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THE EDUCATION OF THE YOUNG

IN

THE REPUBLIC

OF PLATO.
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THE REPUBLIC
OF PLATO

TRANSLATED
INTO ENGLISH WITH NOTES AND INTRODUCTION

BY

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PREFATORY NOTE

The present volume is intended to bring before English readers the description and theory of education in the young which is realized in the earlier books of Plato's *Republic*. The volume deals with the account of education there considered as a moral organon, which explains the reason and purpose of that earlier education. It must be understood that here we have before us only a portion of the educational scheme, and only the picture of the philosophical assumptions which Plato sets forth in the *Republic* as a whole. And this volume may properly serve to some readers, as an introduction to a complete study of the *Republic* and of Plato's ideas.

There are obvious reasons which make it convenient and desirable for an annotator to supplement his commentary by a version from his own hand. This practice implies no desire to compete with the text version, on the whole merits, with those which have found their recognised place in English literature. Its object is to set before students a definite type of recontextualised commentary which otherwise could only be conveyed by a greatly extended commentary.

The only deviation from the text is the omission at a few points in pp. 1-3.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.

See the recent Commentary to Plato's *Republic*, Macmillan & Co.
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EDUCATION IN PLATO'S TIME.

INTRODUCTION.

I. GREEK EDUCATION IN THE BEST DAYS OF GREECE.

The following account of a Greek education in the best days of Greece may be taken as substantially true. When the speaker insists upon the attention devoted to moral training, he is making a point which his argument happens to need. But the passage, which comes from one of Plato’s imaginary conversations, would have lost its force if it had gone beyond the bounds of probability.

"From the moment that a child can understand pretty quickly what is said, his nurse and his mother and his tutor and even his father strive their hardest for this one end, that the boy may be as good as possible. At every deed and word they are teaching him and pointing out to him, 'This is right, that is wrong; This is pretty, that is ugly; This is good, that is impious; Do this, Don't do that.' So if he obeys them of his own accord it is well, if not, they correct him with threats and blows, like a bit of wood which is twisting and warping. After that, when they send him to the schoolmasters, they urge upon them to look after the children's good behaviour much.
more than their letters or their lyre-playing. And the schoolmasters do pay great attention to this; and again, when the boys have learned their letters, and are on the point of understanding what they find in books, as before they understood what was told them, the teachers set them to work on their benches to read the poems of great poets, and oblige them to learn these by heart, containing as they do many admonitions, and many adventures, and commendations and laudations of good men of old, that the boy may set his heart on imitating them, and long to grow up such as they. And in the same way again, the teachers of the lyre take precautions for morality and that the boys may do nothing wrong; and besides this, when they have learned to play the lyre, they teach them poems of other good poets again, lyrical poets, setting them to the lyre; and they compel the rhythm and the tunes to be appropriated by the souls of the boys, that these may be the more gentle, and becoming more rhythmical and more tuneful may be of use for speech and action; for man's whole life needs good rhythm and good tune.

"Then, moreover, in addition to this, they send them to the gymnastic master's, that they may be in better bodily condition to serve their good intelligence, and may not be obliged to run away from their duty owing to bodily defectiveness, whether in war or in any other line of action. All this is what those do who are best able; and those best able are the most wealthy. And it is their sons who begin to attend the teachers at the earliest age, and who leave off latest."

If now we write down in a few words the general nature of what was learned by a Greek citizen's son in the best age of Greece from the whole of the regular teaching which was given him, we are disposed to reflect that it amounts to no more than what we should call a primary education, with one exceptional feature. He was taught reading and writing, to which a little practical arithmetic was added, and in some cases perhaps the
Greek Education in the best days of Greece

...elements of geometry; he was taught to sing and to play a simple stringed instrument, and—here is the feature which we at once recognise as exceptional—he was instructed in dancing and in very various athletic exercises by a special teacher, whose lessons he attended no less regularly than those of his other masters, and for quite as many years of his life.

But on looking closer we see that this very simple primary training filled the place and in some degree did the work of what we should call a secondary education. Its apparent scantiness did not arise from want of money or of time, though in a certain sense it arose from want of knowledge. It was held to be the right and the best education, and was important in that part. It formed the whole systematic preparation for life enjoyed by the ruling classes in the highly civilised Greek commonwealth, until by gradual steps something corresponding to University culture was introduced among a part of them.

The serious attention given to athletic training, which in some ways finds a parallel in the rank held by games at English public schools and Universities, is part of its character as an education for a leisured class, to whom efficiency in war was a duty, and a fine physical development an end in itself. The same thing is true of the time for which education was continued. In Greece, as elsewhere, the children of the rich attended school to a later age than those of the poor, and the only limitation we know of is indicated by the Athenian custom that boys in their 17th or 18th year were enrolled in a sort of cadet corps to which real patrol duties were assigned, incompatible with the continuance of school education. We shall return to this cadet corps, the famous body of "Ephets" or "lads who have just become men," in speaking of the aims of Greek education and of its later development.

Thus it would appear that for the whole of his boyhood, say from the age of seven or eight to that of fourteen or sixteen (though unhappily we have no warrant for these or any other precise figures), the Greek lad was mainly occupied with the
three "R's," with singing and playing the lyre, and with training in bodily exercises. We do not really know how these occupations were distributed in the day's work, though we have certain general descriptions of Greek educational life, such as that cited above. But our question, at present, is what the boy was actually acquiring all this time. How was this elementary education handled, that it made so much out of so little? For almost the whole of what we think positive knowledge is here conspicuous by its absence. There are no foreign languages, no dead languages, no scientific grammar, no history nor geography, no Scripture teaching, and no natural science, still less the elements of any industrial or professional knowledge.

To avoid exaggeration in our answer to this question, we must remind ourselves of certain obvious points. The arithmetical notation in use was extremely cumbersome. Books, again, though quite attainable, were costly, and lessons dealing with them were no doubt largely carried on by dictation from copies in the teacher's hands. In Greek writing, the words were not separated, and the difficulty of dividing them must have been a great hindrance in learning to read. It seems probable too that instruction in the three "R's" only began when the boy entered on attendance at the day-school; in other words that it began late, perhaps at seven or eight years of age—Plato advises ten—and that no foundation was laid by home instruction except in the correct speaking of the mother tongue. We do not know what the school hours were, but probably they were not long, especially if the reading-school, the music-school, and the gymnasia (using the word in our sense) were all three attended on the same day. Thus the simplest educational processes may have extended over a longer period than would be the case with modern methods and appliances.

The tardiness so caused might indeed have its advantages, and in the age, for instance, of beginning to read, modern educators are returning to it. A boy, too, who had to struggle
with a clurmy notation, might be more likely to reflect on the nature and relations of number than we to whom it seems like a law of nature that numbers must be written and put together in a single and very facile way. There are intellectual dangers even in our uncompromising assumption that the word is the unit of language, which might be lessened by having to learn the practice of interpunctio (dividing word from word within the sentence). And thus we may conceive that very simple matters might occupy time and also have educational value in the then condition of the human mind, which are now rapidly acquired as formulae, and serve merely as stepping stones to real education.

But when we have allowed for all this, the wantonness of the educational scheme still exists, for if we compare it with the work required from a moderately well taught public schoolboy to-day, how we repeat, was so much made out of so little! The answer lies in what has already been implied. The education, however imperfect, was given as being the best. There was a comparative absence of distortion by pressure of practical necessities. And so the very simple subject-matters, by help of which the mind was trained, naturally expanded, so to speak, in the absence of external resistance, to their fullest range as influences on mind and character.

The study of letters, of reading and writing in the mother tongue, pursued in a persistent and merely way, came to involve a considerable knowledge of the ancestral classics of the Greek race, the Homeric poems, not merely by reading, but by committing to memory and by the habit of reciting. What this might mean to a boy in ancient Greece we possess little that can help us to imagine. If the heroes of Roman History or the personages of the Bible belonged to our own national past - were instead our own reputed ancestors - had been celebrated by a Shakespeare in our mother tongue, and the poems so created were something like one half of the whole
literature accessible to us, they might then master our imagination as Homer mastered that of the Greeks. And when we look at the matter in this way, we come nearer to understanding the alleged Greek estimate of Homer as a teacher of life and morals. We are, no doubt, inclined to think, with Plato, that to make a poet, who sings of half-civilised times, your authority in morals and religion is absurd on the face of it. But whether we will or no, a literature from which we borrow more than half our ideas is in a very real sense authoritative for us. It acts on us by a "suggestion"—through an effect of "imitation," as Plato would say—from which we cannot escape. And we must not forget the influence of recitation under careful training in impressing suggestions on a boy's mind. So much for the study of "letters"—it secured for the boys their entrance into the common national world, gave them in general their first ideas and impulses regarding things human and divine, and was not interrupted, but continued and developed, as the mind expanded into later boyhood and early youth. And the protracted exercises in playing the lyre and in singing followed the same lines. The boy was thoroughly familiarised with the older and accepted forms of music, a very simple music, for which perhaps our hymn tunes affording the nearest modern analogy. And here again, in a persistent and leisurely way, the boy would receive into himself a great part of the best lyrical poetry of his nation; and the practice of singing and playing accompaniments, through which he was taught it, could not but foster in his mind some sort of characteristic taste and impulse; some preference as between different types of songs, their music, their sentiments and their heroes. It seems clear that as was the case in England not so long ago, but much more so owing to the absence of books, the school-boy was expected to sing and recite for the edifica-

1 The comparison refers only to the simplicity and well-marked character of the music. I do not mean to suggest a strictly musical analogy between ancient and modern music of any kind.
tion of the home circle; and no doubt his taste and bearing in singing and reading was just such a revelation of his character to his parents as a boy's favourite reading is to-day. And this importance given to the whole subject helps to explain why Plato thought so much about the characters in which boys were to recite, and the melodies and sentiments they were to sing. Not all parents, even to-day, would be delighted to find that their boy had surpass ed himself mainly in acting. Sir John Falstaff, or in singing opera bouffe, and we may argue from this how such masters would be regarded, and what would be their actual influence on the young, when singing, reciting, and learning by heart were among the chief instruments by which education was carried on. It is a striking picture which Aristophanes draws for us, writing late in the 5th century B.C., of the educational customs of an earlier and as he thinks of a better date. Of course we must remember that the account is a comedian's poetry and is not history. "The boys of the quarter had to march through the streets in good order to the music master's, all together, without overcoats, even if it were snowing like meal. Then he would teach them to rehearse a song sitting decently and in order, either 'Pallas, I celebrate, sacker of cities, terrible goddess of war,' or 'The far-sounding cry of the lyre,' to the serious tune which our fathers handed down. And if any of them played the bugloon or turned any inflection like those troublesome inflections of the new music of to-day, he was visited with a sound whipping, for bringing the Muses into contempt."

The third, or if "music" includes both letters and singing, the second, branch of a Greek boy's training, had in practice as in Plato's theory, points of connection with the first. The gymnastic master in teaching the boys to dance must have

\[\text{1 The reader can remember when there was a sitting tradition at Harrow, and at Eton, he believes, something like a school rule, prohibiting the use of any horses, even when the boys had to go half a mile to school, &c. &c., so a writer's note.}\]
come very near the province of the music master; especially as Greek dancing was to a great extent dancing in character, so that different types of musical and dramatic expression were hardly less involved in it than in playing and singing or recitation. On the other side, the practice of dancing was connected with training in the use of arms; for the dance with shield and spear was a display which the State expected from the young men on festival occasions, and was no doubt carefully learned and rehearsed with the gymnastic master. Besides dancing, the sports practised under the gymnastic master seem to have been jumping, the foot race, hurling the disc (not exactly quoit-playing, but throwing a heavy disc for a long distance), throwing the javelin, and wrestling. It seems true that this scheme of training was not calculated to foster the social and self-governing spirit which is embodied in the games of an English school. But as regards the question of a complete and serviceable bodily education there is something to be said on the other side. Mr Maclaren, I think, has pointed out, that our exercises in games and rowing leave the bodily development too much to chance, so that it tends to be unequal, and needs to be corrected by just such special attention under a master as the Greek system provided. And it might also be urged that on the Greek method the educational aim of the whole procedure was more easily borne in mind; the lads would be kept in hand, so to speak, and the narrow semi-professional spirit which tends to grow up in our specialised and hotly contested games might be hindered from arising. If any definite bodily service was before the minds of the Greek youth during their gymnastic education, it would be that of war on behalf of their country, except in the case of the few who might decide to train for the Olympic or other games. And preparation for military service is a better all-round type of preparation for life than the devotion to games and athletic feats, which chiefly demand a highly specialised skill and peculiar bodily condition. Not that we must deny the possi-
ability of a system which should combine the excellences of the
Greek and the English plan.
As we saw, the climax of the boy's education was marked at
Athens by his being enrolled at 17 or 18 in the cadet corps
of "those who have come to manhood." This corps, the
"Epheloi," had garrison and patrol duty assigned them within
the borders of Attica, and had a certain place and importance
at public festivals. The elaborate organisation of it as a sort
of undergraduate body belongs to a later date than that of
which we are speaking, and almost seems to mark the end of
its practical service as a feature in the self-defence of a free
State.

It may be of interest here to cite the oath of the Epheloi,
the confirmation vow, as we might call it, of an Athenian
citizen, which marked his entrance upon civic manhood and the
end of his school education. At the age of 17 or 18, imme-
derately after being entered upon the citizen register of his
district, and being about to receive the soldier's shield and
spear in presence of the assembled citizens, he made oath to
the following effect: "I will not dishonour my sacred arms,
I will not desert my fellow-soldier, by whose side I shall be set,
I will do battle for my religion and my country whether armed
or unarmed. I will leave my country not less, but greater and
more powerful, than she is when committed to me, I will rever-
tently obey the citizens who shall act as judges, I will obey the
ordinances which have been established, and which in time to
come shall be established, by the natural will, and whoever
would destroy or disobey these ordinances, I will not suffer him,
but I will do battle for them whether armed or unarmed; and I
will honour the temples where my fathers worshipped, of these
things the gods are my witnesses."

The schools for letters and music and the schools for
gymnastic, as teaching institutions, were private enterprises,
Public gymnasia existed, and were much visited by the citizens;
but they were not schools of gymnastic. There was a certain
amount of variety and experiment even in the school education, especially just about and after the greatest days of free Greece. Drawing was introduced, in some cases, at a slightly later time; and a noteworthy ground is alleged for the practice, "to make the scholars apt to appreciate the beauty of objects." We have a curious history of flute-playing, on good authority. It became a fashionable study just in the great time, when the Athenians were eager for novelty, but its ethical influence was thought bad, and it was discarded again. Plato's feeling about it is noteworthy in this connection (see Republic, 399 D, E). There was something in the wind instrument that seemed barbaric to the Greeks. And other teachers, being perfectly free to do so, no doubt offered classes which boys might be sent to at their own or their parents' wish. We hear in this way of "scholars," who could do more for the explanation of the classics than the elementary schoolmaster, of geometricians, and of teachers of military tactics.

There remains a difference of principle worth observing in the gymnastic education of different States. In some the training was more specialised to feats of strength and skill, accenting certain special muscles and actually spoiling the figure; in others the idea of general serviceableness for the ends of life, and with it of beauty or complete development, was more effectively retained. It is as a type of this latter kind that fitness for military service was considered by the theorists a fair test of a good all-round bodily training. Sound health, not easily shaken by hardship and accidents of diet, and supporting a vigilant and spirited frame of mind with adequate bodily activity, seemed to them a better foundation for life than the power of achieving special muscular feats under highly artificial conditions. It is for this reason, and not from blood-thirstiness, that the theorists think highly of a bodily training designed on the whole to ensure fitness for military service. Sparta is praised for her educational system, looked at in this light,
though blamed in that the higher ends of life were not super added by her to the training for war.

But it will be observed, are not mentioned in this discussion. They learned enough reading and writing, it would seem to manage the household accounts, but their education must have been carried on within the household, which was almost Oriental in the seclusion of its women. This was not of things both emphasis and explains the violence of the revolution which Plato advocated, in demanding for women on the later books of the Republic, an equal share in the pursuits and the education of men.

When we compare the ancient Greek education with our own, whether primary or secondary, as a training of the whole man, we are surprised to find ourselves put upon our defense. We suffer from an *aménia de sérénité* in the intellectual world; and we can hardly see the wood for the trees. We teach one thing after another, or a number of things at the same time, rather as the most convenient way of making room for all that seems necessary to be learned, than with the aim of bringing before the growing mind as much and no more of the best experience as it will be able to appropriate with advantage to its growth. We think of education, on the whole, as an intellectual process, as a process of learning a number of things, each of which, on separate grounds, is necessary to be known.

The Greek thought of it, on the whole, as a moral process, or rather, he would not have understood you, if you had asked him which of the two he supposed it to be. He would have said that the best experience, if due time and opportunity is given for assimilating it, necessarily enters into the tissue of the mind, and determines its feelings and desires no less than its views and ideas. We are all aware, probably, that the word "school" is derived from a Greek word meaning "leisure." This conception of "leisure" is one of the greatest ideas that the Greeks have left us. It is not that of amusement or holiday making. It is opposed both to this and to the pressure
of bread-winning industry, and indicates, as it were, the space and atmosphere needed for the human plant to throw out its branches and flowers in their proper shape. "To have leisure for" any occupation, was to devote yourself to it freely, because your mind demanded it; to make it, as it were, your hobby. It does not imply useless work, but it implies work done for the love of it. It is worth thinking of, how far in education the idea of the growth of a mind can be made the central point, so that the things which are considered worth teaching may really have time to sink into and to nourish the whole human being, morally and intellectually alike. In as far as this problem is solved we shall attain a higher result than was attained by the Greeks, in proportion as our resources for appealing to human nature are more varied and profound than theirs.

2. EDUCATION IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC.

i. Education of the Young in Plato's Republic.

In the part of the Republic which we have here before us Plato's proposals are based on the existing education of the young. He does not condemn the system of his day, but is of opinion that its originators built better than they knew. They followed, indeed, not theory but experience; yet experience—"the great length of time"—has on the whole guided them well. Of the true principle, however, which underlay their work, they themselves were unconscious, and such a principle he is attempting to point out, much as a sympathetic critic to-day will attempt to explain the true theory of classical or "scientific" education or of open air games and
Education in Plato's Republic

sports, admitting certain defects and suggesting certain amendments. His views are fully before us in the portion of the Republic which we are to study, and a word or two of additional information is all that is needed here. When Plato looks back on the education of the young from a later point in the Republic—from a point at which his fuller conception of human life has been developed—he adds one or two details to that treatment of it which we have before us in Bk. IV. He makes clear the time for which it is to last, viz. from the beginning of the boy's school days to about the age of 17, or if we include the period of serious and exclusive devotion to bodily exercises, to the age of 20. This period, 17 to 20, in which the educational work was to be attempted, corresponds to the time spent by an Athenian youth, or "Ephelbos," in preparatory military duty within Attica. He also makes it clear that the education by Music and Gymnastic is not to exclude the elements of arithmetic, geometry, and perhaps other mathematical sciences. The boy is to "play" with these, not to be hard worked at them, the object is not for him to master them during his boyhood, but that later, on he may find himself prepared to pursue them seriously, without having had his interest crushed by hard labour before his powers are matured. At the age of 20, a selection is to take place of those who are fitted to enter upon a further education, great regard being had to character as shown in the bodily exercises. Here then is the point of junction between the education of the young Greek citizen as we see it in Bks. II—IV of the Republic, and the education of a human mind to the fullest practical and theoretical efficiency, as Plato has tried to sketch it in the later books. In the former we were dealing with the highest theory of the traditional Greek education. But in the latter we are face to face with Plato's attempt to conceive how the very best may be made of a human mind and a human society. The education of the young by music and gymnastic now appears as a stage preliminary to true
education, a stage in which feelings, opinions and habits undergo a discipline necessary for social life, but in which there is no real attempt to open up to the mind the completest expansion of which it is capable. It falls into its place, to speak in modern language, as a scheme of prolonged primary education, on which, for all who may be capable of it, an elaborate university education is to be superadded. Like many things in later civilisation, the elaborate academic routine of the Alexandrian and the Greco-Roman time—and even that which survives to our own day—reads very like a misunderstanding of Plato's suggestions. It is impossible to suppose that these had no influence on a movement, which, beginning so soon after them, so strangely caricatures them. It is worth while to point out in a few words the gist of Plato's larger ideas of education.

ii. The Higher Education in Plato's Republic.

He has declared that there is no chance of a good time coming either to States or to mankind unless political power and the best and highest intelligence can somehow be brought together, to the exclusion of mere empirics from statesmanship, and mere theorists from philosophy. In suggesting how this may be done, how the forces of intelligence may be given due training and nurture, so that they may become useful instead of fatal to the State, he draws what may be called the general or ideal draft of a university education. By him, however, it is conceived as the combined education and experience of a lifetime, and the attempt to reproduce it in the curriculum of a few years, while the mind is still immature, turns it into something essentially different, though, of course, serviceable in its way. We must not treat such suggestions as Plato's literally, which involves pronouncing them impossible, but try to master their spirit. (See Bk. vii for details; v and vi lead up to vii.)
The education of the young would leave the boy of 20 (or girl, for we know by this time that Plato's women are to share the education of the men) a hardy, active, and disciplined young creature, versed in the best literature and music, and fairly though slightly rounded in the mathematical sciences. From 20 to 30, if worthy of further education, he was, while not by any means neglecting his military and official duties as a citizen, to enter upon the serious study of the whole range of sciences known in Plato's day, beginning with arithmetic or the nature of number, and proceeding, on a scale of increasing concreteness, through plane and spherical geometry, theoretical astronomy, and physical harmonies or acoustics. The method of study is to be specially directed to demonstrating as it were the "law of all"—the general connection and affinity of these subject matters with one another—and to test in the student the power of grasping such a connection. For a student who has the gift of apprehending a general connection is capable of the higher forms of knowledge, but one who has not, is hopeless. And then, and not till then, those who have excelled in all these tests, both practical and theoretical, are from the age of thirty to that of thirty-five to be admitted to the highest and most complete of all possible studies—a study such as philosophy would be if it fulfilled its best aspirations as an insight into the most important matters of life, and knowledge, and religion. The late age at which philosophy is to be approached is essential, in Plato's view, to ensure sufficient seriousness and steadiness in the student. For, if boys like these are apt to turn the head and shake the faith of boys and girls just leaving school, it needs trained character and experience of life to make them stages in the apprehension of truth instead of playing in the game of disputations. From thirty-five to fifty they are again to bus themselves with the practical duties of public and citizen life, which, it must be borne in mind, have never been entirely broken off throughout their whole training except in the five years' interval after the
age of thirty. And after the age of fifty they are still to take their share of public business, in its higher branches, but are to devote themselves in a large measure to the deepening and completion of their philosophical or religious insight. It is time for them to be sure in their own minds what makes life worth living, and to carry out this conviction with authority and efficiency in the varied tasks of government and administration.

We must not take these as literal proposals, but we must feel what Plato means. He means that, in the sense of really doing the best with the human mind, education is a lifelong process, and has two inseparable sides. You cannot “complete your studies” at twenty-three or twenty-four, and then, leaving study behind, pass on to practice. The best kind of knowledge—the knowledge of what makes life worth living—cannot be won except by a mind and character trained and matured in the school of life; and again, no good work can be done in the arena of practice unless inspired by the highest spirit of study—the vital enthusiasm for truth and reality. Plato's formidable curriculum of the mathematical sciences—the mere prelude, as he carefully explains, to real knowledge—is for us simply a type of energetic determination to expand the intelligence by exercising it on the best that is known. He draws his suggestions from the intellectual experience of his day; we, in appropriating their spirit, have before us the whole resources of our own. We shall however catch his intention much more by bringing the true student's enthusiasm to bear upon our life work, than by a vain effort to learn the whole circle of the sciences. Knowledge ceases to be knowledge when it loses unity and relevance.

1 "The truth is that at twenty-four no man has done more than acquire the rudiments of his education." Anthony Trollope, in *The Claverings*. Of course the very nature of true education as here suggested makes it necessary that school and college training should not be too much prolonged. The higher education demands responsibility and independence.
EDUCATION AFTER PLATO'S TIME.

We admitted above that the games and sports of the young among the Greeks had not the aspect of self-government and self-management which we are proud of in English school-life. Perhaps the discipline of the youths at Sparta, which has been compared to a sort of monitorial system, should be cited as an exception to this rule. But a consequence of some importance, in its bearing on the higher education, follows from this general state of things. We find in Greece no trace of the divorce between school-life and the life of home and of ordinary society which recent literature accents so strongly in England. The public school boy, we seem to be taught to-day, is a creature by himself, living in a world of his own, with no share in the manners, habits, or interests of the mature society around him. And allowing for caricature, there is yet too great truth in the picture. But the Greek, or at least the Athenian boy, was a product of home training, and the day school. Out of school hours, or in the leisure intervals at the gymnastic master's, he associated, on terms of due courtesy and subordination, with his older relatives and with his father's friends. There is no trace of his having been absorbed by a self-contained world of school interests and ambitions, and by a fierce esprit de corps colouring his entire view of life. As his intelligence expanded, questions of the public welfare and the topics and problems of the day must have come within his reach by natural growth and intercourse. The picture which Plato has drawn of Socrates conversing with the boys in the presence of their friends and relations represents no specific matter of fact, but the tone of these imaginary conversations cannot be wholly fictitious. It is the tone of eager-minded lads, pleased and proud to be admitted to the conversation of distinguished men, and to learn something of the ethical problems of the day.
It was out of this intercourse with older men that the higher education at Athens grew up by gradual organisation. "Please let these young men have the benefit of your society" is the request addressed to Socrates on behalf of his sons by the venerable merchant prince in the Republic. Socrates as we know took no payment for his social intercourse and conversation; other teachers and lecturers, whose work was no doubt more systematic in its form, initiated the habit of taking fees and enrolling their pupils for a more or less definite course. The whole arrangement was absolutely free and unorganised. A young man might if he pleased attend a course on geometry, or military tactics, or on ethical and philosophical problems, or on the duties of citizenship. There seem to have been two great points which distinguish the "sophists," or travelling professors of ancient Greece, from University teachers and University Extension lecturers of the present day, besides the fact that the "sophists" were appointed by no one and belonged to no institution, but simply opened a room and gave their lectures, as e.g. Auguste Comte did in Paris when a young and unknown man. First, they were not as a rule citizens of the state in which they taught. Hardly any famous "sophist" was an Athenian citizen. There was nothing morally wrong in this; but it affected their point of view. It is difficult to lecture on ethical and political subjects to an audience whose life you do not thoroughly share; and the best men to-day will sometimes refuse to attempt it. A modern University teacher, on the other hand, is or may be a citizen of the citizens, the very incarnation of the national and municipal spirit. Socrates, who had fought more than one severe campaign for his country, may well have found it difficult to believe that those brilliant aliens were sound guides for the Athenian youth. And secondly, the absence of a classical tradition in science and philosophy made a great difference. A lecturer to-day has done much if he has animated his audience to appreciate any one of the great standard writers of the
world. There is a great deal known, we may say, of which we may be confident: that it is worth knowing. And in fact, an average lecturer seldom delivers himself of a brand new system, and would rightly be suspected if he did. He is but a showman in the great museum of science and letters. But the \"empire\" of Socrates' day had no such firm foundation to rely upon. He taught for the most part a kind of general culture, and although it was a great man, his ideas might be valuable and original; if he was not, they could hardly avoid being superfluous and commonplace.

Such, however, was the form assumed by the higher education at Athens in the lifetime of Socrates, that is, in the latter half of the 5th century and before the beginning of Plato's literary activity. It was an outgrowth of the free intellectual intercourse of young men with their seniors, and gradually assumed the shape of regular lectures or conversational teaching, for which a fee was paid, wholly and entirely by private arrangement.

Plato's lifetime forms a convenient era from which to date the introduction of more systematic organisation, and this for two reasons. First, we have seen that Plato has handed down the earliest ideal sketch of an education, intended to express the needs of the human mind, and their satisfaction, in the fullest possible form. Not but what the art was full of educational schemes and theories, outside and independent of Plato's writings. But we may take Plato as a type of the rest, and as the most influential and comprehensive. Secondly, it was Plato's precedent which first instituted an educational endowment, by leaving certain pieces of land, at the place where he was accustomed to teach, to a successor whom he named. His example was followed by others, and a set of endowed day-colleges thus grew up at Athens.

By the side of the philosophical schools which were thus passing into endowed colleges, another subject was claiming an important place. This was Rhetoric, the art of convincing.
expression: the opposite and complementary side of that "art of discourse" which had been understood to include the reasonings of Socrates. Of course the importance of Rhetoric is connected with the part played by public speaking in Greek life; but it is not so far removed as we might think from what is acquired at our Universities to-day. The actual knowledge which men attain in their University course is hardly their principal or permanent possession, excepting when it leads up to a student's life. What they are expected to have acquired and to retain is a power of mastering a subject, and giving a clear and reasonable account of it, treating its parts in their proper order, with due subordination to the whole, and with a certain sense and judgment. To gain this power they must have pursued a study which is by no means purely verbal, and an ancient rhetorician would not have admitted that Rhetoric, the art of order and suitable expression, was a mere matter of words. To us the study of Rhetoric may seem to set the shadow before the substance; but after all, if we thus put the objection at its strongest, we may recall that most of us have spent a great part of our educational life in the practice of "composition."

This art of expression, then, seems to have worked its way into the educational course as a stage subsequent to grammar, and supplanting the older Music or lyre-playing. And the demand expressed by Plato, and no doubt by many others, for an ampler grasp of organised knowledge, seems to have resulted in the recognition of a University course bearing a strange relation to his scheme of higher education. The names of the arts and sciences which formed the regular curriculum in Graeco-Roman times are given as Grammar, Rhetoric, Dialectic, Arithmetic, Geometry, Astrology¹, Music. The three first of these studies form the Trivium, the four last the Quadrivium, of mediaeval education. Looking at this list,

¹ Including I presume what was known of Astronomy, but very possibly with unscientific additions.
which represents the educational tradition, as we may say of the civilised world, we cannot but observe that the last four sciences correspond exactly to the mathematical sciences of Plato's higher education, if we divide geometry into plane and solid geometry, and take music, as its position suggests, to be the equivalent rather of harmonics or acoustics than of playing the lyre or singing. Rhetoric, as we saw, has thrust itself in after Grammar or letters, which is still considered as the natural education for a boy. And Dialectic, which in Plato's theory was to be the crown and climax of all studies, as philosophy and religion might at their best, has found a place as a continuation of Rhetoric, presumably consisting in the study of certain trivial elements of formal logic. The entire course might occupy from five to eight years; but ordinary students probably took little beyond grammar and rhetoric, and spent a comparatively short time at the University. Under the Roman Empire, professors were paid by the Emperor, and practically appointed by the Roman government. Education had now become a training chiefly in Rhetoric and philosophical generalities for the gentlemen of the Roman Empire, and the Lysis had become in effect an undergraduate body, with all the customs and manners of such a body, to which alumni who visited the University were admitted. We still hear nothing of foreign languages being taught at Athens, though the Romans had their sons taught Greek by means of Greek teachers.

Small as the positive value of such a course may seem to us to have been, it preserved to the modern world that comprehensive idea, of an intelligence at home in the whole sphere of knowledge, which Plato's genius had desired. It preserved it in a shrivelled and distorted form, but this, like many ideas

1 The name "Dialectic" came into the Middle Ages through Latin writers from the name. It came, first from the philosophy Aristotelian and by Plato, but a Latin form as seen preserved from Aristotle.

2 The mathematical sciences indeed long retained their vitality, but it may be doubted whether ordinary students profited by them.
of the ancient world, seems capable of renewed life when brought in contact with modern conditions. On the other hand, the education of the young as described in Plato's *Republic* is a monument of the actual life of a great people in the day of their greatness, and the simple principle which Plato shows to underlie it—the principle of the growth and nourishment of a living creature, not a body *plus* a mind, but a unity in which the physical life passes upwards into the mental—can never cease to be significant.

4. THE OPENING ARGUMENT OF THE *REPUBLIC*.

Book I of the *Republic* discusses first the nature of justice or morality, and then, as an extension of this discussion, how far it is essential to human life. The arguments, though highly suggestive, turn largely on the meanings of words, and the important idea that justice or morality has to do with men's obligations in society is put in the mouth of the disputant who denies that it is the true principle of human life.

In the opening of Book II Glaucon expresses discontent at the generalities which have been accepted as decisive in favour of justice in Book I, and, in order to draw a refutation, restates the opposite case from the point of view of those who say that justice or morality is purely artificial, a restraint submitted to for selfish ends, and that man's true inward impulse is always towards the egoistic and immoral course. Adeimantus chimes in, for the same purpose, by the supplementary observation that the ordinary preachers of morality are practically in agreement with its enemies, seeing that they lay all the stress of the argument not on goodness, but on the rewards which follow a reputation for it; as if goodness in itself were not defensible. Our text begins with the closing paragraphs of Adeimantus' speech.

It should be noted that Socrates, in attempting a more thorough answer than that of Book I, accepts the challenge of
The opening argument of the Republic.

Thrasymachus, repeated by Glaucon, and sets to work to examine justice or morality as a social phenomenon, the ultimate question being, whether, because it is certainly "conventional," it need therefore be artificial and unreal, or, in short, other than "natural." It should be remembered that even in Books II—IV the "social" explanation of morality consists in treating the Commonwealth as a structure in which the true meaning of the human soul is up to a certain point revealed. It does not rest on any such idea as that the greatest number of persons is always to be most regarded in moral action. And in the later books of the Republic, when the nature of the mind and that which will satisfy it is more profoundly examined, we see more and more clearly that there are other sorts of what is highest in human nature than the mere fact of fitness for living in a given society, though this remains a necessary condition of the best life.
THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

Books II 366—end of IV.
NOTE ON THE FORM OF THE "DIALOGUES" AND THEIR RELATION TO SOCRATES.

