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14 April, 1886.
PRINCE BISMARCK.
Otto von Bismarck in 1834.

ÆTAT. 19.

From a Drawing in possession of the family.
PRINCE BISMARCK

AN

Historical Biography

BY

CHARLES LOWE, M.A.

With Two Portraits.

Vol. II.
THE GERMAN EMPIRE.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER X.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE.

1.—From Frankfort to Danzig.
CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XI.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE (continued).

2. —Isolation of France; Estrangement from England.

France and Germany—Bismarck saves the Empire from an "industrial Sedan"—The Empire and the Republic co-operate in the settlement of
the Eastern Question—Germany joins the naval demonstration at Dulcigno—The Greek Frontier Conference—Bismarck does much to avert a Graeco-Turkish war—Ascendancy of Germany at Stamboul, and the causes thereof—Bismarck encourages France to take Tunis, and why—The Bardo Treaty robs the jealousy of the Italians.--They appeal to Bismarck for help, but get none—Léon Gambetta disapproves the rapprochement between the Empire and the Republic, and makes a mysterious dash into Germany—Bismarck checkmates the Democratic Lion of France by a move in Italy— Estrangement between France and Italy—Executive of effusive compliments between Hoffsin and Berlitz—Italy joins the Austro-German Alliance—Necessity and nature of the new Triple Agreement—Its effect on France—Germany and Spain—Bismarck encourages the ambition of King Alphonso—The King and the Kaiser at Homburg—Alphonso becomes a "Chian King".—And is consequently mobbed in Paris—Unforeseen results of the incident—The German Crown Prince visits Spain, and scores another success to Bismarck's policy The Danubian States choose between Austria and the German Powers—Servia becomes a kingdom, on tacit conditions—Roumania also joins the Peace League—Bismarck gives advice to the Prince Eleet of Bulgaria—Russia more and more returns to her old love—M. de Gières, the new Russian Chancellor, carries an olive-branch to Varzin—Mr. Gladstone suddenly appears with the Czar at Copenhagen, and flutters the Germans—Other symptoms of reconciliation between Germany and Russia—The peace-maker and the peace-keeper of Europe—The three Emperors meet at Skierniewice—The interest of England, as the best-hated nation on the Continent, in the Skierniewice meeting—German irritation against England, and the causes thereof—Did Bismarck share the anti-English feeling of his countrymen?—Sudden revelation of an agreement between France and Germany—The progress of rapprochement between the Republic and the Empire—The genesis of the Conference idea—The Anglo-Portuguese Congo Treaty—Bismarck gives foot upon it, and astonishes Lord Granville—Feeling of Bismarck at this time towards England—The Chancellor suddenly springs the Conference proposal on England, and is very gruff with Lord Granville—His Lordship sacrifices form to substance—How Bismarck appropriated the prestige of England—Bismarck only the Blücher of the free-trade battle in Africa—Germany gets all the honours, and England most of the tricks—The work of the Conference—Bismarck acts as accoucheur to the Congo State—Bismarck begins to trench on another African region especially dear to England—His attitude to the Egyptian Question—Did he wish Egypt to be the Schleswig-Holstein of France and England?—Bismarck at first gives England more than his moral support in Egypt—The rulers of the British Empire pester Bismarck for advice as to Egypt—The advice he ultimately gave—What the Chancellor thought of Mr. Gladstone and his Egyptian policy—Mr. Gladstone irritates the Germans by showing an ostentatious preference for the French—How English policy in Egypt responded to the hopes of Germany—The London Conference reveals Germany acting in accord with France—Lord Granville repeatedly over-rules Count Münster—How an unsound body may serve the ends of a sound policy—Bismarck draws ever nearer to France—How the unnatural allies evinced their anti-English accord—Germany not yet a colonising Power—Bismarck's policy—The influence of the Great Elector—Influence of the "Blink and England"—Paterson on the colonial policy of Prussia—Lucrative colonies versus "lange Kerle"—Joachim Netzelbeck and his colonising mania—Netzelbeck vainly petitions two successive Kings of Prussia—Gneisenau's theory of the Prussian State—How Bismarck at first agreed
CONTENTS.

PAGE

with Gneisenau, and differed from Nettelbeck—Creation of the German Fleet—How the national pride was flattered by the fleet’s achievements—The naval power of Germany engenders new aspirations in the nation—Bismarck propounds an astounding theory of emigration—German rivalry with England—Bismarck at first will not hear of colonies—Signs of a change: he wishes to assist the “South Sea Kings”—He is discouraged by the rejection of his Samoa Subsidy Bill—His Mail Steamer Subsidy Bill, and his enunciation of a colonial policy—The nation applauds this policy, but the Reichstag rejects his Subsidy Bill—He suspects England of a jealous desire to thwart this new policy—And commences to issue a series of White Books—The White Book tale of Angra Pequena—Bismarck will hear nothing of a Monroe doctrine in South Africa—Bismarck seizes the British Bull by the horns—Faults of the English Government—A gross misunderstanding—Who was to blame for it?—Extremely sharp practice of the German Government on the West African coast—The German Government tries to vindicate its conduct—The irate and unappeasable Chancellor assails England with sledge-hammer strokes—Lord Granville replies with dexterous rapier-thrusts—Another German grievance against England in Fiji—Grave results of the Fiji grievance—Anglo-German conflict as to New Guinea—How a Boer deputation was feted in Berlin—and what ensued from disappointment of the hopes excited thereby—Bismarck’s policy from the British point of view—Bismarck enunciates his theory of “do ut des”—A mystery and a misunderstanding—Lord Amnithill’s share in the misunderstanding—Count Münster and the part he played—Ostlerical duel between Bismarck and Lord Granville—Count Herder’s story of Bismarck going on a special mission to England—Mr. Gladstone wishes Germany “God speed” in her colonising career—“Sine Germani sed arma salus” not the belief of true Britons—Bismarck, the unifier of Germany, helps to federate the British Empire . 125

CHAPTER XII.

THE “KULTURKAMPF.”

1.—With Pius the Ninth.

“Priest, beware your board!”—Meaning of the word, and antiquity of the thing—The Syllabus of Errors—Bismarck the “incarnation of the Devil”—An astounding feat of the Jesuits—Bavaria sounds a note of alarm—Bismarck will meanwhile not interfere—Harry von Arnim’s plan of action—A measure of precaution—A weapon in reserve—Bismarck’s action during the Ecumenical Council—Ratting of the German bishops—Papal infallibility and war—Papal calculations—The Vatican in league with revolution and the Tuileries—End of the Pope’s temporal sway—Bismarck on the prospects of the Papacy—The “Evangelical Empire”—A Catholic ultimatum—The Centre party in the Reichstag—Dr. Windthorst—The Centre shows its colours—The German bishops at the grave of English Winfried—Rise of the Old Catholic party—How Bismarck viewed the Vatican Decrees—Furst results of Papal doctrine—The Brunsweg case—Bismarck abolishes the Catholic Ministry, and quotes a fable—The Reichstag passes a “Pulpit Law”—Dr. Fulf “Principia obsta!”—State supervision of schools—Bismarck is presented with a symbolic stone-axe—He tries conciliation with the Pope—The Pope repudiates the ambassador of the Emperor—“We shall not go to Canossa!”—Bismarck takes precautions against the election of a Jesuit Pope—German agitation against the
CONTENTS.

Jesuits—The people more despotie than their rulers—Pre and Cons—
The anti-Jesuit Law—The “rolling stone” and the sinful “Colossus”
—Bishop Namssanowski and his conflict with military authority—The
Archbishop of Cologne tries to eject some Bonn professors—The Bishop
of Ermeland bandies words with Dr. Falk—Passage of arms between
the Bishop and the Emperor—Bismarck brings the Bishop to his senses
—A knot of Episcopal conspirators—A virtual declaration of Clerical
war—Skirmishing fire—Bismarck replies to an English address of
sympathy—Thunderbolts from the Papal Olympus, and a Roland for an
Oliver—The May Laws—Guelph versus Ghibelline—Another non pos
sumus from the German bishops—Alteration of the Prussian Constitu-
tion—Bismarck on “Kingship and Priestcraft”—Passive resistance
and severe repression—Correspondence between the Pope and the Em-
peror—The Old Catholics get a bishop—Chaos—Archbishop Ledo-
chovsky and his acts of rebellion—His imprisonment—Martyrs or
misdemeanants?—Increase of the Clerical party—A Civil Marriage
Law, and the reasons for it—Bismarck will not act like the False
Mother—“The best hated man in Europe”—Hate of the Chancel-
lor in France—Sympathy with his aims in England—More repressive
measures—The coping-stone of the May-Law edifice—Rigorous appli-
cation of the May Laws—Kullmann, a Catholic, shoots at Bismarck—
Kullmann’s motives for the crime—Duchesse, another would-be Kull-
mann—The voice of Europe—Kullmann “clings to the coat-tails” of the
Clerical’s—The German mission withdrawn from Rome—Imprisonment
of Dr. Majunker—The Chancellor’s “first Canossa.”—An overwhelming
vote of confidence—More provocation to the Pope—A thunderbolt En-
cylica—The “Bread-Basket Law”—Bismarck claims to “know the
will of God better than any of them”—Amputation of diseased (con-
stitutional) limbs—More Falk Laws—The Italian Guarantee Law—
Bismarck imposes his will on the Belgian Government—Prussia en-
ters into a military alliance—A Dacian era and massacre—A Dacian history
—The Virgins of Lourdes and Marlingen—Increasing popularity of the
Chancellor—M. Thiers on Bismarck’s Church policy—The tide
beginning to turn—The choice of Hercules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

CHAPTER XIII.

THE “KULTURKAMPF” (continued).

2. — With Leo the Thirteenth.

Pio Nono succeeded by Leo XIII.—Berlin and Rome again on speaking
terms—The German Crown-Prince is conciliatory but firm—Bismarck
and Masella at Kissingen—Cholera or poison?—The “polyvalablic art
of saying nothing”—Apparent turning of the Papal tide—The Clericals
enlist under Bismarck’s Protectionist banner—Dr. Falk, Minister of
Combat, is succeeded by Herr von Puttkamer, Minister of Conciliation
—“Rede mihi legiones!”—“Du ut des!”—“Heads I win, and tails you
lose”—Bismarck argues with Jacobini—The “two fixed ideas” cannot
unite—Bismarck anticipates a Papal move—A Dispensing Act—
“Habemus legatum!”—Herr von Schlüzer at Rome—Another Dispens-
ing Law—A second correspondence between the Pope and the Emperor
—A third Dispensing Law—“To be, or not to be?”—Pliancy of the
Prussian bishops—Papal conciliation and Prussian concessions—The
German Crown Prince visits the Pope—Meaning of the visit—The Pope
asks for Bismarck’s portrait—The derniers mots of the Chancellor and
Dr. Windthorst—A Papal “Shylock” and a German “Daniel” . . . . . . . .343
CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE.

Bismarck's reward; opening of the first German Parliament—Character of the Imperial Constitution—Political development and necessities of the German people—Bismarck's principles of parliamentary government—Early appearance of disintegrating elements—*Finis Polonia!*—Alsace-Lorraine—The annexed provinces are placed under a dictatorship—Bismarck exercises a "kindly despotism" over the conquered—Somo Alsace-Lorrainers deputies demand a *plebiscite*, and rise from their benches at the Reichstag—Bismarck answers the charge of "intolerable tyranny"—Progress of Germanisation—Bismarck gives the Alsace-Lorrainers partial home-rule—Aims of the Irreconcilables and Autonomists—A Stettinhalter or Viceroy—Marshal Manteuffel—His principles of government—The Status of Strasburg and the Victory Column at Berlin—The future of Alsace-Lorraine, the "glaci of the Empire"—The imperial French milliards at Funchun—The French milliards in "crisis"—The French business Bubble time—Herr Lasker brings about a "Crash"—Privy Councillor Wagener—Bismarck resigns, and resumes, the post of Prussian Premier—The Chancellor is hated by the High Tories, and vainly tries to "boycott" the *Kron-Zeitung*—An imperial Press Law—A new Army Law and its object—Its expediency—Moltke makes a remarkable speech—Views of the Opposition—A crisis—The Emperor at the bedside of his Chancellor—The Military Septennate—Military security versus parliamentary power—Comparison of the armies of Germany, France, and Russia—Bismarck's view of the millennium—Internal consolidation of the Empire—Legal codification—The Judicature Acts; Herr Lasker's share in framing them—Another conflict and a compromise—Centrifugal forces; Berlin or Leipzig?—Victory of the "hole-and-corner" Germans—Bismarck proposes to hold together the Reich by an iron net—Railway chaos in Germany—A Herculean task—Saxon particularism—Prussian officials—Character of German railways—Pockets versus patriotism—Evils of State railways—Bismarck counsels Prussia to "abdicate in favour of the Empire"—A Railway Bill to this effect—The Bill is passed, but not acted on—Prussia buys up her own private lines—Triumph of the State-railway system in Prussia—Moltke and Bismarck on State-lines—Imperial finance; theory of the "matriculous contributions"—A reformed coinage—An Imperial Bank—Sources of imperial revenue, and fiscal reform—Failure, but "au revoir!"—The Chancellor's fiscal ideal—A "broken old man"—"Frictions; Bismarck's dispute with Stosch—The Chancellor sends in his resignation—"Never!"—Prometheus and the eagle of public care—The "wearyed hunter"—Bismarck tries to find "Government beaters"—A Vice-Chancellor is appointed—Count Stolberg, the Vice-Chancellor—Delbrück, the Chancellor's "Gneisenau," and Camphausen—New financial measures—Nestor and almost despair—Hodel and his pistol—Character and aims of Hodel—Origin and nature of the Red Monster with which Bismarck was suddenly confronted—Bismarck and Lassalle—Influence of Lassalle's ideas on Bismarck—Systems of Lassalle and Karl Marx—Bismarck's eyes are opened—He shouts in vain for the European guard to turn out—Repression and reform—Alarming growth of the Red Spectre—The Reichstag refuses Bismarck repressive means—"independent Weimar"—Hodel's pistol-shot injures him—The Chancellor's "Economic Era"—Rejection of the first Socialist Law—Dr. Nobiling and his double-barrelled fowling-piece—Nobiling's crime directly due to Socialist doctrines—Bismarck vows a silent vow at the...
CONTENTS.

bedside of the wounded Emperor—Parliament is dissolved—Character of the new Reichstag and the new Socialist Law—Attitude of parties, passing of the repressive Law—Bismarck's "Muzzle Measure"—Its rejection—Execution and results of the Socialist Law—The Explosives Act and the Niederwald Dynamiters—State of Social Democracy—A lesson to Englishmen—Repression the co-relative of reform—The new problems of modern statesmanship—Will Bismarck be regarded as the "Saviour of Society?"—Two parallel lines of action—Financial Reform; its two-fold aim—The Chancellor's "Christmas Card" to the nation—A Chinese wall of protectionism and its prospective blessings—Germany no longer the dupe of an "honest conviction"—The Chancellor's "Christmas-tree"—Protectionism versus Free-trade—Bismarck enlists the Clericals under his Protectionist banner—The Clericals hope to be paid with "Canossa coins," and Bismarck destroys not their illusion—The "Pearl of Meppen" is entertained by the Chancellor—Siege of the Fortress of Free-trade—Disunion among the besiegers—Question of constitutional guarantees—Two available courses—The "Frankenstein Motion"—The besiegers make a compromise, and storm the Fortress of Free Trade—Bismarck recalls the story of "Robert Bruce and the spider"—How he acted on it.

