. 13. 1285 a 39 and Eth. Eud. 3. 5. 1232 a 31. Cp. also Theopomp. fragm. 110 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 295), τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν οὕτω ἀπὸ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἄλλα συντετακτα καὶ συνακαλουθεῖ τοῖς μὲν πλούσιοι καὶ ταῖς δυναστείαις ἄνω, καὶ μετὰ ταύτην ἀκαλοσία, ταῖς δ' ἐνδεῖαι καὶ ταῖς ταπεινότητι σωφροσύνη καὶ μετριότητι. In c. 7. 1266 b 26 and in 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 37 sqq. the alternative to τρυφῶν is γλύσχρως, not ἐπιστάνως, ζην.

34. τῷ ἐπιπόνως, sc. ζην, suppressed as already implicitly expressed in τρυφῶν (cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 19).

35. ἔξεις αἵρεταί (see critical note and cp. Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1144 a 1 sq.) is a wider term than ἀἵρεταί: ἐγκράτεια (e.g.) is a συνδεια ἔξεις, but not an ἀἵρετα in the strict sense of the word (see the references in Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 627. 2). Those who reject Victorius' conjecture of αἵρεταί for ἀἵρεταί, which is the reading of all the MSS., and prefer to strike out one of the two words ἔξεις and ἀἵρεταί, should probably strike out the former, for the illustrations which follow (35 sq.) show that good ἔξεις are alone referred to.

37. τὸς χρὴσεις, i.e. τὰς ἐνεργειας, in contradistinction to τὰς ἔξεις
NOTES.

(see Bon. Ind. 854 b 37 sqq. for instances of this use of the word). Here also Aristotle would seem to refer to commendable χρήσεις only.

38. τὰς κτήσεις, 'landed property,' as in 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18. Plato does not equalize all kinds of property (cp. 1265 b 22). The lots of land, however, are evidently intended by him to be equal or virtually equal (Laws 737).

39. κατασκευάζειν, 'de placitis philosophicis (cf. ποιεῖν, τίθεσθαι) dicitur,' Bon. Ind. 374 b 17 sq.

ἀφεῖναι κ.τ.λ. It is not the case that Plato trusts to ἀτέκνη ἀλλοτρίως alone to maintain the numbers of his citizen-body unaltered: see Laws 740 D–E, 923 D. Aristotle, however, desires a limitation of τέκνη: he wishes the State to fix a definite number of children, not to be exceeded, in the case of every marriage (4 (7). 16. 1335 b 22). Aristotle must be quite aware that Plato intends to fix the number of citizens in the Laws, but he appears to think that Plato takes no effectual means to secure that the number named shall not be exceeded.

40. ἐν ἀμαλασθησομένην. On ἐν with the Future Participle, see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 41. 4. Madvig (Adversaria Critica 1. 463) would read ἀμαλασθησομένην, but this verb appears only to occur elsewhere in a single passage, Rhet. 3. ii. 1412 a 16, καὶ τὸ ἀνωμαλίσθαι τὰς πόλεις.

41. διὰ τὰς ἀτέκνιας, 'by means of': see note on 1263 b 36.

1265 b. 1. διὰ δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. Plato does not give this reason. The fact mentioned by Aristotle is interesting.

δέ δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'this stationariness of numbers will need to be maintained with greater accuracy in the State of the Laws than it is now,' for in this State those over the right number will be starved, which now is not the case. This remark was perhaps suggested by an observation in the Laws (928 E)—ἐν μὲν οὖν ἄλλη πολιτείᾳ πᾶσι ἀποκεκριμένοι οὐκ ἔν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπολεῖ εὖ, ταύτης δὲ, ἢ οὐδὲ οἱ νύμφαι ἔσονται, ἀναγκαίως ἔχει εἰς ἄλλην χώραν ἐξαικεῖσθαι τῶν ἀπάρτων—πρὸς γάρ τοῖς τεταράκοντα καὶ πεντακυκλίῳς οἴκους οὐκ ἐστω ἔνα προστενθεῖαι.

3. ἀποτεῖ, 'is destitute' (cp. μηθὲν ἐκείνῳ 5).

For μετείκασθαι τὰς οὐσίας εἰς ὅπου οὖν πλῆθος, where εἰς seems to be used of the recipients, cp. c. 9. 1270 a 18, εἰς ἀλλούς ήκεν ἡ χώρα, and de Part. An. 3. 3. 664 a 27 sq.

tois παράξυνος, 'eos qui praeter numerum et extra ordinem accessissent' Lamb. (cp. τοίς περιγενεμένοις, Laws 740 D).

7. τὴν τεκνοποιίαν, 'reproductive intercourse.' Compare on this subject 4 (7). 16. 1335 b 22 sq.

10. τῶν ἀλλων, i.e. other than τῶν γεννησάντων implied in τῶν γεννηθέντων.

If with Pι Bekk. we read ταῖς πλείσταις, we must infer that in some States a check of some kind on the procreation of children existed. Aristotle's suggestion in 7–10 much resembles that of Plato, Rep. 460 A, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρχουσι ποιήσομεν, ἵνα μάλιστα διασώζωσι τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρθέν, πρὸς πολέμους τε καὶ νίκους καὶ πάντα τὰ ταυτά ἀποσκοποῦσες.

12. κακουργίαν. Vict. 'αλλι antem in minutoribus rebus exercent malitiam suam, qui multis locis in his libris vocantur ab ipso κακουργοι, id est, fraudulenti.' Кακούργοι and μεκροπόνηροι are conjoined, it is true, in 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 10, and contrasted with ἐβρισταί καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι (cp. Rhet. 2. 16. 1391 a 18), but in Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 19 the malpractices ending in tyranny which long terms of office favour are spoken of by this name, and these cannot be said to be 'in minutoribus rebus.' 'Knavery' perhaps comes near the meaning. For the thought here expressed, Sus. 3 compares c. 7. 1266 b 13 (cp. also Isocr. Areopag. § 44); yet Aristotle seems to make less of this danger in 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 18 sqq.

Φείδων μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. 'Pheidon, in fact.' Here, as in ἐνωι μὲν οὖν, 1265 b 33 sqq., and also in 3. 5. 1278 a 6 sq., μὲν οὖν introduces a confirmation of what has preceded, in order to emphasize the sentence introduced by δὲ. The arrangements of the Laws are said to be the opposite of those of Pheidon, because Pheidon, though careless as to the equality of the lots, fixed for ever both the number of households in his city and the number of citizens, whereas Plato equalizes the lots and fixes the number of households, but does not effectually fix the number of citizens (cp. 1265 a 38, ἀποσον δὲ καὶ τὸ τάτα κτῆσις ιδαίζωτα τὸ περὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζων, ἀλλ' ἀφεῖναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀδριστον). Under Pheidon's scheme no pauper citizens would exist: Plato, on the contrary, takes no effectual means for preventing their existence. Is Pheidon's early date mentioned to indicate surprise that Plato took no better means than he did of preventing the existence of paupers within the citizen-body? If Pheidon legislated for Corinth, we can understand how it came to send forth so many colonies in early days. Aristotle would go farther, however, than Pheidon; he would not be content with excluding the over-plus from citizen-
ship, but would prevent it from coming into existence. 'Ο Κορίνθιος is probably added to distinguish this Pheidon from the better known tyrant of Argos (7 (5). 10. 1310 b 26). Compare with the aims of Pheidon those of Philolaus, who also was a Corinthian (c. 12. 1274 b 4 sq.). We learn from Isaeus de Apollodori Hereditate § 30 (quoted by Caillemer, Succession légitime à Athènes, p. 133), that the Attic law required the Archon to take care that no house was left without a representative (καὶ οὗ μόνον ἴδια ταῦτα γυνώσκουσιν, ἄλλα καὶ δημοσία τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὗτο ταῦτ’ ἐγκαθιστήσει νόμω χάρ τοῦ ἀρχοντὶ τῶν οἰκῶν, ὅπως ἄν μὴ ἔξερημάτωι, προστάτει τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν). But Pheidon went much further than this; he fixed not only the number of households, but also the number of the lots and the number of the citizens. Lycurgus is conceived to have fixed the number of households and lots in Plutarch, Agis 5. 1.

13. ὅν νομοθέτησ τῶν ἀρχαίοτάτων. For the gen. see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 533. 1.

14. οἰκος, used of households especially as owning property: see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, E. T. p. 142 n. (who refers to Xen. Oecon. 1. 4–5), and Holden’s Index to the Oeconomicus, p. 95*. Here perhaps something of this meaning is present; elsewhere, however, e.g. in 1. 7. 1255 b 19 and 1. 2. 1252 b 14, the difference between οἶκος and οἰκία seems hardly traceable.

Ἰσός, ‘as they originally were’? or ‘at their original number’? If the former, the primitive distribution of property, as well as the primitive number of households, would be stereotyped; if the latter, only the primitive number of households. Perhaps this is all that is meant.

15. ἄνισος ... κατὰ μέγεθος. For the severance, cp. de Part. An. 4. 8. 683 b 28, τούτων δ’ ἐκάστον πλείω εἶδη ἐστὶ διαφέρουσα οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν μορφήν ἄλλα καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος πολύ, and see below on 1265 b 29.

16. τοῖς νόμοις τούτοις recurs in 18, and also in 1266 a 1.

tοῦδαντίον. See above on 12.


18. ἀλλελειπται δὲ κ.τ.λ. At first sight it seems surprising that Aristotle digresses here to the subject of οἱ ἀρχοντες from that of the property and numbers of the citizens, with which he has been dealing, for he returns to the subject of their property in 21, but the reason for this is that he has just been mentioning an omission (a 38–b 17), the omission to regulate τεκνωσία, and now he has another omission to mention, the omission to explain distinctly
in what way the rulers are to be different from the ruled. Hence the καὶ before τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀρχαντας.

19. δόσει. So Π² Bekk.: Μˢ Π¹ δόσ. In either case 'how' will be the translation. Giph. (p. 201): 'hoc tantum Plato... magistratus privatis antecellere et meliores esse debeere, universe et confuse, similitudine suo more adhibita, monuit.' Aristotle would have been glad if Plato had spoken more definitely and in detail on this subject.

ἐσοναι διαφέροντες. See above on 1259 b 11.

φησι. 'Plato, Legg. 734 E: non tamen prorsus neglegere debuit Aristoteles quae Plato disseruit 961 A sqq.: 951 E sqq.' (Sus.¹). Some few of the citizens are to receive a more scientific training in arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy than the rest (Laws 818 A). In 632 C we find the guardians of the State described as of two kinds—φύλακας ἐπιστήμην, τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονίμιας, τοὺς δὲ δὴ ἀληθοὺς ὅδης ἱστασα—so that even the 'warp' of the State will apparently be of two textures, and this is confirmed by 961 A sqq. and 951 E sqq.

20. τῆς κράτους, called ἐφυπή in Laws 734 E.

21. For the repetition of δεῖν, compare the repetition of δῆλον in 3. 13. 1283 b 16 sqq., of ἔργον in 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 33 sqq., and the addition of ἑτέρος in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 16 and ἐκεῖνος in 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 17. See also above on 1261 b 8.

22. πενταπλασίας. Sepulv. p. 43 b—'mirum est Aristotelem ad quintuplum dicere, cum in libro quinto de legibus Plato ad quadruplum dicat, nisi forte, quod suspicor, vito librariorum factum est ut in Aristotelicis exemplaribus πενταπλασία scriptum sit pro τετραπλασία:' Sus.²—'immo τετραπλασίας, v. Plat. Legg. 744 E, cf. 754 D sqq.: errorem ipsius Aristotelis esse, non librariorum, inde appareb quod idem repetitur 7. 1266 b 5 sqq.' Plato's words, Laws 744 E, are—μέτρον δὲ αὐτὸν (i.e. τὸν ὅρων = τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τιμῆν) θέμενος δ' νομοθέτης διπλάσιον εἴπει τούτου κατάθα και τριπλάσιον καὶ μέχρι τετραπλασίον. He would seem therefore, as Prof. Jowett points out (Politics of Aristotle 2. 1. 63), to permit the acquisition of property four times the value of the lot in addition to the lot, so that the richest man in the State would be, as Aristotle says (c. 7. 1266 b 5 sqq.), five times as rich as the poorest, who has nothing but the lot. The passage 754 D sqq., to which Sus. refers, does not seem to bear on the subject, if Stallbaum's interpretation of it is correct. Μειώνα 22 appears (cp. τῆς ἀλοχίστης, 1266 b 6) to mean 'greater than the minimum with which every citizen starts' (i.e. the lot).
23. διὰ τι κ.t.l. 'Why should not an increase be allowed in respect of land up to a certain point?' The answer is 'because if a citizen were allowed to add to his landed property, what he gains other citizens must lose; their lots must pass from them or be diminished, and thus, besides an infraction of the laws, the main security against pauperism within the citizen-body, itself not complete (cp. 1265 b 4 sq.), would be still further weakened.'

25. συμφέρει. Eucken de Partic. Usu p. 58: 'particula ita adhibita (i.e. in oratione obliqua) vulgo cum indicativo construuntur, ita ut μὴ indicet eum qui dicat expectare ut affirmetur sententia, μὴ οὐ ut negetur—cf. Pol. 5 (8). 5. 1339 b 42 : Phys. 8. 6. 259 b 3: Eth. Nic. 8. 9. 1159 a 6.' Some MSS. (not the best) have συμφέρη, and it is possible that the Vet. Int. ('ne forte non expedit') found it in his Greek text. The subjunctive occurs in this construction in only four other passages of Aristotle, if we exclude the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum: these are Rhet. 2. 20. 1393 b 19: Top. 6. 9. 147 a 21: Metaph. M. 4. 1079 b 6: Metaph. N. 3. 1090 b 8 (Weber, Die Absichtssätze bei Aristoteles, p. 16: see also Eucken, ubi supra).

ἐνειμε. 'Plat. Legg. 745 E: 775 E sqq., cf. 848: at mirum est hoc loco idem in Platone ab Aristotele reprehendi, quod ipse instituit, 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 14 sqq.' (Sus.1). But Aristotle's words in that passage are δύο κλήρων έκάστο τεμπότων—two lots, not necessarily two houses. The object of Plato in this arrangement seems to have been to provide a means of settling the married son in a separate household of his own (Laws 776 A). Aristotle would probably approve the separation, but perhaps in his State there would be little need for the arrangement, for if the father were 37 years of age when he married, and the son waited to marry till he was 37, he would not be very likely to marry in his father's lifetime. At any rate, Aristotle does not provide for the contingency in what we have of the Politics.

26. διελὼν χωρίς. Vict. 'distinctas separatasque.'

χαλεπῶν δὲ οἰκίας δύο οίκευ. Cp. Demosth. in Boeot. de Nomine, c. 26, εἰ γάρ οὖν διαπηρό ήν ὅστε γάμφις γεγαμηκός τὴν ἐμὴν μητέρα ἐτέραν εἶχε γυναῖκα, ἦς υμεῖς ἔτει, καὶ δύο οἰκίας ἤκει, πῶς ἀν ἄργυρων ταῦτας ἄν κατέλειπαν;

26 sqq. Here Aristotle passes from the subject of the citizens, their numbers and property; to that of the constitution. His objections to the constitution described in the Laws are as follows. It is not the next best after that which Plato places first, for it aims at being a polity, which is a constitution compounded of two constitutions, whereas an ἄριστακρατία like the Lacedaemonian, which is'
compounded of three, is better. Nor again (1266 a 5 sqq.) does it answer to Plato's own account of the best constitution, for this is compounded, according to him, of monarchy and democracy, whereas the constitution of the Laws is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy and leans rather to oligarchy.

27. βουλεται μὲν. This μὲν appears to emphasize βουλεται and to imply that success is not attained; we see, however, from 1266 a 7, μᾶλλον δ' ἐγκλίνειν βουλεταὶ πρὸς τὴν δημοκρίαν, that, in Aristotle's view, the constitution of the Laws hardly remains true even in aim to a midway course between oligarchy and democracy.


29. εἰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν ('now while') here introduces an admission which does not exclude, but rather lends fresh emphasis to, a coming criticism introduced by δέ. Translate: 'now while, if his view in constructing (1265 a 39) this constitution is that it is the constitution most readily attainable by States.' Ὅσα καυσοτάτην must be taken with ταῖς πόλεσι and with πολιτείας. For the severance of πολιτείας from ὡς καυσοτάτην, cp. 2. 2. 1261 a 15, and see above on 1255 a 21. For καυσοτάτην τῶν ἄλλων, see Boè. Ind. 493 a 3 sq. ('superlativus comparativi vim in se continent, ita ut vel ipsa coniungatur cum genetivo comparativo').

31. εἰ δ' ὡς κ.τ.λ. This is Plato's meaning (Laws 739 E, ἀθανασίας ἐγγύτατα καὶ η μία δευτέρως). 'Ita tamem cum Platone agit Aristoteles, ut videatur id compertum se non liabere; hoc autem facit, ut aequior ipsi videatur' (Vicit). For τὴν πρώτην πολιτείαν, cp. Laws 739 B.

33. ἀριστοκρατικῶτεραν, 'more aristocratic than the State of the Laws' is probably the meaning, not than the Lacedaemonian State. Aristotle is inclined to regard the State of the Laws as leaning too much to oligarchy (1266 a 7).

ἔνωι μὲν οὖν, 'some, in fact': see note on 1265 b 12. Who these inquirers were, is not known; they seem to have recognized only three constitutions, monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy; neither Socrates nor Plato, therefore, can well be referred to, though Plato (Laws 691 C–693 E; cp. 773 C–D) praises the Lacedaemonian constitution for tempering the 'strong wine' of royalty with a senate representing age and sobriety, and with the Ephorate representing the democratic principle of the lot or something like it. There is a nearer approach to the views of these ἔνωι in the doubt expressed by Megillus, the Spartan interlocutor in the Laws (712 D), whether to call the Lacedaemonian constitution a tyranny.
(because of the Ephorate) or a democracy or an aristocracy or a kingship. On the difference between their conception of mixed government and that of Aristotle something has already been said, vol. i. p. 264, and above, p. xiii. Whether Aristotle agrees with them in regarding the senate as an oligarchical element in the constitution, is not quite clear, for though in 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 18 sq. he describes the mode of electing the senators as δυναταινυτική, he elsewhere says of the senate, ἄλλαν ἢ ἀρχή αὕτη τῆς ἀρετῆς ἑταίρων (2. 9. 1270 b 24). He clearly, however, did not agree with them in their view that the Lacedaemonian constitution was a mixture of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, for he speaks of it as a mixture of virtue (or aristocracy) and democracy in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 16 sq. With the passage before us 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 18–24 should be compared, where other grounds for finding a democratical and an oligarchical element in this constitution are mentioned.

38. δημοκρατεῖσθαι. Bonitz remarks on this passage (Ind. 174 b 54), 'ubi subjectum non additur, δημοκρατεῖσθαι non multum differt a δημοκρατίαν εἶναι;' and he refers to 40 and to 7 (5). i. 1301 b 16. It is not, however, quite certain that τὴν πολιτείαν should not be supplied: cp. 2. ii. 1273 a 41, where Π' are probably right in reading ταιτην οὖχ οἷον τε βεβαιως δραστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν, and 7 (5). i. 1301 b 14 sqq.

39. κατά, 'in respect of': cp. τῶν κατ' ἀρετήν ἡγεμονικῶν, 3. 17. 1288 a 11.

ἐκ τοῦ δήμου. For this mention of a demos in the Lacedaemonian State, cp. c. 9. 1270 b 8, 18, 25: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 30. It is not meant that the ephors were always taken from the demos, but that all citizens were eligible (cp. c. 9. 1270 b 25, καθιστασαι γὰρ ἐξ ἀπάντων). As to the distinction between 'people' (or οἱ τυγχάνοντες, c. 9. 1270 b 29) and καλῶι κἀγαθοί (1270 b 24), see Schémann, Opusc. Acad. 1. 108 sqq.: 'non Homoeos illis qui ἐπουμελῶνερ ερατ opponit, sed in ipsis Homoeis alios καλῶι κἀγαθῶι esse inruit, alios autem in quos haec appellatio non conveniat ... Dignitatis tantum atque existimationis discriminem est' (p. 138). See 6 (4) 9. 1294 b 29 sq.


1266 a. 1. ἐν δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'Aristotle understands this last principle' (that the best constitution should be a compound of monarchy and democracy) 'somewhat differently from what Plato seems to have intended' (Grote, Plato 3. 363 n.). Plato says (Laws 693 D)
that μοναρχία (not τυραννίς) and δημοκρατία are the two mother-forms of constitution, Persia being an extreme example of the former, and Athens of the latter: δεὶ δὴ οὖν καὶ ἄναγκαιων μεταλαβεῖν ἁμφῶν ταύτων, εἶπέρ ἐλευθερία τ' ἔσται καὶ φιλία μετὰ φρανῆσεως: that is to say, a good constitution should partake of each of the two mother-forms (not of their extreme phases), or as he expresses it in 692 Α, the fiery self-willed strength of birth (ἡ κατὰ γένος αὐθάδης ἁρμή) must be tempered by the sobriety of age and checked by an approach to the principle of the lot. In other words, the force of authoritative hereditary government and the tempering element of freedom ought to find a place in every good State. It is doubtful from the sequel whether Plato intended to represent monarchy, even in its milder form, as an essential ingredient. Thus in Laws 756 Ε he describes his scheme for the election of councillors as 'a mode of election midway between monarchy and democracy,' though it is hard to see anything in it which could in strictness be called monarchical. He certainly never meant that a good State must be an union of tyranny and extreme democracy, of which forms alone it could be said that they are the worst of constitutions or not constitutions at all. Aristotle here seems to confound democracy with extreme democracy, for he elsewhere speaks of democracy in general as the least bad of the παρεξήγαγες (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 19: Pol. 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 4 sqq.).

Déon. It is possible that ἕστι should be supplied with δέον here, as in Eth. Nic. 2. 7. 1107 a 32 and 7. 3. 1145 b 28. Bonitz, however, is apparently inclined to emend the latter passage and to adopt a different reading from that of Bekker in the former (see Ind. 168 a 50 sqq.).

3. As to tyranny, cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 28 sq. : 6 (4). 2. 1289 b 2. Aristotle must refer, as has been said already, to the extreme democracy (cp. 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31 : 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 36), which is called in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 14 ἡ μάλιν' εἶναι δικοῦσα δημοκρατία, but he nowhere else seems to treat the extreme democracy as worse than the extreme oligarchy: both are διαμεταί τυραννίδες, 7 (5). 10. 1312 b 37.

4. ἢ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The ἄριστοκρατία, which is a mixture of ὁ εὐπορος, ὁ ἄριστος, and ὁ καλὸς κάγαθος, or of πλοῦτος, ἐλευθερία, and ἄρετή, is superior to the polity, which combines only ὁ εὐπορος and ὁ ἄριστος (πλοῦτος and ἐλευθερία): cp. 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 15 : 7 (5). 7. 1307 a. 7 sqq. Each of the three elements—πλοῦτος, ἐλευθερία, ἄρετή—is the ἄρετος of a constitution (1294 a 10): hence the ἄριστοκρατία may be
said to combine three constitutions. It is true that a constitution combining only two of the three elements is admitted (6 (4). 7. 1293 b. 16) to be ἀριστοκρατική, but this is not Aristotle's usual account of the ἀριστοκρατία. Susemihl, following Riese, brackets ἡ γὰρ—βελτίων: he is inclined, indeed, to question with Schmidt the authenticity of the whole passage 1265 b 29, εἰ—1266 a 6, δημοκρατικά (Qu. Crit. p. 370). His reason for bracketing ἡ γὰρ—βελτίων is that the view expressed in this clause cannot have been held by Aristotle, who would regard, for instance, a combination of aristocracy and democracy, or even of oligarchy and democracy, as better than a combination of oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny (Sus.², Note 222). The clause seems certainly open to this objection, but perhaps the contrast present to Aristotle's mind is that which he has just drawn between an ἀριστοκρατία like the Lacedaemonian and a polity like that of Plato's Laws.

5. οὐδ' ἐξουσία φαίνεται. See note on 1261 a 9.

7. τὴν δηλαγραφίαν, as in c. 11. 1273 a 22 (contrast 1273 a 6).

9. ἐξ ἄρετῶν κληρωταῖς. 'In the appointment of members of the Boulê, of the astynomi, and of the judges of competitions, Laws 756 B–E: 763 D sq.: 765 B–D' (Sus.², Note 223). As to κοινῶν ἄμφων, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 6 sqq.

10. ἐκκλησιάζειν. 'Plato, Legg. 764 Α', Sus.¹—compulsory for the first and second classes only. See 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 17 sqq., where provisions of this nature are reckoned among δηλαγραφικά σοφιστατὰ τῆς νομοθεσίας.

φέρειν ἀρχοντα. 'In reality, only in the election of the judges of gymnastic competitions (Laws 765 C), and also of the Boulê (Laws 756 B–E), and Aristotle has not yet come to the subject of the Boulê' (Sus.², Note 225).

11. τούτο δὲ takes up τὸ δὲ κ.τ.λ.: see Bon. Ind. 166 b 58 sqq.

12. καὶ τὸ πειράζειν κ.τ.λ. So the astynomi and agoranomi must belong to the first or second class (763 D–E); the three hundred names from which the Nomophylakes are selected are to be chosen by those who are serving or have served in war as hoplites or horse-soldiers, and hoplites and horse-soldiers were well-to-do, substantial people (753 B sqq.); the superintendent of education is to be chosen by the magistrates out of the Nomophylakes (766 B); the select judges are to be chosen by the magistrates out of their own number (767 C–D). As to the Nocturnal Council, see 951 D–E.

13. καὶ τὰς μεγίστας κ.τ.λ. 'Haec falsa sunt, v. Plat. Legg. 753 B sqq.: 755 B sqq.: 766 A sq.: 945 E sqq.' (Sus.¹). It is true
that selection from the two highest classes is enforced only in the
cases of the astynomoi and the agoranomoi, but Plato probably counted
on his arrangements proving adequate to secure the same result as
to the Nomophylakes (for these needed at least as much as the
Astynomoi to be at leisure to attend to public affairs—cp. καὶ τοῦ-
των, 763 D), and therefore as to the superintendent of education,
the select judges, and the Nocturnal Council. On the other hand,
the emphasis with which Plato insists on high excellence in his
magistrates, especially in reference to the superintendent of edu-
cation (ἄριστος ἐς πάντα, 766 A) and the priests of Apollo (πάντη
ἄριστον, 946 A), seems to negative Aristotle’s charge that the con-
titution approaches oligarchy. Still, in Aristotle’s view, an
ἄριστοκρατία selects the best ἐκ πάντων, not ἐκ τῶν ἀφωρισμένων (6
14. καὶ, ‘as well as the choice of ἄρχοντες.’ The distinction
between membership of the Boulê and ἄρχη is not always main-
tained: cp. 7 (5). 6. 1306 b 8. As to the election of members of
the Boulê, see Laws 756 B sqq.
15. ἀλλ’ seems to answer to μὲν (see Sus.1, Ind. Gramm. s. v. μὲν).
It introduces a limitation of what has just been said, as in Eth.
Nic. 10. 5. 1176 a 21, ἢδεα δ’ οὐκ ἑστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτους καὶ οὕτω διακεi-
16. ἐκ τῶν τρίτων. Should we supply τιμημάτων here with Mr.
Eaton, or is τῶν τρίτων masc.? The same question arises with
regard to τῶν τρίτων ἡ τετάρτων, 17, and τοῖς πρῶτοι καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις,
18. In the passage of the Laws, the substance of which Aristotle
is here reproducing (756 B sqq.), Plato has ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων,
ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων τιμημάτων, ἐκ τῶν τρίτων τιμημάτων, and lastly ἐκ τοῦ
tetártou timhammadatos, and if he changes without apparent cause from
the plural to the singular, it is possible that Aristotle, who has
hitherto used the singular (τοῦ πρῶτου τιμήματος, τοῦ δευτέρου τιμήματος,
15 sq.), may change from the singular to the plural. It is, how-
ever, also possible that τῶν τρίτων may be masc., and mean ‘the
members of the third class.’
17. πλὴν οὖ πᾶσιν ἐπάναγκες ἦν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἡ τετάρτων.
Here again the doubt arises whether τιμημάτων should be supplied
with τῶν τρίτων ἡ τετάρτων, or whether these words are of the mas-
culine gender. Πᾶσιν has universally been taken to agree with τοῖς
ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἡ τετάρτων, and if we thus take it, τιμημάτων must be
supplied, and the meaning of the sentence will be, ‘but Plato did
not make voting compulsory [in elections from the third class] on
all the members of the third and fourth classes.’ This is a strange
way of expressing the fact that Plato compelled the three higher classes alone to vote in elections from the third, and it is not surprising that extensive alterations have been suggested in the MS. text. But is it absolutely certain that πᾶων agrees with τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἤ τετάρτων? May not the meaning of the passage be—

'but Plato did not make voting compulsory on all in the case of those elected from the thirds or fourths,' or, if we supply τιμημάτων, 'from the third or fourth classes'? For the dative τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἤ τετάρτων, if we understand it thus, cp. 1. 8. 1256 b 34, τοῖς ἅλλωσ τέχναις (in the case of other arts), and [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 5, εἰκὼς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, and see Bon. Ind. 166 b 26–38. Πᾶων is no more bound to be in agreement with τοῖς κ.τ.λ. than ταύτης with τῆς ἱγεμονίας in 7 (5). 4. 1304 a 22–23: see for other instances of the same thing de Part. An. 4. 9. 685 a 9: 3. 1. 662 a 9. If, however, the interpretation of τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἤ τετάρτων which I have ventured to suggest should be thought inadmissible, I would propose the omission of τοῖς: αἰφεῖσθαι will then need to be supplied, as in the next sentence. See Susenheim's apparatus criticus, and Qu. Crit. p. 370 sqq., for the emendations which have been already proposed. As to ἡν, cp. 1. 12. 1259 a 37.

18. ἐκ δὲ [τοῦ τετάρτου] τῶν τετάρτων. The probability is that τοῦ τετάρτου and τῶν τετάρτων are alternative readings, which have been by some misadventure admitted together into the text. See critical note for other instances of the same thing. It is hardly conceivable that Aristotle wrote 'from the fourth class of the fourths,' and the only remaining alternative is to adopt Victorius' conjecture of τῶν τετάρτων, which Sepulveda found in some MSS.—there also probably a conjectural emendation.

19. ἐκ τοὺτων, 'from the persons so elected.'

20. οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ βελτίους. These words seem to go together as the subject of the sentence. For οἱ ἐκ τ. μ. τιμημάτων, cp. Plato, Laws 756 D, τὸν ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ τρίτου τιμήματος ... τῶν δ' ἐκ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πρῶτου. Βελτίους, 'the more respectable': cp. 3. 13. 1283 a 36. That these words refer not to the elected but to the electors, is evident from Plato's use of them; besides, the μέγιστα τιμήματα (i.e. the first and second, 13) will number in the Boulê exactly as many representatives as the third and fourth. Not only most of the magistrates will belong to the well-to-do classes (1266 a 12), but also most of the voters in the election of members of the Boulê.

23. τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν, 'the constitution of which we have spoken,' i.e. τὴν δρίστην, 1266 a 2. The conclusion here arrived at
is considered by Aristotle to be established, partly by what he has said in 1266 a 3, and partly by the failure of Plato to construct his State in the way in which he had announced that it ought to be constructed. We need not infer from 1266 a 4, that the best constitution of Aristotle will be a compound of more constitutions than two; all that Aristotle says is, that a constitution compounded of more than two is better than a constitution compounded of two only. It is evident from the passage before us, as well as from the commencement of the Second Book, that Aristotle is looking forward to an inquiry as to the best constitution.

26. καὶ περὶ τὴν αἰρέσιν τῶν ἄρχοντων, i.e. as well as in the election of members of the Boulê. For in the election of the Boulê, though Aristotle has not fully described it in the passage before us, the process laid down by Plato is threefold (Laws 756 B sqq.):—first, an equal number of individuals is to be nominated by election from each class in the manner he prescribes: next, all the citizens are to select out of those thus nominated 180 persons from each class: thirdly, half of these are to be taken by lot. Thus Plato's scheme for the election of the Boulê is one which involves τῷ ἀιρετῷ αἰρετοῖς, and Aristotle implies by καὶ that this is a perilous way of electing a Boulê. Plato employs the same method in the selection of the Nomophylakes, Laws 753.


29. τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. Aristotle does not meddle with the laws which occupy so large a part of the dialogue (1265 a 1), because his aim is to show that the constitution sketched in it is unsatisfactory, and that there is still room for an effort to suggest a better.

31. πολιτεία. Bern. 'Verfassungsentwürfe.' Aristotle refers to C. 7. constitutional schemes, not to actual constitutions like those of Solon and Lycurgus.

The word ἰδιώτης is used by Aristotle both in contrast with such terms as ἄρχων (6 (4). 16. 1300 b 21) or οἱ τὰ κοινὰ πράττοντες καὶ πολιτευόμενοι (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 1), and in contrast with οἱ εἰδότες (3. 11. 1282 a 11: cp. Plato, Soph. 221 C, Protag. 322 C). Here both these contrasts seem to be combined: we find the former of the two in c. 11. 1273 a 35 and c. 12. 1273 b 29. The distinction of the ἰδιώτης and the philosopher survives in Cicero (Vict. quotes
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pro Sesto 51. 110) and in Epictetus (Arrian, Epictet. 3. 19)—see Grote, Plato 3. 130 n.

33. καὶ καθ᾽ ὡς κ. τ. λ. Vict. ‘est quasi declaratio antecedentis illius nominis.’

34. οὐδὲς γὰρ κ. τ. λ. We read of the Cynic Diogenes in Diog. Laert. 6. 72, ἐλέγε δὲ καὶ κανόνες εἶναί δεῖν τὰς γυναῖκας, γάρ μαν μηδένα νομίζων, ἀλλὰ τὸν πείσαντα τῇ πεισόδη (πεισόδη conj. H. Stephanus) συνείπειν κανόνες δὲ διὰ τούτο καὶ τῶν νεῖσα; but if this view was expressed in the Πολιτεία which passed under his name (Diog. L. 6. 80: Henkel, Studien p. 9), Aristotle knows nothing of it. The work must either have been spurious or of a later date than this passage. Zeno of Citium taught a community of women among the wise in his Πολιτεία (Diog. L. 7. 131), and was followed by Chrysippus (ibid.), but this would be after the time of Aristotle. The Ecclesiazusae of Aristophanes was not a Πολιτεία. Aristotle, however, mentions in 2. 3. 1262 a 19 sqq. that some Libyans had women in common, and he might have mentioned other instances of this, just as he notices the customs of some barbarous tribes in relation to community of property (c. 5. 1263 a 1 sqq.): see for instance Hdt. 4. 104, and Strabo’s report (p. 302) of the stories of Ephorus about some Scythian tribes—εἰδ’ αἰτιολογεὶ διότι ταῖς διαίταις εὐτελεῖς ὄντες καὶ αὖ χρηματισταὶ πρὸς τε ἄλλους εὐνομοῦντα, κανών πίνακες ἔχοντες τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τέκνα καὶ τὴν δηλον συγγένειαν, πρὸς τε τοὺς ἑκατον ἄμαχα i. e. καὶ ἀνίκητοι, οὐδὲν ἔχοντες υπὲρ αὐτοῦ δουλεύσουσι. Cp. also Ephor. Fr. 53 and Strabo p. 775. Euripides in the Protesilaus (Fr. 655 Nauck) had made one of his characters say,

Κατὰ πάντα, ὅπως ἐναὶ φρίτη γυναικῶν λέχοι.

indeed, we are told by Polybius, that among the Lacedaemonians καὶ πάντως ἦν καὶ συνῆθες πρεῖς ἀνδρας ἔχων τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τέκνας, τοῖς δὲ καὶ πλείους ἀδέλφους ὄντας, καὶ τὰ τέκνα τούτων εἶναι κανών (12. 6b. 8 Hultsch). In c. 12. 1274 b 9, the plan of a community in property as well as in women and children is spoken of as special (ἵνων) to Plato; here only the latter.

36. ἀπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀρχονταί. The authors of constitutional schemes before the time of Plato seem to have made their special care the supply of the necessary wants of their citizens. (It is not clear how far this is true of Hippodamus.) Plato, though he too attaches great importance to questions relating to property (Laws 736 C sqq.), did not lose sight of higher things. Cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 27, where τὰ ἀναγκαῖα are contrasted with τὰ εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περισοτίαι and are said to be attended to first. Plato has some remarks in Laws 630 E on the way in which the legislators of his
own day approached their task. For ἀρχονταὶ, cp. de Sensu i. 436 a 19—b 1: Top. i. 14. 105 b 12—15. Their starting-point was also their main point, as the next sentence shows. Cp. Isocr. Areopag. §§ 44—45.

38. ποιεῖσθαι. We have ποιοῦσιν στάσιν, 7 (5). 4. 1304 b 4, but ποιοῦνται τὰς ἐπιθέσεις, 7 (5). 10. 1312 a 20, and στασιωτικὸς ποιησμένων τὴν κάλασιν, 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 38. See on phrases of this kind Shilleto, Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 103, where he says—‘any verb in Greek may be resolved into the cognate substantive with ποιεῖσθαι.’

39. τοῦτο' perhaps means the regulation of property with a view to prevent civil discord. Bern. ‘dahin zielende Vorschläge.’ Others, who must probably be earlier in date than Phaleas (for he is contrasted with τῶν παλαι τῶν in 1266 b 16), e.g. Pheidon the Corinthian (c. 6. 1265 b 12), had sought to regulate property. According to Henkel, Studien p. 36, who refers to Roscher, Thucydides p. 247, Anm. i, Phaleas was an older contemporary of Plato.

40. τὰς κτήσεις, ‘landed property’ (1267 b 9), as in c. 6. 1265 a 38 and 4 (7). 9. 1329 a 18.

1. κατοικισμούνας is probably not to be taken with χαλεπῶν, but 1266 b, rather in the sense of ‘for,’ or possibly ‘in the case of.’

οὗ χαλεπῶν ζητο. It would seem from this that even in the foundation of colonies unequal lots of land were often given. πόλεις must be supplied here and πόλεις in the next line. This is a word which Aristotle often omits: thus πόλη is to be supplied in c. 9. 1269 a 34: τὴν πόλιν in c. 11. 1272 b 37: πόλεις in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 37 and 3. 6. 1278 b 12.

τὰς δ' ἡδὴ κατοικουμένας, sc. πόλεις ἀναμίλετοι. Cp. for this phrase Ἀριστ. 3. 11. 1412 a 16, καὶ τὸ ἀναμαλάθηκας τὰς πόλεις.

3. τῷ τὰς προϊκὰς κ.τ.λ. Rich men were to give dowries when their daughters married poor men, but not to accept them from the parents of the bride, if poor, when they or their sons married. Poor men were never to give dowries, but only to receive them. Aristotle does not criticise this regulation, but it appears to make it the interest of rich fathers to marry their daughters to rich men; thus it tends to defeat its own object. An additional regulation compelling rich families to intermarry with poor ones would seem to be needed. This scheme of equalizing landed property by regulations as to dowries implies that dowries were often given in land, and also that they were often large, as we know from other sources that they were. We see also that poor fathers commonly gave dowries as well as rich ones. Plato abolishes dowries
altogether in the Laws (742 C: 774 C). Vict. remarks, 'in mentem hoc etiam venit Megadoro Plautino,' and quotes Plaut. Aulul. 3. 5. 4:

Nam meo quidem animo, si idem faciant ceteri
Oppulentiores, pauperiorum filias
Ut indotatas ducant uxores domum:
Et multo fiat civitas concordior
Et invidia nos minore utamur quam utimur,
Et illae malam rem metuant, quam metuunt, magis,
Et nos minore sumptu simus quam sumus.

The absence of a dowry, however, would be much felt by the wife, owing to the facility of divorce in Greece: cp. Menand. Sentent. 371, τῆς ἱππείας δ' ἀπροκοσ ὧν ἔχει παρρησίαν, and see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Antiqq. 3. § 30. 16, who quotes this line. See also vol. i. p. 177 sq.

6. ἐὰς, sc. τὸ τῆς υἱόσις πλῆθος (cp. ἐατέων, 1267 b 13). Plato, however, would seem, no less than Phaleas, to have equalized the landed property of his citizens (Laws 737 C, τὴν τοῦ γῆν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις ἀπὸ μόλιστα ὡς ἐπινεμητέον). Phaleas himself did not meddle with anything but land (1267 b 9 sq.), but this may well have been an oversight, for his views clearly pointed to an equality in all kinds of property. If so, he went, in intention at all events, farther than Plato.

πλείον δὲ κ.τ.λ. Literally, 'to acquire to a larger extent than would leave his property five times the size of the smallest.' As to πνευματικά, see note on 1265 b 22, the passage referred to in πράτερον.

12. ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ., 'the abrogation of the law must of necessity follow': 'neque enim pati poterunt patres filios suos esurire' (Vic.). Some render λυσθαυ 'be broken,' but the following passages, collected by Bonitz (Ind. 439 a 5)—2. 8. 1269 a 15: 7 (5).

7. 1307 b 10: 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 31—seem to point rather to 'abrogation' as the meaning. Cp. also c. 8. 1268 b 30, νάμων λόγον ἡ πολιτείας, and 1269 a 15, τὸ δ' ἐθίζειν εἰκήρως λύειν τοὺς νάμων φαλὸν.


14. διδότι, 'that.'

μὲν οὖν here, as in 1265 b 29 and elsewhere, introduces an admission which lends emphasis to the criticism introduced by ἄλλα, 24. What the main value of equality of property is, appears from c. 9. 1270 a 38. Another useful effect of laws of this kind is mentioned in 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 6 sqq.
18. *Phaidon* diewenoktes, ‘clearly have recognized’: see note on 1261 a 9.

17. Σόλων. To what law of Solon’s does this refer? C. F. Hermann (Gr. Antiq. i. § 106. 12) and E. Curtius (Gr. Hist. i. 329 E. T.) take it as referring to some law fixing a maximum limit to the acquisition of land, but Grote (Gr. Hist. 3. 182, ed. 3) thinks that ‘the passage does not bear out such an opinion.’ He seems to hold that Aristotle here only refers to Solon’s ‘annulment of the previous mortgages,’ and to the Seisachthia generally. The former view is probably correct, but in any case Solon’s legislation is evidently conceived by Aristotle to have tended to an equality of property. It is deserving of notice that no mention is made of the equality of landed property which Lycurgus is alleged by some authorities to have instituted.

19. Λοκροῖς. According to Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 32 n., the Italian Locrians are meant, and the law was probably among those ascribed to Zaleucus. It appears, unlike the rest, to have applied to property generally (οἰκία), and not merely to land.

21. ἐτὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. It seems better to supply νόμος ἐστὶ from 17, 19 with διασώζειν than to supply some word from κολύσωσιν (19) with the opposite meaning of ‘enjoin.’ Cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 10, ἢν δὲ τὸ γε ἀρχαίον ἐν πολλαῖς πόλεισιν νεομοθετημένον μηδὲ πολεῖν ἐξείναι τοὺς πρῶτους κλήρους. A special protection was given in the Lacedaemonian State to the ‘original share,’ if we may trust Heraclid. Pont. de Rebuspublicis 2. 7, πολεῖν δὲ γυνὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀρχαῖον νεόμοιμαι τῆς δ’ ἀρχαίας μοῖρας οὐδὲ ἔξεστιν. Aristotle approves the discouragement by the Lacedaemonian lawgiver of the sale of landed property (if that is the meaning of ἕ ὑπάρχουσα [γυς?], c. 9. 1270 a 20: cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 13, τὸ μὴ δανεῖσθαι ἐτὶ τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχόντος ἐκαστοῦ γῆς). Pheidon the Corinthian, again, had sought to keep the number of landowners the same. These legislators appear to have endeavoured, like Plato in the Laws, to secure each household in the possession of the original lot. The motive probably was
partly a wish to prevent the impoverishment of old-established households and the civil troubles which were apt to follow, partly a wish to prop up an oligarchical régime, for Plato (Rep. 552 A, 556 A) notices prohibitions of alienation as a means, though one too rarely resorted to, of preserving oligarchies, concentration of wealth in a few hands being regarded by him as commonly the cause of their displacement by democracies.

22. καὶ περὶ λευκάδα, i.e. 'at Leucas to name one instance,' as in i. 12. 1259 b 8. As to περὶ λευκάδα, see Bon. Ind. 579 a 29 sqq.

23. οὗ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The meaning apparently is that men became admissible to office on the strength of half a lot or less, an arrangement suitable enough to an agricultural democracy like Aphytis (8 (6). 4. 1319 a 14 sqq.), but not suitable to an oligarchy, because poor men came to hold office.


33. παιδείας. A remarkable view, probably suggested by Spartan precedents: cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 21, οἷὼν πρῶτον τὸ περὶ τὴν τραφήν τῶν παιδῶν ὁµαίως γὰρ οἱ τῶν πλουσίων τρέφονται τοῖς τῶν πενήτων, καὶ παιδεύονται τῶν τρισάν τούτων δὲ ἀν δύναιτο καὶ τῶν πενήτων οἱ παιδεῖς ὁµαίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἑσοχῆς ἡμικλίας, καὶ οὕτω ἀνθρωποποιεῖται, τῶν αὐτῶν τρίσαν, οὔτε γὰρ ὁδήγησιν ὁ πλούσιος καὶ ὁ πενής. Aristotle is quite with him in this matter (5 (8). 1. 1337 a 21 sqq.).

36. τοιαύτην ἐξ ἕς. See above on 1257 b 15, and cp. 1267 a 24.

38. ἢτι, for which Spengel and Sus.² would read ἐστι, Sus.³ ὢτι; seems defensible. The meaning is,— besides, you need to deal with office in addition to equalizing property, for στάσεις is occasioned not only, as Phaleas and his school think, by questions about property, but also by questions about office. It is as great a trial to a man of high capacity to have to share office equally with his inferiors as it is to a poor man to be starved.’ Compare Jason’s saying (3. 4. 1277 a 24), that it was starvation to him not to be a tyrant. Cp. also Stob. Flor. 45. 21, εἰ τῶν κοινῶν 'Αριστοτέλεως διατριβῶν οἱ πλὴνται στάσεις διὰ φιλοτήτων ἐν τοῖς πόλεσι γίνονται, περὶ τιμῆς γὰρ οἷς οἱ τυχάντες, ἀλλὰ οἱ δυνατώτατοι διαμιμοβοῦσιν.

I. 3. 1095 b 22, oI dè χαράλντες καὶ πρακτικαὶ τιμῆν [προαρινταῖ], and Pol. 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 9, where this quality in the rulers is treated as a security that they will not plunder or outrage the ruled.

ἐν δὲ ἦν κ.τ.λ. Hom. II. 9. 319 is quoted to support by the authority of Homer what has just been said as to the feeling of oI χαράλντες. Cp. Plato, Laws 756 E, δοῦλοι γὰρ ἂν καὶ δεσπόται οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο βίος, οὐδὲ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τιμαῖα διαφερομέναι φιλοί καὶ σπουδαίοι: Eth. Eud. 2. 3. 1221 b 1: and the remarks on constitutions placed by Isocrates in the mouth of Nicocles (Isocr. Nicocles § 14 sqq.).

2. οὐ μόνον δ’. Here there is a transition from στασιδόουσιν, 1266 b 38 to ἄδικοις, 3—from men as citizens to men as moral beings. As inequality of property is not the only cause of civil discord, so neither is it the only cause of ἄδικαι. Aristippus had apparently anticipated a part of what Aristotle says in the passage which follows: see Plutarch, de Cupiditate Divitiarum, c. 3. 524 A sqq., a passage which I do not notice in Mullach’s collection of the Sententiae et Apophthegmata of Aristippus in the Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum. Compare also Cic. de Offic. i. 7. 24—1. 8. 26 (referred to by Giph. p. 217).