Plato’s genuine writings are in the form of conversations or “dialogues,” in nearly all of which Socrates is represented as taking part, generally as the principal speaker. The other speakers are also, as a rule, given the names of real persons who might have been present, and in some cases probably were present, at such conversations as Plato professes to report. Socrates we must remember was put to death in 399 B.C. when Plato was only twenty-nine. This fact, combined with the obvious growth of original and constructive views throughout the succession of Plato’s writings, is enough to show that Socrates’ utterances in the dialogues are not to be treated as the expressions of ideas entertained by the real Socrates. On the other hand, the nature of Plato’s loyalty to Socrates, and the character of the changes of view which his writings display, forbid us to suppose that Socrates’ ideas in the dialogues were no more those of Plato, than the ideas of a character in a modern novel need be those of the author. In general it is pretty plain that Plato started from Socrates’ method and principles, and while constructing a vast and original fabric of thought, believed himself on the whole to be loyal to the impulse and character of Socrates. Roughly speaking we may say that the earlier dialogues are ironical, tentative, and suggestive, but affirm no positive conclusion; and in this sense resemble what we are told of Socrates’ way of thinking. The first book of the Republic, taken by itself, is a good example of a “Socratic” dialogue. Other dialogues again maintain through the mouth of Socrates a serious and positive thesis, as is the case in the main body of the Republic, and here we feel that we are losing hold of the real Socrates as he was “in the flesh.” Some moreover of the latest dialogues are almost pure exposition, and drop out the person of Socrates altogether. Thus the conversational form of Plato’s writings, though other writers of the time adopted it, seems connected with his admiration for Socrates, who, like the founder of Christianity, taught only by the living word, and left no written memorials. It was also a natural expression for Plato’s tentative and undogmatic speculation, and it appeared to him to be the truest vehicle of genuine thinking, as the inward question and answer by which the mind advances from point to point.

The beautiful opening of Book I should be referred to for the place and persons of the dialogue. Glaucon and Adeimantus are Plato’s brothers. The argument of the first book has been mainly conducted by other speakers.
BOOK II

Argument, 3

Conclusion of the account of Admenous, for a closer explanation and definition of slavery, seeming that its proper advantage are really in the same ruin with its antecedent, that is to say, do not expand it as the one inherent principle of life, but as a course of conduct which is the best policy, in short, as a means to an end other than itself.

What reason then remains for which we should prefer justice to the extreme of injustice? which if we take to ourselves with counterfeit propriety, we shall succeed to heart's desire before God and before man, in life and after death; to run the argument of our leaders, one and all. What possibility is there, Socrates, in view of that which has just been spoken, that anyone should be content to honour justice, who possesses no force of mind or of money, of body or of birth, instead of laughing to hear it commanded? For indeed if there is anyone who is able to demonstrate the falsity of what we have spoken, and who has been sufficiently that justice is best, we must suppose that he has a great leniency, and is not angry with the unjust, being aware that except one keep himself from injustice through a godlike innate temperance, or by the attainment of real understanding, no man in just of his own will, but it is either cowardice or vice or some
other infirmity that makes men censure the injustice which they lack force to do. Evidently it is so; for the first of them to get power is the first to commit injustice, and that as much as he can.

And the reason of it all is that and nothing else, from which our whole argument with you, Socrates, took its rise—my brother's here and mine. We are surprised, my dear Sir, we said, that among you all who profess to be champions of righteousness, beginning from the heroes of old, as far as their ideas are recorded, down to the men of to-day, no one has ever yet censured wrong-doing nor lauded righteousness for anything but the reputation and the honour and the profit which arise from either; but what each of them is in its own potency, within the mind of the possessor, unknown to God or man, no one ever yet either through poetry or through everyday speech has sufficingly pursued the enquiry, proving that the former is the greatest of all evils which a mind can entertain within itself, and righteousness the greatest good. For if this had been the doctrine of you all from the beginning, and you had been urging it upon us from our youth up, we should not now have been guarding one another from evildoing, but every man would himself have been his own guardian, fearing, should he do injustice, that the greatest of all evils would dwell with him. All that, Socrates, and perhaps more than that would Thrasymachus tell you, and others too, no doubt, about justice and injustice, distorting their true potency—grossly, as it seems to me; but I, for I need not hide anything from you, am putting the case with my whole force, because I want to hear you maintain the opposite. Do not therefore merely demonstrate to us in your argument, that justice is better than injustice, but show us too what it is that each of them does to its possessor whereby itself and for its own sake the one

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1 See 443 for the fulfilment of this suggestion.

2 Viz., about the extraneous motives to justice and injustice.
is an evil, and the other a good, and strike out their reputations, as Glaucon demanded. For if you do not strike out the true reputation on either side, and attach the false, we shall say that it is not justice which you are praising, but its appearance, and not injustice that you are blaming, but its appearance, and that your advice is, to be unjust but secret, and that you agree with Thrasymachus, that Justice is another's good, the interest of the stronger, whereas Injustice is expedient and profitable for oneself, but against the interest of the weaker. Since, then, you have admitted that Justice is one of the greatest goods, which are worth possessing both for their results, and also far more for what they are in themselves, like sight and hearing, consciousness, and health too, and all other goods that are profitable in their own nature and not in mere appearance, we now want you to praise this very quality in Justice, whereby itself, and by reason of itself, advantages its preservation, and in the same way Injustice harms him. And leave it to others to extol rewards and appear-

1 To comply wholly with this requirement would involve promiscuous, as it would mean that goodness is a foolish thing useless in an acknowledged sense, in the world. This is the absolute opposite of Plato's conception. Goodness for him is to acquire the life of the soul so far as it may be. But it is still the life of the soul, eternal life, even if and when it fails to win acknowledgment in the world, etc., etc. The very fact that Plato conceive in a moral whole in the true sense of Goodness does not he does not in principle recognize it their own recognition. On the contrary, the whole is reduced to a symbol of it, see vol. II, § 107 below.

2 The departure. a following ethical resemblance to our "character." It was traced to sec. I. Its point is in the assumption that all men's interests are different, and that every man pursues his interest to the utmost power. "Justice" does not the interest of another, viz. the "stronger," by the ruling power in a state, or respected among the weaker and subject classes. In reality to the interest of the strong over the weaker classes, and are not only subordinated as far as possible, but made to the weaker. If this supposition are not made, the reasons interest the role of "the weaker" to far the interest is insurmountable.

3 See beginning of Book II.
ances. For all the others I can tolerate when they praise Justice and censure Injustice in this way, glorifying and vili-
ing the appearances and reputations which attach to them; but you I will not, unless you bid me, because you have spent your whole life long in this study and no other.

**Argument.** 367 E—369 B. Transition from the individual by himself to the individual as member of a commonwealth, in which context the traits of the mind are to be read more completely and on a larger scale. For example, what may have remained an undeveloped impulse in a particular person’s mind—say religion, art, education, industrial capacity, or sport, will be revealed at once as a factor in human life when we turn our eyes upon society, in which the trait in question is vouched for by huge complexes of institutions.

Now I had always admired the nature of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but when I heard them on this occasion I was really quite delighted and I said: That was very appropriate to you, you sons of him who is named in the ode, that beginning of the verses which Glaucon’s admirer composed when you distinguished yourselves in the battle at Megara, calling you Sons of Ariston, godlike offspring of an illustrious sire.

This, my friends, seems to me to be very fitting; for it is something really godlike that has come to you, if you are not convinced that injustice is a better thing than justice, when you are so well able to speak on its behalf. Yet you appear to me in good truth not to be so convinced. I am judging from the rest of your behaviour, since from your actual words I should have doubted you; but the more I believe in you, the more am I at a loss what to do; for on the one hand, I have no way of coming to the rescue; I seem to myself to be powerless; and the proof is, that what I said to Thrasymachus, thinking
it a demonstration that justice is a better thing than injustice, you have not accepted from me, on the other hand I do not see how I am not to come to the rescue, for I fear lest it be an actual sin for one being present when justice is disparaged, to give in and not come to her aid, to have as breath is in him, and he is able to utter a word. The right course is, then, to aid her as best I can.

So Glaucon and the rest besought me with all urgency to come to the rescue and not let the argument drop, but to investigate both what each of them is, and which way the truth lies about their advantages. And I said what I thought as follows:—It is clear to see that the problem we are attacking is no trifle, but demands a keen eye. Now, as we are not to expect, I think we might make our enquiry into it in some such way as this.

If it had been enjoined upon people who were not very keen-sighted to read some small letters1 a long way off, and then one had found out that there are the same letters elsewhere of larger size, and on a larger field, it would have been thought a lucky end, I imagine, to begin by reading the latter, and then to study the smaller letters, and see if they turned out the same.

Certainly, said Adeimantus; but, Socrates, what do you see of this kind in the enquiry respecting justice?

I will tell you, I replied. Justice, we should say, may be of one man, or it may be of a whole city1?

Yes, he replied.

Is not a city larger than one man?

It is larger, he said.

1 For a development of this illustration, see 403. We shall lose its meaning if we do not bear in mind the structure of the thought as indicated there and throughout. The point is, that the same qualities stand written in individual and in social life, and to separate the study of them is impossible—just as that moral life exists anywhere else than in individual life.

2 I explain we may speak of a man as just, or of a city as just.
Perhaps there may be more justice in the larger whole, and easier to discern. So, if you are willing, let us begin with the cities, and enquire what it is like in them; and then according to our plan let us examine it in the single individual, studying the resemblance of the greater in the form of the less.

Why, he answered, I think you say well.

Well then, I continued, if we were to observe in thought the genesis of a city, should we at the same time see the genesis of its justice and of its injustice?

Perhaps so, he said.

So when it is done we may hope to see more readily what we are looking for?

Much more.

Then do you think we should try and accomplish it? for I fancy it is no small labour; so please consider.

Oh, we have considered, cried Adeimantus; pray do not waste time.

**Argument. 369 B—372 C.** The economic genesis of a commonwealth, that is, the sketch in bare outline of what must come to pass and go on in order that a commonwealth, as understood in western civilisation, may hold together. The growth of peoples through each stage of kinship and pre-industrial conditions would not here be to the point. Plato was quite aware that there had been such a growth. The account here given is summarised in

1 In Plato's deepest arguments there is apt to be a touch of humour or irony. Here his apparent naiveté tends to make us smile, for our first thought is "Surely social or general morality is far below that of a good man," and it is only perhaps after following his argument to the end that we see the true force of his appeal, viz., that apart from the social whole, moral qualities can neither be manifested nor explained. There is or may be more injustice in a city than in an individual, as well as more justice.

2 I.e. trying to recognise in the less (the individual) the moral qualities with which we have made ourselves familiar in the greater (social life and structure).
Aristotle's opinion: "The State arises for the sake of life, but is for the sake of good life.

Now a city, I began, comes into being, as I suppose, because each of us is not self-sufficient, but is deficient in many ways. Or what cause but this, do you think, can set up a city?

None but this, he replied.

When each of us calls in another to supply his need of one thing, and yet another to supply his need of another thing, the needs being manifold, we thus having collected associates and co-operators into a single place of habitation give the resulting group of neighbours the appellation of "city." Is this it?

Just so.

Then one gives a share to another, if he does so, or accepts a share from him, because he believes that this is best for himself:

Certainly.

Then, then, I said, let us make a city from the beginning in our speculation. And what will make it, as it seems, is our need.

Undoubtedly.

But the first and greatest of our needs is the supply of convenience with a view to existence and life.

1 We have needs both bodily and spiritual (cf. 349 a, 40-2 a, 7) which are rooted in our human nature, and which only society can supply. How far and in what sense man is himself to be self-sufficient is a radical problem of ethics and religion.

2 Cf. Helmholtz, "It is the houses that make the town, but the towns that make the city." It would be true to say that Plato's a Greek never knew a town, for that town life was a permanent feature in Greek civilization. Still, the actual Greek "Polis" or "City-states" were different from Swiss Cantons, containing a great deal of populous city, and
Quite so.
Second comes the need of housing, and third that of clothing and the like.
That is so.
Come now, I said, how is the city to suffice for all this supply? Will it be by one man being a farmer, another a builder, and a third a weaver? Or shall we add to these a shoemaker too, or some more of those who attend to our personal wants?
That is the way, he answered.
Then the minimum¹ city will be of four or five men?

What then? Is each one of these to contribute his own product² as common to all; for instance, the farmer, being one person, to prepare corn for four, and devote fourfold time and labour to the provision of corn, and share it with the others? Or is he to disregard the rest, and provide for himself alone the fourth part of that corn in the fourth part of his time, and of the other three parts to spend one in providing himself with a house, another on clothing, and the third on shoes, and save himself the trouble of sharing with others by doing his own business³ for his own purposes?

And Adeimantus said, Why, Socrates, probably the common way is more convenient than the other.
I should not be surprised, I answered him. For I myself

many country villages and residences. They were thought of rather as politically centering in towns than as consisting wholly of towns and townsmen.

¹ Minimum both in quantity and quality—supplying only the bare needs of life.
² The same Greek word serves for the function and the product—the "work."
³ The phrase "doing his own business," which is the key of the whole political and ethical structure of the Republic, is here applied to a way of life just the opposite of what it afterwards comes to mean.
too notice, now that you have suggested it. That, to begin with, people are born not quite like each other, but with different natures, one apt for one function, and another for another. Do not you think so?

I do.

Well then, would it be the most effective way for one man to ply several arts, or one man one art?

One man one art is best, he said.

Moreover I imagine this to be quite clear, that if one let slip the right moment for any work, it is ruined.

Clearly.

For, I suppose, that which has to be done will not await the leisure of him who has to do it, but it is needful for the doer to attend upon what is being done, and treat it as no secondary matter.

Inevitably.

It follows then, that every kind of product is produced in greater number and better and more easily when one man does one thing, according to his natural powers, and at the right moment, being at leisure from all else.

Unquestionably.

Then, accordingly, more than four citizens are required for the supply of what we were speaking about, for the farmers, as it seems, will not himself make his own plough, if it is to be a good one, nor his mattock nor other farming implements, to
nor the builder his tools, and he again needs many; and so too the weaver and the shoemaker.

True.

So carpenters and smiths and many other artificers, becoming associates in our little city, will make it of some size. No doubt they will.

Still it will not yet be quite a large one, even if we should add to them oxherds and shepherds and other kinds of herds-men, that the farmer may have oxen for ploughing, and the builders, as well as farmers, may have cattle to use for draft¹, and weavers and shoemakers may have hides and wool.

Nor again, he replied, can it be quite a small city if it contain all these.

Moreover, I continued, it is pretty nearly impossible to plant the city itself in a region where it will want no imports. Quite impossible.

Then there will be need of others too who will bring to it from another city what it requires.

There will.

But if the intermediary go empty-handed, taking with him nothing that those others want, from whom our citizens obtain what they need, he will come back empty; will he not?

I imagine so.

Then they must produce at home not merely sufficient for themselves, but in quality and quantity adapted to those on whom they depend.

They must.

Then we require for our city yet more of the farmers and of the other kinds of workers.

Quite so.

And besides we need the intermediaries who will import and export the different kinds of things; and these are merchants, are they not?

Yes.

¹ n.b. not yet for food.
Then we shall want merchants too.

Certainly.

And if commerce is carried on by sea, a good number of others will be wanted, who have skill in the industries of the sea.

Yes, a good number.

And now within the city itself—how will they share with one another what each set of them produces? For it was actually in framing an association for this purpose that we established our city.

Obviously, he said, they will do it by buying and selling.

Then out of this will arise a market and a currency by way of token for the purpose of exchange.

That is so.

Then if the farmer, or one of the other workmen, brings some of his produce to the market, and gets there at a different time from those who want to exchange their goods for his, is he to give up his own work and sit in the market?

By no means, was the answer; the fact is that there are people who notice this want and set themselves to the service in question, in well managed states pretty much the weakest in body and incapable of discharging any other function. For they have to wait on the spot in the market, and take things in exchange against money for those who want to sell, and to exchange them away again for money to those who want to buy.

This want then creates shopkeepers in our city. Or is not "shopkeeper" the name we give to those who do the service.

1 A combination of an honorific, purpuse, convenience, and useful means. In the Greek art history the shopkeeper was a secretary, steward, and a wafker person, while the Greek thinker supplied him the requirements of earning a good living without producing anything. This is an assumption of modern parallel. Plato however in the present passage merely indicates the shopkeeper's function and the public need of it, without the assumption. "Then if the want..."
of buying and selling, seated in the market, while those who travel to other states we call merchants. Then further, as I imagine, there is another class of serving men, who in their intelligence are not quite capable of an associate's part, but have bodily strength equal to hard work; they, selling the service of their strength, and calling its price hire, take as I imagine the name "workers for hire." That is it.

Then workers for hire, too, belong to the equipment of a city. I think so.

Well then, Adeimantus, is our city by now so far grown as to be complete? Perhaps so.

Wherever then in it will its justice and injustice be; and implanted along with which of the features which we have scrutinised?

A I for my part, Socrates, he replied, have not a notion, unless it be in some dealings of these very persons with one another.

Why, I said, I daresay you are right; at any rate we must pursue our enquiry and not shrink from it. First then let us consider what sort of life they will lead who have so been

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1 The word is "emporos," "a passenger," probably with the idea of supercargo. "Traveller" might be a fair equivalent. Our word emporium is derived from it.

2 This term, ministers, messengers, or intermediaries (diaconoi, from which our "deacon" is derived) does not imply slavery, but seems to be used with more or less intention for kinds of work which Plato thinks comparatively unskilled. We have no mention of slaves so far; their presence seems to be presupposed later on.

3 The Greek word might apply to "wage-earners." But Plato seems intentionally to separate these "unskilled labourers" who have only strength to sell, from artisans and mechanics. He is thinking perhaps of porters and the like, who are hired in the street for casual jobs.
furnished forth. I suppose they will be producing corn and
wine and clothing and shoes, and will have built themselves
houses, and they will work in summer as a rule lightly clad
and barefoot and in winter with good clothes and shoes? And
the food they will prepare meal from the barley and flour from
the wheat, making some and kneading some, and serve up
splendid soups and leaves upon rushes or clean leaves, lying
on couches spread out of yew and myrtle boughs, so they will
lead, they and their children, drinking of their water, garlanded
and singing praises of the gods, living pleasantly together, not
begging, children beyond their means, dreading poverty or
war'.

Argument 373d 374a. Continuation. war, the need of
wardens and their qualities; the knowledge of good and evil.

And Glaucon broke in. You seem to be setting the meal on
dry bread?

You are quite right, I answered. I forgot that they will be

I am aware that as a general view. In the case of I imagine the words
way, in some way to the difference between those who are in danger
War, see Proclus 423 b, to health. Because from enlargement of territory
To a greater or lesser degree, because of the above picture, we must be
imposed on the earth, as NATURE, I read, favor with, the food they are
from a day and pass. Plato, in the conversation with Diogenes,ocrates
describes amounting himself at the expense both of those who think that
consideration matters in winter and, as Socrates like to think, and those
who think it a nonsense, what can be a time by vegetable lent and a life of
pleasantly together. He does not that the consequences in a case of diseases
insane, to his conversation along with war and the ends of an advanced
society.

I put without a relish. The Athenians eat their fish and fish
as a great extent as a condiment or relish to their bread,
likewise their vegetables. Only a few and, according to Greek
would eat fish or vegetables without bread. But it would be a
poor meat to have dry bread by itself. In what follows, Socrates is probably
not the young man above.
having relishes; salt, no doubt, and olives, and cheese, and they will boil truffles, and cabbage, as people do in the country. And we shall set before them a dessert of figs, and pease and beans; and they will parch myrtle berries and beech nuts at the fire, taking their wine moderately; and so passing their life in peace, with good health, they will die most likely at a great age and hand on such another life to their children.

But, Socrates, he cried, if you had been establishing a city of pigs¹, is not this just what you would have fed them on?

Why, Glaucon, I said, how ought they to live?

As respectable people do, he answered; if they are to be comfortable they must have sofas to lie on and tables to dine off and savouries and dessert, just as we have to-day.

Well, I see, said I; it appears that we are not merely studying a city in its way of coming to be, but something more, that is, a city of luxury. And very likely it is just as well; for by examining even such a one we shall perhaps discern justice and injustice, and how they become implanted in states. Now I think that the genuine state is that which we have described, being, so to speak, a healthy one²; but if you like to go on and look at a city in a fever, there is nothing to prevent you. For it seems that there are people who will not be satisfied with these arrangements nor with this way of life; but there will be sofas too, and tables and all the household apparatus, and relishes no doubt, and unguents and perfumes, and courtesans and confectionery, a great variety of each; and

¹ See note 2 on p. 39. Plato enjoys the horror of the young plutocrat, but he has also a meaning in letting him speak in this way of the Utopias of the time, as described, e.g. probably by Antisthenes the Cynic. Voltaire said of Rousseau in a similar sense, "He makes one long to go on all fours." It is in the State which has purged itself (399 E), not in the State which has never known evil, that Plato finds righteousness.

² Still with a double meaning. It might be innocent in comparison with a more artificial society, but the full expression of the human mind was not to be found in it. The form of transition "by examining even such a one," as if it were a pis aller to go on to the "city of luxury," is ironical.
moreover the supply which first we spoke of must no longer be taken in its simple form—houses, clothing, shoes—but we must set to work the art of painting and procure gold and ivory and all that kind of thing. Must we not?

Yes, he said.

Then again we must make the city larger? For the healthy city as we described it will no longer be sufficient, but it must be swarmed with masses and multitudes, which are in cities for purposes outside the necessary—the example hunters of all kinds, and all the imitative artists: many of them working in form and colour, and many dealing with sound and letter, such as poets and their melodistes, reciters, actors, dancers, contractors, and makers of all sorts of apparatus, including that of women’s toilet. And we shall want more personal associations in Greece, usually with as much of the advantage to be gained in contradistinction with each and so suggesting a stimulus; what you cannot do without. It may have a deepening tone in the reverse.

The great and fast is not. City life, assume the shapes of Platonism and Athenian, suppose were the concurrent methods of Greek art as the country before I shall write. Against which he is to come out in reaction. They were of delicate structure besides being of precious materials, and so frequent masses from which we can tell what they thought of.

I have a word or two very important in this last section. Town life, “hunting” means the people who catch game and fish for the rich men’s dinner, but there is a second section. For there are Plato’s candidates under the term hunters such “huntsmen of men” as poets. There are companions, philosophers and popular historians, with a relation partly to them making part out of men, partly to their capturing the minds by unbelief. Plato ranks the imitative artists in connection, along with the hunters, pretending to regard him as trying to take people into the scene instead of real things. Plato can attend to art is a very large and different subject. But on matters of art we can be ranks the “imitators” as friends with the “hunters” and what. They are usually treated out of the city again later on.

Having to do with the production of plays.

Not grammatically under the head of imitation, but Plato means to be analogous.
servants. Or do you not think we shall need children’s attendants, wet-nurses, dry-nurses, tire-women, barbers, and again, relish-makers and cooks? And we shall want swine-herds too; in our first city we had nothing of the kind; for we did not need them; but in this they will be wanted; and cattle, too, will be needed in great numbers, if they are to serve as food. Is it not so?

Of course.

And then shall we not be in need of physicians much more when living in this way than as before?

Much more.

And the territory which then sufficed to support its population will be no longer sufficient, but too small? Must we not say so?

Yes, he said.

Then we must cut off a slice of our neighbour’s country, if we are to have enough to pasture and till; and they will have to do the same to us, if they, like us, let themselves go in the unlimited acquisition of wealth, overleaping the bounds of the necessary.

It is quite inevitable, Socrates, he said.

Then we shall go to war, Glaucon, or how else?

Just so, he said.

1 Fathers will not look after their sons themselves; mothers will not suckle their own children. Jowett and Campbell in loc. Plato’s allusion here again suggests Rousseau.

2 Swine were not kept in “the city of pigs.” They are only kept for food.

3 And not merely for draft as above.

4 “Unlimited” or “unbounded.” Wealth, for Plato, is a collection of instruments or resources, the “end” of which is to promote good life. If wealth or riches is treated as worth having for its own sake, as is apt to be the case when trade has become a distinct factor in the community, it seems to the Greek thinker to be a means which has lost connection with its end, and therefore he calls the acquisition of it “unlimited,” i.e. there is no reason for stopping at any particular point, because there is no point at which anything, which he calls an end, is attained.
And I continued, let us not yet say a word on the question whether war does good or harm, but only this much, that we have discovered the origin of war, in those conditions from which moral insanity arose to enter when they arose at all, both in private and in public relations.

Quite true.

Further then, my friend, the city must be augmented by no small amount, but by a whole army, which will march out and do battle with invaders in defence of its entire possessions and of all those whom we were just now describing.

Why, he said, are they not sufficient by themselves?

No, I answered, but if you and all of us were right in our assumption, when we were mandating our city. For we assumed, if you remember, that it was impossible for one man to preserve several arts well.

Your city then be required.

What then? said I, does not the city of war seem to you to be of the nature of an art?

The mantle of state is a foldable mantle in this army and the question of it members. We cannot tell whether Plato was an arid or nil potable in the assembly of the highest spirit or from the soul of personal self-dence. In any case it gives him perfectly a remarkable portrait of the members of human reason from a certain stage of life and following it, we can say, and almost the great soul of an ideal nation.

A balanced sagacity to the growth of a conversation and personal unity in the 6th century B.C. The inner thought of the true Athenian soul, more like a matter than a regular array, except where, in Sparta, the whole state was organized into military cousins. Plato's idea is that you must have an actual personal model, not a general but the best model of the citizen, and cultivated that power and liberation in him than he was which the Spartans were. The argumentative passage which follows is not a very clear one. Plato was twenty when Athens was conquered by its enemies, and her famous temple was pulled down to the ground with stones and he seems to have been employed with the idea that a state's best duty was to be strong, undoubtedly strong in the strife of her people, not merely rich and powerful.
Very much so.

Then are we to treat shoe-making as more important than war?

Certainly not.

But did we not bar the shoemaker from taking in hand to be at the same time either a farmer or a weaver or a builder, in order that our shoemaker’s work might be properly brought to pass; and of all the others in the same way did we not assign to each one a single thing, to which his nature led him; and for which having leisure from all else, working upon it his whole life long, letting no occasion slip, he was likely to perform it well? Or is it not of the highest import that matters of war should be well performed? Or again, is it so easy a thing, that a man can carry on the tillage of the ground and be a skilled soldier besides, or go on with his shoe-making or working at any other craft whatever? and yet no one could possibly become a competent draught-player, or chess-player, if he did not practise that one thing from his boyhood up, but treated it as a matter by the way? And is it so, that if a man takes up a shield or any other of the arms or instruments of war, he will become within the day an accomplished champion of fence in heavy armour, or of any other that war may demand; but of all other instruments there is none which by just being taken up will make any man a workman or a player, or will be of use to one who neither possesses the science of it, nor has been submitted to a sufficient training?

Instruments would be precious indeed, he answered, if they could do all that.

Well then, I continued, the greater the guardian’s work,

1 Or “beautifully.”

2 Thus, without special remark, is introduced the appellation with which the great ideas of the Republic are inseparably associated. It has been partly anticipated, in its more spiritual sense, by the remark of 367 E that a man duly trained is his own guardian against wrong-doing, and so far has no need of external guardianship. The choice of such a title is in
the more complete liberation from all else will it demand, and moreover the profounder craftsmanship and application.

Indeed I think so.

Then does it not also need a nature suitable to the nature of the calling?

Of course.

Indeed it will be our business, apparently, if we are able, to select what natures and of what kind are suitable for the guardianship of a state.

No doubt it will.

By Zeus, then, I said, it is no trifling business that we have taken upon us: still, we must attend to our work, as far as our strength will stretch.

So we must, he said.

Now do you think, I went on, that the nature of a well-bred dog is different for the purpose of keeping guard from that of a noble young man?

What sort of thing do you mean?

Each of the two, for example, ought to be sharp to notice, and right earnest to pursue when he notices, and strong, more over, in case he should have to fight when he has caught something.

It is so, he said: all this is necessary.

And a step beyond this idea of an army in the ordinary sense, which seemed to be contemplated in 374 a. It prepares us for the discovery that the chief war in which the guardians are engaged through their duty of fighting is a battle in a Holy War, as in Herod’s epigram, and that the city is the seat of Messiah.

144. To the calling itself in what is an essential from others.

For the term guardian is a leading measure of Plato’s business in his combination with a justice in his state, and with a justice in his state, and with a justice in his state. He begins the partnership of the guardians, with the psychology of the watch dog, he takes up the mental dispositions required in their simplest form, and these then spread out to the higher ranges in the human soul. The procedure is essentially modern, and if we have no comparision
And he must be brave, if he is to fight well.

Of course.

Now can any creature be brave which is not spirited—either a horse, or dog, or any other animal? or have you not observed what an irresistible and unconquerable thing is spirit, making every soul that has it fearless and unyielding in face of everything?

I have noted it. So in bodily qualities it is plain what the guardian should be.

Yes. And thus much too, as to his soul, that it should be spirited. That too is clear.

But then, Glaucon, I said, how are they to escape being savage to one another and the rest of the citizens, if they are like this in their natures?

By Zeus, he answered, not easily.

They ought, however, to be gentle to their own people, and dangerous to the enemy, else they will not wait for others to annihilate them, but themselves will do it first.

Quite true.

What shall we do, then? I said. Where are we to discover a disposition at once gentle and great-hearted? for I presume that a gentle nature is the opposite of a spirited one.

1 The Greek word usually rendered brave etymologically = “manly,” so that when applied as here to a dog, it at once makes a link between human and animal qualities.

2 Cf. Sophocles' *Electra*. "For just as a noble horse, though he be old, when in peril does not lose spirit but pricks up his ear." In English usage, the adjective "spirited" corresponds to Plato's meaning better than the substantive "spirit." Whatever word we adopt must be carefully interpreted with reference to the context in Plato, and not merely by its current English associations. The fact which Plato starts from is the "pluck" of the thorough-bred that makes him "go till he drops" and fight till he dies.

3 A different word, pointing to a further step in bringing out the meaning of "spirit." Mr Greatheart in the *Pilgrim's Progress* is in many ways a fair
It appears so.

But yet, if one be destitute of either of these, whichever it be, there is no hope that he will prove a good guardian, and what we want looks like an impossibility, and so the conclusion is that for a good guardian to come into being is impossible.

Something near it, he said.

Then I was surprised, and thought over what had gone before, till I exclaimed, My dear friend, we deserve to be puzzled, for we have abandoned the companions which we set before us.

How do you mean?

We did not notice that in fact there are natures, such as we thought there were not, possessing these opposite qualities.

Where are they?

One may see it in other animals too, but most of all in that which we were comparing to the guardian. You know that well-bred dogs naturally have this disposition, to be as gentle as possible to those whom they are accustomed to and whom they know, but the opposite to strangers.

I know it.

What we want, then, is impossible, and our quest for a guardian like this is not contrary to nature

Apparently not.

Then do you not think that anyone who is to be of the guardian type stands in need of this another quality, in addition to being spirited to be also a lover of wisdom in its nature?

It is a parallel how I am a guardian, the bowels muttering tedium, as for them at once unusual and incomprehensible.

1 It "made," indicating a pleasant sympathy with the dog's nice qualities, and anticipating the sharpening of the argument. Glaucon in a spokesman and leader (see 453 a), and the argument about how dogs and horses is appropriate to him.

2 It "philosopher," which etymologically means of wisdom. Another of the noble steps in the transition from the animal to the higher human soul, and an anticipation of the later argument. The "guardian" of the
How? he said. I do not see.

This again, I answered, you will observe in dogs; a trait which we may well admire in the animal.

Of what kind?

If he sees anyone he does not know, he is angry, though the stranger has never hurt him; but if he sees anyone he knows, he welcomes him, even though he has never received a kindness from him. Or have you never been struck by this?

I never particularly attended to it before; but it is plain that the dog does act in this way.

Well, but this attribute of his nature is quite a pretty phenomenon and genuinely philosophic.\(^1\)

In what way?

In as far as, I said, he discriminates the sight which he likes and that which he hates on no other ground than that he recognises the one and does not know the other. And yet how can he be other than fond of knowledge, if he distinguishes what he is at home with from what is alien to him by his apprehension and his ignorance?

It is impossible that he should not be so.

Well, but, I went on, fondness for knowledge and the love of wisdom\(^2\) are the same thing?

The same, he said.

Then we may boldly take it for truth of a human being too, that if he is to be of gentle bearing to his kinsfolk and acquaintance,\(^3\) he must be by nature philosophic and fond of knowledge.\(^4\)

\(^1\) See note on previous page.

\(^2\) Lit. "the philosophic." See below, note 4.

\(^3\) Lit. "his belongings and those whom he knows," keeping up the connection with the previous argument.

\(^4\) The quality mentioned in 376 A is here defined by a term which
Book II.

We may take it so, he replied.

Then of one who is to be a perfect guardian of a city we shall demand that he be by nature philosophical and spirited and swift and strong.

Absolutely so.

Him then we will take as our starting point. But in what way are these to be nurtured and educated? and will it be any gain to us to examine the question with a view to discerning what is the object of our whole enquiry, in what way justice and injustice come into being in a state? that we may not omit a relevant discussion, or complete an excessive one.

So Channos's brother broke in. Most certainly I anticipate that this enquiry is of value for our purpose.

By Zeus, I said, my dear Alcmenetus, then we must not let it drop, even if it turn out to be rather long.

Of course not.

Come, then, let us make a table of it, story telling at our leisure, and so in fancy educate our men.

Yes, we must do.

Argument 370 b—383. The beginnings of education.

What sort of men about whose being we should be conveyed to the young through tale and poetry.

Then what is the education to be? Or is it difficult to find a better than that which the ages have discovered? It
is, I imagine, Gymnastic\textsuperscript{1} for the body, and Music\textsuperscript{2} for the mind.

So it is.

Now shall we not begin to educate them by music before gymnastic?

Certainly.

And when you say so, you include stories in music, do you not? And there are two kinds of stories, the one true and the other false?

Yes.

And in education we have to use both, but the false ones first?

I do not see your meaning\textsuperscript{3}.

Do you not see, I said, that we begin by telling fables to children; and they, to speak of them as a whole, are fictions, though there are in them some elements of truth. And we tell children stories before we teach them gymnastics.

It is so.

This is what I meant by saying that we must set to work with music before gymnastics.

You are right, he said.

Now you know that in every enterprise the beginning is

\textsuperscript{1} "Gymnastic for the body." Plato starts from the fact as currently accepted, and leads up to a deeper view, see 411 E; for what the bodily training in the widest sense includes, see 412 B. Cf. also 467 C—E.

\textsuperscript{2} Music: the peculiar meaning of the word in Plato must be gathered from Plato. It had of course for the Greeks no such separate application to the mere art of sound as it has for us, but would usually imply something of the nature of poetry, with or without singing or instrumental music. For Plato, as an educational instrument, it is almost equivalent to our "art," including fiction and poetry, music, painting and plastic art.