CHAPTER XV.

CHARACTERISTICS.

With or without his warts?—Bismarck as a soldier—The Emperor's testimony on this point—A sword-wearing Minister—The Chancellor's military enthusiasm—His physique—His "Banting"—The Chancellor's craniology—Physical power of work—A heavy smoker—A deep drinker—A great eater—Love of the country—Rural pursuits—"Sermons in stones and good in everything"—Habits of mental work—Mote of life at Varzin—Beggars and bores—Friedrichsruh—Worldly circumstances—Fond of cards, but not a speculator—"Life is earnest, Art is gay"—Domestic relations—At the bedside of a dying friend—Sympathy with the misfortunes of others—Home tastes—Dislike of society—The Chancellor's hospitality—His Parliamentary soirees—Bismarck as a table-talker—As a parliamentary speaker—The Chancellor's own theory of eloquence—His qualities as an orator—Appearance and habits in the Reichstag—Bismarck as a diplomatic writer—His attitude to the Press—His theory of semi-official journalism—The North German Gazette—How the Chancellor dealt with Polish calumny, and damped American enterprise—His attitude to literature—Bismarck as a versifier—His favourite poets and novelists—His knowledge of history—His accomplishments as a linguist—Not a Chauvinist in the use of German—But a champion of the German orthography and alphabet—Science and art—Fondness for music—The Chancellor's superstitions—His religion—A believer in the immortality of the soul—His Christian creed—Not a church-goer—But a reader of his Bible and of tracts—A Cromwellian effusion—"Settled it with my Maker!"—"My country, right or wrong!"—"Achilles' wrath"—"Outspokenness; Bismarck and Bayard Taylor—"A solitary Colossus with a continent for a pedestal"—What an English boy laid at the feet of this Colossus—How the Colossus was rewarded by the German people—And how he was revered by the German Emperor.
APPENDIX.

A. Treaty of Vienna (1864) ........................................... 567
B. Convention of Gastein (1865) ..................................... 567
C. Treaty of Prague (1866) ........................................... 570
D. Treaty of Frankfort (1871) ....................................... 574
E. The Prussian Constitution ......................................... 584
F. The Imperial Constitution ........................................ 599
PRINCE BISMARCK.

CHAPTER X.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE.

1.—From Frankfort to Dantzig.

The Treaty of Frankfort,* which embodied the results of the Franco-German War, may be called the cornerstone on which reposed the edifice of Germany's relations to all her neighbours; and it is to these relations that we now propose to devote a special chapter, as to a field of action in which Prince Bismarck has achieved such great and unparalleled triumphs. His domestic policy, as we shall see, was a mixture of light and shade, of success and failure; and his opponents have always maintained that, in internal affairs, his failures far outweighed his success. But few of his parliamentary foes ever ventured to question the wisdom of the Chancellor's purely foreign policy, or to express dissatisfaction with any of his acts in the sphere of international relations. It is true that his attitude to the Papacy has divided

* See Appendix.
his countrymen, on this particular subject, into admirers and detractors; but the quarrel between the Prussian State and the Church of Rome falls within limits which so incompletely coincide either with the field of domestic or of foreign policy, while comprising a considerable portion of each, that we have resolved to devote a special chapter to the "Kulturkampf" alone. The "Kulturkampf" was waged with a spiritual Power; but it is to Bismarck's dealings with the purely temporal neighbours of Germany that we must meanwhile confine our attention, and the sequel will show that these dealings proved him to be gifted with a genius for the conduct of foreign affairs equalled by few statesmen of any age and surpassed by none.

We have said that the Treaty of Frankfort (signed 10th May, 1871) was the corner-stone of reconstructed Germany; but even after the rough block of this stone had been dug out of the diplomatic quarry, it could not be chipped into shape and fixed into its appointed place without a painful amount of dangerous delay. Plenipotentiaries of France and Germany had met at Brussels (28th March) to convert the Preliminaries of Peace (26th February) into a Definite Treaty; but a month elapsed, and no great progress was made in this direction. For, now that they were no longer directly overshadowed by the wings of the Prussian eagle, the Frenchmen began to pluck up a little courage, and to whittle at their engagements, suggesting the alteration of this and the modification of that. In particular, they made a most resolute effort to
procure a change in the conditions of payment of the war-indemnity, which would have virtually reduced the five milliards to three or three and a half. But, in addition to this, the French Government had shown bad faith, or remissness tantamount in its effects to bad faith, as to the military stipulations of the Preliminary Treaty.

The German troops in the occupied departments had not punctually received the sums due for their maintenance; and, worse than all, the French had concentrated on Paris an army of nearly 140,000 men, though they had agreed to withdraw all but a tenth part of this number behind the Loire. As an excuse for breaking this agreement, they pleaded that the capital was a prey to the Commune, and that the prime necessity for suppressing domestic anarchy made it impossible for them meanwhile to comply with the conditions that would enable them to get rid of foreign occupation. Bismarck hesitated not to admit the reason of this, and, having no wish to increase the difficulties of the Versailles Government, he permitted it to take its own measures for re-capturing Paris and extinguishing the flames of revolution. But even then it did not seem to him to display sufficient energy, and it was a serious question with him whether the German army ought not again to intervene and bring matters to a crisis. The Government of Versailles showed no alacrity in recognising the substantial favours and forbearance which had been shown it by the Germans; the negotiations at Brussels were dragging; and Bismarck resolved
PRINCE BISMARCK.

to put an end to a relation between the two nations which, as he said, was “neither peace nor war.” He therefore invited M. Jules Favre to a personal interview, and the two statesmen met at Frankfort on the 6th May.*

We need not detail the negotiations that now took place, and which only lasted three days. M. Favre was full of protestations of good faith.

“Your acts,” said the Chancellor, “are more significant than your words, and what you say does not greatly reassure us. You have not abandoned the hope (which to me seems a very chimerical one) of interesting Europe in your cause; and you think that with its intervention you would succeed in modifying the conditions of peace.” †

These accusations—which the Chancellor had urged with an animation that made M. Favre dread a repetition of the angry scene at Versailles—had been preceded by an ultimatum which Bismarck, “in full uniform and accompanied by all his staff,” had read out to the Frenchmen “in a grave and solemn voice.” ‡ “Give us at once the guarantees we desire,” was the substance of this ultimatum, “or we must look after our own interests in the way we deem best.” M. Favre strove to show that the definitive conclusion of peace was surely guarantee enough, without the continued

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* Bismarck was accompanied, among others, by Counts Arnim and Hatzfeldt; while with M. Favre came M. Pouyer-Quertier, Minister of Finance, and M. de Goulard, Member of the National Assembly.
† “Simple Récit,” par M. Jules Favre.
‡ Idem.
occupation of French territory by the German troops; but on this point the Chancellor met him with "inflexible resistance," as, indeed, he also did on most others. One important thing was the future commercial relations of the two countries.

"We had been instructed," wrote M. Favre, "to maintain the status quo, and thus reserve our future; but M. de Bismarck opposed this with downright vehemence, declaring that he would rather re-commence the war of cannon than expose himself to a war of tariffs."

Here again, too, the French had to yield, and grant Germany the treatment of the most favoured nation.

"Those who accuse us of having shown too much complaisance in presence of the enemy's demands, forget that we were completely at his mercy. Unable to resist him on the field of battle, we could do nothing in the negotiations but wring from him a few slight modifications by appealing to considerations of equity and the good sense to which he was not always insensible."

But why proceed further? The Chancellor's ultimatum had the due effect, and on the 10th of May, in the Swan Hôtel at Frankfort—about a bowshot distant, as we have already had occasion to remark, from the meeting-place of the old Diet, where Bismarck really began his career as the Unifier of his nation—there was signed the definitive Treaty of Peace between France and Germany.

Ten days afterwards (the 20th), ratifications were exchanged at Frankfort, and M. Favre with a heavy heart took final leave of Bismarck, "who was radiant," after the two statesmen had frankly exchanged their
views on the future relations of their countries. M. Favre ventured to express the fear that the new ambassador in Berlin would have a very difficult and disagreeable time of it. "Oh, you are very much mistaken," replied Bismarck, with the utmost vivacity; "he will be the happiest of your ministers. We shall keep him wrapped up in cotton wool."* The Chancellor congratulated Favre on the definitive conclusion of peace, attributing it to his "personal intervention." Favre, on the other hand, thanked the Chancellor for the "unmerited compliment," and begged him to address himself directly to him whenever he feared a conflict.

Nor was it long before the Chancellor had occasion to profit by this request. It was the 16th of June—the day on which the Emperor, flanked by Bismarck and Moltke, had made his triumphal entry into Berlin at the head of his laurel-wreathed troops, through endless lanes of captured cannon and the frantic acclamations of a proud and grateful populace—the final scene in the unparalleled drama of the great war. Did the sound of these jubilant shouts of victory and the exultant music of triumphal banquets float through the summer air even unto Paris, and, rendering the bitterness of defeat unbearable, goad the vanquished on to half-unconscious acts of desperate folly?† Bismarck, at least, seems to have thought so;

† "L'écho de ces joies bruyantes retentit jusqu'à Versailles on il augmente l'amertume de nos ordinaires tristesses. Plusieurs fois ma pensée
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 7

for, dismounting from the charger which had carried him through the acclaiming streets, he penned the following telegram to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs:—

"I learn from the reports of our generals that your soldiers have occupied the ground reserved to our troops in the zones of Lilas, Raincy, and Romainville" (around Paris). "Now, therefore, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that unless they at once retire behind their lines, our troops will attack you this very day at midnight."*

inquiète m'avait transporté au milieu de nos vainqueurs, d'ont l'allégresse me semblait insulter à notre doulouër."—"Simple Récit."

* This incident was once vividly described from another point of view by a Berlin journal (the Post), which vouched for the accuracy of its narrative, as follows:—"The Emperor, as glory-crowned victor, had entered Berlin amid the enthusiastic acclamations of the populace. Halting in front of Bücher's statue, there were borne past him fifty-five captured French colours with their silken folds fluttering and rustling in the breeze created by the thundering cheers of the multitude. Prince Bismarck, who, in passing through the (Brandenburg) Gate, had made a curt intimation to and received brief answer from the Emperor, sat upright but restless in his saddle behind his Majesty, looking around him as if in quest of something. An acquaintance approaching him asked what his Highness wanted. 'Paper and pencil' was the reply, and these articles were quickly procured from the pocket-book of a policeman. The Prince wrote off a hasty word or two on his thigh, and holding the paper aloft, said, 'Here is a telegram; will you carry it?' 'Yes,' replied the by-stander thus addressed. 'Thanks,' said the Prince, 'you can read it.' Hurriedly passing through the crowd, the messenger read it in the quieter Behrenstrasse:—'To the German Commander of the Outposts, Paris.—If the French outposts advance further, attack them.' What a moment that was! Close together lay the dice of peace and war. Here were the standards unfurled for the joyful march of peace, there was the drawn sword raised to strike. . . . What had happened? The French troops had pushed their outposts beyond the line agreed upon, and the German Commander had asked whether he should hold on to his line, or whether he should make way for the French movement. Being admirably acted on by Count Waldereuse, the Military Attaché at Paris, into whose hands the telegram came, the war cloudlet vanished as quickly as it had risen, and in undimmed splendour the sun of peace again beamed over Europe."
Intended to bring the French authorities to their senses, this peremptory telegram very nearly had the effect of depriving M. Favre of his; and "I read this incomprehensible message twice so as to convince myself that I was not the dupe of an illusion." What on earth did it all mean? M. Thiers was having his usual evening nap,* and could not be roused. But there was no time to be lost. M. Favre "pounced upon his pen" ("sautai sur ma plume"), and telegraphed (in substance) to the Chancellor: "For heaven's sake forbear; the whole thing is a misunderstanding." To Marshal MacMahon, also, and to the Minister of War, he sent in hot fury, while orderlies scoured away at a breakneck pace through the darkness and "torrential rain;" and half an hour before midnight Favre was able to reply to the terribly imperious Chancellor that the encroachment of the French outposts on the German zone of occupation was due to a sheer mistake, which had now been rectified. But the incident, all the same, afforded a fine illustration of the methods employed by the Chancellor in dealing with the French, even after the Treaty of Frankfort was in his pocket.