3. διὰ τὰ νάγκαν ἄδικοις, δὲν ἄκοις. ἀ’’’ἀκοῖς τινός, genetivo vel id significatur quod avertitur, Pol. 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 26, vel id quod expetitur, Pol. 2. 7. 1267 a 3, 9: 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32’ (Bon. Ind. 26 b 50 sqq.). For this second meaning of the word ἄκοι (‘a means of obtaining’), see Liddell and Scott s. v., and cp. 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32, ἄκοι δὲ τῶν ἡ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἡ τῶν γίνεσθαι ἢττων τὸ τάς φιλοίς φέρειν τοὺς ὀρχώστας, and 2. 11. 1273 b 23, φάρμακαν τῆς ῥουχίας. Bonitz, it will be seen, explains ἄκοι as ‘a means of obtaining’ both here and in 9, and there is much to be said for this view. But on the whole I incline, with the commentators generally, to give it in these two passages its more usual meaning of ‘remedy’ (Sus. ‘Gegenmittel’). ἄν will then refer, not to τῶν ἀναγκαῖων, but to ἄδικοις, which must be supplied from ἄδικοῖς. The view of Phaleas was probably shared by many: cp. 6 (4). 8. 1293 b 38 sq. and [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 5.

4. ὡστε . . . πεινὴν explains δὲν ἄκοι: ‘the result being that no one will be driven to steal clothes by cold and hunger.’

5. ὡστον . . . ἐπιθυμῶσιν. Χαίρωσι is introduced here and not before, because when a man satisfies an absolute need, though he feels pleasure (see de Part. An. 4. 11. 690 b 26—691 a 5), yet pleasure is not his aim. Compare the distinction drawn between μὴ ἀλγεῖν and χαίρειν in Eth. Eud. 2. 8. 1225 a 24: cp. also Rhet,
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1. 12. I 372 b 24, δικασθεί ότι ταύς ταμιότους καὶ τὰ ταιοῦτα ταύς ἔχουσι τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνδείκτης ἢ εἰς τάναγκα ταῖς ἑνεργηθην τοῖς ἀπλασμοῖς.

έκεν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. This passage would be much simplified, if δικασθεί were substituted for ἐπιθυμοῖς in 8, but it is perhaps possible to elicit a satisfactory sense from it as it stands. Taking it as it stands, I incline to translate as follows—'for if men have a desire going beyond mere necessities, they will commit wrongful acts to cure it: nay, not only to cure a desire of this nature, for they may desire superfluities with a view to experiencing painless pleasures.' I follow Lambe and Bern. in my rendering of ὑπ' ἄτοπης. Sepulveda translates these words 'medendi gratia,' apparently interpreting ταύτην as = λατρείαν, not τὴν ταύτης λατρείαν: it would also be possible to supply τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν with ταύτης. For μείζω ἐπιθυμίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων (κ.κ. μείζω ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων), cp. c. 10. 1272 a 28, χείρων τῶν ἐφόρων (κ.κ. χείρων ἢ τὰ ἐφόρων), and see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 781 d. For so τῶν, cp. Xen. Anab. 7. 6. 19, συνέπαιμεν μηδὲ δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ ἔλαβον εἰληφθέντα, µὴ τὰ ταύτα µηδέ ὅσα τῶν λαχαγῶν ἐνια, and Demosth. de Cor. cc. 107, 244. What pleasures are meant by 'painless pleasures,' appears from Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1173 b 16, διόνυσος γὰρ εἶσαι αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς μαθηματικοὶ καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις αὐτῶν τῆς ὑθοφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκραίματα δὲ καὶ ἀράματα πολλά καὶ μηδὲν καὶ ἐκπίδεσι καὶ de Part. An. 1. 5. 645 a 7 sq. Isocrates (ad Demon. §§ 46–47) is already acquainted with the distinction. It has long been noticed that painless pleasures are elsewhere said by Aristotle not to be accompanied by desire (Eth. Nic. 7. 13. 1152 b 36, ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνευ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἡδονα, οἶον αὐτὸν θεορεῖν ἐνέργειας, τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνέδοχεν οὖν: 3. 14. 1119 a 4, μετὰ λύπης ἡ ἐπιθυμία: Eth. Eud. 2. 10. 1225 b 30, ἐτι ἐπιθυμία μὲν καὶ θυμός αἰτὶ μετὰ λύπης). Still an ἐπιθυμία τοῦ θεάσασθαι is spoken of in Rhet. 1. 11. 1370 a 25 sq., and an ἐπιθυμία μαθήσεως in Eth. Nic. 3. 3. 1111 a 31. But here perhaps the question hardly arises, even if we retain ἐπιθυμοῖς, for the desire spoken of in the passage before us is not a desire for the painless pleasures themselves, but for the superfluities through which men sometimes mistakenly seek them. If this is so, it would seem to be unnecessary to adopt any of the emendations of the words καὶ ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖς which have been suggested with the view of meeting this difficulty, among which may be noticed that of Schneider, καὶ ἄν μὴ ἐπιθυμώντων, that of Bojesen, whom Sus. follows, καὶ ἀνευ ἐπιθυμίων καὶ ἀνεπιθιμήτων (cp. Clem. Al. Strom. vii. p. 742 A, B), and that of Bernays, who omits ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖς. With the account here given of the motives of αἰδία, compare (in addition to the passage from the Rhetoric
9. τι οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τοῦτων; For Bonitz' interpretation of ἄκος, see above on 3. The last three words have been translated in many different ways. Lamb. supplies 'malorum,' Vict. 'fomium,' Sepulv. and Giph. 'cupiditatum.' Susemihl translates, 'in allen diesen drei Fällen': Bernays, 'für diese drei Klassen.' Others supply ἀδικημάτων, and, I incline to think, rightly (cp. 16, πρὸς τὰς μικρὰς ἀδικίας βοηθήσω). If we take this view, the translation will be, 'what then is the remedy for these three kinds of wrong-doing?' The three are (1) wrong-doing for the sake of absolute necessaries; (2) wrong-doing for the sake of superfluities with a view to curing painful desire and obtaining pleasure; (3) wrong-doing for the sake of superfluities with a view to obtaining painless pleasure.

11. δι' αὐτῶν χαῖρεν. We expect, not δι' αὐτῶν χαῖρεν, but χαῖρεν ταῖς ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς: Aristotle, however, seems to say that those seekers for painless pleasure who desire to be independent of others for their enjoyment will ask the aid of philosophy, for all other pleasures save that of philosophy (αἱ ἄλλαι, 12) presuppose the assistance of other human beings. He does not absolutely deny that ἑπερβοδαῖ are a means to some sorts of painless pleasure; a tyrant, for instance, may use his power over other men to provide himself with exquisite sculpture or music; but those seekers after painless pleasure who desire to be independent of others will go to philosophy for it (cp. Eth. Nic. 10. 7. 1177 a 27 sqq.).

12. ἐπεὶ ἀδικοῦσί γε κ.κ.λ. 'Other remedies, in short, besides that of Phaleas, are necessary, for...’ For ἐπεὶ...γε, cp. i. 5. 1254 b 34: i. 6. 1255 a 19. In the passage before us ἐπεὶ...γε introduces an evident fact adduced in support of the unexpressed conclusion to which the preceding sentences point—the conclusion that to remove the occasions of ἀδικία something more than a due supply of the necessaries of life is requisite—training, in fact, both moral and intellectual. Both these kinds of training tend to weary the mind from the pursuit of excess—τὰς ἑπερβοδάς, i.e. an excess of wealth, power, glory, and the like (4 (7). i. 1323 a 37–38), or an excess of other goods such as wine and good living (Eth. Nic. 7. 14. 1154 a 15 sqq., referred to by Congreve)—the one by limiting the desires, the other by affording pleasures attainable without command over other human beings; and it is through a craving for excess that men come to commit the worst offences. Men become tyrants, for instance, when they are not content with...
the honours and emoluments of citizen-rulers (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 7); and how great the tyrant's crime is may be gathered from the high honours paid to the tyrannicide.

14. καὶ αἱ τιμαί, 'the honours, as well as the crime the punishment of which they reward.'

15. For the place of ou, see Bon. Ind. 539 a 5 sqq.

17. ὁ τρόπος τῆς Φαλέου πολιτείας. Cp. c. 5. 1264 a 11.

έτι κ.τ.λ. Compare the criticism passed on Plato's Laws in c. 6. 1265 a 18 sqq. Ephorus had already insisted that it is as necessary for a State to possess the qualities which enable it to repel attacks from without as the internal concord (ἡμούνα) which secures it from στάσεις (Diod. 7. 14. 3–4: cp. Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 480), and Aristotle in a similar spirit (cp. Pol. 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 6 sqq.) now goes on to point out that it is necessary to take considerations of national security into account, not only in framing the constitution, but also in reference to the question of the amount of property to be possessed by the members of the State, for if this is too small—and perhaps Aristotle imputes to Phaleas a leaning in this direction, though the latter had said nothing definite—the State will hardly be a match for States similar to itself, while, if the amount is too large, States superior to it in power may well be tempted to attack it. (It is interesting to notice that a Greek State might be too poor to resist attack. In Aristotle's day (4 (7). 11. 1331 a 1 sqq.) the matériel of war had become elaborate and costly.) Thus an ὁρός τῆς οὐσίας is necessary, as he had already said in 1266 b 27; he returns, in fact, to this point, reasserting it on grounds of national security, whereas in the intervening passage, 1266 b 28–1267 a 17, his aim had been to show the insufficiency of even a correct ὁρός τῆς οὐσίας without a correct education. Down to 1267 a 37 Aristotle in criticising Phaleas seeks in the main to point out the latter's errors of omission—he ought to have regulated τεκνοποιία, to have fixed an ὁρός τῆς οὐσίας, to have satisfied the Few as well as the Many, to have instituted a given kind of education, to have taken the security of the State into account: in 1267 a 37–1267 b 9, on the other hand, he deals directly with Phaleas' panacea for στάσεις, and points out how small is its value, indicating at the same time the true remedy. Thus the passage 1267 a 17–37 finds an appropriate place where it stands in the text: to place 1267 a 37–b 13 before it (with Susemihl) as an alternative version of 1266 b 38–1267 a 17 (which it does not seem to me to be) is, surely, to disturb the sequence of the criticisms contained in this chapter. For τὰ πρὸς ἀντίον πολιτείαν καλῶς,
19. For the contrast implied in καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γειτνῶτας καὶ τοὺς ἔξωθεν πάντας, cp. 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 35 sqq. and Thuc. 1. 80. 3.

22. τὰς πολιτικὰς χρήσεις. Vict. 'domesticos usus': cp. 5 (8). 6. 1341 a 8, where, as here, it is contrasted with πολεμικὰς (the sense of πολιτικὸν in c. 6. 1265 a 22 is quite different). Here (cp. 18) the political activities of fellow-citizens in relation to each other are referred to. The citizens of a State must possess a due amount of property (3. 12. 1283 a 17: cp. also 2. 11. 1273 a 24).

24. τοιοῦτον... εὖν. See Vahlen, Aristotel. Aufsätze 2. 21 n., and cp. 1266 b 36. Thasos was a case in point. As to its wealth, see Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens E.T. p. 311. 'The Thasians were compelled to defend their gold mines on the continent from the cupiditv of Athens, which perhaps claimed them as a conquest won from the Persians.' (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 3. 6). Samos also suffered for its fertility in a similar way (Strabo, p. 637).

οἱ πλησίον καὶ κρείττοι. Cp. 1266 a 20, οἱ ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων τιμημάτων καὶ θελτοῦσι, and 1263 b 5, τὸ χαρίσμασθαι καὶ βασιθίσαι.

25. ἀριστέων with the acc. seems to occur but rarely in the writings of Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s.v. and Mr. Ridgeway, Camb. Philol. Trans. 2. 132), but it is less infrequent in those of Plato (see Ast, Lexicon Platon. s.v.).

26. μὲν οὖν ('it is true,' as in 1265 a 17) prepares the way for, and lends increased emphasis to, δὲ δὲ κ.τ.λ. I take the meaning of the passage to be—'Abundant wealth is advantageous' (why it is so, we learn from 1267 a 22—24: cp. 3. 12. 1283 a 17 sq.: 6 (4). 4. 1291 a 33): 'therefore, let us ask abundant wealth for the State, only stopping short of that excessive amount which suffices of itself to attract attack on the part of stronger States, apart from any other causes of war.' Cp. Poet. 7. 1451 a 3, δὲτε δὲι καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄνδρων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος, τὸντο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μῆκος, τὸντο δὲ εὐμημόνευτον εἶναι.

31. οὕτως ὡς ἄν κ.τ.λ., 'but only under circumstances under which they would go to war, even if' etc. In the anecdote which follows Aristotle's principle finds illustration and confirmation. The wealth of Atarneus was not out of proportion to its defensibility. It was not considerable enough to lead stronger States, not influenced by other motives for attacking it, to attack it in the hope of gain, for a long continuance of costly operations would be necessary for its
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reduction. Atarneus was a renowned stronghold, like Pergamon in the same region. As to Eubulus, see Boeckh, Hermias von Atarneus (Ges. Kl. Schriften, 6. 183 sqq.), and Sus. ², Note 247. He was a wealthy Bithynian money-changer, who had got possession of two strong places on the coast of Asia Minor, Atarneus and Assos, at a time when the Persian Empire was falling to pieces. The crisis in his fortunes referred to here must have occurred before he was succeeded—about 352 B.C. according to Boeckh, but certainly not later than 347 B.C.—by Hermias. Boeckh places it as early as 359 B.C. (Ol. 105. 1), when the Persians under Autophradates were operating in this region against the revolted satrap Artabazus. Aristotle, being a friend of Hermias, would be well acquainted with the history of Eubulus, and also with the neighbourhood of Atarneus. For other illustrations derived from this part of the world, see the references in Bon. Ind. 662 b 61 sqq. Autophradates remained a conspicuous Persian leader till 332 B.C., when he disappears from the scene (A. Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 3. 169).

35. ηδη, 'on the spot.'

37. ζτι μὴν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Μὲν οὖν, which is here answered by οὐ μὴν, introduces a summing up on the merits of Phaleas' scheme, which is no longer criticised for not being accompanied by other measures, but considered in itself. Susemihl regards ζτι, 37—ἀδικωντα, 1267 b 8, as a repetition or alternative version of 1266 b 38—1267 a 17, but it hardly seems to repeat 1267 a 2—17, for this passage refers to ἀδικία, not to στάσις, and its teaching does not agree with 1266 b 38—1267 a 2, for there we are led to infer that equality of property would be a remedy for στάσις, so far as the mass of men are concerned, whereas here we are told that the desires of the many are boundless and that a mere sufficiency will fail permanently to satisfy them.


40. καὶ φαίνονται. Not only are the χριστέρες likely to feel irritation, but as a matter of fact they visibly make attacks, etc. (cp. c. 3. 1262 a 18).

1267 b. 1. ἀξιληστον. Cp. Isocr. de Pace, § 7, where Solon, Fragm. 13. 71 sqq. is in the writer's mind.

2. διωβολία. The form found in Attic Inscriptions is διωβελία (so too ἐπιωβελία, ἡμιωβελίαν, ἄβελισκος, ἐβελία), though they have τρϊωβολον, πεντωβολον, δεκαβολον, and the old form ἐβελῶς only once (and that before B.C. 444) takes the place of the usual ὀβελῶς (Meisterhans,
Grammatik der attischen Inschriften, p. 9). All the MSS., however, have διαβολά here. See Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens E. T. p. 216 sqq., where the fact noticed by Aristotle is fully illustrated. Here, as is often the case in the Politics, Athens is glanced at without being referred to by name.

πάτριον, 'a settled, traditional thing.'

3. For ἐως without ἄν with the subj., see Bon. Ind. 307 b 38.

5. τῶν τοιούτων, 'the before-mentioned things': i.e. τοῦ μὴ στασίαζεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τοῦ μὴ δεισάθαι τοῦ πλείους (οὐ τοῦ μὴ πλεονεκτέω, 7). Ἀρχή, which has called forth many emendations, seems to be used in the sense of 'source': cp. 7 (5). i. 1301 b 4: 7 (5). 7. 1307 γ 7: Meteor. i. 14. 351 a 26, ἀρχή δὲ τούτων καὶ αὕτων κ.τ.λ. For the thought, cp. 8 (6). 4. 1319 ι 1 sqq.: 6 (4). i. 13. 1297 b 6 sqq. Compare also Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 16, and the answer of the Pythia to Lycurgus, when he enquired, 'by the establishment of what kind of usages (ποιὰ νόμιμα) he would most benefit the Spartans'—ἐὰν τοὺς μὲν καλῶς ἡγεῖσθαι τοὺς δὲ πειθαρχεῖς νομοθετήσῃ (Diod. 7. 14. 2).

6. ἐπιείκείς ... φαίλουσ. Vict. 'honestiores et humiliores.'

13. ἤ ('aut certe,' Bon. Ind. 313 a 26) τάξιν τινὰ μετρίαν, 'some moderate maximum.'

14. Is ἐκ to be taken with φαίνεται (as Vict. takes it) or with κατασκευάζων (as Bern.)? Probably with the former. 'It is evident from the legislation of Phaleas that he constructs his State (or citizen-body) on a small scale': cp. Meteor. 2. 2. 354 b 15, ἐκ ταύτης δὴ τῆς ἀποφασι καὶ ἀρχῆ τῶν ἄγρων ἠθείων εἶναι καὶ τοῦ παινὸς ὑδατος ἡ ἄλαττα. For τὴν πόλιν (Vict. 'ordo civium'), cp. c. 8. 1267 b 30 and 3. i. 1274 b 41.

15. Phaleas seems to have been as unfavourable to the τεχνώτατος—a far wider term than our 'artisans,' for we hear of τεχνώτατος who were favourites of tyrants, 7 (5). i. 1314 b 4—as Hippodamus was the reverse. Hippodamus, himself one of the class, brings them within the citizen-body (c. 8. 1267 b 32); Phaleas makes them public slaves. The βάναυσοι τεχνώτατος, as we learn from 3. 5. 1278 ι 6 sqq., were in early times in not a few States either slaves or aliens, and this continued to be the case to a large extent down to the time of Aristotle. But Phaleas wished them to be public slaves. We do not learn why he proposed this. When Xenophon proposed in the De Vectigalibus (4. 23) that the Athenian State should invest in τακτον public slaves, and let them out for service in the mines of Laurium, his aim was to increase the revenue of the State. The scheme of Phaleas would obviously have this effect,
for it would secure the State a monopoly of skilled labour, but whether the object of Phales was to enrich the State, is perhaps doubtful. More probably, he wished to keep down an aspiring class, the members of which often acquired considerable wealth (3. 5. 1278 a 24) and would be likely to overshadow or even to buy up his cherished class of small landowners, to say nothing of the difficulty of fixing a maximum to their income. Aristotle, we see, recoils from the strong measure of making all τεχνίται public slaves, but he seems to be willing that οἱ τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζόμενοι (cp. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 36, κατασκευάζειν τι τῶν καυρῶν) should be so. Does this mean 'all workers on public land, buildings, and property' or 'all τεχνίται employed on public property'? It is not clear: perhaps the latter is the more probable interpretation, though, as a matter of fact, Aristotle does make the cultivators of the public land in his own ideal State public slaves (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31). In any case he adds the proviso that even this measure must be carried into effect in a certain way, if it is to have his approval. Diodorus describes (xi. 25. 2 sqq.) how the cities of Sicily, and especially Agrigentum, employed the multitude of Libyan and Carthaginian captives taken after Gelon's victory at Himera in all sorts of public works (αἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰς πέδας κατεύθυναν τοὺς διαρρηθέντας αἰχμαλώτους καὶ τὰ δημόσια τῶν ἔργων διὰ τῶν ἐπεσκέπτων κ.τ.λ.). The work was no doubt cheaply executed, and this would be one of the advantages of employing public slaves for this purpose. Another would be that work would be executed more rapidly and efficiently than if, in accordance with the usual method, a contractor (ἐργολάβος) was employed: see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 42. 8 (ed. 2.). Plato, it may be noted, includes ἐργολάβος among the indications of a φλεγμαίωνον πόλις (Rep. 373 B). On the system of ἐργολάβελα or ἐργωνία, see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 69. 15 (ed. 2.), or in the later edition by Thalheim, Rechtsalt. p. 99. 1, and Dittenberger, Syllloge Inscr. Gr. 2. 481 sqq., 507 sqq. (inser. 353, 367). The scheme of Diophantus would no doubt be unpopular with the many citizens of Athens who were τεχνίται (Büchenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, pp. 325–8), and it probably came to nothing (κατασκευάζε, 18). Whether the Diophantus here referred to is the well-known Athenian statesman of the time of Demosthenes (as to whom, see A. Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, i. 11. 1: i. 182), is quite uncertain. Schömann (Griech. Alterth. i. 365) thinks not.

16. ἀλλ' εἰπέρ κ.τ.λ. I see no cause for any change in the text. ὅσ, which Bekker, following Morel, inserts before Διόφαντος, 18,
rests on no MS. authority and can probably be dispensed with. Aristotle's intention perhaps was to make the sentence run καθάπερ ἐν Ἑσπιδάμω τε καὶ Ἀθηναῖ, but then he remembered that the scheme of Diophantus remained unexecuted.

22. Ἱππόδαμος δὲ Ἐὐρυφάντος Μιλήσιος. Hesychius calls him C. 8. Εὐρυφάντος πάτε: Phoitus, Εὐρυκόντους Μιλήσιοι ἢ Θεόροι (C. F. Hermann, de Hippodamo Milesio, p. 4 sq.). He was one of the colonists of Thurii. We notice that the name of Hippodamus' father is here mentioned, whereas in c. 7. 1266 a 39 Phaleas is simply described as Φάλεας ὁ Χαλκηδώνος. Were there other Milesians who bore the name Hippodamus?

τὴν τῶν πόλεων διαίρεσιν, 'the division of cities into streets' or 'quarters': Bern. 'den Städtebau mit getheilten Quartieren.' Diodorus thus describes the laying-out of Thurii, which was done under the direction of Hippodamus—τὴν δὲ πόλιν διελέμενοι κατὰ μὲν μήκος εἰς τέταρας πλατείας ... κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλάσιον διεἶλον εἰς τρεῖς πλατείας ... ἦπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν στενοτῶν πεπληρωμένων ταῖς οἰκίαις ἡ πόλις ἐφαίνετο καλῶς κατεσκευάσθαι (Diod. 12. 10. 7). For the use of the word πλατεία here, compare the phrase ξενική ὁδός (Hoeck, Kreta 3. 452), which Hoeck explains as 'a strangers' quarter.' C. F. Hermann (de Hippodamo Milesio, p. 52) thinks that when Meton is made in the Aves of Aristophanes (941 sq.) to design an agora at the centre of his city with straight streets converging on it from every point, he reproduces the Hippodameian agora at the Peiraeus, but this seems doubtful, for then Meton's scheme would be nothing new, and much of the point would be lost. Besides, Thurii was not thus laid out.

23. κατέτημεν. See C. F. Hermann, ibid. p. 47. The word is used of 'cutting up' a surface with roads, trenches, or mines: so Strabo (p. 793) says of Alexandria, ἀπάσα μὲν ὁποῦ ὁδὸς κατατέρμησε ἵππηλάτος καὶ ἄρματάτος. In the passage before us ὁδὸς is not expressed. A city laid out in Hippodamus' fashion with straight roads was said to be εὐτυμος, 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 23, 30. This laying out of Peiraeus is not to be confounded with its fortification by Themistocles; it is probably to be referred to the time of Pericles.

24. καὶ περὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίον, 'as well as in his architectural innovations.'

περιττότερος, see note on 1265 a 11. Hippodamus belonged to the stirring generation, active in striking out fresh paths (5 (8). 6. 1341 a 30 sq.), which followed the Persian Wars.

25. περιπεριγέτερον, 'in too studied and overdone a way.' The meaning of the word is well illustrated by its use in a fragment of
Dicaearchus (Fragm. 33 a: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 246), periérgetoν γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη σχηματοποία καὶ προσποιώτος κ.τ.λ. Cp. also Isocr. ad Demon. § 27, εἶναι βεβολόν τὰ περί τὴν έσθήτα φιλάκαλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ καλλω- πιστής ἔστι δὲ φιλοκαλόν μὲν τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς, καλλωπιστοῦ δὲ τὸ periérgetoν. Hippodamus was probably influenced, as will be shown presently, by the teaching of Ion of Chios, who was himself perhaps influenced by Pythagoreanism; but his peculiarities of dress, etc., seem to be characteristic rather of the individual than of any school of opinion, political or philosophical. The Pythagoreans of Hippodamus' day do not seem to have worn long hair: Diodorus of Aspendus, who apparently lived at and after the time of Aristotle, is said to have been the first Pythagorean to wear it after the fashion of the Cynics (Athen. Deipn. 163 c–164 a, τῶν πρὸ αὐτῶν πυθαγορικῶν λαμπρὰ τε ἐσθήτη ἁμφιεσγεμένων καὶ λουριῶς καὶ ἀλείμασι κουρά τε τῇ συνήθει χρωμάτων). Long hair was in Hippodamus' day a mark of Laconism, and it does not surprise us in a Thorian (cp. Philostrat. Vita Apollon. 3. 15, quoted by C. F. Hermann, de Hippodamo p. 20 n., κομμᾶν δὲ ἐπιτηδεύοντας, δισπερ Λακεδαιμόνιον πᾶλι καὶ Θεύρια Ταραττοῦται τε καὶ Μήλιοι καὶ ὁπότα τὸ λακωνίζειν ἢ ἐν λόγῳ), but the expensive adornment of the long hair of Hippodamus points perhaps rather to his Ionic extraction (cp. Thuc. i. 6. 3), if it does not remind us of the θουρμομάντες, λατροτέχνας, σφραγεθονυχαρεκομίταις of Aristoph. Nub. 326. His abundant and expensively ornamented robes would recall the Persian costume (Sept. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1. 148, καὶ Πέρσαι μὲν ἄνθοβοσφεὶ ἐσθήτη καὶ ποδήρει χρησθαὶ νομίζουσιν εὑ- περέτες εἶναι, ἤμετρον δὲ ἀπερετές), or the Ionian (Tim. Fr. 62 : Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 206), or the garment which Zeuxis, a resident at Ephesus, wore at the Olympic festival, into the fabric of which his name was woven in gold letters (Plin. Nat. Hist. 35. 62), were it not that they were of cheap material and that he made a point of wearing warm clothing in summer as well as winter, notwithstanding the current proverb, ἐν θάρει τὴν χλαίνων κατατρίβεις (Leutsch und Schneidewin, Paroemiogr. Gr. 1. 74). This would seem to have been a purely individual whim, comparable to that of the Sophist Hippias, who would only wear things which he had made himself (Hippias Minor, 368 B sqq.), for if the Cynic Crates (Philemon, Inc. Fab. Fragm. 53, ap. Diog. Laert. 6. 87)

Τοῦ θέρους μὲν ἔχειν ἱματιὸν δωσί,

ἐν ἡγεράθη γ', τοῦ δὲ χειμώνιος μάκος,

his crotchet is far more comprehensible than that of Hippodamus. Perhaps, however, like Protagoras (Plato, Protag. 321 A), he held that the thick shaggy hides of animals served them as a defence
not only against the cold of winter, but also against the heat of summer, and sought to protect himself in a similar way. Be this as it may, Aristotle had little patience with affectation even in a man like Xenocrates (Athen. Deipn. 530 d, quoted by Bernays, Phokion p. 119), and what he thought of one of these whims of Hippodamus may probably be gathered from Rhet. 3. 7. 1408 a 11, τὸ δ’ ἀνδρογόν ἐστιν, ἕνα μήτε περὶ εὐθύγκων αὐτοκοβδάλως λέγηται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηθ’ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεί οὐδέποτε ἐπὶ κόσμοι εἰ δὲ μή, κομψία παύεται, οἴον ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἴ ἐπειεῖν ἄν “πότνια σωκῆ.” (Compare the quotation from Strattis in Athen. Deipn. 160 b, Παρανίσας δὲ σφῶν τι βούλομαι σοφόν ὁταν οὐκ ἐσπῆτε, μὴ παρὰ τοῦ μύρος, and the whole following passage in Athenaeus, and see Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 2. 780.) There was a saying about the people of Miletus—Μῆλητοι ἄξωνοι μὲν ὄλκ εὐθύς, ὄρθων δ’ οὖσαν ὑπὸ δαύνοι (Eth. Nic. 7. 9. 1151 a 9)—which the eccentricities of Hippodamus recall (cp. also Ephor. Fr. 92 Müller). Aristotle must have obtained these details about Hippodamus from some earlier source, but I do not think that there is much reason for doubting the authenticity of the passage. The Greeks were vigilant observers and keen critics of things which seem to us personal trifles (see Mr. Sandys’ note on Demosth. contra Steph. i. c. 68). Hermippus took the trouble to record that Theocritus of Chios criticised the dress of Anaximenes as ἀπαθευτός (Athen. Deipn. 21 C), and we also hear in the same passage that the grammarian Callistratus in one of his writings found fault with his great contemporary, the Homeric critic Aristarchus, ἔνι τῷ μὴ εὐρυβιθαμ ἀπεξέχειθαι, φησιν τὸ καὶ τοῦ τουτου πρὸς παιδείας ἔξεται. The Socratic Aeschines seems to have been very severe on the dress of Telanges in one of his dialogues (Athen. Deipn. 220 a sqq.). Plato himself reckons it as one of the merits of μοὐσικῆ (Rep. 425 B), that it teaches men how to dress and wear their hair and carry themselves. Aristotle’s object in this curious paragraph probably is in part to prepare the reader for the fancifulness of Hippodamus’ constitution, but he also regarded a man’s life and character as to some extent a guide to the value of his speculations, in practical philosophy at all events; thus Eudoxus’ view that Pleasure is the greatest good gained support from his remarkable temperance (Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 15 sqq.: cp. 10. 9. 1179 a 17 sqq., and Rhet. 1. 2. 1356 a 5 sqq.).

26. ἔσθήτος I incline to make dependent on πλῆθει καὶ κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ. C. F. Hermann makes it depend on πλῆθει only (de Hippodamo, p. 21 n.), but it seems more natural to carry on both
plūthei and κόσμῳ πολυτελεῖ. The combination of costly ornament with clothing of a cheap material is quite in harmony with the other eccentricities attributed to Hippodamus in this passage.

28. λόγιος δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν διλυμ φύσιν, 'learned in Physics also' (Zeller, Gr. Ph. i. 963. 5), as well as about the laying out of cities: 'learned about Nature as a whole also.' As to the word λόγιος, see Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 284. For τὴν διλυμ φύσιν, cp. τῆς ἀπάντης φύσεως, i. 5. 1254 a 31: τὴν διλυμ φύσεως, Metaph. A. 6. 987 b 2 (opp. τὰ ἡθικά): Metaph. A. 8. 1074 b 3, περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν διλυμ φύσιν (cp. Pol. 4 (7). 4. 1326 a 32). To Aristotle the meddling of Hippodamus with ἡ διλυμ φύσις was probably a further sign of περετρίγια: cp. de Respir. 21. 480 b 26, τῶν τε γὰρ λατρῶν ὅσα καμηθοῦ ἡ περιέργεια, λέγουσι τι περὶ φύσεως καὶ τὰς ἄρχας ἐκεῖνα ἀξίουσι λογικῶς. Was Plato thinking of men like Hippodamus, when he speaks (Rep. 495 C sq.) of αὐθορπίσσων who ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκποίησαν εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ δὲ καμηθάστων οὕτως τιγχάνως περὶ τὸ αὐτῶν τεχνῶν?

30. κατεκεκυμέχε. The imperfect is used with reference to Hippodamus' plans, as being nothing more than plans.

31. μυριάνδρον, 'of ten thousand citizens.' Isocrates contrasts Sparta with αἱ μυριάνδροι πόλεις, Panath. § 257. Hippodamus evidently wished his State to be large for a Greek State, but not so large as Athens, which had 20,000 citizens.

τρία. In this view of Hippodamus, which may have suggested Plato's classification in the Republic, we can perhaps trace the influence of Egypt: cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 a 40 sqq.: Plato, Tim. 24 A sqq.: Isocr. Busiris, § 15 sq. Compare also the three classes into which the population of Attica was divided—Eupatridae, Geomori, and Demiurgi. But Hippodamus evidently had a passion for threefold divisions, inherited very probably from Ion of Chios: cp. Isocr. de Antídosi § 268, δὲν (sc. τῶν πολιῶν σφυτῶν) δὲν μὲν ἄπεραν τὸ πλῆθος ἐφισέν εἰναι τῶν ἄντων, 'Εμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τέτταρα, καὶ νείκος καὶ φιλιάν ἐν αὐτοῖς, 'Ἰων' δὲ αὐ θείον τρίων. See vol. i. p. 381 n. and Zeller, Gr. Ph. i. 450. 1. This leaning to the threefold was also Pythagorean: cp. de Caelo i. 1. 268 a 10, καθάπερ γὰρ φασὶ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοὺς τριάν ἄριστα, and the whole passage down to 268 a 29. That which was divisible into three was held by them to be perfect and continuous. Aristotle himself is inclined to say, τελευτά δὲ ἐν τρισὶ πάντα: see note on 1252 b 27 sqq., and cp. Meteor. 3. 4. 374 b 33 sqq. He would not, however, agree that there are only three μέρη πόλεως, or that these are γεωργοί, τεχνητά, and τὸ προπολεμοῦν: contrast his own enumerations in 4 (7). 8–9 and 6 (4). 4.
33. καὶ explains and limits τὸ προπολεμοῦν. See note on 1263 a 15.

τὴν χώραν. In most Greek States there was sacred, public, and private land. This was so in Crete, in the Lacedaemonian State (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, i. 305), at Athens, etc. Aristotle divides the land of his ‘best State’ into public (including sacred) and private land, his public land being set apart for the support of the syssitia and the worship of the gods, not for the support of the military force, like that of Hippodamus. The public land, here termed δημοσία, is called κοινὴ in 36 (cp. 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 10), because it was to be the property of the community (Sus. ‘Staatsacker’), and not of private individuals. We are not told why Hippodamus made the soldiers’ land public land; perhaps he did so, wishing to keep it more under the control of the State than private land would be—to prevent its alienation, for instance, or its passing into other hands than those of soldiers.

34. ἑδέν. In 3. 4. 1277 b 26 the fem. ἔδεος is used.

37. It would seem that Hippodamus regarded the office of law as measurable by the action of the law-courts; if the law-courts only checked mutual wrong, law did no more. This would not satisfy Plato or Aristotle, who, unlike the Sophist Lycophron (3. 9. 1280 b 10 sq.), expected law to do something more than protect men from mutual wrong—required it, in fact, to aim at making them good and just. As to the classification of offences here given, C. F. Hermann (Gr. Ant. 3. §§ 61–62) traces in Attic law a classification under the three heads of ὑβρις, κακουργία, and φόνος. As to ὑβρις, see Rhet. 2. 2. 1378 b 23 sqq. and Rhet. 1. 13. 1374 a 13 sq., where its nature is explained: see also the remarks of Hug, Studien aus dem klassischen Alterthum, p. 61. As to the δίκη βλάβης, which included all damage, direct or indirect, not falling under some recognized category of offence, see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 70 and note 9. Mr. Pattison, in his copy of Stahr's edition of the Politics, quotes Strabo, p. 702, where Onesicritus, in recording the customs of the Indians of Musicamus' territory, says — δίκην δὲ μὴ εἶναι πλὴν φῶνον καὶ ὑβρεὼν· οὐκ ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ τὸ μὴ παθεῖν τυφλον, τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἐκδικήσῃ, δειὸν ἀνέχεσθαι δει ἐὰν τις παραβῇ τὴν πίστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσέχειν ὧν πιστεύειν, καὶ μὴ δικαίων πληρων τὴν πάλιν. Compare with this Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 20, and note on 1263 b 21. C. F. Hermann (de Hippodamo, p. 29) regards offences against the State and against religion as omitted in Hippodamus' classification, and it would seem that if they are to be included, they must be brought under one or other of his
three heads. A different classification of the subject-matter of laws will be found in Demosth. contra Timocr. c. 192, where ὁι περὶ τῶν ἴδιων νόμων are distinguished from ὁι περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ δημάσιον (see Hug, Studien, p. 81). Aristotle's own classification of δικαστήρια, which is given in 6 (4). 16. 1300 b 18 sqq., throws light on his views as to this subject.

39. ἐνομοθετεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. See as to this Supreme Court, vol. i. p. 382 sqq. That a few should judge, as this court would do, of all matters, is treated as an oligarchical arrangement in 6 (4). 16. 1301 a 12: an aristocracy or polity would commit some subjects to all the citizens, others to a few, but here the few were to judge (in appeals at any rate) on all subjects.

1268 a. 2. φέρειν, sc. γέτο δέω. 'Deposit' is probably the meaning (Bern. 'einreichen')—cp. ψήφοφορίαν, and Plato, Laws 753 C—not 'ferri domo' (Vic.), or 'dari unicusique' (Lamb.).

3. γράφειν is in the same construction as φέρειν. This proposal implies that most people of the class to which dicasts belonged could write. The regulations as to the Ostracism suggest the same conclusion. But then it must be remembered that in either case only a word or two would have to be written, and that in the Ostracism at all events persons unable to write would be allowed to get others to write for them.

τὴν δίκην, cp. ἐρήμην καταδικάζονται [sc. τὴν δίκην], de Caelo 1. 10. 279 b 10.

4. κεννόν, sc. φέρειν πιθάνον.

τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μῆ, 'wished partly to acquit, partly to condemn.'

τοῦτο διορίζειν, 'to particularize this.'

5. ἀναγκάζειν. We see from οἶδεις in 1268 b 17, that the unexpressed subject of ἀναγκάζειν probably is a person or persons, but it is not clear whether we should supply τῶν νομοθέτην or interpret with Bern. 'people compel them.'

9. γίνεσθαι is dependent on νόμον ἐρίθει = ἐνομοθετεῖ.

δὲ σὺπω κ.τ.λ. See on this passage Dittenberger, Gött. gel. Anz., Oct. 28. 1874, p. 1369 sqq. With him I take Aristotle to mean that Hippodamus proposed this law as a novelty (compare the importance attached to τὸ ἴδιον in c. 12), whereas, in reality (νῶν, i. e. 'in Wirklichkeit'), says Aristotle, it exists in several States. I do not think Aristotle means that Hippodamus' suggestion may be taken as an indication that no such law then existed, whereas in his own day it existed in several States, for his remark would then possess merely an antiquarian interest and would be out of place where it stands. Besides, the other interpretation suits better
with the use of ὁς with the participle. On τὸν in the sense of 'id quod in re ac veritate est,' see Bon. Ind. 492 a 60 sqq. As to the existence of this law at Athens, see A. Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit 3. 2. 33, who compares Aristot. Fragment. 428. 1549 a 5 sqq.: Aeschin. in Ctes. c. 154: Isocr. de Pace § 82. It is noticed as a wise law in democratic States in Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 34 sqq. It is not clear how if all the fighting class was supported by public land together (doubtless) with its offspring, there should be any need in Hippodamus' State for a separate enactment securing to the children of those slain in war sustenance from the State.

10. παρ' ἀλλοις, 'in other States than that designed by him.'
12. αἰρετοῖς, 'elected,' not taken by lot—a sign of oligarchy (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 8 sqq.). Cp., however, 2. 11. 1273 a 26 sq.

δῆμον δ' ἐποίησεν κ.τ.λ. This is added, because the word is often used of the poor only, as in 'c. 6. 1265 b 39 and c. 9. 1270 b 25. Hippodamus might well have meant by it only the γεωργοὶ and τεχνητοί.

13. κοινῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν, 'public matters, matters relating to aliens, and matters relating to orphans.' For ξενικῶν, Bonitz (Ind. 493 a 42) compares 3. 5. 1278 a 7. Hippodamus would seem to have contemplated the sojourn of aliens in his State—contrast the Lacedaemonian ἡμιλασία (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 1. § 27. 14)—and to have provided for magistrates like the Polemarch at Athens (Aristot. Fragment. 388. 1542 b 14 sqq.), charged with their supervision. Ὀρφανοφύλακες and ὀρφανουσταί (in the Law of Gortyna, col. 12. 21, ὀρφανοδικασταί) were also known to Greek States (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thalheim, Rechtsalt. p. 14. 3), and orphan heiresses were especially cared for (Hdt. 6. 57). Hippodamus' classification, however, brings the supervision of aliens and orphans into unusual prominence: contrast Aristotle's treatment of the subject of magisterial competence in 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 10 sqq. and 8 (6). 8. C. F. Hermann notices the omission of 'res sacrae,' but they are probably included under 'public matters': Hippodamus made a liberal provision for worship (1267 b 35).

16. πρῶτον μὲν seems either not to be taken up at all, or not till ὁ καλὸς ὃς, 1268 b 4.

τὴν διαίρεσιν. For the acc. after ἀπορῆσαι, cp. Meteor. 2. 2. 355 b 24.

20. γίνονται, i.e. those without arms, the cultivators and artisans. We see from the scolion of Hybrias the Cretan, that the possessor of arms was the lord and master of those who had them not. But
the enslavement of one part of the citizen-body to another is a constitutional soleism: cp. c. i. 12. 1273 b 37 and 6 (4). ii. 1295 b 25, βούλεται ἡ πόλις ἐξ ὀνόματι εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιών ὅτι μᾶλλον.

21. μὲν οὖν, I incline to think, introduces, not a correction of ὁστε γίνονται σχεδὸν δοῦλοι τῶν τὰ ὁπλα κεκτημένων, but an inference, as in i. i. 1252 a 7: each of the two words retains its own meaning, μὲν being answered by δὲ, 24.

22. πολιτοφυλακας. A magistracy bearing this name existed at Larissa (7 (5). 6. 1305 b 29). Its main duty probably was to guard the city against external, and possibly also internal, foes: see Aen. Tact. Comment. Poliorc. 1. 3 and 22. 7, where the words πολιτοφυλακῶν and πολιτοφυλακία are used. The mention of στρατηγοὺς just before supports the view that this was a military office (see also Pol. 8 (6). 8. 1322 a 30–b 1). Sepulveda suggests (p. 51 b) that πολιτοφυλακεῖς were to exist in the State of Hippodamus, and it is possible that strategi also found a place in it.

23. μὴ μετέχωντας δὲ τῆς πολιτείας κ.τ.λ. On the phrase μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας, see the references in Bon. Ind. 462 b 26 sqq. It is here used in contradistinction to κοινωνίαν τῆς πολιτείας, though in 27, four lines lower down, it appears to be used in the same sense as this phrase. In line 23 it is implied that, while those who elect to magistracies κοινωνίας τῆς πολιτείας, only those who are eligible to the supreme magistracies can truly be said μετέχειν τῆς πολιτείας. In 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 3 sqq., however, the distinction between the two expressions is differently drawn, for in that passage οἱ μετέχοντες τῆς πολιτείας are those who possess, οἱ κοινωνοῦντες those who actually exercise political privileges. The contrast between the Lacedaemonian constitution and that of Hippodamus is probably present to Aristotle’s mind, for under the former the ephorship was open to the people, and this helped to recommend the constitution to them (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 29 sqq.). Yet at Carthage the demos was propitiated, not in this way, but in another (2. ii. 1273 b 18 sqq.), and the constitution of Solon, the merits of which are often acknowledged by Aristotle, though it opened the dicasteries to all, excluded a large portion of the citizens from office. Even under the fully developed democracy, the Athenian demos seems to have willingly left some offices of the highest importance to be filled by those who were fittest to fill them ([Xen.] Rep. Ath. i. 3).

25. ἀλλὰ introduces a rejoinder from some imagined defender of Hippodamus’ scheme, and τοῖς χρήστοι 26 Aristotle’s comment in reply.

29. οἷος κ.τ.λ. Hippodamus probably intended, as Vict. suggests, that the cultivators should sell food, etc. to the artisans: this would
be a sufficient raison d'ètre for them. This implies, no doubt, that the cultivators will produce enough from their lots to supply both themselves and the artisans, whereas Aristotle questions (42) whether two households could be supported even from the cultivators’ and warriors’ land together. Still, how else are the artisans to be maintained?

31. καθάπερ, i.e. in the State of Hippodamus (where they have no land) as in others.

33. εὐλόγως, because any social element that contributes to the existence of the State is in a broad sense a part of the State (6 (4).

4. 1290 b 39 sqq.).

34. ἰδία, ‘for themselves.’

36. γεωργήσωσιν, ‘are to till the soil’: see on this use of the future (cp. ἔσωσαν, 38) Bon. Ind. 754 b 17 sq.

40. ἀλλότριον, ‘alien to the constitution,’ and in all likelihood hostile to it (cp. 23 sqq.). Hippodamus, however, probably meant the public land to be cultivated by slaves. Aristotle, we notice, does not raise any question as to the mode of cultivating the sacred land, though the same difficulty might arise here also.

42. τὸ τε πλῆθος κ.τ.λ. ‘It will be a difficult matter to produce enough to enable each of them to support as a cultivator two households, and then again, why are not the cultivators to derive directly from their own farms and from the same lots of land at once sustenance for themselves and a supply of food for the fighting class?’ Εἴδος means ‘without any preliminary distinction between public and private land.’ *Αποροφ seems to be used in the same sense as in Metaph. Z 3. 1029 a 33 and Eth. Nic. 1. 4. 1097 a 8, or perhaps as in Plato, Rep. 378 A and 453 D, though Bonitz would appear to explain it as ‘deficient,’ to judge by the passages with which he groups the passage before us (Ind. 85 b 20). Victor, Lamb., Giph., Sepulveda, and others also translate the word ‘too small.’ I have rendered γεωργήσει δύο οίκιας ‘support as a cultivator two households,’ because this rendering seems to be required by the sense, but it is difficult to extract it from the words. Stahr translates ‘zwei Haushaltungen zu bestreiten,’ but this translation is open to the same objection. Γεωργήσει does not suit well with καρπῶν: Spengel, in fact, conjectures πότων in place of καρπῶν (Aristot. Studien 3. 15), but γεωργήσει appears to be the doubtful word. The expression γεωργήσει δύο οίκιας has long been felt to be a very strange one: we fail to find a real parallel to it in such phrases as χορεύειν θείον, Pind. Isthm. 1. 7 (cp. Soph. Antig. 1151); and if we retain the reading γεωργήσει (see critical note), we must
probably seek an explanation of the construction in the use of the
cognate accusative. We have ὀλείων δύο ὀκίας in c. 6. 1265 b 26,
and it is possible that Aristotle here substitutes γεωργεῖν for ὀλείων
seeing that the phrase ὀλείων δύο ὀκίας (or even διουκεῖν δύο ὀκίας,
4 (7). 10. 1330 a 7) would obviously be inapplicable to the
cultivator of whom he is speaking. In 6 (4). 1. 1289 a 1 sqq. we
find, if the reading of Π² is correct, τὰξιν ἐν ῥόδιοι δυνάμεις κοινώνειν.
For ἄπο τῆς γῆς = ἄπο τοῦ γηπέδου, see Liddell and Scott s. v. γῆ and
Bon. Ind. 154 a 39 sq. Or do the words mean 'from the land as a
whole'? Bern. would omit καί and read ἄπο τῆς γῆς τῶν αὐτῶν
κλήρων, where however τῆς γῆς seems superfluous. As to the thought,
Comte, on the contrary (Social Statistics E. T. p. 130), 'assumes as
an average that, under all conditions which are not very unfavour-
able, the labour of every agricultural family can support at least
one other as numerous as itself, if not two or three.' It will
be observed that Aristotle takes it for granted that the cultivators
will be equal in number to the warriors in the State of Hippodamus,
for if the former were more numerous than the latter, one cultivator
would not have to maintain two households, and the difficulty
anticipated by Aristotle would not arise.