\textsuperscript{3} Often an indication in Plato that the thought will be new to the average mind. Of course, even if Nature is taken as the story-book (cf. Longfellow's Birthday of Agassiz), it is impossible to convey what is truth for a mature mind to an immature one. Plato is about to point out what can and must be done.
the main thing, especially in dealing with a young and tender nature. For at that time it is most plastic, and the stamp sinks in deepest which it is desired to impress upon anyone.

Just so.

Shall we then lightly give license for our children to hear any chance fables imagined by any chance people, and to receive in their souls impressions opposed to those which when they have come to maturity, we shall think that they ought to possess?

We must not permit it in the smallest degree.

To begin with, as it seems, we must control the composure of fables and select any good ones which they compose, and reject what are not good. And we will persuade the nurses and mothers to tell the children those fables which we have selected, seeing that they would their minds with the tales they tell, far more really than their bodies with their hands, and we must throw aside the greater part of what they sell today.

Which? he asked.

In the greater tales, I answered, we shall see how to judge the lesser. For both greater and lesser must be of the same stamp and have the same bearing. Do you not think so?

Certainly, be said, but I do not see even which are the greater ones which you speak of.

They shall be good both in number so far as the relating of manners taught to the giving right training of particular customs and experiences.

Let beauty, that generally in a very general sense which is best ordered by one as well good.

The Socratic question from Theophrastus of the Eucharis. Add. The greater is necessary to the habits of children injuries from both ends that they may grow strong and wholesome, in the same way it is necessary the sphere that character is in the beginning. I do not fear that I shall now be following this passage or which one for one and used to witness for the nation of comprehending the children's bodies. I am told that among the poets that the accuracy in qualify the steps of the children's heads by joining them with the hands.
Those which Hesiod and Homer used to tell us, and the other poets too. For they, I imagine, put together false fables which they told and are still telling to mankind.

Which are they, said he, and what fault do you find with them?

The primary and most serious of all faults, especially when the lie¹ is an ugly lie.

E. What is this fault?

When anyone imagines badly² in his story about gods or heroes³, what they are like, just as a painter whose picture has no resemblance to what he wished it to resemble.

Why indeed, he said, things like that ought to be censured. But what do we mean, and which are they?⁴

First, I said, the greatest lie about the greatest things, an ugly lie to tell, that Uranus did⁵, what Hesiod says he did, and what vengeance Kronos took upon him, and the doings of Kronos⁶, too, and his treatment by his sons; even if it had all been true, I should not have supposed it ought to be told as a matter of course to the young and immature; but if there

¹ The primary defect is the falsehood, and it is worse when it is an ugly falsehood. As the whole passage is about fiction, these two degrees of faultiness tend to come together, i.e. the fiction is both false and ugly when its main ideas are unsuitable to its subject.

² Or, makes a bad likeness. The Greek fuses the ideas of "image" and "likeness" in a way English cannot render.

³ "Heroes" were men one of whose parents was a god or goddess, which was thought to have been possible only in the earlier generations of the human race. Some heroes were supposed to have become gods after their death, but all partook of divinity through their parentage.

⁴ The difficulty with which the interlocutor takes up the criticism is probably meant to illustrate the difficulty of seeing anything wrong in stories to which we are accustomed. Parts of the Old Testament might be a case in point.

⁵ Indecent stories of a type common in savage mythology. We are inclined to say, "But no one in Plato's day would take these things seriously as a part of religion." Plato however thinks that the child's mind would be stained by them.
was some need to tell it, it should be a religious secret, for as few as possible to hear, having to sacrifice not a pig, but some large and extravagant offering, that the smallest possible number might have come to hear about it.

Why yes, he said, these are unpleasant stories.

Yes, indeed, Alcmantus, and they absolutely must not be told in our state. We must not tell a young listener that in committing the extreme at injustice he would be doing nothing extraordinary, nor again in using the uttermost effort to punish his father’s transgressions but that he would be doing the same as the best and the greatest of the gods.

No, by Zeus, he answered, I myself do not think them suitable to be told.

Nor, said I, in any case whatever, that gods make war upon gods, and plot against them, and fight with them—nor, neither is it true—at least if those who are to guard our city ought to believe it must be disgraceful to be lightly at enmity with one another at least of all should we tell them stories and paint them pictures of battles between gods and giants, and other histories of many and various, of gods and heroes with their kinfolk and families. But if in any way we are likely to convince them, that never yet was any citizen at feud with his fellow and that to be so in a sin, this is rather what must be told them from earliest childhood by old men and women, and as they grow older let us compel the poets who compose tales for them to keep pretty near to this. But beholdings of

1 For having summoned the Parnassian muse, which was very kindly attended.

2 One of the best copies preserved to young children, the duty of guards and friends of their state. It might be said that we have the "father" gods and goddesses as a sort of "|your tale about whose adventures may be told without running in imitation. Whereas to the Greeks, because there were in a more numerous class, closed up only by the name of the god and, even when they were very seriously taken
Hera by her son, and hurlings into space of Hephaestus by his father because he was going to defend his mother when beaten, and battles between gods which Homer has composed, we must not receive into the city, whether the poet had an allegorical meaning or had not. For the young are not capable of judging what is an allegory and what is not, but whatever one of that age has received among his impressions is wont to become indelible and immutable. For which reason, perhaps, it should be treated of the first importance that the earliest tales they hear should be invented most beautifully in their bearing upon goodness.

Yes, he said, it is reasonable. But if any one were to put to us this further question what these inventions are, and which are the right fables, which should we then accept?

And I replied, Adeimantus, you and I at the present moment are not poets, but founders of a state. Now it is the founder's business to know the canons within which the poets ought to invent their fables, and which they are not to be permitted to transgress in their composition; but they themselves are not to compose stories.

Quite right, he said; but on this very point—the canons of theology—what may they be?

Somewhat of this kind surely; God must always be repre-

1 Another early lesson inculcated here and just above—respect for parents.

2 An under- or secondary meaning. There are many motives for finding an allegory in poetry, when nothing of the kind was intended; and one of them is the desire to explain away traits that jar on the moral feeling of a later time. Before Plato's day the criticism of Homer and the ancient mythology had taken this shape on the one hand, while it took that of frank censure on the other. Both are superfluous if we understand what poetry is; and Plato's next sentence is irony aimed at the allegorical interpretation.

3 Or of stories or discourses about the gods, or, about God. I believe this is the first time that the word theology, "Theologia," occurs in literature.
presented such as he is, whether the representation be in epic poetry or in tragedy.

He must
Now is not God in reality good, and to be so spoken of?
Of course.
But no good thing is harmful, is it?
I think not.
Then can what is not harmful, do harm?
By no means.
And can that which does no harm, do any evil?
No, again.
And what does no evil, cannot be the cause of any evil?
Of course not.
Well, now, is good advantageous?
Yes.
Then it is the cause of welfare?
Yes.
Then good is not the cause of everything, but it is the cause of all that is well, and not of what is ill.
Exactly, he said.

Then God too, seeing that he is good, will not be the cause of all things, as the common opinion is, but he must be the cause to mankind of few things, and of many not the cause for we have far fewer good things than evil. Now what is good we must impute to none but him, but for what is evil we must seek out some other causes, and not God.

What you are saying appears to me to be perfectly true.
We are not, then, I continued, to assent to Homer or
another poet when he insanely runs into this error about the gods, and says that

"two casks lie at the threshold of Zeus
Full of lots, the one of good, the other of evil ones."

—and he to whom Zeus mingles and gives of the two, "at one time meets with good, and at another with ill," but he to whom it is not so, and the one is given unmingle

"Him an evil plague harries over the divine earth,"

or again that "Zeus is dispenser for us of good and ill."

And the violation of the oaths and the truce, which Pandarus violated, if any man allege to have been brought to pass by Athene's means and Zeus', we shall not approve; nor the strife and altercation of the gods by Themis and Zeus; nor must we permit the young to hear how Aeschylus says that "God implants guilt in mortals when he intends to bring utter woe upon their house."

But if any one shall make a poem on the fate of Niobe—it is in such an one that these verses occur—or on that of the House of Pelops or the Trojan war or any other subject of

This and the following quotations down to "good and ill" are apparently cited from memory, from Iliad xxiv. 527 ff.
2 "The violation of the oaths" is part of the title of Book iv. of Homer's Iliad, and is described in the opening lines of that book. Hera, Zeus, and Athene are all agreed in arranging it.
3 Homer's Iliad xx.
Zeus sends Themis to summon the gods to an assembly, and there suggests to them that they should go and fight for Greeks and Trojans respectively, at their pleasure.
4 The idea of Aeschylus here referred to may be read in the sense of Heracleitus' saying that "Character is fate." Plato is striking at current opinion, and for the moment does not care whether a higher rendering is possible. He is concerned with the actual common feeling which influences the young.
5 The royal house of Mycenae, to which Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, Menelaus, Orestes and Electra, some of the principal figures in Greek poetry, belong.
the kind, either we must not permit him to say that it is the doing of a god, or if it is the doing of a god, they must find out some such principle as we are now seeking, and they must say that all which the god did was just and good; and the others were gainers by being punished. But that those who pay a penalty are miserable, and that he who brought it about was a god, we must not allow the poet to say, but if we should say that the mortals were in need of punishment, because the wicked are miserable, and in paying the penalty they were being done good to by the god, we may allow it, but as for assuming that God, who is good, can prove the cause of evil to any one, we must not say to the death by every possible means that none shall say it in our state, if it is to be a well-ordered one, and none shall hear it, neither young nor old, whether the story be in verse or in prose; for it would be a sin to say it, if it were said, and inexpedient for us, and contradictory to itself.

I vote with you, he said, for this law, and I approve it.

This, then, I said, will be one of the laws and canons respecting the gods, within which the story-tellers must narrate and the poets must compose, that God is not the cause of all things but only of good.

It is quite satisfactory

And what of this for the second? Do you think that God is a wizard, and as of magic prepossession makes appearance first in one guise and then in another, sometimes changing in himself and transmuting his form into many forms, and at

The language of this entire passage is on the whole that of Plato, giving a perfect view of the Socratic form of it. It is continually referred to the natural and religious ideas. No place for moral distinctions are really made by him; and in places the nature of God is so strongly insisted on that the form in which we are associated with the Deity seems to be the best rendering of Plato's meaning.

For the god is not the cause of evil as
other times deluding us and making us think of him to that effect; or that his being is single, and of all things least tending to depart out of his own form?

I am not able to say on the spur of the moment.

What do you think about this? Is it not necessary, if anything departs from its own form, that it be transmuted either itself by itself, or by something else?

It is necessary.

Now that which is in the best condition is least altered or disturbed by anything else? Take the body as affected by food and drink and work, or any plant by heat and wind and such influences; is not the healthiest and the strongest that which is least altered?

Certainly.

And is it not the bravest and wisest soul which an external affection has least power to distract and alter?

Yes.

Well, and surely all artificial things also, all utensils and buildings, follow the same rule; those which are well-made and in good condition undergo the least alteration by time and other influences.

It is so.

Then everything which is in a good condition, whether a work of nature or of art or both together, is capable of the least alteration from without.

It appears so.

But God and the state of God is in all ways the best.

Doubtless.

Then in this point of view God is very far from having many forms.

1 Ancient poetry and mythology are full of stories to this effect, often in connection with the loves of the gods, or with their taking part in the warfare of mortals, both of which ideas would appear improper to Plato.

2 Contrasted with the idea of the next paragraph, that God might change himself.
Very Lis, he replied
But will he transform and alter himself?
Plainly it is so, if he changes at all
Whether then does he change himself into something better and more beautiful than before, or into something worse and more ugly?
Necessarily he must change for the worse, if he changes at all, for surely we shall not affirm that God is lacking in beauty or excellence.
What you say, is perfectly right, I replied, and this being so, do you believe, Ademantus, that any one, either of gods or men, would willingly make himself in any way worse?
It is impossible
Then, I said, it is impossible for a god to wish to change himself, but as it seems each of them being the best and most beautiful that is possible remains for ever simply in his own form.
This, I think, is a sheer necessity.
Then my good Sir, let none of the poets tell us that.

“Gods in the interest of strangers from foreign lands becoming of all forms, none from any kind.

not let any one slander Proteus' and Thetis', nor again in tragedies or any poets introduce Hera transformed as a

1 Here I am quite using the language of philosophers.
2 Odyssey xv. 184. This was the following line to verse 183. It is an argument against treating a wanderer beggarlike the same lad who entertained angels unknown. Hebrews 11. 19.
3 The old name of the sea, whose transformations, when solid hands were laid thereon, were revealed in the Odyssey
4 The wise poets do have taken various or the same forms, but explicitly in the Hesiods.
priestess, collecting alms "for the lifegiving sons\(^1\) of the Argive river Inachus." And there are many such lies which we must not let them tell; nor again must the mothers be perverted by them to terrify the children, telling the fables badly; for example, that there are certain gods who go about by night taking the shape of all sorts of strangers; that they may not at the same time slander the gods, and make their children cowards\(^2\).

They must not.

But, said I, is it that the gods are in themselves incapable of change, but make it seem to us that they appear in various forms, deluding us and playing the wizard?

Perhaps, he said.

What? I answered; would a god be willing to lie either in word, or in act by presenting a false appearance?

I do not know.

Do you not know that *the true lie*, if it is possible to use such a phrase, is hateful to all, both gods and men?

What do you mean? he asked.

This, I said, that to be false in their sovereign part about matters of sovereign concern is what none consent to with their good will, but above all things they dread that a lie should be seated there.

Even now, he replied, I do not understand.

Because you think that I am saying something abstruse; but I only say that to be false in one's soul about realities\(^3\), and to be deluded and in ignorance about them, and in that place to have and to hold the lie, is what all would repudiate

\(^1\) The children of Inachus are the other rivers of Argolis on whose waters the fruitfulness of the plain depended.

\(^2\) To prevent children from being frightened with stories of ghosts and bogeys was, I suppose, found difficult in quite recent years in England.

\(^3\) The soul is "the sovereign part"; "realities," a clumsy modern phrase compared to the "what are" of the original, are the "matter of sovereign concern."
at any cost, and they loathe the thing superlatively in such a case.

Very much so.

But, to come back to the phrase I used just now, this is what may most correctly be called the true lie, namely, the ignorance seated in the soul of the dejected person, for the lie which is spoken is a sort of copy and subsequently generated image of the affection seated in the soul, and not a pure and absolute falsity. Is it not so?

Certainly.

The real lie then is caused not only by gods but by men I think so.

But not the lie in words, when and to whom is it expedient, so as not to merit hate? Is it not in communication with the enemy, or with any of our so-called friends who own to insanity or some form of forenoon, endeavour to do mischief that it proves useful on such occasions as a medicine for the prevention of harm? And do we not in the story telling, in which we were speaking of just now, by reason of our not knowing how the truth truly about matters long ago, antedate the falsehood, so far as we can to the truth, and to make it useful?

Exactly so.

Not in which of these ways can a lie be of use to God?
Would he use fiction to imitate fact from ignorance of matters long ago?

Why, he said, that would be ridiculous.
There is no lying poet in God, is there?
I fancy not.
But would he tell lies from fear of his enemies?
Far from it.

Or because of the unreason or madness of his friends?
No, he said, no one mad or void of reason is a friend of God.
Then there is no ground for which God should be false?
None.
Then the superhuman and the divine is wholly free from falsehood.
Absolutely so.
Then we may safely say that God is a simple and true being in deed and word, neither changing of himself nor deluding others, neither in words nor by sending of portents, neither when men wake nor when they dream.
Thus it seems to me too, he assented, when I hear your argument.

Do you agree then, I said, that this is the second canon, within which men must both tell tales and compose poetry about the gods, that neither are they themselves wizards in metamorphosing themselves, nor do they mislead us by falsehood of word or deed?
I agree.
Then, while approving much in Homer, yet this we shall

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1 A word including all spirits and superior beings, such as the "heroes" above mentioned, who were not considered in the full sense deities. It would be used in the widest sense for the supernatural including the divine. It is the same word which is used for the supernatural sign of which Socrates used to say that he was aware.

2 The use of the word "God" here is probably generic, as we might say "the child as such." It is very close upon the use as a name.
not approve, the sending of the dream by Zeus to Agamemnon not in Aeschylean, when Thetis says that Apollo singing at her bridal

... on her happy nuptial day.

And long years have I known:

And having told that my son was in all things (deed of gods):

He also a dream of simple simplicity:

And I was shaming that I talked then awhile:

Was told, also by such prophetic tellers:

But he that learned says: the same (myself) was present at the song:

Himself spoke (to) itself. Himself is but that now my son.

When anyone tells such tales about the gods, we shall be angry, and shall refuse him a chorus, and shall not permit the teachers to use his work for the education of the young, if our guardians are to prove god-revering and godlike, to the greatest degree possible for man.

I entirely assent to these canons, he answered, and I should adopt them as laws.

1 The sending of a dream to Zeus by Thetis. Agamemnon is described in the opening lines of Book 10 of the Iliad (1.10-15) as a prophecy which the Theban chieftain related to the assembled heroes. It is remarkable that Thetis shares the power of foretelling and prophecies: 

2 This passage for a chorus at Alcmaeon, the chief exponents of his education was preserved at the cost of most worthy exertions, for whose this was a necessary and noble deed, undertaken in a certain measure. Not to grant is the cause to forbid the representation of the play.

3 I take this at the same view, for I ask the god because he is that which of worship. See (210) and especially (245). Do not think it possible for it to mean, what we are familiar with and admire!
BOOK III.

Argument. 386 A—392 C. Passing from fables about gods to fables on the whole about persons rather nearer humanity, and dealing with young people of a more advanced age than in the last book, Plato points out how Courage, Truthfulness and Temperance, in elementary forms, may be promoted or the reverse through the imagination.

So far as regards the gods, I continued, it would seem that something like the above should be heard and should not be heard from early childhood by citizens who are to honour the gods and their parents, and are to pay no small regard to friendship with one another.¹

And I imagine our opinion is just.

What next? If they are to be brave, must not what they are told be of that nature, and what will make them have the least possible fear of death; or do you think that any one could ever be brave, while having this fear in him?

By Zeus, he answered, certainly not.

How then? Do you suppose that one who believes the world of Hades to be real and to be awful will prefer death to defeat and slavery?

¹ A summary of the passage just completed.

² The quotations below show that Plato has mainly in mind not the other world as a place of reward and punishment, but the more primitive idea of a feeble and dreary prolongation of life, similar to life on earth.
Then, as it seems, we ought to attend to these fables too and supervise those who take in hand to tell them, and request them not, as they do, to pour absolute contempt on the world of Hades, but rather to speak well of it, as what they say is not true, and does no good to men whose duty it will be to be valiant.

Not doubt we must.

Then we shall erase everything to that effect, beginning with the following verses :

"Rather, I think, I love above ground as the burning of a lamb, with a hidden name who has no great household, than bear away among all the dead that be departed,"

and [the ruler of Hades feared least]

The manner should be to lay it to gods and men great and possible is

which even the gods beloved,"

and

Ah and! Surely there is even in the movements of Hades a ghost and a phantasm, but no god is it at all,"

and

"That he alone should have understanding, but the other gods whose wasn't at all,"

1 Not true and does not good are for I fix two sides of the same idea. Truth is the conquering of the soul upon reason, what scourges and dments the soul as such, so far, be truth.

2\theta θήλης ἡ αἰγός ἡ The works of Achilles to Ulysses in the world of the departed spirits

3 θνατός ἐν 64 ff. In the description of Iapetus and the land with the seven gods, earth shaken. The moment of the dead are born thought of as an extended grave

4 θνατός 103. Achilles after Patroclus has appeared to him in a dream. The ghost of dead or wrath is thought of as a born matter or overtrace of the man, not as "spirited being." See I. III in Homer.

5 ἐγών ιδον 475 of Ithaca the great prophet or woodcutter whom in Hades.
and

"The soul flitting from his limbs went down to Hades lamenting its fate, leaving manhood and vigour 1 ,"  

387 A and

"The soul went beneath the ground like smoke, with a twittering cry 2 ,"

and

"Even as bats flit twittering in the secret place of a wondrous cave, when one has fallen down out of the rock from the cluster, and they cling each to each up aloft, even so the souls twittered as they fared together 3 ."

B  All this, and everything like it, we shall entreat of Homer and the other poets not to be indignant with us if we cancel, not that they are not poetical, and pleasant to the common crowd to hear; but because the more poetical 4 they are, the less they are fit hearing for children or for men whose duty it is to be free 5 , dreading slavery more than death.

Certainly.

Are not moreover all the terrible and alarming names connected with that world to be put aside, Cocytuses, and

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1 Iliad xvi. 856, of Patroclus when slain by Hector.
2 Iliad xxiii. 100, of the soul of Patroclus, seen by Achilles in his dream. For the twittering or chirping cry, the unmusical and unintelligible utterance of a feeble frightened creature, such as young birds, or bats, see next quotation.
3 Odyssey xxiv. 6—9, of the souls of Penelope’s suitors whom Ulysses had slain. (Rendering modified from Butcher and Lang’s translation.) Plato’s objection to these passages does not touch the question of a future life either one way or the other. Ideas like these of a continued existence would affect his mind as some “spiritualistic revelations” affect ours, with a sense of futility and degradation.
4 I. e. the more they lend attraction to the sentiments they express. To be poetical is not yet a vice per se, though in Book X. it may become so.
5 Free, cf. 395 c. Freedom, the absence of obstruction within and without, is the key-note of the Republic.
Styves, and ghosts and vampires, and the rest of that type, the names of which make all who hear them shudder in the extreme? And thia may be well for another purpose, but we are afraid for our guardian lest such tremours may make them too hot and yet too soft.

We do well to be afraid.

Then we reject them all?

We do.

And our stories and poetry must be of the opposite type to these.

Clearly.

Then we shall remove also the wallows and lamentations of illustrious men?

Necessarily, he answered, if we remove the others.

Consider, said I, whether we shall he right to remove them or not. We affirm that a good man will not think death terrible to a good man, whose comrade also he is.

He will not.

Then he will not lament for the other's sake as if some fearful thing had befallen him.

No indeed.

Well but we affirm this too, that such an one is eminently suitable to himself in living well, and in least of all men dependent upon others.

1 Convos, the river of wailing, and Styx, the river of haine, rivers of the underworld. The plural is more appropriate.

2 Perhaps, the word is ancient and having been corrupted.

3 A metaphor from metal-working; or from war, the idea is clearly expressed—overruled and having been reversed.

4 And so we have the possession of character. The no manship is then a reason for not growing, instead of being one for growing.

5 A sort which anticipates St. John and most opposed to the principle on which the rest. See ibid. and the Oxf. verse may be able to stand alone because he has the true moral spirit as strongly. Christianly has the same apparent contradiction, viz. between the love of God and the love of self.

6 This phrase is exceedingly pregnant in Latin, and indicates the rest.
True.
Then it is not terrible to him to lose a son or brother or money or anything else of the kind.
It is not.
Then he is the last man to lament when some such disaster befalls him, but will bear it most patiently.
Very much so.
So we should be right in taking away the laments of illustrious men, and assigning them to women, and those not the best, and to inferior men, that those whom we affirm we are rearing to the guardianship of our country may feel repugnance\(^1\) to behaving like them.
Quite right.
Again, we shall entreat Homer and the rest of the poets not to represent Achilles the son of a goddess

"Lying first on his side, then again on his back, and then face downwards, and then rising to his feet and sailing along by the shore of the unfertile sea\(^2\),"

B nor taking in both hands the yellow dust to pour it over his head, nor weeping and lamenting\(^3\) on other occasions, when

of his and of Aristotle's ethics. See 353—4 above. Life, or that by which we live (see below 445 A), for the Greek thinker is the soul. Thus, in the largest and at the same time the simplest sense, to live well is to have a soul which is at once efficient (good in the Greek sense) and happy, just as to see well is to have eyes which work effectively and with comfort.

\(^1\) "Repugnance." The same word as in the great passage 401E where the theory of this part of education is summed up. The boy or girl is first of all to be trained by habit and imitation to shrink from what is wrong, vulgar, or ugly, and to be attracted by what is right. When the basis of life is thus moulded, the reason of it all will come home easily, though at a later stage.

\(^2\) Iliad xxiv. 10 ff., of Achilles in his agony of sorrow for Patroclus. The words "sailing along" are put in to make the passage ridiculous.

\(^3\) Plato is insensibly passing from courage (386 A) to temperance (389 D). The affinity of these two qualities, in self-mastery or the power of resisting the onset of emotion, is a favourite conception with Plato.
and as Homer represents him, not Priam, by descent near to the gods, supplicating and rolling in the long heaps,

"Crying loudly on each side by name." 4

And far more earnestly still we shall entreat them at least not to represent divine persons as wailing and crying

"Ah me unhappy, ah me, your wasting of the heart!"

or at the very least, if it must be so with the gods, not to dare to portray with so little likeness the greatest of the gods as to make him say

"Also, I should wish my eyes a man whose I have being chased round the sea, and my heart lamented!"

and

"Ah me! that I am false to Sarpedon, desirous to me of man, to be delivered by Pandarus Memnon's son!"

For if, my dear Adelmarion, our young people were to listen seriously to all that, and not to despise it as an unworthy invention, then a man would be slow to think that himself, a mere human being was above it, and to chide himself if it should but cross his mind to say or do anything of the sort, but, more likely, without shame and without endurance he would whine out many a plaint and lamentation over trivial misfortunes.

"I read with 41, of Priam praying his people not to prevent him from going to ask Achilles for the body of Hector."

"I read xvii. 44. That, the data in favor of Achilles lamenting over his great and his short life.

"I read xvi. 108. Zeus watching Hector persecuted by Achilles.

"I read xv. 47."

The very next the advice were that we die. According to I was to, even a man like Socrates, the great statesman, on hearing of his son's death, is naturally described as "bewailing himself on the head, and lying and saying the other things which belong to a grief." I have observed the manner in which I did lament at a funeral oration. Perhaps we are in some ways right. Yet we know that
What you say is very true.

But this is wrong, as our argument indicated just now, which we must obey, until someone convinces us by another and a better one.

It is wrong.

Again, they ought not to be fond of laughter. For it is pretty much the case that when anyone gives way to violent laughter, it demands a violent reaction.

I agree.

Then we must not approve when men of importance are represented as overcome by laughter, and still less when gods are.

Much less.

Then we must further reject such passages as this in Homer,

"And unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods when they saw Hephaestus bustling through the banquet-hall," according to your rule.

If you like to call it mine, he said; we certainly must reject them.

Again, we must set a high value upon truth. For if we

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1 387 E above.

2 This does not come home to us. Contrast Carlyle on Teufelsdröckh's laugh. The dangers of our temperament are in many ways opposed to those which threatened the Greeks—a people of southern blood, liable to emotional storms, in spite of their extraordinary intellectual endowments. See last note but one. We may illustrate the meaning by the need of stopping fits of laughter in hysterical persons, or by the appearance of a want of self-control and self-respect which is produced by violent laughter in public places.

3 Iliad 1. 599, of Hephaestus, the lame god of fire and of the smithy, acting as waiter at the gods' banquet, to restore their cheerfulness.

4 We must understand that Plato treats the good qualities of a man from different points of view according to the stage of education, the level of mind, with which he is concerned. Here truthfulness is introduced between courage and self-control, as the duty of a pupil or subject to his teacher.
right just now, and falsehood is in reality useless to good, and to men useful only as a medicine, it is plain that such a thing must be committed to the physician, and laymen must not touch it.

Quite plain.

Then the rulers of the state, if anyone, have the duty of telling lies whether in dealing with the enemy or with fellow citizens, for the good of the city, but the rest must not meddle with such a thing, since for a private individual to be to such rulers as these we shall say to be the same offence 1, and a greater too, with that of a patient who should tell his doctor, or an athlete who should tell his trainer, what was not true about the afflictions of his own body, or of a man who should tell falsehoods to the pilot about the ship and the sailors, as to how himself or his mates were tiring in their work.

Most true.

Then if a ruler catches anyone else in the state telling a falsehood, any of those who are craftsmen 1, or rulers themselves, wiser than himself. But this of course is not the ultimate view of the ground or nature of the kind of truth as above says.

1 Not to be the government only to have fairly its own part, partly an anticipation of such trials which are as are raised to say about the color of diplomacy and politicians in general.

2 What is the inference from Plato's present point of view? It seems to be elsewhere, with strong emphasis on the necessity which a public need is not to be lied. The act to self-contradictory, yet to inform to the very people, their own chance, it is your interest to have it. As he says it is the only lie telling the truth to your doctors. We all know how lying the senseless when no sense to be honest, and falsehoods and authority can be. Truth should be to fellow citizens and to whom human beings most important, but we are not speaking of personal matters, in which belongs only to the rulers. This is really a further proof of the same principle, found in the system in which you an argument.

1 Applied to workers for the public; or, Attribution to the human community of professional, not in this view in increasing

Book III. 71
he will punish him as introducing a practice tending to upset the state, like a ship, and disastrous.

Yes, he said, if our act is to follow our word.

But further, will not temperance\(^1\) be necessary to our young men\(^2\)?

Of course.

And are not the following the chief elements of temperance, where a number of persons are concerned, to be obedient to the rulers, and themselves to rule\(^3\) the pleasures of drink, and love, and food?

I agree.

Then we shall affirm that things like this are well said, when in Homer, for example, Diomede cries

"Friend, sit in silence, and obey my word\(^4\),"

and the passage which goes with it,

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\(^1\) "Temperance"; whatever rendering we adopt we shall need some effort to seize Plato's meaning. The etymology of the Greek word suggests soundness or sanity of mind. "Self-control" conveys too much the idea of a struggle. "Temperance" has the fault of suggesting to us merely the opposite of one or two vulgar vices. The temperate man in Plato (fuller account, 442c) is one the elements of whose whole nature work heartily together in the service of reason—of law, that is, or intelligent purpose. A Greek statue of the great time, a figure, say, from the frieze of the Parthenon, might give us the best perception of what a Greek meant by temperance.

\(^2\) "Young men." We have here insensibly passed beyond the stage of childhood.

\(^3\) Obedience to authority and command of self. The relation of these two sides of "temperance" will be further explained in Bk. IV. They are the main aspects which would strike anyone, dealing, as Plato says, with "a number" of persons in course of education, which is the present point of view.

\(^4\) \textit{Iliad} IV. 412. The following parts of lines come from passages (\textit{Iliad} III. 8; IV. 431) different from one another and from this. Plato's memory has associated them.
The Greeks gave us, breaking courage, in science, in art, their art, and any other like them.
They are well said.
But what about such as

"O happy with wine, thou god, with the heart of a man!"

and the following lines, are they well said? And so of all the important acts of individuals to rulers which are recounted in stories or in poetry?

They are not right.

No, for I imagine they are not suited for young men to hear, if temperance is our aim, but it is no wonder if apart from this they produce pleasure. Or what do you think?

I agree.

Once more; to represent the worst of men as saying that he thinks it the finest thing in the world when the tables are loaded

"With bread and meat and a wine potter drawing the wine serves it round and pours it into the cup!"

does this appear to you to be conducive to self-restraint in a young man? or the words

"To die and meet them by hunger is the meanest thing!"?

in to represent Zeus, after he had been deliberating, when the rest of gods and men were asleep and he alone was awake, as readily forgetting it all because of the passion of love, and

1 As quoted by Aristotle. Against Eudemus, the King of Macedon. Evidence of this kind is not rare in Greek poetry, and though it does not disproves what is commonly told us about the fine and regret of Greek art, yet it shows the bondage of experience to us to be less rigid than it often supposed. We are not surprised that Plato found such lines shocking.

2 Tactically as A. As Professor Campbell remarks, Plato does not the measure, which Homer mentions first.
as so smitten at the sight of Hera that he would not go away, but wanted to stay there and make love to her, and telling her that he is so possessed by love as he had never been, even at first when they used to meet

"Without their parents' knowledge," or the binding of Ares and Aphrodite by Hephaestus for similar reasons?

No by Zeus, he said, I do not think this appropriate.

But if there are passages of endurance in the face of extremity, whether spoken or acted by illustrious men, these should be looked at and listened to, such as the lines

"Then he smote upon his breast and rebuked his own heart, saying, 'Endure, my heart; yea, a harder thing thou didst once bear.'"

By all means, he said.

Certainly we must not permit our men to be venal or avaricious.

No.

So it must not be sung to them how

"Gifts convince gods, and convince reverend kings," nor must we approve of Phoenix the attendant of Achilles as

1 Iliad xiv. 296. These words occur in the story, but are not used by Zeus.
2 Odyssey viii. 266. A story in a comic vein, which strikes the reader at once as unlike Homer.
3 Strictly implying "seen on the stage." Later on, Plato rejects the drama from his commonwealth.
4 Odyssey xx. 17. Plato thought the former line very significant, and recurs to it 441 b below.
5 Still under the general head of Temperance. Avarice and sensuality are for Plato extremes which meet; they both mean preponderance of commonplace desire over intelligent aim, and in fact often go together. See 442 a.
6 Said to be a quotation from Hesiod.
7 Iliad ix. 432 ff. In this as in several other allusions, explained above, Plato does great injustice to the intention of the Homeric poet. The ancients were, by our standards, extraordinarily uncritical in their use
giving reasonable advice, when he counselled his master to defend the Greeks if he got gifts, but without gifts not to abandon his wrath. Nor shall we think it right, nor admit the fact, that Achilles himself was so covetous as to take presents from Agamemnon, and again, to give up a dead man for gifts a ransom, but not without.

No, he said, it is not right to approve such passages.

And, I continued, from respect for Homer I hardly like to say that it amounts to a sin to speak thus of Achilles, as to believe it when others speak so, and again that he said to Apollo,

You have counselled me to speak, most watchful of the gods; surely I would take vengeance on you, if I had the leisure to get to the river, who was a god, he was rebellious, and ready to fight him, and moreover we must not believe that, speaking of his hair, which was sacred to the other river, Spercheus, he said,

"Let me offer it to Paris, or the bear, or take with me."

he being a dead man, and that he did so. And the dragnet of Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and the slaughter of the captives over the funeral pile, all of this we shall deny to all authors, and Plato, who is quite at hand in the present manner of poetry, as is our friend Gower, more to the point in that poetry shall more and more insist on the continuance of Homer's method of arranging from lower to higher. So, too, the passage will more natural seem, and it is true that he also the heathen might be a kind of poetry of a certain sort, and have more suggestions than the Warton M. Milnes

\[\text{\textit{Iliad} VIII. 6. 147--8, and see previous note.}\]

\[\text{\textit{Ovid Met.} IV. 114.}\]

Many moments and scenes, included in the Iliad and Odyssey appear to have no other affinity whatever, and it is hard to suppose that they were invented. This represents us the whole. The complete formation of a Homeric or medieval romance, a marked change in a poem, the beginning of which can be traced within the Homer's poetic chemistry.
be true, and we shall forbid our men to believe that Achilles, c the son of a goddess, and of Peleus most temperate of men and grandson of Zeus, and himself bred up by Cheiron, famous for wisdom, was filled with so great distraction as to possess within himself two contrary vices, meanness joined with avarice, and presumptuousness against God and man.