Within a few days after the mutual ratification of that Treaty, Paris became the scene of an appalling and a chastening drama. The Commune—which for more

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* "Tout cela fut fait pendant le sommeil de M. Thiers, qui, lorsque les affaires le lui permettaient, se couchait de six à huit heures. Je n'avais pas voulu troubler son repos."—"Simple Récit."
than two months had defied the regularly constituted
Government of France, defied the French army, that,
succeeding to the Germans, had placed the capital under
a second state of siege—the Commune at
last fell; but it fell not until after, Samson-
like, it had involved the beautiful city of the Seine in
horrible and irreparable havoc. Paris ran with blood
and was all ablaze, as never before, in all its tragic
history, it had bled or burned; and when this ghastly
Transformation Scene of Terror was over, the Germans
looked, and lo! they beheld the Genius of moderate
Republicanism seated triumphant on her French throne
—with one foot on the disjewelled remnant of an
Imperial crown, and the other on the extinguished torch
of anarchic Democracy.

It was the regenerated France of this moderate
republicanism with which Bismarck, the ministerial Cæsar,
now had to deal. Under its patriotic President, M.
Thiers, the Government of the Republic was animated by
loyalty to its engagements, and by the absorbing wish
to get rid as fast as possible of the presence
of the hated invaders, of whom about half a
million still remained behind as a pledge
for the fulfilment of the peace-conditions. Bismarck,
on the other hand, did all he could to facilitate com-
pliance with these hard terms. "It is not our aim,"
hed, "to injure our neighbour more than is abso-
lutely necessary to assure for us the execution of the
Treaty of Peace, but, on the contrary, to help and
enable him, as far as we can do so without detriment to
our own interests, to recover from the disaster that has
befallen his country.” *

The Chancellor, indeed, practised this policy of con-
ciliation to a degree which convinced him that he had
grossly overrated the capacity of the French people to
feel gratitude. Infinitely harder and more humiliating
to the sensitive French than the ruinous
indemnity they had to pay, was the con-
tinued presence of their vanquishers which
they had to tolerate. Bismarck was fully alive to the
moral and political effects of this continued occupation,
and he had as little wish to test to the utmost the
French power of enduring moral degradation, as he was
anxious to avoid the very semblance of interference with
the course of their internal affairs. Now, several de-
partments had already been evacuated on payment of
the first milliard (it may be remembered that there
were five altogether), and it was stipulated that half a
dozen more should be set free on receipt of the second
milliard by the 1st May, 1872. But Bismarck did not
insist on the rigorous fulfilment of this condition. In
the autumn of 1871, M. Pouyer-Quertier (of whom the
Chancellor had formed a most favourable opinion at
Frankfort, and with whom he continued to correspond),†
got to Berlin to plead for a mitigation of this clause;

* Reichstag, 25th October.
† “Pendant que je parlais le Chancelier ne cessait d'attacher son regard
sur M. Pouyer-Quertier. Il étudiait attentivement l'expression de son
visage, et paraissait inquiet et mécontent. Cette impression ne tarda pas
à se dissiper, et fit bientôt place à une cordialité presque confiante.”—
“Simple Récit,” par M. Jules Favre.
and there was signed a Supplementary Convention (12th October), by which the Germans contented themselves with financial * instead of military securities for the payment of the second milliard, undertaking to evacuate six more departments at once, and to reduce their army of occupation to 50,000 men. In return for this concession, the French agreed to open their gates to the industries of Alsace-Lorraine; but still, the balance of political and financial gain was decidedly on the side of the French, seeing that, to speak of nothing else, they had been relieved from the pecuniary burden of maintaining so many German troops.

One would have thought that the material favours thus extended to the French might have disposed them to gratitude—and Bismarck bore public testimony to the fact that a portion of their Press actually did give expression to something like feelings of this kind. But what availed that, when this very same Press openly, or tacitly, applauded the murder of German soldiers of the army of occupation by French assassins; and when the juries appointed to try the cases invariably acquitted the murderers against all the laws of evidence? "Vive la Justice," shouted the Paris crowd on hearing of one of these verdicts—that crowd which only echoed the words of the presiding judge, who remarked: "We all hate the Prussians, and long for the hour of retribution."†

* The securities for payment of the second milliard only retained a military character to this extent, that the evacuated departments were meanwhile declared to be neutral.
† "Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart," 1871.
Bismarck had demanded extradition of the assassins of German soldiers, but his request was refused; and, relying on French justice, he did not press his demand. On finding, however, that he had no less over-estimated the impartiality of French justice, than placed too much faith in the operation of French gratitude, he lost no time in taking measures calculated to secure him in future from detriment in the one case and from disappointment in the other. The occupied departments were at once placed under a state of siege; and the French Government was informed that, should the murderers of Prussian soldiers not henceforth be given up, French hostages would be conveyed to Germany and further reprisals enforced.* At the same time Germany would have to take her own military measures to secure fulfilment of the peace-conditions, irrespective of the wounding of French sensibilities by the continued presence of the invader.

Bismarck was far from making the French Government accountable for the verdicts of the juries; and, indeed, on the very day that the Chancellor had penned his remonstrance, M. Thiers had remarked†:—“To those who may believe that killing a foreigner is not murder, I must observe that they are abominably in error.” But the conduct of the juries, as well as the comments of the Press on their verdicts, had convinced Bismarck that “our hopes of revising mutual confidence must still, alas, be charac-

* Despatch from Bismarck to Count Arnim, 7th December, 1871.
† In his message to the Assembly, 7th December.
terised as premature"; and yet at this time—December, 1871—there was taken a further important step in the desired direction by the restoration of regular diplomatic relations between France and Germany—the Vicomte de Gontau-Biron being sent as Ambassador to Berlin, and Count Arnim, who had assisted Bismarck to negotiate the Treaty of Frankfort, to Paris.

But before pursuing the further course of reconciliation between the two nations, we must turn aside for a short while to glance at the simultaneous development of Germany's relations to some of her other neighbours. Of these neighbours, Russia and Austria were by far the most important; and as for the former of these two Powers, the French war had only served to strengthen the bonds of her friendship—her dynastic friendship at least—with Germany.* Acting on the principle of give and take, Russia had compelled Austria to remain neutral during the great conflict; and, for this essential service, Bismarck had not sought to hamper her in her efforts to shake off the trammels of the Black Sea Treaty. There was mutual satisfaction at the result, and this feeling found expression in a meeting of the two Emperors at Berlin, in June, 1871; but much more so

* We prefer to describe this friendship as more dynastic than national; for the bulk of the Russian people themselves, we are afraid, regarded the unification of Germany with anything but friendly feelings. "The Russian press," as Dr. Busch writes, "was all but unanimously unfavourable to the unification of Germany by Prussia, and therein faithfully reflected public opinion, which regarded the concentration of Germany's people into one mighty force as seriously injurious to Russian interests. Nearly all the Russian newspapers complained that the Germans kept their eyes greedily riveted upon Russia's Baltic provinces."—"Our Chancellor," vol. ii., p. 20.
in December of the same year, when a military deputation—including Prince Frederick Charles, Count Moltke, and several other distinguished Generals, who had been decorated by the Czar for their victories over the French—repaired to St. Petersburg to attend the festival of St. George. In toasting these honoured guests, the Czar was most effusive in his allusion to the—

"close friendship and the companionship in arms which had bound the two nations together in ever memorable days of old, which would also survive to future generations, and which formed the best pledge for the maintenance of peace and legal order in Europe."

All this was clear and significant enough, but for none had it greater meaning than for Austria, who hastened to take her cue from the diplomats of the Neva. But, indeed, Austria had already proved herself to be endowed with that highest kind of wisdom which consists in recognition of accomplished facts, and in submission to the inevitable. There can be little doubt that when, after Königgrätz, Count Beust, the rival and opponent of Bismarck’s national policy, was called to the helm of affairs at Vienna, this was done with a view to devise retribution for the events of 1866. But the logic of events is stronger than the lust of revenge. Beust was prevented by Gorchakoff from giving the promised aid to France; and, when the German Empire was at last proclaimed at Versailles, the inveterate but irresolute intriguer had no other choice than to offer the seeming right hand of hearty fellowship to the young yet powerful nation, the development of whose destinies he had done so much to
thwart. Already from Versailles (14th December), Bismarck had written to Vienna announcing accomplished facts (as the natural outcome of the Treaty of Prague), and expressing the earnest desire of Germany to live on such terms of amity with her powerful neighbour as accorded with the traditions of their common past, as well as with the necessities of their future. To this friendly advance Count Beust had no alternative but to reply that, while decidedly averse from considering recent events in the light of the Treaty of Prague, he could only convey the assurance of Austria's sincere good-will towards united Germany, and the hope that both nations would continue friends.

This exchange of friendly assurances was ratified in the following autumn (August, 1871), when the Emperors William and Francis Joseph, accompanied by their respective Chancellors—Bismarck and Beust—met at Salzburg.* Only four years had elapsed since Francis Joseph and Napoleon, at the very same place, had whispered revengeful hatred of Prussia in their mutual embraces; and now, with Bismarck standing by, the haughty Hapsburg made an admirable show of spontaneous sincerity in pressing his lips to the proffered cheek of the Hohenzollern chief of that Germany which knew Austria no more. There were long and frequent conferences at Salzburg between the Majesties and their Ministers, and we cannot do better than record the

* With the Emperor of Austria were also his Minister-Presidents of each half of the Dual Monarchy, Counts Hohenwart and Andrassy.
general result of these interviews in the words of Count Beust himself *:

"These conferences have led to results which we must regard as extremely satisfactory, no less to ourselves than also, as I would fain believe, to all Cabinets which cherish the wish to see the peace of Europe placed on a solid basis. My conversations with Prince Bismarck have not only elicited the expressions of our truly sincere wish to help in consolidating universal peace, and obviating the recurrence of exciting questions which might imperil it; they have also enabled us to admit the complete agreement of our views on the nature of our future relations, on the non-existence of conflicting interests, and finally on the expediency of a provisional understanding (between us) in all political questions, and the easy possibility of establishing it."

This was a fine melodious strain, but it was the song of the dying swan; for shortly afterwards—in November—this bond of friendship was sealed by Beust's dismissal from office, and by the appointment in his stead of Count Andrassy, a Hungarian statesman who had always honestly counselled reconciliation with Germany, and who could therefore be more safely entrusted with the carrying out of this policy than the converted advocate of revenge. Austria had finally made up her mind to forget 1866. Not without justice did German writers boast† that, whereas the first Napoleon, *vi et armis*, had to compel the monarchies of the Continent to become his allies, the neighbours of regenerated Germany approached her by irresistible

* Circular Despatch of 12th September.
† Vide article quoted in "Bismarck; Zwölf Jahre Deutscher Politik," p. 17.
force of political gravity. "The German Empire," said one of those writers, "born of a war of defence, betrays no inclination to meddle with things beyond its own borders. It threatens no one, it forces no one to come to it. It is simply there, as the centre of the earth is there, and behold! everything is beginning to approach it."

But this centripetal tendency of Germany's neighbours was to some extent the result of those centrifugal forces which had begun to inspire the statesmen of most Continental capitals with the deepest concern. The demoniacal orgies of the Paris Commune had aroused the attention of Europe to the revolutionary embers smouldering under the structure of all society; and to none did the subject suggest itself in a more serious light than to the German Chancellor. There is, indeed, reason to believe that, at the time of the Salzburg interview, it was the subject that lay nearest his heart; but it is certain, at least, that it then formed the topic of earnest conversation between the Austrian and German statesmen. It was very sagacious of Bismarck to pave the way for perfect reconciliation between the two Empires by suggesting the common pursuit of an object affecting, not so much their international relations, as their internal welfare and stability. How to deal with the social problems of the time; how to disarm anarchy and revolution—were two of the questions gravely discussed at Salzburg; and to a certain extent the discussion was productive of a common agreement. But,
from various causes, this agreement could not be immediately and completely acted on by either side; and, in particular, the German Chancellor soon found that he was considerably ahead of his time with his schemes of international defence against European anarchy.

The realisation of these schemes was retarded by press of more important affairs, as well as by the indifference of certain foreign Governments; and it was not till the year 1881—if we may shoot so far ahead to trace the development of a policy which was mooted at Salzburg in 1871—it was not, we say, till ten years after this that a positive step was taken by the Chancellor with the view of combining Europe against its common foe. Taking alarm at the assassination of the Czar Alexander, in March, 1881, the Emperor William immediately requested Bismarck to consider what could be done towards inducing the Powers to check political murders by changing their laws of asylum. "The main thing," wrote the Emperor, "will be to gain over England, France, and Switzerland, who have hitherto afforded refuge to political criminals."