1268 b. 5. τὸ κρίνειν ἀξίον. So Π, and though Vet. Int. has 'lex
iudicare dignificans,' there is no doubt of the correctness of this
reading: cp. 2. 12. 1274 b 11, ὀ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος, τὸ τούς νήφωνται
συμποιησαρχεῖν, and 1274 b 19–20. Ἀξίον is 'to prescribe' (cp.
φάσκειν, i. 13. 1260 b 6), as in 4 (7). 11. 1331 a 3, where it answers
to φάσκοτες, 1330 b 32.

τῆς δικής ἀπλὸς γεγραμμένης. Π² read κρίσεως: Π¹ δίκη, which
Sus. adopts. In 18 we have εἰπερ ἀπλὸ τὸ ἐγκλήμα γέγραπται δικαίως.
If we read κρίσεως (and perhaps we thus get some additional point
from the more marked contrast with κρίνειν διακριόντα), we cannot
well attach to it a different sense from that which it bears in the
preceding line, where it seems to mean 'adjudication' or 'judicial
decision.' We cannot well interpret the first κρίσεως thus, and the
second (with Bonitz, Ind. 409 b 60) 'causa,' 'the action.' But if
we translate the second κρίσεως also as 'the decision,' we must
apparently take 'the decision' here as meaning 'the charge to be
adjudicated upon.' This is awkward, and it seems better to adopt
the reading of Π¹. Κρίσεως may well have been repeated by mis-
take from the preceding line.

ἀπλὸς, 'in absolute terms,' without saying τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μῆ, 1268 a 4,
or πῶς μὲν ἥπτο πῶς δ' ὄβ. For this was, as is implied here, the
special province of the διαιτήσις (τὸ διαιρέων): cp. Phys. 3. 6. 206 a 12,
διαφορμίσαν τοις μηδετέρως φαίνεται ενδίκεσθαι, διαστήματι δεῖ, καὶ δήλων ὅτι πῶς μὲν ἔστι πῶς δ᾽ οὔ, and Rhet. 1. 13. 1374 b 19 sq.

6. τούτο δ᾽ ἐν κ.π.λ., 'for this (τὰ κρῖνην διαμορώτα) is possible in an arbitration, even if there are more arbitrators than one.'

10. μὴ κοινολογώνται. Vict. 'arbitror, cum verba auctoris attendo, ipsum ostendere voluisse illos nomothetas praecipisse sedilia ipsorum ita aedificari, ut si vellent capita conferre, non possent, communicareque opiniones inter se.' But perhaps we need not go quite so far as this. The object of the prohibition of communication between jurors seems to have been to preserve the secrecy of suffrage (see Shilleto on Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 265, p. 192 of his edition, and C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. i. § 143. 1, who compares Plato, Laws 876 A, εν πολει, εν ἡ δικαστήρια φαίλα καὶ ἄφωνα, κλέπτοντα τὰς αὐτῶν δόξας, κρίθησιν τὰς κρίσεις διαδικασίας). In τιμωτοί δὲκα, however, where the jurors were left to fix the penalty, communication must have been unavoidable (see C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. i. § 143. 11), to say nothing of the 'shouting dicasteries' censured by Plato in the Laws (876 B), the members of which must soon have come to know the opinion of their fellows.

11. ταραχώδης, 'full of perplexity': cp. 5 (8). 2. 1337 a 40, and πολλὴν ξεὶς ταραχήν ('involves much perplexity'), 1268 b 4.

12. 6 μὲν, Π²: other MSS. μὲν δ', a more logical order, but for the displacement of μὲν, see Bon. Ind. 454 a 20 sqq.

13. δικαίωμενος, 'he who brings the action, the plaintiff,' as in 3. 1. 1275 a 9.

14. ἢ δὲ μὲν πλέον, δ᾽ 8᾽ ἀλασσόν. These words have been variously interpreted. Bernays translates them 'or whatever larger sum one may select for the plaintiff and whatever smaller sum for the juror': others 'or one juror more than ten and another less.' Susemihl now apparently adopts the rendering of Bernays (Qu. Crit. p. 375). The meaning of the words is doubtful, but perhaps on the whole Bernays' view, which makes them parenthetical, is the one most likely to be correct.

15. καὶ τούτον δὴ is right, though Π² have δὲ instead of δὴ, for here we have, as in 1. 13. 1259 b 32 and 2. 3. 1261 b 23, a transition from particular statements to an universal statement.

μεριόδομι, 'dividem sententias,' Lamb. followed by Bonitz (Ind. 454 b 30). Is it not rather 'split up the amount' (Schn. 'summan pecuniae divident')? Those who vote part of the amount claimed are apparently contrasted with those who vote all or none. Cp. Philemon, ἑρατιώτης (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 27),

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Oî μὲν ἡρπασάν τι γὰρ,
oi δ’ οὐδέκα, οἱ δὲ πάντα.

18. εἴπερ . . . δικαίως, ‘if the charge has been duly brought in an unqualified form’: i.e. if the question which ought to be raised is really an unqualified one. ‘Duly,’ not ‘truly,’ for of course if the unqualified charge were true, no one could suppose that the juror who decided that it was so would perjure himself, and the denial of perjury would apply only to a case in which perjury obviously would not occur. For δικαίως in the sense of ‘properly,’ cp. Eth. Eud. 3. 1. 1229 b 34. Aristotle seems to admit by implication that if the charge has been brought in an unqualified form not duly, but otherwise, then the juror, if compelled to give an unqualified verdict, may have to break his oath; he ascribes, however, the perjury thus necessitated, not to the plan of requiring an unqualified verdict from the jury, but to the putting of an improper question.

19. οἱ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. No doubt; and Hippodamus would say at once that the case adduced by Aristotle is not one of those which would create the difficulty he foresees. The kind of case in which he anticipates difficulty is that in which the charge is partially true and partially false (τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, 1268 a 4), and this is not so where a debt of 20 minae is untruly alleged. It is possible that Hippodamus had in view cases in which the issue put to the jury included more charges than one. The indictment of Socrates was of this nature: it ran (Diog. Laert. 2. 40: Xen. Mem. i. 1)—‘Αδίκει Σωκράτης οὐ μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεόν τι νομίζων, ἄτερα δὲ καὶ θεαμόνα εἰσπαγούμενον ἀδίκει δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων τίμημα βάνατος. Suppose that a juror thought that one of these charges was true, but the rest not: was he to say Yes or No to the indictment? The latter would probably be the correct course, yet some might think it not wholly satisfactory. In Socrates’ case the three questions ought to have been put separately to the jury, and then the difficulty would not have arisen; but the same evil may well have occasionally assumed subtler forms. No doubt, however, there is much force in Aristotle’s plea that the fault lay in the question put to the jury, not in expecting the jury to give an absolute answer. The Roman plan of a ‘non liquet’ verdict would not have met Hippodamus’ difficulty; nor would the form of verdict which the Emperor Augustus adopted in one case (Suet. Aug. c. 33: et cum de falso testamento ageretur, omnesque signatores lege Cornelia teneretur, non tantum duas tabellas, damnatoriam et absolutionem, simul cognoscentibus dedit, sed tertiam quoque, qua ignosceretur iis quos fraude ad signandum vel errore inductos constitisset).
21. ἄλλα ἐκείνος ἦδη ἐπιορκεῖ. For the use of ἦδη in this passage, cp. Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 4, τούτο γὰρ ἦδη ... ἐξιολογώτατον ἄνδρος ἔργον ἔστιν, and Plato, Gorg. 485 C, όταν δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερον ἔδω ἐτι φιλοσοφότατα καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι, πληγῶμαι μοι δοκεῖ ἦδη δείσθαι ... ἐντὸς ἀνήρ. In the passage from Xenophon Sturz, Lex. Xenoph. s.v., translates ἦδη by 'utique,' or 'quidem,' but perhaps in all three passages something of the usual meaning of ἦδη is traceable, and we may render that before us 'in him we do arrive at a man who perjures himself.'

22. Athens already awarded special honours to persons who had done great service to the State and their descendants, and even to victors at the four great games (Demosth. in Lept. c. 105 sqq.: see also R. Schöll in Hermes 6. 32 sqq.), and Aristotle makes no objection to this; he is himself quite willing to award honours for integrity in office (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 13); but he disapproves of the proposition to award honours to those who claimed to have discovered something advantageous to the State. False accusations, he thought, would thus be encouraged—accusations, for instance, directed against persons deemed to be withholding money from the State or otherwise damaging it. Eubulus appears to have risen to power at Athens by repeated exposures of men who detained or embezzled public money (Schäfer, Demosthenes 1. 175). Aristotle thinks that legislation of the kind desired by Hippodamus might even result in changes of the constitution: thus Theramenes according to Lysias (contra Eratosthen. cc. 68, 70) overthrew the Athenian democracy and laid Athens at the feet of her foes under cover of an assurance that he had made a great and valuable discovery (φάσκων πράγμα εὑρηκέναι μέγα καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξιον). The recommendations of Simonides in Xen. Hiero. c. 9 (esp. § 9, εἰ δὲ φανερῶν γένοστι οὕτω καὶ ὁ πρόσωδὸν των ἄλλων ἐξευρήσακαν τῇ πόλει τυμήσεται, οὐδ’ οὕτω ἐν ἡ σκέψις ἄργοιτο, cp. § 10, οὐ γὰρ τι ἐστὶν γνώμενος) recall this one of Hippodamus, and are perhaps present to Aristotle's mind. Contrast the view of Diodotus (Thuc. 3. 42. 7) —τὴν δὲ σῴζοντα πόλιν [χρῆ] τῷ τε πλέοντα εἰ δουλεύσωι μὴ προστίθεναι τῷ πτωχῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐλασσῶν τῷ ὑπάρχουσιν.


26. ἄλλο ... ἐτέραν. See Bon. Ind. 34 b 34 sq.

27. τινες. Very possibly Pythagoreans, for this school held, according to AristoX. Fragm. 19 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 278), that it was better μὲνειν τοῖς πατρίσις ἔθεσε τε καὶ νόμοις, εἰ καὶ μικρὰ χεῖρα τῶν ἐτέρων εἶν. It was a charge against tyrants that they
altered time-honoured laws (Hdt. 3. 80). The fact, however, that the Greeks used the same word (κυρίριον) for the alteration of a law and the development of an art or science, tended to disguise the difference between the two things, and thus Isocrates had said (Evagoras § 7), ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἤσμεν γνωστές καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων οὐ διὰ τοὺς ἐμμένοντας τοῖς καθεστῶσι, ἀλλά διὰ τοὺς ἐπανορθώσας καὶ τολμώσας αἱ τι κινεῖ τῶν μὴ καλῶς ἐχόμεν (compare the remark of the Corinthian orator to the Lacedaemonians in Thuc. 1. 71. 3, ἀνάγκη δ’ ἀφετέρων τέχνης αἱ τὰ ἐπιστημονήματα κατείχαν, καὶ ἴσως καθεστώτως μὲν πολλεί τὰ ἀκανθατα τόμμα αἵρετα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκα-
ζομένιος ἴσως πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιστημήνης δέ, which may possibly be in Aristotle’s memory here: compare also the view ascribed to Charondas in Diod. 12. 16, to Zaleucus in Stob. Floril. 44. 21, p. 280). Plato provides for the improvement, in course of time, of his legislation in the Laws (769 D), but subject to strict conditions (772 A–D) which almost exclude the possibility of serious changes. See also Polit. 298 E–299 E.

30. ἐνδέχεται δ’. Sus., after Spengel, reads γάρ in place of δ’ without MS. authority, but Aristotle occasionally uses δ’ where we rather expect γάρ (e.g. in 3. 9. 1280 a 15, σχεδὸν δ’ οἱ πλείστοι φαῖλον κριταί περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, where we expect σχεδὸν γάρ, and in 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 19, where ταύτη γάρ might well take the place of ταύτη δ’). Perhaps he adds the words—‘and it is not impossible that changes in the laws or constitution may be proposed as a common good’—to anticipate an objection that no revolutionist would proceed in this way (compare the use of δ’ in 1. 5. 1254 a 36); for it was only those who claimed to have discovered something for the advantage of the community that it was proposed to reward. Theramenes had, in fact, done exactly what Aristotle here says might be done: see note on 22 above.

35. ιατρική, i.e. has improved. This must be elicited from σωματίσματος.

36. αἱ τέχναι πάσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις. For the difference between an art, or πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήμη, and a ‘faculty,’ see Cope on Rhet. i. 4. § 6. 1359 b 12 sqq., where ῥητορικὴ and διαλεκτικὴ are said to be not ἐπιστήμαι but δυνάμεις. It is implied in what follows that if ἡ πολιτικὴ κυριεύται, this will involve τὸ κινεῖ τῶν νόμων, which are ἐργα τῆς πολιτικῆς (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1181 a 23).

39. ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐργῶν. For this use of ἐπ’, see Bon. Ind. 268 a 31 sqq.

νόμους. Perhaps unwritten: cp. 1269 a 8. In 42 νομίμον is the word used, apparently in the same sense as νόμοι here: these
words are interchanged, as Bonitz points out (Ind. 488 a 16 sqq.), in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5, 7 also. Much the same thing is said by Thucydides (i. 6. 7, πολλά δ’ ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἀποδείξειν τὸ πολαῖν Ἑλληνικῶν ὀμαρότοσα τῷ νῦν βαρβαρικῷ διαιτῶμεν). Popular sentiment, however, with which Isocrates appears to agree (de Antid. § 82), praised most highly the oldest laws, and Aristotle himself often counts the antiquity of an institution or opinion as a point in its favour.

40. ἐσιδηροφοροῦντο. Cp. Thuc. i. 5 sq. where we find both the active and the middle. As to the contrast of Hellenic and barbarian practice in this matter, see Lucian, Anacharsis c. 34.

41. τὰς γυναῖκας, i.e. brides, not wives. This custom existed among the Thracians (Hdt. 5. 6). Thirlwall remarks (Hist. of Greece, i. 175) with respect to Homeric Greece, that ‘it does not seem that the marriage contract was commonly regarded in the light of a bargain and sale,’ but he adds in a note—‘compare, however, Od. 15. 367 and 18. 279 with the constant epithet ἀδίκοιβους.’ Plato (Laws 841 D) seems to recognize the purchase of brides—ταῖς μετὰ θεῶν καὶ ἱερῶν γάμων ἀδυνάτους εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν, ἁνηταῖς εἶτε ἄλλοι ὀρθοὶ πρόποις κητηταῖς.

42. λοιπά, ‘still in existence.’

1. Κύμη. Which of the cities of this name is meant, is unknown, 1269 a. as also in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 1.

πληθὸς τι, ‘a definite number,’ as in 3. 1. 1274 b 41. Τῶν αὐτῶν συγγενῶν is to be taken with μαρτρῶν—‘witnesses from the number of his own kinsmen.’ We are reminded of the practice of compurgation, but compurgators were called by both parties to the suit, they ‘swore to the purity and honesty of the oath of their principal,’ and they had to be ‘possessed of qualities and legal qualifications which should secure their credibility’ (Stubbs, Const. Hist. of England 1. 610–1). Some traces of a not very dissimilar custom to that mentioned by Aristotle have been thought to be discoverable in the law of Gortyn—see the recently discovered Gortyna Inscription, col. 2. 37 sqq.: 3. 51: 4. 8, and the comments of Zitelmann (Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 76–77).

3. ξυτούσι δὲ . . . πάντες. Cp. i. i. 1252 a 2: 2. 5. 1263 b 4: Eth. Nic. 10. 2. 1172 b 36, δ πάσι δοκεῖ, τοὺς ἐκεῖ φαμεν.


5. εἶτε γυγενεῖς ἦσαν εἰτ’ ἐκ φθορᾶς τινὸς ἐσώθησαν. Here two
current views as to the human race are grouped together—the former enshrined in Greek poetry and literature (Pindar, Nem. 6. 1: Hesiod, Op. et Dies, 108: Plato, Menex. 237 D), and taught by Anaximander (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 1. 209 sq.)—the latter adopted by Plato in the Laws (676 sq.) and the Timaeus (22 B sqq.). Euripides had already dealt a blow at the ‘earth-born’ myth of man’s origin in his Ion, where Ion says (482), γῆς ἔρ’ ἐκπέφυκα μητρός, and Xuthus rejoins, οὐ πέθων τίκτει τέκνα: and Plato (Laws 781 E sqq.) holds that ‘the human race either had no beginning at all and will never have an end, but always will be and has been, or had a beginning an immense time ago’ (Prof. Jowett’s translation). Aristotle himself believed that not only the world (Zeller, Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 432 sq.), but also mankind (ibid. 508. 1) had existed from everlasting. (See on this subject Dicacearch. Fragm. 3 and 4 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 234 sq.), and Bernays, Theophrastos über Frömmigkeit, p. 44 sqq., and Über die unter Philon’s Werken stehende Schrift über die Unzerstörbarkeit des Weltalls, p. 58 sqq.) Thus Aristotle cannot have believed in the ‘earth-born’ theory of man’s origin, though in de Gen. An. 3. 11. 762 b 28 sqq. he thinks it worth while to inquire how γηγενεῖς can have come into being; the other view, that the earliest known men were the survivors of some vast φθορά was more reconcilable with the doctrine of the eternity of the human race, but Aristotle does not seem to admit universal, or nearly universal, φθορά. The φθορά he recognizes are quite partial, arising from some local excess of moisture or aridity (see the interesting discussion of the subject in Meteor. 1. 14). As to the Stoical view, see Zeller, Stoics E. T. pp. 155–160.

Θ. ομολογεῖ κ.τ.λ. For ομολογεῖ καί, see Bon. Ind. 511 a 21: Vahlen, Beitr. zu Poet. 3. 314: Sus.1, Ind. Gramm. s. v., who compares 4 (7. 11. 1331 a 3. ‘Similar to ordinary or even’ (Bon. Ind. 357 b 20 sqq.) ‘weak-minded people nowadays.’ Why οὐ πρῶτοι should be so, Aristotle does not explain; but as to the γηγενεῖς, cp. de Part. An. 2. 4. 650 b 18, συμβαίνει δ’ ἐνδιὸν, γιὰ δὲ καὶ γλαφυρωτέραν ξένων τῶν διάνοιαν τῶν τουτών, οὐ διὰ τὴν ψυχράτητα του ἀίματος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν λεπτότητα μᾶλλον καὶ διὰ τὸ καθαρόν εἶναι τὸ γὰρ γεῦδει οὐδέτερον ξένων τουτών, and Dio Chrys. Or. 21. 507 R, παντελῶς σκληρῶς καὶ ἀργῶς, τῆς γῆς τὰ τέκνα. As to the survivors of the φθορά, he probably conceived the φθορά as entailing a wholesale destruction of knowledge (cp. Aristot. Fragm. 2. 1474 b 6, [αὐ] παρωμιαί] παλαιάς εἰσὶ φιλοσόφαι ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνθρώποις φθορᾶς ἀπολογομένης ἑγκατα- λείμματα περισσότερα διὰ συντομίαν καὶ δέξιότητα: and Metaph. Α. 8. 1074 b 10 sq.): he also ascribes the progress of the arts to the
favouring influence of time (Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 23 sqq.: Poet. 4. 1449 a 9–15). Plato had already said that the remnant left by the deluge (in Greece, at all events—Tim. 22 D) would be hillshepherds or herdsmen ignorant of the arts which flourish in cities (Laws 677 B–678 B), though he draws a favourable picture of their morals and social state (678 E–679 E). Contrast the opposite view of some of the later Stoics: τὸν δὲ νεωτέρων στοιχιῶν φασὶ τινὶ τῶν πρῶτων καὶ γνησίως τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ πολὺ τῶν μὲν συνέσει διαφέροντας γεγονέναι (Sext. Empir. Adv. Phys. 1. 28).

9. ὥσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ‘For, as in relation to the other arts, so in relation to the political [art, and its product, the political] organization it is impossible that everything should be written down with complete precision.’ As to αὐτὶς τέχναι, cp. τὸ κατὰ γράμματα ἀρχεῖσθαι φαίλων, Pol. 3. 16. 1287 a 33. It seems to be implied that as written law is necessarily couched in general terms, and human action, which it seeks to guide, is concerned with particulars, it is unlikely that the first form of a law will be as ἀκριβῆς (cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1104 a 1 sqq.) as it may be rendered by revision after fuller experience (cp. Plato, Laws 769 D, a passage probably present to Aristotle’s mind here: Aristot. Pol. 3. 16. 1287 a 27: Eth. Nic. 1. 7. 1098 a 20, περιγεγράφθη μὲν αὐν τάγαθιν τοιάτη δει γὰρ ἢσος ὑποστυπώσαι πρῶτον, εἴδ’ ὡσπερον ἀναγράψαι et sqq.: Soph. El. 33. 183 b 17 sqq.: Rhet. 1. 1. 1354 b 2). For the omission of περὶ before τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν, Bonitz (Ind. 630 b 2) compares 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 37: Rhet. 2. 18. 1391 b 15, 17: see also below on 1274 b 12. ‘Ἡ πολιτικὴ τάξις seems here to include not the πολιτεία only but also laws; it means something more, therefore, than ἡ τάξις τῆς πολιτείας means in Pol. 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, and elsewhere (cp. c. 10. 1271 b 40, where ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις is used in a different sense from τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις, 1272 a 4).’

13. ἄλλον . . . τρόπον, i.e. looking not to cases where the law is antiquated and absurd, but to cases where changing it brings little gain and tends to weaken men’s respect for law. It appears from 17, that Aristotle feels the same reluctance to disturb measures adopted by magistrates of the State.

17. ὀφελήσεται. See note on 1263 b 28. For the omission of the subject (Ms P1 wrongly supply τας), see note on 1268 a 5.


21. παρὰ τὸ ἔθος. If we adopt this reading (which is that of the better MSS.) instead of πλὴν παρὰ τὸ ἔθος Bekk., παρὰ will mean ‘other than,’ or ‘except’ (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 a 18, ἐτερῶν τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτείας ἄρχας, and 1. 13. 1259 b 25), and the ἔθος will be
viewed as a kind of ἀρχών: cp. 3. 15. 1286 b 29, ἀρχών των περὶ αὐτῶν ἦ διαφέρειν βιάζεσθαι τὸν μή βουλομένους πεπιθαρχεῖν. For the thought, cp. 7 (5). 9. 1310 a 14 sqq.

τούτῳ, i.e. τὸ ἔθος. Cp. Rhet. 1. 10. 1369 b 6, ἔθει δὲ (γινεται), ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολλάκις πεπιθαρχεῖν παρούσιν.

23. ἔτερως νόμους κανονίς. For the order, cp. 1. 2. 1252 b 15–16: de Part. An. 2. 14. 658 a 28, καθ’ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα πρανεῖς: Pol. 2. 11. 1272 b 26, αὕτα αἱ πολιτείαι πρεῖσ. We have, however, in the indictment of Socrates (Xen. Mem. i. 1: Diog. Laert. 2. 40) ἕτερα κανών διαμόνα (though in the version of the same indictment given by Plato, Apol. 24 B, ἕτερα διαμόνα κανών). So we find in de Gen. An. 3. 2. 752 b 6, στόλον μικρῶν ὑμισθιόθη. In each case, probably, a reason can be discerned for the order in which the words are placed.

24. εἰ καὶ κινητέοι, 'if in fact it is allowable to change them': see Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 168, and compare the use of εἰ καὶ in 2. 2. 1261 a 21 and 2. 11. 1273 b 6.

25. Should the laws which embody the constitution be changed? Or sacred laws? Or unwritten laws, such as are referred to in 3. 16. 1287 b 5? Should laws be allowed to be changed even in the case of the best constitution? And is anybody to be permitted to propose a change, or only selected persons? Plato had held (Laws 634 D–E) that only old men should be allowed to draw attention to defects in the laws. Aristotle is, however, perhaps thinking of assigning the right of proposing a change to a specially constituted magistracy.

26. ταύτα γὰρ ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν. 'For there is a great difference between these various alternatives.' (See for this expression Bon. Ind. 192 b 13 sqq.) Hence the discussion of the question is likely to take time, and Aristotle drops it.

C. 9. 29. Aristotle speaks in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 18 sq. of the writers on the Lacedaemonian Constitution' as if there were not a few of them, and describes them as 'admir ing the lawgiver because he had trained his citizens to face perils and thus enabled the State to win a wide supremacy.' He names only one of them, Thibron, but Xenophon's work on the subject is also probably present to his mind (see Sus.3, Note 911ab, who refers to Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 1), besides others which, like that of Critias, have not come down to us. Ephorus had treated of the Lacedaemonian constitution in his history, and he too may possibly be referred to. Aristotle mentions in the chapter before us (1271 a 37) that he was not the first to criticise the arrangements respecting the Admiralship, but it is not
certain whether he means that writers on the constitution had done so. The grounds on which the Lacedaemonian constitution was approved were very various. Hippodamus, like others after him, would praise it for the distinction which it drew between soldiers on the one hand and cultivators and artisans on the other, but it seems to have been commonly commended mainly for two reasons—first, because the system of training which it enforced had given the State empire, and secondly, because it harmonized the claims of the Few and the Many. It was held to be a skilful mixture of all constitutions (2. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq.), and especially of two, democracy and oligarchy (6 4). 9. 1294 b 14 sqq.). At Sparta rich and poor received the same education in childhood, they dressed alike and fared alike at the public mess-tables. This would please both Phales (c. 7. 1266 b 31 sqq.) and Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 480). Oligarchs and democrats, soldiers and philosophers all found something to commend at Sparta. Socrates commended the obedience to law which gave the State happiness in peace and irresistible strength in war (Xen. Mem. 4. 4. 15). On the other hand, opinions were much divided as to the Helotage (Plato, Laws 776 C sqq.), and other weak points in Lacedaemonian institutions were well known to Thucydides and Isocrates. Aristotle would not doubt be fully acquainted with what had been said on the subject, but he is especially influenced by the views of Plato. Plato is perhaps more favourable to the Lacedaemonian constitution in the Republic than in the Laws. In the Republic he ranks it (with the Cretan) next to the ideal constitution, whereas in the Laws he assigns this place to the constitution described in the dialogue, which differs much from the Lacedaemonian, and if it is true that in the Laws a new merit is discovered in the Lacedaemonian constitution—its mixed and tempered character—it is also true that much is borrowed in this dialogue from Attic legislation.

If we turn to Aristotle's criticisms in the chapter before us, we note first of all that his object is mainly to point out defects, not to give a complete estimate of the constitution. His admiration for Lycurgus is sufficiently proved by his reference to him in 6 4). 11. 1296 a 20, and by the remark which Plutarch reproduces from the Polities—δι' τούτ' οὖν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐλάττωνας σχέως φοσι τιμᾶς ἣν προσήκον ἵν αὐτῶν ἔχειν ἐν Δακεδαμομοι, καίστε ἐχοντα τάς μεγίστας ἱερόν τε γάρ ἄτιν αὐτῶν, καὶ θύσιν καθ ἐκαστὸν ἐναντίν ὡς θεώ (Lycurg. c. 31). In criticising the constitution he takes the word πολιτεία in its widest sense and examines the whole social and political organization of the State. Plato had tested the Lacedaemonian constitution by
comparing it either with the ideal constitution or with other actual constitutions of Greece, whereas Aristotle also inquires how far its arrangements fulfil the design of the lawgiver, which was to found an ἀριστοκρατία. This was perhaps the most novel feature of his criticisms. He had included a notice of the Lacedaemonian constitution in his Polities—indeed, he probably repeats in the chapter before us not a little of what he had said in that work—and his studies must have given him an unrivalled knowledge of the subject, but his grasp of the details must not lead us to forget how often he repeats previous criticisms of Plato. Plato had already said that the Lacedaemonian laws aimed only at the production of a single kind of virtue, warlike prowess (Laws 626 A sqq., etc.)—that the Spartans valued external goods such as wealth and honour more than virtue (Rep. 548)—that the Helot type of slavery was wrong (Rep. 469 B sqq.: Laws 776 sqq.)—that the lives of the Spartan women were left unregulated by law (Laws 780 E). He so far anticipated in the Laws Aristotle's account of the causes which had thinned the ranks of the Spartan citizens that he makes the lots of land in his State inalienable and indivisible (740 B sqq.), forbids dowries (742 C), restricts the right of bequest (922 E sqq.), and asserts the claims of relatives both in relation to inheritances and in the disposal of orphan heiresses (924 D sqq.). On the other hand, his attention does not seem to have been called to the mischievousness of the Lacedaemonian law by which the enjoyment of political rights was made dependent on the payment of a quota to the syssitia. Nor does he criticise the Lacedaemonian Kingship, Senate, and Ephorate, though we observe that he does not seem to adopt any of these institutions in the Laws.

30. ὃδι. The organization of slavery in the Lacedaemonian State is apparently criticised in what follows as being by no means the best possible; the γυναικῶν ἄνερες, on the other hand, as not only wrong from an ideal point of view but also as not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution (1269 b 12–14). Τὰ διὰ τῶν ἐφόρων (1270 b 31) and the φθίνη (1271 a 31) are criticised on the latter ground. In 1271 a 41 sqq. we find a criticism of the ὑπάθεια of the constitution which may perhaps be brought under the first of the two heads, though the ὑπάθεια itself can hardly be said νεομοθετησθαι (32). What does Aristotle consider the ὑπάθεια of the Lacedaemonian constitution to be? Probably he views it as an ἀριστοκρατία (i.e. as a mixture of ὑπάθεια and δῆμος) organized πρὸς τὸ κράτειν: cp. 1269 b 19–20: 1271 b 2–3: 4 (7). 2. 124 b 7 sqq.: 2. 11. 1273 a 4, πρὸς τὴν ὑπάθειαν τὴς ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας: 6 (4).
1269 a 30—34. 315

γ. 1293 b 15 sqq. Yet, as Sus² (Note 1262) points out, Aristotle seems to speak in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 14 sqq. as if the Lacedaemonian constitution were a polity, i.e. a combination of oligarchical and democratic elements. As in the chapter on Phaleas, so here Aristotle begins with subjects connected with the primary elements of the State—slavery, the household, property, population, and the like—and passes on from them to constitutional questions.

34. For the omission of πολει, see note on 1266 b r. We see from Plato, Laws 83 ε C sqq., that something more than slavery—freedom from the spirit of money-getting—is necessary to secure leisure to a State. In illustration of the difficulty of determining how the citizens of a State may best be secured leisure from necessary work, Aristotle refers to three slave-systems, in two of which the slaves had attacked their masters, while in the third, according to him, a similar catastrophe was only warded off by fortuitous circumstances. These three slave-systems were especially conspicuous and famous (Plato himself refers to two of them in entering on the subject of slavery, Laws 776 C sqq., a passage present to Aristotle's mind here); and it is perhaps for this reason that Aristotle regards their failure as proving the difficulty of the subject. It is not impossible, however, that they enjoyed a good deal of credit in some quarters: we see from the passage of the Laws just referred to, that even the Helotage of the Lacedaemonian State had its defenders. Many Greeks may have preferred servage to slavery, and in all the three systems referred to, the slaves were only half enslaved (μεταξὺ ἐλευθέρων καὶ δοῦλων, Pollux 3. 83, quoted by Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 127: δοῦλοι ἐπὶ τακτοὶ τινων, Strab. p. 365, cp. p. 701: ὤπειέωτες, Strab. p. 542). Aristotle, however, holds that serfs of the type of the Helots and Penestae (c. 5. 1264 a 34 sqq.: 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.) are dangerous inmates in a State, especially if neighbouring States are not withheld, as in Crete, by their own interest from making common cause with the revolted serfs of their antagonist. Where this is not the case, war with neighbours commonly brings in its train risings of the serfs. As to the importance of the attitude of neighbours in this matter, see Plato, Rep. 579 A—B. In c. 10. 1272 b 18 sqq. another reason is given for the quiescence of the Cretan serfs—the distance of Crete from the rest of Greece, together with the fact that it possessed no dependencies outside the island to tempt interference, and was for a very long time exempt from invasion. They probably were not as purely Hellenic as the Helots; they do not seem
to have been employed as hoplites in the wars (c. 5. 1264 a 21),
and their freer and more satisfactory position (1264 a 21) may,
as Oncken suggests (Sus. 2, Note 281), have made them more
manageable. Aristotle’s language in this passage seems to imply
that the Argives, Messenians, and Arcadians had no class
corresponding to the Helots; yet περίοικοι (serfs) are mentioned
at Argos in 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 8 (Herodotus speaks of slaves in 6. 83),
and it would seem that the Gymnesi or Gymnetes of Argos
answered in some degree to the Helots (see Sus. 2, Note 1518, and
Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 74). It is to be noticed that Aristotle in
constructing his best State (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 25 sqq.) prefers
slaves to serfs, and insists that, if serfs there are to be, they shall
be non-Hellenic (δύρδαροι). The Mariandynian serfs of the
Pontic Heracleia (Strabo, p. 542) were non-Hellenic, but we know
not whether Aristotle would regard this race as sufficiently submis-
sive (1330 a 26).

36. τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαῖων σχολήν, ‘leisure from necessary things’
(i.e. necessary work) : cp. Plato, Tim. 18 B, τῶν ἀλλων ἐπιτηδεΥμάτων
ἀγωνας σχολήν, and Plut. Agis 5. 3, πενία ἀσχαλία τῶν καλῶν καὶ
ἀνελυθρίαν ἐπιφέρονσα (see Schömann’s note on this passage).
Cp. also [Plut.] Inst. Lac. c. 40, ἐν δὲ τὰ τῶν καλῶν καὶ μακάριων ἐδόκει
παρεσκευασθῆναι τοῖσ πολίταισ ὁ Δυκαύγος, ἀφθονίαν σχολής’ τέχνης μὲν γὰρ
ἀγαθοθείς βανάουσι τὸ παράπων οὐκ ἔξεσθι . . . οἱ δὲ ἐναπόταυς αὐτῶς εἰργά-
ζουσι τὴν γήν.

1269 b. 3. τοῖς δὲ Λάκωνιν κ.τ.λ. Cp. Isocr. Philip. § 51, πολεμοῦσα μὲν
γὰρ [Ἀργείων], ἐξ ὑπὲρ τὴν πόλιν οἰκοῦσα, πρὸς τοὺς ὑμῶν, ὡσπερ
Δοκειάδαμον, τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρομεν ὅσον εἶκοι μὲν πρὸς ἡτοι αὐτῶν,
εἶτο δὲ πρὸς κρείττοις, καὶ § 74. Does ἤσον mean ‘at the time when
the Helots first revolted’? Possibly, but the past tense recurs
frequently throughout the chapter: see below on 1269 b 31.

5. ἐπεῖ adduces a proof that the cause assigned for the troubles
of the Lacedaemonian State and the exemption of Crete is the true
one.

7. καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἔτερον, such as (e.g.) self-defence against
their attacks. So Vict. ‘si nihil periculi impenderet reipublicae
ab hoc genere colonorum, relictò hoc malo.’

8. αὐτώς, ‘serfs such as the Helots.’ Aristotle gives a promise
in 4 (7). 10. 1330 a 31 sq. to consider the question how slaves
are to be treated. He would offer ultimate emancipation to
slaves as a reward for good conduct. This is just what the
Spartan owner had no power to do (Strabo, p. 365, κρεβήναυ δοῦλον ἐπὶ
taktos tisw, διὰτε τὸν ἔχουσα μήτ’ ἐλευθεροῦν ἔξειναι μήτε παλεῖν ἔξω τῶν
δρον τοίτου). Plato (Rep. 549 A) seems to regard the Spartans as erring on the side of severity, for in his description of the timocratic man, the type of character corresponding to a timocracy like the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions (544 C), he speaks of him as δούλοις ἄρμος, ὁ καταφρονῶν δούλων, δοσπερ ὁ ικανῶς πεπαθεμένος, and Aristotle himself is said by Plutarch to have ascribed the institution of the Crypteia to Lycurgus (Aristot. Fragm. 495. 1558 b 19 sqq.). But the Spartans may have had occasional fits of leniency.

12. τρόπον, probably 'mode of organization,' referring to τρόπον, 1269 a 36, not to τρόπον, 1269 b 9, for Aristotle is concerned rather with the organization than the administration of the State, and he is opposed to slave-organizations like the Lacedaemonian, not merely to the way in which the Spartans behaved to their slaves.

tούτο συμβαίνει (cp. 1269 a 40, οὐδὲν πο τοιοῦτον συμβαίνει) probably refers to 1269 a 38 sq., and also to 1269 b 7 sqq.


14. πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως. Aristotle adopts this phrase from Plato, Laws 781 B, a passage relating to the subject here discussed. But Mr. Congreve is probably right in explaining it here as ἀπὸ τὴν ἀριστην τάξιν, 1269 a 31 (see Sus., Note 284).

δοσπερ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. For μέρος, not μέρη, cp. Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 10, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἦσος λοι πηλίκων καὶ μὴ χωρισθή, δοσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ. In 3. 4. 1277 a 7 man and wife are said to be the component parts of the household, and perhaps the same thing is said here, though on the other hand Mr. Welldon may be right in translating μέρος, not 'the constituent elements,' but 'constituent elements.' For though man and wife are the most important parts of the household, others are mentioned in 1. 3. 1253 b 4–7. Plato thinks that, as women are inferior to men in excellence, and therefore need more legislation, the lawgiver who omits to legislate for them leaves far more than half his work undone. See on this subject Plato, Laws 781 A sqq.: 806 C: Aristot. Rhet. 1. 5. 1361 a 10 sqq. The Spartan girls were trained both in gymnastic and music (Plato, Laws 806 A: cp. Plutarch, Lyc. c. 14), and marriage and the education of children were controlled by the State, but Aristotle looked to the State to do something more than this—to exercise a control over the life of women inside and outside the household and to develope in them, as well as in children (1. 13. 1260 b 13 sqq.), the moral virtues which they need to possess.
15. δήλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ. What is the construction of this sentence? Vict. translates, ‘ita prope accedere civitatem ut bifarriam dissecta sit... existimandum est,’ apparently making the sentence run δήλον ὅτι δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ πᾶλιν (eàwi) ἑγγὺς τοῦ δίχα διηρήθαι, but the translators and commentators generally take ἑγγὺς τοῦ δίχα as an adverb meaning ‘nearly equally.’ Probably the latter view is correct, though adverbs thus formed do not seem to be by any means common.

19. ὅλην τὴν πόλιν. See below on 1273 a 38.

20. καρτερικήν. Compare the description of the Lacedaemonian training given by the Lacedaemonian interlocutor of the Laws in Laws 633 B sqq., where the expressions καρτερήσεις τῶν ἀλγηδῶν, πολλάποσ πρὸς τὰς καρτερήσεις, δειναὶ καρτερήσεις are used.

22. ἐξημαλίκην, ‘has wholly neglected to apply his principle.’ ἤσις γὰρ κ.τ.λ. An old indictment (Eurip. Androm. 575 sqq.: Ibycus ap. Plutarch. Num. et Lycurg. inter se comp. c. 3: Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. 2. 24, οὕτε ὁμοίως, ὅστε Δακεδαμόνωι, τὰς τῶν γυναικῶν φυλακὰς) stated in exceptionally strong language. What the charge amounts to, we see from Eth. Eud. 3. 2. 1231 a 19, ὀνομαλαγία γάρ καὶ γαστραγαρία καὶ λαγεία καὶ ὤφαργια καὶ πίτα τὰ τουωτὰ περὶ τὰς οἰκήμενας ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεις, εἰς ὅπερ μόρια ἡ ἀκολογία διαμεῖται (cp. πάσας ἀκολογίας, Theopomp. Fragm. 178: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 308). Plato (Rep. 548 B) speaks of the Spartan women as the objects of extravagant expenditure; but in Laws 806 A we get a more favourable impression of their life, and we see from Plutarch’s Lives of Agis and Cleomenes that even in the corruptest period there were noble exceptions. According to [Plutarch,] Apophth. Lac. Lycurg. 20, men looked back to a time when adultery was unknown at Sparta. Πρὸς, Bon. Ind. 641 b 46 sqq.

23. ὅστε ἀναγκαῖον κ.τ.λ. The necessity of this is explained by what is said in i. 9. 1258 a 2 sqq. ’Εν τῇ τουωτῇ πολιτείᾳ means ‘in a constitution of the kind we have just described’ (cp. 17, εἰ διὰς πολιτειαις φαύλως ἐχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναικάς, as well as c. 4. 1262 b 20 and c. 5. 1264 a 6). In a constitution which allows half the population to live a dissolute life, wealth as the means to dissoluteness must be honoured, especially if the dissolute half of the population bears virtual sway. In [Plutarch,] Apophth. Lac. Lycurg. 20, a Spartan of the ‘good old days’ asks, πῶς ἃν μοιχῶς ἐν Σπάρτῃ γένοιτο, ἐν ἧς πλούσιος καὶ τρυφὴ καὶ καλλωπισμὸς ἀτιμᾶσεται;

25. καθάπερ κ.τ.λ. We may gather from 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 9-21, what nations are referred to. Cp. Ephor. Fragm. 78 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 258), or rather Scymnus Chius (888 sq.),
2.9. 1269 b 15—28.

Contrast 1. 2. 1252 b 5, ἐν δὲ ταῖς βαρβάροις τὸ βῆλυ καὶ δούλον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν. It would seem, therefore, that the more warlike barbarian races allowed at all events some of their women to gain ascendency over them; but it does not follow that many or most of the sex were not made drudges. These nations were strong in θυμὸς, and θυμός, we learn from Pol. 4 (γ). 7. 1327 b 40, is the seat of the affections as well as the source of military spirit.

τῶν στρατιωτικῶν καὶ πολεμικῶν γενῶν. For γένος in this sense, cp. Isocr. Paneg. § 67, ἢστι γὰρ ἀρχικῶτα μὲν τῶν γενῶν καὶ μεγίστας δυναστείας ἱστορίας Σκύθων καὶ Θρᾴκης καὶ Πέρσας. The word στρατιωτικός (‘soldierlike’) is not a common one, but it recurs in 1270 a 5. Compare the contrast of πολεμικός and στρατηγικός in [Plut.] Inst. Lac. c. 25.

26. Κελτῶν. The commentators refer to Athen. Deipn. p. 603 a (see Sus.², Note 287). See also Diod. 5. 32. 7 and Strabo 4. p. 199, who probably draw from the same source as Athenaeus. Sextus Empiricus speaks in similar terms of the Germani (Pyth. Hyp. 3. 199) and of the Persians (ibid. 1. 152). ‘Aristotle, like the earlier Greeks generally, appears to make no distinction between the Celts and the Germans’ (Sus.², whose notes 287, 722, 953 should be consulted). From the sources of the Danube in the mountain Pyrene (the Pyrenees?) the Celts seem to have extended to the sea (Meteor. 1. 13. 350 a 36 sqq.: Eth. Nic. 3. 10. 1115 b 26 sqq.). There were, besides, Celts at this time ‘settled in the neighbourhood of the Ionian Gulf,’ an embassy from whom reached Alexander after he had crossed the Danube (Arrian, Anab. 1. 4 6). Ephoratus appears to have given a great extension to the designation (Strabo 4. p. 199, ὑπερβᾶλλοντο τῷ μεγέθει λέγει τὴν Κελτικήν, ὡστε ἢστε τῷ ἱστορίας καλοῦμεν ἑκείνου τὰ πλέιστα προστείμεν μέχρι Γαλατίων). As to φανερῶς, cp. Polyb. 6. 56. 4, παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδονίων διάφανοι διδόντες λαμβάνοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς, and perhaps we should also compare the language of Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 19, with regard to the lawgivers of Thebes— λαμπρῶν δὲ τῶν ἐρωτα ταῖς πολιτισταῖς ἐνεμβρέφας συγκεραδίντες τὰ ἑπὶ τῶν νέοι. If Aristotle is not thinking exclusively of barbarian races, he may allude to the Thebans here, and also to the Cretans (cp. c. 10. 1272 a 24) and Chalcidians (Aristot. Fragm. 93. 1492 b 22 sqq.).

28. ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος. Sus.² (Note 288) points out that just as Aristotle traces the πόλεις to a ‘first constructor’ (1. 2. 1253 a 30), so here he speaks of ὁ μυθολογήσας πρῶτος. For a similar hint
of the truth in myth, see 5 (8). 6. 1344 b 2. The myths are conceived by Aristotle to embody fragments of truth saved from the wreck of previous periods of greatness in philosophy and art (Metaph. A. 8. 1074 b 1–14). Cp. Plato, Theaet. 180 C. What age, however, he ascribes to the myth here mentioned does not appear.

συζεδίαν, 'paired,' as in 4 (7). r 6. 1335 a 16 ('join in wedlock'). Cp. Lucret. r. 31–40. The two deities are often named together: see Tümpel, Ares und Aphrodite (Teubner, 1880), who illustrates their association in local worship (esp. at Thebes, Aeschyl. Sept. c. Theb. 135 sqq.: cp. Hes. Theog. 933 sqq.)—in poetry (Pind. Pyth. 4. 155: Simonides, Fragm. 43 Bergk: Aeschyl. Suppl. 664 sq.)—and in art. The Ares of the Villa Ludovisi has an Eros at his feet and may perhaps have formed a group with Aphrodite: the Venus of Milo is thought by some to have formed part of a similar group. Tümpel points out that the tradition passed to Rome, where it did the Julian house the service of bringing Venus Victrix, its foundress, into close union with the national god Mars, and thus consecrated the rule of the Caesars. So on silver coins of Augustus we see the Julian Venus looking down at a helmet in her hand, the symbol of Mars (Tümpel, p. 677 n.): compare the couplet ascribed to Petronius Arbiter (Fragm. 46 Buecheler):—

Militis in galea nidum fecere columbae:
Adparet, Marti quam sit amica Venus.

The lines of Rutilius Namatianus (De Reditu Suo, r. 67 sq.) may also be quoted—

Auctorem generis Venerem Martemque fatemur,
Aeneadum matrem Romulidumque patrem.

Sulla, indeed, had already inscribed on his trophies Αρη καὶ Νικην καὶ Ἀφροδιτήν (Plut. Sulla c. 19), and the month sacred to Venus at Rome (April) came next to that sacred to Mars (Plut. Numa c. 19). Compare also the Chalcidian song, Aristot. Fragm. 93. r 492 b 30, εὼν γὰρ ἄνδρεια καὶ ὁ λυσμέλης Ἔρως ἔπι Χαλκιδῶν θύλλῃ πόλεσιν. Aphrodite is, however, occasionally conjoined with Dionysus, as in Probl. 30. 953 b 31, ὁρθῶς Διόνυσος καὶ Ἀφροδίτη θέγονται μὲν ἀλλήλων εἶναι, but this is quite comprehensible, as is also the statement of the Scholiast on Aristophanes, Ranae 315, συνὶδρυται τῇ Δήμητρι οἱ Διόνυσοι.

30. κατακώχιμοι. See critical note.

31. τοῦθ’, 'the latter.' Cp. Plut. Agis c. 7, ἄτρο κοῦλα Δακεδαιμονίου ἐπιστατέμανε κατηκόος ὄντας ἄεὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ πλείων ἐκεῖναι τῶν δημοσίων ἦ τῶν ἱδίων αὐτοῖς πολυπραγμονεῖν διδόντας, and Lycurg. c. 14,
The page contains a scholarly analysis of historical events and figures, discussing the importance of women, particularly in the context of Spartan society and the Peloponnesian War. It references ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, and historical figures like Gorgo, wife of Leonidas, and Pyrrhus. The text is rich in detail, examining the role of women in civic defense and the application of laws during wartime. It also references the works of Plutarch and Xenophon, and includes citations from various classical sources.
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μὲν οὖν, ‘indeed’ or ‘true,’ taken up by μὲν αὖν, 1270 a 8, and then answered by ἀλλά, 9. Aristotle here seeks to account for the error of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver, whose name he mentions (perhaps out of respect) only once in this chapter (1270 a 7), though often in later ones (c. 10. 1271 b 25; c. 12. 1273 b 33, 1274 a 29: also in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 20). He often seeks to account for the errors he corrects (e.g. in 1. 9. 1257 b 40 sqq.), and explains his reason for doing so in Eth. Nic. 7. 15. 1154 a 22 sqq.