You say right, he replied.

And then, I pursued, there is more which we must not believe, nor permit to be told; that Theseus, son of Poseidon, d and Peirithous, son of Zeus, set out to perform such horrible outrages, or that any other hero, son of a god or goddess, would have endured to do such awful and impious acts as are now slanderously laid to them; but we must compel our poets either not to affirm that the deeds were theirs, or not to affirm that they were sons of gods; but never to affirm both at once, or to set about convincing our youths that gods produce evil offspring and that heroes are no better than men. For as we were saying above, such stories are sinful and untrue; for we proved, I think, that bad things cannot spring from the gods.

Unquestionably.

And in truth they are harmful to the hearer; for everyone will feel indulgence for his own badness, when he is convinced that such are and have been the doings even of the close kindred of the gods, of those near to Zeus,

"Whose altar to ancestral Zeus is on the hill of Ida, in heaven, and the blood of deities has not yet perished out of them."

1 Peirithous aided Theseus in carrying off Helen, and Theseus joined Peirithous in his attempt to steal Proserpine away from Pluto.

2 All this is in part humorous, indicating that Plato here feels himself in the region of myth and anthropomorphism—of the "false," above, i.e. fiction and fancy; so that as long as the right effect is got it does not much matter how you get it. It is, too, a parody of the popular method which will get moral instruction out of poetical texts at all hazards.

3 380 c.

4 The hill is supposed by the poet to reach up into heaven. The quotation is from the Niobe of Aeschylus, a lost play.
For which reasons such tales must be stopped, lest they generate in our young men a great facility of vice and crime.

Surely, he said.

And now, I said, what kind is left for us to treat of in determining what stories are to be told and what are not? We have stated how gods are to be spoken of, and also about spirits and heroes and the world of Hades.

Quite so.

Then what remains is to treat of human beings.

Obviously.

My dear Sir, it is impossible to ordain that at the point where we are.

Why?

Because I suppose we shall say that, as we hold, both poets and story tellers go very far wrong in speaking of human beings, when they assert that there are many who are unjust yet happy, and many just yet miserable, and that injustice is advantageous if it is not found out, and that justice is another’s good and one’s own less, and all this we shall found men to say, and shall enjoin on them both to sin and to tell the contrary of it all. Do not you think so?

Nay, he said, I know it well.

Then if you admit: that I am right, I shall say that you have admitted what we have all along been discussing?

Your rejoinder is right.

Well, then, we will not totally agree that statements about human beings are to be such as I suggest until we have found out what justice is, and that it is by nature advantageous to the possessor, whether he is thought to be just or no.

Most true, he answered.

1 These were the teachers of Pythagoras, who I have elsewhere mentioned, as we have Hesiod and the Delphian and Athenian in Book II, beginning. This Socrates is another’s good and unhappy men does in some passages to the obscure Aristotle (Plato, &c.)
Argument. 392 c—398 b. Discussion of the permissible form of narration or representation, i.e. how far it is right to "imitate" for imitation's sake, and how far a reserve should be exercised as to what characters and sentiments we throw ourselves into by "imitating" them.

And now, I went on, we may close our treatment of narratives; and the next thing to study, as I imagine, is the form of narration; and then we shall have completely considered both what is to be said, and how to say it.

And Adeimantus broke in, I don't understand what you mean by this 1.

Well, but you ought to, said I; perhaps you will know it better if I put it this way. Is not all that is told by storytellers or by poets a narrative of things past or present or future?

What else should it be?

Then do they not execute it either in simple narrative or in narrative by way of imitation 2?

This, too, he said, I need to understand more distinctly.

It seems, I rejoined, that I am a ludicrously obscure instructor. So, as incompetent speakers do, I will try to explain to you what I mean by isolating a particular case of the matter,

1 Indicating that Plato was saying something which he held to be new and important.

2 This is the first introduction of the word imitation in the Republic. Plato uses it to begin with in a simple sense which he explains below (393 c), much like ours; then in the course of the argument it naturally expands to a wider meaning (e.g. 400 A and 401 A) analogous to that in which both he and Aristotle employ it to sum up the essence of the "fine" arts. Expression, representation, are fair equivalents for it in this sense, as when (400 A) the rhythms of verses are spoken of as "imitations" (expressions or representations) of ethical types of life. The fact that human beings are almost infinitely open to "suggestion" from one another and their surroundings has recently been much insisted on in Psychology and Sociology. See Prof. W. James, Talks on Psychology and Life's Ideals, p. 48.
and not in general. Now tell me, do you know the beginning
of the Iliad, in which the poet says that Chryses entreated
Agamemnon to release his daughter, and he was angry, and
Chryses, when he did not obtain his request, prayed to the god
to bring harm upon the Achaean? I know it.
You know, then, that down to the lines

 Achilles entreated all the Achaeans, not chiefly the two Achaean brothers

the poet himself is the speaker, and does not even attempt to
turn our thoughts in any other direction, as if anyone else were
speaking but himself, but in the lines after those he speaks as
if he were Chryses himself, and endeavours so far as possible
to make us think that the speaker is not Homer, but the priest,
who is an old man; and he has composed in pretty much
these proportions the rest of his narrative about what took
place at Ilium, and events in Ithaca and throughout the
Odyssey.

Exactly so.

Now it is narrative both when he is repeating the
speeches made on each occasion, and in the parts between
the speeches.

Of course.

But when he is recounting a speech as if he were someone
else, shall we not say that then he is assimilating his way of
speaking as much as possible to the person whom he has
named beforehand as about to speak?

No doubt we shall.

Then to assimilate oneself to another, whether in voice or
in figure, is to "imitate" that person to whom one assimilates
himself?
Yes.

In such a case, it appears, both Homer and the rest of the poets conduct their narrative by way of imitation.

Certainly.

But if the poet were never to conceal his own person, the whole of his poetry and narrative would have come into existence without any imitation. And that you may not say that again you do not understand I will point out how this might be done. If Homer, after saying that Chryses came bearing his daughter's ransom and as a suppliant to the Achaeans, but chiefly to the kings, had continued the story from that point, not as having turned into Chryses but still as Homer, you know that it would not have been imitation but simple narrative. It would have been something like this—I will give it without metre, for I am no poet—The priest, when he had come, prayed that the gods would grant to the Greeks to take Troy and get safe home themselves, and to release his daughter, accepting the ransom and reverencing the god. And after he had said this the rest were for respecting him and assenting, but Agamemnon grew furious, ordering him to depart at once and not to come again, lest the sceptre and fillets of the god should fail to protect him; and before his daughter was released she should grow old in Argos with Agamemnon; and he commanded him to depart and not to provoke him, that he might reach home in safety. And the old man, when he heard it, was afraid and departed in silence, but, having left the camp, made many prayers to Apollo, rehearsing the titles of the god

mind all through Plato's discussion of its admissibility in the training of the guardians. It is to throw off your own characteristics and adopt those of someone or something else. As remarked above, imitation has for the Greek thinker also a wider meaning in which all "fine" or expressive art and therefore the whole of Homer—and indeed everything capable of expression, is imitative. In Book X., where Plato is assailing the weak side of fine art, he applies a meaning akin to the first in the sphere of the second, i.e. he treats art and poetry not as expression but as copy-making.
and reminding him and entreating a recompense if ever he gave him grateful offerings either in the building of temples or in sacrifice of victims; in return for which he prayed that the Achaeans might pay for his tears through Apollo’s arrows. Thus, my friend, is an instance of plain narrative without imitation.

I understand, he said.

Then you must understand, I continued, that the opposite case occurs, when we take away what the poet puts in between the speeches and leave the dialogue.

Thus again, he said, I understand; tragedy is something of the kind.

You apprehend me perfectly. And now, I think I can make clear to you, what before I could not, that part of poetry or story telling is altogether in the medium of imitation, being, as you suggest, tragedy and comedy. Part consists of narrative told by the poet himself; you will find the clearest case perhaps in dithyrambs, and part again uses both together, as in the composition of epics, and many other instances, if you follow me.

Yes, he said, I see now what you meant to say.

And you must recollect what went before, that we said we had finished describing what was to be told, but had still to consider how it should be told.

Yes, I remember.

Now this was the very question on which I meant that we must come to an agreement, whether we are to permit our poets to compose their narratives in imitative shape, or partly in imitative shape and partly not, and then of what kind each part should be, or whether they are not to imitate at all.
I predict, he said, that you are considering whether we shall receive tragedy and comedy into the city or not.

Perhaps, I said; and perhaps something even more than this¹; for I myself do not yet know, but wherever the argument, like a wind, may carry us, there we must go².

E Why, that is well said.

Then, Adeimantus, you have this to consider, whether our guardians are to be imitative³ or not; or is this a further consequence upon what has been said before, that each one person can practise one vocation well, but not several; and if he attempted it, would become "Jack of all trades and master of none"?

Of course he would.

And does not the same rule apply to imitation, that the same man cannot carry on several imitations successfully, as he can one by itself?

Certainly he cannot.

Then it will be quite out of the question for him at the same time to practise any vocation worth speaking of, and to carry on several imitations and be an imitative person, seeing that the same persons are unable to carry on at once even the

¹ This sentence may indicate that the question is not primarily one of literary classification, but of dealing with an ethical and educational factor, not confined either to literature or to any department of literature, the factor of imagination or suggestion, the entering into other lives and minds.

² "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth; so is every man that is born of the spirit (breath or wind)." Plato here touches the analogy on which the idea of "spirit" rests. The wind seems a type of freedom and activity; it is invisible, you cannot stop it, or control its direction, or know, except by going with it, where it will take you. This is part of the reason why mind is called spirit; no doubt there is also a reference to the "breath" as the invisible means of life.

³ This is the real question, of which the issue about literature is only a sub-case.
two forms of imitation which are supposed to be akin, as in composing tragedy and comedy. Or did you not call these two forms of imitation?

I did, and you are right in saying that the same person cannot compose both.

Nor do the same men succeed as rhapsodes and as actors.

True.

Why, we do not even have the same actors in comedy and tragedy, and all these are cases of imitation, are they not?

Yes, of imitation.

And further, Alcmanitus, I believe that human nature is subdivided into smaller parts as regards inability to imitate many things well, than to do those real things of which the imitations are resemblances.

Very true.

Now if we are to maintain our earlier principle, that it is right for our guardians, freed from all other craftsman ship, to be consummate artists of liberty for their State, and to

1 In the Sophronican of Ariston of Athens. I mean represent Socrates as maintaining the reverse of this, viz., that the same person ought to compose tragedy and comedy. Very likely this was meant to be a paradox: at any rate an Athenian poet of this great time did compose both tragedy and comedy.

2 True.

3 Public meetings, where recited poetry especially verses of Homer on occasion such as festivals or games, when it was in excess of entertainment. The "rhapsodes" among the great have been credited with a certain kind of authority in making the Homer poetic what they are. Undoubtedly the poems were long preserved without writing.

4 Idleness and idlers are "imitators" more than imitation poets.

5 "Imitation" is an admission that it is less possible to produce different modes of it, say different arts, than it is to combine different kinds of action in one, and which of course we all admit to be a great evil.

6 A critic remarks with some difficulty on understanding where Pausanias's work is to be found. It is, however, a most striking fact that no person in the management of democracy as vulgarly understood.
practise nothing but what bears upon this end, then it will be
right for them neither to do nor to imitate anything else; but
if they imitate, they should imitate from earliest childhood
what belongs to such a part, brave, temperate, religious and
free men, and all such like characters; but what is unfree they
should neither do nor be skilled to imitate, nor anything else
that is ugly, that they may not from the imitation be infected
with the reality. Or have you not perceived that imitations, if
they continue far on from our young days, become habits and
a nature both in body, in speech, and in intelligence?

Very much so.

Then, I went on, we shall not permit persons whom we say
we are taking care of and intend to become good men, being
men to imitate a woman, whether young or old, either abusing
her husband or contending and vaunting herself against the
gods, thinking herself in high good fortune, or again concerned
in disaster and griefs and lamentations; and as for one in
sickness or in love or in travail, we shall be very far from
allowing it.

should yet proclaim that he held liberty to be the end of the State. What
he means by liberty is a condition in which all selves are at their best and
all made the most of, and there is no baffling of action and will by jarring
elements. This is the purpose of the commonwealth, whether we agree or
not with the means adopted to secure it. Cf. 387 B, and 577 C and D. This
passage gives quite simply, though emphatically, the basis and point of his
view about the power of imitation in education.

1 We may think of the recognised evil of letting boys run wild among
servants; see below on not imitating slaves.

2 As they would have to do in acting or reading tragedy. The position
of women was perhaps the weakest side of Athenian society; the intensity
of political life, in which they had no share, seems to have made them even
less important than, e.g., the Homeric poems represent them. It must be
borne in mind that if Plato saw their weaknesses in a strong light, he also
advocated the remedy. See Bk. V. of the Republic.

3 Cf. 396 D, a parallel prohibition about men. The felicity with which
these censures strike the subject-matter of modern novels is at least amusing
and suggestive.
Certainly, he said.

Nor again, slaves, whether women or men, doing what belongs to slaves.

Nor that either.

Nor again inferior men, cowards, and behaving in the contrary way to what we have done: now, reviling and satirizing one another, and calling ugly names, whether drunk or sober, and otherwise transgressing as such persons do both by words and deeds against themselves and others alike. I imagine too that our guardians are not to be trained to assimilate themselves to madmen in word or deed. For they must learn to recognize both madmen and vices, men or women, but they must do nothing in such a character nor imitate them.

Very true.

Well then, I asked, are they to imitate men working at the forge or at other artisan's work, or rowing galleys or giving time to the rowers, or anything else of the kind?

\[ \text{Footnotes:} \]

1. Masters are apt to treat expressions like these, and to regard the terms that here are used for foreign and slave are not suitable to the character of the words. And this is a fair indication of the kind and corresponding ends of the slave power. But it would be absurd to state that the "manual" has peculiar vices, through not constant in the "manual" slaves; and the terms, rightly, had an external appropriation to them. With slaves, as with women, Plato would give every importance to development of the bodily organs by which the slave is held so strongly and so grossly.

2. Is "putting one another into confusion." Anaxagoras' attack on Socrates by means of the Cophers had made much with Socrates' unpopularity, and so that was, probably, with his train and condemnation. At the same time of unpopularity he was passed at Athens. "I.V. putting people to death under these laws; and it aggravated of the slave by the master. The nature of Anaxagoras is a necessity and subjection, in a degree in which Socrates would be a modern parallel, of his master's work, all being used of living masters by slaves. All this of course is agreed with the fact that the drama is our great form of the profession.
Why, how can they, he replied, when they will not be allowed even to let their attention dwell on any of these things ¹?

Well, and neighing horses and bellowing bulls and sounding torrents and the roaring sea and thunder and all that kind of thing ²—shall they imitate this?

Why, he answered, we have forbidden them either to be mad or to copy madmen.

¹ Here we touch perhaps the hardest of all paradoxes in Plato for the modern educationist. He, with the Greeks in general, seems to see no ethical or educational value in industrial occupations; on a level with which he puts rowing (!), the function at Athens of the slave, alien, or poorer citizen. Rousseau's enthusiastic recommendation of carpentrying as an educational pursuit (Emile) seems directly opposed to Plato's views, as is also the modern advocacy of "manual occupations" which dates, perhaps, from Froebel. We may note some points to diminish the difficulty. (i) A Greek gentleman's life was in some ways comparable to that of an English country gentleman. It was not a town or study-bred life, but simple, social and athletic, with much management of farming, horses, and probably simple industries (vine-culture, tree-planting, etc.). The need for a "return to nature"—for renewed contact with earth and industry—was less pressing than now. (ii) Plato and the Greeks loathed any occupation that disfigured the man, physically or mentally. Of course this feeling is in the main quite just—and if art, war, politics and literature, the occupations open to a gentleman in Greece, disfigure the man, as they may, this was an evil the Greek was only just beginning to experience, though Plato indeed is in this work devising and providing against it. We should admit that all occupations must "mark" the man, and should try to make this mark a development and not a disfigurement. (iii) It is therefore perhaps not in actual industrial practice, but in carefully organised training with wider aims, that the best educational result is obtained from "manual" occupations, when their discipline is gained without cramping mind or body. The great passage, 401—2, shows how well Plato knew what the principle of plastic industry could do for the mind, and elsewhere he often shows (602 D, cf. Philebus and Apology) his appreciation of workmanlike skill and accuracy, and of the workman's recognition that he has a task in life (406 D).

² Refers to entertainments which were coming in with the new music of Plato's day.
Then, I said, if I understand what you tell me, there is one kind of speaking and narration in which a man who is genuinely good and noble will recite when he has to do so; and there is another, unlike it, in which one will recite who has been bred and nurtured in the opposite way.

What are they?

I think, I answered him, that a good man, when he comes in his narrative to a saying or doing of a good man, will be ready to recite it as if it were that person himself, and will not be ashamed at such an imitation; preferring no doubt, to imitate the good man when his conduct is steadfast and rational, but at a less amount and in a less degree, when upset by attacks of sickness or of love or even by drink or some other misfortune; but when he comes to someone unworthy of him, he will not consent seriously to assimilate himself to an inferior, except for a moment when he is doing something good, but he will be ashamed to, both because he has no training in imitating such persons, and also because it is repugnant to him to squeeze and stamp himself into the mould of his inferior, as the whole thing seems despicable to his understanding, except for the sake of amusement.

Naturally, he said.

Then he will employ the sort of narrative which we de

1 The important and necessary conclusion is arrived at in Plato's verbal story in the last mentioned work.

2 Lords were often told to sing or recite before company at Athens, just as young people are exposed today to sing if they can. The father enticed with a small reward, in Attic places, calls on him to sing as a matter of course, and is shocked if the music and poetry be obscene.

3 This is plainly true. We have only to think of different people's choice of songs, of books for reading aloud, and the ways in which they sing them.

4 In a large emporium should be sold. There can be little doubt that great harm is done today by making trivial and vulgar characters and situations at once by some one place to recall the principal concerns of the soul. It is quite a different thing, as Plato implies, to take up such matter and sing it as a song.
scribed a little above in the case of Homer's epics; and his way of speaking will partake of both—of imitation and of ordinary narration; but the imitation will be little in proportion to the length of the recital; or am I wrong?

That is just what must be the type of such a speaker.

And so, I continued, the other, who is not like him—the poorer creature he is, the readier will he be to imitate everything, and will think nothing beneath him, so that he will set to to imitate everything intentionally and before large audiences; both what we mentioned just now, such as thunder and the noise of wind and hail and of axles and pulleys and trumpets and flutes and panpipes and all sorts of instruments, and moreover the noises of dogs and cattle and birds; and the whole of his mode of speaking will be by way of imitation with his voice and gestures and contain but a small part of mere narration.

This too is inevitable.

These, then, I said, are the two kinds of speaking which I referred to.

They are.

Then the one of these has but slight transitions, and if a suitable inflexion and rhythm be adapted to his mode of speaking, the result is, with proper utterance, that he employs

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1 394 C.
2 Imitating musical instruments with the human voice.
3 See 396 B and C. Considering 397 B and 401 B "we must not regulate only the poets," we may take these two types or kinds of speaking as ultimately a classification of poets. Some poets observe a proportion in dealing with life, and a reserve in touching its lower aspects; others revel in the latter. Poetry was regarded in Greece much more as something spoken or sung than something written. So the poet and the occasional reciter are hardly kept apart in this passage; though the following sentence seems to explain how the reciter should adapt himself to the poet.
4 Understanding the word Harmonia, which in a context dealing with music means scale or key, to be here used of the inflexions or transitions of the voice in reading or reciting without music.
It is absolutely so, he said.

And what of the other's type? Doesn't it need just the
contrary—call inflections and all rhymes—so it is in turn to be
notably uttered, because it has the most varied forms of
transition?

That is precisely the case.

Then do not all poets and narrators either hit upon the one
type and transition, or upon the other, or upon one
which they compose by mingling the two?

Naturally so.

What are we to do then? I asked, and we to receive all of
these into the one, or of the two unmixed types, or the
mixed type?

If my view compels, be said, the unmixed narrator of the
good.

It does not suit matter whether in presenting the incident we
think better of language, matter or name. It is Plato's fundamental
principle that all those must go together. We might compare it with
the contrast between Woodsworth and Boston or with that between
Handel and Wagner. From one point of view I may be supposed to bring to
light the moral in Plato's philosophy, to some degree the
unmixed type; the other a mixed one, and may the former a moral. We
ought to suggest perhaps, that our modern great men from Shakespeare to
Wagner might not roughly divide Plato's means in a type in
which great characters are greatly shown, but all would hold a position;
where the unmixed means type would correspond to a variety enthrallment
of all to the moving.

We have necessarily enlarged the question from that of the thinking of
the young and that of the political meaning of the nature. The question was
posed here to speak of this and more and typical, where we ask that the
true principle is what the fundamental character of the situation is to be, and
the question are: as far for curiosity and matter in the means of the South,
we cannot consider as we have been in the means of the means of the
unmixed means. So that his current becomes not of the real.
But in truth, Adeimantus, the mixed type too is pleasant; and by far the most pleasant to children and their attendants and the bulk of the crowd is the opposite type to that which you select.

Yes, it is the pleasantest.

But perhaps, I said, you would affirm that it is not in harmony with our institutions, because with us there is no double nor multiple man, seeing that each does one thing.

No, it is not in harmony.

Therefore for this reason it is only in a State like ours that you will find a shoemaker a shoemaker, and not a helmsman in addition to his shoemaking, and the farmer a farmer and not a judge in addition to his farming, and the soldier a soldier and not a money-maker in addition to his soldiering, and so with

1 Nurserymaid’s art, as we might say. When we wish to prove Plato to be narrow and perverse, we talk grandly of modern art—Shakespeare and Beethoven. But if we were to take downright views of the facts—say a census of the London theatres, concerts, and music-halls for any one night, noting the quality of the entertainments, we should find Plato’s estimate of what people like to be pretty literally true.

2 I.e. the unmixed imitation of variety, probably something like a pantomimic entertainment.

3 The Athenian fleet employed large numbers of the poorer citizens as rowers, and no doubt as steersmen. It was their energy and skill that secured the power of Athens, by giving her a nucleus of reliable sailors such as no other Greek state possessed. As the fleet when fully manned would employ 60,000 men, and there were not more than 20,000 adult citizens all told, it is plain they could only be a nucleus. Plato was in violent reaction against much that seems to us really splendid in the vigorous life of the old democracy. The whole system seemed to him to have meant “meddling and muddling” and disaster. We should compare his feeling with that of Ruskin or Carlyle about nineteenth century achievements.

4 The poorer Athenian citizens acted as paid jurymen or judges in enormous courts of 500 or more with no presiding judge to control them. The system was supposed to be a democratic abuse, though it did not work altogether ill.

5 In allusion to the mercenary soldiery which was a phenomenon of Plato’s time. An immortal type of the soldier who is a man of business as
all of them? Thus, as it seems, were there to be a man of such cunning that he was able to make himself into anything as a and imitate all objects, if he should come into our city being to make an exhibition of himself and his poems, we should prostrate ourselves before him as a sacred being and marvellous and delightful, but we should say to him that there is no such man in our city, nor is it lawful that one should come there; and we should dismiss him to another State, having poured perfumes over his head and garlanded him with wool, but we ourselves should employ the severer and less delightful poet, for the sake of its probability, who should imitate for us the mode of speaking of the good man, and tell us what he has to tell within those outlines, which we entered at the beginning, when we were taking in hand to educate our guardians.

Certainly, he said, that is what we would do, if it were in our power.

—_— the necessary in all agree—is to be found in Walter Scott's Captain Dugald Blair's_ in the _Legend of Marmion._

Here again is what he says. "but is a man to have no vern" and in nature shown and wavering inside his deep core?" But what is it want to write the Shakespeare, when you have learned the alphabet. That is, according to established the principles, the prospect of which he intended to be ranking the world. That such man is rooted in the common wealth through some service which he, hopes that one more easy, not render to it, and it implies to begin with that, with a loyalty and unanimously good will expressed in one definite duty, to him in principle what his humanity requires. When that has no admitted as a foundation, then whether a man may single himself prove himself capable of a contrary and function, as it is. That's guardian the is a problem of actual capacity.

1 Fullers, or garland out wool, whose to make not went very tempting, were used in sacred occasions in the temple because its that look colors were washed almost as soon as planted.

2 After all reservation the remain the right for all time in its natural source, drast art makes a great demand. It is the problem 1 are an object that to get the higher or even the poorest pleasure you must not take up with that which seem easier to hand.

3 Being patient of them see. 3.16 A.
So now, my friend, I said, it seems likely that the part of music which includes stories and fables\(^1\) is completely finished; for we have laid down what is to be said, and how.

I think so too, myself, he answered.

**Argument.** 398 c—401 a. Modes and Rhythms express character.

After this, then, there remains the subject of the character of song and of tune\(^2\)?

\(^1\) Note that "fable," Latin *fabula*, Greek *muthos* (from which "myth" is derived), is the technical word for the "story" or plot of a drama. So that the above discussion has included a reference to the drama, though the point considered has not been the difference between dramatic and other poetry, but the general influence of poetry on the tendency to indiscriminate impersonation. In the beginning of Book X. Homer and the dramatists seem to be treated as of one ethical type, and it is assumed that the present discussion has had the result of banishing them all.

\(^2\) Greek music is a difficult subject about which important questions are still in controversy. We will set down some simple points which may help to make Plato's suggestions intelligible.

(a) Music was thought of as an accompaniment to words and dancing. Its independent development, which was just beginning, seemed to Plato to be wrong. As a rule, a note went to a syllable, that is, a musical note to a subdivision of the metre. The composer could not stretch out the words as he liked.

(b) Harmony, in the modern sense, was but little used. The Greek word *Harmonia*, below rendered "mode" in compliance with custom, may have meant a "scale," a certain sequence of intervals. If so, the modes differed from each other in the same sort of way as our major scales differ from our minor scales; this is the older view, and according to it there were seven modes, one for each note of the scale. We get them by playing on the white notes of the piano as follows: Hypo-Dorian or \(\text{Æ}olian\), A to A; Mixo-Lydian, B to B; Lydian, C to C; Phrygian, D to D; Dorian, E to E; Hypo-Lydian, F to F; Hypo-Phrygian or Ionian, G to G. According to another view the difference between the modes was a difference of pitch, a difference, in short, of "Key"; see *The Modes of Ancient Greek Music*, by D. B. Monro, or, for an interesting quotation
Clearly.

Now everyone can see at once what we have to say that they must be like, if we are to harmonise with what we have already said.

So Glaucon smiled and said, Probably then, Socrates, "everyone" does not include me, at least I am not able, at the moment to utter adequately what we ought to say. However, I have a suspicion.

At any rate, I answered, presumably you are equal to affording this, that a melody consists of three parts, words, mode, and rhythm.

Yes, I can say that much.

Now the part of it which is "the words," I suppose, in no way differs from words which are not being sung, in respect that its matter should be within the outlines which we laid down, and its form be what we prescribed.

If from this we look at other books, such as "Hymns," "Poetry," and "Law," etc., we should see the different modes more commonly recognised as being necessarily suitable for expressing certain periods and moods. E.g. the "Dionysian" was "merry," "forty," "Harmonious," "celebrant," etc. and so on.

As the music was very simple, and the deliverance of the effect expected, it might have been done in a sing-song. Hence it was much easier, and hence was the two latter intimately associated with the movements which accompanied them. May each in some sense of the characteristic which I am about to name.

If we look at the way in which the art of song and expression which we describe is the music, we may appreciate his other connections that it matters extremely to us, what kind of music, poetry and language we associate ourselves to here, and that in all these utterances we are including, in making us say, certain general tendencies to which others have given shape.

1 Or rhythm are similar and similar. This word suggests movement, and dancing is to the Greek the typical case of it. Dancing again is connected with acting, though the peculiarly Greek art of oratorical punctuation, dancing, is worked the performer called Meleagris, as "Aeacides."  

4 The two elements, at the narration itself, and [3] in the form of narrative.  

See 359 C.
True, he said.
And further, the mode and rhythm ought to follow the words.\(^1\)
Of course.
But we said that we did not want wailings and lamentations in our narratives.
Certainly not.

Then which are the mournful modes? Tell me, for you are musical.
Mixo-Lydian, he said, and syntono-Lydian\(^2\), and some of that type.
Well, then, these, I said, ought to be abolished; for they are useless even to women who are to be good, not to speak of men.
Quite so.
Again, drunkenness is a most unbecoming thing to guardians, and so are softness\(^3\) and indolence.
No doubt.
Which of the modes, then, are soft and convivial?
Ionian, he said, and Lydian, which are called the relaxed modes.
Could you make any use of them for military men?
Not at all, he replied; probably the Dorian and Phrygian are what you will have left.
I am not acquainted with the modes\(^4\), I said, but leave me

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\(^1\) The whole work of art, with its different aspects, must be penetrated with the ideas and emotions of the words which express its substance. Of course even Plato does not mean that the music adds nothing. But what it adds, must carry out further the idea which inspires the text.

\(^2\) Not identical with any of those in the enumeration given above (p. 92), but probably akin to the other Lydian modes. The name of the "mode" has in Greek a peculiar adverbial ending.

\(^3\) The opposite of spiritedness in Plato’s sense; see 375 and notes; effeminacy.

\(^4\) Plato’s way of indicating that the subject is too technical to be gone into in a general work, and that the principle concerned could be made clear
that mode which will properly imitate the tones and inflexions of a brave man in the act of war or in any inevitable duty, and falling, or going to meet wounds, or death, or having fallen into any other disaster, and in all this confronting fortune with discipline and endurance, and another mode for one in the acts of peace, acts not compulsory but voluntary, either persuading and entreating someone, whether a god in prayer or a man with instruction and admonition, or again, in the contrary, giving attention to another’s prayers or instruction or persuasion, and in the sequel surrendering in his wish and not being presumptuous, but in all these matters behaving temperately and reasonably, and accepting the issue. These two modes, the compulsory and the free, which will best imitate the tones of men taming ill and of men taming well, of men temperate and of men brave, these you must leave me.

Yes, he said, those which you ask to have left are no other than those I mentioned; but now

Then we shall not want instruments of many strings or of all the modes in our songs and melodies.

I am sure we shall not.

So, we shall not maintain artisans of three-cornered lyres and other lyres or of any instruments which have many strings and can be played in many modes.

Clearly not.

But now shall you admit flute-makers or flute-players into
your city? Or is not the flute, if I may say so, the most many-stringed of all\(^1\), and the instruments of many modes themselves are imitations of the flute?

Obviously.

Then you have the lyre left, and the harp, for use in the town, and some kind of panpipe for herdsmen in the fields. That, at any rate, is what the argument indicates.

At least, my dear Sir, we are doing nothing extraordinary in preferring Apollo and his instrument before Marsyas and his. Indeed, I think not.

And, by the dog\(^2\), I said, without noticing it we are purging again the State which but now we said was luxurious.

The more temperate we, he said.

Come, then, I resumed, and let us finish the purgation. Next after modes we must treat of rhythms\(^3\), deciding not to

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1 I.e. capable of producing the greatest variety of notes. The mode of expression is an intentional paradox. There was always a feeling among the Greeks, expressed by the story (see below) of Marsyas the Faun, who contended with Apollo (the flute against the lyre) that the flute represented a barbaric element in music, and the lyre was the instrument for civilised peoples. It seemed a confirmation of this view to the Athenians that flute-playing disfigured the face. Compare the remarks on Gabriel Oaks' appearance in *Far from the Madding Crowd*.

2 Elsewhere in Plato "by the dog, the Egyptian god." A humorous variety of the current Greek oath.

3 See note on 398 c. The idea of rhythm is derived from movement, and is usually understood of it. It requires (a) a succession of equal units, (b) a recurring stress or change to bind them together into larger systems. The ticking of a clock, if unvarying, has not the latter; the song of birds, as a rule, has not the former, and neither of these is a really complete rhythm, though we seem to find a simple one in the clock's ticking or in soldiers' marching. In a wider but kindred sense, all perceptible form has some sort of rhythm, or binding of members into systems; e.g. the word can be used of architectural effects, such as the way in which the windows of a house are set in its wall-surface. The proportion of a man's limbs, too, may be called a "rhythm." All speaking has a stress or accent, both of the sentence and of the word, and metre or verse is merely an elaboration of this, taking a beat or short syllable as a unit, and combining them into
aim at elaborate ones nor very varied movements, but see
what are the rhythms of an orderly and courageous life; and,
having seen these to compel the foot and the tune to follow new
rhythms of such a character, and not the words to follow the foot
and tune! But which these rhythms may be, it is for you to
point out, as you did the modes.

In Zeus, he answered, I cannot say. I have indeed seen
enough of the subject to affirm that there are three forms:
out of which the metres are built up, as in sounds there are
feet by counting stresses. In modern verse the stress is given to
the last word with which a syllable is pronounced compared to the others: but in
Greek, and Latin verse as a rule, the stress was pronounced by quantity, or
by the fact that a consonant syllable took twice as long
to pronounce as a vowel or stressed one. Thus, the syll-
bles supposed to take as long to reach as the new syllables (4) in together:
On some there is "quantity." In modern verse, a vowel syllable is longer
in pronunciation than a consonant, and this affects the movement of the verse. It
is not always the "quantity," as we please, and determines the rhythm usually
by accent, as in iambic iambs. Other recurrent changes mark off the
verse, complex or simple.

In general, the characteristic rhythm of the meter is
that one
the lecture in which the introduction of

"Addle's needs to trouble the dustless spring,
Of wise understand, honest, prudent, wise."
four\(^1\), out of which all the modes arise, but which of these are imitations of which type of life, I cannot say.