In consequence of this appeal, the Chancellor at once took a step in the desired direction by asking Russia; as the nation most affected, to invite the Powers to a Conference on the subject, promising at the same time to give her

* Speaking in the Reichstag on the Socialist Law (9th May, 1884). Bismarck read out the autograph letter addressed to him by the Emperor on the subject of political murder, and detailed the negotiations with the Powers which thereupon ensued.
Germany's heartiest support. Acting on this suggestion, Russia lost no time in inviting the Powers to a Conference at Brussels; but the project fell through, on account of the negative attitude of England. Russia, Austria, and Germany at once declared their readiness to attend the Conference, while France made her participation in it dependent on the decision of England; and England declined. Switzerland, too, and other States, had replied that their attitude would have to be determined by that of the Western Powers. Nevertheless, negotiations continued to be carried on between Germany, Russia, and Austria; but at last Austria, too, declared it to be impossible for her to come to an agreement on the subject with the other two Empires, and the latter, who had taken the initiative, were left to concert their own measures. Nothing more was heard of the maturing of these measures till the beginning of 1885, when the basis of an Extradition Convention, in the form of identical Notes exchanged, was at last agreed upon between Russia and Prussia* (and afterwards

* The following is the text of the Prussian Identical Note, which will have an historical interest: "I. The Royal Prussian Government undertakes to hand over to the Imperial Russian Government, on demand, Russian subjects charged, or to be charged, with any of the crimes or offences hereinafter set forth, or those who have been condemned for one of these crimes or offences, but who have escaped by flight from the punishment to which they are liable: (1.) The following crimes or offences or any preparations for their commission, if directed against his Majesty the Emperor of Russia or the members of his family—murder, malicious wounding, imprisoning, and insults. (2.) Assassination or attempted assassination. (3.) The making or keeping of dynamite or other explosive substances, in cases where the making or keeping of such substances is punishable by the Russian law. II. In all other cases where extradition shall be demanded by the Russian Government on account of crimes or
between the German and the Russian Empires)—as a common precaution against the political revolver, the dagger, and the terrible Dynamite Fiend, which had begun to stalk across all civilised countries with such havoc-scattering hand. But in recording the conclusion of this extradition agreement between Prussia and Russia, we have—for artistic reasons of narrative—anticipated the fluctuating course of Germany’s friendship with Russia, which the French War, as we saw, left on such a very satisfactory footing, as far, at least, as the relations of the two dynasties were concerned.

The Czar and the German Emperor had met in the summer immediately after the war; and, in the autumn of the following year, Imperial uncle and nephew again exchanged assurances of friendship in circumstances which riveted the attention of all Europe for more than a week, and kept its tongue wagging for months afterwards. On the 5th of September (1872), the Czar—who was accompanied by his heir-apparent and his Chancellor—arrived in Berlin; and next day the two Emperors were joined by Francis Joseph, who brought his new Minister, Count Andrassy, in his train. These were brilliant and memorable days for Berlin, with their balls and banquetings, their Imperial embraces and health-

offences not set forth in Clause 1., the request shall be taken into consideration by the Royal Prussian Government, and if there be nothing against it, it shall be granted, regard being had to the friendly and neighbourly relations which unite the two countries. III. The fact that the crime or offence, in respect whereof extradition is demanded, has been committed for a political object, shall in no case be a reason for refusing extradition.
drinkings, their grand reviews and military manœuvrings, and their frequent political conferences. Prince Bismarck, too, might well be proud of this meeting of the three Emperors, for it was all of his sagacious devising.

Having achieved all he wished by war, he had now become a "fanatic for peace;" * and his chief aim was not only to reconcile any possible foes of Germany herself, but also to reunite neighbours whose quarrels might affect the security of the young Empire. Ever since the Crimean War, Russia had been on anything but cordial terms with Austria; and the natural resentment felt by the latter, when restrained by the Czar from falling on the flank of Germany during the French conflict, had not tended to improve the mutual relations of the two States. But the reasons that prompted Austria to recognise accomplished facts in the German Empire, left her no choice as to the policy she might pursue towards Russia, whose mighty ruler had extended his hand to Kaiser William; and therefore Francis Joseph, who had already, as we have seen, kissed the proffered cheek of the German Emperor at Salzburg, now repaired with a double palm-branch of settled peace to Berlin, which had not beheld him for a score of previous years.

Prince Gortchakoff said of the Imperial meeting that the best thing about it was that its results had not been reduced to writing.†

* "Friedensfanatiker." as he once termed himself.
† Speaking in the Reichstag on the Eastern Question in February.
But, indeed, its meaning was plain enough without that. Long estranged monarchs, the most powerful in Europe, had met and embraced each other; while their three famous Chancellors—Bismarck, Gortchakoff, and Andrassy—had repeatedly been closeted for hours. There was no mistaking the significance of acts like these. Europe was not over curious to learn what passed at these interviews—what current questions were discussed, what lines of future policy were agreed upon. Europe was content to know that old hatreds had been buried, that hands had been shaken all round, and that in its midst there had been founded a Triple Alliance, to which even France hesitated to ascribe aggressive aims. "The meeting of the Emperors," said Bismarck himself,* "will strengthen the confidence of our friends in the preservation of peace, and show our foes how hard it will be to break it." This was a gentle hint to the French, whose dreams of an anti-German alliance with Austria or Russia now began to dissolve. The meeting of the three Emperors marked the first stage in the consummately skilful policy by which Bismarck sought to isolate France from the rest of Europe, and thus minimise the danger of a war of revenge.

Of this tacit peace-alliance between the Emperors, 1878, Bismarck himself said of the Triple Alliance: "The relations of the three Emperors does not at all rest upon written obligations. Not one of the three Emperors is bound to allow himself to be out-voiced by the two others. They rest on the personal sympathy and confidence of the three Monarchs, and upon the long-existing personal relations of the three leading Ministers."

* To a municipal deputation, which about this time presented him and Moltke with the freedom of the city of Berlin.
ratifications, so to speak, were exchanged next year (1873), when Bismarck accompanied his master both to St. Petersburg and Vienna to pay the necessary return visits. The Imperial party, which also included Moltke, remained in the Russian capital for about twelve days (27th April to 8th May), and were treated with every mark of consideration and respect by the Court, from which society and the Press failed not—as in duty bound, though somewhat reluctantly, perhaps—to take their cue. It cannot be pretended that the German alliance found much favour with the bulk of the Russian nation, which had followed the German victories over France with unmistakable malevolence; and even the heir-apparent, at this time, was not without reason suspected of a decided predilection for the French; but the Czar himself was ardently attached to his uncle, and left nothing undone to enforce from others the semblance, at least, of hearty sympathy with his pro-Teutonic feelings. "The pliancy of those around him," says a very competent writer,* "as well as of the public at large, resulted from the Czar's expressed will, and the careless amiability of the Russian nature." Says the same author:

"After the Emperor William, Prince Bismarck was naturally the object of special attention. The Czar had always treated the Prince with marked attention, and this time, therefore, he could only show him particular favour by honouring his son" (Count Herbert, who accompanied him). "And of course, too, the German Chancellor

* "Aus der Petersburger Gesellschaft ('Fürst Bismarck in Petersburg')," Leipsig, 1881.
displayed all the amiability he was capable of, addressing all who came in his way with that confiding heartiness and outspoken humour which twelve years previously "(when he was Prussian Minister at this Court)" had made him the pet of our society. Of politics during his stay here, there was no mention; and even in his intercourse with Gorchakov, Prince Bismarck affected much more to play the old acquaintance and the habitué of St. Petersburg society—the man who had also enjoyed the special grace and favour of the Czar—than the Foreign Minister. With the help of a memory which astonished every one, the former Prussian Envoy recalled a thousand incidents of the time he had lived among us; all the great and small people with whom he had been connected between 1859 and 1862 were recognised and reminded of old times by the man who had in the interval transformed Europe. . . . Wherever his lofty figure in its white cuirassier tunic with the blue band (of the Order of St. George) showed itself, he was sure of a friendly reception—the happy inconsistency of the Russian nature being such that no one thought of the feelings of enmity (towards Prussia) which had filled him in the days of the fall of la belle France, and that nobody had a memory for the words of consolation and assurance of Russia's enduring sentiments of affection for France which had been whispered into the ear of General Le Flô" (the French Ambassador).

This visit of Kaiser William and his Chancellor to St. Petersburg was hailed by the German public as a pledge of lasting friendship between the two Empires; while by a considerable portion of the Russian Press, on the other hand, it was treated as a merely personal affair of the Czar, involving no political consequences whatever. The lapse of a short couple of years was to show which of these inferences was based on the sounder reasoning.

But meanwhile the attentions which had been showered on Bismarck at St. Petersburg, in May (1873), were again lavished on him at Vienna in the following
October (17-23), which found him at the side of his 
master in the old Kaiserstadt. A wish to see the great 
International Exhibition was the ostensible 
object of his visit; but its real aim was to do 
what the Czar, accompanied again by his heir-apparent 
and his Chancellor, had already done in the month of 
June—return the handgrasp of Francis Joseph of the 
previous year. The German Chancellor was now again 
frequently closeted with Count Andrassy, in whom he 
found all the qualities of a statesman that could win 
his perfect confidence—all those qualities which induced 
him a few years later to declare that his personal relations 
to his Austrian colleague were the best conceivable. 

"He is as sure of my telling him the truth, as I am of his doing 
so too. But in former times it was otherwise. For at the Old 
Diet" (in Frankfort) "I have had Austrian colleagues to whom I 
said: 'It is a matter of indifference to me whether you speak, or 
whether the wind whistles down the chimney, for I don't believe a 
word you say.'"*

At Vienna Bismarck found encouragement to hold 
out in the struggle against the Papacy, on which he was 
now fairly launched; the political weather-glass was 
consulted as to the aspects of the Eastern Question, 
which had now begun to assume a recrudescent form; 
but, as a general interpretation of the German 
Emperor's presence at Vienna, the outside world was con-
tent to accept the words in which His Majesty replied to 
to the toast of his health. "The sentiments of friend-
ship," he said, "which were then" (at Berlin in the

* Speech in the Reichstag, 19th February, 1878.
previous year) "exchanged between us, and which have been repeated to me here in full measure, are a pledge of European peace, and of the welfare of our peoples." And thus again the French hopes of revenge waxed ever fainter and fainter.

But shortly before the Emperor's visit to Vienna, a further stage in his Chancellor's policy of isolating France had been indicated by the presence of Victor Emmanuel in Berlin (22nd—28th September, 1873). Without altogether joining the Triple Alliance, Italy had thus expressed a wish to make common cause with its aims, and to live within the sunshine of its power. Three years had produced a wonderful change in the sentiments of Italy towards Germany. In spite of the fact that Prussia had conquered Venetia for the House of Savoy on the field of Königgrätz, and notwithstanding that Germany had given Italy an unmistakable proof of her sincere goodwill in subsidising the construction of the St. Gothard Tunnel—an act, as we saw, which must be reckoned as one of the causes of the war with France; in spite of both these facts, the relations of the two Governments had been anything but cordial during the course of the conflict.

"Every one who was with us in France," said Bismarck once,* "knows that our relations to Italy during the war were somewhat strained—I will not say clouded—and remained so till the conclusion of peace. And this was owing to the general attitude of Italy, which, in our opinion, betrayed greater love of the French than regard for

* In the Prussian Upper Chamber, 10th March, 1873.
the interests of the nation; otherwise Italy would have had to defend her independence with us against France. For us, that was a very striking phenomenon, and doubts arose" (in our minds) "as to which of these various influences would predominate with the Italian Government. Certainly, at least, it was a fact that Garibaldi led against us forces, whose departure from Italy, as we thought, might have been much more emphatically opposed. Thus a coolness arose between Germany and Italy, which is now happily removed."

For Italy was not long in perceiving that her most vital interests were identical with those of Germany. Above all things, both States were threatened by a usurping and aggressive Papacy; and as the thunder of the German cannon at Sedan had shaken down the walls of Rome, and with them the last refuge-rock of the Pope's temporal power, so it was in the interest of Italian unity, as well as of civil liberty in Germany, that these walls should never again be raised. Thus both Italy and Germany had, at least, one sacred cause in common; and this cause united them in a similar attitude, not only towards the Curia, but also towards France. For while Germany had every reason to thwart the French apostles of revenge, Italy was apprehensive lest, under a monarchical restoration, the lily banner might be unfurled on behalf of the dispossessed and self-imprisoned occupant of St. Peter's Chair. These were the chief causes which dispelled the cloud that had threatened to gather round the relations of Germany and Italy during the French war.

An improvement in these relations had already been indicated by the visit of Prince Humbert and his consort to Berlin, in the spring of 1872; while their per-
fection was denoted by the arrival of King Victor Emmanuel himself in the German capital, in the autumn of the following year (1873). On his way to Berlin, the Re Galantuomo, by special invitation of Francis Joseph, had spent several days at the Hofburg; and, in spite of bygones, the popular reception of the King at Vienna was such as caused him to remark that only once before had he been accorded a similar welcome, and that was when, at the head of his conquering troops, he entered Rome. Victor Emmanuel's reception in Vienna was tantamount to frank recognition, on the part of his Imperial host, of the events of 1859 and 1866; while the King's presence in Berlin—where no less enthusiastic plaudits greeted him, and where he was made the object of every conceivable honour and attention—was rightly interpreted as expressing his regret for the causes of previous coolness between Italy and Germany, as well as his desire to stand shoulder to shoulder with the new and powerful Empire against common foes.