1270 a. 2. ἀπεξεροῦντο. Giph. (p. 245) refers as to the Messenian war to Justin 3. 4, where however Ephorus is the original source (fragm. 53: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 247). Cp. also Aristot. Fragm. 504. 1560 b 17 sqq.

'Ἀργείουσ. Πᾶλω (3) seems to imply that the war with Argos preceded the other wars (see Bon. Ind. 559 b 5 sqq.).

4. σχολάσαντες. For the tense, see note on 1271 b 4, ἐρευνεῖτε.

'O νομοθέτης does not always, apparently, in this chapter mean Lycurgus (e.g. in 1270 b 19 the reference would seem to be to Theopompos, for it is to him that Aristotle ascribes the establishment of the ephorate in 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 26 sqq.); but here Lycurgus is referred to, as is evident from 1270 a 7. Thus the passage before us would seem to place the date of Lycurgus’ legislation after the close of, at all events, the first Messenian War—i.e. according to the ordinary chronology, after B.C. 723. Yet Aristotle makes Lycurgus the guardian of Charilaus, whom the ordinary chronology places about 880 B.C. Triebcr (Forschungen zur spartanischen Verfassungsgeschichte, pp. 44–65) illustrates the contradictions in the testimony of the authorities as to the date of Lycurgus, without, however, referring to this passage. Plutarch, indeed, already notes the fact (Lycurg. c. 1). The remarks of Plato (Laws 780–1, esp. 780 B and 781 A) are probably present to Aristotle’s mind here. Plato speaks of Lycurgus as having given way in the matter of the women (᾿ἐλευθερεῖα τῶν νομοθέτων, 781 A). The following passage from Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus (c. 14) deserves to be quoted in full—οὐ γάρ, ὥς ἀριστοτέλης φησίν, ἐπιχειρήσας σωφρονίζειν τὰς γυναῖκας ἐπάνω τὰ μέρα τῶν τολῆς ἀνώτεροι καὶ γυναικοκρατία διὰ τὸ πολλά στρατεία τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐν αἷς ἰσομερῶς κυρίας ἀπολείπειν ἐκείνας, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μάλλον τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτὰς ἑθεράπευν καὶ διστασίνας προσηγό- 

ρέων ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποίησατο. Is Plutarch here commenting on the passage of the Politics before us? It is quite possible that he is, for though he connects the γυναικοκρατία with the prolonged absence of the husbands on campaigns far more
distinctly than Aristotle does, and though Aristotle says nothing about the title δέσποινα, there is a great resemblance between what he makes Aristotle say and this passage of the Politics. Perhaps, however, it is more likely that Plutarch is commenting on a passage of the Politics, for Aristotle may have used this work here, as he seems to have done elsewhere in the Politics (see above, p. xviii sq.)

The form προωδοποιημένος is elsewhere used by Aristotle (see Bon. Ind. s.v.), and Liddell and Scott (s.v.) would read προωδοποιημένους here. Προωδοποιημένοι, however, as these authorities remark, occurs in Probl. 30. 1. 954 b 12. See Göttling’s note on προφοικοφόρηται in his edition of [Aristotle,] Oeconomica, p. 74.


6. μέρη, i.e. εἰδή, Bon. Ind. 455 b 46 sqq. (cp. 1271 b 2).

ἄγεσιν ἑπὶ τοῖς νόμοις. Bonitz (Ind. 5 a 47) groups this expression with 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 19, ἄγεσι τὰς βασιλείας ἑπὶ τὸ μετριότερον. In Demosth. adv. Timocr. c. 31 we have ἄγεσι’ αὐτῶν ἑπὶ τοῖς νόμοις.

7. αὔται μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὐταὶ τῶν γενομένων. ‘The causes then of what happened are these’: for the omission of the article before αὔται, see above on 1. 3. 1253 b 11. The causes referred to are the long absence of the husbands and the fact that the women had not been prepared by previous experience to submit to the lawgiver’s yoke.


10. τῶν is probably neuter, like τῶν ὀρθῶς καὶ μὴ ὀρθῶς in the next line, not masculine. Cp. Eth. Nic. 7. 3. 1146 a 2 sqq.


13. οὐ μόνον k.t.l., i.e. not only spoils the harmony of the constitution taken by itself, but also spoils its influence and has an ill effect on character. The negligence of the lawgiver in relation to women is not only inconsistent with the ἐπόδεσις of the constitution, but also unfavourable to virtue: cp. 1269 b 12, ἐτε δ’ ἡ περί τὰς γυναικές ἄνεισι καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαιρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εἴδαμον πόλεως. I incline to the reading αὐτῆς καθ’ αὐτῆς, not αὕτην καθ’ αὐτῆς, though the latter is the reading both of M8 and Π4. Τὴν φιλοχρησματίαν, because the Spartan fondness for money was well-

16. γρ. 'I draw attention to this now, for the arrangements of the State respecting property are my next topic.'

τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως. Cp. 1270 b 7, τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐφορεῖαν.

18. διόσπερ. Property in general falling into a few hands, land did so too. For the fact, cp. Oecon. 1. 6. 1344 b 30, πρὸς δὲ φιλακήν τοῖς τῇ Περσαίῳ συμφέρει χρήσαται καὶ τοῖς Δακονικαῖς, on which Schömann (Opusc. Acad. 3. 223–4) remarks, that both the Persian and the Laconian methods referred to are designed for 'latifundia.' In what follows (18 sqq.) the unequal distribution of landed property in the Lacedaemonian State is traced in part to the freedom of gift (especially on marriage) and of bequest. But nothing here said excludes the operation of another cause, to which the inequality of wealth in this State is ascribed in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 34, ἥτις δὲ τὰ πάσας τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς πολιτείας διαγραμματεύεται, ἑνώς μᾶλλον πλεονεκτοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ὅπως καὶ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ εἰς ὀλίγους αἱ συστατικὴ ἐξαρσάται. For this use of εἰς, compare also Plut. Agis c. 5, τῆς εὐπορίας εἰς ὀλίγους συρρείοντος, Pol. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 1 sq., and 7 (5). 6. 1305 b 11, εἰς ἀλάττονων εἰς ἐβακασίων ἔλθεν, and see Bon. Ind. 222 b 17 sqq.

tοῦτο δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'This matter'—i.e. probably τὰ περὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως, though it is evident from what follows (τῆς πάσης χώρας, 23: τῆς χώρας, 29) that the faulty distribution of the land is uppermost in Aristotle's mind. Cp. 32, φαύλως αὐτοῖς εἰς τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, and 38, βέλτιον τὰ διὰ τῆς κτήσεως ὀμαλισμένης πληθύνειν ἀνθρώπων τὴν πάλιν, passages which serve to explain that before us. Aristotle is bound to trace the evil in some degree to the lawgiver, because he is occupied in the Second Book with a criticism of constitutions and lawgivers, and if the faulty distribution of property in the Lacedaemonian State had been due not to ill-conceived laws, but to some other cause, its mention would not have been in place in an attempt to show that the laws of the State were not wholly satisfactory (cp. 2. 1. 1260 b 34, διὰ τὸ μή καλὸς ἠκούειν ταύτας τὰς τῶν ὑπαρχόντας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην δικάμεν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον). The remarks which follow (18–39) are interesting, especially because they indicate to some extent how Aristotle intended to deal with the question of property in his 'best State.' We learn from his comments here what we do not
learn from the Fourth Book, that he was in favour of making the citizens' lots of land inalienable and of regulating, or perhaps putting an end to, gift and bequest. He would abolish dowries or limit their amount, and would not allow either a father or his heir to give an heiress in marriage to any one they pleased. See below on 21. We do not learn whether he was, like Plato, in favour of Unigeniture.

19. ἀνείλθαι μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Μὲν here = 'while.' The nom. ὁ νομοθέτης must be supplied from τῶν νόμων: cp. c. 8. 1268 a 5, if τῶν νομοθετην is to be supplied there. Is οὐσιάν or γῆν to be supplied here with τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν? Probably the latter: cp. 8 (6).

4. 1319 a 13, τὸ μὴ δανείζων εἰς τι μέρος τὴς ὑπαρχούσης ἑκάστορ γῆς, and 10, ἢ δὲ τὸ γε ἀρχαίον ἐν πόλλαις πόλεσι νεομοθετημένων μὴ δὲ πολεῖς ἐξεῖναι τοὺς πρῶτος κλήρους, and the regulations of Plato in Laws γ 41 B: cp. also Heraclid. Pont. de Rebuspublicis 2. 7, πολεῖς δὲ γῆν Λακεδαμονίων αὐξάρχαν νεομάται: τῆς δ' ἀρχαίας μοίρας συνδέεσθαι: and [Plutarch.] Inst. Lac. c. 22 (quoted by Gilbert, Studien, p. 163–5), ἐννοεῖ δ' ἔφασαν δι' ἀλλ' τῶν ξένων διὰ ἀν υπομείνῃ ταύτην τὴν ἀκραίαν τῆς πολεμίας κατὰ τὸ βουίλιμα τοῦ Δυκαίρου μετέχει τῆς ἄρχηδει διαπεραμένης μοίρας: πολεῖς δ' οὐκ ἔξεπα. Aristotle says nothing here about the 'original share': on the other hand, we see that the purchaser no less than the seller lay under a ban. Polybius (6. 45–46) implies that not only had the land been at the outset divided equally among the citizens, but that this equality of landed property was enforced by law; he also holds in the same passage that all ambition to make money was thoroughly and successfully discountenanced by the Lacedaemonian constitution. In all these contentions he is altogether at issue with Aristotle, who can hardly have credited Lycurgus with an equal division of the land belonging to the citizens, or he would have mentioned the fact in c. 7. 1266 b 14 sqq. and here, and who certainly does not hold that an equality of landed property was enforced by law, or the love of money discouraged. Aristotle, however, would evidently have attached but little value to an equal division of the land unsupported by checks on population and by laws making the lot inalienable and regulating gift and bequest. He refers to the subject of population in 1270 a 39 sqq.: here he dwells on the lawgiver's omission to regulate gift and bequest, and traces the inequality of property in part to this cause. Was this criticism of Aristotle's (or possibly a similar criticism in the Polities) known to the writer whom Plutarch follows in his life of Agis (c. 5)? For here the inequality of property in the Laced-
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daemonian State is traced to precisely the same cause—the freedom of gift and bequest—though the error is not ascribed to the original lawgiver, but to an ephor named Epitadeus in the fourth century, who is said to have effected a change in the law, of which Aristotle does not seem to be cognisant (ἐφορεύσας δὲ τις ἄνήρ δυνατός, αὐθάδης δὲ καὶ χαλασός τὸν τρόπον, 'Επιτάδεως ὄνομα, πρὸς τὸν νῦν αὐτῷ γενομένης διαφοράς ῥήτοραν ἔγραφεν ἐξείναι τὸν οἷον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν κλήρον ὅ τις θέλει καὶ ζῶντα δοῦναι καὶ καταλιπεῖν διατεθέμενον). There were evidently two views current in Greece as to the cause of the decline of the Lacedaemonian State: many (e.g. the writer of the fourteenth chapter of Xenophon's treatise de Republica Lacedaemoniorum and of [Plutarch,] Inst. Lac. c. 42) ascribed it to a departure from the laws of Lycurgus; Aristotle, on the contrary, ascribed it to faults in his laws (cp. 4 (7). 14. i333 b 23, ἐτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ μέναντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενῶς ἐμποδίζομεν πρὸς τὸ χρήσκαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποδεξάθηκον τὸ ἥπερ καλῶς). Is it not, to say the least, possible that the writer whom Plutarch follows in this chapter of his Life of Agis, belonged to the former school, and was anxious to save the credit of Lycurgus from the criticism passed on him by Aristotle here or in the Polities? He in effect replies to Aristotle, that Lycurgus was not in fault; the fault was that of Epitadeus and the degenerate Spartans of his day. In just the same way Plutarch (Lycurgus c. 28) will not believe that Lycurgus can have had anything to do with the Cryptea, which Aristotle had attributed to him, or with the illtreatment of the Helots generally, and in another chapter of the same life (c. 14), as we have seen (note on 1270 a 4), will not admit that Lycurgus failed to subject the women to his laws.

21. διδοναι δὲ καὶ καταλείπειν κ.τ.λ. We must here again supply τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν γῆν. Vict. 'non vidi idem incommodum nasci ex utroque facto, non minus enim usu venit ut aliqui luctu pletiores quam oporteat flant posteriore hoc modo quam priore.' A man might impoverish himself and his family and enrich others by giving and bequeathing as easily as by selling. He might, for instance, give or bequeath more than he ought to a favourite son and so leave his other sons poorly off, or he might give or bequeath to some flatterer or legacy-hunter (Plato, Laws 923 B: cp. Aristot. Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 21 sq.) property which ought to have descended to his own children, but Aristotle probably refers especially to the giving and bequeathing of dowries to daughters (cp. 25). If these were large, as they often were at Sparta, the father might impoverish both himself and his sons and enrich husbands perhaps already
sufficiently wealthy, while his own sons, if impoverished, would be little likely to receive large dowries with their brides. Thus the rich would become richer and the poor poorer. The Spartan father, however, seems from what follows to have had not only full power to give and bequeath dowries, but also full power to give and bequeath an ἐπίκληρος or heiress to any one he pleased. The Attic law also gave this power to the father, though his exercise of the right to bequeath an ἐπίκληρος was often, it would appear, contested by the relatives, if his will interfered with their claims to her hand (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant., ed. Thalheim, Rechtsalt. p. 57. 1). The Lacedaemonian law, however, seems to have gone further than the Attic, for if the father died leaving an ἐπίκληρος and without having disposed of her hand by will, the person who inherited the ἐπίκληρος had full power to give her in marriage to any one he pleased. He was not bound to give her in marriage to a relative; he might give her away to an entire stranger, possibly to a man already rich. In this way again the rich would become richer and the poor poorer. Under the Attic law an ἐπίκληρος who had not been given or bequeathed in marriage by her father descended to the nearest male relative, who would be entitled to marry her if he chose, but if he did not, would have no right to give her in marriage to any one he pleased: the right to marry her would in fact pass from him to the male relative next in succession. 'If the person entitled to marry a rich ἐπίκληρος waived his claim, he left the field open to the claims of less near relatives (Isaeus 3. 74, p. 45, and 10. 5, p. 80), while in the case of a poor ἐπίκληρος (θησα) the Attic law required the nearest relative to marry her or to give her a dowry' (Hermann-Thalheim, p. 57. 1). Aristotle holds that property stands a better chance of being evenly distributed when inheritances pass, not by gift or bequest, but by descent, and he recommends oligarchies to adopt this system of succession (7 (5). 8. 1309 a 23 sqq.). Thus, though he would prefer the provisions of the Attic law to those of the Lacedaemonian, he would evidently wish to go far beyond them. He is clearly unwilling to allow even a father to give or bequeath an ἐπίκληρος to any one he pleased, and he may well have been in favour of abolishing the right of bequest altogether, or at any rate of imposing severe restrictions on it. Plato had adopted the latter course in the Laws (922 E sqq.), where he confines the discretion of testators within narrow limits and exhorts them to remember that their property belongs not to themselves alone, but to their family (γένος) and to the whole State (contrast the language of Plutarch as to Solon’s law περὶ διαθηκῶν, Solon c. 21), while he
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prescribes that in the disposal of heiresses not bequeathed in marriage by their fathers regard shall be had to nearness of relationship and to the preservation of the lot, and in fact gives the relatives in a fixed order of succession the right to marry the heiress, thus withholding from the inheritor of the ἐπίκληρος the prerogative which he possessed at Sparta of giving her in marriage to any one he pleased. In the time of Herodotus, if the father had not betrothed his ἐπίκληρος before he died, it fell to the Lacedaemonian King to determine to whom she was to be married (Hdt. 6. 57), but possibly only in case there were more claimants than one for her hand; it would seem, however, that by the time of Aristotle the inheritor of the ἐπίκληρος had come to have the same right to dispose of her hand as her father. There were some who asserted that Lycurgus forbade dowries (see C. F. Hermann, De vestigiis institutionum veterum per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis, p. 24, n. 78, who refers to Hermippus ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 555 C, Aelian, Var. Hist. 6. 6, and Justin 3. 3. 8). In Crete dowries were fixed in amount by law at half a son’s share: this had been mentioned by Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 482) and was probably known to Aristotle. Compare the Gortyna Inscription, col. 4. 48, and see Bächeler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 116. The law of Gortyna also placed a maximum limit on gifts (Bächeler und Zitelmann, pp. 125–9), which seem usually to have been left uncontrolled by Greek legislation (Hermann-Thalheim, p. 64). Under the Attic law there was no right of bequest if there were sons (Isaeus 3. 68, p. 45), but if the story of Epitadeus, as Plutarch tells it, is true, testators at Sparta would appear not to have been subject to this restriction, for Epitadeus’ object in introducing the right of bequest is implied to have been to disinherit his own son.

23. καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν, i.e. not only belongs to a few but to women. For the fact, cp. Plutarch, Agis c. 4, τῆς τε μητρᾶς Ἀγησιστράτας καὶ τῆς μάμμης Ἀρχιδαμίας, αὐτί πλείστα χρήματα Λακωνικῶν ἐκέχρησε: and c. 7, ἢν δὲ τότε τῶν Λακωνικῶν πλούσιων ἐν ταῖς γυναικὶ το πλείστων.

24. γυνομένων. The tense indicates a continued occurrence of the circumstance: cp. 1270 b 5.

25. ἢν. For the suppression of ἄν, see Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 49. 2.

26. ἢ καὶ, here apparently ‘or even’: see note on 1264 a 15.

νῦν 8’ ἔξεστι, ‘but, as it is, so far from that being the case . . . ’ I do not think, with Bächeler, Sus. (see Sus.², Note 304), and others, that we are obliged to suppose a lacuna after τετάχθαι. The law,
says Aristotle, ought to fix some limit to the amount of dowries, but, as it is, so far from doing so, it actually allows the father or his representative to give an heiress in marriage to any one they please, or, in other words, to dispose as they like of an entire inheritance. It goes, in fact, quite into an extreme in its complaisance. We often find a contrast between what ought to be and what is drawn, as here, by means of βέλτινον or δεί followed by νῦν δέ (e.g. in 1271 a 11–14 and 1273 b 21 sqq.).

27. δὲ φιλοτητα. According to Plutarch, Lysand. c. 30 (cp. Stob. Floril. 67. 16), there was a form of action at Sparta (κακογαμίων δίκη) available against those who looked to the wealth rather than the virtue of a family in marriage (cp. Plutarch, Apophth. Lac., Lysand. 15. 230 A). But of this Aristotle seems to know nothing.

28. μὴ διαθέμενος, ‘without having disposed of her hand by will.’

δὲ ἐὰν καταληπῇ κληρονόμον. For the phrase, cp. Plato, Laws 740-B. Camerarius (p. 99) asks, ‘qui autem est heres iste alius praeter illam ἐπίκληρον?’ and Coray in his edition of the Politics (p. 276) quotes Harpocration’s explanation of ἐπίκληρος—ὅρθιαν ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ κλήρῳ καταλελαμμένη, μὴ δάνειον αὐτῇ ἀδελφόν. If all the property of the father passed to the ἐπίκληρος, how would it be possible for him to leave a κληρονόμος in addition to the ἐπίκληρος? (It may be noted that Harpocration’s account seems not to be literally correct, for there might be more ἐπίκληροι than one (C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 64. 11), but that does not concern us here.) The explanation of the enigma probably is, that the κληρονόμος referred to in the passage before us is the κληρονόμος τῆς ἐπικλήρου, the person who inherits the ἐπίκληρος: cp. Demosth. contra Εὐβυλίδ. c. 41, ἐπικλήρου δὲ κληρονομήσας εὐπόρου, and Heraclid. Pont. de Rebuspubl. 28, καὶ ἀπαθανάτου τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὄσπερ τάλα, οὕτω καὶ τὰς γυναικάς κληρονομοῦσιν. C. F. Hermann (Gr. Ant. 3. § 64. 10) quotes Gans, Erbrecht, 1. 339—‘diesen’ (i.e. this recognition of the ἐπίκληρος) ‘liegt durchaus nicht der Begriff zu Grunde, dass sie selbst als Erbende auftreten, sondern dass sie mit dem Vermögen von den Collateralen ererbt werden.’ So too Caillemot (Droit de succession à Athènes, p. 40) says that in an ἐνδικασία for an heiress ‘les formes de procédure ressemblaient beaucoup à celles que le législateur avait établies pour les demandes d’envoi en possession d’un heredité.’ The κληρονόμος would be ‘the nearest adult male relative, or if there should be more than one equally near, the eldest of them’ (Sus, Note 305), for we need hardly concern ourselves with the unlikely case of the father naming a κληρονόμος without disposing of his daughter’s hand.
29. τοιγαροῦν κ.τ.λ. As the land found its way into fewer and fewer hands, the number of citizens would dwindle, especially as in the Lacedaemonian State the citizen who could not pay his quota to the syssitia lost his political rights. As to the extent of the territory, cp. Isocr. Panath. § 45, (Lacedaemwnoi) ἐχοντες πόλιν ἀλλοτριῶν καὶ χώραν ὑπὸ μόνον ικανήν, ἀλλʼ δεν ὁμοίω πόλει τῶν Ἐλληνίδων. Does Aristotle mean by τῆς χώρας the territory belonging to Spartan citizens both in Laconia and in Messenia, or in Laconia alone, for Messenia had long been lost to the Lacedaemonians, when he wrote? He is probably speaking of the time before Leuctra (cp. Ἰςαν, 31), and, if so, he refers to Laconia and Messenia together. It is perhaps not necessary to suppose that he means 31,500 ἀργοῖ, though, as a matter of fact, the Spartans were ἄργοι. If he does, he need not have gone so far as to Babylon to find a parallel to the extent of the State-territory in Plato's Laws. See note on 1265 a 15. As the women who owned land would be married to Spartans, the military strength of the State can hardly have been impaired, however large the number of households may have been in which the family property was derived from the wife, and not from the husband. The evil appears rather to have lain in the concentration of landed property in a few hands, than in its frequent devolution to females. It is, however, no doubt true that female landowners, even when they were free from the vices which Aristotle ascribes to the Spartan women, might be less inclined to use their property for the good of the State than male landowners trained from their earliest years to live for the discharge of their duties as citizens. It does not seem that the feudal plan of proportioning the amount of military service due from the holder of land on military tenure to the amount of land held occurred to the Lacedaemonian lawyer or to the lawyer of any other Greek community. If there were no males in the family of the owner, no military service was rendered: the owner was not bound to supply hired military service. Yet the land, whether owned by women or by men, might have been made subject to the burden of supplying a given number of soldiers. It is true that hired military service, though not unknown to the Lacedaemonians, would not have been as satisfactory, or as politically safe, as that of citizens.

31. αὐτῶν, 'by themselves,' apart from any reasoning.

32. φαύλως, an epithet frequently applied in this book of the Politics to defective social and political arrangements (e.g. in 1271 b 10, c. 10. 1272 b 7, c. 11. 1273 a 36, b 8). Οὐ καλῶς (1271 a 26, etc.) is a somewhat milder expression.
33. μίαν γὰρ κτ.λ. Leuctra, of course, is meant. Cp. Isocr. Archid. § 56, τίνας γὰρ ὑμεῖς, διὸ καὶ ποιήσασθαι μενείαν δένδρ' ἔστιν, ὀφθαλμὶς ὑπαξ ἡπτὴντες καὶ μᾶς εἰσβολῆς γενομένης, οὕτως ἀνάρθρος ἀρμολογήθηκαν πάντα τὰ προστατόμενα ποίησεν; and Polyb. 4. 81. 12. The power of Carthage, Athens, and Syracuse had survived several defeats.

34. τὴν ἄλγανβροπίαν, 'its paucity of citizens,' or possibly 'its well-known paucity of citizens': for the meaning of ἄλγανβροπία, see 3. 5. 1278 a 31. Xenophon (Rep. Lac. c. 1) had already spoken of Sparta as τῶν ἄλγανβροποτάτων πόλεων ὁσα: cp. also Isocr. Panath. §§ 255, 257.

λέγουσι δ' ὡς κτ.λ. On μέν not followed by δὲ, see above on 1262 a 6. The suppressed clause evidently is, 'but that now they do not,' or rather perhaps, 'though they do not now.' Sus. 3 (Note 310) thinks that the Aegeidae and Talthybiadae, old families of non-Doric extraction, are referred to. The case of the Epeunacti, as to whom see Theopomp. Fragm. 190 (Miller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 310), is, however, also to the point. Triebcr (Forschungen, p. 101) suggests that Aristotle here has in view the statement of Ephorus (ap. Strab. p. 364 συν βπ.), τὴν δὲ Ξαρτήν (Εὐρυσθῆνα καὶ Προκλῆ) βασιλείων ἀποφήνα σφίσαν αὐτοῖς' εἰς δὲ τὰς ἄλλας πέμψα βασιλείας, ἐπιρέφαντας δέχεσθαι συνοίκους τοὺς βουλομένους τῶν ἐξών διὰ τὴν λευκανδρίαν: but this seems to refer to the Perioecic cities, not to Sparta. Alcman the Lydian is said to have become a Spartan in an epigram which is given in Anth. Pal. 7. 709 and in Plutarch, de Exilio c. 2. Herodotus, on the other hand, knows only of two men, Tisamenus and Hegias, who were ever made Spartan citizens (9. 35).

35. On ὅστ' οὖ γίνεσθαι, see Appendix B to Shilleto's edition of Demoethenes de Falsa Legatione.

36. πολεμοῦντων, 'though engaged in war': cp. 1271 b 12 and c. 5. 1264 a 32.

καὶ φανὴν κτ.λ. Τοῖς Ἐπαρτιάταις, cp. 1271 b 10, φαῦλως δὲ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰ κοινὰ χρήματα τοῖς Ἐπαρτιάταις, and 1270 b 8, αὕτως. Demaratus (Hdt. 7. 234) makes Sparta a city of 8000 citizens at the time of the invasion of Xerxes. Nine thousand lots are said by Plutarch (Lyc. c. 8) to have been assigned to Spartans by Lycurgus. Isocrates, on the contrary, puts their number at 2000 only even in the earliest times (Panath. § 255), and contrasts Sparta with αἱ μυριάνδροι πόλεις (§ 257).

38. βηλτίον, i.e. better than populousness obtained by the admission of strangers to citizenship: cp. Plutarch, Agis c. 6, καλὸν ὁ Ἀγις, ὥσπερ ἦν, ποιήσωσι καὶ ἀναπληρώσω τὴν πόλιν.
NOTES.

40. ταύτην τὴν διόρθωσιν, i.e. the correction of ὀλγανθρωπία by means of an equalization of property. For, though this law tends to promote an increase of population, it does nothing to equalize property; on the contrary, it tends to increase the number of pauper citizens and to add to their poverty, thus intensifying the existing disparities of wealth. It encourages parents to bring off-spring into the world for whose maintenance no land is available. Plato may possibly have this Lacedaemonian law before him, when he says (Laws 740 D), μηχαναὶ δ’ εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ γὰρ ἐπισκέψεις γενέσεως αἰτίων ἐς ἐν εἴροις ἡ γένεσις, καὶ τοινυντίον ἐπιμέλεια καὶ σπουδὴ πλήθους γενημάτων εἰσὶ ταῖς τε καὶ ἄτμιας καὶ νοθετήσει πρεσβυτῶν περὶ νέων κ.τ.λ.

1270 b. 2. προάγεται. Spengel (Aristotelische Studien 3. 16): ‘ίμο προάγει.’ The middle does not seem to be used in this sense by Aristotle elsewhere (see Bon. Ind. s. v.), but a reference to Liddell and Scott will show that it is thus used by other authors.

3. νόμος, ‘a law’: cp. c. iο. 1272 a 15, εἶ δὲ μι, μετέχειν νόμος κολύει τῆς πολιτείας, and Isaeus De Apollodor. Hered. § 30, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἰδία ταύτα γινώσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δημοσία τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως οὕτω ταῦτ’ ἐγνωσι’ νόμος γὰρ τῷ ἄρχοντι τῶν οίκων, ὅτε οἱ δὲ ἐξερημῶνται, προστάτει τὴν ἐπίμελειαν. Νόμος takes up ὁ νομοθέτης.

4. ἀφρουρον. ‘Φρουράν Lacones dicebant τὴν στρατείαν, ut in nota illa formula οἱ ἐφοροὶ ἐφημον φρουρᾶν, Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 59’ (Schn.).

6. πολλοὺς γίνεσθαι πένητας. Sus. ‘many poor must come into being’: Mr. Welldon, ‘there will inevitably be a large body of poor’: but I incline to translate (with Prof. Jowett) ‘many must necessarily fall into poverty’ (cp. c. 7. 1266 b 13, φαῦλον τὸ πολλοῦ ἐκ πλουσίων γίνεσθαι πένητας). The father of several sons would be likely to become a poor man, and the sons still poorer.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. This subject naturally follows. There being many poor men among the citizens, and all being eligible for the ephorship, the corruption of the ephorship followed from the unequal distribution of property.


αὐτοῖς. Bernays connects αὐτοῖς with τῶν μεγίστων, translating ‘über die wichtigsten Angelegenheiten Sparta’s’ (Mr. Welldon, ‘issues of the highest importance to the Lacedaemonian State’), but perhaps αὐτοῖς should be connected with the sentence generally and translated ‘amongst them’ or ‘in the Lacedaemonian State’ (cp. 1271 a 35, ὅρος δὲ τῆς πολιτείας αὐτοῖς ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ πάτρως, and c. iο. 1272 a 27, τοῖς Κρητικῶν ἢ τοῖς Λάκωνοι).

γίνονται κ.τ.λ. As to the nature of the distinction between the
demos and the καλὸι κάγαθοι in the Lacedaemonian State, see Schömann, Opusc. Acad. 1. 138. It is not necessarily implied here that none but members of the demos ever became ephors; the meaning is, that all the seats in the college of ephors were as open to the demos as to anybody else (cp. 25, καβδοςταται ἐκ ἄπαντων, and c. 6, 1265 b 39). It appears from 1271 a 3, however, that the senators also, though presumably καλὸι κάγαθοι, were often bribeable.

10. ἡμικράνια. The tense is noticeable. Is it used because Aristotle is speaking here, as elsewhere in this chapter, of the time of the Lacedaemonian empire, or because he looks back to definite instances of corruption arising from poverty?

11. ἐδήλωσεν. Vict. 'sc. se esse tales ut muneriibus facile labe-factori possint': cp. ἐδήλωσεν δὲ, 1269 b 37.

ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδριοῖς, 'in the events at Andros,' 'in the Andros business': cp. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 38, μετὰ τὰ τυραννικὰ: Isocr. περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους § 25, τὴν 5 ἐθνων ἢν ἐἴχον εἰς τὰ πλῆθος, ἐν τοῖς τυραννικοῖς ἐπεδείκται συγγενεὶς γὰρ ὁντες Πεισιστράτου κ.τ.λ.: and τὰ Κύπρια, the subject of an Epic poem, Aristot. Poet. 23. 1459 b 1. It is quite unknown to what Aristotle here refers, but I venture to suggest whether it is not possible that certain events of the year 333 B.C. are referred to. In that year the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus and Autophradates advanced from Chios first to Andros and then to Siphnos (nearer to Laconia), with the object of bringing about a rising in Greece against Macedon, and thus effecting a diversion in favour of Persia at the critical moment when Alexander was commonly thought to be 'caught and cooped up in Cilicia' (Grote, Hist. of Greece, 12. 157 n.). We have, indeed, no record of any negotiations between the ephors and the Persian admirals while the fleet was at Andros, though we know from Diodorus (17. 29) that the Lacedaemonians were already on the side of Persia, and that Memnon had won over many of the Greeks by means of bribes; but at Siphnos King Agis made his appearance in a single trireme, and commenced negotiations for a subsidy and for the despatch of a fleet and an army to his aid in the war which he was contemplating with Macedon. The news of Issus, however, arrived in the midst of these communications and nipped the project in the bud (see A. Schäfer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 3. 1. 163, who refers to Arrian 2. 13. 4 sq.: Curt. 4. 1. 37). If, as is probable, the ephors sent Agis on this errand, Aristotle may well have thought that they came near to ruining their country. Τὴν πολέω, 13, in any case probably means
the Lacedaemonian State, not Andros, for the fact that the corruptness of the Ephors nearly ruined Andros would not be to the point: Aristotle has to prove that it was perilous to their own State. If events of 333 B.C. are really referred to, the circumstance would be interesting, because it would show that this passage was added to, if not written, subsequently to that date. I mention the hypothesis for what it is worth.


δημαγωγεῖν. Cp. 7 (5). 6, 1305 b 24 sqq. According to Plutarch, Agesilaus was fined by the ephors on one occasion for seeking to court the senators (De Fraterno Amore, c. 9, αί μὲν γὰρ ἔφοροι, τοῦ Ἀγησίλαυ τῶν ἀποδεκυμένων δεὶ γερότουν ἐκάστῳ βοῶν ἄριστεῖν πέμποντος, ἐξημισῶν αὐτῶν αἰτίαν ὑπειπόντες, ὅτι τοὺς κανάδες ἰδίους κτάται δημαγωγῶν καὶ χαριζόμενοι).

15. ὅστε κ.τ.λ., 'so that, together with the kingship itself, the constitution received injury in this way also' (i.e. it suffered not only through the venality of the ephors, but also through the kings being forced to court them).

16. δημοκρατία γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Sepulv. 'nam ex optimatum imperio in principatum popularem mutabatur' (sc. respublica), and so Sus. and others, but the expression ἡ πολιτεία συνέβαινε δημοκρατία seems a strange one, and it is possible that δημοκρατία is the subject, not the predicate: cp. Plato, Rep. 545 C, τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας. For συνέβαινε, cp. 2. 7. 1266 b 23.


μὲν οὖν, 'true' or 'indeed,' answered by ἀλλά, 26. Aristotle has just been saying that the organization of the ephorate was such as to injure the constitution, and he now admits its value in holding the constitution together, only to reaffirm (ἀλλ' αἱρετὴν ἔδει κ.τ.λ., 26) his statement respecting its defects of organization.

19. διὰ τὸν νομοθέτην, 'owing to the lawgiver': cp. c. 11. 1273 b 22, and ἀ' ἀρετῆν, c. 5. 1263 a 29. It would seem that Theopompos must be referred to here: cp. 7 (5). 11. 1313 a 26 sqq. 'Plerumque γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τόχης δicitur, sed etiam διὰ τόχην, Phys. 2. 4. 195 b 32: Rhet. 1. 10. 1368 b 34' (Bon. Ind. 780 b 40 sq.). See critical note.

21. δεὶ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. All the MSS. have the word ταῦτα after διαμένειν, except P⁴ O¹, which have ταῦτα, and P¹, which has ταῦτα (Vet. Int. 'has'). Ar. has 'opportet enim rempublicam quae duratura sit velle ut omnes civitatis partes consentat atque in statu
suo permaneant': he therefore probably read ταύτα. But if we retain this word, τὴν πολιτείαν must, it would seem, be the subject of βούλεσθαι. The next sentence (23—26), however, certainly reads as if, not τὴν πολιτείαν, but πάντα τὰ μέρη were the subject of βούλεσθαι, and this impression will be confirmed, if we compare c. 10. 1272 a 32 sqq.: c. 8. 1268 a 23 sqq.: 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 36 sqq.: 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 14 sqq., especially as εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν is used of constitutions in 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 38—40, οὐδετέρων μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν (i.e. democracy and oligarchy) εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ἄνευ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τοῦ πλῆθους (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 12). It is true that we gather from 6 (4). 12. 1296 b 15 and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 16 sqq. that the safety of a constitution is sufficiently secured, if the stronger section of the elements of the State, not necessarily all of them, desire its preservation, but nevertheless I incline on the whole to think that ταύτα should be omitted. It may have been added by some one who deemed it necessary for the completion of the sentence, or it may be a blundered dittography of πάντα, 21: a dittography of τὰ ἄλλα occurs in r. 8. 1256 b 18, where Π¹ appear to repeat these words from 16 (see Susemihl's apparatus criticus). Schneider would omit ταύτα or read τὴν αὐτὴν in place of it; Bernays would read κατὰ ταύτα. On the phrase μέρη τῆς πόλεως, which comes to Aristotle from Plato, Rep. 552 A, see vol. i. Appendix A. The 'parts of the State' are here βασιλείαι, καλοὶ κάγαθοι, and δήμοι—quite a different enumeration from those given in 4 (7). 8 and 6 (4). 4.

23. μὲν οὖν, 'saepè usurpatur ubi notio modo pronunciata amplius explicatur' (Bon. Ind. 540 b 42): so here πάντα τὰ μέρη are successively taken up and considered separately: a similar use of μὲν οὖν occurs in Soph. El. 6. 169 a 18 sqq.

τιμὴν. Aristotle occasionally applies the term ἄρχη to a Kingship (e.g. in 7 (5). 10. 1313 a 8 and 2. 11. 1273 a 30).


28. παιδαριώδης. The same thing is said in 1271 a 9 sq. of the κρίσις in the election of senators. Susemihl has already pointed out (Sus. 9, Note 324) that the condemnation here passed on the method of electing ephors is not thus limited. We learn from Plutarch, Lyc. c. 26, how elections to the γερουσία were decided. The test was the comparative loudness of the shouts of approval evoked on the appearance in the popular assembly of the different candidates. Plato's language as to the ephorate—
\[ \text{NOTES.} \]

\[ \text{ēγγίς τῆς κληρονομῆς ἀγαθῶν δυνάμεως (Laws 692 A: cp. 690 C)—has led to the conjecture that the election of the ephors was in some way or other determined by auspices. See Sus.}^{2} \text{, Note 324, and Schömann, Gr. Alterth. i. 247. Schömann suggests that the people may have designated a certain number of persons for the ephorate, and that five of those designated may have been selected for the office by taking the auspices. The language of Aristotle in 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 29 sq. has been held to imply that the people did not elect to the ephorate, and the passage before us does not expressly say that they did, though it implies that the office was in some sense an elective one (cp. Isocr. Panath. § 154). \text{In c. 10. 1272 a 31 sqq. we have ἐσταίθα} \delta^{2} \text{(in Crete) φυκ εἴ} \text{ἓν} \text{ἄπιστων ἁρπώντα} \text{τῶν κόσμων, and as Aristotle is here contrasting the election of the cosmier with that of the ephors, his language might be taken to imply that the Lacedaemonians elected the ephors, if it were certain that we should supply} \text{ὁ Κρήτης with ἁρπώντα. But in c. 11. 1272 b 36 ἁρπώντα} \text{is used of the election of the Hundred and Four at Carthage, who were not elected by the people, if they were identical with the Hundred, for the Hundred were elected by the Pentarchies (c. 11. 1273 a 14). All we can be sure about, therefore, is that the ephors were elected in a way which Aristotle regarded as ‘very childish.’ He evidently thinks that the office might safely remain open to all, if the mode of election were improved. He seems, in fact, to hold that the ‘very poor’ and ‘venal’ men of whom he speaks (1270 b 9 sq.) would not then be elected ephors.} \]

\[ \text{κρίσεων ... μεγάλων. Sus.}^{2} \text{compares 3. i. 1275 b 9, ἀριστε-} \text{ραμένοι τὰς τῶν συμβολών δικαία τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλας ἄλλας. Add 8 (6). 2. 1317 b 26, περὶ τῶν πλείστων καὶ τῶν μεγίστων καὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων, ἀριστερῶς περὶ εὐθυνῶν καὶ πολεμείας καὶ τῶν ἓν ἐν συμβολάματον.} \]

\[ 30. \text{κατὰ γράμματα καὶ τοὺς νόμους. For the omission of the} \text{article before γράμματα, see Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq. Καὶ is ex-} \text{planatory, as in c. 5. 1263 a 15. The recently discovered In-} \text{scription containing a portion of the laws of Gortyna refers to its own provisions as τάδε τὰ γράμματα (col. 12. 17), or τὰ ἐγγραμένα (col. 1. 54).} \]

\[ 31. \text{καὶ ἡ διάτα. Their mode of life as well as their powers, which in effect turn an ἀριστοκρατία into a democracy, 16. Cp. Isocr. ad Nicocl. § 31. Plato (Laws 674 A sq.) forbids wine to magistrates during their year of office. He does not seem, however, to have been aware of any excesses on the part of the ephors: see Laws 637 A. The ephors did not take their meals at the public mess-tables, but had a συνσίτιον of their own (see Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. i. 57, who refers to Plutarch, Cleom. c. 8).} \]
32. τῷ βουλήματι τῆς πόλεως, 'the aim of the State.' We expect rather τοῦ νομοθέτου (cp. Eth. Nic. 2. 1. 1103 b 4), or τῆς πολιτείας (Scaliger), and the words πόλεις and πολιτεία are often interchanged in the MSS.: still τῆς πόλεως is possible.

αὕτη μὲν γὰρ, 'for that' etc.: compare the use of αὕτα in 4 (7). 12. 1331 a 21, and see Vahlen on Poet. 15. 1454 b 17.

33. τοῖς ἄλλοις, sc. πολίταις (Coray).

μᾶλλον, 'rather than in the opposite direction,' as in c. 11. 1273 a 6, or = λαν, as in c. 6. 1265 a 31? Probably the former.

ὑπερβάλλει, sc. ὑπαίτα (Bon. Ind. 684 a 39). For the fact, cp. 5 (8). 4. 1338 b 12 sqq.

34. λάβρα τῶν νόμων ἀποθεωμάτων. Aristotle has here in his mind the language of Plato about the Spartans in Rep. 548 B, λάβρα τὰς ἡδονὰς καρποῦμενοι, ἀσπέρ παῖδες πατέρα, τῶν νόμων ἀποθεωμάτων. The expression, however, was perhaps first used by Alcibiades: see Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 37. Lysander was said to be one of these recreants (Aelian, Var. Hist. 13. 8). Dercyllidas also liked to live away from Sparta (Xen. Hell. 4. 3. 2: cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 15). As to the Spartan Archidamus, see Theopomp. Fr. 259 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 1. 322).

37. ἐπιεκένων μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Xenophon had added the arrangements respecting the senate in proof of the care taken by the lawgiver of the State to encourage καλοκαγαθία even in old age (de Rep. Lac. c. 10. 1); he had already dwelt (c. 4) on the lawgiver's skill in developing ἀνδραγαθία in the young (c. 4. 1–2). ἀνδραγαθία is rather a Xenophontic than an Aristotelian word (Aristotle would seem from Bonitz' Index to use it nowhere else), and perhaps the aim of this passage is to controvert the opinion of Xenophon. As to the meaning of ἀνδραγαθία, see L. Schmidt, Ethik der alten Griechen 1. 301 sq. Xenophon, according to him, used it in much the same sense as ἀρετή, to denote 'moral perfection.' Συμφέρειν, sc. ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν.

39. Aristotle seems to have held that judges of important causes should not retain their office after a certain age, for there is an old age of the mind as well as of the body. The view is noticeable, for we are familiar with the opposite practice. He apparently would not approve the life-long tenure of the members of the Athenian Areopagus. The best men in his own ideal State become priests in advanced life. Plato is of much the same opinion (Laws 755 A: 923 B): extreme old age in parents is for reverence rather than for use (Laws 931). The γέφονες of the Lacedaemonian State tried cases of homicide (3. 1. 1275 b 10). As to διανοίας γῆπας,
however, contrast de An. i. 4. 408 b 19 sqq., though this passage may perhaps be only aporetic (see Wallace ad loc.), and compare Rhet. 2. 13. Giph. compares Lucr. 3. 445 sqq. For ὀσπερ καὶ answered by καὶ, Sus.¹ (Ind. Gramm. s. v. ὀσπερ) compares c. 8. 1269 a 9 sq.

1271 a. 2. ἀποστείν, cp. 23 sqq. Contrast Polyb. 6. 10. 9, τῶν γερότον, δὲ καὶ ἐκδογῆν ἀριστίδην κεκρυμένοι πάντες ἐμέλλον δὲ τῷ δικαίῳ προσνε- 

μεν ἑαυτός.

3. φαίνονται δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'And it is evident that those who have enjoyed this dignity have often been led by bribery and favouritism to deal recklessly with the public interests.' I have ventured (with Lamb. and others) to connect πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν not only with καταχαρίζομενοι but also with καταδιδοκούμενοι, though this use of καταδιδοκούμενοι (med.) is uncommon and hardly finds a complete parallel in Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 377, ὅτι γὰρ ταῦθα ἀπλῶς δεξιωδικηταί καὶ τιμῶν ἔχουσιν ἀπάντων τούτων οὖσα ('they have done this because they have been bribed,' Shilleto), for the acc. here is of the thing done, not of the thing betrayed. Sepulv., Vict., Bern., and Sus., in fact, take πολλὰ τῶν κοινῶν with καταχαρίζομενοι only. They may be right, but the sentence seems to read rather the other way.

5. ἀνευθύνους. Ἀνυπετεύθυνος is common in Aristotle: ἀνευθύνος occurs only here, according to Bonitz' Index.


νολ μὲν εἰς ἲμιοῦν δ' ἀν βούλωνται, κύριοι δ' ἐκπράττεισαν παραχρήμα, 

κύριοι δὲ καὶ ἀρχονταὶ μεταξὸς καταπέφυαν καὶ ἑξῆς γε καὶ περὶ τῆς ψυ- 

χῆς εἰς ἀγώνα καταστήσαν: they have also the power to inflict immediate punishment on elected magistrates for any infraction of the laws, as tyrants and the superintendents of the great festivals have. Aristotle does not approve this mode of exacting an account. He regards the power of the ephors as ἵστοτάρανον (1270 b 14) and probably wishes it to be regulated by law (cp. c. 10. 1272 b 5–7). The Athenian plan of requiring a public account from the magistrate at the close of his term of office would evidently be inapplicable or unsatisfactory in the case of magistrates held for life. It would seem from Rhet. 3. 18. 1419 a 31 that the ephors held office subject to accountability.

8. οὗ τούτων. 'Ad augendam oppositionis vim negatio, quae poterat ad universum enunciatum referri, ipsi nominis negato praeponitrur, veluti 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 6: 2. 7. 1267 a 15' etc. (Bon. Ind. 539 a 5).

9. τὴν αὐτεσθ. For the acc. cp. c. 6. 1265 a 13. The subject
of approaching comment is first mentioned (in the acc.), and then the comment follows. The regulation which determines who may become candidates is distinguished from the selection (κρίσις), both being incidents of ἣ ἀφεσις. Perhaps κρίσις was the technical term: at all events both Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. 10, 1, 3) and Plutarch (Lyc. c. 26) use it in referring to the election of the senators at Sparta. This election was, in fact, an ἀγων, in which the prize was awarded to the best and most temperate of the candidates (see Xenophon and Plutarch, ὑδ᾽ supra). Plutarch describes the process, which seems, as Sus.² (Note 333) says, to be a peculiar development of the rude old-fashioned method of voting by ‘cry.’ In 7 (5). 6. 1306 a 18 the process of choosing senators at Elis is said to be δυνατετητική, and similar to the same process in the Lacedaemonian State. Thus the childish method followed in the latter State seems somehow to have favoured the predominance of a few wealthy families. Contrast with Aristotle’s account of the election of the Lacedaemonian senate those of Isocrates (Panæth. § 154) and Polybius (6. 10. 9).

10. αἰτεῖσθαι, ‘ask to be elected,’ ‘offer himself for election.’ I do not think that the making of ‘a personal canvass’ (Mr. Welldon) is necessarily implied.