**B** Well, then, on these points we may take Damon\(^2\) into our councils, to consider what are the metrical movements appropriate to illiberality and insolence or madness and other viciousness, and what rhythms are to be left for their opposites. For I think I have heard him—but I did not grasp it clearly—speaking of a cretic\(^3\) metre which was compound, and a dactyl and heroic foot, too, arranging them somehow so that the up and down were equal\(^4\), being resolved into long and short; and I fancy he named an iambus, and a trochee\(^5\) too, and marked longs and shorts in them; and in some of them I fancy that he censured and approved the movement of the foot\(^6\) no less than the metres themselves; or perhaps it was their combined effect: I am not able to say. But all this, as I said, we must refer to Damon; for to make it distinct would need a considerable discussion; do you not think so?

Indeed I do.

But this at least you are able to state distinctly, that right

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\(^1\) Perhaps the four notes of the tetrachord; but the meaning is disputed.

\(^2\) A famous musician, said to have been the teacher of Pericles: he was supposed to communicate philosophical ideas in his musical teaching. Very probably this was a popular misunderstanding, adopted by Plato in jest.

\(^3\) Cretic or paemonic \(\text{-}\text{-}\) five time, see above, p. 97, note 4. “Compound,” because \(\text{-}\text{-}\) a trochee \(\text{-}\), plus a long syllable.

\(^4\) “Equal kind,” or in our terms “four time”; the dactyl \(\text{-}\text{-}\) and anapaest \(\text{-}\text{-}\) having the “up” or unstressed part \(\text{-}\text{-}\) named \textit{arsis} from the foot being raised, equal in duration to the “down” or stressed part named \textit{thesis} from the foot being down \(\text{-}\). Modern writers reverse the use of \textit{arsis} and \textit{thesis}, making them mean the “raising” and “lowering” of the \textit{voice}.

\(^5\) \(\text{-}\text{-}\) and \(\text{-}\text{-}\); three time.

\(^6\) Possibly a phrase taken from dancing. Here it seems to mean the actual \textit{tempo} of performance—the time occupied by the unit beat.
Of course.

But right and wrong rhythm attend upon and retain the likeness of the right form of utterance and its opposite, and right and wrong mode, in the same way, if, as we just now laid it down, the rhythm and the mode follow after the words, and not the words after them.

Surely, all this must be made to follow the words.

And what of the form of narrative and the narrative itself does it not follow the character of the mind?

Of course.

And all else follows the form?

Yes.

Then reasonableness, harmoniousness, grandiloquy, and good proportion, attend upon a good character, now the fool moments which we call by the just name of "good nature," but the mind which has a real truth its character rightly and beautifully constituted.

Unquestionably.

Must not these qualities be pursued by our young men in every way if they are to do their duty?

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1. The "disposition," a different word from "taste," "nature." It is the word from which not, through the Greeks, get the Latin "inclinatio," "disposition." We are very much in this and original meaning when we speak of the mind as a kind of energy of man, the intellectual, and in characteristics, temper as disposition. It is used it as individual as just the same mean.

2. These attributes are here given a more general meaning, but their common habitat is the disposition: for instance, "the taste" of a man, "the disposition" of a man, or a man with a "gentle disposition." They must be of the character.

3. Preparing the way for reading and the story, "attitudes of mind" in the initial stage of plastic art.

4. See book 13, ch. 3 and 5 and 7. 5. and mention especially 455 A and most of 456 C and 555 A. It is important for the rendering of this passage, the keynote of the earlier passage of the argument, that the
Undoubtedly they must.

And painting, surely, and all similar craftsmanship, is full of them; and so too are weaving and embroidery and house-building, and besides, all manufacture of the objects of use; and moreover the growth of all living bodies and of all organic beings; for in all of these there is rightness and wrongness of form. And wrongness of form and bad proportion and inharmoniousness are akin to bad thinking and bad character, while their opposites are akin to the opposite, a temperate and noble character, and are imitations of it.

Thoroughly so, he said.

Argument. 401 B—403 C. Extension of the principles of "music" first to plastic art and then to life and conduct.

Are we then to regulate the poets only, compelling them

difference between Greek and English idiom forces us to supply a substantive where the Greek has merely a neuter article. "To do their own," "Das ihrige zu thun," is all that Plato says. The principle is often thought by moderns to be something merely negative, like "minding one's own business." But we should get nearer the meaning if we brought in some such comparison as taking a part in a piece of music, for which a positive capacity and a complete training of it are required. What the training aims at is just being explained to us—a perfect and accurate but free and reasonable serviceableness—free, because the outer act is to be the very image of the thought.

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1 Or "gracefulness and its absence."
2 Lit. "un-rhythmicalness."
3 Also = "bad speech" or "narration," in reference to the discussion of literature.
4 "Utterance," "expressions," "representations," "symbols," would be other ways of rendering the word "imitation."
5 This passage, taken in connection with the above, is perhaps the high-water mark of Plato's theory of fine art, and contains, as Nettleship observes, the pith of what is to be said on the subject. The best means of grasping the full bearing of the ideas involved would be found in a study of the life and works of the late Mr William Morris and of Mr Ruskin. Ruskin's chapter
to create in their poems the image of the noble character, or pain of not making poetry among us, or shall we also regulate the other craftsmen and put a stop to their enslaving the character which is ill-humoured and intermperate and illiberal and improper, either in their pictures or in their buildings or in any other productions of craftsmanship, on pain of being deliried from working among us. If they cannot obey, that our guardians may not, from being nurtured among images of badness, as though in a poisonous pasture, gathering in the course of every day, little by little, many things to feed upon from many surroundings, collect before they know it a whole huge evil within their soul? Shall we not rather seek out those craftsmen who are able, by a happy gift, to follow in its footsteps the nature of the graceful and beautiful, that as itliving in a healthy region the young men may be the better for it and, from whomsoever of the beautiful works a something may strike upon their seeing or their hearing, like a breeze bearing health, from wholesome places, bringing them more consciously from early childhood both to know and to remember or harmony with the law of beauty?

Yes, he said, that would be by far the best nurture for them.

Then, Gloucester, I said, is not this the reason why music is the most sovereign matter, because nothing else sinks into the mind like rhythm and tone, nor causes it as dominantly as they

"The Place of the Workman in Gothic Architecture" (Wren of Wren and Mr. Wren's Essay on the History of Architecture) [from Lectures on Art] (pp. 476 and 477)

"More literally 'unions' or 'if joined.'"

"There is a second point in the comparison, vis. the feeling we have when we go, nor, in the sea, in the sun, nor the everything round us is graceful, and there it goes.

"I mean and understand, I mean to speak of music. See 384 and 500.

Music, therefore, as we have seen, even appeal to sense-perception in which beauty and regimen can be demonstrated.

I am understood to a larger scale corresponding to the larger scale.
The Republic of Plato.

carrying gracefulness along with them and making the man E graceful if he be rightly nurtured, and if not, the contrary? And because, once more, he who has been rightly nurtured wherein will be keenest to perceive shortcomings—what is not beautifully wrought or not beautifully grown—and having a just repugnance for them will approve all that is beautiful, and enjoying it and absorbing it into his soul will grow up in the strength of it and become a good and noble man; whereas all that is ugly he will censure and loathe in his very youth, before he is able to apprehend a principle; but when the principle comes before him, he who is thus nurtured, above all others, will welcome it with the recognition due to that which is his own?

I certainly think, he said, that these are the reasons for which “music” is the right nurture.1

Then, I said, it is just like this; we had finished learning our letters when we were able to recognise the letters of the alphabet, though their number is so small, in everything in of “music.” A picture or a house, or one's temper or manners, can be “out of tune.”

1 Cf. Aristotle's sentence which summarises the whole view of moral education, shared by him with Plato. "Wherefore they (persons who are to grasp the principle of morality) must have been trained from their youth up to be pleased and to be pained by what they ought." It is the deliberate view of the Greek thinkers that the young must be trained through the formation of their likings and dislikes by "suggestion" or "imitation" on a principle which they do not know, but which exists in society or in the teacher's mind. It is thus that they acquire a practical instinct or feeling which in all acts and incidents of life is attracted by the right and shocked by the wrong. On the basis of this moral experience they can apprehend an ethical principle when they come to years of discretion, and see their "acquired" instincts justified by a comprehensive purpose. Without such a training they would have nothing to go upon—no real hold of what is and what is not workable in life. We may think, in this connection, of the feeling which selfish and vulgar habits produce in anyone who has had a good home-training, when he first meets with them; a feeling that he simply could not live in that way.
which they are exhibited, and we never neglected them, as if they need not be noticed, either on a small scale or on a large; but we were eager to discern them in every quarter, considering that we should never be scholars till we had that readiness.

True.

And so again, we shall not recognize the reflections of letters, if they are to be seen anywhere in mirrors or in pools of water, until we have learned the letters themselves, but then belong to the same science or study.

Certainly.

Well then, to come to my point, in the same way again we shall not be "invaluable," neither ourselves nor the guardians, whom we say that we have in education, until we recognize the letters of temperance and courage and liberality, and all akin to them, and again their equivalents everywhere that they are exhibited, and notice their presence where they are present, both themselves and their images, and neglect them neither on a small

3 The phenomenon of seeing or taking with intelligently in this place is an appearance on a small scale of what Plato mentions throughout.

3 Images of likenesses. This passage points back to the similar of the large and small letters (60) and forward to the whole development of degrees of knowledge in BK VII and of integration in BK X. It is in fact one of the metaphors of shadows and reflections. The idea is one of shadows and reflections, well enough if taken to be some glimpses of truth, but no better than the shadow compared with the substance if we use it to us as a guide. Apparently people used to look at a copy of the letter on a water, as we look at their image through a glass; and they gave from the shape of the image which tells you some of the truth, but only by scrutinizing it through it "in a glass slightly turned" or after it has a some such as such.

And so again, come to my point, we mean and mean to be scholars.

The guardians are obviously becomimg in truth what we already are to be.
field nor on a large, but believe them to belong to the same art and study? 

It is necessarily so, he said.

So then, I said, the most beautiful sight for him who has eyes to see is one who unites the presence of a beautiful character in his soul and qualities in his form accordant and harmonious therewith, partaking of the same pattern?

By far.

And the most beautiful is the most lovable.

Of course.

Then the persons most nearly like this will be those whom a cultivated man could love? but he could not love one whose nature is discordant.

No, he answered, not if the defect lay in his soul; but if it were something bodily he might put up with it so far as to be fond of him.

Does our discussion of music appear to you, as to me, to be now complete? for it has ended where it ought to end;

1 This passage, modelled on the illustration of learning the alphabet, is a description of "musical" education as learning the alphabet of the moral world, or learning to read in the moral world. Where, for example, did we get our first recognition of courage, and what was it like? Perhaps from Richard Cœur-de-lion or Horatius Cocles; these would be "images," artistic likenesses of it, suggesting a quality rather remote from the uses of our life; then we should learn to read it or its opposite in some behaviour of our family and ourselves, and so come to form a certain rough recognition of it in daily life, probably very imperfect indeed. But such as it is, a very great deal depends upon it—what we admire and what we imitate under the name of courage, whether gentleness and resolution, or roughness and swagger; whether we know real courage when we see it, or not.

2 "Qualities" supplied to meet the English idiom. Note that Plato does not say "a beautiful soul in a beautiful body," but "a beautiful soul with a body which expresses its beauty," which explains the true subordination much more precisely.

3 Type or mould; the word e.g. for the canons or outlines of theology, 379 A.

4 Lit. "musical."
since surely the end of music ought to be the love of the beautiful.

Argument 41:31—41:38. Training of the body, and relation of this training to mental qualities.

After music the young men are to be trained in gymnastic.

Of course.

Then in this too they ought to be carefully trained from early childhood throughout life. And as I suppose, the matter stands thus, but you must help me to consider it. I do not think that the body, however good as a body, can by any
excellence of its own make a good mind, but on the contrary I think that a good mind by its own excellence brings the body into the best state possible; what do you think?

I agree, he answered.

So if we adequately prepare the intelligence and then hand over to it the detailed care of the body, we merely laying down the outlines of the course to be followed, not to make a long story of it, we should be doing right?

Undoubtedly.

Well, we said that they were to abstain from drinking 1; for a guardian, surely, is the last person who shall be allowed to be drunk, and not know where in the world he is.

Yes, he said, it is ridiculous for a guardian to need a guardian.

And what about food? For the men are champions in the greatest of contests 2, are they not?

Yes.

contrary of this? Not if we see what he means. He means that we cannot state what we understand by bodily health, and consequently cannot secure it, without using standards and purposes dictated by mind. We sometimes speak, e.g. of a man as in perfect "animal" health, as if our standard was animal life taken apart. But the comparison will not work. If a man’s health were really that of an animal he would be quite useless for the purposes of human life. He would always be asleep or just have over-eaten himself, when he was wanted to do anything. Sporting dogs and horses would be useless unless man’s supervision regulated their food and exercise. Their relation to their master is a good example of the relation of mere body to mind. Health, for a man, is to be able to do and enjoy what a man has to do and enjoy, and his body must be disciplined and habituated, to make this possible, in view of the aims and activities which determine it. See for Plato’s result 410c.

1 Note the wide meaning assigned to Gymnastic from the beginning. They are to be sober in view of their duty, not because drink is bad for men in training; and this is the first rule of their "Gymnastic." Plato’s thought is not far off the track of St Paul’s.

2 "Soldiers of the idea" or "Knights of the Holy Spirit" would express the underlying meaning.
Then would the habit of the men in training, when we were to know be suitable to them?

Perhaps.

But, I said, this is a sleepy sort of habit, and the health is easily upset in it: or do you not see that these athletes sleep through their life, and have serious and severe illnesses on the slightest departure from their established diet?

I do.

Then, I continued, we need a finer sort of training for our military champions, since they have to be as wakeful as dogs, and to see and hear with the greatest acuteness, and, as on their campaign, they undergo all sorts of changes of drinking water and food and summer heat and winter cold, not to be easily upset in health.

So I think.

Then would not the best gymnastic be one akin to the machine which we described not now?

How do you mean?

A simple and reasonable gymnastics, that preparatory for war could be the most on.

In what way?

Why, I answered, Homer is enough to teach us that. For
you are aware that on the campaign, at the heroes' banquets, he neither gives them fish for dinner, though they were on the seashore of the Hellespont, nor boiled meat, but only roast, which would be easiest for soldiers to procure; for everywhere, we may say, it is more convenient to use the fire itself than to carry pots and pans about.

Very much so.

Moreover, as I think, Homer never makes mention of sweet sauces; or even our everyday men in training know this, that to have one's body in good condition one must abstain from everything of that kind.

Yes, he said, they are quite rightly convinced of it, and they do abstain.

And, my dear Sir, you seem likely not to approve of Syracusan courses and Sicilian multiplicity¹ of savouries if our views seem to you to be correct.

I am sure I do not.

Then you would disapprove of men having intimacy with grisettes from Corinth, if they are to be really sound in body.

Absolutely.

And the luxuries, as they are thought, of Athenian confectionery?

Necessarily we reject them.

For I suppose we should be right in likening such diet and life as theirs to melody and song composed in all modes and in all rhythms.

No doubt.

¹ "Multiple" and "multiplicity." The Greek adjective poikilos, or substantive poikilia, seems to express the very essence of all that Plato censured in the civilisation of his day. They seem to mean, to begin with, any surface that shows varied lights or colours—a "dappled" stag, a painted or inlaid surface, or the arts of painting, inlaying and embroidery. Then they are used of the new music and new poetry, the new cookery, the new politics, always to indicate what Plato thinks an evil; something bunt, as the Germans say, variegated, a sea of sensations without form or law.
Then, as in that case multiplicity engendered intemperance, so in this it generates disease, while simplicity of motive creates temperance in souls, and of gymnastic healthfulness in bodies.

Most true.

And when intemperance and diseases abound in the State, are there not opened many courts of law and doctors' consulting rooms, and the legal and medical professions put on an air of importance, because even free men run after them in crowds and earnestly?

Of course they will, he said.

"Assume 4.5 A—C. A reduction of the discussion of gymnastics, or the relation of body to mind, during a

Non could you have a greater proof of the badness and ugliness of education in the State than the need of first-rate doctors and judges, not merely among the inferior people and the handworkers, but among those who pretend to have been nurtured after the fashion of freemen? Or do you not think it a shameful thing, and a great proof of uneducatedness, to be obliged to get our justice as an import from other persons, as masters and judges over us, and to have none of our own?"

A more certain, and following answer. Even assuming that some poor people's great health is to be got from a regular

Or would you have thought that a gentleman ought to possess these of his own. Again an expression of St Paul. ...relliances in i.
The most shameful of all things, he replied.

Do you think, I continued, that it is more shameful than this, that a man should not merely spend the greater part of his life in law courts as defendant and prosecutor, but even, by inexperience of what is noble, should be led to glory in this very thing, that is to say, in being a master of wrong-doing, competent in every twist and turn, able to find a way through every exit, wriggling out of reach to avoid submitting to justice, and all this for gains of little or no value, being ignorant how much nobler and better it is to arrange a life for himself that will have no need of a sleepy judge?°

No, he answered, this is more shameful than the other.

But to need the doctor's art, I said, not merely for wounds or from being attacked by epidemic diseases, but from being filled with gales and currents like so many lakes, owing to idleness and the sort of diet we described, forcing the polite Asclepiadae to baptise our ailments with names like flatulence and catarrh—do you not think it a shame?

Why really those are novel and ridiculous names for diseases.

Such as, I imagine, did not exist in Asclepius' day; and I infer it, because his very sons, when at Troy the nurse gave the wounded Eurypylus Pramneian wine with flour scattered into it and cheese grated over it, which one would think inflamm-

1 It is to be remembered that the love of litigation was one of the chief vices charged against the Athenian democracy by hostile critics. In the great time of Athenian supremacy the citizens of Athens had formed to a great extent the supreme court of justice for a large number of dependent states. Neither the motives nor the results of this system were altogether bad, but it gave a handle to hostile criticism.

2 Descendants of Asclepius (Aesculapius) = "doctors."

3 Compare 404 B and C for this parody of the current way of appealing to Homer. While humourously illustrating the point of the present passage, Plato is suggesting, in his double-edged way, how absolutely unfit Homer is to give rules to a civilised society. He quotes from memory; it is Machaon, not Eurypylus, who is thus treated. ii. 11. 624.
Book III.

memory, found no fault with her, and passed no censure on Patroklos, who was in charge of the treatment.

Most certainly, he replied, it was a strange thing for a man in that condition.

Not, I said, if you reflect that up to that time the Aesclepeion made no use of our modern medical art, the man of diseases, not (as the story goes) till Herophilus lived, and Herophilus, who was a trainer and became an invalid, mixed by gymnastics with the medical art, till he formulated first himself, and subsequently many others.

In what was?

By lengthening out his death, I replied. For attending upon his disease, which was a mortal one, while he was unable, I take it, to cure himself, yet he lived his whole life long undergoing treatment with no hope for anything, in poverty he departed a few from his accustomed rule of life, and in one long death-struggle, so great was his cunning, he arrived at old age.

Then that was a fine reward which he won by his art.

And one, likely to come, I said, to him who did not know that from no appearance or incipience did Aesclepios refuse to...
reveal this type of medicine to his descendants, but because he knew that in all law-abiding commonwealths there is a certain work assigned to every man in the State which it is necessary for him to pursue, and none has leisure to be sick and under treatment his whole life long; which we, absurdly, perceive in the case of the working class; but do not perceive in the case of the rich and those who pass for prosperous.

How? he asked.

A carpenter, I answered, when he is ill, desires the doctor to give him a drug to drink that he may throw up the evil\textsuperscript{1}, or to rid him of it by a downward purge or by cautery or the knife. But if any man orders him a prolonged cure\textsuperscript{2}, putting felt packing round his head and so forth, he soon says that he has no leisure to be ill, and it is no gain to him to live in that way, giving his attention to his disease and neglecting the industry before him; and after that, saying farewell to such a physician, he returns to his customary mode of living, regains his health, and lives in discharge of his duty\textsuperscript{3}; or, if his body is not strong enough to go through with it, he dies and is rid of his troubles.

Yes, and for a man in that position it is admitted that this is the right dealing with medicine.

Is that, I asked, because he had a work to do, which if he did not discharge, he found life not worth living?

Plainly so.

But the wealthy man, as we affirm, has no such work set before him, from which if he is compelled to abstain he does not care to live.

shall often find it a good hint to interpret Plato as we should interpret Mr Ruskin.

\textsuperscript{1} Lit. "the disease," thought of as a material thing. Of course there often may be a definite poison or growth in which the disease is embodied. Cf. 407 D, "some definite" or "isolable" disease.

\textsuperscript{2} Lit. "diet," way of life.

\textsuperscript{3} Lit. "doing his own." See note above.
Certainly he is not said to have one.
No, for you do not attend to Phocylides, how he says that when one has got enough to live on, one should practice excellence.
And, I should think, before that.

Do not let us quarrel with him on that point, I said, but let us make it clear to ourselves whether the rich man has this to practise, and apart from it, his life is not worth living or whether valetudinarianism, though an obstacle in the way of attending to carpenter's work and the rest of the crafts, is yet no hindrance to what Phocylides exhorts.

Yet, indeed, was the reply, there is perhaps no greater hindrance than this supererogatory care of the body, which goes beyond "Gymnastic", it is inconvenience both for the duties of estate management, for military service, and for sedentary offices in the city.

1 The word might even be rendered virtus. But we must note that it has not the significance of our word virtue or morality. See just below, the sentence beginning "it is necessary for some recognized sphere of excellence..."

2 We should say, Why not. You can be good on a rock bed, many of the sports of relics and valetudinarianism are taken from such a scene. But this is not your Plato's point. It is a great one to be on a rock bed. You can be anything else. Much of a man's best and worst serves a sentimental function in a Greek, put in his notion of hermeneutic service more to me. I reverence for Plato, means doing something well...

3 Gynæceum is taken to include all such habits and training as some necessity for physical superiority. See above on Jowett's edition, note 1.

4 Three ways of life in which "excellence" was open to a man to do were the sphere of household and estate management ("economy"), of governing the community, and of political administration. As to the two of military service, we should not be in mind that an Athenian's share in these did not consist in reading election announcements at the breakfast table. So his defense was a science, couched and contextual part of the business of every State, and ordinary service was a duty which might fall any day on any man (usually able to discharge it). Socrates was hodor of what we
And the most serious thing of all is that it is constantly throwing difficulties in the way of study in any shape, and of any consideration or meditation with oneself, perpetually suspecting headaches and fits of giddiness, and imputing them to be produced by the pursuit of knowledge, so as to present obstacles at every point where excellence is practised and tested in that direction; for it makes you continually think yourself ill, and never cease from being in pangs about your body.

It is likely, he said.

Then must we not say that Asclepius knew all this as well as we, and that he, thinking of those who by nature and conduct are healthy in body, but are suffering from some specific ailment, for them, and for their condition, revealed the medical art, and expelling their ailments by drugs and by the knife enjoined upon them their customary way of living, that he might not interfere with their citizen duties; whilst, on the other hand, in the case of bodies which are penetrated through and through with disease, he did not attempt by rules of diet, drawing off and adding in minute quantities, to make such a man’s life a long and wretched one, and to let him beget, as is probable,

should call the Victoria Cross, for gallantry in rescuing a comrade in action.

1 Lit. "by philosophy."

2 The pursuit of knowledge or wisdom, the life of the scholar, man of science, or any student with the true spirit of study, is another form in which excellence or virtue may be practised; it is higher than the civic excellences above mentioned, the hindrances to it being reckoned "the most serious," but does not of course exclude them. It is a large and interesting question what the great Greek thinkers really took to be the relation of study and science to life. We should be very careful to understand what they actually say, and not to run off with superficial notions, mostly borrowed from later ages, when the unity of life had been lost.

3 The metaphor is apparently that of keeping a fluid at a certain level by adding and drawing off; an image of the delicate balance to be maintained in a body always tending to go wrong.
offering no better than himself; but he thought it wrong, we must say, to give medical treatment to anyone who is unable to live in the common course of life, deeming him an unprofitable person both to himself and to the State? Asclepius was a statesman by your account.

Obviously, I said, and did not you see how, because he was so, he made not only proved great warriors at Troy, but adopted the treatment which I describe? Or do you not remember how in Menelaus' case, after his wound when Pandaros shot him, "they poured out the blood", and spread washing segments upon the wound, but what he was to drink or eat after that they no more prescribed to him than to Eurypylus? for they held that their remedies were sufficient to cure men whose wounds were of healthy and orderly life, even if at the moment they desired to drink a wine posset, while as to people who were sickly by nature and intemperate they thought it unprofitable both for themselves and for everyone else that they should go on living, and held that their art ought not to be for the benefit of those who ought they to have medical treatment even if they were rather than Males.

You describe the men of Asclepius as very clever people.

So I ought, I answered him. And yet the tragic poets and Pandar, flatly contradicting us, say both that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, and that he was persuaded by gold to restore a

The same part the passion, in the present instance a very great part of the session of certain times of different persons, nor at the very in the part of others to abandon some marriage.

The aims of abounding and occasions have now replaced the idea of companions as who Paris has been to and at Athens. Though we are ready to undertake the cure and maintenance of the unfortunates, of the incurable persons, and the unfortunates they have been forced out of their present condition.

The two the gods of the wound again on ground, they do for you.

My reply answered me, that I had begun nothing from serious.
wealthy man who was already dead, for which reason, indeed, they say he was struck by a thunder-bolt. But we, in accordance with what we said before\(^1\), do not believe both their stories, but, we shall affirm, if he was the son of a god, he was not meanly covetous, and if he was meanly covetous he was not the son of a god.

Quite right, he said, so far.

**Argument. 408c—410a.** Comparison and co-operation of physical and moral therapeutic. *In what sense the experience of evil is a factor in the knowledge of good.*

But what do you say about this, Socrates? Ought we not to have good physicians in the city? And they would be more especially such as have handled the greatest number of healthy persons and the greatest number of diseased; and in the same way the best judges would be those who had held intercourse with all kinds of natures.

Most certainly, I said, I recognise good physicians; but do you know whom I think to be such?

I shall know if you tell me.

Well, I will try, I said; but you have asked about two different subjects in the same sentence.

In what way?

We should get the most skilful physicians\(^2\), I said, if from their youngest days, besides learning their art, they were to come in contact with the greatest number of most defective bodies, and were themselves to suffer from all ailments, and to

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\(^1\) See 391D.

\(^2\) In pressing the distinction he has in mind, Socrates seems, as Campbell observes, to decline answering Glaucon's point, which is that in the healthy state the physician will not find the required experience. The difficulty is a real one, and is met to-day by the collection and selection of cases which is the essence of the hospital system. In this way we so to speak make the most of the illness which we have.
be by nature not entirely healthy. For, I imagine, they do not treat the body with the body; if they did, it would never have been allowable for them, being of this sort of body, to be or to become defective, but they treat the body with their mind, for which it is not possible, if it has become or is defective, to treat anything well.

True, he said.

But the judge, my friend, rules over mind with mind, for which it is not allowable to have been nurtured among evil minds from its earliest days, and to have been associated with them, and to have experienced all wrong-doings by having itself committed them, as so scantly to rule the crimes of others from itself, like diseases in case of the body, but it ought to have passed its youth apart from experience or contact of evil character, if it is to be good and noble, and to judge sensibly in matters of right: When to c it is true that in their young days

...
good men appear innocent and easily deceived by the wicked, as not possessing in themselves patterns of like affections with the bad.

Yes, he said, this is very apt indeed to befall them.

Therefore, I said, a good judge should not be young but old, having come late to the study of the nature of iniquity; not observing it as his own and seated in his own soul, but having practised through long years to discern its evil nature, outside him and in other souls, by the instrumentality of knowledge\(^1\) and not of his own experience.

Certainly such a judge is of the finest type.

Yes, and good too, to answer your question\(^2\); for he who has a good mind is good. But your clever and suspicious fellow, who has himself done many wrongs, and fancies himself so thorough and so knowing, appears clever in his precautions when among his likes, judging everything by the patterns he has in himself; but when he comes in contact with good men and men no longer young, then again he makes a poor appearance, being distrustful out of season, and not understanding a healthy character, because he possesses no pattern of the kind; but as he meets bad people oftener than good he seems to himself and others a wise man rather than a fool.

That is absolutely true.

Then it is not in a man like this that we must look for the good and wise judge, but in the former. For badness can never know both excellence and itself; but excellence, in a nature educated by time, will acquire knowledge of itself and

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\(^1\) Cf. 366 c.

\(^2\) See 408 c. "Good" here, good both as a judge and as a man. The question then is practically, must not good judges have experience of bad men? Plato answers the point which he considers to underlie it, by saying, "The good judge must be a good man; i.e. it is not necessary that he should take badness into his own soul." He explains his answer further 409 d below.
of kindness alike. So, as seems to me, it is this man, and not the villain, who learns to be wise.

I agree, he said.

How will you not establish by law in your State, such a medical art as we referred to, in conjunction with a similar judicial art, which together shall give treatment to those of your patients, who are well natured in body and soul, but those who are not, if then detect be bodily, they shall permit to die, while those who are evil natured and incurable in soul they shall themselves put to death.

This has certainly been shown to be the best course both for the patients themselves and for the State.

The idea here raised is one of great importance. It implies that unhappiness arises from human nature, while goodness is its complement.

If you are really good as to speak, you are all that a bad man is and something more. Does the medical answer to the difficulty which I have here raised, all through this passage, and which we know as you learn to be good, can you understand life and human nature, without being hampered?

The word "Art" is converted by the translator to not the English "Name. The word in the Greek, medical and judicial, are, according to a medical cause, human nature, with a man who would be hampered, and this is the reason why we have made previous to them. The point is that the Greek does not decide whether the denominations into which a subject or method, all of which could be found in both, agriculture and probably the adjective and seem to be raised by an independent term, in fact, in agriculture.

Not in this passage, not the suggestion of a co-operation between medical and judicial premises in this preservation of the physical and mental health of the community, a suggestion anticipating concern as departments of administration and legislation, and whole provinces of social opinion at the present day. 18th century 19th, and in the implications of these therapeutic and preventive theories of punishment, raising large problems which cannot be covered here. See the whole.
Argument. 410 B—412 B. Final explanation of the aim of gymnastic and—almost—its inclusion in music.

Then it is clear that our young men will take good care not to come in need of the judicial art, using that simple music which we affirmed to generate temperance

No doubt, he said.

Then will not this same be the track on which the man trained in music will pursue gymnastic and attain it if he chooses, so as not to need the medical art, except on some special compulsion?

Indeed I think so.

His actual gymnastic exercises and tasks he will work at rather with a view to the spirited element of his nature, and as means of awakening it, than for bodily strength; not as ordinary competitors regulate their food and their tasks for the sake of muscular power.

Quite right.

Then those who institute an education in music and gymnastic do not institute it for the reason which some suppose, that they might treat the body by the one, and the soul by the other?

How then?

It is probable that they institute both of them principally for the sake of the soul.

1 404 E.
2 Viz. that indicated by the "simple" music.
3 As the man qua trained in music did not need the judicial art.
4 See 403 B and note.
5 This is the climax of the idea suggested in 403 D. Body is subordinate to mind as an instrument to be moulded for its purposes; and further, bodily training actually is a part of moral and intellectual training, through the elements of character and intelligence which are concerned in all athletic activity, which is bodily activity par excellence. It is not easy to say exactly what we mean by bodily in this sense of "athletic"; reading and writing, for instance, are activities in which we use our bodies, but are not, as ordinarily
How do you mean?

Do you not notice, I said, what disposition grows up in the very mind of men who spend their whole life in gymnastics, and never touch music? or in those who are of the contrary temper?

Disposition in respect of what? he asked.

In respect of fierceness and hardness, and their contraries, softness and gentleness, I said.

I notice, he replied, that those who have devoted themselves to unmixed gymnastics turn out fiercer than in right, and those who have done so with music become softer than is proper for them.

personal affections. We mean exercise that makes concernable to the body, needing both strength and skill, and is all the bane to its future commerce, courage, and the spirit of generation. We are sometimes told that all the arts are additions to a different bodily achievement, and without the principle of Pythagorean gymnastics would have the theory of moral training, and the educational value of hand exercises (James, Tauch, in Tack. 16:5), though he has not as applied it. Here Music and Gymnastics,他说, should have a collecting point.

I read a chapter of Gymnastics, including war and told me by the training for the great Olympos and similar compositions, which were in the Greeks more than the body on the continental public anthems and games are to the.

I am writing here that in the next two centuries until the relations of Gymnastics and Music amounted to their acting on different ethical elements and in opposite ways, and if Gymnastics simply "strings up" the passions, and competition "strengthens", and Music simply "relaxed", further the refined and gentle "love of culture". But just below, 11:13, he says that Music is not in the "more eloquently" by the least, and it is plain that they may not be thought of both at the time speaking the "spiritualness," and as breaking up the love of culture. Indeed, interpreting bodily training, as above, we see that, the body of moral and artistic activity, not in view of the discipline of games and dancing it is quite clear that Gymnastics must be really connected with Music and in fact a more branch of the same educational substance. It is, however, always a principle of exceptions which seem to break up the moral into part, but we must remember that spiritedness, and love of culture are only ways of behaving in the pure or a single nature.
Well, I said, and their fierceness will be produced by the spiritedness of their nature, which if rightly nurtured will be courageous, but if strung up beyond the right point will in all probability become hard and intractable.

I think so.

And again, their gentleness will belong to the culture-loving\(^1\) nature; and if it is too much relaxed it will be softer than it ought, but being properly nurtured will be gentle and orderly.

It is so.

And we say that the guardians\(^2\) ought to have both of these natures.

They ought.

Then ought not these to be brought into harmony\(^3\) with one another?

Not a doubt of it.

And he who has been brought into harmony has a soul both temperate and brave?

Just so.

And the soul of the un-harmonised is both cowardly and clownish\(^4\)?

Utterly.

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\(^1\) Lit. "philosophic," see 375 E.

\(^2\) Who are in fact ourselves as we ought to be, a type of the complete man, the largest animal nature expanded into a spiritual being. Cf. 375—6.

\(^3\) I.e. is not this an essential of any education which can be called complete?