What stamped the King's visit to Berlin with political meaning, was the fact that his numerous train included his Minister-President, Minghetti, and his Foreign Minister, Visconti-Venosta. When the latter first called on Bismarck, it was said that he found the Chancellor reading General La Marmora's lately published book—"A Little more Light," * which dealt with the Prusso-Italian negotiations connected with the war of 1866, and aimed at

* "Un po più di luce."
discrediting the statesmen of Berlin. General La Marmora was the chief of that Italian party which still held out for a French alliance; but his Gallic proclivities were based on mere personal pique against Prussia, whose official writers, he conceived, had said some very uncomplimentary things about his military capacity. But, indeed, his dilatory conduct as Chief of the Staff of the Italian army, in the campaign of 1866, had made his own countrymen even denounce him as the secret accomplice of Napoleon. In deference to public opinion he resigned his military office, but he never ceased to look upon Prussia as the perfidious author of his misfortunes; and his repeated attacks on the Government of that country culminated in the publication of the pamphlet above referred to, which contained much that was unpardonably indiscreet, and much, according to the Official Gazette of Berlin, that was positively forged.* Bismarck contented himself with describing General La Marmora as his personal enemy, and certain charges which had been built up on his revelations as "bold, mendacious inventions." "I could easily write about his (La Marmora's) policy," said the Chancellor, "much more disagreeable books than he has written about mine, were I not averse from dragging other personalities and powers into such discussions."†

But La Marmora's spiteful and sensational publica-

* We have interwoven some of General La Marmora's revelations, now made, in our narrative of the events of 1866.
† Reichstag, 16th January, 1874.
tion, appearing, though it did, shortly before the arrival of Victor Emmanuel in Berlin, failed to frustrate in any degree the success of the King’s visit. We have no record of the mutual impression produced upon His Majesty and the German Chancellor by their meeting; but we may be sure that the bluff, soldierly, honest, and outspoken Re Galantuomo found himself in very congenial company with the man who shared so many of his own popular qualities. Bismarck doubtless showed the King the remarkable correspondence between the Pope and the Emperor which had just taken place, and which virtually declared the firm resolution of His German Majesty to allow no “Italian priest to tithe or toll in our dominions;” * and we know that the Chancellor wrote to Count Arnim, at Paris, a few months afterwards (January, 1874): “We by no means wish to see a war break out between France and Italy, as in such an event we should be unable to refuse Italy our support.”† So King Victor Emmanuel must have left Berlin with the sincere conviction, that he could not possibly have done better than identify his interests with those of the three Emperors.

His visit to Germany was another triumph to Bismarck; and this victory was rendered complete when, in the autumn of 1875, the Emperor William repaired to Milan to return Victor Emmanuel’s visit, as Francis Joseph, in the spring of the same year, had already done at Venice—in that Venice which had once been

* See p. 298, post. † Bismarck to Count Arnim, 18th January, 1874.
his. "I have never experienced anything like it all my life," wrote home His German Majesty of his triumphal progress through the plains of Lombardy, and his enthusiastic reception in its capital; while to the Italians, the only matter for regret was that the world-famous Chancellor of Barabianca, as they called the venerable successor of Barbarossa on the throne of the Holy Roman Reich, was not at his master's side.* We can well imagine what were the feelings which animated the breast of Pio Nono, as, peering through his prison bars in the Vatican, he beheld the "first German Emperor and the first King of Italy" thus affectionately embracing each other, on soil erstwhile the refuge-ground of Holy Church. But the exasperation of the apostles of religion in Italy was not greater than the dejection of the apostles of revenge in France, to whom the meeting at Milan was a pregnant warning and a sign.

During all these years, the French idea of revenge was the element in the foreign affairs of the Empire with which Bismarck chiefly had to reckon, and therefore we must now turn back to trace the progress of this idea from the point where we branched off to consider the simultaneous development of Germany's relations to some of her other neighbours. This point was indicated by the restoration of regular diplomatic intercourse between the

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* The state of the Chancellor's health prevented him at the last moment from accompanying the Emperor to Italy; but he was represented by his eldest son, and Moltke also was in his Majesty's train.
Empire and the Republic (December, 1871); but this observance of outward form did not blind Bismarck to the truth.

"The openness," he wrote to Count Arnim, "with which, since the conclusion of peace, national hatred against the Germans has been fomented and proclaimed aloud by all parties in France, leaves us in no doubt that every Government, whatever its party form, will regard the revanche as its chief duty."

And further:

"If it be correct," (as you report), "that Her Majesty the Empress has written to ask M. Guizot's advice as to how French hatred of us might be moderated, a feeling springing from feminine sensibility doubtless dictated that step. But it does not lie within your Excellency's province to soothe the unjustifiable ire of our neighbours, so long as any such endeavour shall continue to be as manifestly futile, as it is inconsistent, with our national dignity. We do not desire war, but we are quite ready to wage it again whenever fresh aggressions on the part of France shall compel us to do so."

The prospect of continued peace for Germany varied with the changing kaleidoscope of parties in France. To all of those parties, as we have seen, the Chancellor ascribed more or less bellicose intent; but from the republicans he seems to have thought that Germany, on the whole, had less to fear than from any of the monarchical factions. Bismarck favoured the idea of a republican form of Government in France, as it existed; while Count Arnim, the German Ambassador at Paris, felt prompted, no less by his own convictions and interests, than by the presumed leanings of
the Emperor, or at least the Court party, to countenance the notion of a return to a monarchical régime. The Prince argued for the support of the Republic for the twofold reason, that the Empire would be more likely to derive support from it than from a Catholic monarchy in its struggle with the Vatican, and that it would also be less likely, as such, to procure an anti-German alliance with any of the continental Powers; while the Count, on the other hand, affected to see in the democratic legislature of France a real danger to the semi-absolute, or at least quasi-constitutional, dominion of neighbouring Sovereigns. The Chancellor pointed out that the fall of the Republic would in all probability involve the repudiation of the indemnity, and strove to show, on general and more permanent grounds, that it was Germany's interest to favour the continuance of a French Government which would have to expend most of its strength in dealing with internal foes.

"My opinion," wrote Count Arnim, in May, 1872, "is that we ought not to repel the addresses of the Bonapartists."

"A monarchical France," replied the Prince, in December of the same year, "would meanwhile be more perilous to us than the contagious influence of republican institutions, the spectacle offered by these being more deterrent than otherwise; wherefore you are to regard my instructions on this head as unconditional, and to refrain from saying or doing anything in an opposite sense."

These few words accurately explain the difference of political opinion between the two highest servants of the Empire which brought them into sharp personal antagonism that finally ended in open quarrel, and in one of the most interesting and sensational State trials...
of the century. As this cause célèbre was intimately connected with the relations between France and Germany, we cannot do better than interweave here some account of that memorable conflict between Bismarck and the only man who ever made a serious effort to usurp his place and power.*

Ten years younger, Harry von Arnim-Schlagentin was of much the same social origin as Herr von Bismarck; his family was one of the most powerful and popular in Pomerania. He was adopted and grew up under the influence of an uncle—Heinrich of the Boitzenburg line—a man who, though a Conservative, had a surprisingly liberal and enlightened mind, and became known to fame as the "March Minister," but was prosecuted for a patriotic speech against the Olmütz policy. Bismarck, on the other hand, recording the opinion he formed of him (the uncle) while serving under him in his unruly youth at Aix-la-Chapelle, once declared him to be "amiable and talented, but disinclined for any steady or energetic work," and compared his opinions to the motions of an india-rubber ball. There was a clear

intellectual family-likeness between uncle and nephew. Young Harry von Arnim once told Herr von Bismarck that "he looked upon every official superior as his natural enemy." Little did the two young men then think what was to come of this theory of State service.

After having filled various diplomatic offices of a subordinate kind, Harry von Arnim, in 1864, was accredited as Prussian Minister at the Curia, a post which had almost come to be regarded as the traditional monopoly of men like Niebuhr and Bunsen. But Arnim was a statesman as well as a scholar, and when the hour for action struck, that is to say, when the Ecumenical Council was summoned, he was ready.* On some material issues he was diametrically opposed to his Chief at Berlin. But this difference of opinion did not shake him in the confidence of his Court, which, in recognition of his services at Rome, elevated him to the rank of Count, and appointed him to assist in the peace negotiations with France. It seems clear, however, that Bismarck by no means shared the Emperor's good opinion of the man who, with himself, had signed the Treaty of Frankfort. During the siege of Paris he pronounced him to have a good head, but complained that there was no relying on his reports, which often presented two wholly different views on the same day. . . . "When I was at Varzin," he said, "and had to read his despatches from Rome, his opinion about people there changed twice every other week, according as he had been well or ill treated. Indeed,

* See our chapter on the "Kulturkampf," p. 255, post.
he changed with every post, and frequently had different views in the same letter.” “He has no rocket powder in him,” said the Chancellor once, referring to Arnim’s alleged lack of ambition—an opinion which he was to have ample reason to change before long.

The war being over, Count Arnim was selected as, on the whole, the likeliest man to promote the peace which he had helped to negotiate, and in the autumn of 1871 was sent as German Ambassador to Paris. Knowing, however, the Count’s tendency “to allow his personal impressions to acquire the mastery over his political judgment,” the Emperor did not sign his appointment without grave misgivings, while Bismarck was wholly opposed to it. And the event proved him right. It is the strict duty of an Ambassador to represent the mind of his Government, and carry out its injunctions to the letter; but Count Arnim had not been long in Paris before he began to act on a wholly different theory of diplomatic service. The German Ambassador at Paris was all in favour of facilitating a monarchical restoration of some kind in France. Prince Bismarck, on the other hand, was clear and emphatic in his reasons for supporting the republican form of Government. “You are to regard my instructions on this head,” wrote the Chancellor, “as ‘unconditional, and to refrain from saying or doing anything in an opposite sense.’

This was surely precise enough. But it did not satisfy Count Arnim, who took the unconstitutional course of appealing directly to the Emperor, with the
object of vindicating his views and converting His Majesty to his own way of thinking. Success in the latter respect, he knew, could only lead to the resignation of the Chancellor, as well as to the probable selection of himself as his successor. Failure, on the other hand, he must have been aware, ought to result either in his own retirement or subjection to the will of his superior. But though he missed his main purpose, Count Arnim yielded to neither of the resulting alternatives as affecting himself. He stuck to his post, and continued to carry on intrigues which, aiming at one man, imperilled the peace of all Europe. He was ambitious, and he leagued himself with French party leaders; and he was even said, we know not with what truth, to have speculated in French stocks. He remained a scheming diplomatist of the old school, which his Chief had rendered unpopular, if not obsolete, by giving to truth itself all the political virtues of falsehood; and he had numerous hirelings on the Press, who aided him in the prosecution of his crooked designs.

In the spring of 1873, these were manifested by covert acts. M. Thiers wished, by pre-payment of the indemnity, to hasten the evacuation of the still occupied departments; and the draft of another convention to this effect was forwarded to Count Arnim from Berlin, with the short and simple direction: "C'est à laisser, ou à prendre." But, from some reason or other, the Ambassador saw fit not to communicate to the President the full text of the document. What was his motive? To achieve,
suggest impartial judges, more than was bargained for by his Chief; to show, in fact, that he was the cleverer man of the two, and better able to guide the policy of the Empire. Be that as it may, he was in this particular matter undoubtedly guilty of irregularity of conduct so grave, that it subsequently formed one of the counts against him in a proven charge of high treason. The weighty transaction with which he had been charged fell out of gear. The diplomatists of Berlin, Nancy, and Paris were all at cross purposes. "I cannot comprehend any more than you," wrote M. Thiers to M. St. Vallier, "the double-dealing of a certain personage." The upshot of the matter was that the negotiations were transferred to Berlin, and the German Ambassador at Paris had the mortification of hearing that the Evacuation Treaty, with the conclusion of which he was himself entrusted, had been signed (15th March, 1873) by Prince Bismarck and M. de Gontaud-Biron. Another man would probably have at once resigned. Count Arnim addressed himself directly to the Emperor, beseeching him to enquire how and where "truth had suffered shipwreck," and insinuating serious charges against the Chancellor. To this complaint, which the Emperor at once sent to Varzin, the Prince replied in calmly indignant terms, dwelling on his rival's habit of petty intrigue, and reducing, in fact, the issue between himself and the Ambassador to one of superior trustworthiness. Yet Count Arnim had powerful friends at Court, including, it was said, even the Empress, and he was not recalled.
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE.

About two months after the conclusion of the Evacuation Treaty, a monarchical coalition brought about the fall of M. Thiers, and Marshal MacMahon ruled in his stead. The event was regarded by Bismarck as favourable to the hopes of the Bonapartists, and, therefore, as a misfortune for Germany, whose enemies openly rejoiced at the turn of things. The Chancellor urged this eloquent fact in proof of the wisdom of the policy which, as responsible adviser of the Emperor, he had directed Arnim to carry out in France; and accused the latter of having "facilitated, if not directly caused the change of Government, by thwarting his efforts to keep M. Thiers in power." How far Count Arnim was encouraged by the Emperor in the course he took, is not quite clear; but it is certain, at least, that His Majesty was not nearly so anxious as his Chancellor for the continuance of the Republic.*

With the change of rule in France came a sudden change in the opinions of Count Arnim. He had

* "Your repeatedly expressed opinion," wrote Bismarck to Arnim, 19th June, 1873, "that the course of things in France under the Government of M. Thiers, must be dangerous to the monarchical principle in Europe has so far found favour with his Majesty, that the latter did not deem it expedient to support this Government to the same extent as I did. The satisfaction which was openly expressed by all our political foes on the fall of M. Thiers, is, meanwhile, a proof of the propriety of the policy which I, as responsible adviser of his Majesty, have vainly advocated against the counsels of your Excellency. The influence exercised by your Excellency here (in high quarters) has not permitted me to give you positive directions to bring the whole weight of our policy to bear for the maintenance of M. Thiers, and to this circumstance, as you cannot but be aware, must be ascribed in great measure the easy and unobstructed change of Government (in France)."
formerly described M. Thiers as meditating a war of revenge, and now he eulogised him as the man of peace and safety for Germany. But it was too late. Bismarck pointed out to him the serious consequences of his disobedience, and intimated his intention of taking such steps as would ensure unity and discipline in the foreign service of the Empire. Instead, however, of resigning, the offender went to Berlin in hopes of making his peace with the Chancellor. He was received by the Emperor, who said that he saw no reason for his recall from Paris, and expressed himself—according to the Ambassador, whose credibility, however, was rudely shaken by the revelations of his trial—in a way which showed that he was not blind to the faults imputed to the Prince by his bitterest foes. The same day (September 1) Arnim called on the Chancellor with purposes of reconciliation, but was driven away by words of wrath. The meeting of the rivals was stormy and dramatic. It was some minutes before the shattered state of the Count's nerves allowed him to speak, and the Prince was almost speechless with rage. He galled his visitor by the lofty superciliousness of his manner; he loaded him with reproaches. For several months, Bismarck said, he had robbed him of sleep and rest; he had delayed the Convention of March to overthrow Thiers; he had slandered him to the Emperor, and he had conspired with the Empress to bring about his fall. The angry Chancellor remained implacable, and Count Arnim returned to Paris with the conviction that it
was as useless to assail him with reasons (or what he held to be such), as to "batter with peas a stone wall."