12. νῦν δὲ ῥαπερ κ.τ.λ. We have just been told what ought to be: now we are told what is: compare for the contrast of δεῖ and νῦν δὲ 1270 a 25 sq. and c. 11. 1273 b 21 sqq.

13. φιλοτίμους γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Sepulveda (who seems to read τοῦτο) translates (p. 55): ‘ut enim cives ambitiosos redderet, hanc senatores deligendi rationem invit, cum nemo non ambitiosus imperio se praefici petat.’ Mr. Welldon also reads τοῦτο and translates in much the same way. It seems to me that this view of the passage is the right one, and that τοῦτο (cp. c. 11. 1273 b 20 and 3. 5. 1278 a 31 sq.), not τοῦτος, is the true reading: I translate, therefore, ‘for it is in his anxiety to make his citizens emulous of distinction, that he has adopted this regulation for the election of senators’—the regulation that the future senator must ask to be elected—‘for,’ etc. To require men to ask to be elected is to make φιλοτίμημα a condition of the attainment of the highest honours, and so to encourage the citizens to be φιλοτιμοῖοι. Sus. and others read τοῦτο but explain it as τῷ φιλοτιμῷ. If τοῦτος is read (with Π² Bekk.), then we must translate, ‘for in his anxiety to make his citizens emulous of distinction, he makes use of men of this type in filling vacancies.
in the senate; but τούτως κέχρησαι πρὸς τὴν αἴρεσιν τῶν γερόντων is an awkward way of expressing this.

18. τῶν γ' ἀδικημάτων τῶν ἐκουσίων. Π' Bckk. read τῶν γ' ἀδικη-

μάτων ἐκουσίων, and it is not impossible that instances might be

found of a similar displacement of the adjective when emphatic (compare, for instance, Plato, Laws 713 D, ταύτων δὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄρα

φιλάνθρωπος ὁ λός τὸ γένος ἄμενων ἡμῶν ἐφίστη τὸ τῶν δαμόων: Theo-
pomp. Fr. 143 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 302), ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἄροντων

τρίτων καὶ σπάρων ἡ ἄρα ἦ), but the probability here is that, ἀδικημάτων

immediately preceding τῶν, the latter word was omitted in copying

by a natural and frequent error of copyists. The words imply

that ἀδικήματα ἀκούσα are possible: contrast Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 a

15–23. For the view expressed in this passage, cp. Plato, Laws

870: Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 7. 'I would rather,' said Dr. Johnson,

'have the rod to be the general terror to all to make them learn,

tell a child, if you do thus or thus, you will be more esteemed

than your brothers and sisters.' For other accounts in the Politics

and elsewhere of the causes of ὀδίκια, see note on 1267 a 5. Plato

says of the timocratic State (Rep. 548 C)—διαφανεστάτων δ' ἐν αὐτῇ

ἐστίν ἐν τί μᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατῶντος, φιλονεκία καὶ φιλοτιμία.

19. μὲν is probably not taken up either by ἄλλα μὲν ... γε, 20 or

by δὲ, 22: it seems here as in 1270 a 34 to stand by itself, the

course of the sentence being broken at ἄλλα μὲν.


ἄλλα μὲν ... γε, 'but certainly': cp. 3. 4. 1276 b 18, 1277 a 25,

and see Ast, Lex. Platon. 1. 103.

21. μὴ καθάπερ νῦν. Göttl. 'intellige κατὰ τὸ γένος.' Cp. on this

subject c. 11. 1272 b 38–41. Aristotle appears to have agreed

with Lysander, if the object of the latter was not, as some thought

(7 (5. i. 1301 b 19 sq.), the abolition of the kingship, but the opening

of it to the best men irrespectively of descent. Lysander’s scheme

was, according to Ephorus (ap. Plutarch. Lysand. c. 30), ὅς χρῆ

tῶν ἐθυπωστιδῶν καὶ Ἀγαδόν τὴν βασιλείαν ἀφελομένου εἰς μέσον θείων

cαι ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἴρεσιν ἐκ τῶν ἀριστῶν—a sentence continued as

follows in the version of the same story given in [Plutarch,]

Ἀποφθ. Lac. 229 E sqq. (Lysand. 14), ὥσ μὴ τῶν ἄρ' Ἡρακλέους,

ἄλλ' οἷς Ἡρακλῆς ἡ ἀριστὴ κραυμάκαν τὸ γέρας ἦ, ἦ κάκεις εἰς θεοῦ

tιμάς ἀνίχθη. Cp. also Plutarch, Comp. Lysandri et Sullae c. 2.

Aristotle does not approve of the restriction of the kingship to the

Heracleids, nor of the mode in which the kings were selected from

their number. The merits of a father or a family should not help

the son; his claims should be decided according to the life led by
him personally (cp. for βίον Eth. Nic. 10. 9. 1179 a 18 sq., and for κρίνεσθαι Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 30). Aristotle’s language reminds us of the views expressed in the composition of Lysander, the substance of which appears to be given in the passage from the Apophthegmata Laconica quoted above.

22. ἀτι δὲ ὁ νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ. The connexion perhaps is—‘it is impossible to make sure of educating men taken simply on grounds of seniority from a given family (1272 b 40) into models of manhood, and this the lawgiver himself seems virtually to admit.’ Ποιεῖν 23, sc. τοις βασιλεῖσ.

24. συμπροσβευτᾶς, i.e. with the kings or one of them. Two ephors usually accompanied the king on campaigns, and it is to their presence, according to Schömann (Gr. Alterth. i. 250), that Aristotle here refers. If so, however, the use of the word συμπροσβευτᾶς seems strange. It is more likely that Aristotle refers to occasions on which the kings were sent on embassies. The lawgiver is here viewed as the author of these administrative traditions.

25. σωτηρίαν ἐνόμιζον τῇ πόλει κ.τ.λ. Contrast c. 2. 1261 a 30, διότι τὸ ἱσον τὸ ἀντιπαράθεσθαι σώζει τὰς πόλεις, and Rhet. i. 4. 1360 a 19, ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως.

26. οὐ καλῶς ὥς οὐδὲ κ.τ.λ. The defect in the arrangements respecting the syssitia here noticed does not seem to have occurred to Plato: cp. Laws 842 B.

28. ἀπὸ κοινοῦ, ‘at the public expense’: see the references in Liddell and Scott s.v. In c. 10. 1272 a 20 we have ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι: in 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 19, τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως. For the Cretan system, cp. c. 10. 1272 a 12 sqq. For τὴν σύνοδον (‘meeting’ or ‘gathering’), Bonitz (Ind. 731 b 25) compares 4 (7). 12. 1331 b 10: 8 (6). 4. 1319 a 32. Compare also Plato, Laws 640 A, and Theaet. 173 D.

30. καὶ intensifies σφάδρα (‘though some citizens are extremely poor’ etc.).

32. βουλεταὶ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ‘For he intends’ etc. Cp. c. 6. 1265 b 40 sq. The rich are said (Plutarch, Lyc. c. 11) to have been violent in their opposition to the institution of syssitia.


γυνεῖς. See note on 1264 a 14.

35. δρός δὲ κ.τ.λ., ‘and this is the traditional standard by which participation in the advantages of the constitution is regulated in
the Laconian State.' Cp. c. 10. 1272 a 15, ει δε μη, μετέχειν νόμοις καλῶν τῆς πολιτείας, καθάπερ ἔφηται καὶ πρότερον, and Plato, Rep. 551 A-B, a passage which throws light on the meaning of ὅρος τῆς πολιτείας here. In 8 (6). 1317 b 11 the phrase seems to bear a different meaning, 'the criterion of a democratic constitution.'

38. καὶ ἕτεροι τίνες. 'Critiae tyranni Laconi, ἡ πολιτεία vel similes libros respici probabile est,' Bon. Ind. 822 a 37 sq.

39. στάσεως, as in Lysander's case, 7 (5). 1. 1301 b 19 sq.: 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 33.

ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖς βασιλεύσιν. Bonitz (Ind. 268 b 36) compares Rhet. 2. 6. 1384 a 9, ἐπὶ σαῦτος, 'praeterea,' apparently making the meaning 'for in addition to the kings,' but perhaps something more than this is meant—'as a check upon the kings' (cp. 1271 a 23 sq.: 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 36, οἱ πρόβασι διαθέτασιν ἐπὶ τοῖς βασιλεύσιν).

40. οἵσις στρατηγοῖς ἀδίδος. Cp. 3. 15. 1285 b 38. These words are probably added to show how it is that the Admiralship can fairly be called an additional Kingship. It is because the Kingship is nothing more than a perpetual Generalship. It should be noted that an ἀδίδος ἀρχή is apparently distinguished from one held for life in Polyb. 6. 45. 5.


3. χρησίμη. 'Feminini forma et χρησίμος et (fortasse paullo rarius) χρησίμη exhibetur' (Bon. Ind. 854 b 19).

4. ἀπάλλυστος δὲ ἀρξαίτε. Cp. 4 (7). 14. 1334 a 6, αἱ γὰρ πλείον τῶν τοιούτων πάλαι πολεμοῦσαι μὲν σάς οὖν, κατακτήσαμεν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπάλλυστα. For ἀρξαίτε in the sense of 'having acquired empire,' cp. σχολάσαντες, 1270 a 4, and κοινώνιασανες, c. 5. 1263 b 28, and see Schömann's note on ἐφορεύσας δὲ τὶς ἀνὴρ δυνατός in his edition of Plutarch's Agis and Cleomenes, p. 106. As to the fact, see Plutarch, Agis 5. 1. The ruin of the Lacedaemonian State is also traced to δυναμοποιία in 1270 a 33, but the deeper cause of it is now for the first time dwelt upon. A fuller culture, moral and intellectual, would have taught the Spartans to resist the temptations of their newly acquired wealth and power: cp. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 22–34. Ephorus had said much the same thing of the Thebans in a striking passage of his history (Fr. 67: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 254): compare also Plutarch's remarks on the character of Marius (Marius c. 2).


τούτου δὲ κ.τ.λ. The fault now noticed is hinted by Plato, Laws
Isocrates had said much the same thing (Panath. §§ 187–8, 228). Aristotle virtually repeats the charge in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 9: cp. Eth. Eud. 7. 15. 1248 b 37 sqq. He finds much the same fault with Carthage in c. 11. 1273 a 37 sqq.

7. τάγαθα τὰ περιμάχητα are goods for which the many strive (cp. Rhet. 1. 6. 1363 a 8 sqq.), such as wealth, honours, bodily pleasures, Eth. Nic. 9. 8. 1168 b 16 sqq.


10. φαύλως δὲ ἔχει κ.τ.λ. In this passage the words of Archi-damus (Thuc. 1. 80. 4)—οὗτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν (χρήματα) ὁπτε ἐτοίμας ἐκ τῶν ἱλιῶν φέρομεν—seem to be present to the mind of Aristotle. Polybius (6. 49. 8 sqq.) draws a contrast between the Lacedaemonian and Roman States in this respect.

11. οὗτε ... τε. 'Not only is there nothing in the public treasury, but they also are slow to pay extraordinary contributions.' For οὗτε followed by τε, cp. c. 10. 1272 b 19 sqq.

ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, 'in the public treasury.' See Liddell and Scott s.v. for this sense of the word; they refer among other passages to Thuc. 6. 8. 2, καὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὡς ἐλη ἑτοίμα ἐν τε τοῖς ἱεροῖς πολλά καὶ ἐν τοῖς κοινῷ.

12. ἀναγκαζομένους, 'though they are compelled': cp. c. 5. 1264 a 32 and 7 (5). 9. 1309 b 12.

13. διὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Here most of the territory is said to belong to the citizens. In Plutarch's life of Lycurgus (c. 8), on the contrary, we are told that Lycurgus made 9000 lots for the Spartans and 30,000 for the Perioeci, nor is there anything to show that the Spartan lots were larger than the Perioecic. In the division made by Agis (Plutarch, Agis c. 8)—4500 Spartan lots against 15,000 for Perioecic hoplites—much the same proportion obtains. It is very possible (cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 34 sqq.) that the portion of Laconia belonging to the citizens increased as time went on, and that the aim of Agis was to restore what he conceived to have been the proportion at the outset. We see that the εἰσφορά of the State fell to a large extent, if not wholly, on land: as to Athens, see Boeckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens E. T., p. 506.

16. τὴν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here describes the result of the lawgiver's arrangements.

17. φιλοχρηστός, for the lawgiver has not brought the extravagant habits of the women, who nevertheless rule their husbands, under the control of the State, and he has taught his citizens to prefer wealth to virtue (1271 b 7 sqq.).
18. *ταύτα γάρ κ.τ.λ.* The translation probably is, 'for these are the main points for censure,' not 'for these are the main censures which one may pass upon it': cp. Demosth. in Lept. c. 148, ὧν τοῦτο ἐπειμῷ. It is true that ἐπειμῷ is used in 1271a 38 with a dative of the thing found fault with, and that Aristotle does not seem to use ἐπειμῷ with an accusative in this sense anywhere else; still we have τῶν ἐπειμηθέντων αὖ in c. II. 1273a 2 and αἱ ἐπειμῆμεναι τῶν κακῶν in Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114a 30.

C. 10. 20. The similarity of the Cretan institutions to those of the Lacedaemonian State must have been early recognized, for Herodotus found the belief prevailing among the Lacedaemonians that Lycurgus had derived his institutions from Crete (Hdt. i. 65). Plato in the Republic (544 C) classes the Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitutions together as timocracies and makes the same description serve for both (547A sqq.). And so again in the Laws the chief interlocutor draws little or no distinction between the constitutions under which his Cretan and Lacedaemonian comrades live; he applies the same criticisms to both (631 B sqq., 634, 635 sqq., 780 E sqq.). He finds in the one constitution no less than in the other a mixture of monarchy, or authoritative government, with democracy, or the principle of freedom; both are constitutions in the truest sense of the word, inasmuch as they are framed with a view to the common good, whereas in many States part of the citizens are slaves to the rest. It is as hard to decide with regard to the constitution of Cnosus as it is with regard to the Lacedaemonian constitution, whether it is a democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, or kingship (712 E). Not only Plato, but Xenophon, Ephorus, and Callisthenes are said by Polybius (6. 45 sq.) to have treated the Cretan and Lacedaemonian constitutions as the same, and we see from Strabo, p. 481 sq., that Ephorus did in fact trace many resemblances between them, though he mentioned certain customs as peculiar to Crete (Strab. p. 483) and also spoke of the Lacedaemonians as having 'perfected' the Cretan institutions, which implies that they had altered them to a certain extent. He describes how Cretan freedom was guaranteed by the unanimity and valour which were the fruits of the constitution, in language which contrasts strangely with Aristotle's remark, σώζεται διὰ τῶν τόπων, and with his reference to intervals of civil discord during which the Cretan States were at the mercy of any one who chose to assail them. Ephorus probably wrote, as Plato certainly did, before the raid of Phalaecus (345 B.C.) had
revealed the weakness of the Cretan laws, whereas Aristotle wrote after it. It is perhaps for this reason that Aristotle is far more alive than Plato or Ephorus to the differences between the Cretan and the Lacedaemonian constitution. So far indeed as deviations from the best constitution are concerned, he agrees that the same criticisms are applicable to both (c. 11. 1273 a 2 sq.), but while in the chapters on the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian constitutions he inquires how far the lawgiver has succeeded in his design of constructing an *apartokapria*, he seems to think it hardly worth while to raise this question as to the Cretan constitution; the doubt is rather whether it is a legally ordered constitution at all. Still there seem to have been points in which the Cretan laws were superior to the Lacedaemonian. The freedom of the Cretan States from troubles with their serfs appears indeed to have been no more than a happy accident. But the Cretan syssitia were better organized than the Lacedaemonian, for the citizens were not expected to contribute a quota to them, and poverty cost no man his rights under the constitution. No fear can have been felt in Crete of a paucity of citizens, for while in the Lacedaemonian State rewards were given to the father of more than two sons, the Cretan lawgiver discouraged large families. The Cretan women, again, though Plato speaks of them in the Laws (780 E sqq.) as equally *ámmobérttai* with the Spartan, seem to have been less indulged, for dowries were limited in amount to half a son's share (see above on 1270 a 21), and, at Gortyna at any rate, certain important portions of the inheritance were reserved for sons and could not pass to daughters (see below on 1272 a 17). If in the Lacedaemonian State the caprice of testators was, as Aristotle implies, among the causes which led to the concentration of the land in a few hands, Gortyna would seem to have had nothing to fear on this score, for there is no indication in the fragment which we possess of its laws that wills were known there (Bücheler und Zitelmann, Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 134). The inheritor of an heiress, again, unlike his Spartan compeer, had no right to give her in marriage to any one he pleased: if he were unwilling to marry her, the right to her hand passed to the next in succession (Bücheler und Zitelmann, p. 151 sqq.). How far Crete had its reward in a comparatively even distribution of landed property, we are hardly in a position to say; the language of Polybius (6. 46. 1) points the other way, at any rate as to his own time. A further fact may be noted to the credit of the Cretan States, that though, unlike the Lace-
daemonian, they had no ambitious dreams of empire, they nevertheless maintained and enforced a laborious system of gymnastic training.

On the other hand, the constitutional organization of the Cretan States was very defective. The government in each of them was in the hands of ten Cosmi and of a Boule composed of persons who had held the office of Cosmus. We see that this office was not held for life, but whether it was an annual office in the time of Aristotle, as it seems to have been in that of Polybius (6. 46. 4), is uncertain. Aristotle's use of the word μεταχείν in 1272 b 5 appears to imply that it was held for some definite term or other, though Zitelmann points out (Bücheler und Zitelmann, p. 54) that the expression 'if' he quits office,' and not 'when he quits office,' is used of a Cosmus in the law of Gortyna (col. 1. 52). The Cosmi had large powers, for they were not only the rulers of the State, but also its generals in war. It would perhaps be hardly safe to infer from αἰποιρίαι, 1272 a 34, that they were elected by the whole citizen-body, but we are distinctly told that only the members of certain gentes were eligible; the people, however, acquiesced in their exclusion from the office, because it brought those who held it no illicit gains; nevertheless the monopoly of supreme authority by a few families, which was all the more marked as the powers of the popular assembly were small, cost the Cretan States dear, for it led to the occasional displacement of the Cosmi by violent means. The worst point in the working of Cretan institutions, however, was the insubordination of the most powerful men. They occasionally carried their turbulence to the length of declaring an abeyance of the office of Cosmus, the result being a temporary dissolution of the body politic. The δυναροί here referred to would probably belong to the families whose members were alone eligible to this office. It is evident that whatever the effect of the syssitia may have been in equalizing rich and poor, the people in Crete readily rallied round δυναροί, just as in youth they formed ἄγελας under the leadership of a δυναρός (Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 483). In an island so rich in legend as Crete the great families would be likely to be strong.

Ἡ δὲ Κρητικὴ πολιτεία. This must mean the constitution which prevailed in the Cretan cities, for Crete was not gathered into one State. 'The forms of government established in the Dorian colonies in Crete' (and, it would seem, in the Cretan cities generally) 'so closely resembled each other, that we find one only described as common to all' (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece 1. 284).
According to Ephorus, Lyctus Gortyna and some petty towns had remained truer to the primitive institutions of Crete than Cnosus (Ephor. ap. Strab. p. 481). How much Aristotle has drawn in this chapter from Ephorus will best be seen, if a few extracts from Strabo’s summary of Ephorus’ account of the Cretan constitution are appended (Strab. pp. 481–2)—λέγεσθαι δ’ ὑπ’ τῶν ὄν ὅσ παλλά τῶν νομιζομένων Κρητικοῖν, τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς εὑρήσατε μὲν ὑπ’ ἕκειναν, ἥκριμβοκέω δὲ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας . . . καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ Δυττίων νόμμα ποιεῖται μαρτύρια τοῦ τά Λακωνικά πρεσβύτερα ἀποφαίνοντας ἀποίκους γὰρ ὅταν φυλάττει τά τῆς μητροπόλεως ἔθη, ἐπὶ ἄλλως γε ἔνισχε εἶναι τὸ τοὺς βελτιών συνεστῶτας καὶ πολιτευομένους τῶν χειρόνων ξηλοσά ἀποφαίνειν’ οὐκ εὖ δὲ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι . . . πολλὰς γοῦν τῶν ἀποκύδιων μὴ φυλάττειν τὰ πάρμα, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀποκύδιων ἐν Κρήτῃ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχειν τοῖς ἀποικίοις ἔθη (cp. 1271 b 28 sq., where Aristotle adopts Ephorus’ view that the colonists of Lyctus found the characteristic Cretan institutions already existing there on their arrival). Besides (Ephorus continues) Althaemenes the founder of the settlement lived five generations before Lycurgus: τῶν δ’ ἀρχεῖον τὰ μὲν καὶ τὰ δυοκήσεις ἔχειν τὰ αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπωνυμίας, διότι καὶ τὴν τῶν γερόντων ἀρχὴν . . . τοὺς ἐφόρους δὲ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ἐν Κρήτῃ κόμοις διοικοῦντας ἐτέρως ἀνομίασαι τὰ δὲ συνουσία ἀνδρεία παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Κρησίν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ καλεῖσθαι (cp. Dosiadas ap. Athen. Deipn. 143 b), παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις μὴ διαμείναντα καλούμενα ὡμοίων πρότερον’ παρ’ Ἀλκάμαν γοῦν οὕτω κεῖσθαι “φαίνεις δὲ καὶ ἐν βιάσεωι ἀνδρείαν παρὰ διαμιμώνεσθι πρέπει παιάνα κατάρχειν.” Then follows, in the form in which it was current among the Cretans, the story of Lycurgus’ visit to Crete after giving up his guardianship of the child Charilaus; this is told at greater length than Aristotle tells it in 1271 b 24 sqq., but to the same effect, except that Aristotle does not allow (cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 20) that Lycurgus ever was king, while the next allegation of these Cretan informants of Ephorus—the statement that Thaletas was the instructor of Lycurgus—is rejected in c. 12. 1274 a 29 sqq. on grounds of chronology, and Aristotle is silent in the Politics as to Lycurgus having, like Minos, asked for guidance in his legislation from a god, though in the Politics (Aristot. Fragm. 492. 1558 a 30 sqq.) he would seem to have followed Ephorus and his Cretan authorities in this matter. Cp. also Strab. p. 476, ἵστορια δ’ δ’ Μίνως νομοθέτης γενέσθαι σπουδαίος βαλαττοκρατήσαί τε πρῶτος, where Ephorus is perhaps again referred to, for he is quoted a few lines lower. The germ of some of the statements in 1271 b 32 sqq. may, in fact, be detected in some lines of the poem which passes under the name of Scymnus Chius—lines which
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evidently reproduce passages of Ephorus: see Ephor. Fragm. 61 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 249):—

Πράτος ὤ Κρήτης φασι τῆς Ἐλληνικῆς
ἀρξαι θαλάττης, ὡς τε νησιωτίδαις
πόλεις κατασκεύασα, ὡς τε καὶ συνοικίασα (cp. 1271 b 38)
αὐτῶν Ἐφορᾶς έφηκεν, εἶναι φησὶ τε
ἔπονεμαν τὴν νῆσαν ἀπὸ Κρήτας τινος,
τοῦ δὲ γενομένου βασιλέως αὐτόχθων
πλανὸν ἡμέρας ἀπέχειν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς (cp. 1271 b 35).

The statements of Diodorus 5. 78. 3–4 seem to be based on the same passage of Ephorus. I have not observed that any commentator has pointed out its resemblance to the passage 1271 b 35 sqq.

πάρεγγυς. Ephorus, according to Polybius (6. 45: cp. 6. 46. 9 sq.), treated the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions as identical. Polybius says the same thing less emphatically of Xenophon, Callisthenes, and Plato.

21. μικρὰ μὲν οὕτω χεῖρον, c. g. the syssitia.

ηττον γλαυφρός, 'with less neatness of finish,' explained by ηττον διήθρωται, 24. It is an exception to the general rule, when Charondas is found, c. 12. 1274 b 7, to be τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ τῶν νήσων γλαυφρό-

τερας καὶ τῶν νυν νυμφετών.

22. λέγεται, by Herodotus (1. 65), who says that according to the Lacedaemonians themselves Lycurgus derived his laws from Crete (contrast Plato, Laws 624 A), whereas others ascribed them to the counsels of the Pythia; and by Ephorus, as we have seen, who appears to have blended the two accounts and to have traced the institutions to Crete, though he adds that Lycurgus promulgated them as proceeding from the Delphian Apollo (Strabo, pp. 481–2). Xenophon (Rep. Lac. c. 8. 5) and Plato (Laws 624 A: 632 D: 634 A: contrast Minos 318 C sq.) say nothing of the derivation from Crete (Trieber, Forschungen p. 73 sq.). Isocrates boldly alleges that Lycurgus borrowed from Thesean Athens (Panath. §§ 152–3), but this is only 'his way.' On καὶ . . . δε, 'and also,' see Liddell and Scott δε iii, and cp. Pol. 3. 16. 1287 a 7.

24. ηττον διήθρωται, 'less elaborated,' 'less fully worked out in detail': cp. Oecon. 1. 3. 1343 b 16. The word is sometimes used of the change of an embryo into a fully articulated animal—e. g. inHist. An. 7. 3. 583 b 23: so διαμόρφων in Prob. 3. 31. 875 b 22 is replaced by διακριβών, 24 (δημοκρισία δε τοῦς Ἐπαρχίας is the expression used by Ephorus, ap. Strab. p. 481): cp. de Gen. An.
25. τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν. Cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 20, ὁ γάρ ἤν βασιλεὺς. However, the guardianship after the birth of Charilaus was admitted by some who, like Ephorus (Strabo p. 482), held that Lycurgus was king till Charilaus was born.

Χαρίλλου. See critical note.


27. διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν, i.e. the relationship of Lyctus, a Laconian colony in Crete, to its mother-city. The same expression is used in 1. 2. 1252 b 21 sq., and probably of the same relation. Strabo (p. 476) found Λύκτος the name of the city in Homer, but he writes it himself Λύττος (cp. υπτίτι = νυκτί in the Law of Gortyna, col. 2. 14), and this is the form used on coins and in inscriptions (Bursian, Geogr. von Griechenland, 2. 569. 3). On its remarkable situation commanding the one zig-zag track which leads from its fertile plain to the mountain-pastures, see Bursian ibid. p. 570. Λύττος is ‘Cretan for ὕψιλος’ (Liddell and Scott, s.v.).

30. διὸ καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ. Cp. 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 16, διὸ καὶ νῦν έτε τῶν ἁπ' ἐκείνου των χρόνων τοῖς συσστίων καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐνίοτε, and see vol. i. Appendix E (p. 575, note 2). For τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων, cp. 3. 1276 a 13, εἶπεν οὖν καὶ δημοκρατοῦντα τινι κατὰ τῶν τρόπων τούτων. 31. ός κατασκευάσαντος, ‘their view being that’ etc.

32. δοκεῖ δ' ἡ νήσος κ.τ.λ. What follows down to Κάμικον (40) is evidently taken from Ephorus: this is clear from the lines of Symnus Chius quoted above. The passage may be an interpolation, but it is more probable that it was placed where it stands by the hand of Aristotle himself, who has already drawn largely in this chapter from Ephorus, and may well have added it in order to show that there was nothing improbable in the view that the Lacedaemonians owed their famous laws to Crete. Crete, he in effect says, though now so out of the world, is well adapted by nature for supremacy over the Greek race, for it commands the Aegean sea, round which the Greek race is planted. This the Lacedaemonian king Agis III saw, when in B.C. 333 in preparation for an attack on the power of Macedon he despatched his brother Agesilaus to secure Crete.

καὶ before πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν is translated by Sus. ‘also,’ not ‘both,’
and he is probably right. For πεφυκέναι πρός, cp. Rhet. i. 5. 1361 b 10 sq.

34. πάση ... τῇ θαλάσσῃ, 'the sea as a whole' (see above on 1. 4. 1253 b 33). What sea, however, is referred to? Evidently ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ θάλασσα, if we compare the lines of Scymnus Chius quoted above on 1271 b 20, with which σχέδου τῶν Ἑλλήνων κ.τ.λ., 34, agrees, and ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ θάλασσα would seem to be the Aegean (the sea by the Greeks familiarly called their own,' Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 1. 2), not the Mediterranean: cp. Thuc. i. 4, and Plutarch, Eumenes c. 19, ὅπως μηδεὶς αὐτῶν εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀπεισ & μηδὲ δῆνεται τῇ Ἑλληνικῇ θάλασσῇ. The explanation ἀπέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 35, seems to suggest a reference to the Aegean. We find, in fact, that Eudoxus placed Crete in the Aegean (Strabo p. 474), a view to which Strabo objects. For the connexion of empire in Greece with the sea, cp. Thuc. i. 15. Ephorus (Fr. 67: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 254) praised Boeotia for being τριθάλασσας and pronounced it well-adapted for hegemony. So in Pol. 4 (7). 6. 1327 b 4 an adequate fleet is considered essential for hegemony over other States.

ἐπίκειται, 'lies close to,' perhaps with some notion of commanding or dominating: cp. Polyb. i. 42. 6, and 5. 44. 4, 5, ἐπίκειται δὲ καὶ κρατεῖ τῶν καλαμίνων Κασπίων πυλῶν.

35. ἀπέχει γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'From the isle of Cythera, which is parted by a narrow channel from Laconia, the snowy summits of the Cretan Ida are clearly visible, and from them the eye can probably reach the Rhodian Atabyrus and the mountains of Asia Minor' (Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, 1. 2). Cp. Diod. 5. 59. 2, Δίος ἱερὸν τοῦ προσαγαρμομένου Ἀταβύρας ... κείμενον ἐπὶ τινος ὑψηλῆς ἄκρας, ᾧ ἐς ἠτον ἀφοράν τῇ Κρήτῃ. This temple was in Rhodes.

39. τῇ Σικελίᾳ, also an island.

40. ἀνάλογον, here an adverb: see on this word Liddell and Scott, and Bon. Ind. 48 a 51 sqq. The Cretan institutions are said to be 'analogous' to the Lacedaemonian, whereas in c. 11. 1272 b 33 sqq. some of the Carthaginian institutions are said to be 'analogous,' and others 'similar' (παραλήψει) to the Lacedaemonian. Things may be 'analogous' without being 'alike' (Hist. An. 2. 1. 497 b 33: de Part. An. 1. 4. 644 a 16 sqq.: see Bon. Ind. 48 a 46), but here a certain amount of likeness is no doubt implied; still 'analogous' is probably a less strong word than 'similar.'

ἡ Κρητικὴ τάξις. Not only τῆς πολιτείας ἡ τάξις, 1272 a 4, but the whole body of Cretan institutions (see above on 1269 a 9).
41. γεωργοῦσι τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. On the importance of this severance between the military and cultivating classes, which was common to the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States and also to Egypt, see 4 (7): 10. 1329 a 40 sqq. Here as there the syssitia are mentioned in immediate connexion with it, perhaps as an institution tending to mark off soldiers from cultivators (cp. Hdt. r. 65, where syssitia are included under τὰ ἐστὶν πόλεμον ἔχοντα). Compare Strabo, p. 542, εὑρήκας δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι πρῶτοι τὴν Ἰθάκην κτίσαντες Μιλήσιοι τοὺς Μαριάνθους ἐπιστεύειν ἠφάγακασαν τοὺς προκατέχοντος τῶν τόπων, ὡστε καὶ πυράσκεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν, μή ἐστιν τὴν ύπεροπίαν δὲ (συμβόησα γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτων), καθόσπερ Κρητεῖ μὲν ἐβθητευεν ἡ Μυσα καλομείᾳ σύνδοσις, Θεταλεῖ δὲ οἱ Πενέσται.


οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοροὶ κ.τ.λ. Thier (Forschungen, p. 90 n.) justly remarks that Aristotle seems to be in conflict with himself, when he derives the ephorship from Crete as if it had been introduced by Lycurgus, while nevertheless he ascribes its institution to Theopompos (7 (5). 11. 1313 a 25 sq.), unless indeed he supposes that Theopompos also borrowed from Crete. The functions of the cosmi do not seem to have been quite the same as those of the ephors, for they commanded the troops on a campaign (1272 a 9), which the ephors did not.


βασιλεία δὲ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle goes on to mention other similarities between the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions. Kingship once existed in Crete, as it still does in the Lacedaemonian State, and the popular assembly in Crete is like the Lacedaemonian. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, r. 285) thinks that Aristotle probably 'has the age of Minos in his view,' but, as he points out, Herodotus mentions (4. 154) a King of Axus in Crete as grandfather of the founder of Cyrene according to the Cyrenean tradition. We are perhaps in the region of fable when we read in Diodorus (5. 59. 1) the moving history of 'Althaemenes, son of Catreus, king of the Cretans,' and still more when we mount up to the autochthonous King Cres mentioned in the lines of Scymnus Chius. For πρόθεσαν μὲν answered by ἔτε, see Bon. Ind. s.v. ἔτα.

11. κυρία 8' οὔδενος κ.τ.λ. With the passage before us should be compared Aristot. Fragm. 493. 1558 b 9 (Plut. Lycurg. c. 6)—for what Plutarch here says may well be based on the Δακεδαμωνιών
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Πολιτεία of Aristotle, whom he mentions by name shortly before—
tόù δὲ πλὴθους ἀθροισθέντος εἰσεῖν μὴν οὐδὲν γράφην τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέσα, την δ᾿ ὑπὸ τῶν γερώντων καὶ τῶν βασιλέων προστεθέσαν ἐπικρίναι κύριος ἦν ὁ δήμος, and also Pol. 2. 11. 1273 a 9, \\[21. 32. 1., Hultsch], (i.e. the Carthaginian Suffetes and senators), οὐ διακόσιοι μόνον ἀπαθεῖας τῷ δήμῳ τὰ δᾶξαντα ταῖς ἀρχαῖοι, ἀλλὰ κύριοι κρίνει εἰσὶ καὶ τῷ βουλαμένῳ τοῖς εἰσαφερμένοις ἀντειπεῖν ἐξεστιν, ἀπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολιτείαις οὐκ ἔστιν (i.e. in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions). It is not quite clear whether ἀπερ—ἔστιν refers to both κύριοι—εἰσὶ and τῷ βουλαμένῳ—ἔσεστι, or only to the latter clause. We have, however, a definite intimation in the passage before us that the only power possessed by the assembly in Crete was that of confirming the resolutions of the senators and cosmi (cp. Polyb. 22. 15. 1 [21. 32. 1., Hultsch], referred to by Liddell and Scott s. v. συνεπεψήφισθ'—δᾶξαντος δὲ τῷ συνεδρίῳ καὶ τοῦ δήμου συνεπεψήφισθ'αντος, ἐκφύεθ' τα κατὰ τὰς διάλυσεις). It might probably withhold that confirmation, and most authorities think that, if it did so, the resolution laid before it remained without legal force, but Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 221) thinks otherwise, and there is much to be said for his view, if we take ἀπερ—ἔστιν to refer to κύριοι κρίνει εἰσὶ as well as to τῷ βουλαμένῳ—ἔσεστι. In any case the fact that it was not open to any member of the assembly who pleased to speak against the proposals of the senate and cosmi—whether any one at all was empowered to do so, we are not distinctly told, though we gather that any member who pleased might speak in support of them—must have tended to make a refusal to confirm an event of rare occurrence. Still the rights of the members of the assembly in Crete were in this matter of speaking the same as those possessed by the members of the Lacedaemonian assembly, and that the Lacedaemonian assembly possessed real authority we see from such passages as Thuc. 1. 87: Xen. Hell. 2. 2. 19: Plutarch, Ages. c. 6. The various ways of limiting the powers of the popular assembly are described in 6 (4). 14. 1298 b 26 sqq. One of them is ἡ ταῦτα ψηφίζεσθαι τῶν δημῶν ἡ μηδὲν ἑναιτίον τοῖς εἰσαφερμένοις, a plan not very unlike the Cretan. In some States no such thing as a popular assembly existed (3. 1. 1275 b 7). The Speaker of the English House of Commons of 1593 in answer to his request for liberty of speech, was told that it is granted, 'but not to speak every one what he listeth or what cometh into his brain to utter; their privilege was Ay or No' (Acland and Ransome, Political History of England, p. 82).
12. μὲν οὖν here, as in c. 6. 1265 a 10 and c. 11. 1273 a 2, introduces a transition from description to criticism: we have been told that the syssitia and cosmi in Crete correspond to the Lacedaemonian syssitia and ephors, but now we learn that while the organization of the Cretan syssitia is better than that of the Lacedaemonian, the Board of Cosmi is a less satisfactory institution even than the ephorate. The sentence introduced by μὲν οὖν is repeated in 26, and then the answering δὲ comes in 28.

15. νόμος, 'a law': see above on 1270 b 3.

16. πρώτερον, c. 9. 1271 a 26–37.

κοινοτέρος, sc. τα τῶν συσσιτίων έχει: 'the syssitia are placed on a more public footing': cp. c. 9. 1271 a 28, ἔδει γὰρ ὅτι κοινὸν μᾶλλον εἶναι τῶν σύνοδων, καθάπερ εὖ Κρήτη, and below 1272 a 20, δόσι' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφθαι πάντας. Ephorus had already mentioned that the Cretan syssitia were maintained at the public expense (ap. Strab. p. 480)—τοὺς δὲ τελείους ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις ἄν καλοῦν ἀνδρεῖα συσσιτίων, ἐποῖος τῶν ἵππων μετάχυος τοὺς ἑπτάρους οἱ πενήντεροι δημοσὰ τρεφόμενοι (cp. Pol. 2. 5. 1263 b 40 sq.)—but whether he also stated that this was otherwise in the Lacedaemonian State, we do not know. In Crete we see that the provision for the syssitia was put on a level with that for the worship of the gods and the public liturgies.

17. 'For from the whole of the agricultural produce and live stock raised on the public land and the tributes rendered by the serfs one part is assigned for the service of the gods and the discharge of the public liturgies, and the other for the syssitia.' For the order of τῶν γνωμένων καρπῶν τε καὶ βοσκημάτων ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων, cp. de Part. An. 4. 10. 690 a 23, τὸ ἐκλείπον ὅστιοτε ἐκ τοῦ ποτός: 4. 1. 676 b 15, διὰ τὸ ἄλλα κοινωνίας αὐτίας πρώτερον. For τὰς κοινὰς λειτουργίας, cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 3. 1424 a 23, τοῖς δὲ πλουτοῦσι τούς ταύς κοινὰς λειτουργίας ἐκοινώσαν ἄπασαν φιλοτιμίαν ἐμποίησαν. It would seem that the liturgies, elsewhere borne by rich men, were undertaken in Crete by the State. Compare Aristotle's own arrangement as to the public land (4 (7). 10. 1330 a 9 sq.), which is not very dissimilar from the Cretan, though no provision is made for the liturgies, many of which he would be glad to abolish (8 (6). 5. 1320 b 3 sq.). The scheme for the division of the produce adopted in Plato's Laws 847 E is said to 'approach near to that sanctioned by the Cretan law,' but it is not easy to combine it with that described here. It is enough to say, with Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, 1. 288), of Dosiadas' account (ap. Athen. Deipn. p. 143) of the syssitia at Lyctus, that the system which prevailed at Lyctus seems to have been different from that which Aristotle here describes as obtaining.
generally in Crete. The public land was evidently in part arable, in part pasture. Bücheler und Zitelmann (Das Recht von Gortyn, p. 138 sqq.) infer from some provisions of the succession-law of Gortyna (col. 4. 31 sqq.), which reserve for the sons, where there are sons and daughters, the succession to houses in Gortyna itself and to cattle and sheep, no mention being made of land, that the citizens of Gortyna grazed their cattle and sheep on the public pastures, which consequently must have lain, in part at all events, near the city. If this was so, the βοσκήματα here referred to would probably be private property. It is not quite clear from Aristotle’s language, whether the produce from the public lands and the φόροι of the serfs were used for these purposes exclusively, no balance being left for others. The term φόροι applied to the contributions of the serfs indicates subjection, and probably conquest. These φόροι would seem to have been due to the State: a rent would perhaps be payable to the owner of the land in addition.

20. ἄντι ἐκ κοινοῦ κ.τ.λ. If we understand this to mean that women and girls took part in the Cretan syssitia, it conflicts with Plato, Laws 780 E, as Oncken points out (Staatsslehre des Aristoteles, 2. 386 sqq.), and also with c. 12. 1274 b 11, not to dwell on the name ἀνδρεία. Probably all that is meant is that the share of produce given to each householder was sufficient to provide not only for the needs of himself and his sons at the public tables, but also for his wife and daughters at home. See Sus., Note 366.

22. πρὸς δὲ τὴν διαγωσίαν κ.τ.λ. ‘And for securing scantiness of fare, in the view that it is beneficial, the lawgiver has devised many contrivances.’ The transition from syssitia to διαγωσία, and next to preventives of πολυτεκνία, is, as we shall see, easy. Ὡφελέμων includes considerations both of health and morality. The aim of the Lacedaemonian lawgiver in studying the same thing is explained in Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 5–6, Plutarch, Lycurg. c. 10, and [Plutarch,] Inst. Lac. c. 13. Ephoros confirms Aristotle’s statement as to Crete (Strab. p. 480, σωφρόνως καὶ λιτῶς ζῶσιν ἄπασιν). Epimenides the Cretan is, in fact, said (Plato, Laws 677 E) to have achieved by his ‘device’ (μηχάνημα) what Hesiod divined before him: the reference no doubt is to the lines (Op. et Dies, 40)—

Νύπτων, οὐδὲ ἵστσιν ἄσφ πλέον ἤμαν παντός,
οὐδ’ ἄσφον ἐν μαλάχη τε καὶ ἄσφαδέλφῳ μέγ’ ἄνειαρ.

The μηχάνημα referred to by Plato may possibly be the famous Ἀμος, ‘of which a small quantity satisfied both hunger and thirst’: see Herodor. Fr. 19 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 33) and Hermipp. Callim. Fr. 18 (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 3. 40), together with Stallbaum’s
note on Laws 677 E, and also the note of Mr. Purves (Selections from Plato, p. 376), to whose references may be added Plutarch de Facie in Orbe Lunae c. 25. 940 C, ἡμίθαν φέν Ἰσίδορος, εἰπὼν
Οἶδ' ὅσων ἐν μαλακῇ τε καὶ ἀσθενῶς μέγη ὀνειρῷ
ἐργα δ' ἐμφανὴν παρέσχεν Ἐπιμενήδης, διδάσκας ὧτι μικρῷ παντάπασιν ἥ
φῶς ἐνεκκαταμάζον ἔστωρει καὶ συνέχει τὸ ἔρως, ἄν ὅσων εἰλαῖας μέγεδος
λάβῃ, μυθείας ἐκ τροφῆς ἐδέμναν. It is possible that Aristotle here
includes the invention of Epimenides among the expedients which
he ascribes to the Cretan lawgiver. At any rate, Crete seems to have
given birth to, or derived from Egypt (Diod. i. 82. 2), an idea which
came to be widely diffused in Greece. The object of the original
lawgiver probably was to make hardy soldiers of his Cretans (cp.
Xen. Cyrop. 8. 1. 43, where we are told that Cyrus, in the case of
those whom he destined for slavery, ἐπεμελετο ὅσως μήτε ἀντιοὶ μήτε
ἀποτεῖη ποτὲ ἐσώντω εἰλεθερίων ἕνεκα μελετήματος): it is hardly likely
that he shared the mystical and ascetic tendency of Epimenides,
still less that he found the virtues in a spare diet which Xenophon
and others attributed to it. 'To them scanty food meant scanty
περιττόματα, and scanty περιττόματα meant freedom from disease:
thus the Persians of the Cyropaedia owed it, we are told, to the scant-
tiness of their food that they rarely needed to spit or to blow their
noses (Cyrop. i. 2. 16: 8. 8. 8–9): cp. Plutarch de Sanitate Tuenda
σ. 14, μαλλιστά δὲ τροφαίες κεχρημένους ἐμβριώθησα καὶ κρέαζεσαν ἡ πουκίας,
ἄλγοςίτειν, καὶ μηδὲν ὑπολείπειν περιττόματας πλήθος ἐν τῷ σώματι: so
too Dicaearchus ap. Porphyry. de Abstinentia 4. 2 (ed. Nauck, p. 158.
14 sqq.: Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 233–4), and Porphyry in the
account of the Essenes which he gives on Josephus' authority (de
i. 46. 865 a 1, ἢ ὅτι τοῦ νοοῦ τῶν περιττόματος πλήθος, τοῦτο δὲ
γίνεται ἡμίκα τροφῆς ὑπερβολὴ ἡ πῶν ἔνδεια: Theopomp. Fr. 57
(Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. i. 286). Aristotle himself holds that luxuri-
ous living accelerates puberty (Phys. 5. 6. 230 b 1, αὔξησειν αἴ
tῶν παντὸς διὰ τροφῆς ἥβωντων). Thus the transition from ἄλγοσίτα
checks on ἀποτύπωσιν is easy. Aristotle's δρόμος, however, is not
γλύσιχρος, but σωφρόνας καὶ εἰλεθερίως... ēρον (c. 6. 1265 a 29 sqq.: 4
(7). 5. 1326 b 30 sqq.); he is for avoiding either extreme.
πάντες ἀναγκάζονται παρ' αὐτοῖς αἱ κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν χρόνων ἐκ τῆς τῶν παιδῶν
ἀγάλης ἐκκριβέσσετε, οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ ἀγαπᾶται παρ' εαυτοῦ τὰς γυμνείας
παιδῶς, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐνα διοικεῖν ἱκανοὶ δοι πέρι τοὺς οἴκους, and see
Gilbert, Gr. Staatsalt. 2. 223 sqq., who refers to Heraclid. Pont. De
Α a 2
Rebuspbl. 3. 3 sub fin. (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. 2. 211). Aristotle approves the end (cp. 4 (7). 16. 1335 a 36–b 2), but not the means used in Crete, for though the discussion on this point is postponed, his judgment is not doubtful. Contrast the law of the Lacedaemonian State which encouraged πολυτεκια (c. 9. 1270 b 1 sqq.).

24. ποιήσας, cp. ἐπιστήμη, c. 12. 1274 b 7. For ποιεῖν in the sense of ‘constituere, sancire legibus,’ see Sturz, Lex. Xenoph. s.v., p. 29.

26. In place of δὲ Sus,23 following Laminus reads δῆ, but compare 7 (5). 10. 1311 a 8, δὲ δ᾽ ἡ τυραννίς ἐχει κακὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς δημακρατίας καὶ τὰ τῆς δηλιγραφίας, φανερῶν.

28. δὲ answers to μὲν οὖν, 12.

29. γίνονται, ‘are elected’: cp. γυνομένων, 36, and c. 9. 1270 b 8.

30. συμφέρει πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ‘is of advantage in relation to the constitution’ (explained by βούλεται μὲνεν τὴν πολιτείαν, 33): cp. c. 6. 1265 b 25, συμφέρει πρὸς οἰκονομίαν, and see Bon. Ind. 719 a 35 sqq.

35. περὶ δὲν κ.τ.λ. The third of these criticisms, that relating to ‘rule exercised without the check of law,’ reminds us of Aristotle’s remark as to the Lacedaemonian Ephors (c. 9. 1270 b 28 sqq.), that they ‘judge without the check of law,’ while his first and second criticisms repeat those which he has passed on the Lacedaemonian Senators (c. 9. 1270 b 38 sqq.), but to refer δὲν both to the Cosmi and to the Senators makes the sentence read awkwardly, and it is more likely that Aristotle is here speaking of the Senators only, though he has not said of the Lacedaemonian Senators that they ‘rule without the check of law.’ For this expression, which is not quite the same as ‘judge without the check of law,’ cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 12. Demosthenes (in Lept. c. 107) speaks of the Lacedaemonian Senator as δεσπότης τῶν πολλῶν. We see that while the magistracy of the Cosmi is more defective than the Ephorate, the Cretan Senate may be characterized in the same way as the Lacedaemonian. For γυνομένων 36, cp. 7 (5). 8. 1308 a 5, τὸν δὲν ταῖς ἄρχαις γυνομένως.