\(^4\) Lit. "rustic," which may seem to us a strange opposite for temperate. Temperance, gentleness, and orderliness are all the outcome of the culture-loving disposition, which strikes the right note, so to speak, on all occasions of conduct. Clownishness, the vice of the "churl in spirit," is conceived as the having no sense of law in oneself or of consideration for others. From this point, at which the idea of harmonising the sides of man's nature is introduced, it becomes more and more clear that whichever side is directly influenced, both are affected.
So when he surrenders himself to music, to let it flood the
and gush over his soul through his ears, as if they were a
funnel, the sweet and soft and plaintive modes which we were
mentioning, and he paves his whole life long humming to
himself and under the glamour of song, then to begin with, if
he had not spirituality, he soften it like iron, and makes it
useful, instead of useless and hard; but when he goes on
unremittingly till it is well-bound, from that point onwards
he begins to melt and dissolve it, till he has melted his spirit
away, and as it were cut the seams out of his soul, and made
it but a soft, warm.

 Exactly so.

 And if he deal with a mind which from the beginning is by
nature spirits, he soon does the work, but if it is spirits-
by weakening, too (just he makes it ill-balanced, quickly pro-
voked and quickly extinguished on trifling occasions. Such
people are made irritable and passionate in place of spirited
and are full of ill-temper.

aptitude and 6, 755

* In the present, make 6, 755 as opposed to become.

* His kind.

"Spirits" is here the direct effect of these on the "spirit," nature;
and is meant to come from over-reactions of the "nature having-
ordained." It is plain that Heavens himself to be dealing with a continuous
fruit even as his temperament and bravery need to give into one another
through the life of impartial. Sec 749.

* Irritable, not vigorous, then, they move in an inward depression
from which would commonly be regarded as opposing influences, to
from economical emotions, and an absence of a tone, wide and danger. It is a
true and subtle process, and makes us feel the reality of the true, wise
that make the gift of self-assertion and temptation. As with this give
self-depreciation, and caution to wisely, and with wisdom, to
be wise.

O. Eversmore's Sonnet

Took help the wise, I take his part,
Of anger in the coming war.
A breeze, even to my heart,
But more than my streak of one?
The Republic of Plato.

Completely so.
And again, when a man works hard in the way of gymnastic, and feeds thoroughly well, and never touches music or the pursuit of culture, the first thing is, is it not? that in his good bodily condition he is filled with confidence and spirit, and becomes more valiant than he was.

Very much so.
Well now; when he does nothing else, and holds no sort of communion with the Muse, then, even if there was something of studiousness in his soul, since it is given no taste of study or research, and partakes of no discourse or "music" in any shape, it grows weak and deaf and blind, because it is never awakened nor fed nor are its senses purged.

Just so.
Such an one, I imagine, becomes a hater of thinking and an uncultivated man, and gives up making use of persuasion by means of reasoning, but carries through everything by violence and savageness like a brute, and lives in a state of unintelligence and plundering, full of inharmoniousness and ungraciousness.

It is absolutely so.
Then, for these two, I shall say that—as seems natural—

1 Lit. Philosophy.
2 As goddess of Music.
3 "Tastes" and "partakes"—note the metaphor of food. The germ of studiousness in the soul is like a plant or young animal; it must have its food. This notion of the mind as an organism depending on nurture and atmosphere is at the root of Plato's educational theory. See above all 401 B and C.
4 His senses are not stimulated, and so never clear themselves of obstructions.
5 Lit. a hater of "discourses," i.e. of all shapes of coherent thinking or reasoning whether with or without writing or speech.
6 "Anti-musical," in Plato's sense of "music"; a Philistine.
7 I.e. the two parts, factors or sides of mind, just about to be mentioned.
two arts have been given by some god to mankind, music that is and gymnastic for the spirited and the wisdom-loving; not for mind and body, unless incidentally, but for those two, that they may be brought into tune with one another, being strong and relaxed in the proper pitch.

It does seem natural, he asserted.

Then but who best unites gymnastic with music and applies them to the mind in most due measure, then we should most rightly pronounce to be absolutely the best orator and the greatest master of harmony, in a far higher sense than one who tunes the strings to each other.

With good reason, Socrates, he said.

Then Glaucon, will it not always be necessary to have some such controller in our State, if the polity is not to perish?

It will be necessary in the highest possible degree.

1 The spirited and the wisdom-loving.

2 The two arts were also called music and gymnastics for the mind, and gymnastics for the body. In sect. 111 it becomes clear that both are really abbreviated versions of the mind, and there is a tendency to transfigure that much of them after the same model, which is of course the case.

3 Still the original distinction is as far retained that the principal effect of "music" is to teach us "truth," and the principal effect of gymnastics is to bring us "true" knowledge. This is true and important, because it remains an impression which the soul might have produced, as if literary teaching could mark the power of action apart from the exercise of the active senses. In this sense music and gymnastics are algebraically parts of the greater power of that, and the whole the training in abstraction, and the other the training in action. Do you wish to understand music and gymnastics, or, to use the very words of Plato, the highest experience of human faculty, make moral and intellectual?

4 We have not yet found the best way in which music with gymnastics and apply these comparatively to the end of the average schoolboy."
Argument. 412 b—414 b. Further selection of the guardians after or in the course of education, and the qualities determining it. Cf. for the first selection 374 e, and for a later one in the more developed educational scheme 535 a ff. and 539 d ff.

The outlines of their education and nurture then will be these. For why should we describe their dances and field sports and hunting and contests in athletics and in horsemanship? For it is pretty clear that they must be in accordance with these outlines; and so not difficult to contrive.

Perhaps not.

Well, I said, and what is the next distinction we have to lay down? Is it not which of these very men are to rule and to be ruled?

It is.

It is plain that the rulers ought to be the elder, and the ruled the younger?

It is plain.

And that the best of them must be the rulers?

Yes.

sort of education is to be maintained, not by what governmental machinery we can maintain it. Comments upon the particular form of State control in which Plato embodied his ideas are really beside the mark in dealing with the substance of those ideas.

1 Note that all this is an explanation of the component parts of the gymnastic training, which in the dancing, as in other respects (see notes 401—2), runs into the music. We see then that we are not to understand by Gymnastic merely the feats of the gymnasium (in its modern sense) or the wrestling ring, but the whole round of active pursuits open to a Greek citizen, practised with an educational purpose. Some taste of war was clearly included, 467 d and 537 b, and the age set apart for the special gymnastic training, 18—20, shows that the garrison and patrol duty of the young men in Attica was in Plato’s mind. Their “record” in all this, with their social conduct in scenes of pleasure and the like, was to determine their future, 413 e.
And so, once the rulers are to be best of guardians, they must be the most guardian-like of the city?

Yes.

Then they must be both sagacious and capable for that end, and moreover men who will care for the State.

It is so.

And a man will care for that more than all else, which it so happens that he loves.

Necessarily.

And further he will love that more than all else which he thinks to have the same interests with himself, believing that when it loves well it will be too, to consequence, fare well, and when it does not, the contrary.

It is so.

Then we must select from among all the guardians such men as shall appear to us above all others, when we look into the matter, likely to do all their life long with the fullest zeal what they believe to be advantageous to the Commonwealth, and under all circumstances to consent to do what they think right.

Yes, they are the right men.

Then I think that a watch must be kept upon them at all ages, to see whether they are guardian-like or not, doctrine, and whether by mischief or by force can be brought to forget and to let go the opinion that they ought to do what is best for the Commonwealth.

1 I: have the quality of guardianship of the city as by amongst love.

2 Greek letter (σωφρονίσται) requires a mental sound quality, as in god.

3 The word "common" is not to check the noble race at all.

4 Greek; "most" of is opposed to "mostest" for "common".

5 Yet that is only saying - whereas from themselves, these will proceed.

6 Of the guardianship of the Commonwealth, equally good and sufficient guardianship of a prince.

7 Opinions of opinion, so to speak, as highest or lowest state of mind according to the full doctrine of the Bolognese, not applicable to the same person, whatever and discipline with it now being considered.
What sort of letting-go do you mean?
I will tell you, said I. An opinion seems to me to pass away from the intelligence either voluntarily or involuntarily; voluntarily when it is false and one learns better, but involuntarily in every case when it is true.

I understand the case of the voluntary letting-go, he replied, but that of the involuntary I must have explained.

Why, I said, do you not think with me that men are deprived of good things involuntarily, and of bad things voluntarily? or is it not a bad thing to be deceived about the truth, and a good thing to be true? or does it not seem to you that to think what is, is to be true?

Yes, he said, you say right, and I think that men are involuntarily deprived of a true opinion.

Then are they not either robbed or bewitched or overpower when this befalls them?

We may compare it to authority or rule of thumb as contrasted with original knowledge and thorough understanding.

1 In other words, "seek the good voluntarily, and receive the bad against their will"; the doctrine that whatever is desired is desired *qua* good, so that the bad can be desired only through ignorance. This principle, propounded in too crude a form by Socrates, has been with necessary interpretations at the root of all sound systems of ethics. One such interpretation is furnished in the present passage, when Plato explains what sort of influence may cause one to lose one's hold of a vital truth. Aristotle opposed the principle in its crude form, but not substantially.

2 We can hardly render the felicity of the Greek construction which is "to be deceived of the truth," i.e. to be defrauded of it: to have it taken from you by deception.

3 To be in state of truth, includes to speak truth and to have it. For the whole passage cp. carefully 382, the lie in the soul, i.e. the being in a state of falsehood or deception.

4 Not "think" in the emphatic sense of "understand"; merely in the sense in which "I think so" = "that is my opinion."

5 "That which *is,*" a regular phrase for fact or truth in Greek writers, often and emphatically used by Plato.
I seem to be as difficult as a tragic poet, I replied. But those who are robbed! I mean those who are overpersuaded and those who forget, because from the latter, time, and from the former, argument, with almost something without their knowledge. Now do you understand?

Yes.

By those who are overpowered I mean those who are powerless or enduring causes to change their opinion.

The too I understand, and you say right.

And those who are bewitched, I imagine, you would say to yourself are those who change their opinion under the charm of pleasure or at the alarm of fear.

Certainly, he said, everything which deludes may be said in general.

Then as I was just saying, we must examine who are the best guardians of the opinion which has been imparted to them. For they must do that which at every moment they think is best for the commonwealth; that they should do. So we must observe them from childhood up, setting them tasks in which a man might most readily forget such a principle, or be deluded out of it, and him who remembers. And he who remembers, and is hard to deceive, we o
must select, and him who is not so we must reject. Is it not so?

Yes.

And again they must be given hard work, and pain\textsuperscript{1}, and contests, in which these same points should be noted.

Quite right.

Further there must be set up a test for them of a third kind—in witchery; and they must be observed, just as people lead colts up to noises and alarms, to detect if they are shy; so in the same way while they are young we must bring them to face some sort of terrors, and again we must transfer them into the midst of pleasures\textsuperscript{2}, testing them much more carefully than gold in the fire, to see if a man turns out witchery-proof and of proper bearing in it all, being a good guardian of himself\textsuperscript{3} and of the music which he was taught, and showing himself in all these matters to have an orderly and harmonious character, by which he will be most profitable both to himself and to the commonwealth. And whoever is tested both among boys and youths and men and comes out unstained is to be made a ruler and guardian of the State, and to be granted distinctions both in life and after death, having allotted to him the greatest honours both of sepulture and of the other memorials. And

\textsuperscript{1} Plato may have had in mind the Spartan scourging trials. But it is not necessary to suppose that artificial inflictions are meant. School, college, or regimental life afford plenty of tests by annoyance, especially if a wise amount of \textit{laissez faire} is observed by the authorities. The whole of this very significant passage is not as much emphasised as it should be, in comparison with the more attractive suggestions of 401—2. It certainly seems to imply some degree of self-government and freedom among the young men. The tests are arranged in the same order as the causes of non-attention, 413 A—C.

\textsuperscript{2} To be borne in mind when we are tempted to accuse Plato of narrowness. They are to have their chances of enjoyment, like men at college or in society, and what they make of them will affect their "record," as of course it does to-day.

\textsuperscript{3} See 367 A. The argument has worked up to the point demanded by Adeimantus.
he who is not such is to be rejected. * Something of this sort, Glaucon, I said, appears to me to be the selection and appointment of the rulers and guardians, speaking of it in outline and not with exactness.

To me that, he replied, it appears in some such way.

Is it not then in real truth most right to give those the name of perfect guardians towards enemies without and towards friends within, that the latter shall have no desire, and the former shall have no power to injure, while the young men, whom but now we were calling guardians shall have the name of "allies" and defenders of the ruler's decree?

I argue from 414 to 415. The inquiry of true guardians.

Now how can we contrive, if we tell one splendid falsehood of those convenient falsehoods which we spoke of but now, to convince if possible the rulers, but failing that, the rest of the community?

To what effect? he asked.

Nothing new, I said, but a Phoenician story, what has happened before now in many places at the poets' shams and are believed, but has not happened in our time, and I do not

1 A splendid is sometimes used as the synecdoche of the principal or chief part of the rest of the sentence. Here is thinking of education at all times and not primarily of adapting it to different classes, and he has little or nothing that bears directly on this position. For comparing the present passage with 423, and the previous selection of 420—1 it is evident that if we succeed in the plan the results will be that all who the capacity of it are to have the ideally best education (Vid. 423) and those who are to have none at all shall be exactly the same, and the others are to drop off at various ages and stages and from 414 to where we are.

2 The line of thought, which we have been following up to this sentence.

3 A* "Allies"* story.

4 Against the material, and in the parallel.
know if it is likely to happen; and to get it believed needs a
good deal of persuasion.

It looks as if you hesitated to tell it; he remarked.

And you will think I was quite right to hesitate, when I have
told it.

Tell it, he said, and do not be afraid.

Well, I proceed to tell it; and yet I do not know with what
D face or with words I am to speak; and I shall attempt to per-
suade first the rulers themselves and the soldiers, and next the
rest of the community as well, that all the time we were
nurturing and educating them, it was so to speak a dream
in which they thought that all this befell them and was done to
them, but in reality they were then themselves being fashioned
and nurtured within the earth beneath, and their arms and the
E rest of their array were being wrought; and that when they
were completely finished, the earth who was their mother sent
them forth; and that now it is their duty to take counsel and to
fight, if any one attack it, for the country in which they are, as
their mother and their nurse, and to feel for the other citizens
as their brothers, earth born like them.

It was not without reason that you were so long ashamed to
tell your lie.

Naturally enough, I said; but yet listen to the rest of my
story. For "All of you in the state are brothers," as we shall
say to them in telling our tale, "but God in fashioning you
mingled gold in the creation of as many as are fit to be rulers;
and silver, in the auxiliaries; and iron and brass in the husband-
men and the artificers. Now as you are all of one family,
though for the most part you will have children like yourselves,
B yet sometimes a silver offspring may be born of golden parents
and a golden offspring of silver, and so all the others too of each
other¹. To the rulers then it is the first and greatest command-

¹ The next sentence shews that Plato does not exclude the gold or
silver springing from the brass or iron, as the form of this sentence might
suggest.
ment of God, that there shall be nothing of which they shall be such good guardians, and which they shall watch so intently as the children, but what they find to be engrafted in their souls; and whether a child of their own is born with an alloy of brass or iron, they shall by no mean compassionate him, but assigning him the rank that belongs to his nature they shall throw him down among the mechanics or the husbandmen, or whether again one is born of these with a tinge of gold or silver, having appraised them they shall bring them up higher, the former to rulership, the latter to auxiliary rank, seeing that an oracle has said that the city must perish when iron or brass shall guard it." Now have you any contrivance to make them believe this story?

By no means, he said, to make these men themselves to believe it, but one might be found to make their sons believe it and their descendants and all future men.

Well, even this, I said, would be of service to make them more devoted to the city and to one another, for I see pretty well what you mean.


So this shall be left where rumour may carry it; but we must arm our earth-born and march them forth with the rulers.

The fact that Plato requires the government to work the mechanism of a state upon a large scale is not quite appropriate for the smaller city. Indeed it does not seem to agree with his conception of government, or at least the constitution and arrangement of the latter; but determines how far with a small city they cannot be so used.

I leave the supposed first set, those destined to give the State a form.

I believe, he replied, were now over, and must have taken these to conclusions. The Athenians believed themselves to be abnormal and nothing which gives point to Plato's suggestion.

Nor that the first rulers should be taken under such conditions as p-
leading. And on arriving they must look for the most suitable place in the city to encamp; one from which they can most easily restrain those within, should any one not be willing to obey the laws, and keep off those without, should an enemy come on them like a wolf on the fold; and after encamping, and sacrificing to whom they ought, they must prepare their sleeping places. Must they not?

Yes, he said.

Then these should be such as to give shelter in winter, and be large enough in summer?

Unquestionably they should: I understand you to be speaking of houses.

Yes, I said, but houses for soldiers, not for money-makers.

How do you mean, he asked, that the latter kind differ from the former?

I will try and tell you, I said. It is surely the most horrible of all things and most ruinous to the flock to nurture dogs for defending the fold, of such a character and in such a way that from intemperance or starvation, or some ill habit besides, the dogs themselves set to to injure the sheep, and become like wolves instead of dogs.

1 There is Plato's irony in every line of this conversation, as he gradually unveils the difference of the standpoint from which Socrates and Glaucon at first regard the question of residences for the all-powerful knights who are to rule the State.

2 The two opposite evils. Cf. 421 D.

3 The illustration from dogs further pursued. The dog, without his gentle qualities and tendency to attachment, becomes like a wolf. Here is an incident which must have been in Plato's mind, told us by Xenophon about the real Socrates. In 404 B.C. (when Plato was about 25) the cruel and covetous oligarchy of "the thirty" was ruining Athens by proscription and confiscation. Socrates at that time took occasion to observe in conversation that it was a strange thing if one thought a man a bad shepherd who made his sheep fewer and poorer, and did not think it a bad government which made the citizens fewer and poorer. The "thirty" sent for Socrates and told him not to talk about shepherds.
Humble, he said, beyond question.

Then must we not take every precaution that our auxiliaries may do nothing of the kind to the citizens, as they are stronger than these, becoming like savage masters instead of kindly allies.

We must, be replied.

Then will they not have been prepared with the very best of circumstances if they have been in reality well educated?

That they have been, he said.

And I answered, That is not fitting for us to affirm so absolutely, my friend, but it is fitting to affirm what we were saying just now, that they must have the right education, whatever it is, if they are to have what is most important to make them good to one another and to those whom they guard.

Yet, and it is true.

Now in addition to this education any reasonable man would say that we ought to provide their houses and the rest of their belongings of such a kind as neither to interfere with the guardians being the best of men themselves, nor to uplift them into doing evil to the rest of the citizens.

And he would say true.

So then, I continued, whether they ought to live and dwell in some such way as that, if they are to be what we desire them to be, none of them possessing any property of his own, except what is absolutely necessary; then, none of them to have any house or store chamber into which all cannot enter when they

1 Looking upon the whole a scene of Book VII.
2 The word means no property but they too hardly to have property in the ordinary sense of the term.
3 Hereafter I suppose in chariots, homes and the like.
4 In describing the degeneracy from the ideal state to the misery amounting of the Spartan type, etc. They will be compelled to keep property in any thing that is worth gold and silver to them the same preservation of property; however, and private property, where they can have them and owned condition in any well private men. etc.
please; and their provisions, all that men need who are experts
in warfare, temperate and brave, they are to receive on a settled
estimate from the rest of the citizens as the wages of their
guardianship, to such an amount that in every year there shall
be neither surplus nor deficit; and to live in common like
men in camp, having their meals together; and for gold and
silver, we must tell them that they have these always in their
souls, divine and god-given, and have no need of what men
call such beside; and it is a sin to pollute that possession by
mingling it with the ownership of mortal gold, because much
that is unholy has been done with the coinage of this world,
while the gold of their souls is untainted; but for them alone,
of all that are in the city, it is not allowable to handle gold and
silver, nor to go under the same roof with it, nor to wear
ornaments of it, nor to drink out of silver or gold. And so
they would be safe and would save their city; but when they
shall acquire land of their own and houses and coined money,
then they will be estate managers and husbandmen instead of
guardians, and will turn into hostile masters of the other
citizens in place of allies, and will pass their whole life long in

1 Perhaps the earliest definite suggestion of the “no-margin theory”
which has so often seemed to social reformers to cut the knot of economic
difficulties. “Just enough” is easily said.

2 The syssitia or common meals were a feature of the Spartan quasi-
military organisation of the State. At Sparta the households existed as
centres of private expenditure besides the tables which the men attended,
much as tutors at Oxford and Cambridge may have their private houses
independent of the college high tables. Plato means to put a stop to all
that.

3 It is to be noted that the guardians’ way of life is to be exceptional in
the city. Money, and probably a wider licence of self-indulgence, is per-
mitted to the other classes—the commercial and industrial society—as we
may perhaps say, because of the hardness of their hearts, or the roughness
of their duties. Yet the life of the guardians, though exceptional, no doubt
stands for the life which Plato believes to be the best. Whether he is right
or wrong, we shall note how absolutely opposed his view is to the ordinary
associations of aristocracy.
Hating, and being hated, in plotting and being plotted against, leaving the scene within much officer and much more than that without, and by that late morning most near to destruction, both themselves and the entire community. Now for all these reasons, I ended, shall we say that the guardians ought to be then appointed as to their dwellings and all else, and shall we enact this as a law or not?

Certainly, said Glaucon.

-Aristotle (The Laws, Book III, Chapter 10)
BOOK IV.

Book IV. is occupied as far as 427 c with pointing out different respects in which the moral and intellectual unity of the commonwealth—the fact that it is "a whole"—makes itself apparent, a unity resting ultimately on the "music," or character engrained by education, which one set of guardians hands on to the next. From 427 c to the end it points out the specific moral qualities or cardinal virtues which were most important to a Greek, as revealed (a) in the structure and functions of the commonwealth (i.e. in the behaviour of individuals in their civic and industrial relations) and (b) in the heart and mind of the individuals themselves, as filled and guided by their functions in the commonwealth.

Argument. 419—421 C. The two meanings of happiness—the pleasures of individuals v. the welfare of the whole; which is of course the individuals at their best.

And Adeimantus broke in, Socrates, how will you defend yourself if any one says that you are not making these men particularly happy, and that of their own act; seeing that the city in truth belongs to them, and yet they have no benefit of any of its advantages like others, viz. possessing estates and building fine large houses and acquiring establishments suitable to them, and sacrificing private sacrifices to the gods1, and having

1 I.e. killing an ox or a sheep, which would be the occasion of a dinner-party, so that this and the next clause hang together.
their friends to dine, and indeed what you yourself referred to just now, possessing gold and silver, and all that people usually have who are to court us at the height of bliss. But, he might say, they appear to be absolutely posted in the city like hired attendants, simply on garrison duty.

Yet, I said, and moreover having only their board, and even getting wages in addition to their rations like all other mercenaries, so that it will not even be possible for them to go abroad if they wish to, on their private accounts, nor to make presents to mistresses nor to spend money on anything else they may desire to, after the fashion of people who are supposed to be happy. You are leaving out of your calculation all this and more like it.

Well, he said, consider it all to be included.

And what is our defence to be, you ask?

Yes.

If we continue on the same path? I fancy we shall discover what to say. For we shall say, that to begin with, it would be no wonder if these very men as they are had the greatest possible happiness, but that nevertheless we are not considering our city, with a view to this, that we should make any one group supernaturally happy, but that as far as possible the city should be so as a whole. For we thought that in such a city...
we should find the highest degree of justice, and injustice 
c in one badly constituted\(^1\); and that having seen both, we 
should be able to decide the question which has so long 
been before us. So now, as we believe, we are fashioning 
the happy commonwealth, not cutting off a part, and making 
a few people in it happy, but as a whole; and presently 
we will examine its opposite. Therefore, just as, if we were 
painting statues\(^2\), and some one came up and censured us for 
not putting the most beautiful pigments on the most beautiful 
parts of the figures, for the eyes, which are the most beautiful 
part, were not painted with crimson, but with black; we should 
d have thought to make a reasonable defence against him if we 
said, My good Sir, you must not suppose that we ought to 
paint such beautiful eyes as not to look like eyes at all\(^3\), or the 
other parts in the same way, but you should see whether, by 
assigning to every part what is appropriate to it, we make the 
whole\(^4\) beautiful; so too in the present case you must not 
two different senses of the term happiness, corresponding to two different 
ways in which individuals may try to satisfy their nature. 
\(^1\) See Bk. IX. for the examination of injustice in the degraded forms of state.

\(^2\) It is interesting to learn definitely from this passage that it seemed 
natural to a Greek of Plato's time that statues should be painted. The 
famous sarcophagi from Sidon are said to show with what excellent effect 
this was done; modern attempts have as a rule been most unsuccessful. The 
terra-cotta statuettes from Tanagra are prettily coloured.

\(^3\) These words contain the whole argument in this passage and the whole 
principle of the Republic. The first thing is to be what you are, what your 
place in the whole demands. What interferes with this, however fascinating, 
is of evil. There can be no beauty nor goodness nor truth if parts are not 
in harmony with the whole.

\(^4\) We see what is meant by a work of art being beautiful as a whole; 
but what is meant by a State or society being happy as a whole? It must 
be understood that the paradox conveyed by this comparison is precisely 
what Plato means to insist upon. It is happy "as a whole," we might say, 
when individuals are at their best in and through their membership of it. 
Note that there is nothing specially "aesthetic" in the comparison, which 
merely takes the work of art as an example of unity.
Book II.

...to attach to the guardians a kind of happiness which will make them anything rather than guardians. For we could very well, for example, take the farm-labourers and clothe them in long cloaks and give them golden ornaments, telling them to till the land as much as they please, or set the potters on couches by the fire, drinking round and round and enjoying themselves, with their wheel beside them, and order them to make pots as much as they feel inclined; and to make all the rest prosper in similar fashion, that the whole city may be happy, but you must not give such advice to yourselves, if we do so you tell us, neither the husbandman will be a husbandman nor the potter a potter; nor will any other possess any such fashion of life as goes to make up a society. Now the rest are of less account; for if the husbandmen become bad and go to ruin and pretend to be guardians when they are not, it is no danger to the State; but if guardians of the laws and the commonwealth are not so but only seem, you see that they bring utter ruin on the entire society, and they again alone command the chances of good organization and happiness. Now if our plan is to make guardians in very truth, but removed from being evildoers to society, but he who takes the other view treats them as a sort of landed class or happy revelers at a public festival, not members of a State, he must be speaking of something other than a city. We must then examine,

1 That does not put the case as the general that it is impossible for all...

2 Happy as of all men's conditions it is, what else would we call...

3 Note how thoroughly I am applying the principle of modern physics...
whether we are instituting the guardians with a view to engendering the greatest happiness in them; or whether as far as happiness goes we are to look at the entire community to see if it grows up there; while these auxiliaries and guardians are to be persuaded and compelled to act so that they will be the best possible artificers of the work which is their own, and all the others in the same way; and thus, as the whole society prospers and is nobly organised, we must leave each of its groups to what their nature assigns them in the way of participation in happiness.

Argument. 421 c—423 b. In all classes, not merely the guardians, wealth and poverty are fatal to function. The strength of the social whole is its unity, which does not depend on wealth.

Why, he said, I think you are right.
Then shall you think me reasonable when I say what come next to this?
What in particular?
About the rest of the workers in their turn, consider if the influences I shall speak of corrupt them, so that they become worthless.

D What are they?

1 Their work is the liberty, or development of faculty, of all members of the community, cf. 395 c, "consummate artificers of liberty for the commonwealth."

2 "Their nature" or "nature"; there is no difference. The society for Plato simply is the outgrowth of man's natural endowments in their completest form, or in other words, the maturity of man's endowments in their completest form is the nature of society, asserting itself in an intelligent and therefore social being. For the full hearing of the reference to what man's nature permits in the way of happiness see Bk. IX. 586 e and 587.

3 The guardians have been dealt with in this respect; he goes on to the other "public workers," i.e. the artisans, etc.
Wealth, I said, and poverty.
In what way?
In this way, do you think that a potter when he has got rich, will go on attending to his art?
By no means, he said.
But he will become more idle and careless than he was?
Yes, greatly so.
Then he will be a worse potter?
A great deal worse.
And again, if poverty prevents him from getting the proper instruments, or anything else necessary to his art, he will make his products inferior, and make worse workmen of his sons or others whom he may teach.
Undoubtedly.
From both of these then, poverty and wealth, the products of art grow worse, and so do the artificers.
It appears so.
We have found then as it seems, another task for the guardians, something which they must watch against by every means, lest it should slip into the city behind their backs.
What is this?
Wealth, I said, and poverty, as the former produces luxury and idleness and revolution, and the latter meanness and evil-doing in addition to a revolutionary spirit.

1 Besides keeping themselves clear of poverty, money, etc.
2 The same thing is to me, who think much on the whole question.
3 We find in the Greek state it was not inconsistent for the wealthy party, being in opposing circumstances themselves, to adopt various measures. Anything that went toward a permanent position was apt to be "suspect" in a free, and yet, you see without reason. There is a quaint experiment in Herodotus about a man who, when his house was on fire, sat down to read a well written history. "The Athenians felt also about Aristocles, and of course the idea that great wealth was one above the law is not unknown in the modern world. In 1803 Plato draws a picture where poverty and the humblest pauper are after all the same social type.
Just so, he said. But consider then, Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, when it possesses no money, especially if it is compelled to fight with one which is great and wealthy.

Obviously, I replied, it would be harder to fight one, but easier to deal with two of that type.

What do you say?

In the first place, I said, if they have to fight, will it not be with wealthy men, while themselves are experts in war?

Yes, that much is true, he said.

Well then, Adeimantus, I said; do you not think that one prize-fighter, in the best possible state of preparation, could easily fight with two men, who were not boxers, and were rich and stout?

Perhaps not with two at once, he said.

Not even if he were allowed to run away for a little, and then turn back and hit the first who came up with him, and were to do this time after time in the sun and the heat? Could not a man like that defeat many men like the others?

Well, he replied, it would be nothing wonderful.

But do you not think that the rich have more to do with boxing in the way of skill and experience than with war?

I do.

Then our experts in all likelihood will fight with double or treble their own number?

I shall assent to your view, he said, for you seem to me to say right.

And what if they were to send an embassy to one of the two cities saying, what would be quite true, "We make no use of gold or silver coin, nor is it lawful for us, but it is for you; so

1 Greek "athletes," which originally means "competitors" or "prize winners"; i.e. people specially trained for a special purpose.

2 A trick of the Spartans in actual war, which Plato may have in mind, as they passed in Greece for military experts par excellence.

3 See 419 E and note.
you had better take out side in the war and possess the belong-
ings of the other city." Do you suppose that any body of
men after hearing such an order would choose to go to war
against hardy and lean dogs rather than to join the dogs
against soft and delicate sheep?

I do not think so. But, he went on, if the wealth of the
one city is gathered into the other, take care lest it bring a
danger to the city which is not wealthy.

You are in a fool's paradise, I said; if you think that the
name of city applies to any but such an one as we were
eating loding;

Why, how is that? he said

You must find a larger name for all others, for each of
there is a number of others, but not one city, as they say in the
game. For if it be anything at all it is two cities, hostile to
the another, the one of the poor, the other of the rich, and
in each of these contain several, which if you deal with as a
single one, you will entirely miss your aim, but if as many,
ofering the wealth and resources of the one group to the other
or even their persons, you will always have many allies and

Abstraction disputy an mandatory in this point quite irreconcili-
ble with the Socratac. I mean that to recognize the strong
conviction which is drawn a generation or two previously that wealth is
"the means of war." Thereafter, for example, gave arguments in his
favor, that the event of the struggle between Athens and Sparta could
be held to be really contrary to such a view, considering what a poet was
placed behind him. Persia in the name of that struggle. Socrates
therefore argues all the more consciously against it. Perhaps so continued
as a poet on his favor.

The difference is not great. If men were a gymnastic struggles in which
the two sides of the board were called "poorer" or "richer.

So as to change Plato expresses his views on a return of the towns of
anim, but we must not suppose that he necessarily advanced the
propogation of plural and enlargement as a means of making them again
than of a stable State. He is hardly devoting the point, which it is
wonderful that he saw, accurately in the small communities of his day, that
a State is a system of groups within groups and bodies within bodies, and to
few enemies. And as long as your city maintains a sane organisation such as was ordained but now, it will be the greatest, I do not say in prestige, but in real truth the greatest, even if it have only a thousand defenders; for so large a single city you will not easily find either among the Greeks or among foreigners, though you will find many that appear to be many times its size. Or do you think otherwise?
No, by Zeus, he said.

423b—424. The area of a State to be that compatible with unity. The basis of unity.

Then, I continued, this will be both the best limit which our rulers can adopt in determining the right magnitude of the State, and a rule for the amount of territory which they must appropriate for a State of any given size; and they must let alone all beyond.

What limit? he said.

This, I imagine, I answered. They must enlarge it to the point up to which it can grow and yet be one, but not beyond.

Yes, you are right.

powerless for external action if these elements fall into conflict beyond a certain point.

1 Lit. "temperate," i.e. based on a harmonious frame of mind in which the true ends of life have their proper place.
2 I.e. in population, as the context shows.
3 Viz. in population.
4 Perhaps I may cite a modern equivalent for this principle from my Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 185. "A principle, so to speak, of political parsimony—entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, 'two organisations will not survive when one can do the work,'—is always tending to expand the political unit. The limits of the common experience necessary for effective self-government are always operating to control this expansion. We might therefore suggest, as a principle determining the area of States, 'the widest territorial area compatible with the unity of experience which is demanded by effective self-government.'"
Then shall we not lay upon the guardians the further injunction, to ensure in every possible way that the city shall neither be small nor have the appearance of being large, but be such as to be sufficient, and not.

Yes, no doubt it is a simple injunction to lay upon them.

And here is one still simpler. I said, which we alluded to previously, when we urged that if an inferior offspring was born of the guardians, he should be sent away among the others, and if a noble one came of the others, he was to be transferred to the guardians. Now this meant to declare that if they have a duty extending to all the citizens, to bring every one to that one particular work for which he is fitter than him, in order that each practicing now work, his own, may be not many people, but one, and so the whole city may grow to be one, not many.

I have clearly stated a way writing or appearing "small" or "large": we must really mean that it is too small or too large for its proper work. If it were put under the thorough examination and it would not cover and not rest of so small or large. Actual case. There is something, not nothing to do with the point: the moment is lost of one of elements of party.

1 Personal.
2 See &c.

An interpretation of Plato by himself made valuable on a guide to go in computing.

3 On he way which he is more. Now the maximum difference between the pleasing "for which he is born" and "for which he is born.

4 The T won not change as we find it is constant for the moment through our first thought.

5 The word is "one." If the assumption of its numbers, though all different from each other, are such at to form a co-operative system. It is necessary, as for us men, while we can separate, not by thousand, but dozen, being the same as the co-operative system. Then the same has nothing a co-operative system. For a minute or a moment, involving the majority of many. It is a very important style of healthy life. These are my words, only with: almost the same: that one thing. Probably is generally
Yes, he said, this is still easier than the former.