The quarrel ripened. In the beginning of August (1873) the Bishop of Nancy, whose diocese included several parishes of Lorraine, issued a pastoral breathing the spirit of reconquest and revenge. In the absence of the Ambassador, the German Chargé d'Affaires was instructed to demand security against the repetition of such inflammatory words. The Duc de Broglie, while deploiring their imprudence, replied that he had not sufficient means at his command to prevent their utterance. But the Chancellor was inexorable, and at last the French Government sent him the copy of a reprimand which it had addressed to the delinquent prelate. In less, however, than three months, out came a couple of other pastorals from the bishops of Angers and Nîmes, who seemed to vie with each other in their desire to surpass the passionate appeals of their colleague of Nancy. Aware of what his Chief had done in the latter case, Count Arnim must have known what was expected of him with respect to a similar explosion which had fired the German Press, and threatened to destroy the appearance of amity between the Republic and the Empire. The incident, in his opinion, was too insignificant to be noticed. "The German Emperor," he said, "sits enthroned too high to be touched by the stone-throwing of tonsured Zouaves." But Bismarck was of a different mind, and instructed Count
Arnim to proceed against the bishops on the strength of certain articles in the Code Pénal which, to the shame of the German Ambassador, had been pointed out to his Government by a French journal. But the Ambassador wished to be thought a wiser man than the Chancellor. Perhaps, even, in this case he was. But his reasons did not satisfy his Chief, and it was therefore his duty to obey him. But instead of doing this, he argued, and doubled, and theorised; so that at last the question was taken from his care, and he had again the mortification of finding that the satisfaction demanded by the Chancellor had been conveyed to him by the French Government through its representative in Berlin.

One more little incident, and the drama reached its climax. The French Government had thought of exchanging, as of old, Ministers with the minor German Courts—no great compliment to the Empire!—and Count Arnim wrote to the Chancellor for instructions on the subject.

The latter merely expressed his astonishment that the Ambassador should want to know how to treat a question, about which nobody in Germany had any doubt. The Count returned to the charge, and worried his Chief with what the latter called "feuilletonistic" remarks about the difficulties of his social and diplomatic position in Paris. His Chief rejoined that he had no time for such controversies, and that he claimed more obedience, and less initiative, from all his agents abroad. Count Arnim hereupon again
complained bitterly to the Emperor, but before his letter reached Berlin his fate had been sealed. How the Chancellor at last managed to convert His Majesty to his will, is not clear; but at any rate, towards the middle of March, 1874, Count Arnim was informed of his transference from Paris to Constantinople. The latter post had recently, at the request of the Sultan, been raised to one of the first rank; but Count Arnim could not help resenting his appointment to it. Had he foreseen that Stamboul was on the eve of becoming the engrossing centre of European diplomacy, his vanity and ambition might have been fully gratified. But he felt punished and degraded, and he resolved to have his revenge. He would show that he was a much better man than the Chancellor, and that, instead of being under, he ought to be over him. He had powerful friends at Court, among the noblesse and the clergy; and, with them to back him, what might not yet be done?

Within a fortnight after Count Arnim had received notice of his appointment to Constantinople, a Vienna journal, *Die Presse*, made certain diplomatic revelations professing to emanate from Florence. As a matter of fact, they came from Paris. The documents in question consisted of several letters written by Count Arnim, when at Rome, to Dr. Dollinger and another ecclesiastic, with the celebrated *Pramemoria,* in which he set forth his views on the questions raised by the Vatican Council. At this time (April, 1874) the struggle between Church and
State was at the height of its fury, and the publication of these papers added fuel to the flames. The mine had been well laid. The German Press wrote of nothing else. The enemies of the Chancellor sang the praises of the man who had predicted the evil consequences of the Council, and whose advice, if followed, might have averted them all.* Was not, therefore, Count Arnim a very much wiser man than Prince Bismarck, and ought he not rather to stand in the Chancellor's shoes? The heat of party strife was then intensified by discussions on the Army Law,† and great excitement reigned.

Prince Bismarck took in the situation at a glance. Closely following the revelations of the Presse, the North German Gazette published his elaborate despatch, to Arnim, of May, 1869, showing why he had refused to adopt the suggestions of the latter as to Prussia's attitude to the Council. Its effect was magical. The Prince's foes grew less blatant. They were further silenced by the publication of one of Count Arnim's reports, which revealed a decided contradiction between the views therein contained and the pessimist tone of his "Promemoria" written a year later. There was,

* Arnim recommended the presence at the Council of lay agents from all the German States, with the view of encouraging the bishops to such resistance as would, at least, deter the Pope. Guided by precedent in similar cases, from acting on a narrow majority; and with wonderful truth he presaged the baneful results which would otherwise ensue from the sanctioning of the Syllabus and the declaration of infallibility. But whether the same results could have been obviated by the adoption of his advice, is a very different question. See our chapter on the "Kulturkampf," p. 255, post.

† See p. 397, post.
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 45

indeed, strong ground for the suspicion that the latter document had been tampered with, before its publication, in a way calculated to increase belief in its author's gift of statesmanlike prophecy. The Count felt that he had been fairly checkmated, and threw off the mask. In a letter to Dr. Döllinger, sent to the Augsburg Gazette, he openly impeached the Chancellor's Church policy; while, in a Berlin journal, he denounced the publication of his report as a breach of all diplomatic custom. It had long been suspected that Prince Bismarck and Count Arnim were at daggers drawn. It was now known. The quarrel was not only complete; it could not be compounded.

Menacingly commanded to say what he knew of the revelations in the Presse, Count Arnim denied all responsibility for them. But, in saying this, he told a deliberate falsehood. He had himself sent them to Vienna through a German journalist in Paris, as was shortly afterwards proved. But, meanwhile, untruth was brought home to him in connection with another Press intrigue, and he was placed on the retired list before he had time to enter on his post at Constantinople. "Count Arnim," to quote the words of so calm a judge as Professor Bluntschli, "had wearied out his superior with his opinionativeness, irritated him by his disobedience, forfeited his confidence through indiscretion and want of truth, and at last compelled him by a direct challenge to dispense with his services." The Chancellor had now put aside and rendered his rival innocuous. He
was quite willing to be satisfied with this measure of justice and revenge. But there presently transpired something which forced him to fight the quarrel out to its bitter end.

Prince Hohenlohe, the successor of Count Arnim at Paris, had not been long at his post when he reported that the archives of the Embassy were incomplete. A considerable number of most important documents were missing. Questioned on the subject, Count Arnim admitted that he had taken with him certain papers, and these he was asked to return to the Foreign Office. Some he sent back, but retained others, declaring them, from their peculiar contents, to be his private property, and necessary to vindicate him in his quarrel with the Chancellor. He remained obstinate, and hinted at the decision of a court of law. He was plainly told that the case belonged, not to the civil, but the criminal judge. The Ambassador replied that he had no interest whatever in avoiding an inquiry, even by the latter. He doubtless thought that the Chancellor, with all his boldness and disregard of appearances, would never dare to prosecute a man like himself, of high position, with powerful friends at Court; and that he would shrink from the unpleasant, and in many respects damaging, disclosures which such a course would be sure to entail. He was soon undeceived. All Germany, all Europe, was startled to hear that Count Harry von Arnim, late Imperial Ambassador at Paris, had been arrested on his own estate near Stettin, one day in October,
1874, and brought to gaol in Berlin like a common felon.

Into the details of his sensational trial, which lasted a week, and was followed with the deepest interest by the Press of two hemispheres, it would be beside our purpose to enter.* The accused was ably defended, the most ingenious pleading was displayed on both sides, but the Court sentenced Arnim to three months' imprisonment on the minor count of his indictment. The mildness of this judgment excited universal surprise. Both the parties at once rushed to the Appeal Court—the Arnims as deeming the sentence much too heavy, the Bismarcks as holding it to be much too light. But the country in general was satisfied that Arnim had simply been judged. An impartial court of law had condemned his conduct, while his impartial countrymen pronounced against both his actions and his opinions. Count Arnim, of course, had his own story—in some respects a very plausible story—to tell; and there were many who believed, with him, that he had been made the victim of his jealous and unscrupulous Chief. But history, on the whole, is compelled to reject this view. There are others again who, while admitting the faults, nay even the crimes of Arnim, contend that Bismarck acted towards him with quite unnecessary harshness. Perhaps he did. As to this point we can only ask our readers to judge for themselves from the unbiased

* We have already made use of the main facts revealed in the course of the trial.
account of the quarrel which we have endeavoured to construct.

The main interest of the trial centred in the correspondence on French affairs which was divulged in the course of it, and the substance of which we have already interwoven in the preceding pages. After perusing these State documents, thus dragged, against every principle of custom and expediency, into the garish light of day, the bitterest foes of the Chancellor were forced to admit that they proved him to be a high-souled, sagacious patriot; his rival, a vain and scheming egotist. Europe could not help admiring the clear and far-seeing statecraft of the Prince's masterly treatises on the affairs of France, as Germany could not help congratulating herself on escaping the dangers of an intriguer who aspired to control her destinies. The timid were afraid that the revelations of the Arnim trial might somehow embroil the Empire once again with its hereditary foe; but the Chancellor had no such fears. Still, the disclosures made had most serious disadvantages. That the Chancellor, foreseeing them, nevertheless proceeded against Arnim, is a proof, if any were wanted, that he allows no obstacle whatever to stand between him and his end. Prince Bismarck did not, perhaps, succeed in doing vengeance upon his incompetent rival without sacrificing, in the eyes of other nations, much of his own dignity, and that of the German Empire. But what he lost in dignity abroad, he gained in confidence at home. For he emerged from his struggle with Arnim as the doubly popular champion
of his countrymen, unselfishly devoted to their highest interests.

* Having now vanished from the Empire and its service, Count Arnim must now also drop out of our narrative, though the rest of his sad and downward career may be briefly sketched. In June, 1879, the Court of Appeal, to which both parties at once hastened, took a more severe view of Arnim’s offence, and increased the term of his sentence from three to nine months, though the arm of the law could not reach him, as he had taken the precaution to retire to Switzerland. In April, 1876, his conduct as an official was subjected to a searching public inquiry by the Imperial Disciplinary Chamber at Potsdam, which finally decreed his dismissal from the service of the State, with loss of title and pension. But meanwhile the condemned man had exposed himself to a fresh prosecution by the publication of an anonymous pamphlet Pro Nikilo, or the Vorgeschichte des Arnim’schen Processes, in which he sought to vindicate himself, and prove that he had fallen a victim to the personal enmity of the Chancellor. The brochure was as interesting as it was indiscreet; but, though much in it may be truc, its general character and force was weakened by the known untruthfulness and untrustworthiness of its author, who was now accused of high treason in that, among other things, he had revealed certain State secrets, and wilfully retarded the negotiations of the Evacuation Treaty of 15th March, 1873, to the great detriment of the Empire. Arnim pleaded ill health in bar, and the non-competence of his tribunal—the Royal Staatgerichtshof at Berlin—apart from which he demanded publicity of trial, the oral examination of certain high witnesses, including M. Thiers, the Ducs de Broglie and Décazes, Leon Rénault, Prince Bismarck, and Marshal Manteuffel, and the production in evidence of a large number of weighty State documents. Refusing to appear, he was sentenced in contumacia on the strength of the criminal code to five years penal servitude. Shortly afterwards, the prosecution and punishment of a paper called the Reichsglocke, which devoted itself to calumniating the Chancellor, deprived Count Arnim’s friends of their last pièce de résistance, and the struggle was at an end. The defeated and disgraced Ambassador never returned to Germany alive. While living in exile at Vienna he published two pamphlets: “Der Nuntius Kommt,” and “Quid Faciamus Nos?,” in which he sought to vindicate his conduct during the Vatican Council, and criticised the attitude of Prussia towards the Catholic Church. Both these brochures are most interesting and instructive reading, and, in marked contrast to the tone of Pro Nikilo, display an impartial and even appreciative treatment of the Chancellor’s ecclesiastical policy. After that, the Count made repeated attempts to procure a safe-conduct to return and stand his trial for high treason, sentence for which, in contumacia, continued suspended over him, and of which he firmly believed
PRINCE BISMARCK.

Bismarck, as we saw, accused Arnim of having contributed, by his monarchist intrigues, to the fall of Thiers (May, 1873); but, before retiring from office, that republican statesman had already done most of what was expected of him by the German Chancellor, having but shortly prior to his overthrow earned the proud title of "Liberator" of his country's territory. By a third Supplementary Convention concluded with Germany (15th March), it was agreed that the balance of the war-indemnity, which only required to be wholly paid by the 1st March, 1875, should be cleared off before the 5th September, 1873; and that the evacuation of the still occupied departments should be expedited in proportion. Both Bismarck and M. Thiers received the warmest thanks of their respective Legislatures for their accomplishment of this most gratifying result. Moved he could prove himself innocent. But in vain. His latter days were embittered by disgrace and clouded with disease, and he expired at Nice on 19th April, 1891. His remains were taken to his own native ground. His fast forgetting age was reminded by his death that such a man had ever lived, and his countrymen tried to be as indulgent as they could to his unhappy memory. Count Arnim was a man whose endowments were undoubtedly of a higher order than those of any of his countrymen who, while serving, might inspire jealousy in their political Chief. But he was also one of those men who confound ambition with ability, and who commit the Napoleonic mistake, fatal to all lasting success, of yielding to the preponderance of their intellectual over their moral powers. His story, indeed, is a mournful one, and will not yield in dramatic interest to the tale of Wolsey.