40. ‘Debe oiddem ti v. Jacobs. ad Achill. Tat. p. 728’ (Göttsl.). See critical note. For the happy results which follow when office is not a source of gain, see 7 (5). 8. 1308 b 31 sqq., and Isocr. Panath. § 145, who speaks of τὰ λήμματα τὰ εἰδισμένα διδοσθαλ ταῖς ἄρχαις.

41. ὁσπέρ. Cp. c. 9. 1269 b 38.

πόρρω γε κ.τ.λ. Aristotle probably regarded Persia or the Greek States of the mainland of Europe and Asia as the most likely
sources of corruption (cp. Hdt. 5. 51): the Greek islands were usually poor (Isocr. Paneg. § 132: cp. also Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 12, οίσα γαρ ἐν τούτῳ πολιτικὴν ἡ νομοθετικὴν, δὲ γε μηδὲ νόμιμον ἐστὶν; οὐ νόμιμως δὲ τὸ μὴ μόνον δικαίον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀδίκος ἄρχειν, κρατεῖν δὲ ἐστι καὶ μὴ δικαίος). The remedy employed involves a resort to arbitrary measures on the part of a handful of powerful men quite out of character with a constitution governed by law: hence it is διωναστευτική, for a διωναστεία is the tyranny of a handful, as the τυραννίς is the tyranny of one man and the extreme democracy the tyranny of the Many (6 (4). 14. 1298 a 31 sq.), and tyranny is least of all a constitution (6 (4). 8. 1293 b 29). See below on 10.

4. αὐτῶν, ‘their colleagues themselves,’ whom one would least expect to do such a thing.

ēξετεῖ δὲ κ.τ.λ. It would seem that not only might individual ἄστες resign before the expiration of their term of office, but that the cosmi might resign in a body, thus leaving the State without cosmi. Apart from this, however, Aristotle objects to the magistrate resigning in the midst of his term, for, as he says in c. 9. 1271 a 11, δεῖ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τῶν ἄξιων τῆς ἄρχης. Possibly, however, resignation before the close of the official term was not usually allowed in Greece. It seems to have been allowed at Rome (Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht 1. 508 sqq.: Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities, art. Magistratus, p. 724 a).

6. Congreve, followed by Welldon, would read δε in place of δῆ, but perhaps δῆ is defensible (it is the reading of all the MSS. and the Vet. Int.). ‘As the present method leads to violence and other inconveniences, it is therefore better to regulate the matter by law.’
NOTES.

7.  οὖ γὰρ ἀσφαλὴς ὁ κανὼν.  Cp. 3. 15. 1286 a 17 sq.: Eth. Nic. 5. 19. 1134 a 35: Hyperid. Or. Fun. col. 9. 23 sqq. (p. 63 Blass). Aristotle may possibly here have in his mind a familiar line from the Perithous of Euripides (Fr. 600 Nauck), which seems also to be present to his memory in 3. 16. 1287 b 6 sq.:

Τρόπος ἦστι χρηστὸς ἀσφαλέστερος νόμον.

8. τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας κ.τ.λ., 'the way the great men have of declaring an abeyance of the magistracy of the Cosmi': cp. 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 18, ἀκοσμίαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων πεστερίζειν. 'Ἀκοσμία is formed on the model of ἀραχία, 'the abeyance of the archonship,' Xen. Hell. 2. 3. I have retained in the text the reading of Π², but not without much hesitation. Π¹ read πάντων δὲ φαινότατον τὸ τῆς ἀκοσμίας, ἣν καθίστασι πολλάκις ὅταν μὴ δίκαι βούλωνται δύναν τῶν δυναστῶν. This is unintelligible without Corey’s slight emendation of οἱ ἂν for ὅταν, but with this it is certainly smoother Greek, though perhaps not more Aristotelian, than the reading of Π². But all the MSS. and also the Vet. Int. have ὅταν. As to the reading of Π¹ τῶν δυναστῶν, perhaps we rather expect to hear of δυναστεῖα than δυνάστα, notwithstanding δυναστευτική, 3. The Cretan constitution is not pronounced to be a δυναστεῖα μᾶλλον till 10, and even then is probably regarded rather as a virtual, than as an actual, δυναστεῖα. The mention of δυναστεῖα no doubt makes the inference that the constitution is a δυναστεῖα easy: perhaps indeed it makes it too easy. For if Aristotle had already spoken of δυνάστα, he would hardly need to draw the inference that the Cretan constitution approaches a δυναστεῖα, as he does in 1272 b 9 sq. We find a reference to δυναστεῖα in Crete in the account of Ephorus ap. Strab. p. 483, τάς δ’ ἀγέλαις συνάγουσιν οἱ ἐπιφανέστατοι τῶν παιδῶν καὶ δυναστάτου. Cretan methods remind us of the ‘liberum veto’ of Poland. They far transcend the turbulence of medieval Genoa (Machiavelli, History of Florence, p. 211 E. T. Bohn).

10. οὖ πολιτεία, because a constitution is not compatible with these moments of surrender to the will of powerful individuals: cp. 6 (4). 4. 1292 a 32, δόγοι γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἀρχώντων, οὐκ ἦστι πολιτεία. Intentionally or not, Aristotle negatives here the remark of the Athenian interlocutor of the Laws (712 E) to Cleinias the Cretan and Megillus the Lacedaemonian—ἀντοι γὰρ, οἱ ἄριστοι, πολιτείῶν μετέχετε· ἀς δὲ ἀνωμάκαρμεν νῦν, οὐκ εἰσὶ πολιτείαι. Αἱ δυναστεῖαι is thus described in Pol. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 5—τέταρτον δ’ ἑπίδομα ὄλγαρχιας, ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τὸ τε νῦν λεγένθη (i. e. ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσῆλθ), καὶ ἀρχὴ μὴ δ νόμος ἄλλ’ οἱ ἀρχαὶς· καὶ έστων ἀντίστροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλγαρχίαις ὡστερὴ ἡ τυραννίς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἦς τελευταίας εἴπαμεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημο-
10. constitution KaTa(j)povfiaras. monarchy Totaunj hiaKay-^avavras irokis, Swarda, fimXa^eiv ToO Stahr, 8, (subject iwaarela Distance A. SwacrTeta 1320 Aristotle v6p.os. enl Tois yap' near subject is We. 18. With law the aXX' iyyiis ttpariais' elections, though resemblings are definite, tS>v into monarphy, preceding the rpiVijw 1293 did this (6). Xpdvov jiivr)! of aWovs. tovTOS wish 10, of kann aiXfirai,, 11. 13. 15. 17. ^EcijXao'ias this passage of Aristotle seems to forget that he is speaking not of one State, but of the many States of Crete. 

11. elóðasa dé k.t.l. We see from the passages quoted in the preceding note that Aristotle regards a δυναστεία as 'near to monarchy,' and now we are told that the leading men form followings for themselves by breaking up the demos and their friends into factions, and so set up a monarchy (cp. 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 8, τῶν τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς βουλημένων ποιεῖν πολείταια), just as Peisistratus did according to Herodotus (Hát. 1. 59, ἵπταται δὲ στασιαζόντων τῶν παρόλων καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου 'Ἀθηναίων . . . καταφρονήσας τὴν τυραννίδα, ἤγειρε τρίτην στάσιν) As to διαλαμβάνοντες ('dividing into parties'), cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 8, διαλαμβάνοντας τῶν ἀρρώσει, and 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 10, ἐν δὲ ταῖς μικραῖς ῥάβδιοι τὸ διάλαβεν εἰς δύο πάντας κ.τ.λ. With this picture of Cretan feuds compare Polyb. 4. 53. 5, ἐγγενομένης δὲ φιλατρίας ἐκ τῶν τυχάντων, ὅπερ ἔθαν ἔστι Κρητῶν, ἐστασάσας πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους.

18. τὸ τοιοῦτον, 'the state of things just described.' For the thought here expressed, cp. c. 11. 1272 b 30–33, where the absence of στάσεως is said to be σημεῖον πολιτείας συντεταγμένη, and Thuc. 1. 18. 1, ἤ γὰρ Δακεδάμων . . . ἐπὶ πλείοντος διὸ ἱσχειρ χρόνον στατάεσσα, ὅμως ἐκ παλαιωτάτου καὶ εὔνομῆθη καὶ αὐτοὺς ἁμαρτοντάς ἦν.

15. ἐστὶ 8' ἐπικίνδυνος κ.τ.λ. 'A State in this condition' (subject to intervals of non-existence) 'is in peril, as' (or 'if') 'those who wish to attack it are also able to do so.' Stahr, however, translates, 'läuft derselbe (Staat) Gefahr, jedem der ihn angreifen will und kann zur Beute zu werden,' but in the absence of other instances of this use of ἐπικίνδυνος with a genitive it is hardly safe to interpret the passage thus.

17. εἰρήται, 1272 a 41.

σοῦλεται, sc. ἡ πόλις, for Aristotle seems to forget that he is speaking not of one State, but of the many States of Crete.

ἐγγελασίας plural, as usual. 'Distance has produced the effect of a law expelling foreigners.' Hoeck (Kreta 3. 442 sqq.) illus-
trates the isolation of Crete, but also points out (p. 450 sqq.) that there are many indications that foreigners were not excluded from the island. He refers to Plato, Laws 848 A among other passages.

18. καὶ may perhaps here mean 'for instance,' as occasionally elsewhere (e.g. in 1. 12. 1259 b 8).

μένει τοῖς Κρητικοῖς. 'The perioeci stand firm in the Cretan States' (not, I think, 'are faithful to the Cretans,' as some translate, though the dative τοῖς Κρητικοῖς probably implies some advantage to the Cretans from their attitude). Cp. 1272 a 26, ὅτι δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰ συνοίτια βέλτιον τίτακται τοῖς Κρητικοῖς ἐπὶ τοῖς Δάκως, φανερῶ, and 1270 a 37, τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις, and for μένει, 8 (6). 5. 1319 b 35, μᾶλλον γὰρ ἵνα ἥ τις ἕμερας οὐ χαλεπῶν μείναι πολεμεύοντος ὀπωσοῦν.


οὖτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. apparently gives the reason why the Cretan perioeci do not revolt like the Helots; but Aristotle does not explain how external dominion leads to the revolt of serfs. Does he hint that it was the foreign empire of the Lacedaemonians that led to the liberation of Messenia by Thebes? Perhaps he only means that external dominion involves foreign war, which he has stated in c. 9. 1269 b 5 to be one main reason for serf-revolts. 'Not only,' we are told, 'do they not possess any external dominion, but' (οὖτε—τε) 'it is only lately that a foreign war' (πολέμου ἔννοικος—cp. ἐξονυλικείας, 17—not, probably, 'a mercenary war,' for its being waged by mercenaries is not to the point) 'has passed over to the island' (cp. Choerilus ap. Rhet. 3. 14. 1415 a 17, ὅταν 'Ἀδίας ἀπὸ γαῖς ἔλθεν ἐς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας). Wars between one Cretan city and another, he has already said, did not lead to revolts of the serfs (c. 9. 1269 a 40 sqq.): indeed it would seem from the language of this passage—περὶ δὲ τοῖς Κρηταίοις οὐδὲν πα τοιοῦτον συμβέβηκεν—that even the 'foreign war' here referred to did not, though it manifested the weakness of their institutions. Whether Aristotle refers here to the operations of Phalaecus and his mercenaries in the island (345 b.c.), or to its subjugation by Agesilaus, brother of the Lacedaemonian king Agis III, in 333 b.c., is uncertain, but perhaps it is more probable that Phalaecus is referred to, for Aristotle is evidently speaking of the first intrusion of a foreign war into Crete. Though Phalaecus was ultimately foiled and slain before Cydonia, he had previously taken Lyctus.

C. 11. 25. περιττῶς, 'in a vein above the common.' See note on 1265 a 11.
μᾶλλον μένιν κ.τ.λ., 'but so far as the Carthaginian constitution can be said to resemble any other, it comes nearest in some points at least to the Laconian.' Cp. σύνεχεια πως, 27.

26. αὐταὶ γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι τρεῖς. For the order, which is quite regular, see note on 1269 a 23. The Cretan constitution is now brought in, which had already been said to be the model on which the Lacedaemonian was framed.

29. The older editors place a full stop after Καρχηδονίων (as do Bernays and Susemihl), whereas Bekker places only a comma there, thus making αὐτοῖς. 30, refer to all three States. There is something to be said in favour of Bekker's view, but on the whole I am inclined to think that Bern. and Sus. are right. If we place a full stop or colon after Καρχηδονίων, καὶ πολλά 29 will take up πολλά 25.

30. σημείων δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'And it is an indication of a constitution carefully framed with a definite aim that, possessing though it does its well-known popular element, Carthage remains faithful to the arrangements of its constitution.' In most States the laws are not συντεταγμένωι, but χθές κειμένωι, 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 5—9. The meaning of the word comes out clearly in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 7 sq.: 8 (6). 1. 1317 a 6 : Metaph. A. 10. 1075 a 18 sq. Schneider, followed by Bernays and others, would insert ἐδοματικόν, but this is probably unnecessary: cp. Democrit. Fragm. 45, τοῖς ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶ εὐθατὰς, ταυτέστι καὶ βλέος ξυντάτακτα. Τεταγμένη πολιτεία is a term used by Plato (Rep. 619 C)—in a different sense, however, for it seems to be used in that passage of a constitution favourable to the formation of habits of virtuous action. With ἡξιοῦσαν (which Πυ Βυντ. Int. have, though it is omitted in Μπ Π1), I supply τὴν πόλιν, which, as has been already noticed in the note on 1266 b 1, is often omitted by Aristotle. Τὸν δῆμον, as in c. 12. 1274 a 2, τὸν δὲ δήμον καταστάσας, and 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 36, τῷ ἄγοι: it was well-known that the citizen-body at Carthage comprised a mass of poor (cp. 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 5, where Carthage is even described as δημοκρατουμένη, if the reading is right, and Plutarch, Praecepta Reipubl. Gerend. c. 3, where the character of the Carthaginian demos is sketched and contrasted with the character of the Athenian in a striking passage probably based on some earlier authority). For δήμος in the sense of 'a popular element,' cp. c. 12. 1274 a 2: c. 6. 1265 b 39. For ἡ τάξις τῆς πολιτείας, cp. c. 10. 1272 a 4. The quiescence of the demos, it appears later (1273 b 21), is due to a fortunate accident rather than to the skill of the lawgiver.
32. omáv. The design of Hanno, however, is mentioned in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 5.

καί, 'at all' (Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 168).

tóραννον. Yet in 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 34 a tyranny is said to have changed into an ἀρωτοκρατία at Carthage, if the reading is right. Perhaps Aristotle intends to confine his assertion to the duration of the ἀρωτοκρατία, and does not reckon what preceded it. It is, we note, in this same twelfth chapter of the book on Revolutions (B. 7)—a chapter somewhat loosely hung on to the book and not impossibly later in date—that Carthage is referred to as δημοκρατου-

μένη (1316 b 5).

33. ἔχει δὲ κ.τ.λ. Some remarks on the Carthaginian con-
stitution will be found in Appendix B. The word ἑταιρία is used in so many different senses that it is hardly possible to determine the exact nature of these συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιρῶν at Carthage. Its most usual meaning is 'a political club or association,' but Aristotle would hardly compare gatherings of this nature with the Lacedaemonian Phiditia. 'Ἐταυρία is used by Dosiadas in his description of the syssitia of Lyctus in much the same sense apparently as συσσίτιων (cp. Athen. Deipn. p. 143, διήρηται δ' αἱ πολίται πάντες καθ ἑταιρίας, καλοῦσι δὲ ταῦτα ἄνθρωπα τὴν τ' ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχει τοῦ συσσίτιου γνή), so that τὰ συσσίτια τῶν ἑταιρῶν may here only mean 'the common meals of the messes.' One would suppose from the comparison of them with the Phiditia, that they must have comprised the whole citizen-body, and that they must have been designed, like them, to promote efficiency in war.


38. καὶ βελτιών δὲ κ.τ.λ., 'and it is also better that the kings (at Carthage) neither belong to one and the same family, nor that again an ordinary one; and that if the family from which they are taken is of marked excellence, they are appointed from it by election rather than by seniority.' I have adopted the reading of Π', κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος (καὶ αὐτὸ πρ. Π', καταυτό πρ. Μ'). καταυτό corr. Μ', 'per se' Vet. Int.), but Sussemihl's reading, καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος (‘do not form a family apart’), has many claims to attention. The καὶ αὐτὸ of Π and καταυτὸ of Μ', however, may easily have originated in a miswriting of κατὰ ταῦτα the second τα being omitted, as often happens (cp. 6 (4). 15. 1299 b 27, where κατὰ ταῦτα τὸς διαφοράς, which is probably the right reading, has undergone similar changes); and there is some roughness in the expression τοὺς βασιλείς καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος. Besides, no MS. gives καθ' αὐτό. There is also some awkward-
ness in the sequence of μηδὲ (or μήτε, Sus.) τῶν τὸ τυχόν, if we read καθ' αὐτῶ, for we shall have to translate—'it is better that the kings do not form a family apart, nor this an ordinary one': we seem to need 'do not belong to' instead of 'do not form,' but it is not easy to get this meaning from the words μήτε καθ' αὐτῶ εἶναι γένος. And how can it be said that the kings form a whole family? On the other hand, it must be admitted that the use of κατὰ in κατὰ τὸ αὐτῶ εἶναι γένος is not a common one. Κατὰ with the acc., however, occasionally bears much the same meaning as ἐν: thus κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν, de Gen. An. r. 19. 727 a 5, is replaced by ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἡλικίᾳ, de Gen. An. r. 20. 728 b 24. (The use of the phrase εἶναι κατὰ is slightly different in 3. 4. 1276 b 33, where ἀγαθὸν should perhaps be supplied.) Aristotle objects to a single family monopolizing two posts of such importance as the Lacedaemonian kingships: cp. 7 (5). 7. 1306 b 22 sqq. and 7. (5). 6. 1305 b 2 sqq. Arrangements of this kind often led to σφάλμα, especially when the favoured family was not one of conspicuous merit, and Aristotle does not seem to think that the Heracleidae of the Lacedaemonian State were so: hence the design of Lysander (7 (5). 7. 1306 b 31 sq.). We have in this passage μήτε followed by μηδὲ and τε, much as we have μήτε—μηδὲ—μήτε in Plato, Gorg. 500 B, μήτε αὐτῶς οὗτος δεῖν πρὸς ἐμὲ παίζειν, μηδὲ διὰ τὸν τύχην παρὰ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀποκρίνου, μήτε αὐτῷ παρὰ ἐμὸν οὕτως ἀποδέχον ἀς παίζοντος. On μήτε—μηδὲ, see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 775. 2. d and Obs. 5 (where this passage from the Gorgias is quoted), and Ast, Lex. Plat. s. v. μηδὲ, οὔδὲ. Μηδὲ following μήτε 'gives its clause an adversative or emphatic force,' 'neither—nor yet.' (Jelf, ibid.). No change, therefore, is called for in μηδὲ. As to the view here expressed by Aristotle, cp. Cic. de Rep. 2. 12. 24, quo quidem tempore novus ille populus (the Roman) vidit tamen id quod fugit Lacedaemonium Lycurgum, qui regem non deligendum duxit, si modo hoc in Lycurgi potestate potuit esse, sed habendum, qualiscunque is foret, qui modo esset Herculis stirpe generatus. Nostri illi etiam tum agrestes viderunt virtutem et sapientiam regalem, non progeni, quaeri oportere. Herodotus (5. 39, 42) evidently bears no good-will to the rule of succession by which Cleomenes was preferred to Dorieus.

41. εὔτελεῖς, 'insignificant in character': Bonitz (Ind. s. v.) compares Rhet. 2. 15. 1390 b 24, εἰσίν οἱ παλλοὶ (τῶν εὐγενῶν) εὐτελέεις.

2. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Aristotle here passes with μὲν οὖν from fact 1273 a. to criticism, as in c. 6. 1265 a 10 and c. 10. 1272 a 12, but he
continues to make the Carthaginian constitution the subject of his remarks, so that it hardly seems necessary to add *ε* *κατά* *καρκαθριοῦν* either (with Thurot, Études p. 32) after μᾶλλον, 6, or (with Sus.) after *πολιτεια*, 5. The Carthaginian and Cretan States, no less than the Lacedaemonian, are open to the charge of making military success and predominance their aim and thinking *τὰ* *ἀγαθὰ* *τὰ* *περιμάχητα* better than virtue. The same thing is said in 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 5 sqq. of the lawgivers of all the best-constituted Hellenic States. Cp. also below, 1273 a 37 sq. 

Τῶν ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν must here mean *of the points open to censure* (*not* *of the censures one might pass*) : cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1114 a 30, *εἰ ἐπιτιμήμεναι τῶν κακῶν*. See note on 1271 b 18. Here the *παρεκβάσεις* referred to are *παρεκβάσεις τῆς ἀδιόστης πολιτείας* (cp. c. 9. 1269 a 31), as in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 24 sqq., *not* *παρεκβάσεις τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν* as in 3. 7.

4. τῶν δὲ, *sc.* ἐπιτιμηθέντων ἂν. The framers of *aristocratic* constitutions are said in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq. often to give the rich too much power.

πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν κ.τ.λ., *in relation to its aim of being an Aristocracy or Polity.* For *καὶ* = *‘or,* see Bon. Ind. 357 b 20 sq. It is possible, however, that *καὶ τῆς πολιτείας* is added (cp. i. 9. 1257 b 9, *τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν κατηλλικὴν*) to explain the sense in which the word *διαστοκρατία* is used, for it might mean *‘the best constitution’* (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 1).

5. δῆμον = δημοκρατίαν, as (e.g.) in 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 16.

6. μᾶλλον, *‘rather than in the opposite direction’* (cp. c. 7. 1266 a 36 and c. 9. 1270 b 33).

τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. A deviation in a democratic direction is here noticed. Μὲν (*= *‘while’) is answered, I think, by δ’ in δ’ ἄν εἰσφέρομεν. For the parenthesis *εἰ δὲ μὲν* κ.τ.λ., cp. c. 10. 1272 a 15.

8. If *πάντες* is read (which P² omits) after *όμογνωμονῶσι*, two explanations are possible: either *πάντες* means *‘both authorities,* as it frequently does in the style of Aristotle (Bon. Ind. 571 b 50 sqq.), or absolute unanimity not only of the Suffetes but of the senators was required. The latter is improbable: Sus.² (Note 387) refers to Liv. 21. 3 sqq.: 21. 9. 3–11. 2: 23. 12 sqq. to disprove it. Aristotle most likely means by *‘are unanimous’* *‘are unanimous as to bringing or not bringing a given question before the popular assembly.* Καὶ τούτων, 9, will then mean *‘over matters as to the reference of which to the popular assembly the kings and senators are not unanimous, as well as over those which they agree to refer to it.’ If, on the other hand, *‘are unanimous’* means *‘are agreed
on a measure,' then καὶ τῶν will mean 'over the measure which is the subject of that difference of opinion, as well as over matters voluntarily referred to the assembly in cases of unanimity.' In either case the power possessed by the assembly was a very real and substantial one, though it would seem that it had not, like most popular assemblies in Greece (6 (4. 14), an absolute claim to have certain specified matters, such as questions of war, peace, alliance, and the like, referred to it. If the kings and the senate agreed not to refer a question to the assembly, they could effectually prevent this question coming before it Susemihl (Note 387) remarks that the Second Punic War was decided on by Suffetes and Senate alone, notwithstanding that the assembly had by that time (Polyb. 6. 51. 6) gained the chief voice in deliberation.

9. ἀ... ἅν εἰςφέρων ὁστοι, 'as to any matters brought by them before the assembly' (cp. εἰσφοράν, 8 (6). 8. 1322 b 14). See note on 1264 b 39.

οὗ διακούσας μόνων κ.τ.λ. Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1113 a 7, δῆλον ἰὲ τούτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτείων, ἄσ 'Ομηρος ἐμμεῖτο' οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἀ πρόελευντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δήμῳ.


11. κρίνειν, 'to come to a decision of their own.' The word used in Plut. Lycurg. c. 6 (Aristot. Fragm. 493. 1558 b 9 sqq.) to describe the powers of the Lacedaemonian assembly is ἐπικρίνων—τοῦ δὲ πλῆθους ἀδραυσθείσος εἰπείν μὲν οἴδειν γρώμη τῶν ἄλλων ἐφείτα, τὴν δ᾽ ἱπτὸ τῶν γερότων καὶ τῶν βασιλέων προτεθείσον ἐπικρίνων κύριος ἂν ὁ δήμος. For the meaning of ἐπικρίνων, cp. Plato, Laws 768 Α, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ δύνησθον κοινωνήσαι τῇ ἀμολογίᾳ αὐτοῖ, τὴν βουλήν ἐπικρίνεις αὐτῶν τὴν ἄφεσιν ἐκατέρω, and for that of κρίνειν, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 3. 5. 1113 a 11, ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι κρίνασθαι. See note on 1272 a 11.

12. ἀπερ. See note on 1272 a 11.

ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολιτείαις, i.e. the Lacedaemonian and Cretan.

13. τὰς πενταρχίας. As δεκαρχίαι = 'decemviratus' (cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 2), so πενταρχία = 'quinqueviratus' (Kluge, Aristoteles de politia Carthaginiensium, p. 121-2). Nothing is known about these bodies of five magistrates. On self-election as an oligarchical feature, cp. 6 (4). 5. 1292 b 1 sqq.: it is so only if eligibility is confined to a few.

16. πλείονα ἄρχειν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων. So ἀληχοχώροι ἄρχαι are a sign of democracy (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24). Τῶν ἄλλων is translated
by Bern. 'als die Mitglieder anderer Behörden,' and by Mr. Welldon 'than any other board of officers,' but Sus. translates 'than all other magistrates,' and, I incline to think, rightly.

έξελημφότες, 'after exit from office.' Kluge compares εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν, 2. 7. 1266 b 24; cp. also εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς παρέσκει, 7 (5).

17. τὸ δὲ ἀμίθους καὶ μῆ κληρωτᾶς, sc. εἶνα. Here Aristotle notices one or two points which might seem to be deviations in an oligarchical direction, but are not. The payment of magistrates is democratic (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 35–38), but the non-payment of them is compatible with aristocracy as well as with oligarchy. The same may be said of appointment by election, not by lot (cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 7–13, 32–33, etc.). No deviation from the aristocratic ἱσόδεσις of the constitution is involved in these arrangements.

19. καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας κ.τ.λ. The Carthaginian and Lacedaemonian States had this feature of judicial procedure in common, that in them all suits came before magistrates of the State for adjudication, not before the citizen-body (3. 1. 1275 b 8 sqq.). In the latter State, however, each magistracy had its own exclusive field of judicial competence, so that a very small number of persons possessed the right of dealing with this or that offence—of inflicting, for instance, the punishment of death or exile (6 (4). 9. 1294 b 33, where this is noted as an oligarchical feature of the constitution)—whereas at Carthage this was not so: all magistracies were competent to try any suit—whether severally or in combination, we do not learn. We are left to guess why this arrangement is more suitable to an aristocracy than the other, just as in 4 (7). 11. 1330 b 20 we are not told why a plurality of 'strong places' in a city is suitable to an aristocracy; but the reason may perhaps be that under the Carthaginian system less is left to the decision of a very few, for it must be remembered that an ἀριστοκρατία takes account of ἐλευθερία (or δῆμος) as well as of wealth and virtue (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sq.: 6 (4). 8. 1294 a 19–25). Or possibly the Carthaginian system may be regarded as more suitable to an aristocracy, because it assumes and implies a greater diffusion of virtue among the holders of magistracies than the other.

21. For παρεκβαίνειν followed by a genitive, see Bon. Ind. 568 a 27 sqq.

22. διάνοιαν here = δέξων, Bon. Ind. 186 b 4 sqq.

23. συνθοκεί, i.e. approves itself not only to the Carthaginian constitution but also to the mass of men. Cp. Plato, Laws 763 D, δεί δὴ καὶ τούτους δυνατόν τε εἶναι καὶ σχολάζειν τῶν καὶ νῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι,
and see the criticisms which Aristotle passes on the Laws in c. 6.

25. καλός probably qualifies both ἄρχειν and σχολάζειν: cp. 4 (7). 5. 1326 b 30, πλήθητε δὲ καὶ μεγίστη τοιαύτην δια τοῦ δικαίωτας ζην σχολάζαντας ἐλευθερίως ἄμα καὶ εὐφρόνως. Καλός σχολάζειν is a condition of καλός ἄρχειν.


29. εἰς δύο ταύτα βλέποντες. In 35 (cp. c. 12. 1274 b 21) we have βλέπειν used with πρός: for βλέπειν with εἰς, see Bon. Ind. 138 a 51 sqq.

30. τὰς μεγίστας. Ἀρχάς is omitted, though it is some time since even ἄρχειτε were referred to (24); but no one will be at a loss to supply the missing word, so it drops out.

31. ἀμφίρριμα νομοθέτου, 'a lawgiver's error': cp. 3. 4. 1277 a 20, ὡς οὖσαν τινὰ ἄρχειτε παιδείαν. Lawgivers are regarded as responsible, if what ought to be attended to at the outset (ἐξ ἄρχης, cp. c. 9. 1269 b 39) is not attended to. Here Aristotle traces back the practice of the Carthaginians in paying regard to wealth as well as excellence, when they elect magistrates, to an omission on the part of the lawgiver or founder of the State (cp. c. 9. 1270 a 18, ταῦτα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων τέτακται φαύλως), who ought to have done what Aristotle himself does in constructing his best State (4 (7). 9. 1329 a 17 sqq.), and secured εἰπάρχα to the best men of the State. Cp. Isocr. Busir. § 18, ἵτι δὲ τὸ μηδένα (τῶν μαχίμων) τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαραίτητα τῶν κοινῶν προσταγμάτων ἀμελείν.

35. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ., i.e. but if it is right to look to wealth as well as to virtue in electing to offices, it is not right or necessary to go to the extreme of making the greatest offices in the State purchaseable; yet there is a law at Carthage to this effect. For the fact, cp. Polyb. 6. 56. 4, παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδόνας δόρα φανερὰς διδόντες λαμβάνοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς. Plato perhaps was thinking of Carthage, when he speaks (Rep. 544 D) of ὁμοία τας βασιλείας.

χάριν σχολής. 'Χάριν plerumque ipsi nominis postponitur; aliquoties anteposimus legitur,' Bon. Ind. 846 a 42.

37. ἐντιμον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The phrase ἐντιμον πασῶν recurs in 3. 15. 1286 b 14, ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρας γεγυμνοι ἐχοματιζόντα ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, ἐντείθεν παθεῖν εὐθυγον γενέσθαι τὰς διλαρχίας ἐντιμον γὰρ ἐπαινέσθαι τὸν πλούταν. Cp. also Plato, Rep. 550 E sqq. referred to by Giph., and 554 B.

38. τὴν πόλιν ἰδιν. Compare the use of this phrase in c. 5. 1264 b 16 sqq., in 3. 13. 1283 b 40, where it seems to be explained
by τῶν πολιτῶν 41, and in 2. 9. 1269 b 19, where it includes not only the citizens, but also the women of the citizen class.

39. ὑπ' αὐτ. κ.τ.λ. Susemihl reads γὰρ, though all the MSS. as well as Vet. Int. have δέ. Δέ seems to be quite in place here, for the sentence which it introduces does not appear to be added in proof of that which precedes (ὁντων γὰρ—φιλοχρήματον), in which no reference is made to τὸ κύριον. Aristotle's meaning probably is—the law makes wealth to be esteemed more than virtue, and renders the whole city fond of money, and those who purchase these high offices will come to prize above all other things the wealth by which they are won, yet what the possessors of supreme authority prize most will be most prized by the other citizens also.' We read already in Xen. Cyrop. 8. 8. 5, ὅποιοι τινες γὰρ ἂν οἱ προστάται δαι, τοιούτου καὶ οἱ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὄς ἐπί τὸ πολιτικόν γίγνονται, and the same thing is said by Isocrates (ad Nicocl. § 31, τὸ τῆς σόλων ἀληθὸς ὁμοιώματι τοῖς ἄρχονσιν: cp. Areopag. § 22: Nicocl. § 37). Cp. also Plato, Laws 711 B sqq.

40. τοῦτος = τῇ τούτων, just as in the passage quoted in the last note from Isocr. ad Nicocl. τοῖς ἄρχονσι = τῷ τῶν ἄρχοντων (see Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 781 d. Obs. 2). Τούτως refers to τὸ κύριον: for the plural, cp. 1273 a 11, κύριοι, which refers to τῷ δήμῳ. 10. We are reminded of Plato, Laws 711 C, καὶ πῶς οἵμεθα ταχός ξυνακολουθήσωμ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας τῷ τῆς τοιαύτης πειθό καὶ ἄμα βιον εἰληφώνει;

1273 b. 1. οὐχ οἷς τε βεβαιῶς ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. So Π^1: οὐχ οἷς τε ἐναὶ βεβαιῶς ἀριστοκρατικὴν πολιτείαν, Π^2. With ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι we expect πῶλιν rather than πολιτείαν, but it may possibly be right to supply τῶν τῶν Δακεδαιμονίων (πολιτείαν) with δημοκρατεῖσθαι in 2. 6. 1265 b 35–38 (see note on this passage). Perhaps on the whole it is probable that the reading of Π^1 is the original reading, and that of Π^2 the result of an attempt on the part of some one or other (possibly Aristotle himself, though that is not very likely) to soften the harshness of ἀριστοκρατεῖσθαι. As to the thought, we must bear the passage before us in mind when we are told in 6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq., that an ἀριστοκρατία will pay regard to πλοῦτος, ἀρέτη, and δῆμος. It will not be durable, if it does not honour virtue most. Compare the passages referred to above on 37, and also 7 (5). 12. 1316 b 5 sqq. Aristotle seems to have thought it likely that the Carthaginian ἀριστοκρατία would ultimately pass into an oligarchy.

ἐδίξεσθαι δ' εὐλογον κ.τ.λ. This is a further objection. Not only does this law lead the citizens to count wealth more precious than virtue, and thus tend to imperil the aristocratic character of the
constitution, but the purchasers of these great offices will probably learn by degrees to seek to replace the money spent in their purchase by dishonest gains.

3. "εἰ πέννης μὲν ὄν ... κερδαίνειν. And this is the view implied by the law making these offices purchaseable (cp. 1273 a 24 sq.). After φαύλοτροπος ὃν ὄν we should supply, with Bernays, 'like those purchasers of office.' The argument is an argumentum ad hominem addressed to the lawgiver or the supporters of this law.

5. διὸ κ.τ.λ. This amounts to saying—'therefore the ἐπιεικεῖς should be put in a position to rule': εἰπορία should be secured to them. And then, in the next sentence, Aristotle goes on—'but even if the lawgiver neglected to secure a sufficiency of means to the best men both in and out of office, still it is better that he should provide for their leisure when in office.' As to τούτων, 5, see note on 1260 b 35 and Bon. Ind. 546 a 47. For προείρητο, Liddell and Scott (s. ν.) compare 7 (5). 7. 1307 b 4: see also Bon. Ind. 638 b 54 sqq.

9. διπέρ κ.τ.λ. M. Yriarte says of the Venetian system of government (Vie d’un Patricien de Venise, p. 95)—'il permet le cumul de plusieurs fonctions, et le permet à un tel point qu’il n’est pas rare de voir un Sénateur occuper en même temps jusqu’à cinq ou six postes très-importants dans l’État.' See also Dr. Arnold, History of Rome 2. 550, note 6. We learn from Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 22, that some of the earlier tyrannies owed their origin to the practice adopted by certain oligarchies of entrusting the most important magistracies to a single holder.


πολιτικότερον here seems to be taken by Bonitz (Ind. 614 a 30–39, b 10–24) in a similar sense to that which it bears in 6 (4). 9. 1294 a 41, κοινὸν δὲ καὶ μέτον τούτων ἀμφότερα τοῦτα, διὸ καὶ πολιτικῶν, μέμεικτα γὰρ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν: i.e. in a sense contrasted with δημοκρατικῶν, διαγωρίχων etc., 'aptum ad moderatum quoddam imperium popolare.' But must it not be used here in some sense in which καὶ κάλλων—θάτου can serve as a justification of it? Its meaning is probably 'more statesmanlike,' 'more agreeable to political science,' as in 4 (7). 2. 1324 b 26 (cp. ἐργον τοῦ πολιτικοῦ, 24) and 4 (7). 14. 1333 b 35. Cp. also Demosth. de Falsa Legatione § 114 Shilleto (p. 373), καὶ τῶν σκῆσεων τούτων αἴδεμα ἐστὶ πολιτικὴ οὐδὲ δικαια, where Shilleto translates 'one which you would take from a statesman.'

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13. κοινοτερόν τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ‘For it is fairer to all, as we said’ (the reference probably is to 2. 2. 1261 b 1 sqq.), ‘and work of one and the same kind, whatever it is (ἐκατον), is done better and more quickly.’ Cp. Plato, Rep. 370 C, ἕκ δὴ τούτων πλείον τε ἐκατστὰ γίγνεται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ μᾶκον, ὅταν εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἐν καρφὶ ἁγολή τῶν ἄλλων ἁγών πράττῃ, and Aristot. Pol. 1. 2. 1252 b 3 sqq. For κοινοτερόν, cp. Rhet. ad Alex. 9. 1430 a 1, καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὅ ἦν ἰσώς καὶ κοινῷ πρὸς αὐτῶν προσφερόμεθα, πολὺν χρόνον τὴν συμμαχίαν φυλάξαμεν, where κοινῶς is conjoined with ἰσώς (see Liddell and Scott s. v. ἰσός, ii. 3) and opposed to πλευρικτικῶς, 1429 b 38. ‘Εκατστὸν τῶν αὐτῶν seems = ἐν ἔργον, 1273 b 9, e. g. τὸ σκυτοσκεῖον as distinguished from a combination of αὐλείν καὶ σκυτοσκεῖον: cp. Isocr. Busir. § 16, ἀπανταὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμοὺν περιλαβών ἐὰν δώ ἄριστὰ ἐὰν τὰ τὰ κοινὰ διακήσειν, δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τὰς αὐτὰς πράξεις μεταχειρίζεσθαι προσέταξεν, εἰδὼς τοὺς μὲν μεταβαλλομένους τὰς ἐργασίας ὅσοι πρὸς ἐν τῶν ἔργων ἀκριβῶς ἔχονται, τῶν δ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐταῖς πράξεις συνεχῶς διαμένοντας εἰς ἑπερβολὴν ἐκατον ἰσοτε- λοῦντας, and Nicocl. § 18, αἱ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἑπιστατοῦντες κ.τ.λ. Yet there is much to be said for Bernays’ conjecture of τῶν ἔργων in place of τῶν αὐτῶν. Has Cicero this passage in his memory when he writes to Atticus (13. 10. 2)—Ad Dolabella, ut scribis, ita puto faciendum, κοινότερα quaedam et politiōterα? We perhaps find an echo of it in Plutarch, Reip. Gerend. Praecepta c. 15. 812 D, οὗ γὰρ μόνον τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς πολλοὺς διανέμεσθαι δοκάσης, ὥστε εὐγελεί τῶν φθάνου τὸ μέγεθος, ἄλλα καὶ τὰ τῶν χρείων ἐπιτελεῖται μᾶλλον.

15. τοúτo, i.e. the advantage of a diffusion of ἀρχή. It is not quite certain whether ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν ναυτικῶν means ‘in military and naval affairs’ or ‘in affairs of war and in maritime affairs.’ I rather incline to the former view. In fleets and armies almost every one may be said both to rule and to be ruled, for each has a superior at the same time as he commands inferiors. There were in the Lacedaemonian army even enomotarchs, i. e. leaders of 30 or 40 men, and very possibly commanders on even a smaller scale. Lord Napier of Magdala remarks (Times, July 25, 1885), that ‘the command even of a small body of soldiers involves . . . the exercise both of subordinate discipline and of discipline in command.’ In civic life a share of ruling and being ruled is secured in a different way—by alternation (2. 2. 1261 b 1 sqq.)—but the result is the same.

17. Σιὰ δὲ πάνων διελήλυθε. This phrase recurs in 6 (4). 14. 1298 a 17 and 6 (4). 15. 1300 a 26, where however it is used of office, not of ruling and being ruled.

18. ὀλιγαρχικῆς, and hence exposed to much danger of being
upset (7 (5). 12. 1315 b 11: 7 (5). I. 1302 a 4 sqq.: compare the transition in c. 6. 1266 a 11 sqq. from ἀληγραψιν, 12, to ἑπεκίνδυνον, 27). As oligarchies rest on wealth, the remedy employed at Carthage (that of enrichment) was an excellent one, for it brought fresh blood into the ruling class, or at all events made the people less hostile. See on this subject 8 (6). 5. 1320 a 35—b 16, τεχνασ- τέων οὖν ὅπως ἂν εἰσπορὰ γένοστ ἄριστος κ.τ.λ. Ischomachus (Xen. Oecon. 14. 4 sqq.) contrasts the laws of Draco and Solon, which punish those who do wrong, with the ‘royal laws’ (i.e. those of kings, or perhaps those of the king of Persia—see Holden, Oeconomicus, p. 217), which enrich those who do right, and says that in his management of his slaves he employs both methods, and that further, when he finds slaves anxious to be commended by him, τούτοις ἀντεπ ἐλεοθέρα ἢδη χρῶμαι, οὐ μόνον πλουτίζων ἄλλα καὶ τιμῶν ὑπὲρ καλοῦσ τε καίγαμον. See also Xen. Cyrop. 8. 2. 22.

ἐκφεύγουσι, sc. τῶν κτίσιν (Coray). Bernays, ingeniously enough, would insert (ε conj.) στάσιν after ἀρσάτα, but it is doubtful whether anything has dropped out. Aristotle often omits a word where it will be readily supplied. See note on 1266 b 1, and cp. 5 (8). 5. 1340 b 17, where πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν is left to be supplied by the reader. We find ἐκφεύγειν, however, used absolutely now and then, and διαφεύγειν is frequently thus used (e.g. in Hdt. i. 10).

19. τὸ πλούτειν. So all MSS. τὸ πλούτιζειν (Schn.) would certainly be much simpler, but perhaps τῷ πλούτειν (which Bernays leaves unaltered) is defensible. Πλούτειν means ‘to become rich’ as well as ‘to be rich,’ cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 20, and Menand. Καλαξ, Gr. 6 (Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. 4. 154), οίδαι ἐπιλύσθησε ταχέως δίκαιος ὃς: thus τῷ πλούτειν may here be translated ‘by becoming rich,’ (by enrichment.’ Members of the demos became rich and contented through being despatched to the cities dependent on Carthage in some capacity the exact nature of which is uncertain (as officials, if we follow Susemihl—as colonists, if we follow Grote, History of Greece 10. 545): cp. 8 (6). 5. 1320 b 4, ταπευτὴν δὲ των τρόπων Καρχερόνων πολιτεύομεν φίλον κέκτησα τὸν δήμον' ἀν γὰρ τῶν ἐκπέμματος τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοχὰς ποιῶσιν εὐπόρους. See Sus. 3, Note 398, who explains the ‘cities’ here mentioned to be cities of the agricultural section of the indigenous Libyans subject to Carthage, as distinguished on the one hand from Phoenician cities ruled by her and on the other from pastoral Libyan tribes.

ἐπὶ τῶν πόλεισιν. In 1320 b 4 sqq. (quoted in the last note) ἐκτέμ- πειν is used with πρὸς. Ἐπὶ perhaps implies that they were sent out to rule the cities: cp. Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 20, τούτων ξενοκλέα μὲν καὶ
NOTES.

ἀλλων ἐγραφὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱστίας κ.τ.λ. Ἠκτέμπειν is used of sending out officials in c. 9. 1271 a 24, but it is also commonly used of colonists (see Liddell and Scott s. v.). For τὰς πόλεις, ‘the cities dependent on Carthage,’ compare the use of ἀνὸ τῶν πόλεων in Xen. Hell. 3. 4. 20 and of ἐν τοῖς πόλεωι in [Xen.] Rep. Ath. 1. 14.


tουτί. Aristotle would seem, if we may judge from the Index Aristotelicus, to use αὐτοίς but rarely. For the contrast between τοῖς ἐργον and διὰ τῶν νομοθέτην, cp. 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 29 sqq., and for διὰ τῶν νομοθέτην, see above on 1270 b 19.

23. φάρμακον... τῆς ἄσκεσας. Compare the use of ἄκος in 7 (5). 5. 1305 a 32 sq.

25. Κρητικῆς. For the omission of the article, see Bon. Ind. 109 b 44 sqq. and Vahlen, Beitr. zu d. Poet. 4. 409.

δικαιῶς surprises us, but still the Cretan constitution had its merits.

C. 12. 27. Τῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Looking to the programme of the Second Book which we find in its opening chapter, we might well expect it to close with the review of the Carthaginian constitution. We are there prepared for a review of the constitutions subsisting in reputedly well-governed States and of schemes of constitution put forth by individuals and generally well thought of; but now Aristotle speaks as if he had promised a review of αἱ ἀποφηματικαὶ περὶ πολιτείας, divides them into two classes, those who had not taken an active part in politics and those who had, and calls to mind that he has not yet spoken of anyone except Lycurgus belonging to the latter class. He will now, we gather, enter on a review, not of existing constitutions or of schemes of constitution, but of lawgivers who had played a part in politics. It is no doubt true that, as Aristotle ranks Solon among the best lawgivers in 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 18 sqq., we look for a criticism of the Solonian constitution from him, and that this constitution, having passed away and given place to another, is not in strictness included in either of the two classes of constitution marked out for treatment in the first chapter of the Second Book. Still there is some awkwardness about this addition to the programme, and the purpose of the book—the indication of what is good and useful in the constitutions reviewed and the revelation of their general inadequacy (2.1. 1260 b 32-35)—seems to be but little served by the inquiries of this concluding chapter. The more valuable portion of it—that relating to Solon—rather corrects current mistakes as to the
nature of his legislation than criticises it, and the remainder is little more than a collection of jottings. The notice of Solon's legislation, though possibly incomplete, seems to be Aristotelian, but it may have been tacked on by some later hand to the notice of the Carthaginian constitution, and the authenticity of the rest of the chapter in its present shape is very questionable. See note on 1274 a 22.