My dear Adeimantus, these are not, as a man might think, many and serious tasks which we shall present to them, but all of them are trivial, if they secure the one great thing, as men say, or rather, not great but sufficing.

What is that? he asked.

The education and nurture, I replied. For if they are well-educated and become reasonable men, they will easily see the right in all these matters, and in others too, all that we are now omitting, the possession of wives, and the arrangement of wedlock and of the begetting of children, to the effect that all of them is as far as possible to be treated ‘in common as friends’ belongings,’ according to the proverb.

Yes, he said, that would be by far the best way.

And indeed, I went on, the system of a State, if it is once started right, goes on with accumulating speed like a wheel.
For good nurture and education being kept up, produce good nature, and again good nature, supported by such an education, grow up even better than their predecessors; more especially in the begetting of offspring, as with other animals.

In all probability.

Then, to put it in brief, there is one precaution to which the authorities of the city must hold fast, that it may not break down unnoticed, but they may observe it on every occasion, that it is to have no innovation in gymnastic and music contrary to the ordinance, but to guard it with the greatest possible care, in that last when a poet says that men care must for the newest song they sing, it may perhaps be thought that the poet meant not new compositions but a new fashion of song music, and approves of it. But we must not approve of it, nor understand him so. But we must beware of a change in a new type of music as taking everything, since the fashions of music are never changed without change of the greatest civic laws, as Dionysus alleges and I agree.

You may set me down too as agreeing, said Adrasteus.

A very wise man, though an enemy, L. Mytilus, said, "Dionysus. In any case it would seem that there is a serious inv. the poem in making the Muson, even as poorly physical activities, whatever the change may be.

1 Homer, Odyssey (431), apparently quoted from memory.

2 The word which means laws also means dramas of music. And better, in the words "laws" it is not understood to stand as contrasted with what we should call conditional usage, or moral, sentimental and rational, but includes all of them. A great Greek historian attributes to a great Greek statesman the view of the previous laws, whose action is to recognize, that a political opinion are the strongest. There may be some passage in a part of that passage mentioned. Platonic or Sallian (1701 - 1716).

I knew I knew a very wise man, on much, of St. Christopher's statement that he believed if a man were permitted to make all the buildings he used his hands which would make the laws of a nation. Obviously this might make a very wise man not considered to be political sentiment, which is considered with Thukydides, and the rest. But this is very different from it. The practical advice is a very large and the conclusion of changes in art
Argument. 424 D—427 C. The unity of the city, then (on which, according to the three preceding sections, its happiness, strength, and proper size depend) is a spiritual or ethical unity, and if this is maintained, all else will settle itself; and if not, all reforms of detail are like medicines to an intemperate man.

D It is here, then, in music, that the guardians must build their fort?

Certainly, he answered; lawlessness in this sphere easily creeps in unobserved.

Yes, I said, as if in play and doing no harm.

Nor does it, he replied, unless this is harm—immigrating and letters with changes in the life of peoples, and whether as causes or as symptoms. Ruskin and William Morris have written about little else than this, and in music proper we may think of the general change of sentiment implied in the popularity of Wagner. Of course Plato sees the point very simply and directly. But his view contains the essence of the matter.

It would be less easy than might seem to "place" Plato with reference to modern political tendencies. He has a profound contempt both for elaborate or paternal legislative regulations, and for timidity in fundamental reform (see 426 B and C). If you say that he is a conservative you are met by the fact that revolutionary changes are just what he does not shrink from. If you try him as an advanced liberal, you are faced by his absolute contempt for reform by progressive legislation, and, to take him at his word, for the achievements of an imperial democracy very like our own. The only right course is to learn his great ideas sympathetically, and trust our own sense for their application.

An intentional modification of 415 E. The city, as we have said before, is the city of Mansoul, and the fort or watch tower is not an Acropolis such as many Greek cities possessed, but vigilance in maintaining a harmonious and loyal spirit, or as we might say, a civic religion. "We wrestle not with flesh and blood—but with spiritual wickedness in high places." Note that the Greek word here used for fort or safeguard is the original of the word "phylactery" known to us in the New Testament. I do not know whether this Greek name for a Jewish habit could possibly have any connection with Plato's ideas; but in any case it is interesting to observe the analogous symbolism in the two cases.
little by little it quietly permeates both character and conduct, and from these it comes out in greater force into men's dealings with one another, and from their dealings it proceeds to attack the laws and polities, with licence. Socrates, of great violence, until at the end it overturns all, both in the private and the public world.

Well, I ask, is that so?

I think so, he answered.

Then as we maintained from the beginning, our children must partake in a more law-abiding kind of play, from childhood. For, since it comes to be lawless and the children resemble it, it is impossible that they should grow up to be as loyal and noble men.

Unanswerable.

So when children have begun by learning to play prettily and have taken in its calmness from their mothers, then again in the contrary way to those others, it successively turns them into everything and prepares it, building up again any part of the State that may have been in decay.

For reasons, children's games, and also the assumption of having women with them, have nothing at all, and all these make between, which are the beginning of Man.

Therefore, rather than the training of our children to be law-abiding and kind in dealing with one another, the other side of licentious, and exists of course in many terms. The nature of a little game seems so that children have no picture if they have not something or elsewhere that with a good tradition in nature, and this is what I am speaking. Just as in a healthy remainder, leaving once brought to light, so we are hardly aware of the amount of rather good training which we have to pass through, as child and boyhood—playing with good temper, to impress the child's mind with good temper, to impress the mind, and to view and other people into it. We have never been able to say whether we should have been better or felt the benefit. Just because things can have, as these are not known.

[Note: The text is not fully legible in some parts, but the general meaning is clear.]
That is certainly true.
And they rediscover the minor moralities, as they are called, which former generations had entirely lost.
Of what kind?
Such as these; the proper habits of silence in the young before their elders, and offering them a seat, and standing up when they enter, and respect for parents, and hair-cutting and dress and shoes, and in general the personal appearance and everything of that kind. Or do you not think so?
I do.
But I think it foolish to legislate about them; for they do not come about, and could not be maintained, by enactment in written clauses.
How should they?
It is probable, at any rate, Adeimantus, I said, that the sequel of a man's education is such as the direction it impresses upon him. Or is it not always so that like calls out like?
Certainly.
And we should say, I imagine, that in the end it results in something complete and vigorous whether good or the opposite.
No doubt.
Then I, I continued, for this reason, should not attempt to extend legislation to such matters.
Quite reasonably.
And for heaven's sake, I said, what are we to do about market laws, dealing with the covenants between individuals in the market-place, and if you like with contracts for industrial work, and with slander and assault; and again about the initiation of lawsuits and appointment of juries\(^1\), and any collection or assessment of dues which may be necessary in markets or harbours, or in general the regulations of the market, the city,

\(^1\) Or "judges"; the Athenian "dicast" was both or neither.
or the harbour, or anything else of the kind—shall we bring
ourselves to exact any of them by law?

Why, he said, it is not fitting matter for injunctions upon
good and honourable men; they will easily devise for the most
part any legislation that is needed.

Yes, my friend, I said; if God grants them safekeeping of it
the laws which we described before.

And if not, he replied, they will spend their lives perpetually
engaging and amending things of the kind, expecting some day
to hit upon the very best.

You mean that each man will live like invalids whose
intemperance makes them refuse to depart from their unwhole
some mode of life?

Exactly so.

And how charmingly these spend their days. For they
gain nothing by continual treatment except to make their
ailments more varied and more intense, hoping all the time
that every new remedy which is suggested will at last make
them well.

Precisely, he said; that is the experience of invalids of that
type.

And further, is not this a graceful feature in them, that they
think their greatest enemy to be any one who tells them the
truth, that unless they stop drinking and stiling and indulge
their lust, and selling, neither drugs nor cauteries nor the knife,
or again spells nor amulets nor anything else of the kind will
do them any good?

Not altogether graceful, he said; for there is no grace in
being angry with one who speaks the truth.

All these regulations and rules of laws were very important and
pleasing at Athens.

Note.—Reference is made here to the usual Roman law of
behaviour. In Book VI. and VII. we have less of "the setting up"
and more of the teaching for the comprehension, truth, and goodness.

As in the comparison with baths, so it is now applied to
the body of the person, so that is the conduct of the individual.
You do not seem to applaud such persons, I said. By Zeus! no.

Then if the whole State acts in this way, as we were saying but now, you will not applaud it. Or do you not think that all States are acting in the same way with them, which having a faulty constitution proclaims to the citizens not to touch the fabric of the State as a whole, under penalty of death for whoever does so; but any one who will minister to them most pleasantly, while retaining their constitution, and will make himself agreeable to them by fawning on them and foreseeing their wishes, and who is skilful in accomplishing these, he in their view will be a good man, possessed of the highest wisdom, and will be honoured by them?

I think they are acting in the same way, and I do not at all approve.

And what of those who consent and are eager to be the ministers of such States? Do you not admire them for their courage and versatility?

Yes, I do; except those who have been deluded by their communities, and suppose themselves to be statesmen in reality, because they are applauded by the crowd.

What are you saying? Have you no sympathy for the men? Do you think it possible for a man who does not know how to measure, when a number of others who are in the same case keep telling him that he is six feet high, not himself to believe it of himself?

No, not in that instance, he answered.

Then do not be angry; for surely too these are the most delightful of all, as they keep legislating and amending the sort of things we enumerated but now, constantly supposing that

1 "Constitution," not in the somewhat special sense of modern politics, but the whole way in which the social fabric is constituted and behaves, certainly including its economic system.

2 Including the idea of "being medical attendant of."

3 425 D.
they will put an end to trades in commercial transactions, and to all the evils I referred to just now, not knowing that in fact they are, as it were, cutting off a hydra's heads.

Yes, indeed, that is just what they are doing.

So then, I said, I should not have thought that the true legislator ought to lay himself in the kind with laws or policy either in a State where the civic life is bad, or in one where it is good, in the former because it would be useless and nothing gained, in the latter because part of it any one could contrive; yet will follow spontaneously from the practice before laid down.

Then what more have we to do in our legislations? I asked.

And I replied, We have nothing more, but for Apollo and Delphi there remain the gravest and most beautiful and highest of the commands.

Of what kind?
The establishment of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods and demigods and heroes, and the sepulture of the dead, and all the services by rendering which to those elsewhere\textsuperscript{1} we ought to retain their good-will. For in matters of this kind, as we do not ourselves understand them, so in founding our city we shall obey no other than our ancestral interpreter\textsuperscript{2}; for this god surely as the ancestral interpreter of such matters to all mankind, interprets, sitting in the navel in the centre of the earth\textsuperscript{3}.

You say right, he answered; and we must act accordingly. The\textsuperscript{4} foundation of your State, O son of Ariston, may now

\textsuperscript{1} The dead.

\textsuperscript{2} As the Pythia, the woman who uttered the oracle, was the forthteller or mouthpiece (prophet) of Apollo, so Apollo himself was the declarer or utterer, here rendered interpreter, of the divine will. "Ancestral." i.e. relied on by the Greek nation from the beginning. There is a curious reticence, almost amounting to irony ("we do not ourselves understand"), combined with a real seriousness in this passage. Religion was to be the culmination of the national life; not a detached object of individual fancy. In the \textit{Laws} Plato would not allow private persons to establish temples and services. This is quite in harmony with the view of the historical Socrates, who when asked, "How should I worship God?" replied, "according to the law of the State."

\textsuperscript{3} Apollo’s temple at Delphi was supposed by the Greeks to stand on a rock or boss which was the actual centre of the earth’s surface. This belief had an ethical bearing; for the idea of the unity of mankind can hardly be grasped apart from the conception of the earth’s surface as a limited area of some kind. Moderns have remarked on the importance, in this respect, of our knowledge that the earth is a globe. Plato’s words, “to all mankind,” are unmistakeable. No doubt he would be thinking first and chiefly of the Greeks; they inhabited very various regions, Gaul, Africa, Italy, Asia, Thrace, Russia, Cyprus, and were thought of as representative types of the human race making up the civilised world. But foreign princes, as we know, often consulted the Delphic oracle; and there is no reason to doubt that Plato’s solemn language was meant to recognise a common spiritual centre for mankind as such. The oracle of course answered with reference to the tradition and descent of the State it was addressing; it made no attempt at introducing religious uniformity.

\textsuperscript{4} See note on 419. Here we pass to the second part of Book IV.
be considered complete; and the next thing is that you should bring a sufficient light from somewhere and look about in it yourself, and ask your brother to help you and Polemarchus and the rest, that we may see if possible wherever justice can be; and where injustice, and in what the two differ from one another, and which of them a man must possess who is to be happy, whether known for what he is, or not, by all gods and men.

That will not do, said Glaucon, for you promised to make it the search, seeing that it was a sin for you not to come to the aid of justice in every way to the best of your power.

You remind me truly, I said, and no doubt I must do so, but you must take part with me.

We will do that, he answered.

I hope, then, I said, to find it in this way. I suppose that our city, seeing its foundation has been rightly conducted, is wise, brave, temperate and just.

Clearly.

Then whatever of all these we find in it, the remainder will...
be that which we have not found. So it is just as with any four qualities, if we had been seeking one of them in anything, we should have been satisfied as soon as we recognised it; but if we found the other three first, this very fact would have make known to us that which we sought; for plainly it could now be no other than what remained.

You are right.

Then must we not enquire about these qualities, since there are four of them, by the same method?

Clearly so.

And first I think that wisdom is to be seen in it; and there is a paradoxical look about the quality.

How? said he.

The State which we described seems to me to be really wise; for it is well-counselled, is it not?

Yes.

And this very thing, good counsel, is plainly a sort of knowledge; for surely people take good counsel not by ignorance but by knowledge.

Obviously.

Now there are many and various kinds of knowledge in the State.

Undoubtedly.

Then is the State to be called wise and well-counselled by reason of the knowledge of the carpenters?

1 The Greek has no substantive where the word "qualities" stands in this sentence. The necessity of inserting one to suit the English idiom makes the argument seem much more naïve than it really is, especially if "things" is the word inserted. Plato thinks of the four moral excellences as the most notable elements of a civic society, and on this basis his argument is fair enough.

2 A rather naïve anticipation of the "method of Residues." It depends purely on the investigator's insight, even more than the modern method.

3 See 428E for the nature of the paradox.

4 Any science, art, craft, or skill, may in Greek be described by this
By no means, he said, because of this, but only "famous for woodwork."

Then it is not by reason of the knowledge which has to do with wooden furniture, and by taking counsel how it may be best turned out, that the State is to be called wise?

Certainly not.

Well, then, is it because of the knowledge that deals with things made of brass, or any knowledge of that kind?

It is not due to any of them.

Nor again is the State called wise by reason of the knowledge how to grow sprout out of the ground; but only "famous for agriculture."

I think so.

But now, I said, is there any knowledge, within the State which we have just founded, in the minds of any of its citizens, by which counsel is taken not on behalf of any one of the elements that are in the State, but on behalf of itself as a whole, in what way it may best conduct itself both towards itself and towards all other States?

Certainly there is.

What, I said, and in whom?

This, he answered, is the guardian knowledge, and it is in those rulers, whom last time we were speaking of, by the name of perfect guardians.

Then in virtue of this knowledge what do you call the State?

Well-constituted, he answered, and really wise.

Now, I asked, which do you think will be more numerous in our State, the brass-workers, or those real guardians?

The brass-workers, he said, by a long way.

And of the whole number of those who are given certain
class names from possessing certain kinds of knowledge\(^1\) will not the guardians be the fewest?

By far.

Then a State which is organised according to nature will be wise as a whole through the smallest group and portion of itself, that which is chief and rules, and through the knowledge which is in it; and this race, as it seems, naturally comes into being in the smallest number—this which has the gift of part-taking in the knowledge in question, of all kinds of knowledge the only one which should be called wisdom.

What you say is most true. This one then of the four we have made shift to discover, both the quality itself and where in the State it is seated.

I at any rate think, he said, that it is adequately ascertained.

Argument. 429\(\text{A} - 430\text{A}.\) **Courage as a social or civic quality; not the highest kind of courage conceivable, but on the other hand quite distinct from certain lower kinds\(^2\).**

Courage, again, both the quality itself and in what part of the city it lies, owing to which the city is to be called courageous, is not very hard to see.

\(^1\) I.e. the members of the various trades and professions. Much may be said from a modern point of view about the need that the ruler's knowledge shall be in touch with the craftsman's life and ideas. But none of it will seriously impeach the paradox which Plato drives home with his whole force here and elsewhere, that actual government is necessarily in the hands of a few. This is almost as true of a trade union or a democracy as of an army or a monarchy. Whether the capacity for ruling is as he thinks a rare gift, is perhaps more doubtful. But the position in which it can be fully developed is necessarily confined to a few.

\(^2\) The definite conception of courage, excluding a great deal which for us passes by that name, is one of the corner-stones of Greek Ethics. It is well worth while to compare with the present passage Aristotle's account of this quality in *Nicomachean Ethics* (Peters' translation), Book III. ch. 6 —9 inclusive.
How so?

Who would have regard, in calling a city either cowardly or brave, to anything but that part of it which does battle and goes to war on its behalf?

No one would have regard to any other part

For I presume that whether the others in it are cowardly or brave would not determine whether the State was the one or the other.

No.

Then the State will be brave, again, through a certain part of itself, because in that part it possesses a capacity such as to preserve through everything the opinion concerning things to be feared, that they are both and such like as the lawgiver in the education taught; that they were. Or is not this what you call courage?

I did not quite understand what you said, he answered, please to say it again.

I for my part said I, affirm that courage is a kind of safe-keeping.

What kind of safe-keeping?

That, of the opinion, which the law has created by means

1 I mean stating broadly and clearly the doctrine of a social organism which is in each instance, what the organ charged with that function taken in. It would be easy to suggest reservations upon Plato's statement. In saying whether I should in not brave in virtue of her manners her conversational manners as well as in virtue of her wisdom and her war knowledge is of these, if they have any social importance, would ultimately fall under Plato's principle.

2 For what is the first condition? and the second of the social organism which is in respect we are only dealing with opinion? the sort of temperament or constitution which all of us are under in matters determined as we are by nature and moral training. That some might well conclude the lawgiver is a problem that now at a great stage. For it is a mere commonplace that the doctrine that country rational principles, so that they may be to the great advantage to speculate.

3 The conclusion of proportion is something depending on what it was.
of the education, about things to be feared, which they are, and of what kind. And by a safe-keeping through everything I meant that they preserve it in pains and in pleasures, in desires and in fears, and do not let it go. And if you wish, I will give you a simile, showing what it seems to me to be like.

Of course I wish it.

You know then that the dyers when they want to dye wool so as to have the true sea-purple, in the first place select out of all the possible colours the quality of white wool, and then prepare it for dyeing by treatment with very elaborate processes, that it may receive the bloom quite perfectly, and not till then do they dye it; and everything that has been dyed in this way has an indelible dye, and no washing either with detergents or without is able to take away its bloom; but what is not done in this way—you know how it comes out, whether they dye it with other colours or even with this, omitting the previous treatment.

I know, he said, it washes out most absurdly.

Then you are to conceive that we too were doing something like this, so far as we were able, when we were selecting our soldiers, and training them in music and gymnastic; you must suppose that we were devising nothing else than how with full conviction our men might best take the colour of the laws, like a dye, in order that their opinion, both about terrors and about all else, might turn out indelible, because their

1 The purple that came from a shell-fish, one of the earliest articles of commerce in Greek waters. It is difficult to believe that this idea of the “sea-purple,” which the Greeks were fond of dwelling on, had no connection with the colour of the sea.

2 Lit. “nature.”

3 First comes the preparation, then the acceptance; cf. 401 E and 402 A. This assent or acceptance only amounts to coming to see the meaning of what you have been taught to do and feel; it does not imply a critical attitude, which, as said above, is dealt with at a later stage.
quality and their nurture had been appropriate, and that the
detergents of the soul, however fatal in their operation, might
never wash away their dye, whether pleasure, more tremendous
in its efficiency than any more or alkali, or pain and tear and
desire, stronger than all other detergents. It is this faculty, a
safe keeping through everything of the right and lawful opinion
with regard to what is terrible and what is not, which I name
and set down as courage, unless you say something against it.

No, he answered, I say nothing against it. For as regards
that right opinion about these same matters which has come
into being without education, that of the lower animals and of
slaves, I understand you not to consider it altogether lawful,
and so to call it something other than courage.

Perfectly true.

Then I agree that courage is what you say.

Yes, you must agree that this is citizen courage 1; and you
will be right, but we will treat of this excellence more per-
fectly, if you like, another time. For at present it was not
this we were looking for, but justice; so I fancy our enquiry into
it is sufficient for the purpose.

You say well, he answered.

1 Let nature, keeping to the words of a wise shall be as each followed by
"matter.

1 The citizen character is here distinctly marked off from the animal
character to which it was at first compared (13) 3—6. As one servant who
would also for his master to regard the same kind of "opinion" as
universally and necessarily, but such "opinion" is not the nature of the
matter, for as it is not bounded by the law of the soul, of a common
cause, proper, by accident through education. We must as change many
qualities which would not readily Plato's conception. On the other hand,
the Greek notion for the short of good moderns groups in philosophy of
disciplined virtues. The temperance would be a matter of course to a modern
statesman.

2 Distinctively both from the aristocratical and from, and from the nature of the
matter here, the perfection of manhood, which is
to be described when the treatise passes beyond the merely moral, and to
So. 49c, and a.
The quality of temperance, not seated in any one organ of the State, but consisting in a certain responsiveness to law and reason which pervades every element of the community, and gives authority to the recognised higher self of the society, which may (in actual States) be an embodiment of very different principles (432 A).

There still remain two qualities, I continued, which we have to discern in the State; temperance, and that for the sake of which we are pursuing the whole enquiry, namely justice. In what way then shall we discover justice—to pass over the discussion of temperance?

I do not know, he said, and I do not care for justice to be first brought to light, if we are not to go on to consider temperance; but if you are willing to do me a favour, scrutinise the latter before you treat of justice.

Why surely, I said, I should like to, if I am not doing wrong.

Make the scrutiny then.

We will do so, I replied; and looked at from this distance, it is more like a harmony or piece of music than the others were.

In what way?

Temperance, I said, is a sort of order and restraint of certain pleasures and desires, as people say, and they speak of a man as having self-mastery, I know not in what way; and other such facts we can see, clues, as it were, to the quality in question. Is it not so?

Most certainly.

1 Greek symphōnia, "sounding together," meaning something analogous to our "harmony."
2 Greek harmonia, a tune or scale. See 398 ff. and note.
3 Lit. "as being stronger than himself."
Now is not the expression "master of himself" an absurdity? For a man who is master of himself must also surely be subject to himself, and one who is subject, master, it is the same person who is spoken of in all these expressions.

Obviously.

But this way of speaking, I think, clearly intends to express that within the man himself and belonging to his mind there is a better and a worse, and when that which by nature is better has control over the worse, that is what the phrase "master of himself" expresses; certainly it is a phrase of approval, but when under the influence of bad nurture or worse evil association that which is better, being the smaller, is overcome by the quantity of the worse, this is censured as matter of reproach by the mode of speech in question, calling the man who is in such a disposition "slave of himself" and profligate.

And quite right, he said.

Now turn your eyes to our new city, and you will find in it the one of the two characters, for you will say that it is rightly called "master of itself," if indeed that, the better part of which rules the worse, is to be described as temperate and possessed of self-mastery.

1 Lit. "a man who is stronger than himself must also surely be weaker than himself," if in nature rules his love, it follows that his love is subject to reason, but both alike seem to be "himself." Still some sense has been intended in which either of them is not so. Thus, without further explanation, these expressions have no sense; they do not distinguish the character from the undesirable state of mind.

2 Of course it is not necessary to say, but the expression which they draw falls within a large sphere, when explained as above.

3 This phrase is further explained in the correspondence of Book IX., see especially 116ff. It would not be right to speak as if one element of mind were better from the beginning and in itself than others. The expression "reason is in nature worse than instrument" is an argument as to reasons of feeling or sensation. But I am by nature one thing, and by others from the beginning and by others.
I am doing so, and what you say is true.

Yes, and the multitude\(^1\) of various desires and pleasures and pains we shall find principally in children and women and servants and in the inferior natures which form the majority of those who pass for freemen.

Certainly.

But for the simple and moderate ones, which are guided by deliberation under the influence of reason and right opinion, these you will find in few, and only in the best born and best educated.

True, he said.

So you see that just these elements\(^2\) are present in your city, and that in it the desires which are in the multitude and the inferior sort are ruled by the desires\(^3\) and the intelligence which are in the fewer and better?

I see, he answered.

Then if any city is to be called superior to pleasures and desires, and master of itself, this one must be called so too.

Most certainly.

And must it not be called temperate also on all these grounds?

Very much so.

And moreover, if in any city the same opinion is in the rulers and the ruled on the question who are to be rulers, this will be the case in ours; do you not think so?

Emphatically so, he said.

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1 Explaining, in accordance with the last sentence but one and p. 428 above, how the evil, or at least the unnecessary, element is the "larger." See 428 e and note.

2 The "better" and the "worse," which in the proper relation constitute "temperance."

3 He allows desire as well as intelligence to the latter class, and he ought to allow intelligence as well as desire to the inferior class. It is only through intelligence that the ruled can respond to the intelligence of the ruler. Plato is not here speaking with psychological accuracy, but broadly and generally.
Now in which group of the citizens shall you affirm that temperance resides, when they are thus disposed, in the rulers or in the ruled?

Surely in both.

Do you see then, I said, that we were prophesying pretty correctly just now, in saying that temperance bears the likeness of a kind of harmony?

How?

Because it does not act like courage and wisdom, each of which residing in a certain part makes the city in the one case wise and in the other brave; temperance does not act in this way, but extends literally throughout the whole society, producing all down the scale 'a constant voice of the weaker, the stronger, and the middle classes', ranking them, if you choose, by intelligence, or if you choose, by strength, or by number or by wealth or by any other such standard' so that we should be nearest the truth if we said that temperance is a unanimity consisting in the natural harmony of the worse and better as to which of them is to rule, both in the State and in the individual.

I altogether agree with you.

1) [Footnote: In a passage (lately brought to my notice) called Art in gear, I am told that Plato wrote another account of a harmony.]

2) This very remarkable passage shows the wealth of Plato's political intelligence in his conceptions of a harmony and evolution in States. Cf. Books VIII and IX. You may have, however, so many different bases, the essential point is that, whereas in the house it should be respected and accepted throughout the society, and thus you have a 'temperance' relative to your social standard there.

3) 'Natural, not an imperative, but as prescribed by an authority.

4) In my view the same 'reigns in the natural' duty to obey the dictates of temperance, though it may be comparatively unimportant. Plato sometimes uses the careless language of common life, and works the forms of a (vulgar).
Argument. 432 B—434 C. The quality of Justice consists—not merely, as a modern might say, in having or keeping your own, although this is included, 433 E, but—in “doing your own,” i.e. doing your work or duty, with a strong negative implication of not interfering with the work or duty of others [and therefore not with their “means,” 433 E]. See further note on 433 A.

Well, I said, we have discerned three out of the four qualities in the State; so at least it seems to us; but what can the remaining kind be, the further ground of excellence in the State? For it is plain that this is justice.

It is plain.

Then, Glaucon, is it not now our duty to stand like a party c of hunters round a cover, giving attention that justice may not slip away and disappear before we detect her? For it is clear that she is somewhere hereabouts; so please look out and take pains to see her, in case you should catch sight of her first, and point her out to me.

I wish I could, he answered; but it is the other way; if you treat me as one who will follow and can see what you show him you will be treating me very reasonably.

Offer up a prayer then, and come on with me.

I will do so; only lead on.

Why, I said, the place looks rough to walk in and deep in shade; it is certainly obscure and hard to explore; but all the same we must go on.

Yes, we must, he said.

So I caught sight of her and called out, Hallo, Glaucon; I think we have found a trace, and I fancy she will not altogether escape us.

Good news, he said.

Really, I went on, we have been behaving very stupidly.

How?

My dear Sir, as it turns out, the thing has been tumbling about at our feet all along from the very beginning, and we did
not see it, but made ourselves most ridiculous; just as people sometimes keep not looking for a thing when they have got it in their hands, so we would not turn our eyes upon it, but kept looking away to somewhere at a distance, which probably was the reason why we failed to observe it.  

What do you mean?  

Thus that we have for some time been both speaking of it and hearing each other speak of it, without perceiving that we were saying, in a manner, what it is.

Your preface seems long when one wants to hear the result.

Well, I said, here if there is anything in what I say. That is which we laid down from the beginning when we were organizing our State, as what we ought to effect throughout; that, I think, or some form of it, is justice. We laid it down, surely, and were constantly insisting on it; if you remember, that each one ought to practice some use of the employments belonging to the city, that, namely, for which his nature was naturally best adapted.

We did meet upon it.

And farther, that to do one's duty and not to meddle with

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1 The degree to life and to ethics was as a rule in looking not for

2. The application of Stato the Syrian. It is a consistent expression to Plato presents an almost unfathomable hunch from which one naturally forms an unknown and personal expression.

3. Was the form to be described, or if?  

4. Whenever construction is used, here as the translation must be set in another, the form used nearly to its meaning is. The word "nature," which really suggests itself, has unhappy implications to a nineteenth-century reader. Plato's meaning is probably very wide, so of what he means in one to do what duty or time in the application of one's capacity to "play" one's own part as is a part of his natural nature. How can remain the effect or idea of justice a question and it is.  

5. There is a negative correlation in the phrase, though in nature it is "nothing more than business" would make it too narrow. To its own duty is perhaps the tone rendering all fault, but the Greek has not the notion of something
many businesses is justice,—this too we have heard from many others, and ourselves have frequently maintained.

B    Yes, we have.

This then, my friend, the doing one's duty, when it takes place in a certain manner\(^1\), seems likely to be justice. Do you know what makes me think so?

No, he answered, but please tell me.

It seems to me, I said, that what is left over in the State, after the qualities we have examined, temperance and courage and intelligence, is this, which imparted to all those others the power to arise in it; and that when they have arisen, this is what ensures them preservation, so long as it is present. And certainly we said that justice would be what was left over after the others, if we could find three out of the four.

And necessarily so.

But again, I said, if we had to determine which of these qualities being engendered in the State will do most to make it good, it would be hard to decide whether this is the agreement of the ruler and the ruled\(^2\), or the maintenance in the soldiers' minds of an opinion formed by law about what is and what is not to be feared\(^3\), or the intelligence and guardianship present in the rulers\(^4\), or whether this principle does most to make it good, when present in every child and woman and slave and freeman and workman and ruler and subject, the principle that each is to be one and to do his own duty and not to interfere with various businesses\(^5\).

hard and probably distasteful which is apt to attach to duty in the modern mind.

\(^1\) See 443 c.

\(^2\) Temperance.

\(^3\) Courage.

\(^4\) Wisdom.

\(^5\) Justice. Note the width of Plato's conception, quite different in principle from what is often ascribed to him. Every creature in the community, the children and the slaves included, is to act, not under
Undoubtedly it is hard to decide.

Then in promoting the excellence of a State, the quality by which every one does his duty is a rival to its wisdom and its temperance and its courage.

Quite so.

Should you not give the name of justice to the quality which rivals these in promoting the excellence of a State?

Most certainly.

And see if you come to the same conclusion from this point of view. Shall you require the rulers in your State to determine the lawsuits?

What then?

In determining them, will not their chief object be that individuals shall neither retain what belongs to others nor be deprived of what is their own?

It will.

Because it is just?

Yes.

Then in this point of view also the having and doing of what belongs to us and is our own, will be admitted to be justice.

It is so.

See now if you agree with me. Suppose a carpenter to attempt to do a shoemaker's work, or a shoemaker a carpenter's, either exchanging their tools and privileges, or again the same person attempting to do both, do you think that any interchange in these minor matters would seriously injure the State?

Hardly so.

But I imagine when one who is by nature a workman or
b some other wealth producer\(^1\), is subsequently uplifted by wealth or numbers or strength or any similar influence till he attempts to pass over into the military type\(^2\), or one of the military class, without the requisite merit, attempts to pass into the deliberative and guardian type, and these\(^3\) then interchange their instruments and their privileges, or when the same person takes in hand to do all these things at once, then, I fancy, you think with me, that the exchange and intermeddling of these with one another is the ruin of the State.

Absolutely so.

c So the intermeddling and reciprocal interchange with one another of the three classes is the greatest mischief to the State, and may most rightly be entitled evil-doing in the strongest sense.

Certainly.

And the gravest evil-doing against one's own State you will affirm to be injustice, will you not?

Unquestionably.

This then is injustice. And the other side we may state in this way; the doing of what belongs to them by the wealth-making\(^4\) the auxiliary\(^5\), and the guardian class, each of them

\(^1\) Or "money-maker." This is the first indication, given in Plato's gradual and casual way, that he is going to bring the satisfaction of sensuous desires into intimate connection with the idea of cupidity and avarice.

\(^2\) Or "kind."

\(^3\) I.e. representatives of the different classes, as contrasted with different persons inside the same class.

\(^4\) See 434 A. This is the first time that "wealth-making" or "money-making" is used as a general term for the "third" class in the *Republic*, described 415 A as the husbandmen and the other workmen. It thus corresponds in Plato's analysis with the element of desire in human nature, and the connection is further insisted on in the later books, e.g. as a connection between avarice and sensuality, while again, desire, as the demand for the true necessaries of life, is an essential basis of individual morality, and corresponds to an essential function of society.

\(^5\) Or military.
performing its duty in the State, this, being the reverse of that
other, will be justice, and will make the city just
I think it is so, he said, and not otherwise.

Argument 434 b 443 Verifaction of the four moral
qualities of a State by comparison with them as experienced in the
individual soul.

We will not yet, I said, affirm it as altogether fixed; but
if this principle, when applied to each single human being, is
admitted in that case also to constitute justice, we will agree
to the conclusion with less more alarm for what judgment shall we
have to say against it? But if not, then we will consider some-
thing else. But now let us complete our inquiry, in which we
thought that if we should first set to work to study the quality
of justice in a larger one among the objects which possess it,
we should then more easily detect what it is in a single human
being, and this larger object seemed to us to be the city-state,
and so we organized the best city we could, knowing well that
in a good city there would be justice. So what in that case it
appeared to us to be, let us compare with the single human
being and if it agrees well and good; but if justice reveals
itself as anything different in the single person, we will test it
by returning to the case of the city; and perhaps by looking at
the two side by side and rubbing them together we shall
make justice show its light like fire from fire-sticks, and when it
has become clear we will establish it in ourselves.