* "There can be no higher satisfaction to a servant of the State," said Bismarck in thanking the Reichstag for its vote of thanks, "than the recognition which is accorded him by the representatives of all his countrymen. To me such an expression of thanks is as a spur, an encouragement, and, I may say, a medicine against the foibles with which I have to battle in doing my duty."
by the absorbing desire to be relieved of the presence of
t heir hated conquerors, the French people had made
enormous sacrifices and efforts, which showed them to be
possessed of a truly Antaeus-like power of recuperation;
and by the 5th September, 1873, the bitter five milliards
had been handed over to Germany. A few days after-
wards the last Prussian troops of occupation, commanded
by Manteuffel, evacuated Verdun, and raised a triumphant
shout as, crossing the French frontier, they swung along
the road to Metz, across the grave-besprinkled plain of
Mars-la-Tour and through the ensanguined gorge of
Gravelotte.

The great war was now definitely at an end, and the
only question was when it would be followed by another.
For that it would soon be followed by another, was believed by all who marked
the course of things in France. "Revanche" was written on the banner of every party, and seemed
to be engraved on the heart of every Frenchman.
When the war of revenge would break out, was the
great question of the hour. France was preparing for
it; Europe deemed it to be impending; and Bismarck
was doing all he could to obviate what others pro-
nounced to be an inevitable calamity. That a mild,
civilian statesman like M. Thiers had been succeeded,
(May, 1873) as President of the Republic, by a manly
soldier of the stamp of MacMahon, was looked upon in
Berlin as vastly increasing the chances of the expected
catastrophe; and the odds against it seemed to be still
further lessened when MacMahon's tenure of office (in

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November) was extended to seven years. For why, it was reasoned, should the Marshal have insisted on this permanency of his power, unless he wished himself to be the instrument of avenging his own personal defeat (at Sedan), as well as his country's overthrow? Moreover, if retribution were not his aim, what then could have been his object in introducing, as one of the very first measures of his administration, another military reform law that, among other things, added no fewer than forty regiments of various kinds to the French army, which, for the rest, had been exactly remodelled on the Prussian pattern?

Again, M. Thiers had replied with an emphatic "Apôge!" to the enticements of those Clericals who had implored him to undertake a crusade on behalf of the expropriated Pope—which could only be done by assailing Germany, the implacable foe of Papal pretensions. "We respect the rights of the Holy Chair," said M. Thiers to Monseigneur Dupanloup, "and we should like to see its independence established; but we also recognise accomplished facts, and we shall do nothing to estrange us from a Sovereign and his Minister (Bismarck), of whom we have nothing to complain." For Germany, these were tranquillising assurances; but no sooner had MacMahon succeeded Thiers than the Clericals, presuming on the countenance of the former, began to shout their war-cry with redoubled fury. The "Kulturkampf" was now raging fiercely across the Rhine, where the Catholic foes of civil freedom were being very
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 53

properly placed in penal bonds; and thus the political rancour felt by all French Clericals against Germany was intensified by religious hatred of the bitterest kind. For in their eyes Bismarck was the ruthless despoiler of the Pope, as well as the pitiless destroyer of France. The interests of religion thus seeming to the French Ultramontanes to be closely bound up with the cause of revenge, it was little wonder that they gave vent to their feelings in torrents of impassioned eloquence, inciting the Catholics of Germany to open rebellion against the May Laws, and exhorting their own countrymen to prepare for the day of national retribution. The Bishops of Nancy, of Angers, of Nîmes, and of other sees, as we previously had occasion to record, vied with each other in the violence of their pastoral tirades against Germany, her Emperor, and her Chancellor; till at last the patience of Bismarck became exhausted, and he demanded of the French Government that the war-trumpets of the bishops should forthwith cease to sound, on pain of the German bugle at once taking up the note with an immediate call to arms.

"Germany," wrote the Chancellor to the representatives of the Empire abroad (January, 1874), "Germany is sincerely desirous to live at peace with France; but should a collision become manifestly inevitable, Germany will not be able to reconcile it with her conscience, or with her duty to her people, to await the moment that might appear most favourable to France." And as Italy, the
dispossessor of the Pope, no less than Germany, was the object of Clerical fury in France, Bismarck wrote about the same time to Arnim: "I am convinced we cannot leave Italy without help, should she be attacked by France without reason, or from reasons that also affect our interests." All this was language which the Duc Decazes, Foreign Minister of the Republic, could not fail to understand. For he knew that, when Bismarck spoke, he meant what he said, and he further knew that it was not yet in the interests of France to draw the sword of revenge. He therefore acted like a wise man, and sang a humble song. In our account of the Arnim case we have already had occasion to show how he complied with the demands of the Chancellor, and we may now add that the regret of the French Government for the fire-and-sword effusions of the bishops was further expressed by the suspension of several newspapers, which had been bold enough to give circulation to the bellicose pastorals.* By one of the Chancellor's timely "cold water-jets," as his warning despatches were called, the flames of anti-German fury among the French Clericals had been considerably reduced in volume; but what they lost in size they gained in secret force, and being confined in one place they only burst out in another.

They even spread to Spain. In Spain, at this time, there was raging the Carlist war—a war in which the antagonists respectively represented a liberal and

* In the spring of 1875, the Chancellor had a similar incident with Belgium, but this will be dealt with in our chapter on the "Kulturkampf."
enlightened Government on one side, and a despotic, divine-right monarchy, entirely devoted to Rome, on the other. It is needless to say that the latter principle found embodiment in Don Carlos, and that the manner in which he carried on hostilities was worthy of the political and religious principles which inspired him. Europe stood aghast at the barbarities committed in his name, but there was one of his acts of savagery which roused the particular indignation of Germany. Among the prisoners taken by the Carlists at the victorious battle of Estella (June, 1874), there was an ex-Prussian officer, Captain Schmidt, who was acting as a newspaper-correspondent; and poor Schmidt, an iron-cross man of the first class, was mercilessly shot with a large number of his fellow-captives. It was not proved that he was a combatant, but he admitted being a Protestant German, and he was suspected of being a spy of Bismarck's. That was quite enough for the Carlists, who shared the hatred of French Clericals against the anti-Papal Empire, and so he was straightway shot.

Time was, as a German writer* remarks, when no Government in the Fatherland would have bothered itself about any of its vagrant subjects who had thus been murdered; but, with Bismarck, that time had come to an end. The Chancellor's blood boiled within him when he

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* Professor Wilhelm Müller's "Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart," for 1874.
was told of the barbarous insult that had been offered to
the Empire by the wanton murder of Captain
Schmidt. "Thought I to myself," said the Prince,*
"if Schmidt had been an English, or an American, a
Russian, or a French correspondent, that would never
have happened to him. I called to mind all the old
humiliations which Germany had been compelled to
endure by reason of her dissensions, and I said to
myself, 'it is high time to remind other countries that
Germans, too, may not now be murdered with im-
punity.'"

Off went the German fleet to the Bay of Biscay,
and away to Paris sped a despatch of the Chancellor.
Bismarck revolted from the "hangman-like method of
taking reprisals by effecting a landing at
the first Carlist port he came to, and string-
ing up the first Carlist staff-officer he could
lay hold of, though that was the justice
that recommended itself to the natural man."† But
there were other means of avenging on the Carlists the
barbarous crime they had committed, and one of these
was to induce the Powers to recognise, and thus
strengthen, the Government which Don Carlos was
striving to overthower. There was little prospect, per-
haps, of this Government proving the settled form of
rule in Spain, but it meanwhile had a de facto exist-
ence; and, apart from his avowed aims of political
vengeance, Bismarck was probably as apprehensive of
seeing a reactionary Papal monarchy established at

* Reichstag. 4th Dec., 1874. † Idem.
Madrid, as he dreaded the consequences of a monarchical restoration in France. It was not, thought the Chancellor, either in the interest of Spain or of Germany, that Don Carlos should mount the throne of Philip II., and therefore he invited the Powers to join with Germany in blowing into a clear and light-diffusing flame, "the last glimmering wick of political order"* in Spain, which the son of the Church was doing his very best to extinguish.

Away to Paris, we said, sped a despatch of the Chancellor, and on the strength of its contents Prince Hohenlohe had a very serious interview with the Duc Decazes (26th July). Germany, said the Ambassador, did not wish or intend to break with France; but at the same time she could no longer look with indifference on the barbarities that were being committed in the northern provinces of Spain by the Carlists, who had received material countenance in various ways, either by the omission, or by the commission, of the French authorities. And were the Carlists not at once deprived of this means of encouragement, Germany would be forced to take her own measures by blockading the coast, so as to cut the Carlists off from one of their lines of supply, and thus avenge the murder of one of her sons. The Government of Marshal Serrano had already remonstrated with the Duc Decazes in a still more serious and complaining tone, and this double representation had the effect of preparing the ground in Paris for a further advance on the part of

* Reichstag. December 4, 1874.
the Chancellor, which took the form of a Circular addressed to the Cabinets of all the Great Powers.

In this Circular, dated 6th August, Bismarck dwelt on the atrocities that had been perpetrated by the Carlists in the name of conservative and monarchical principles, "which these enormities were only calculated to discredit;" and he invited the Powers, in the true interest of these principles, to recognise the Government of Marshal Serrano, "so as thus, without actual intervention, to exercise a moral influence on the affairs of Spain, and in this manner help to put an end to the Carlist insurrection, that might otherwise eventually imperil the peace of Europe."

How to deal with this Circular of Bismarck, was a question which sorely vexed the French Government. And, indeed, it was in a dire dilemma. For not only would its declining to recognise the Madrid Government imply more than a sneaking sympathy with the Carlists, but this refusal would also in all probability have the effect of isolating France from the rest of the Powers. On the other hand, acquiescence in the German proposal would be sure to expose the Duc Decazes to the charge of receiving his orders from Berlin; while it would also tend to estrange the sympathies of the Clerico-Legitimist party in the Assembly, with whose support, as against the extreme Republicans, the Government could not very well dispense. The French Government had to choose between what, in its eyes, were two evils; and the lesser of these, on the whole, was the semblance of its agreeing
to dance as Bismarck piped. And yet it had to contrive an ingenious formula wherewith to make the sensitive nation forget as much as possible, that the first violin in the continental orchestra, which had formerly been played by France, had now passed into the hands of Germany. Accordingly, the nation was officially informed that France—not acting on the initiative of Germany, but following the example of England—had resolved to recognise the Government of Marshal Serrano. All the other great Powers, too, hastened to acquiesce in the proposal of Bismarck—all but Russia, and the autocratic Czar, for reasons which have never become wholly clear, refused to sign the European protest against the absolutist pretensions of Don Carlos.

Now, if there was anything more than another that was calculated to console the French for the part they had no alternative but to play in the Spanish incident, it was the fact that Gortchakov had declined to take his cue from the German Chancellor. "Russia not acting in accord with Austria and Germany? Ha! ha! where is your boasted Triple Alliance now?" shouted the French apostles of revenge with joyful malice; and their chorus of delight was even taken up by the Clericals in the German Parliament, who accused the Chancellor of "having suffered such a check by Russia's disavowal of his Spanish policy, as would make him give much to have it undone."* Such a charge, which was the outcome of an Ultramontane

* Herr Jörg, 4th December, 1874.
hostility to the Chancellor so rabid and bitter, that it had lately produced a fanatic who tried to take his life * —such a charge, we say, Bismarck could only rebut by a scornful sneer at those who thus sought to derange the accord existing between St. Petersburg and Berlin, despite the negative attitude of the Czar in the Spanish question. "Thank God," he said, "our relations there (in Russia) are firm and 'tower-high' (Thurmhoek) above the range of all such petty efforts."

Bismarck himself characterised the year 1874 as the most uneventful of all the thirteen years during which he had been in office, as far as foreign affairs were concerned. In fact, the only incidents that had relieved the monotony of those affairs were the Spanish question, and the "cold water-jet" with which he had been obliged to cool the bellicose ardour of the French bishops. Nevertheless, at the end of this uneventful year he was accused by the Clericals of pursuing a secret, an arbitrary, and a perilous foreign policy, and of casting about to conjure up another European war.† Nothing could possibly have better suited the purposes of these unpatriotic Ultramontanes than another war, which might, perchance, restore the King of Hanover to his throne, the Pope to his seat of temporal sway, and the priests to their former position of power in Germany. When Dr. Windthorst and his disciples denounced Bismarck's

* Kullmann, for an account of whose crime see our chapter on the "Kulturkampf," p. 314. *post.*
† See the pregnant debate in the Reichstag of 4th December, 1874, frequently before referred to.
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 61

silencing of the French bishops as "an unjustifiable interference in the internal affairs of France," everyone knew what that meant. What exasperated the German Clericals was, not that Bismarck was doing all he could to bring about another war, but that he was really exerting himself to the utmost, and seemingly with only too much success, to keep the peace of Europe. At the beginning of the year (1874*), Cardinal Manning had expressed his conviction in the almost immediate breaking out of a war, "that would (among other things) re-instate the Vicar of Christ in his rightful place;" and when the year began to wane without any certain prospect of the fulfilment of this delightful prophecy, the Clericals in Germany, who could not in all decency complain that the Chancellor was the prince of peacemakers, began to vent their spite and disappointment by upbraiding him for a foreign policy that was sure, they said, to end in bloodshed.