35. Σόλωνα δ' ἐνιοὶ κ.τ.λ. This approval is mentioned because good repute confers a claim to notice (c. 1. 1260 b 32). Plato had already said in Rep. 599 E, σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτίας πόλεις νομαθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι καὶ σφᾶς ὀφεληκέναι; Χαρώνδαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰταλία καὶ Σικελία, καὶ ἑκεῖνον Σόλωνα. Aristotle himself ranks Solon among the 'best lawgivers' (see above on '27). It is not clear whether Isocrates is referred to among these ἑνιοι, though he was an eulogist of Solon and of the πάρθενος δημοκρατία (cp. Areopag. §§ 16–17, 26–27, 37: de Antid. § 232). They regarded Solon as the destroyer of an extreme oligarchy, on the ruins of which he constructed the πάρθενος δημοκρατία, a wisely mixed constitution: they took him to have founded the Areopagus, to have introduced the system of filling magistracies by election, and to have created the popular dicastery, thus as it were equipping the State with a complete set of new institutions. 'Most writers,' says Plutarch (Solon c. 19), 'made Solon the author of the Areopagus': Plutarch himself, however, doubts the fact for the reason he there mentions. To this view of Solon's work Aristotle objects; he says that Solon would seem to have found the council of the Areopagus and the system of filling the magistracies by election already established, and that he was only so far responsible in relation to those matters that he left them as he found them, whereas he did institute the popular element in the constitution by founding the popular dicasteries. He appeals in support of his contention to the opinion of a second set of critics, who made Solon responsible for the existing extreme democracy. They complained that so far from being the author of a mixed constitution, he overpowered the oligarchical element of the constitution by the democratic, inasmuch as he gave supreme power to the popular dicastery. Armed with this judicial authority, the people became masters of the State; one statesman after another had to play into their hands, and so the extreme democracy gradually came into being. Aristotle, however, holds that these inquirers ascribed to Solon's institution of popular dicasteries consequences which would not have resulted from it, if it had not been for accidental circumstances. Solon was far from intending to found an extreme democracy; he
gave, in fact, only a modicum of power to the people—enough to content them and no more—and reserved office for the better-to-do classes. On the other hand, he was not the contriver of an elaborate mixed constitution, but rather the founder of the beginnings of popular liberty; still less was he the undoer of the power of the Few. He left office in their hands, and gave the people only just enough power to make the holders of office govern well (8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27—1319 a 6). That Aristotle approved of Solon's legislation is evident from 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 18 sq.: 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 27 sqq.: 3. 11. 1281 b 21—1282 a 41.

39. μέξατα καλὸς τὴν πολιτείαν κ.τ.λ. These critics appear to have thought that a good mixed constitution should include oligarchical, aristocratical, and popular elements: compare the view referred to in c. 6. 1265 b 33 sqq. Aristotle may perhaps have regarded the Areopagus as an oligarchical rather than an aristocratic institution (7 (5). 4. 1304 a 20: cp. 6 (4). 3. 1290 a 27), but he would hardly agree that election to office, unless it is κατ' ἀρετήν, is an aristocratic feature (cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 7 sqq.), or think that the mere admissibility of all citizens to serve on the dicasteries, without the accompaniment of pay to the poor for serving, is a large step in the democratic direction.

41. Here, as it seems to me, Aristotle's statement of his own opinion begins.

1274 a. 2. τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσαι κ.τ.λ., 'set up the demos' (gave a place in the constitution to the demos) 'by enacting that all the citizens should be admitted to sit on the dicasteries.' Aristotle uses the same words—καταλῦσαι, καταστήσαι—as had been used by the critics to whom he refers, in order to bring out clearly the difference of his own view. Solon is here so far connected with the dicasteries that he is said to have provided that membership of them should be open to all citizens.


6. τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν. Cp. 10, where this expression is repeated. It is implied that the Athenian democracy was in the writer's time a democracy of an advanced kind—perhaps a τελευταία δημοκρατία. The passage is noticeable, because Aristotle commonly avoids mentioning Athens in connexion with his censures of extreme democracy. Some have doubted its genuineness because of its unwonted outspokenness.

8. Ἐφάλτης... καὶ Περικλῆς, cp. Plutarch, Praecepta Reip.
Gerend. c. 15. 812 D, ὁς Περικλῆς Μενίττω μὲν ἔχρητο πρὸς τὰς στρατηγίας, δὲ Ἐφημαλτοῦ δὲ τὴν ἐς Ἀρείου πάγου βουλήν ἐταπείνωσε, διὰ δὲ Χαρίου τὸ κατὰ Μεγαρέων ἐκύρωσε ψήφισμα, Δάμπως δὲ Θουρίων ὁ ὑστή ἐξεπείσειν.


12. ἀπὸ συμπτώματος. Cr. 7 (5) 6. 1306 b 6.

τῆς ναυαρχίας, a rare word, apparently, in the sense in which it is here used.

13. ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς. Cr. 7 (5) 4. 1304 a 20, ὅπως ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή εὐδοκίμησα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ἔνδοξε συντονωτέραν παῖσαι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ἱχλὸς γενόμενος αὖτοις τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἠγεμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ βιδαλταν δύναμιν τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἁγχορατέραν ἐποίησεν: Isocr. de Antid. § 316 sq.: Plato, Laws 707, and also 708 Ε, ἐκεῖνοι λέγειν, ὡς ὁιδεὶς ποτὲ ἄνθρωπον ἐνδεδωσκότη, τοιχα δὲ καὶ ἔμφοραί παραιτούσι παντοῖοι νομοθετοῦν τὰ πάντα ἐν μέσῳ ἡμῶν ἢ γὰρ πάλιμος τὰς βιασάμενος ἀνέτρεψεν πολιτείας καὶ μετέβαλε νόμων κ.τ.λ.

14. δημαγωγὸς φαύλους. Probably those alluded to by Isocrates, de Antidosi §§ 316-7, a passage which Aristotle evidently has in his mind here. Aristotle had a good opinion of the antagonist of Pericles, Thucydides son of Melesias (Plutarch, Nicias c. 2), but would hardly have applied this expression to Pericles, even for the sake of contradicting Isocrates, who calls him δημαγωγὸς ἀγαθόν (de Antid. § 234).

15. ἐπεὶ Σῶλον γε κ.τ.λ. Cp. Solon, Fragm. 5 (Bergk), and Pol. 3. ii. 1281 b 32 sqq. It would seem, however, from 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 21 sqq., that Solon might have given the people less; and Plato in the Laws, though he allows the people some share in judicial and deliberative functions, reserves the review of the conduct of magistrates in office for his great college of the priests of Apollo.

16. ἀποθεῖται. See note on 1273 a 10, ἀποθεῖται τῷ δημῷ.


18. ἄρχασι, here as in 6 (4). 1. 1298 a 1—3 (contrast 3. i. 1275 a 23-29) distinguished from τὸ δικαίον. Cr. 3. 4. 1277 b 1, διὰ παρ’ ἐνδοιαν αὐτὸ μετέχουν αἱ δημοσιογού τὸ πολιτείαν ἄρχαν, πρὸς δὴ τῶν ἐσχατῶν, where Athens may be among the States referred to, for, as Schömann says (Gr. Alterth. 1. 342), 'it is clear that as the three upper classes of the Solonian Constitution were framed in relation to the amount of their landed property, all those who
owned no land must have been placed in the fourth, even when well endowed with other kinds of property.' The Archonship was probably confined to the first class (Plut. Aristid. c. 1).

19. ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίμνων κ.τ.λ. Diels (Über die Berliner Fragmenten der 'Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία des Aristoteles, p. 33. 3) regards 1274 a 19–21 as an interpolation, and if with Susemihl we regard all that follows νομοθέται δὲ, 22, as spurious, there is something to be said for rejecting ἐκ τῶν πεντακοσιομεδίμνων—μετήν, 21, also. These words, however, seem to be added to justify and enforce τῶν γυναῖκων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων, and to show that Solon not only confined office to well-to-do men, but did so by the requirement of a property qualification (cp. 8 (6). 4. 1318 b 30, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρεταῖς καὶ ἀπὸ τυμημάτων... ἣ καὶ ἀπὸ τυμημάτων μὲν μυθείων, ἀλλὰ τοὺς δυναμένους).

20. τρίτου τέλους probably means 'third in mention' (cp. c. 6. 1264 b 33: c. ι. 1272 b 28), not necessarily 'third in point of dignity.' Susemihl brackets (though doubtfully) these two words as spurious, but τέλους seems to be needed for τὸ τέταρτον, 21.

21. οἷς κ.τ.λ. The fact was mentioned by Aristotle in the 'Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία also (Aristot. Fragm. 350. 1537 a 20 sqq.).

22. νομοθέται δὲ ἐγένοντο κ.τ.λ. The review of Solon’s legislation seems, as has been said, hardly to be complete. Be that, however, as it may, we expect it to be followed by a review of lawgivers who legislated for their own States or for others after taking an active part in politics (πολιτεύοντος αὑτῶν, 1273 b 31), whether they were the authors of laws only or of constitutions as well as laws, for it is doubtful whether Susemihl is right in thinking that the authors of laws only are dismissed in 1273 b 32 from consideration. And we do find that in what follows lawgivers who legislated for other States than their own (Charondas, Philolaus, Androdamas) are specially noted. Nothing, however, is said as to the lawgivers now enumerated having taken an active part in politics, and we are even more at a loss in this part of the chapter than in that relating to Solon to see how the scanty notices given of their legislation serve the main purpose of the book, which is set forth in c. 1. 1260 b 32–36. Of Zaleucus all that we are told is that he legislated for the Epizephyrian Locrians, and it would even seem (see next note) that Aristotle elsewhere gave an account of him which would at all events exclude the idea of his having legislated after taking an active part in politics, for according to the Πολιτεία he was a shepherd and a slave when he became a lawgiver. About Charondas we learn a little more, and perhaps there is a reason for the insertion of the story about Philolaus and
Diocles, though it seems out of keeping in the Politics. From this point onward the object of the writer appears to be to note anything special and peculiar to each lawgiver. This aim had not, to say the least, been equally prominent in previous chapters, though we find, it is true, some traces of it in c. 7. 1266 a 33-36, 39 and c. 8. 1267 b 29. The passage 1274 b 9-15 is especially open to suspicion. A recurrence to Phaleas and Plato seems quite out of place, especially now that we are concerned with lawgivers, and with lawgivers who had taken an active part in politics, of whom Plato was not one. The statement (1274 b 9 sq.) that Plato was the first to propose a community of property conflicts with c. 7. 1266 a 34 sq. It is true that there is much that is characteristic of Aristotle in the style of the passage which begins at 1274 a 22 and extends to the end of the chapter. The quiet correction of Ephorus (1274 a 25 sqq.), and of the too patriotic Locrian legend which traced back the beginnings of the legislative art to the Locrian Onomacritus, is also quite in Aristotle’s vein.

On the whole, the guess is perhaps permissible that Aristotle may have left only the fragment about Solon and a few rough data for insertion after the notice of the Carthaginian constitution, and that some member of the school, not very long after his death, completed them as he best could. Zeller, it should be noticed, holds that the chapter has suffered from interpolation (Gr. Ph. 2. 2. 676).

Zαλευκός τε κ.τ.λ. Of the lawgivers noticed in the remaining portion of the chapter, some seem to have been authors of constitutions as well as laws, others of laws only. We cannot be certain that the ‘ill-compounded ἀπειροκαρία’ at the Epizephyrian Locri which Aristotle criticises in 7 (5). 7. 1307 a 38 sq. was regarded by him as the work of Zaleucus, but Plutarch speaks of Zaleucus as the author of a constitution (Numa c. 4). Charondas, however, appears to be referred to in 6 (4). 12. 1297 a 7 sqq. as the founder of an ἀπειροκαρία, or at all events of a constitution of some kind: cp. 6 (4). 11. 1296 a 21: 6 (4). 13. 1297 a 21 sqq. Draco and Pittacus, on the contrary, are stated to be authors of laws only in 1274 b 15, 18. It is hardly likely that Cicero refers to this passage in Ep. ad Att. 6. 1. 18: Quis Zaleucum leges Locris scripsisse non dixit? Num igitur iacet Theophrastus, si id a Timaeo reprehensum est? Cp. Cic. de Leg. 2. 6. 15, where Timaeus is said to have denied that Zaleucus ever existed. There were perhaps some who ascribed the Politics to Theophrastus, but Cicero can hardly have been among them,
for, as has been pointed out elsewhere, he says in the De Finibus (5. 4. 11) that both Aristotle and Theophrastus had written 'de optimo statu rei publicae,' so that at all events the two books of the Politics which relate to this subject cannot have been attributed by him to Theophrastus. It has apparently escaped notice, that while Zaleucus is here classed among those who had become lawgivers after taking an active part in politics (πολιτευόντες αὐτοί, 1273 b 31), he is said by the Scholiast on Pindar on the authority of Aristotle to have been a shepherd and a slave when he was called on to legislate (Aristot. Fragm. 505. 1561 a 5 sqq.). Perhaps, however, the words πολιτευόντες αὐτοί need not be interpreted as implying that the participation in political life preceded the legislation; the intention may be only to contrast lawgivers who took an active part in politics at some time in their life with those who διετέλεσαν ἱδιωτεύοντες τῶν βίων (1273 b 28).

24. ταῖς ἡλκιδικαῖς. Some would omit ταῖς, but cp. 1. 11. 1258 b 19, τῶν ἄλλων ζηνων τῶν πλωτών ἡ πητρῶν, ἄφ' ἄσων ἐστιν πυγχάαν βοηθείας, where τῶν ἄλλων ζηνων undergoes a similar series of limitations.

25. πειράνται δὲ κ.τ.λ. 'And some attempt even to put facts together, their view being that' etc. Welldon, following Congreve, translates εἰςφύειν 'to make out a catena of legislators,' and so also Bernays, 'eine ununterbrochene Reihenfolge von Gesetzgebern nachzuweisen,' but the correctness of this rendering seems doubtful. For the construction, cp. 6 (4). 9. 1294 b 20. Who were these τνες? Triber (Forschungen, pp. 67, 72, 101) and Sus.² (Note 418) say Ephorus; and it is true that Ephorus (ap. Strab. 10. p. 482), on the authority of 'the Cretans,' brings Lycurgus into communication with Thales—μελητοφόροι ἄνδρι καὶ νομοθετικοὶ—from whom he is said to learn in particular the way in which Rhadamanthus, and afterwards Minos, fathered their laws on Zeus. But we nowhere learn that Ephorus connected Thales with Onomacritus; and as to Zaleucus, Ephorus would seem from Strabo 6. p. 260 to have regarded his laws as a compilation ἐκ τε τῶν Κρητικῶν νομίμων καὶ Λακωνικῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν 'Ἀρεωπαγιτικῶν. This hardly looks as if he made Zaleucus and Lycurgus disciples of Thales, and therefore contemporaries or nearly so. Ephorus, it is true, was an enthusiast for things Cretan, and may well have pointed to Crete as the birthplace of the legislative art among others—indeed, those who traced the beginnings of Greek civilization to Crete were probably very much in the right (see E. Curtius, History of Greece
E. T. 1. 73)—but one would rather suspect a Locrian origin for a tradition which made a Locrian the first skilled legislator, and placed Zaleucus and Lycurgus on a level, thus virtually denying the debt of the former to the latter. We know that the Italian Locri claimed to have been the first State to use written laws, those which Zaleucus had given it (Scymnus Chius, 314 sqq.). If again the Locrian Onomacritus mentioned here is the same man as the well-known Athenian oracle-monger of Peisistratid times, the anachronism is very great—too great, probably, for Ephorus to have committed. We should also expect Ephorus, with his strong interest in Crete, to look back to Rhadamanthus or Minos as the earliest able lawgiver.

26. γυμνασθήσας δ’ αυτόν κ.τ.λ., ‘and that he trained himself by practice in Crete, though a Locrian and sojourning there in the exercise of the prophetic art.’ For γυμνασθήσας, cp. Isocr. de Antid. § 187, where it is coupled with ἐντριβέσαι γενεσθαι.

28. Θάλης. Thales the Cretan, in contradistinction to whom Thales the Milesian is thus designated in 1. 11. 1259 a 6. On Thales the Cretan, the other and probably later form of whose name is Thaletas, see Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, and Sus.², Note 419. In associating Thales with Lycurgus, Ephorus and the authorities here criticised gave currency to a long-enduring and widespread error, which survives not only in Plutarch, Lycurgus c. 4, but also in Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. 2. 21, and Diog. Laert. 1. 38. We probably learn the true date of Thales the Cretan from the De Musica attributed to Plutarch (c. 10), where he is said on the authority of Glaucus (a Rhegian, contemporary with Democritus) to have lived after Archilochus. The contradiction given in the text on chronological grounds to the ingenious combination of these times may perhaps apply to the whole of it. Lawgivers do not fall so easily into an order of filiation: Lycurgus was not the pupil of Thales, nor Thales the contemporary of Onomacritus, nor Zaleucus the contemporary of Lycurgus, nor Charondas the pupil of Zaleucus.

30. ἄλλα ταύτα κ.τ.λ. For the transition, cp. 1. 5. 1254 a 33, ἄλλα ταύτα μὲν ἰσος ἐξωτερικοτέρας ἐστὶ σκέψεως, τὸ δὲ ζέων πρῶτον σωφροσύνην ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, where Aristotle turns from a question lying somewhat off his path to the inquiry which he is pursuing. So here the meaning seems to be—‘but all this rests on an error of chronology, and to return to our subject, Philolaus the Corinthian also legislated for a city not his own, Thebes.’ It seems doubtful whether, as some have thought, the times of 25 are found fault with
here for omitting Philolaus in their enumeration. ἔγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος is repeated in 1274 b 18, ἔγένετο δὲ καὶ Πητακός, and 23, ἔγένετο δὲ καὶ Ἀνδροδάμας.

τῷ χρόνῳ. So II, Vet. Int., Bekk.: Ar. ‘sed qui ista dicunt, tempora non supputant,’ on the strength of which rendering Schneider, Coray, and Susenbuhl read τῶν χρόνων. Τοῖς χρόνωσιν seems to be read by Bonitz (Ind. 856 a 20), who groups this passage with 6 (4). 6. 1293 a 1 and 4 (7). 10. 1329 b 24, and the plural is certainly far more usual in this sense. As to λέγουσιν . . . λέγουσις, the repetition, though harsh, may perhaps be explained by such phrases as ἐποίησον οὐ καλὸν, ὥρας ποιήσας, c. 9. 1270 a 20.

32. ἡν δὲ κ.τ.λ. The purpose of this narrative seems to be partly to show how remarkable the career of Philolaus was, but still more to explain how a Corinthian came to live at Thebes: we were informed a few lines back how it was that a Locrian came to sojourn in Crete. The striking feature of the story to the mind of a Greek would be that a member of the ruling family of Corinth should have been willing to give up country and home, honours and power, and to accompany Diocles into a life-long exile. A tale like this was not out of place at the head of the legislative traditions of Thebes: cp. Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 19, ἀλος δὲ τῆς περὶ τῶν ἐραστῶν συνθέσεως σώματος οὖχ, ὡσπέρ αἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, Ἐθσαῖος τὸ Δαιὸν πάθος ἄρχην παρέσχει, ἀλλ’ οἱ νομισθέα τὸ φόνοι θυσιασθὲν αὐτῶν καὶ ἄκρατον ἀνικεῖ καὶ ἀνυγρανθεὶς ἐθεδος ἐκ παιδίων βουλήμενον πολὺν μὲν ἀνεμίζαντο καὶ στουδὴ καὶ παιδιὰ πάτη τῶν αὐλῶν εἰς τιμὴν καὶ προεδρίαν ἐγένετε, λαμπρῶν δὲ τῶν ἐρωτα τῶν παλαιόστασις ἐνθέρψαντο συγκεραυνύστες τὰ ἁβι τῶν νέων. Plutarch’s reference to the untempered strength of the spirited element in the Theban nature suggests that the Thebans may be present to Aristotle’s mind when he says (4 (7). 7. 1327 b 34), τὰ μὲν γὰρ (τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔθνη) ἔχει τὴν φύσιν μυοκόκων.

36. καὶ νόν ἔτι κ.τ.λ. Aristotle seems also to have mentioned (perhaps in his Ἐφασμικός) a tomb of Iolaus, probably at Thebes, at which lovers exchanged pledges of fidelity (Plutarch, Pelopid. c. 18: Aristot. Fragm. 92. 1492 a 39).

37. πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν Κορυβίων χώραν, ‘in the direction of the Corinthian territory.’ The tombs were mounds, but the distance would be not far from 40 miles, as the crow flies. So Althaemenes, after exiling himself from Crete lest he should fulfil prophecy and kill his father, built the temple of the Atabyrian Zeus on a high peak in the island of Rhodes, from which his native land could be described on the horizon (Diod. 5. 59. 2). As to the position of the tomb of Diocles, compare the last stanza of Wordsworth’s Laodamia:
even the elm-trees planted on the grave of Protesilaus could not bear the sight of Ilium (Anth. Pal. 7. 141).

40. διὰ τὴν ἀπέχθειαν τοῦ πάθους. Vict. 'propter odium illius affectus' (cp. διαμασίας τῶν ἑρωτα, 34).

ὁπος...ἔσται after τάξασθαι. Weber (Die Absichtssätze bei Aristot., p. 36) compares Soph. El. 33. 183 b 3 sq.

ἀποτελοῦσθε here 'visible,' not, as in Soph. Aj. 15, 'invisible.'

3. παιδοποιίας, not τεκνοποιίας. Τεκνοποία, 'the begetting of offspring,' is common to man with the lower animals; not so παιδοποία, which means 'the begetting of children': we often find παιδοποία conjoined with γήμοι (e.g. in Plato, Rep. 423 Ε, 459 Α, Symp. 192 Β: Plutarch, Solon c. 6). But C. F. Hermann (Gr. Ant. 1. 180. 10) may possibly be right in translating the word here 'adoption,' for in Plutarch, Quaest. Platon. 1. 3. 1000 D we find παιδοποιεύσαν used in the sense of 'adopt' (δοσπερ ὁ μὴ τεκνων παιδοποιεύται τῶν ἄρτων, where however Wytenbach would read παιδα ποιεύται, comparing Paus. 7. 1. 3). On the other hand, it should be remembered that the laws referred to might be called θετικά without relating solely to adoption. No other instance of the occurrence of παιδοποία in Aristotle's writings is given in the Index Aristotelicus, though τεκνοποία, which is never used by Plato or by the Attic Orators, is of frequent occurrence in them.

The antecedent of οὗς seems to be in the gen. after νομοθέτης: it is, however, as often happens, caught into the relative clause.

4. θετικόως, 'relating to adoption.' See Büchsenschütz, Besitz und Erwerb, p. 32, and C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 65. 2, who points out that Philolaus, if he was the first to permit adoption at Thebes, in effect introduced testation. This would be the case even if the form of adoption introduced by him was, like that prescribed by the law of Gortyna (Bächeler und Zitelmann, p. 161), adoptio inter vivos. The aim of Philolaus in permitting adoption was very different from that which Isaeus ascribes to the Attic lawgiver— ἁ γὰρ νομοθέτης, ἐν ἄνδρες, διὰ τοῦτο τῶν νόμων ἐθελεῖν οὕτως, ὡς μόνη ταύτην καταφυγὴν οὖσαν τῆς ἐρήμιας καὶ παραψυχῆ ποὺ βίον τοῖς ἀπαιτεῖν τῶν ἄνθρωπων, τὸ ἐξείσαι ποιήσασθαι ὧν τίνα ἐν βουλαντὶ (2. 13).

ὁδῶς. His aim he shared with Pheidon, who was, like himself, a Corinthian (c. 6. 1265 b 12 sqq.), and perhaps earlier than Philolaus, but the means used were peculiar to the latter. From this point onwards we note an effort to point out anything special and peculiar to each lawgiver. Some attention had been paid to this before (c. 7. 1266 a 33—36, 39: c. 8. 1267 b 29), but now the thing is done systematically. Probably the view is that enactments peculiar to a
lawgiver are those which are most likely to deserve attention. To produce something ἵδων was held to be the surest sign of capacity and training: cp. Plutarch adv. Colot. c. 26. 1121 E, τοῦ δ' Ἀρκεστα-λᾶος τῶν Ἐπίκουρον σὺ μετρῶν οȗικεν ἢ δόξα παραλυτέων... μηδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἱδών λέγωστα, φησίν, ἐπιληψιν ἐμποιεῖν καὶ δόξαν ἀνθρώπων ἀγαμμά-τως, άτε δὴ πολυγράμματος αὐτῶν ἄν καὶ μεμονοιμάτον: Aristot. Metaph. A. 1. 981 b 13 sqq.: Metaph. A. 4. 984 b 31: see also de Soph. El. 33. 183 b 20 sqq. Ephorus and others are said by Polybius (6. 45. 3) to have pointed out certain things as ἵδα τῆς Ἀκαδημονίας πολιτείας. Inquiries respecting εὐρήματα and their authors were popular in Greece (Pol. 5 (8). 6. 1341 b 2 sqq.: Aeschyl. Prom. Vinct. 476 sqq.: Plato, Phaedrus 274 C, Rep. 600 Δ), and they were especially popular in Aristotle's day: Ephorus paid much attention to the subject in his History (Müller, Fr. Hist. Gr. vol. 1. p. lxii), and is also said to have written a separate work on εὐρήματα, as did two successive heads of the Peripatetic School, Theophras- tus and Strato (Diog. Laert. 5. 47, 60): Hermippus also in his book on Lawgivers concerned himself with εὐρέσεις (Athen. Deipn. 154 d). Isocrates, in arguing (Paneg. § 10) that honour should be paid rather to the best practitioners of an art than to its originators, implies that the prevailing tendency was in the latter direction. It is not surprising, then, that the authors of anything ἵδων in legislation should be noted here; still the aim of the Second Book is not history but criticism, and of criticism there is hardly anything in this concluding chapter.

6. Ψευδομαρτύρων. See critical note.

7. πρώτος γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'For he was the first to introduce the de- nunciation for false witness.' See Mr. Sandys' note on Demosth. Or. 2 adv. Steph. c. 7 (p. 115 of his edition), and, on the general significance of the innovation, which gave unsuccessful litigants an opportunity of re-opening questions decided against them, C. F. Hermann, Gr. Ant. 3. § 72 (in Thalheim's edition, Rechtsalterth. § 17. p. 119 sq.), who refers to [Demosth.] contra Evurg. c. 1. These suits had evidently become in Aristotle's time a great social nuisance: cp. c. 5. 1263 b 20 sq. 'Ἐναόηςε is here used of a legis- lator, as e.g. in c. 9. 1270 a 20.

8. γλαφυρώτερος, 'more finished': see note on 1271 b 21.

9. [Φαλέω... ἀχρηστον.] As to this passage, see note on 1274 a 22. In c. 7. 1266 a 34 we read οὐδὲς γὰρ οὗτε τὴν περὶ τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας ἄλλοις κεκαιμάτηκεν (except Plato) οὗτε περὶ τὰ συστήματα τῶν γυνακῶν: here, on the contrary, the suggestion of a community of property is said to be also peculiar to him. The
two passages seem inconsistent, and probably the earlier statement is the truer. Most of the suggestions with which Plato is here credited are trivial enough, and it may well be doubted whether this paragraph is anything more than a marginal annotation from the pen of some reader of the treatise, which has crept into the text. Its style, however, resembles that of Aristotle, and its date may well be very early. Φαλέων seems to be the correct reading, not Φαλαλάων, though Φαλώλαων has the weight of MS. authority in its favour, for a re-equalization, or at any rate an equalization, of οὐσία (the word οὐσία is used also in 1266 a 37 and 1267 b 5, though, as Aristotle points out in 1267 b 9, his project extended only to land) has been ascribed to Phaleas (c. 7. 1266 b 1 sq.), whereas nothing of the kind has been attributed to Philolaus.

ἀνομαλωσις. Here all the MSS. read ἀνομαλωσις (Vet. Int. 'irregularitas')—i.e. 'partitio inaequalis,' which is evidently not the sense intended. 'Ἀνομαλωσις ('aequalitatis restitutio': see Bon. Ind. s. v.) is probably the true reading: the word does not, however, occur elsewhere in Aristotle: still we have ἀνομαλισθαι (from ἀνομαλίεσι) in Rhet. 3. ii. 1412 a 16, and some would read ἀνομαλισθησομένην for ἄν ἀμαλθησομένην in Pol. 2. 6. 1265 a 40.


12. καὶ τὴν... ἀξιρητοῦν. Sus. compares Plato, Laws 794 D–795 D. τὴν... ἀκρασίαν is governed by περὶ, 11: see the passages collected by Bonitz (Ind. 630 a 39 sqq.), and cp. also Pol. 7 (5). 10. 1311 b 37, and de Gen. An. 3. 1. 749 b 24, where PZ omit διὰ. Κατὰ τὴν μελέτην (13), 'by practice': cp. κατὰ φύσιν, κατὰ τύχην. Plato's view was that the difference between the right hand and the left has arisen διὰ τὰ ἑθή, αὐτὶ ἀρκεῖς χρωμάτων, there being by nature none whatever (Laws 794 E). Aristotle, on the contrary, held that this difference existed by nature (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 b 33 sqq.: de Caelo 2. 2. 284 b 6 sqq.: Hist. An. 2. 1. 497 b 31), though men might make themselves ambidextrous by practice: cp. Magn. Mor. 1. 34. 1194 b 32, τὰ φύσει ἄνυτα μεταλαμβάνονται μεταβολῆς λέγει δ' ὅνων εἰ τῇ ἀριστερᾷ μελετημένοις πάντες ἀεὶ βάλλειν, γίνομεθ' ἐν ἀμφιδέξιω ἀλλὰ φύσει γε ἀριστερά ἐστι κ.τ.λ. He would probably, however, be opposed to attempts to counteract nature by habituation (4 (7). 17. 1337 a 1: 4 (7). 14. 1332 b 35 sqq.).

NOTES. 2. 12. 1274 b 17—26.*

toιν χεροίν. ‘In Attic the dual of ά, ί, τό has commonly but one
gender τό, τοίν’ (Liddell and Scott s.v.). See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 388.
3 b, and cp. Plato, Protag. 314 D: Theaetet. 155 E.
17. καὶ, ‘at all’: see Riddell, Apology of Plato, p. 168.
Ant. 3. § 73. 10 (in Thalheim’s edition, Rechtsalt. § 18. p. 122. 5).
18. A transition is made from Draco to Pittacus, because Pittacus
also was the author of laws only: the two lawgivers, however, had
more than this in common, for Pittacus’ law about drunkards was,
like those of Draco, famous for its severity ([Plutarch,] Sept. Sap.
Conv. 13, τόν αὐν ἐκείνον τόν χαλεπόν νόμον).
20. τι πταλάωσι. See critical note.
21. οὐ πρός τὴν κ.τ.λ. Literally, ‘he paid regard not to the greater
consideration which it might be pleaded is due to men who offend
when drunk, but’ etc. ‘Οτι is used, and not ὅνν, because the writer does
not wish to affirm that this greater consideration is due. The ques-
tion with regard to which neutrality is here maintained, a neutrality
perhaps slightly benevolent to the drunkard, is solved without hesi-
tation in Eth. Nic. 3. 2. 1110 b 24 sqq., where the drunken offender
is said not to act δι’ ἄγνωσι, much less involuntarily (in which case
alone συγγνώμη is called for, Eth. Nic. 3. 1. 1109 b 31 sq.), but only
ἄγνωσι: thus Pittacus was quite right, ἥ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύριος γὰρ
τοῦ μὴ μεθυσόρμα, τοῦτο δ’ αὐτὸν τῆς ἄγνωσι (Eth. Nic. 3. 7. 1113 b 30
sqq.). Lesbos, we remember, was a wine-producing island, and
Pittacus was engaged in restoring order to Mytilene. According
to the English law, if intoxication amounts to stupidity, it reduces
the crime (Ruling of an English Judge, Times, Feb. 4, 1881). It
should be noted that Pittacus was credited with the exclamation
Συγγνώμη παμφρασί κρείσσων, on liberating his opponent Alcaeus
(Diog. Laert. 1. 76).
24. οὐ, sc. νόμος, latent in νομοβέτης.
26. τὰ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. Constitutions which ‘took effect’ (κυπλας)
seem to be here distinguished from schemes which remained mere
schemes. Κυπλας, however, would more naturally mean ‘actually in
force,’ and this winding-up would be more in place at the close of
the notice of the Carthaginian constitution, than at the end of a
chapter on νομοβέται, for it makes no reference to νομοβέται. We
note also that μὲν οὖν is not taken up by δι’ at the commencement
of the next book, which begins τοῖ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντα without
any connecting particle, as does the Sixth Book likewise. This is
hardly reassuring as to the state of the text, though it is impossible
to say what precisely has happened to it.
APPENDIX A.

The Relation of the teaching of the Nicomachean Ethics to that of
the Politics.

It is proposed to examine in the present Appendix, so far as
limits of space will allow, the relation in which the Politics stands
to the Nicomachean Ethics, and also to ask how far its teaching
agrees with that of the latter treatise—how far the two works can
be said to form well-planned parts of a coherent whole.

In dealing with these questions, it will be necessary for us to
take the Nicomachean Ethics as it stands, without pausing to
inquire whether parts of it are due to other hands than Aristotle's,
or whether intrusive or interpolated matter is present in the work,
or again whether its component parts were designed at the time of
composition to form part of the whole which they at present con-
stitute. To enter on these and other vexed questions with re-

gard to the state of the text of this work would carry us too far.

That the Nicomachean Ethics should have a sequel was necessary
for more reasons than one. As we have already seen, Aristotle
himself mentions one of these reasons at the beginning of the last
chapter of the treatise. Moral Philosophy is to him a practical
science with a practical aim: οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρή-
σαν ἑκαστὰ καὶ γρῶνα, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὑτὰ (Eth. Nic. 10. 10.
1179 a 35)—οὐ γὰρ ἵν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵν'
ἀγαθὸν γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὃς ἄφελος αὑτῆς (Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1103 b 27):
the study of Morals thus involves a study of the means by which
men are made good. It involves therefore a study of the State.
To stop short at the close of the Nicomachean Ethics would be to
leave the science of moral action incomplete, to balk its aim and
rob it of its effectiveness.

But then again it is in the State that happiness assumes its
noblest form (Eth. Nic. 1. 1. 1094 b 7 sqq.). We must study it in
the State if we wish to see it at its best. Nor is this all. Aristotle
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would probably say that we have not fully explored the nature of the στουδάιος till we have explored the State of which he is a part. We do not fully understand what the στουδάιος is until we have viewed him as a part of a whole—as a husband, father, citizen, soldier, and ruler.

Plato had treated of Ethics and Politics in one and the same dialogue. He had not only traced a parallel between the State and the soul of the individual, but had laid stress on the mutual reaction of individual and State. As is the individual, so is the State; as is the State, so is the individual. The individual, he seemed to say, could no more be understood apart from the State than a limb apart from the body to which it belongs. Ethics and Politics, according to this view, gain by being treated together; the individual must not be severed from the State which makes him what he is, nor the State from the individual who gives it its character. The Republic of Plato gains in concreteness by its adoption of this method. We study the good man and his opposites, as we see them in actual life, in a ‘setting’ of institutions. We view them in connexion with the little world of which they form a part. We recognize not only what the στουδάιος is, but what makes him what he is, and see the medium in which he lives and moves. The relation between the individual and the State has never been more vigorously portrayed than in the Republic. The unsound State, we see, is fatal even to sound philosophy. The four virtues of the Republic are public virtues, all of them relative to the Whole of which they are the pillars; they presuppose the State and the State presupposes them.

Aristotle’s plan, on the contrary, is to part the study of εὐδαιμονία and the virtues of which it is the outcome from the study of the State and its various forms. He thus severs what Plato had joined together. Plato’s plan of dealing with Ethics and Politics in one work had, in fact, its disadvantages. Pent within so narrow a space, neither could really thrive. It brought out, indeed, more effectively than any other method could have done the pressing need of a return to justice and of a reform of the State, and this was precisely what Plato sought to do; but a full scientific treatment of the two subjects was hardly possible without a double inquiry. In dealing with them separately Aristotle took a great step in advance. In the interest of science, he concerns himself in the Nicomachean Ethics primarily with the individual viewed as the subject of εὐδαιμονία and as exercising the various moral and intellectual virtues. He asks what constitutes virtuous action and happiness, and dwells only
incidentally on the forces external to the individual which bring them into being, and the field in which they are realized. His aim is for the time to view virtue as an internal fact, a psychological diathesis, rather than as the life-breath of society or its product—
to approach it rather from the side of Psychology than from that of Politics. But he too, in his turn, as he passes from virtues like Temperance or Liberality to virtues like Justice and Moral Pru-
dence, and then to Friendship, is led further and further into the
domain of Politics. If we are not yet asked to analyse the State,
we are taught to study the work of Justice in the State. If the
objects in the foreground are still virtues, we look through them
into a background of Politics, and thus the study of Ethics leads
Aristotle on to the study of Politics. If, unlike Plato, he treats
of Ethics in one work and Politics in another, he is far from
intending to break the link which binds the two subjects together,
or to stop short in his inquiries at the close of the Nicomachean
Ethics.

It was necessary then that this treatise should have a sequel,
but how far is the Politics an appropriate sequel to it and in accord
with it?

It is easy to see that the two treatises have much in common.
Not only do both of them presuppose the great central principles
of the Aristotelian philosophy, but a broad similarity of method and
treatment is traceable throughout them. We find evidence in both
of a desire to gather up all that is sound in the work of previous
inquirers and in the beliefs of ordinary men, to do justice to all
aspects of truth, and to frame a creed in which all the jarring
schools would find their best results embodied. Half-truths were to
vanish before the whole truth, as the stars disappear before the
light of day. Aristotle sought to mediate between contending
doctrines, and to sum up the best traditions of the Greek race and
the net result of Greek inquiry in a broad-based and broad-minded
system\(^1\). This could only be done by steering a midway course.
Truth no less than moral virtue lay in a mean; the conception of
the mean is of the very essence of Aristotle's philosophy. We

\(^1\) Τὸ διορίζειν was precisely that of
which the Many are incapable (Eth. Nic. 10. 1. 1172 b 3) and of which
the philosopher should be capable.

\(^2\) Ιςος ὁν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων
dιαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐκ' ὅσον ἑκάτερον
καὶ τῇ διαδεδομένῃ (Eth. Nic. 9. 8.
1168 b 12). Ληπτεῖος δὲ τρόπος δυστι
ἡμῖν ἀμα τὰ τε δικοῦντα περὶ τούτων
μᾶλιστα ἀποδώσει καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας λύσει
καὶ τὰς ἑναντίωσεις. τοῦτο δ’ ἔσται,
εὰν εὐλογὸς φαίνηται τὰ ἑναντία δι-
kοῦντα· μᾶλιστα γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμενος δ’
tοιοῦτος ἔσται λόγος τοῖς φανομένοις,
αὐσμαίνει δὲ μένην τὰς ἑναντίωσεις, εὰν
ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἀνρήσει τὸ λεγόμενον, ἔστι
δ’ ὡς ὁδ’ (Eth. Eud. 7. 2. 1235 b 13
sqq.).

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hear less of the mean in the Politics than in the Nicomachean Ethics, but the idea is very present there also. The same breadth of view appears in Aristotle's readiness to recognize higher and lower forms of things. Just as in the Nicomachean Ethics the recognition of higher forms of virtue, or justice, or pleasure, or friendship does not preclude the recognition of lower forms also, so in the Politics, side by side with the true citizen and the best constitution, the citizen of the deviation-forms and the deviation-forms themselves receive recognition. Aristotle declines to say, as Cicero in effect said, that the lower forms of State are not States at all. Many a problem is solved in both treatises by the use of this method. It enables Aristotle to do justice both to the higher and to the lower forms of things without sinning either against truth or against the ordinary use of language; and authorizes a careful study both of the more and of the less perfect. The Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics would have been far less comprehensive in treatment than they are, if Aristotle had followed a different course in this respect. So again, the two works agree in aiming both at speculative truth and practical utility. Another common feature is an unwillingness to rest content with generalities. Broad general descriptions of things are wanting, Aristotle feels, in clearness; they seem to say much, but really say little. We learn but little when we are told that virtue is to εὖ ζήν τήν ψυχήν (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 a 25 sq.). Plato and the contemporary Academy dealt too much in these generalities. Aristotle insists on τὸ διαόλον (e.g. in Pol. 2. 5. 1264 a 14, 37, and 2. 6. 1265 a 28 sqq., b 18 sqq.), and his definition of virtue is full and particular. This effort to be clear and detailed is traceable in both treatises. In both Aristotle learns the nature of the Whole (e.g. εὐδαίμονία, υἱός, πάθος) by beginning with the part and working up from it to the Whole.

But these broad similarities do not carry us very far, and if we are to judge to what extent the two works are in accord, we must recall some of the more important passages in the Nicomachean

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2 See vol. i. p. 216 note, and above p. xiv.
3 Cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 5. 1157 a 25, ἕπει γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγωντες φίλους καὶ τῶν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον . . . καὶ τῶν δὲ ἡμῶν ἄλληλοι αὐτοῖς ἀκροπολίστηται . . . οὐσι λέγειν μὲν δὲ καὶ ἡμῖς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἰδὴ δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείον, καὶ πρότερον μὲν καὶ κυρίως τῆς τῶν ἄνθρωπος αὐτοῖς, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς καθ' ὁμολογίας.
4 See Eth. Nic. 2. 2. 1103 b 26 sqq., 10. 10. 1179 a 35 sqq., and above on 1. 3. 1153 b 14 as to the Politics.
Ethics in which light is thrown on the State, its functions and organization.

The reader of the Nicomachean Ethics, as he passes on from book to book, finds the relation of virtue to the State and of Ethics to Politics coming ever more prominently before him. Virtue, he learns, is the offspring of law, and law is an incident of the State. Virtue varies with the constitution, and reaches its full height only in the best constitution. Some virtues, again, belong exclusively or especially to the ruler. In these and other ways we are constantly being reminded of the importance of the State.

The earliest pages of the treatise bring the νολιτική ἐπιστήμη before us, the Science which is at once the Science of the State and the Science of Life. Its end is nothing less than the end of human life; it is supreme over the State as over the individual, 'determining what sciences are to exist in the State, and what each man is to learn, and how far'—'legislating what is to be done and not done.' (Not a word, we note, is said here about those lower problems of νολιτική, of which we hear so much in the first chapter of the Sixth Book of the Politics.) We are told further, that the happiness of a State or nation is a nobler and more divine thing than the happiness of an individual; later (Eth. Nic. 1. 5. 1097 b 8 sqq.; cp. 9. 9. 1169 b 16 sqq.), we learn that man is by nature a political animal, and that his needs are not fully satisfied unless the needs of the persons who live in society with him—his parents, wife, children, and fellow-citizens—are also satisfied. In all this the Nicomachean Ethics anticipates the teaching of the Politics, that man is more fully a political animal than any of the gregarious animals (Pol. 1. 2. 1253 a 7 sqq.), that the training which produces a νολιτικός is the same as that which produces a σοφοδιός, so that the νολιτικός cannot be far other than the σοφοδιός (Pol. 3. 18), and that the νολιτικός must know both the end of human life and the best means of attaining it (Pol. 4 (7). 13. 1331 b 26 sqq.).

Later on in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics (c. 13. 1102 a 18 sqq.), we are told that broad psychological data, such as the division of the soul into a rational and an irrational part, have an interest and importance for the true νολιτικός, and we soon learn why: the appetitive section of the irrational part of the soul needs to be brought under the control of right reason (λόγος), so that moral virtue may be developed, but this can only be accomplished through habituation, and habituation to virtue is the business of the lawgiver, or in other words, of the State. The true statesman—the lawgivers of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan
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States, for instance—is generally held to concern himself with the development of virtue (Eth. Nic. i. 13. 1102 a 7 sqq.); every lawgiver aims at making his citizens virtuous, and the only difference between lawgivers is that some do this well and others not; it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one (Eth. Nic. 2. i. 1103 b 2 sqq.). In fact, as those are held to be bravest whose States honour the brave and disgrace the coward (Eth. Nic. 3. ii. i116 a 18 sqq.), the virtue of the individual appears to depend on the distribution of reward and punishment, pleasure and pain, by the State. Often as in this treatise the ordinary πολιτικοί are weighed in the balance and found wanting, νομοθέται are always treated with respect: νομοθετείτω, we are told in a later book (Eth. Nic. 6. 8. 1142 b 24 sqq.), is the architectonic form of φρόνησις περὶ πάντων: the makers of ψηφίσματα are mere χειροτέκνα.

Aristotle’s psychology and ethics reveal to him, in fact, the necessity of a power capable of disciplining the lower nature by habituation, and he ascribes a power of this kind to the lawgiver. Not all lawgivers were wise enough to begin their training of the citizen in childhood, or to supervise education and the habits of adult life (Eth. Nic. 10. 10. 1180 a 24 sqq.), but all sought more or less wisely and well to make their citizens virtuous by a skilful use of pain and pleasure, or, in other words, by habituation. The account of Universal Justice in the Fifth Book confirms all this, for what the laws prescribe (or ‘normally constituted laws,’ at all events) is there said to be universally just (c. 3. 1129 b 14 sqq.); and if (c. 5. 1130 b 26 sqq.) a question is raised, whether πολιτική has to do with the training which makes a good man as distinguished from a good citizen, this is perhaps nothing more than an anticipation of the teaching of the Politics, that πολιτική is concerned with other forms of State than the best, in which alone the virtue of the citizen is identical with that of the good man.

Already then we discern the ethical necessity of the lawgiver and the State, but the study of Particular Justice brings the State more vividly before us. Aristotle’s account of it incidentally corrects Plato’s account of Justice in the Republic, according to which a just man is he who does the work for which he is fit (τὰ ἄνδρα πράττει). Justice, in Aristotle’s view, has rather to do with external goods—honour, wealth, and the like—than with work. He is just who gives these to those to whom they are due, not he who does the work for which he is fit. Justice is a question of external goods, not of functions. But the main purpose of the
Fifth Book probably is to show that Justice, like all other moral virtues, has to do with a mean—that it is ἀνάλογον and ὀς ὁ λόγος (the word for reason and proportion in Greek being the same), and that it has more kinds than one. True justice does not, as Plato thought (Laws 757 A–D), always take account of virtue in the award it makes. The justice of the lawgiver and ruler does so, but not that of the judge.

We see in Aristotle's account of Justice an effort to be more definite than Plato had been, and to keep closer to facts. We learn that Justice differs with the social function. The justice of the ruler is not as the justice of the judge. Far more than any other moral virtue, justice presupposes the κοινωνία of the State, for it especially appertains to the lawgiver, the ruler, the judge, and the citizen, if it also appears in the ἀλλακτική κοινωνία, which need not, of course, be between fellow-citizens. Its highest type apparently implies rule. It is to be found rather in the relations of the State than in those of the household—ἐπὶ κοινωνῶν βίου πρὸς τὸ εἶναι αὐτάρκειαν, ἀλλοιωτέρον καὶ ἵστων ἡ κατ’ ἀνάλογων ἡ κατ’ ἀριθμόν (Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1134 a 26)—between those between whom law subsists (30), or can subsist (Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 b 6 sq.). But then there are two kinds even of τὸ πολιτικὸν δίκαιον, one natural, the other conventional, and we gather that the true standard of that which is naturally just among men is to be found in the best constitution (μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἁρίστη, Eth. Nic. 5. 10. 1135 a 5).

1 Cp. Eth. Nic. 3. 10. 1115 b 17, ὁ μὲν οὖν ὁ δὲ καὶ ὁ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ ὃς δὲ καὶ ὅτι, ὡμῶς δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος καὶ άθλίων γὰρ καὶ ὁ ὁ λόγος πάσης ἔργης ἢ ἀνδρείας.

2 'In my opinion,' says Mr. Jackson (Fifth Book of the Nic. Ethics, p. 87), 'c. 5 [of Eth. Nic. 5] should be read in close connection with cc. 2–4, the passage as a whole being an attempt at once to connect and to distinguish three kinds of particular justice. In order to connect these three kinds of particular justice, the author regards them each as ἀνάλογον τι: in order to distinguish them, he represents each by a special and appropriate kind of ἀνάλογια.'

3 In the account of the ἀλλακτική κοινωνία (Eth. Nic. 5. 8) and the part that money plays in making it possible, a social value is assigned to money different from that which it is implied to possess in the First Book of the Politics, though there too money is said to be the σταυχεῖον καὶ πέρα τῆς ἀλλαγῆς, just as here it is said to be the μέσον, or standard, by which the value of the commodities exchanged is measured and determined (cp. Eth. Nic. 9. 1. 1164 a 1 sq.).