Why, he said, you speak to good purpose, and we must do
what you say.
Now, I asked, is that which one speaks of as the same, in a larger example and in a smaller, dissimilar in the respect in which it is the same or similar? Similar, he answered.

Then it follows that the just man, in respect of the very principle of justice, will differ not at all from the just State, but will be similar to it.

He will be similar.

Now certainly the State seemed to us to be just, when the three kinds of natures contained in it were each of them doing its duty; and temperate and brave and wise, owing to certain other affections and dispositions of these same kinds. Then, my friend, in accordance with this, we shall expect the individual to possess these same forms in his own soul, and to merit the term applied to the State by the same affections which we found in it.

Inevitably.

Then, my dear Sir, we have fallen into a trifling enquiry concerning the soul, whether it has these three forms in itself or not.

I do not quite think, he replied, that it is a trifling one. For perhaps, Socrates, the proverb is true that "Fine things are difficult."

It appears so, said I; and, Glaucon, you must clearly understand that in my view there is no chance of apprehending this matter precisely by such methods as we are employing in our discussions: for it is a difficult path, longer and harder,

1 E.g. if there is something we call "life" both in a gnat and in an elephant, will it, so far as it is life, be similar or dissimilar in these two examples? Or, to come nearer to Plato's mind, if we give the name of "justice" alike to a great nation refusing to oppress a small one, and to one man resisting the sway of cupidity or vengeance in his soul, will it, so far as it is justice, be described in dissimilar language in the two cases, or in similar?

2 Or "classes."

3 Cf. 532 E. Plato had a strong feeling of the imperfection of his methods and data. His mind was possessed with a passion for scientific
that leads to this result, perhaps; however we may achieve it in a way adequate to our discussion and enquiry than this.

Then must we not be content with that? he said; I shall be satisfied with it for the present.

Well, I said, it will certainly be quite sufficient for the present.

Then do not give it up, but pursue the enquiry.

Now is it not, I said, quite necessary for us to admit that the same forms of mind, and dispositions, are present in each one of us as in the State? For surely they have come there from no other source. For it would be absurd to suppose that the spirited disposition has not been engendered in States by their individual members, in the case of peoples who bear this character, such as the inhabitants of Thrace and Scythia and, as a rule, in the up-country region, or the element of intelligence, by which one would characterize more especially our own part of the world, or the love of wealth, which we

consider as the source of our advance towards a progress so sure as the one we are now discussing. It would, for example, be wholly impossible to extract the following passage as a statement of his psychological conceptions. They develop greatly under his analysis even within the Republic. What was actually said is this, when he there set down the suggestion before us, it is impossible to say; but we can see from the latter books of this Dialogue that the wide outlook of modern science and philosophy, as in some ways the fulfillment of his explications.

1. *the upper regions*; *mountain district.* But more probably the region extends from cultivation and the sea, practically toward the North, whether the word “upper” may indicate that of not. Aristotle seems to mean the same by the word “regions of Greece.” The term has implied, but to me was the result of the world, both geographically and in the happy combination of qualities in its natives, as well with more than one of Greek writers. The one Greek, however, was appointed in these terms and parameters, the Arimaspean, and engaged but waiting in spirit to an extraordinary extent with the master conception of West and East as we shall say in Homer’s Ilios. The Greek race above, they thought, had a large portion of spirit and conception.

In short, oddly in one sense, as more than lower classes, and in another rageliness which indicates there the characteristics of the lowest race of the State.
should assert to belong principally to the inhabitants of Phoenicia and Egypt.

It would be absurd, he said.
Then this is so, I said, and it is not hard to see.

No.

But now we come to a hard question, whether we have here a single power by which we perform our various kinds of action, or whether there are three, and we do one kind of thing with one and one with another; for example, whether we study by one of the powers in us, and are angry by another, and by a third have desires for the pleasures of food and sex and any kindred affections, or do we act with the whole soul in each of these directions, when we have got our impulse? These are the points which will be hard to determine adequately.

I think so too.

1 See note on 434 D. The second point (436 A—441 C) in verifying the existence of the four moral qualities in the soul, is to find out whether its three aspects or kinds or tendencies are really different from one another, so that they can stand in the relations required to constitute the moral qualities. This point is stated here, 436 A—B, answered first about reason and desire, 439 D, and then about all three "kinds," 441 C.

2 No substantive in the Greek.

3 No substantive in the Greek; the phrase is simply "one of the (neuter plural article) in us." This resource of the Greek language gives Plato's psychology a capacity of not committing itself by premature classification, which a modern may envy.

4 Plato is not suggesting that it is open to discussion whether the soul is a unity or in three separate parts. He is merely considering, with reference to the special problem before him, whether the modes of action of the soul are sufficiently distinguishable to conflict with or control one another in the way demanded by his description of the moral qualities.
Argument 436 - 437 & The standard of sameness and
difference is the principle known in Latin as the Law of Con-
tradiction, a step within the discussion 43 & 441 whether
the three "kinds" in the soul are or are not "different"

Then let us try as follows to distinguish whether they are
the same with one another, or different.

How?

It is plain that the same thing cannot be brought to act or
to be affected in opposite ways at the same time in the same
part of it and in the same relation. So that if ever we find this
taking place among the kinds in the soul, we shall know that
they are really not the same, but several.

Granted.

Now consider the case I put

Say on

Is it possible for the same thing at the same time to stand
still and to move, in the same part of it?

By no means.

Let us settle the point yet more precisely, lest we should
get into difficulties at a later stage. If any one were to say of
a man standing still, but moving his hands and his head, that
the same man was standing still and moving at the same time,
I suppose we should not admit that this was the right way to
state the case, but should maintain this to be, that part of the
man was at rest and part was in movement. Is it not so?

It is.

And if such an objector were to refine his argument to a
still further subtlety, by urging that tops which spin with their
pegs fixed in a single spot, are as a whole, at once standing
still and in movement, or that this is so with anything else
which goes round in a circle and does so in the same place,
we should reject the conclusion, since when at rest and
motion in these ways, it is not with the same part of themselves. But we should maintain that they have in them a vertical axis and a circumference, and that as regards their axis they are standing still, for they do not deflect in any direction, but as regards their circumference they are moving in a circle; but whenever one of them while going round inclines its vertical axis to right or left, or forwards or backwards, then it cannot in any sense be standing still.

And rightly, he said.

Then no argument of this kind will confound us, nor go any way to make us believe, that anything, while the same, could at the same time, in the same part, and in the same relation, act or be affected in opposite ways.

It will not make me believe it.

But yet, that we may not be obliged to protract our discussion by going through all such objections and establishing their falsity, let us assume that this is so¹ and go forward, on the understanding that if at any time this shall appear to be otherwise, all the conclusions which we have drawn from it shall be held to be undone.

Yes, he said, we must do so.

Argument. 437 B—437 D. There are oppositions in the soul, of the general nature of acceptance versus rejection; an application of the argument, that opposite behaviour indicates different elements to be concerned in it, and so a part of the discussion 436 A—441 C. See note on 436 A.

B Should you not then, I said, set down assent and dissent, and the longing to get something and the refusal of it, and acceptance and rejection, and everything of this class, to be opposites to one another whether as actions or as affections (for this will make no difference)?

¹ Viz. that the same thing cannot behave in opposite ways at the same time, etc.
Book IV.

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Yes, he said, they are opposites.

Well then, I went on, should you not set down hunger and thirst, and in general the desires, and to be willing, and to wish, and everything of the kind, as belonging to those types which have just been mentioned. For example, should you not affirm that the soul of him who desires, in every case, either keeps for that which he desires, or rejects that which he wishes to come to him, or again, in as far as he is willing that something should be given him, accepts it; in answer to itself, as if in some one asking a question, being anxious for its coming to pass?

Yes.

And then to be secure, and not to be willing, and not to desire, we must rank under the head of the soul rejecting and repelling a thing from herself, and under all terms which are opposites of those former ones?

Unquestionably.

Argument 437 A—438 A. One thing we know of things opposed in these cases of opposition is what we call "desire," by which we mean in a positive impulse the corresponding object, as thirst is to drink. A further step in the discussion 438 B—441 C.

This, being so, we shall say that desires constitute one type of kind, and the clearest cases of them are what we call thirst and hunger.

The following are different ways of describing theRead more of desire for an act of thing, the proof being that they are all alternative, like Yes argued by N., and are "opposites" of the negative attitudes, mentioned before.

The purpose of the remarks of argument in this section is to move away from the opposition and realize the one and the same in the last sentence of it to be in contrast, viz., the case of the desires must be far as he is content, not willing that to think and thereon "opposition" so that it is thinking which in my view is an essential element which is different from desire.
We shall.
Thirst is for drink, and hunger for food?
Yes.
Now in as far as thirst is thirst, will it be a desire in the soul of anything beyond what we say? For example is “thirst” thirst for hot drink or for cold, or for much or for little, or in a word for any particular quality of drink? Or is the case rather that, if there is heat in the thirst it will produce the desire of something hot in addition to the desire of drink, and if there is coldness, that of something cold? And if, from the presence of quantity, the thirst is much, it will give rise to the desire of much, and if it is little to that of little? But to be thirsty, as such, can never be a desire of anything but of its natural object, drink as such, and hunger too of its object, that is food?

Yes, he said; each desire, as such, is only for its natural object as such; to be for this or that kind of object belongs to the additions.
Then let no one find us unprepared, and confound us by urging that no man desires mere drink but only good drink, nor mere food but only good food. All men no doubt desire what is good; so if thirst is a desire it will be for good drink or whatever else the desire may be for, and so with all the rest.
Really, he answered, such an objection might be held to have something in it.

Well, but, I answered, in all that is such as to be of some-

1 I.e. beyond “drink,” the object mentioned in the last sentence.
2 It sounds odd that “much” or “little” should count as a “quality,” but the meaning is easy to see. If you say, “I want to drink a great deal,” of course you have added a “qualification” to the simple statement, “I want to drink.”
3 Briefly, the point of this objection would be that desire might limit itself, and so reject certain of its objects, without implying another mental element opposing it. Plato answers that “good” is implied in desire, and constitutes no limitation.
thing, what is such and such is of what is such and such, while what is merely itself is of what is merely itself?

I don't understand, he said.

Don't you understand that the greater is such as to be greater than something?
Quite so.

Greater than the less?
Yes.

And the much greater than the much less, is it not?
Yes.

And the greater at some time or other than the less at some time or other, and the greater in the future than the less in the future?
Why, of course, he said.

And is it not so with the more in relation to the fewer, and c
the double to the half, and all cases of that kind, and again
with the heavier in relation to the lighter, and the quicker in
the slower, and once more with hot things in relation to cold, and
everything like that?

Certainly it is.

And what about the sciences? Is it not the same rule?
Science itself is science of the knowable itself, or whatever we
ought to take science to be "of," but a particular science, being such and such, is of a particular branch of knowledge.

The sentence is made difficult by the multiplicity of the terms used, partly for the sake of giving the statement a long and involved form. The following sentence explains the meaning.

It serves the same purpose as the previous one, so that
such as to be greater than something is an example of "things
which are such as to be something" on the last sentence relative

Some of the following cases of terms relative to each other, those of

The terms of quantity involving a difference that is

States of same opposite position, though of course there is a relation
of quantity underneath them.
which is such and such. I am thinking of a case like this; when there came to be a science of the production of a house, did it not take on a difference from the other sciences, so as to be called the science of house-building?

No doubt.

Was not this by reason of its being such and such, like none of the other sciences?

Yes.

Then it came to be such and such itself, because it was of something which was such and such.

It is so.

Well, then, I said, this is what you must take it that I meant to say a moment ago, if you now understand it; that with everything which is such as to be of anything, itself alone is of the other's self alone, but if the other is such and such, this which is of it is such and such. And I am not saying that they are like what they are of, as for instance that the science of what is healthy and unhealthy is healthy and unhealthy, and that of evil and good is evil and good; but, from the moment that it became the science not merely of that of which science is, but of such and such things, and these were the healthy and unhealthy, then the consequence was that itself too came to be such and such, and this fact caused it no longer to be called simply "science," but, with the addition of the such-ness, "medical science."

I understand, he said, and I agree.

Thirst, now, I said; should you not affirm that it is, in its nature, one of these "of's"? Thirst, I suppose, is of—.

1 He puts the logical distinction between genus and species as if it arose by a definite step in time. This is merely to give his explanation vividness. "When science took to building houses it began to merit, and obtained, the distinctive name of 'the science of house-building.'"

2 See note on 438 D just above.

3 E.g. the knowable or truth in general, as opposed to the objects of particular sciences.

4 Or "quality."
I should, he broke in: it is of drink
Then of such and such drink there is such and such thirst,
but thirst in itself is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor
bad, nor, in a word, of any such and such at all, but the nature
of thirst itself is to be of drink itself and nothing else.
Quite so.
Then the thirsty man's soul, in as far as he is thirsty, wishes
nothing else than to drink, and this is what it longs for and is
what it has an impulse towards.
Clearly so.

Argument. 439 10. There is something which can directly
effort desire, and therefore must be something different (according
to the standard of the Law of Contradiction). And it appears
to be reasoning or calculation. So Reasoning or calculation are two
different kinds in the soul. First, mention to discuss 439 a - 441 b. see note on 439 a.

So then if anything ever draws the soul the other way when
it is thirsty, must it not be something in it different from the
actual part which is thirsty, and which leads it, like an animal,
to drink? For, we maintain, the same thing can certainly
never act in opposite ways at the same time with the same
part of itself in relation to the same object.

See note on 41. The above argument, which leads up to this
answer, may be paraphrased in some such way as this. You might be
more what you say, i.e. you might be what is implied in what you
say. If you doubt (as will be assumed in the next sentence) that you can be
thirsty and yet nothing else desire to drink, you must cast aside out of
the argument in one sense, etc. that it must (and mean that one was thirsty for
wine, and did not dare to drink the water offered to him. This may sometimes be true, but it is not what the words mean, and the place meaning of the words is supplied by common sense, viz.: that one can be thirsty and
yet continue the impulse to drink, which is one's thirst. This impels some
argument that this must be.

* See 407 b 9

† It is worth noticing that the principle is established, both here and
above 438 a, so as to suggest that the same thing once, perhaps consider-
Certainly not. Just as, I imagine, it is not right to say of an archer, that his hands push away the bow and draw it to him at the same moment; but the truth is that one hand pushes it away, and the other draws it to him.

Quite so.

c Now are we to say that sometimes people when thirsty decline to drink? Why it is constantly the case with very many people. Then what are we to say of them? I asked. Is it not that their mind contains that which urges them to drink and that which hinders them from drinking, which latter is different from and stronger than that which urges them?

I think so.

Now does not that which hinders such actions arise, whenever it arises, from reasoning, while the influences which pull and drag us towards them, present themselves by means of affections and morbid states?

It appears so.

Then it will not be irrational for us to esteem them to be two and different from one another, entitling that wherewith the soul reasons the reasonable part of it, and that wherewith it loves and hungers and thirsts and is agitated by all the elements or parts. Thus Plato's argument does not deny the unity of the mind, in asserting its diversity.

1 The statement of plain fact, which the previous section was meant to guard from being explained away.

2 Or calculation. Reason is here introduced as a prohibitive and calculating mood. And this is a very important way of regarding the intelligence, but it is not at all a complete way, and Plato does not mean that it is. His doctrine of "Music" has already anticipated the deeper expression of the later books, according to which the intelligent side of the soul is an absorbing positive passion for order and truth.

3 No substantive in the Greek.

4 Or "calculative."

5 In the sense of desire.
other desires, the irrational and appetitive, the associate of certain replenishments or pleasures.

No, he said, we may reasonably consider them thus.

Argument 430 b-441 c. The "spirited" element distinct named as a third distinct "kind" in the soul. (See also the conclusion of discussion 430 a-440 c. See note on 430 a.)

Then we may take these to be two kinds, which we have distinguished as present in the soul, but well the element of spirit, that by which we are indignant, be a third kind, or of one nature with either of these?

Perhaps with the second, the appetitive.

Well, I said, I once heard a story, in which I believe, that Leontius the son of Achaeon, on his way from Paros to Athens under the north wall on the outside, noticing some dead bodies lying at the executioner's, at the same time was "desirous" to look at them and shrank from doing so and tried to keep himself away, but finally his desire overcame him, and he pulled his eyes wide open, and running up to the corpses exclaimed, Take what you want, you wretches, and glut yourselves with the noble spectacle.

I have heard it myself, he said.

But this story, I continued, indicates that the anger sometimes makes war on the desires, as if they were different things.

Yes, it does.

1 Plato represented the satisfaction of desire, which he treated as practically the same thing with pleasure, under the metaphor of "deeply interested." On killing "up of a violence or necessity." This does not agree with what Plato says to his "unfitting up" as something "in its immediate interest." Thus may have suggested the metaphor, but further that in the states of war, peace, or even of fortune's various appearance, we seem to be divided over proper rule, desire one thing, wish the other, or even the same men, and the removal of one circumstance seems like filling up a wound.

To the appetitive, and the appetitive.

We may bring the appetitive to a desire.

With the appetitive, I suppose, as a sort of marriage on them for their desire.
And do we not see, I said, in many other cases, when desires are constraining any one against his reason, that he reviles and resents the constraining force in himself; and as if in a civil war between two factions the spirit of such an one becomes the ally of his reason? But the spirit taking part with the desires, when reason judges that she ought not to be opposed, is something which I fancy you would not say that you had ever observed to take place either in yourself or in any one else.

By Zeus, no, he answered.

Well but, I said, when anyone believes himself to be in the wrong, is he not, the more noble he is, the less able to be angry at enduring hunger and cold and anything else of the kind at the hands of one whom he believes to be acting justly, and, for here is my point, is it not true that his anger refuses to be aroused against that other?

True.

But again, when one thinks he is being wronged, does not his anger in this case boil and rage and take part with what it thinks to be just, and holding out the more for hunger cold and all such like sufferings both triumph in the mind and persist in its noble efforts, till the man has either succeeded or perished, or his anger has calmed down, being called off by the reason within himself, like a sheep dog by the shepherd.

Yes, he said; that is a good illustration of your point; and indeed in our city we appointed the auxiliaries like sheep-dogs to be under the authority of the rulers—the shepherds of the State.

---

1 Cf. Romans vii. 24, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of this body of death?" (R.V. margin).
2 The tendency to resentment or indignation; it seems necessary to retain the rendering "spirit" in order to show a connection with the "spirited" element of the soul.
3 The original comparison for the "spirit." See 375 A ff.
4 See e.g. 416 A.
You understand my meaning rightly, I said, but have you thought of this also?

What?

That our view of the "spirited" element is the opposite of what it was just now. For then we were supposing it to be a kind of desire, but now we maintain it to be a kind of desire, and to be much more disposed, in the civil war of the mind, to take its stand on the side of the reason.

Just so.

Then do we take it to be different from this too, or to be one kind of reason, so as to make our three, two kinds in the soul, the reasoning and the appetitive? Or as in the State there were three kinds that formed its system, the money a making the auxiliary and the deliberative, is there in the soul too this third kind, the spirited, auxiliary to the rational part by nature, if it has not been deprived by evil nurture?

Necessarily it is a third.

Yes, I said, if it is shown to be something other than the reasoning part, if it was shown to be something other than the appetitive.

Why, he said, there is no difficulty in showing it. In children for instance one can see this, that from their birth onwards they are full of spirit, while as for reasoning, some men seem to me never to partake of it at all, and the majority not till late.

1 As Justice and Command point out. See also our commentary notes above.
2 There is no mention of the "soul" in the text. It is not clear what "the soul" refers to in this context. However, the text seems to be discussing the nature of reason and the role of the spirited part of the soul.
3 It is not clear what "the soul" refers to in this context. It seems to be discussing the nature of reason and the role of the spirited part of the soul.

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5 It is not clear what "the soul" refers to in this context. It seems to be discussing the nature of reason and the role of the spirited part of the soul.
By Zeus, I answered, you are right. And further one may see in the animals that what you say is true. And besides this, we may appeal to the passage in Homer, which we mentioned in one place above, for there Homer has distinctly represented in his poetry the part which has made an estimate of what is better and what is worse, rebuking the part which is angry without reason, as one thing addressing another.

Certainly you say true.

**Argument.** 441C—443B completes the argument begun 434D, of which the discussion 436A—441C was a part, by pointing out in the individual soul the qualities corresponding to the four moral qualities of the State.

All this, then, I said, we have swum through with difficulty; and we are fairly well agreed that the same kinds and in the same number are present in the State, and in the soul of every one.

It is so.

Then at this point it further becomes inevitable that as, and by what, the State was wise, so, and by that, the private person is wise?

No doubt.

And as, and by what, the private person is brave, by that, and so, the State is brave; and in the same way both parties possess all the other elements of excellence.

Inevitably.

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1 See 390D above.
2 No substantive in the Greek.
3 The word implies reckoning up a sum. This is of course a simple type of the attempt to look at all the bearings and consequences of an action in its place in our life.
4 Anticipates the simile of the great waves, in the later part of the Republic.
5 Viz. three.
6 State and private person.
Then, Glaucon, I imagine, we shall affirm that a man is just too, in the same way in which the State on its side was just.

This again is quite inevitable.

But I presume that we have not forgotten this, that the State was just, by each kind in it doing its duty, the kinds being three.

I do not think we have forgotten it.

We must bear in mind then that each of us, that in whom each of the kinds within him does its duty, will be a just man, and one who does his duty.

Certainly we must bear it in mind.

Then it belongs, does it not, to the reasoning part to rule, being wise, and having the task of forethought: on behalf of the mind as an entity, and to the spirited to be its subject and ally.

Quite so.

Then will not, as we said, a mixture of music and gymnastic make them harmonious, giving tension and vigor to the one by noble thoughts and studies, while relaxing and altering the other, making it by harmony and rhythm?

Completely so.

And these two then having been thus nurtured, and in real truth having learned their duty and been educated, will have the government of the appetitive part, which forms:

1 No subdivisions in Greek.
2 This is the true ground of the necessity of intelligence, and when it is forgotten, the presumption that intelligence is the highest thing is liable to exaggerations.
3 410 a 11
4 The reason for “philosopher” (transcending) part or kinds.
5 This strengthening of the mind on the reduced and harmonious side—scarcely is it to the sinking parts would mention, according to the earlier account, be described by gymnastics. But the fact is that those considered as the elements to make the harmonious through and all its aspects, described as we saw, in harmonizing the type of an education by whatever names.
6 The “special” sense.
7 but having “learned their parts,” a parenthesis in the phrase “being their part,” by which justice is always described. One true duty and place has to be discovered, and we to be adapted to:
the greatest bulk\textsuperscript{1} of the mind in every man, and is by nature the most insatiate of wealth; which they will watch, lest through being indulged in the pleasures which are called bodily, it should grow big and strong, and refuse in its turn to do its duty, but should endeavour to subjugate and to govern what it has no right to in virtue of its kind, and thus overthrow the entire life of all the parts.

Most certainly.

Will not these two then, moreover, be the best guardians against enemies from without, on behalf of mind and body as a whole, the one taking counsel for them, and the other fighting their battles, obeying the ruler and by its courage accomplishing his designs?

True.

Then again in virtue of this part we call each man brave, when his spirited temper preserves throughout both pleasures and pains the law of what is to be feared and what is not, as taught it by the reason\textsuperscript{2}.

You are right.

And we call him "wise" in virtue of that little\textsuperscript{3} part which was the ruler within him and gave this instruction\textsuperscript{4}, seeing that it possesses in itself the knowledge of what is expedient for

\textsuperscript{1} An expression constantly recurring in Plato, which conveys his sense of the irreducible multitude and confusion of the desires as we meet with them, in contrast with the oneness of intelligence. He does not mean that this disorderly bulk is a feature of the soul as it ought to be. Cf. 588—9 and 611. The positive education of desire, too, by adapting it to the objects of life in their true order and importance, is implied but not expressed in the present passage. It is more fully accented in the later books of the Republic.

\textsuperscript{2} Cf. 429 B, C. The idea of "courage against pleasure," frequent in Plato, tends of course to make courage continuous with temperance. We noted in 386—8 how readily the one passes into the other.

\textsuperscript{3} "Little" symbolises the unity or centrality of intelligence, in which the whole is, as it were, brought to a point. Cf. last note but one; and for the parallel "in the state" see 428 E.

\textsuperscript{4} In the education.
each severally and for the community of these three kinds as a whole.

Quite so.

And again, do we not call him temperate by the freeness and concord of these very parts, when the one ruler and the two which are ruled are in agreement that the reasoning part should rule; and the latter raise no insurrection against the former.

Temperance certainly, he said, is this and nothing else, both in a State and in a private person.

And just, too, he will necessarily be, by the quality and in the way which we are continually speaking of.

Quite necessarily.

Well then, I went on, is justice now less distinct to us, so as to seem something different from what we saw it to be in the State?

I for my part do not think so.

For we might wholly confirm our view, I said, if there is still any doubt in our minds, by applying commonplace tests to the quality.

Or what kind?

For example, if we had to determine about the State which we have described, and the man who is like it in his nature and his training, whether such an one seems likely to steal a deposit of gold or silver which he has received for custody, do you think that anyone would suppose him likely to do it, and that, rather, men of a different character?

I think that no one would suppose so.

And he would be far from satiety and embroilment, and from treachery, whether private against his friend or public against states?

Book IV. 191
Far from it all.
And he would not be in the least degree untrustworthy, whether in promises on oath, or in other forms of covenant.
Of course not.
Acts of adultery, again, or neglect of parents, or omission to do service to the gods, belong to any character but this.
Yes, indeed.

Is not the reason of all this that in him each of the kinds within his soul does its duty with regard to governing and being governed?
It is this and nothing else.
Then shall you go further, and look for justice to be other than this quality, which gives this character to all those who have it, both men and States?
By Zeus, he said, I shall not.

Argument. 443 B to the end of the book: conclusion as to the inward and essential nature of justice and injustice, and inference to their respective desirableness, from their being the health or disease of "that very essence whereby we live": followed by suggestions for a further comparison of justice or goodness and injustice or badness as at work in further social phases corresponding to further psychical phases.\(^1\)

Then our dream is completely fulfilled, that is, the suspicion which we expressed\(^2\), that from the very beginning, in founding our State, we had probably, by some deity's guidance, hit upon a first step to justice, and in some sort a type of it.
Most certainly.

\(^1\) Note that in treating the inward state as the essence of morality Plato most carefully links it with the outer act, and system of external and social life. He is wholly free from the dangerous separation of faith and works. The further discussion of the bad forms of society and soul is carried out in Books VIII. and IX.
\(^2\) 433 A.
Sec. 211. It really was a sort of image of justice that was why it helped us), when we said that it was right for the man who had a natural bent for shoe-making to make shoes and do nothing else, and for him who was fit for carpentering to carpenter, and so on with the rest.

It appears so.

For on earth, justice was something of the kind; not with reference to the external duty, but to that inward action which in very truth deals with the soul and what is most one's own, that is, when a man does not permit each element within him to do what does not belong to it, nor the kinds within his soul to meddle with one another's tasks, but as reality has set in order what is his own, and won the government of himself, and organised himself, and come to be at peace with himself, and has adjusted to one another the three kinds, actually like three fixed notes of the scale, higher, lower, and middle, having bound into one all these and anything between them, and having made himself completely a unity out of a multiplicity, temperate and in

Footnotes
- Footnote 6: great use of the idea of image as symbol. An image or symbol is really a unique and partial example of the fact or principle which it represents, e.g., we use food as a symbol of health and spiritual maintenance of humanity. Thus the image on the bottom of metal quality and compared to nature external to water or in nature.
- Footnote 7: A.
- Footnote 8: By this amendment the appearance of rigidity and immobility which might still in the full description of quasis or principle remained.

One sees one town do exactly only a symbol of justice, a rough approximation which Fulchs be fundamental truth that it must of men to make a world. The aim peace is that the spiritual character should be restored to human society, which involves of course an external harmony as a part of it. On what variety human matter is relative without immediate distraction, then becomes a more operation of law.

Suggesting that the psychology of man has only been a rough sketch for practical purposes.

See note above.
tune,—and then, and in this spirit, enters upon action whatever it may be, whether concerning the acquisition of wealth or the treatment of his own body, or whether it be something political, or about his private matters of business; in all these cases esteeming and describing as just and noble a course of action which preserves such a disposition and helps to perfect it, and to the knowledge which governs such a course giving the name of wisdom; and holding all action for unjust which tends to break down such a disposition, and to the opinion which governs it giving the name of ignorance.

What you say, Socrates, is quite true.

Well then, I said, if we were to affirm that we have found the just man and State, and justice as a quality in them, we should hardly, I imagine, be thought in error.

No, by Zeus, he said.

Are we to affirm it then?

We are.

Then let that be, I said; for next, I suppose, we ought to examine injustice.

Clearly so.

Then must it not be a civil war, so to speak, of these three, an over-meddliness and interference and insurrection of some one part against the totality of the soul, trying to dominate in her contrary to fitness, while being by nature of a kind which ought, properly, to be the servant of that which is of the ruling race? Something of this sort, I imagine, and

1 "Opinion" emphatically contrasted with "knowledge." It seems odd to treat ignorance as a kind of opinion. But opinion, for Plato, and indeed for ourselves, includes mistake and illusion; while, again, ignorance does not always mean mere blankness or absence of ideas, but is often applied to the erroneous thoughts of an ignorant man. George Eliot somewhere satirises the feeling that a man's ignorance is of more reliable quality than a woman's—that is, his behaviour where he is ill-informed.

2 Not, observe, against the intelligence, except in as far as the intelligence represents the mind as a whole.
rooted in distraction and confusion of the "kinds," are injustice and interdependence and cowardice and ignorance, and, in short, all wickedness.

The very same, he said.

Then, I asked, if it were not now plainly manifest what all three are—the doing of unjust actions, and wrong doing, and again the doing of just actions, wrong that injustice and justice themselves are made clear?

In what way?

That, I said, they differ not at all from healthy and unhealthy living, that being in the body as these in the soul.

How?

Healthy living produces health in the body, and unhealthy living disease.

Yes.

Then in the same way does not the doing of just acts produce justice in the soul, and of unjust, injustice?

Insanely.

Now to produce health is to constitute the elements of the body as to dominate and be dominated by one another according to nature, and to produce disease to to constitute

---

3 The opposites of the four typical moral qualities or cardinal virtues, Justice, Temperance, Courage, and Wisdom.

The two are distinguished from naturals as the one from the other.

The significance of moral information is clearly stated in the following sentence:

"S. substance. If we suppress the condition as a property, very likely would the point of the comparison with particular actions severely change.

4 For instance, note

5 Nature: To you and I, Aristotle says whatever a thing is when it is a thing; for instance: that we are to be the author of the former, or to say what it is, by nature. Nature for the Greek thinkers was real, what it was for Gombrich and Woolf, the productive principle of life in the universe.

---
them so as to rule and be ruled by one another contrary to nature.

Yes, it is.

Then is not to produce righteousness, to constitute the elements of the 
*soul* so as to dominate and be dominated by one another according to nature, and to produce injustice, to constitute them so as to rule and be ruled by one another contrary to nature?

Completely so, he said.

Then *virtue*¹, as it seems, will be a kind of health and good condition of the soul; and *vice* will be its disease, and ugliness, and infirmity.

It is so.

Then is it not the case, in general, that noble practices lead to the acquisition of excellence, and ignoble ones to that of *vice*?

Necessarily.

At this point then, as it seems, it remains for us to consider if, moreover, it is profitable² to do just acts and to pursue noble practices and to be a just man, whether or not one's being such remains unknown, or rather to do injustice and to be unjust, supposing that one suffers no penalty, and does not meet with chastisement to make him better.

Why, Socrates, he said, to me the enquiry appears to be becoming ridiculous. We think life not worth living with a bodily constitution that is being ruined, no, not if we have all possible foods and drinks and wealth and power; and shall we believe it to be worth living when the constitution of that very *essence*³ by which we live is being confounded and ruined, if

¹ Or "excellence." We must not tie down Plato's meaning to the modern use of "virtue," which is very narrow and negative.
² Cf. 367 D and 368 C. But the issue is more plainly stated in the contention of Thrasymachus in Book I. 344 C.
³ No substantive in the Greek. The Greek phrase is a happy expression of what a Greek thinker really meant by the soul, viz. *that*, whatever it may
only a man do what in the world he wishes, except indeed what will rid him of vice and injustice and give him virtue and
courage; these two opposites proving to be such as we have
described them?

Yes, it is ridiculous, I said, but since we have arrived at a
point from which we may most clearly discern that this is as
my say, we must not give up the attempt.

By Zeus, he said, that is the last thing we should do.

Then come up here, I said, that you may see for yourself
how many forms there are of vice, which in my judgment are
varied by observation.

I feel it, he said, only too sure.

Yes, I continued, it appears to me, looking as it were from
a high place, since the argument has brought us up to one,
that there is one form of excellence and infinite forms of bad
vice, but of these forms no particular which are worth men
coming.

How do you mean?

There are probably as many modes of and as these are
modes of policies forming distinct types.

How many?

Five modes of policies, I answered, and five of the soul
say what they are.

I say that one of them would be that mode of policy which
we have described, but it might be called by two names, for if
one man were among the rulers, superior to all, it would be
called a monarchy, if the superiors were several, an anar-
chocracy.

Note: My aim is to show you which is the underpinning principle of all opinions of
our time and thus to gain the greatest good for them.

II. By policy generally to treat it as an art, which to practice and to solve the
difficulties of the day.

The idea of good government is to be simplicity, economy
and fulness and to correct defects with humanity. Thus VIII.
and I are to stand on the same side.

You mention "race" and are the highest among all the rest; since
True, he said.
This then, I continued, I call one form; for neither a number of rulers, nor one if he arose, would disturb any of the more considerable laws of the polity, as long as they adhered to the nurture and education\(^1\) which we have described.
Naturally they would not, he replied.

Plato the very opposite extreme politically to Despotism or unconstitutional monarchy, which the Greeks, and Plato among them, called Tyranny. Of course it is not meant that Plato’s rightful monarchy would imply constitutional monarchy in our technical sense.

\(^1\) Cf. 424 D. To keep to the right music was the way to hold the fort.
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