4 This would appear to exclude the παμβασιλεία: cp. Pol. 3. 13. 1284 a 11 sqq. It of course implies that the relation of man to the lower animals is in strictness one with which justice has nothing to do: they have, in Aristotle's view, no rights against man and cannot be wronged (ἀδικεῖσθαι) by him: they are merely ἑργανα for his use, not κωσωλ: they are not even, like the slave, human ἑργανα and therefore capable of being the objects of friendship (cp. Eth. Nic. 8. 13. 1161 a 32 sqq.). See as to this view Porphyry de Abstinentia, 1. 4–6. It justified the slaughter of animals, the rightfulness of which had been questioned by some.
Already we have been told (5. 6. 1131 a 26 sqq.) that different constitutions distribute what they have to distribute on different principles, and now we are made aware that justice varies with the constitution, and attains its true form only in the best constitution. This quite agrees with the teaching of the Politics (cp. Pol. 7 (5). 9. 1309 a 37, εἰ γὰρ μὴν ταῦτα τὸ δίκαιον καθὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι διαφοράς).

Aristotle’s ethical treatise is pervaded by the half-mathematical conceptions of the mean and the proportional, and we nowhere learn more clearly than in its Fifth Book how important is the part played by ‘proportion’ (τὸ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν ἵσον) in holding the State together (Eth. Nic. 5. 8. 1132 b 33, τὸ ἀντιποιν ἀνάλογον συμμεῖν ἥ πόλις: cp. Pol. 2. 2. 1261 a 30, τὸ ἵσον τὸ ἀντιποινθὸς δὲ γὰρ τῶν πόλεως, ὀντερ ἐν τοῖς ἴδιοις ἐφητα πρότερον).

The books on Friendship possess an especial interest for the student of the Politics, both on account of the importance of Friendship to the State (Eth. Nic. 8. 1. 1155 a 22 sqq.: Pol. 2. 4. 1262 b 7 sqq.) and because they study Friendship not only in its highest form—the friendship of the good—but also as a concomitant of every kind of κοινωνία. The less temporary and the more comprehensive are the aims with which a κοινωνία is formed, the stronger is the link which binds one member of it to another, and the fuller the friendship. The link which binds together a band of merchants making a voyage for gain is a far less close one than that which binds together the members of a State, for the latter have joined together not for the sake of that which is advantageous for the moment, but to win that which will benefit their life as a whole (Eth. Nic. 8. 11. 1160 a 21). We learn in these books how all κοινωνίαι should be constituted, if friendship is to prevail within them. We learn the true form both of the parental relation and of the manifold relations of kinship which spring from it; we study the relation of husband and wife, the relation of master and slave, and then again the political relations on which the family relations seem to be modelled—those which prevail between ruler and ruled in a Kingship, an Aristocracy, and a Timocracy, or again those prevailing in a Tyranny, an Oligarchy, and a Democracy. The study of all these κοινωνίαι, and especially of the six constitutions, makes it clear that justice is a condition of friendship in κοινωνίαι. The members of a κοινωνία must render honour and advantage (ἀφέλεια) to each other κατ’ ἄξιαν, if friendship is to prevail in it. The father must benefit the child, and the child must honour the father. The king must rule for the advan-
tage of his subjects and they must render him honour. It is because in Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Democracy the rulers rule, not for the advantage of the ruled, but for their own advantage, thus monopolising both honour and advantage—it is because, in fact, they rule unjustly—that there is so little friendship in States thus governed. Honour belongs justly to rulers, benefit to those ruled, but the rulers in a deviation-form grasp both at honour and gain.

Thus the books on Friendship enforce anew the importance of Justice: we learn more clearly than before how essential Justice is to κοινωνία: we see that not only the lawgiver, the ruler, the judge, and the trader need to be just, but that all members of κοινωνία need to be so—even children and slaves—and that precisely in so far as they are so, will Friendship be present in the κοινωνία. This holds good both of equal and unequal κοινωνία (Eth. Nic. 8. 15. 1162 b 2 sq.): τὸ ἱσότερον is necessary in both. It is best, indeed, that in friendship ‘the same thing should be rendered on both sides’ (Eth. Nic. 8. 5. 1156 b 33 sqq.)—that the friendship should rest, not on the return of an equivalent amount of different things, but on an identical return: in the relations of the State, however, and in many of those of the household this is not possible; hence here a return must be made κατ' ἀξίαν.

Political society rests on τὸ ἀνάλογον, on τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν: this is the far-reaching principle laid down in these books of the Nicomachean Ethics. It is an infraction of the principles of political society, when the ruler draws to himself the whole advantage: rule to be justifiable must be πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον. The just is that which is for the common advantage. Aristotle’s ethical treatise thus contains the germ and something more of his Politics. The former treatise gives us at all events one of the main laws which govern κοινωνία: the latter works it out in its application to the State.

And yet there are points in which the teaching of these books of the Nicomachean Ethics is not quite borne out by that of the Politics. Take, for instance, the account they give of the deviation-forms of constitution. These are implied in the Eighth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics to arise from the deterioration of the rulers of the normal constitutions. The rulers of an oligarchy are ‘few and bad’ (Eth. Nic. 8. 12. 1160 b 12 sqq.). The Politics appears to be more ready to recognize that even the deviation-forms are founded on δικαιον τι. The book on Revolutions,

1 Cp. Pol. 8 (6). 7. 1321 a 40 sq.
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Indeed, goes so far as to say that it is not safe to base a constitution wholly on ἡ κατ' ἀξίαιν ἰσότης (7 (5). 1. 1302 a 2 sq.)\footnote{The view that the constitution should rest partly on ἀριθμητική ἰσότης, partly on ἡ κατ' ἄξιαν ἰσότης is, it should be noticed, derived from Plato’s Laws 757 D, ἀναγκαίως γε μή καὶ τούτοις παραμυθούμε (‘his quae insta quidem vocantur, nēc tamen revera insta sunt,’ Stallbaum) ποτε προσχρή-

ποσαὶ ἄδικα, εἰ μὲνεκε ἀνακάμψου ὑπὸ προσκύνησεν κατὰ τῇ μέρῳ . . . διὸ τῷ τοῦ φλόρου ἴσην ἰσότητι προσχρήσεσθαι δυσκολία τῶν

πολλῶν ἐνεκα . . . ὡστὸ δὲ κριστεῖν ἀναγκαίως μὲν τῶν ἰσοτήτων ἀμφοῖ, ὥστε δὲ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἐπὶ διέλευσις τῇ ἐτέρα, τῇ τῆς τόχης δεμένης. Plutarch (Solon, c. 14) even carries the idea back to Solon—λέγεται δὲ καὶ φωνῇ τις αὐτοῦ περιφερέται πρότερον ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅτι τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον ὧν ποιεῖ καὶ τοῦ κυριαρχού ἅμοεν καὶ τοῦ ἐντή-

μοι, τῶν μὲν ἀξίας καὶ διετῆ, τῶν δὲ μέτρω καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ ἴσον ἕξειν προσδο-

κώτων.} the most durable constitutions are those which are partly based on this kind of equality, partly on arithmetical equality. We learn in the Sixth Book of the Politics that the deviation-forms are not mere gratuitous embodiments of injustice: we are taught, on the contrary, to trace the law of their appearance; the social conditions of a community, we find, have much to do with its government. A deviation-form of some kind is often the only possible constitution. Aristotle had also learnt by the time at which the Sixth Book of the Politics was written, that there are better and worse shades of each deviation-form. So again, the scheme of constitutional change given in Eth. Nic. 8. 12, according to which Kingship passes into Tyranny, and Aristocracy into Oligarchy, and Timocracy into Democracy, is quite different from any of those given in the Politics (cp. Pol. 3. 15. 1286 b 8 sqq.: 6 (4). 13. 1297 b 16 sqq.). In the former of these passages Kingship is made to change into Polity, in the latter first into Oligarchy, and then into Polity. In the Politics (7 (5). 7. 1307 a 20—25: 7 (5). 12. 1316 a 17 sqq.) Aristotle is far from thinking that constitutions change most often into the forms most akin to them. His view of the just or normal constitution in the Politics seems also to be different. Justice, we are there told, requires that all elements which contribute to the being and well-being of a State—not only virtue, but also wealth and free birth—should receive due recognition (Pol. 3. 13. 1283 a 26 sqq.). Constitutions which rest on a bare superiority in one such element only, even if that element be virtue, are unjust. Superiority in virtue must be transcendent if it is to confer an exclusive title to rule.

We are further surprised to find Aristotle speaking in Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1161 b 13 sqq. of πολιτικαὶ φιλίαι as resting on compact (ἀλὸν γὰρ καθ’ ὀμολογίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι), when we remember the decided way in which at the outset of the Politics he de-
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clares the State to be based on nature. The relation of kinship, again, seems in this book of the Nicomachean Ethics to count for more in comparison with the political relation, than in the Politics, and man is said to be by nature συνδυαστικῶν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικῶν (Eth. Nic. 8. 14. 1162 a 17). On the other hand, when we read that πολιτικὴ φίλα thrives best between good men (Eth. Nic. 9. 6. 1167 b 4 sqq.: cp. 9. 8. 1169 a 8 sqq.), we recognize an anticipation of the teaching of the Politics, that the best State is the State whose citizens are ἄριστοι σπουδαῖοι. The same book also prepares us for the limitation of the number of the citizens in the best State (Eth. Nic. 9. 10. 1170 b 29 sqq.: cp. Pol. 4 (7). 4).

The whole tenour of the Nicomachean Ethics points to the conclusion that virtue not only presupposes a life in relation to others, but life in a State, and further a good State, or even the best State. Nay more, one kind of Justice presupposes the exercise of rule, for it appears only in the ruler. That φρόνησις is peculiar to the ruler, Aristotle asserts in the Politics (3. 4. 1277 b 25)1, but not, it would seem, in the Nicomachean Ethics.

So largely indeed does the latter treatise admit virtue to be modified by the constitution and by the social function discharged, that we might almost expect it, seeing that it has a practical aim in view, to deal with the variations of duty under different constitutions and in different social positions. But this it does not do. Its moral teaching seems to apply indifferently to all constitutions, for all that we hear to the contrary. And then again, if the State is represented in the Nicomachean Ethics as essential to virtue, it seems to be essential rather to moral than to intellectual virtue. We do not learn whether the State does as much for the highest element of man's nature, the speculative intelligence, as it does for the appetitive nature and for moral virtue. At all events, we are not told what it is that the State does for σοφία, though we know that it 'rules for its sake' (ἐπιτύπτει σοφίας ἑνεκα, Eth. Nic. 6. 13. 1145 a 9)2.

The last book of the treatise, which finds τελεία εὐδαμονία in the contemplative life and exalts this life above the political life, should have traced the dependence of the highest of man's energies on the excellence of the State. So far however is it from doing this, and completing the indications given us earlier in the work of the intimate relation between virtue and the State, that it closes with a

1 Following Plato (Rep. 433 C) and Xenophon (Cyrop. 1. 6. 22), Plato how much a defective State could do to corrupt philosophy.

2 We learn from the Republic of
chapter (c. 10), which, though it points to the State as the most effective agency in the production of virtue, seems half to hint that its place may to a certain extent be filled by heads of families trained in legislative science. We are conscious, as has been observed elsewhere, of some change of tone, when we pass to the commencement of the Politics. We there learn that man is by nature a part of a Whole; he is a part of the State, born to rule and be ruled with a view to the highest and most complete life. The Politics asserts emphatically and in unmistakable terms the truth which the abstract method of the Nicomachean Ethics had kept somewhat in the background, though even there facts constantly force it on our notice—the truth that the life of the State is marked out for man by nature. Even the virtue of the wife and the child, we are here told, is relative to the constitution (Pol. 1. 13. 1260 b 8 sqq.); much more is this true of the virtue of the citizen. The citizen varies with the constitution, but the citizen of the best constitution, and therefore the στρατάδεως, is he who is able and purposed to rule and be ruled with a view to a life in accordance with virtue (Pol. 3. 13. 1284 a 1 sq.). We might well infer that the life of ruling and being ruled, or in other words the political life, is the highest life open to man. It is not till we reach the Fourth Book of the Politics, that the lesson of the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics is again impressed on us—the lesson that the supreme end of man is not work (ἀεχολα) but leisure (σχολή)—not the political life, not even the life of the ruler in the best State, but rather the life of leisure and contemplation. The highest employment of man, we are again told, is the employment of leisure; his highest and most godlike moments are moments of speculation, not of political activity. True, the right use of leisure presupposes the active virtues (Pol. 4 (7). 15. 1334 a 16 sqq.); still the ruler rules for the sake of speculative virtue (σοφία), not over her. But the Politics couples this doctrine with the emphatic assertion that man is a part of the State. Many of the virtues enumerated in the Nicomachean Ethics drop out of sight in the Politics, but some features in the character of the στρατάδεως acquire a fresh prominence. We see him in a “setting” of institutions, as we know him in actual life; we see him as a member of a πολις, and therefore as one who is “his brother’s keeper”¹, and who cares for the virtue of all his equals and dependents in the community to which he belongs. We see him in connexion with the social positions which he fills—a husband, a father, a master, a proprietor, a citizen, and

¹ Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.
a ruler. Virtue is depicted diffusive of itself and radiating its influence through household and State. We learn to know happiness better, when it is embodied for us in an entire State of happy men.

Thus the Politics completes the Nicomachean Ethics. The latter treatise is, in fact, presupposed by the former. It would not have been possible to discover the best constitution, if the nature of the most desirable life, or in other words of ἑιδαμονία, had not been ascertained previously (Pol. 4 (7). 1. 1323 a 14 sq.: 4 (7). 13. 1332 a 7 sqq.).

But then again, the last three books of the Politics teach us a lesson of which we have heard but little in the Nicomachean Ethics. If the State is at its best when it is realizing ἑιδαμονία, Political Science falls short of completeness unless it can deal with cases in which the production of σπουδαίον and ἑιδαμονές is out of the question. The highest mission of Political Science is not its only mission; it needs to understand the deviation-forms and to know how to constitute them, as much as it needs to understand the best State. Political Science has its technical side; it is not a mere handmaid to Ethics. Thus if the Nicomachean Ethics sought in some measure to view the moral agent apart from the State, one portion of the Politics studies the State apart in some degree from ethical aims. In Aristotle’s hands, Ethics and Politics show to this extent an inclination to draw away from each other.

Not all the Politics, we see, is a strictly necessary sequel to the Nicomachean Ethics. When Aristotle announces his intention to study all constitutions—which he does as early as the close of his ethical treatise—he goes beyond the limits of the task which the interests of Moral Philosophy obliged him to undertake. He in effect implies that his purpose is to deal with Political Science not simply as a sequel to Ethics, but as a science deserving of study even apart from ethical considerations. Plato had studied the inferior constitutions in the Republic, only to show how fatal they are to justice and happiness; Aristotle will study them because it is the business of the πολιτικός to know how to construct even these lower forms of the State.

Aristotle, in fact, worked out to its results the parallel between πολιτική on the one hand, and γυμναστική and λατρεία on the other, which he inherited from the Gorgias of Plato (464 B sqq.) and from Socrates. These are arts, while πολιτική is a practical science; yet on the whole a resemblance exists between them 1, though it is

not complete at all points\(^1\). \textit{Politikē}, no less than \textit{dunameis} like Rhetoric and Dialectic\(^2\), resembles the arts in dealing with cases in which an imperfect success is alone attainable as readily as with others; ‘it is quite possible to treat scientifically patients who can never enjoy health’ (Rhet. i. i. 1355 b 13). Just as it is the business of Medicine to treat any one who may be proposed for treatment \((τῆν προσθέσθαι, \text{Eth. Nic.} \, 10. \, 10. \, 1180 \, b \, 26^3\)), so it is the business of \textit{politikē} to study how any given constitution is to be brought into being, and how, having been brought into being, it is to be kept in being as long as possible, even if the constitution thus demanded at its hands falls short of that to which the circumstances of the particular State enable it to attain \((μὴ ἔστω ἐνεσθε-\muένην ἐκ τῶν ύπορχόντων ἀλλὰ τινα φαιλοτέραν, Pol. 6 (4). i. 1288 b 28 sqq.)\.

Thus the political branch of \textit{politikē} seems, as it were, to waver between two levels; it is, on the one hand, a practical science closely akin to Ethics, if indeed it does not deal with a nobler subject-matter; it is, on the other, an art or productive science like Medicine, ready to construct on demand any constitutional form which may be asked of it, whatever its merits or demerits, in such a way as to be as durable as possible; indeed, stooping even lower than Medicine, for while Medicine seeks in all cases to restore some degree of health, Political Science is not in every case to require States to adopt a good constitution.

Why, we ask, does not the Nicomachean Ethics also make it its business to deal with \(τῶν προσθέστη\) and to do as much as possible for the virtue and happiness of the ill-circumstanced individual, just as the Politics does its best for the ill-circumstanced State?\(^4\) We do, in fact, find lower as well as higher virtues described in the Nicomachean Ethics—continence as well as temperance; the lower kinds of friendship as well as the higher; justice as well as equity and friendship; prudence as well as speculative virtue—but why does not the treatise go on to trace out a life for the less favourably constituted individual, as the Politics traces a fitting organization for the less favourably circumstanced State? The answer is that

\(^1\) Pol. 2. 8. 1269 a 19 sqq.: 3. 16. 1287 a 32 sqq.
\(^2\) Rhet. 1. 4. 1359 b 12 sqq.: 1. 1. 1355 b 10 sqq.: Top. 1. 3. 101 b 5 sqq.
\(^3\) Cp. Eth. Nic. 1. 11. 1101 a 3; καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῇ παρ formatter.\[\textit{rē̆̄γε}\] 
\(^4\) See on this subject the remarks of Teichmüller, Einheit des Aristotel. Endamönne, pp. 103–108, though perhaps there is more difference between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics in this matter than Teichmüller here allows.
in strictness it has to do only with the virtues and the virtuous action which culminate in εὐδαμονία: it seeks to draw out the contents of εὐδαμονία: thus its aim is essentially ideal, and any attempt to do for the less well-endowed individual what the Politics does for the less favoured State would have conflicted with its plan. The question, however, remains, why the work was constructed on this plan—why Aristotle's treatment of Ethics is more ideal than his treatment of Politics. Perhaps the steps which Plato had already taken in the direction of sketching lower and more easily attainable forms of the State (Laws 739 E) may have suggested to Aristotle a broader and more practical treatment of Politics.

But if the Politics is something more than a sequel to the Nicomachean Ethics, the teaching of the latter treatise seems also to be less adjusted to that of the former than we might have expected. We learn in the Politics to regard man as a part of a greater Whole, the State, and we expect to find this fact kept in view by Aristotle in his ethical treatise. Virtue, we anticipate, will be the sum of the qualities which tend to the maintenance and excellence of the Whole, and the first question discussed in the work will be the question what these qualities are. The course followed, however, is quite different. Aristotle's ethical ideal is deduced partly from psychological facts, or alleged psychological facts, such as the natural supremacy of a certain part of the soul over other parts, partly from opinion, and especially opinion evidenced in action, or the opinion of wise and good men; in no way from the nature of the State or the conditions of its successful working. On the contrary, the State seems rather to be adjusted to the ἐπιστευάζων than the ἐπιστευάζων to the State; we are nowhere taught by Aristotle to deduce the nature of virtue from the nature of the State. If this had been otherwise, the ethical ideal of Aristotle might have been somewhat different from what it is. The virtues which tend to make men valuable members of a Whole would probably have assumed a more conspicuous place in it. The highest virtue would have been discovered not by asking what is the virtue of the most divine part of the soul, but by asking what virtue tends most to the harmony and excellence of the State. We do, in fact, find that in the Politics the highest virtue, that virtue whose exercise is more the end of human life than the exercise of any other—speculative virtue—is placed in a new light, as being (together with temperance, prudence, and justice) preservative of the State in those times of peace and leisure which are fatal to the exclusively military
State (4 (7). 15. 1334 a 22 sqq.). But we hear nothing about this in the Nicomachean Ethics. There, on the whole, the principle that man is by nature a part of the State seems to find less application than might have been expected. Virtue is described rather as the supremacy of that part of the soul which is rightfully supreme, than as the adaptation of the individual to the maintenance of the highest type of society. Ethical Science dominates Political Science, not Political Science Ethical. The supreme end of the State is contemplative activity, precisely the activity in the exercise of which the individual is most independent of his fellows.

But then again, as we have seen, Political Science claims freedom for itself. The Politics studies the πάλιν and the various πολιτείαι more independently of Ethics than we might have expected. If Aristotle's only object had been to complete the Nicomachean Ethics, the Politics would have been a very different work from what it is. It would have been more ideal and less technical.

We see then that the two treatises are to a certain extent correlated, but that they are not perfectly adjusted to each other.

One remark may be added. There is no sign that Aristotle deduced from the Politics the lesson which it would seem clearly to imply, as to man's chance of attaining full virtue and happiness. The further we advance in the Politics, the more clearly we see how dependent the moral virtue of the individual is on the constitution—that is, on the ethical creed adopted by the State as a whole—and also how much the constitution depends on causes not altogether subject to man's control. The result is—as the reader of the Politics can hardly fail to see, whether Aristotle himself saw it or not—that virtue can rarely be attainable in its purity, for only the citizen of the best constitution is ἀπλῶς συνθαλός, and that if virtue is rarely attainable, still more must this be the case with happiness, for happiness presupposes not only pure and complete virtue, but also a certain measure of external and bodily goods. We hardly saw this, while we were

1 Some virtues which are implied in the Politics to be essential to the successful working of the State appear to escape notice in the Nicomachean Ethics: e.g. that which is exercised in caring that others shall be virtuous (Pol. 3. 9. 1280 b 1 sqq.: 1. 13. 1259 b 18 sqq.)—unless indeed, as is probably the case, φιλονομία is the virtue whose existence is here implied. But then, how imperfect is the sketch of φιλονομία or πολιτική in the Nicomachean Ethics, if this important feature of its action is not dwelt on there.
absorbed in the Nicomachean Ethics with the analysis of the nature of happiness: it is when we turn to the question how happiness is produced, that we learn how little it can really be said to be πολύκαυνον, as it is said to be in Eth. Nic. i. 10. 1099 b 18—how little we are able without the aid of Nature and Fortune to bring the best State into being\(^1\), or in other words, to realize the indispensable condition of full virtue and happiness. The ideal picture of εὐδαίμονία in the Nicomachean Ethics turns out to be little else than a glorious vision. We see the goal of human life, but the road to it seems to be well-nigh blocked.

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**APPENDIX B.**

*On the Carthaginian Constitution*\(^2\).

The Carthaginian State was not a declining State when Aristotle wrote, like the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States, but was perhaps in its prime or approaching it. Carthage was a seaport, unlike Sparta and most of the Cretan cities, and a very populous seaport, for even in the days of its decline it is said to have had seven hundred thousand inhabitants\(^3\); the number of its citizens, therefore, was probably also very great—great enough, one would have thought, to remove Carthage from the category of well-governed States, if in these the citizen-body was never allowed to pass moderate limits (4 (7). 4. 1326 a 27 sq.). We know not who had written on the Carthaginian constitution before Aristotle—he himself may have already sketched it in his Polities—but it evidently enjoyed a high reputation. Aristotle remarks that the fact of its stability, notwithstanding that a demos existed at Carthage, proved it to be a well-designed constitution, and that under it Carthage had been free from serious civil trouble, and also from tyrants. It is clear that whatever Aristotle may say as to the political weaknesses of Asiatic

\(^1\) Cp. Pol. 6 (4). ii. 1295 a 25 sq.

\(^2\) See on this subject Susemihl’s notes (Sus.\(^3\), Notes 376-398), which have been of much use to me.

\(^3\) It is thus that Grote (History of Greece, 10. 542) interprets the words of Strabo, p. 833, πόλεις μὲν ἔλεγον τριμακσίας ἐν τῷ Λιβύῃ, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐν τῷ πόλει μιράδις ἐβδομηκοντά. Mommsen, however, takes Strabo to refer, not to the inhabitants, but to the citizens of Carthage, ‘whether dwelling in the city or its neighbourhood, or resident in its subject-territory or in other lands’ (History of Rome, E. T. 2. 24 n.).

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races (4 (7). 7), the Carthaginians deserve the credit, often ascribed too exclusively to Greece and Rome, of being among the earliest pioneers of free institutions.

We do not hear that, like the Lacedaemonian State, Carthage forbade its citizens to practise agriculture, trade, and the handicrafts, but it seems to have sought to encourage a military spirit in them (4 (7). 2. 1324 b 12 sqq.), and though we are not told that anything corresponding to the Lacedaemonian and Cretan systems of gymnastic training existed at Carthage, we hear of the existence of syssitia, and these may well have been there also, no less than at Sparta and in Crete, designed with a view to war.

It is, however, on the political constitution that Aristotle mainly dwells. His chapter on the Lacedaemonian constitution throws much light on the social organization of the Lacedaemonian State, but this cannot be said of his chapter on the Carthaginian constitution. We learn far less from him, indeed, than we could wish even as to the political constitution, for he is mainly preoccupied with the question, how far the Carthaginian constitution fulfilled its aim of being an ἀριστοκρατία, and not an oligarchy or a democracy. His remarks on this question throw some light on the arrangements of the constitution, but only enough to make us wish for more.

He had mentioned at the outset of the chapter that the Carthaginian constitution was similar in some respects to the Lacedaemonian, and he is thus led to enumerate, though in the briefest and baldest way, first those Carthaginian institutions which were similar (παραπλησία, 33), and next those which were analogous (διάλογον, 37), to Lacedaemonian institutions. The former epithet is applied to the Carthaginian syssitia and to the Council of the Hundred and Four, which are respectively compared with the Phiditia and the Ephors, while the Carthaginian kings and senate are described as analogous to their Lacedaemonian correlatives. The Carthaginian constitution, though an ἀριστοκρατία (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq.), is held by Aristotle to deviate from the true model of an ἀριστοκρατία both in an oligarchical and in a democratic direction. It sometimes conceded too much to the people and sometimes too much to the rich. A strict ἀριστοκρατία would not have given as much power to the popular assembly as the Carthaginian constitution gave it—would not have given it full power to arrive at decisions of its own or have allowed any one who pleased to speak against the pro-

1 See Sus3, Note 388, who points out how limited were the powers of the people even in a democracy of the more moderate type.
posals of the magistrates. On the other hand, poor men of high merit had a career open to them in the Lacedaemonian State which was not open to them at Carthage. Carthage, indeed, not only tended to exclude poor men from high office, but confined two at least of its highest magistracies to wealthy men, actually making them purchaseable. The Carthaginian practice of allowing several offices to be held by one man also had an oligarchical tendency, inasmuch as it diminished the number of office-holders. Many even of the wealthy would find that office came to them but rarely. Thus, if we can understand how the Carthage of Aristotle's day could be described, not quite baselessly, as δημοκρατομένη (7 (5). 12. 1316 b 5), we can still better understand the language which Isocrates puts into the mouth of Nicocles with regard to it—ἐν δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Δακεδαμωνίοις τῶν ἀριστῶν ἐξηρτωμενῶν ὀίκοι μὲν διαγραφομένους, πορὰ δὲ τῶν πύλεων ταπεινομενῶν (Nicocl. § 24). Carthage, he holds, was oligarchically ruled at home, but ruled by kings in the field. Aristotle, on the contrary, would say that the Carthaginian constitution was an aristocracy, though it deviated from the true standard partly in the direction of democracy and still more in that of oligarchy. It was an aristocracy because it did homage to virtue as well as to wealth and popular power (6 (4). 7. 1293 b 14 sqq.), but it was so much mastered by a worship of wealth that Aristotle doubted whether it was a durable aristocracy, and would seem to have anticipated that it would ultimately become an oligarchy (1273 a 41 sq.). If it is allowable slightly to alter a phrase of Mr. Lowell's, the Carthaginian aristocracy was 'an aristocracy with oligarchical instincts.'

When we pass from the broad outline of the constitution to details, we find ourselves much at a loss, but it would seem that till the fifth century before Christ, when the Council of the Hundred and Four was instituted, the Kings (i.e. the Suffetes or Judges) and the Senate were supreme at Carthage, and that even after that event they probably retained to a large extent the immediate administration of affairs, for we are told that nothing came before the popular assembly except matters referred to it by them, and matters as to the reference of which to the popular assembly the kings and senate were not agreed (1273 a 6 sqq.). It would appear, therefore, that in practice either the kings or the senate could compel the reference of a question to the popular assembly. It does not seem that there were any determinate subjects with which the popular assembly had the exclusive right of dealing, and
no doubt the kings and the senate would commonly deal with administrative questions themselves. For all we hear to the contrary, they may have had the right to legislate also.

The Kings, or Suffetes, who were probably two in number, and who are compared by Livy to the Roman Consuls (30. 7. 5, suffetes, quod velut consulare imperium apud cos erat), cannot have held office for life, as Cicero appears to imply that they did (De Rep. 2. 23. 42-43), for Aristotle tells us (1273 a 15 sqq.) that the members of the Pentarchies held office for a longer term than any other magistrates, and they did not hold office for life. The kingship was probably an annual office, but those who held it may have been indefinitely re-eligible. We gather from Aristotle's language (1272 b 38 sqq.) that the kings were not taken, like the Lacedaemonian, from a single family, and that they were elected from families of merit, and were men of mark themselves, though they needed also to be wealthy men, but we know not by whom they were elected; Aristotle speaks, indeed, of the kingship as a purchaseable office (cp. Plato, Rep. 544 D). Isocrates, in the passage of the Nicocles which has already been quoted (§ 24), appears to regard the kings as the generals of the State, but Aristotle distinguishes the offices of King and General (1273 a 36 sq.). These two offices, however, may often have been combined. They are described by Aristotle in 1273 a 30, 36 as the greatest in the State, but in 1273 a 15 he refers in similar terms to 'the Hundred.' We have seen that in comparing the Carthaginian kingship with the Lacedaemonian he uses the epithet 'analogous,' not 'similar,' and it is clear that these two forms of kingship differed in many respects; the Carthaginian kingship was elective and purchaseable, was not held for life, and was not always combined with the Generalship.

We learn little from Aristotle as to the Senate. We have already seen that it probably shared with the Kings or Suffetes the ordinary administration of the State, and that he speaks of it as 'analogous' to the Lacedaemonian. It must have been a far more numerous body than the Lacedaemonian Senate, for the inner council by which it was to a large extent guided itself numbered thirty members (Liv. 30. 16. 3: oratores ad pacem petendam mittunt triginta seniorum principes; id erat sanctius apud illos consilium, maximaque ad ipsum senatum regendum vis), and the Carthaginian Senators cannot, like the Lacedaemonian, have held office for life, at any rate in the time of Aristotle, for Aristotle implies that no magistracies at Carthage were held for life (1273 a 15
Valerius Maximus (Facta et Dicta Memorabilia, 9. 5. 4) remarks on the arrogance of the Carthaginian Senate in using a bath of their own, distinct from that used by the plebs, and the contrast of Roman and Carthaginian custom in this matter is not without significance. See on the subject of the Carthaginian Senate Sus², Note 382.

The Council of the Hundred and Four is described by Aristotle as 'similar' to the Lacedaemonian Ephorate. He probably means that its function in the State was similar, and that, like the Ephorate (c. 9. 1271 a 6), it exercised a control over the other magistracies, and especially over the kings. He mentions a body called 'the Hundred' as the greatest magistracy of the State (1273 a 14 sq.), and the question arises whether he means by 'the Hundred' the Hundred and Four. It is not absolutely certain that he does, for the use of the word αὐτῶνας (1272 b 36) in reference to the election of the Hundred and Four might be taken to suggest (if we supply οἱ Καρθηνικῶν, as in 1273 a 29) that they were elected by the citizens generally, whereas we are told that the Hundred were elected by certain Boards of Five called Pentarchies; it is also true that, if we identify the Hundred with the Hundred and Four, we shall have to suppose that the Pentarchies, which Aristotle criticises as defectively constituted (1273 a 13 sqq.), nevertheless elected the Hundred and Four well and fairly, for Aristotle says that the Hundred and Four were chosen on grounds of merit (1272 b 36). Still it is difficult to believe that a Council answering, as the Hundred and Four did, to the Lacedaemonian Ephorate, which, as Susemihl points out (Note 379), is itself called ἡ μεγίστη δραχμή in 2. 9. 1270 b 18 sq., can have been second to any other magistracy at Carthage; it seems, therefore, on the whole, likely that it is to be identified with the Hundred, ἡ μεγίστη δραχμή. If, however, we identify the Hundred and the Hundred and Four, the resemblance which Aristotle traces between the Hundred and Four and the Ephorate cannot have extended to the mode in which the members of these two magistracies were appointed, for the Ephors were not elected by Pentarchies. Nor can the Hundred and Four have resembled the Ephorate in being recruited from the people and in forming a bulwark of popular power, for it was a principle at Carthage to prefer rich men to poor men in elections to office. Aristotle himself implies that the Hundred and Four were far superior to the Ephors in character, position, and capacity (1272 b 35 sq.). The resemblance between the two magistracies must probably have
lain, as has been said, in similarity of function. The Hundred and Four, like the Ephors, seem to have controlled the Kings and the Generals, and perhaps also the Senate.

This great council has commonly been identified with the magistracy, the original creation of which in the fifth century before Christ is thus described by Justin (19. 2. 5-6)—dein, cum familia tanta imperatorum (the descendants of Mago) gravis liberae civitatis esset omniaque ipsi agerent simul et indicarent, centum ex numero senatorum iudices deliguntur, qui reversis a bello ducibus rationem rerum gestarum exigerent, ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent, ut domi iudicia legesque respicerent. Aristotle says nothing about the Hundred and Four being senators, and Justin speaks of the 'centum iudices' as reviewing the conduct of the generals after their return from the field, not as controlling the kings and senate, but they may have added to their functions as time went on, and we have already seen that the kings were often the generals of the State. It is a further question whether Livy alludes to the Hundred and Four, or even to the 'centum iudices' of Justin, in the well-known passage (33. 46) in which he depicts the 'impotens regnum' of the 'ordo iudicum' at Carthage in the time of Hannibal. 'Iudicum ordo Carthagine ea tempestate dominabatur, eo maxime quod idem perpetui iudices erant. Res jam vitae omnium in illorum potestate erat. Qui unum eius ordinis ordinis, disset, omnes adversos habebat, nec accusator apud infensus iudices deerat.' The term 'ordo iudicum' would seem to be a wider one than 'centum iudices,' and may perhaps include the whole 'order' of judges at Carthage, not merely a single court, however important. And then again, if 'the property, the good fame, and the life of every one lay in the power' of the 'centum iudices,' their jurisdiction must have at this time extended far beyond its original limits, for their functions were confined at the outset, as we have seen, to the control of the Generals. The 'ordo iudicum' of Livy, again, is recruited by the accession to it of quaestors, and probably other magistrates, at the expiration of their term of office (Liv. 33. 46. 4); we hear nothing of this in relation to the Hundred and Four, or indeed the 'centum iudices.' And if Livy means by saying 'idem perpetui iudices erant,' that the members of the 'ordo iudicum' held office for life, this certainly was not true of the Hundred and Four in Aristotle's time. It is evident, indeed, from the expression 'ea tempestate,' that Livy is describing a state of things which had not always existed. He is speaking of a time a century and a quarter after that of Aristotle.
We have seen that Isocrates puts in the mouth of Nicocles an interesting remark on the dual character of the Lacedaemonian and Carthaginian constitutions. They were, he says, oligarchies at home and kingdoms in the field. It was probably with a view to diminish this duality and to bring the Kingship and the Generalship under the control of the oligarchy, that the Council of the Hundred and Four was instituted. The Lacedaemonian Ephorate was intended to serve a similar purpose, but a democratic character was skilfully imparted to it which was wanting in the Hundred and Four, and the services of the Lacedaemonian demos were thus enlisted in the task of checking and controlling the Kings.

In the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions, and indeed in the earlier constitutions of Greece generally (7 (5). 5. 1305 a 15 sqq.: 7 (5). 10. 1310 b 21 sqq.), not a few great magistracies found a place. This is true of the Carthaginian constitution also, though the great magistracies tenable for life, which form so conspicuous a feature of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan constitutions, seem to have been wanting in it. The democratic spirit (8 (6). 2. 1317 b 24 sqq.), though stronger at Carthage than in the Lacedaemonian and Cretan States, had not yet begun in Aristotle’s day to abolish or cripple the great magistracies. When in the fifth century before Christ the House of Mago had threatened to become too powerful for the safety of the State (Mommsen, History of Rome, E. T. 2. 16), its ascendancy was checked by the creation of a new great magistracy, not by the abolition of the Kingship and Generalship, the offices through which it asserted its influence, or by the aggrandisement of the popular assembly. The Carthaginian constitution, after this great change had been made in it, came to belong to the class of constitutions in which the magistracies are ranged, as it were, in two tiers, one or more magistracies being charged with the control of the rest. At Carthage this controlling authority was lodged with the Hundred and Four, just as in the Lacedaemonian State it was lodged with the Ephors, in early Athens with the Council of the Areopagus, and in the State described in Plato’s Laws with the Nomophylakes, the priests of Apollo, and the Nocturnal Council.

In reading Aristotle’s remarks on the Carthaginian constitution, we must not forget that he criticises it from a point of view from which it was probably seldom regarded by its framers. Their desire was for a constitution which, while it favoured the acquisition and preservation of empire by the State, would also guard its liberties—a constitution under which the virtues and the ascend-
ency of great leaders like those of the House of Mago might be made as useful to the community and as little perilous to it as possible; Aristotle, on the other hand, is mainly interested in the inquiry, how far does the Carthaginian constitution give supremacy to virtue and place power in the hands of virtuous men?

APPENDIX C.

The following are the variations of MS. Phillipps 891 (z) from the text of the first two books of the *Vetus Versio* of the Politics printed by Susemihl in his edition of 1872. Some unimportant variations of spelling are omitted.

BOOK I.

quidam (with a): Siracusis: 11. plus] phura. 27. 3. om. omnes: 4. quae est] quae et: 6. magnum after habens (with a): 7. haec] hoc. 28. 3. om. utique: 8. et is added before ex (as in a): 10. om. quidem: 12. utrum autem] utrum autem enim, but enim is expunged by dots placed beneath it (by whom, is uncertain) and utrum autem (except the first u) is written over an erasure in darker ink than that of the MS. 29. 3. multae] multa pr. z; s is added above the line in a different ink: 4. agricultiva] agricultura (with a t): 5. universaliter] utiliter: 7. om. et before animalium (with a): 9. enim] et enim (so a): quidem] quod: 10. que is added in a different ink above utro: 11. esse is added after quidem. 30. 8. necessarium after fuerit (with a b t): 9. m of viventem is over an erasure. 31. i. tot before, not after, fere: 2. quicunque] quacunque: sponte natam] spontaneam (with a): 3. per commutationem] percontationem pret a z?, but the word has been touched up with darker ink and made hardly legible, so that it is not easy to say what the original reading was (i. commutationem is written above in similar ink to the MS.): 7. simul after furatitvani: 10. videntur after natura (with a): 11. perfectionem] perfectam: 13. cœ of coeperint is over an erasure (as in a). 32. 1. om. utique (with a): om. sibi ipsi: 3. generatis] genitiis: om. in se ipsis: 7. om. cibi: 8. ipsis] eis: 10. ipsa after omnia. 33. 2. om. et: 3. possessivae after naturam (with a): 4. quorum] quarum: 5. communione (with b c): 6. videntur] universaliter was first written, then expunged, and videntur added in the margin probably by the writer of the MS. 34. 1. om. pontur after viris pr. z (it is added above in darker ink): 2. organum] organorum: nullius] ullius: 7. vocare] vocari: om. quam: 8. terminus after esse (with a t Alb.): 12. fit after magis (with a): 13. autem] enim. 35. 2. om. rei: 6. factum after est (with a): 10. qua] quae. 36. 1. est after opus (with a): 9. nulla] utia: 11. magis is joined to the preceding sentence in z, and not to peregrino. 37. 1. enim after facile: 6. pondere et magnitudine (so a): 7. absolvent: 9. species after pecuniatiavs. 38. 2. rursum deliramentum esse after videntur (so a): 4. om. nullo dignum: 6. sit is added after inconveniens (as in a): perit: 7. om. propter (with pr. a): 8. om. factis: 9. alterum after aliudc (as in a): 11. full stop after yconomica, the next word Campsoria beginning with a capital letter: 12. per] propter. 39. 3. in infinitum] infinitorum: 5. -um of illum is over an erasure: om. in before infinitum (with a c m Alb.): 10. necessarium] necessiarum: 11. video] vide' (= videnum), but the e is followed by an erasure, and I do not feel absolutely certain that the symbol for -mus is in the ink of the MS.; still it resembles other symbols
before fortitudo: ii. different] differunt. 52. i. uxore is written
above muliere and filio above puero in the hand and ink of
the MS.: sunt] sint: 2. esse before temperatam (with a): intem-
peratus] in is added above temperatus (with a caret) in the hand
and ink of the MS.: 4. et is crossed through before natura: 6.
kalokatia: 14. est is added after necesse. 53. i. om. esse:
differentiae is over an erasure: 2. exemplificatur] exemplificabitur
(with a): 6. et in aliis quae plura principantia et subiecta]
et in alius quae natura sunt, puia principantia et subiecta,
but the words quae natura sunt puia are written in the hand
and ink of the MS. over an erasure: 9. quidem after servus runs into
the margin: ii. the first habet is added above the line with a caret,
but in the hand and ink of the MS. 54. 4. immittit] immittitur:
5. et] est: 9. hoc is over an erasure: ii. aut] est, but over an
erasure: 12. dicunt is added above the line (with a caret) in the
hand and ink of the MS. 55. 1. dixit] dicit (with a): ii. aut difert]
isto] hoc (so Alb.): 10. autem om. pr. z, but it is added above the
line with a caret, I think in the hand and ink of the MS.: ii.
quidem. 57. 6. esse is added before studiosas (as in a m Alb.):

BOOK II.

58. 2. qui] quae: 4. legibus after dicuntur (so a): 7. sophyzare:
8. propter after non: has] eas (with a): 10. om. est (with a m).
59. i. civitas] civilitas: 3. om. quidem pr. z (it is added in lighter
ink, but in the hand of the MS.): 4. sotii: 10. sic] sit: 12. caus-
sam] caussa. 60. 5. omnem] omnium (with a): ii. esset before
quis (with Alb.): operari before hoc (with a): 13. om. et (with a m).
om. et pr. z (it is added with a caret in lighter ink but in the hand
of the MS.): ii. alium before aliquem. 62. i. eidem] idem
63. 6. om. quidem: 10. om. magis: ii. est before optimum (with a):
scilicet] sed. 64. 4. dicent] dicit: 7. om. ut pr. z, but something
which may possibly stand for it is added above the line (with
a caret) in a similar ink to that of the MS.: 8. om. autem: 9. om.
quamquam lamen: 8. neglegunt] negliguntur (with a b t Alb.): ii.
APPENDIX C.

the line (with a caret) in the hand and ink of the MS. 120. i.
post ea enim] postea vero (with a): 5. om. quidem. 121. 2. dere-
linquet] derelinguat (with b c t Alb.): 8. sub prioribus] superioribus:
10. om. et before decem (with Alb.): attemen. 122. 4. enim
pecuniam (with pr. m and pr. a). 123. 1. autem] quidem: 3.
eaquityrannum] sequi iterannum: 4. laedatur politia] politea polit-
tiam ledant: 8. evenerit] venit. 124. 1. kaikagati, but the first
i is not in the ink of the MS.: 8. dicta pr. z, but it is crossed
through and dicta written above in the hand and ink of the MS.: 12.
epieikes| was probably the original reading, for there is an
erasure after the final letter of epieikes. 125. 1. andragarchiam
velle videri dativi et inutiliter tribuentes] velle videri dativi et lacra-
tivi tribuentes: 8. correctione] coruptione probably pr. z, altered
into coreptione: 10. donum] domum z, domum in lighter ink in the
margin: 11. correctiones] cornuphones pr. z, altered in darker ink
into coreptiones. 126. 1. dignificabantur: 4. amatores] the last
letter but one has been written over and is indistinct: 5. usus]
iudicari regum] iudicare regnum: autem] aut: 2. kaloskagathos]
kalkuskatus pr. z, but ga is inserted with a caret before t and the
last u is altered into a, perhaps in a different ink from the MS.: 4.
emittebant] emittebat: 8. Creta] cata pr. z; cata is written above
in the hand and ink of the marginal glosses: 11. voluntatis] volun-
tati: om. quidem. 128. 3. ista] ita (with a): 5. eam] eum
icrepuit] increpavit (with a). 129. 6. communes] omnes: 7. coac-
tis] coacti: 8. que] quae: 10. fecit] the second letter has been
written over, and what it originally was is uncertain; e is written
above it, apparently in the ink of the MS.: 12. in tantum] iterum.
130. 3. modica] modicam: 6. uninoribus] in moribus: likurgum
(with a): 7. karuli (with a): 8. om. est: 13. minus (mi pr. a): et
is added before insula. 131. 3. om. quidem: 4. triopisci: 5.
2. eandem after habent (with t): 3. om. quidem: 5. boulin: autem
quidem: om. quidem: 6. kosmoi] kosmous: 8. consentientiandi] con-
senciendi: 10. in Lacedaemonia] Illacedaemonia: 12. lex] hoc or
haec: om. et: 13. in Creta] Incata with a dot under the first a to
expunge it and what is probably an e written above. 133. 1. et
ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. xii, line 17. An epic fragment of Rhianus (Meineke, Analecta Alexandrina, p. 199: Prof. Mahaffy, Greek Life and Thought from the Age of Alexander to the Roman Conquest, Appendix C) reminds us here and there of Pol. 6 (4). 11. 1295 b 6 sqq., but we cannot be sure that Rhianus was acquainted with this passage.

P. xxxiii, line 11, for γεγονότος read γεγόνεγον

P. 26, last line but one, dele the commas

P. 31, line 22, read τοις μεν

P. 87, last line, read in

P. 93, heading, for 15 read 7

P. 95, heading, read 1273 b 15—1274 b 20,

P. 120, line 7, for 3 a read 32

P. 151, line 9, for of one read alone

P. 169, line 4, read ἀδόληδος

P. 185, line 17, dele bracket after 649

P. 194, line 14, for 8. c. read c. 8.

P. 200, end of note on κτήματα, add 'The shepherds of a hamlet near Elympos in the island of Carpathus 'call their mules κτήματα or possessions... This use of the word κτήματα is, I take it, of distinctly classical origin' (Mr. J. T. Bent, Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. 6, p. 241).

P. 212, line 1, read βασιλείας

P. 213, line 13, read ἀγαθῶν.

P. 221, line 29, for ἀπα read ἀρα

P. 245, line 2, add Compare the use of λέγω δὲ in Oecon. 1. 6. 1345 a 26 sqq.

P. 262, line 4, after οὐκ εὖ add Compare Oecon. 2. 1352 b 1 sqq.

P. 294, line 1, after labour add (cp. Oecon. 2. 1350 b 30 sqq.)

P. 294, line 30, read ἑγοδαβία

P. 300, last line but eleven, far of a not very dissimilar custom to that mentioned by Aristotle read of the employment of witnesses of this kind

P. 316, note on 1269 a 35, add Cp. also Magn. Mor. 1. 35. 1198 b 14 sqq.

P. 322, last line but six, read ἐπισβάσω

P. 323, note on προοδομονημικῶς, add See also Veitch, Greek Verbs Irregular and Defective, s. v. ὀδορρόπεω.

P. 334, line 25, after ἀροστοκρατίας add and Aristotle. Pol. 7 (5). 3. 1303 a 5.

P. 376, line 2. Plutarch here speaks only of the Eponymous Archonship, but C. F. Hermann (Gr. Ant. 1. § 109), Schömann (Gr. Alterth. i. 343), and Gilbert (Gr. Staatsalt. 1. 134) hold that the restriction applied to all the Archonships.

P. 386, lines 24—27. I believe that this remark was suggested by a remark in Mr. J. Cook Wilson's unpublished Essay for the Conington Prize, which I read with much interest some years ago.