This was a strange, if, perhaps, natural enough inconsistency on the part of the German Ultramontanes, but in their accusations the French Clericals only beheld truth. It was the old story of the wolf accusing the lamb of troubling the pellucid waters of peace; only Europe could not very well make up its mind as to which was the lamb, France arming to an alarming degree, and which was the wolf. But one thing was certain, namely, that France was again arming to a degree which seemed unnecessary for the mere purposes of defence. By the Cadre Law (intro-

* At a meeting of the St. Sebastian League, 20th January, 1874.
duced in January, 1875) it was intended to give the French army such an accession of strength as would be measured in time of peace by 171 battalions more than the Germans, and by 269 battalions more than France had placed in the field in 1870. To the German mind this in itself appeared significant enough, but doubly so when these warlike preparations were considered in connection with the aggressive tone of the whole French Press. Far from having been extinguished by the Chancellor's "cold water-jet" of the previous spring, the flames of the revenge-passion now only seemed to have been acted on as if by oil; and the memory of the Spanish incident was still rankling in the breasts of the Chauvinists. In spite of Russia's independent action in that affair, the Triple Alliance was still a fact. Italy, too, was in tacit alliance with Germany, and the Empire had just won the sympathy of the mass of the Spanish people by its benevolent interposition on their behalf. The French felt that the Chancellor's policy of isolating the Republic was succeeding to perfection, and their exasperation grew in proportion as the gradual realisation of this policy deprived them of their hopes of an anti-German alliance with some other Power.

Yet once more their drooping hopes were cheered by what seemed to be a favourable change in the international constellation, and they hailed this last ray of hope as the sinking traveller revive at the distant sight of a desert-well, never thinking that it may after all turn out to have been a mere delusive mirage. The *Drei-
Kaiser-Bund still existed; but, in the spring of 1875, the French caught up from Vienna the joyful tidings that this Imperial coalition was on the point of giving way to another triple alliance of a more beneficent character. Breaking away from the other two Empires, Austria would give her hand to Italy and France; and this Catholic League, sanctified and made invulnerable by the blessing of the Pope, would obliterate Protestant Germany, and thus not only pay off all old individual scores, but also restore the temporal power of Rome in all its ancient splendour.

That France would only be too eager to join such a league, everyone knew full well; and, indeed, there were certain superficial appearances which induced the world to believe that she might actually be asked to do so. It was unquestionably a fact, for instance, that there was a most decidedly anti-German party at the Court of Vienna, and even the Arch-Duke John Salvator of Toscana had written a pamphlet so bellicose in its tone, that he was put under arrest for several days. The money, he said, which had been wasted on the great International Exhibition, would have been much better expended in the purchase of cannon, to bar the German invasion that was inevitable. It is true, the Emperor himself, as well as Count Andrassy, were fervid and faithful advocates of the German alliance; but Count Andrassy was opposed by a powerful party under Jesuit influence, and his fall, thought many, was only a question of time. On the other hand, when Francis Joseph, about this time (April, 1875), repaired
with his Minister to Venice to return Victor Emmanuel's visit of two years before, the French Press raised a shout of exultation at what it deemed to be a step preliminary to the formal conclusion of the Catholic League. That Victor Emmanuel, too, would be all the more disposed to welcome the supposed advances of Francis Joseph, was inferred from the fact that his Government had lately (10th March) been sharply taken to book by the German Chancellor for granting the Pope, under the so-called Guarantee Law,* certain political privileges—unbalanced by any corresponding responsibility—which the Curia might thus abuse to the detriment of foreign States. It was, moreover, rumoured that the Pope had written to Francis Joseph at Venice, pointing out that his true interest lay in making common cause with France and Italy against Germany; and when to all this was added the further fact, that the return visit of the Emperor William to Victor Emmanuel, which his Majesty had intended to make about the same time as Francis Joseph, was postponed "on the urgent advice of his physicians"—of whom Bismarck was suspected to be the chief, it will readily be understood why the French believed the moment to be approaching which would enable them at last to realise their dearest hopes, and why their war-like zeal began to excite most serious apprehensions in the mind of Bismarck.

The political heavens looked very black indeed, and just at this particular juncture Berlin gave forth a low

* See p. 331, post.
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 65

but ominous roll of journalistic thunder, which made Europe dread an almost instantaneous outburst of the storm. "Is war in sight?" inquired the Post, an organ supposed (but wrongly in this particular case*) to enjoy a semi-official inspiration; and, after a disquieting review of the European situation, it came to the conclusion that "war certainly was in sight, though it did not follow that the clouds would not disperse." Now, such was the feeling of uneasiness and apprehension then prevailing everywhere, that this article had the effect of producing a regular "war-scare," which has now become historical. All the Bourses of Europe were thrown into a panic, and questions were put and answered in various Parliaments.

The relations of France and Germany even formed the subject of an alarmed discussion in the English House of Lords. It was also believed that the Queen

* We were once told by Herr Geheimrat Hahn, ex-director of the Chancellor's Press Bureau, that the famous "Krieg in Sicht" article in the Post was not of semi-official origin. Speaking on the Press Law Bill in the Reichstag 9th February, 1876, Bismarck said: "Anybody who holds the articles that appeared in non-official papers—I refer more particularly to the Post—responsible for the panic affecting the Bourse here last year, is in error. I never knowingly caused an article to be written for the Post; least of all the one headed 'War in Sight.' But I did not object to that article; for I hold that when it is generally felt that a minority is egging the country on to war, people cannot make too great a noise in order to attract the majority's attention; for, as a rule, the majority does not incline towards war, which is brought on by minorities, or, in Absolutist States, by the Sovereign or the Cabinet. He, however, who first shouts 'Fire!' cannot be suspected of incendiarism. Were a Minister bent upon urging the country to war in an utterly groundless cause, he would scarcely begin by kicking up a row in the Press, for that would be to summon the Fire Brigade."
had addressed herself to the German Emperor in the interests of peace; but, at any rate, a correspondence passed between the Cabinets of London, Paris, and Berlin. It was remembered that, in the year 1756, Frederick the Great had invaded Saxony under the mere belief that the Saxons cherished hostile designs against him, and it was feared that Bismarck had now resolved to anticipate the French in a similar manner. Certain it is that, in the previous spring (1874), the Chancellor, on the occasion of the "cold water-jet" incident, had told the French that, if they were really believed to meditate aggression against Germany, the latter could not afford to wait till France was perfectly ready. And now Europe thought that the moment had actually come when he was going to put this threat into execution. Lord Derby even informed the House of Lords that the German Chancellor had now again made use of similar language in Paris, and demanded a considerable reduction of the French army as the only means of securing peace. His Lordship must surely have had sufficient reason for making this grave assertion, but it was at any rate denied by the official Gazette at Berlin.

The German Government made no secret of its uneasiness at the enormous increase in the armaments of France, and it admittedly asked its representatives abroad, especially those at Vienna, St. Petersburg, and London, to draw attention to the significance of the French Cadre Law. These representatives also were summoned
to a special conference at Berlin. That was all; and yet it was generally thought sufficient to prove the wish of the military party in Germany to anticipate France. The incident, indeed, is still wrapt in a certain degree of mystery; but France, at least, succeeded pretty well in convincing all but Germany of the pacific nature of her intentions. Her assurances on this head to England were most explicit; and it appears to have been the task, no less of the English than of the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to intercede with the Czar for the maintenance of that peace which Germany seemed bent on breaking. Prince Gorchakov was charmed with the prospect, thus opened up to him, of intervening between the quarrellers as a *Deus ex machiná*. Said the Russian Chancellor to General Le Flô, who had received similar assurances from the Czar himself: “I promise you to make representations to Prince Bismarck at Berlin (which I shall pass in a few days on my way to Ems, with my Imperial master), and the Czar will do the same thing to the Emperor William.”

The Czar and his Chancellor duly arrived in Berlin (10th—13th May), but by this time the war scare had been allayed. “*On a voulu nous brouiller,*” said the Emperor William to the French military attaché, at a ball given by Countess Hatzfeldt, towards the end of April; “*mais tout est fini maintenant. Je tiens à vous le dire.*”

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† "They wanted to embroil us, but the danger is now over, and I think it my duty to tell you so." "I told the Emperor the fright we had
“war-scare” had been allayed—as far as the Governments of France and Germany were concerned; but it still remained to reassure the European public, and to this agreeable task Gortchakov and his master now addressed themselves. Bismarck had repeated conferences with the Emperor Alexander and his Minister, and the result of these was expressed in the words let fall by the Czar before his departure from Berlin. “Russia’s pacific task is easy, for no State wishes to make war. I have found the Emperor William and Prince Bismarck animated by the most peaceful sentiments. The co-operation of Germany in maintaining peace has never been doubtful, and it may now be regarded as completely assured.” At the same time Prince Gortchakov hastened to telegraph to all the representatives of Russia abroad: “The Emperor leaves Berlin convinced of the pacific intentions which prevail there, and which are a pledge for the preservation of peace.”

France’s dream of an anti-German League had dissolved, leaving the bare and disagreeable reality of a Drei-Kaiser-Bund still courted by Italy. The grave misunderstanding between France and Germany was removed. The war-clouds were scattered, and Prince Gortchakov was hailed by about the war,” wrote the Princess Alice of Hesse-Darmstadt, to her mother, the Queen of England (10th July, 1875). “He was much distressed that anyone could believe him capable of such a thing; but our Fritz and Fritz of Baden agree that, with Bismarck, in spite of the nation not wishing it, he might bring about a war at any moment. . . . This enormous and splendid army, ready at any moment, is a dangerous possession for any country.”
grateful Europe as the beneficent Cloud-Compeller. Is it possible that the vanity of one man could carry him so far as to have made him conjure up the spectre of an European war, only to reap the theatrical glory of seeming to ally it? Hear what Bismarck himself said on this subject, three years later*:

"I should not have wished for peace if I had been the villain (Bösewicht) Gortchakoff made me out to be in 1875. The whole story which then startled Europe, and to which a letter in The Times gave so great an echo, was nothing but a plot devised by Gortchakoff and Gontaut. It was a plot between Gontaut and Gortchakoff, who was eager to reap praises from the French papers and be styled the 'saviour of France.' They had arranged this so that the thing should burst forth the very day of the arrival of the Czar, who was to appear as a Quos ego, and by his mere appearance to give security to France, peace to Europe, and honour to Germany. I never saw a statesman act more heedlessly—from a sentiment of vanity to compromise a friendship between the two Governments; to expose himself to the most serious consequences, in order to attribute to himself the rôle of saviour, when there was nothing in danger. I told the Emperor of Russia, and I told Gortchakoff, 'If you have such a mind for a French apotheosis, we have still credit enough in Paris to be able to make you appear on some theatre in mythological costume, with wings on your shoulders, and surrounded with Bengal lights. It really was not worth while to depict us as villains for the sole purpose of issuing a circular.' That famous circular, moreover, commenced with these words,—'Peace is now ensured,' and when I complained of that phrase, which would have confirmed all the alarming rumours, it was altered into, 'The maintenance of peace is now ensured,' which did not mean much less. I said to the Russian Chancellor, 'You certainly will not have much room for congratulations on what you have been doing in risking our friendship for an empty satisfaction.' I frankly tell you, however,

* To a Correspondent of The Times during the Congress of Berlin, who then published in The Times of 7th September, 1878; an account of the interview he had with the Chancellor.
that I am a good friend with friends, and a good enemy with enemies.' And Gortchakoff while engaged for the last two years in the Eastern affair has found this out. But for the affair of 1875 he would not be where he is, and would not have undergone the political defeat he has just experienced.*

• "Upon Gortchakoff," writes Dr. Busch (in his "Our Chancellor"), "the Chancellor pronounced judgment to me as follows, in March, 1879:—

'Without the least reason, many people take him for a particularly clever and skilful diplomatist. He never has any really great object in view, and therefore cannot point to any remarkable success. His policy is not that of the Czar Alexander, nor is it a Russian policy, but one dictated and guided in the first place by considerations personal to himself, and in the second by his predilection for France, which his master does not share. His chief characteristic is a highly developed egotism; his chief aim the gratification of his yearning to be esteemed a politician of the first class, which is just what he is not. Hence his chronic disposition to invent scenes in which he can play a part likely to elicit applause from public opinion. The Russian Chancellor has only exhibited any personal activity during the past four years; and no expert will venture to say that his operations have revealed either adroitness or perspicacity. These four years were devoted on his part to preparing the war with Turkey, and to making sure that the struggle in question should result favourably and profitably to Russia. But his manner of conducting this business has not altogether signalled him as an intelligence capable of clearly discerning its own aims and the means of attaining them. In preparing to fight the Turks, the most important preliminary was to ascertain beyond a doubt what position Austria-Hungary and Germany would take up in relation to Russia's projects, and to establish satisfactory relations with those States. This was not effectually done, as everybody knows. Firm and distinct relations were not even arranged and established with Roumania, although Gortchakoff had ample opportunities for fulfilling that part of his task during his six months' sojourn in Bucharest. But the old gentleman spent too much of his time every day with girls of a certain description to have any to spare for business. The results of his policy resembled the work he himself did; both were mediocre. But his yearning to be, or at least to appear, more than he really was, remained as vigorous and lively as ever theretofore. After 1874 it seemed as if his greed for praise and renown would never again leave him any peace or quiet. At the time of the Reichstadt Convention (1876) he remarked: 'Je ne peux pas filler comme une lampe qui s'éteint. Il faut que je me couche comme un autre.' The Triple Alliance only satisfied him for a very brief period.Already in 1874 threads of the Gortchakoff-Jomini policy (now set forth in the Golois) made themselves manifest in the foreign Press—more particularly in that
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE.

The political defeat here referred to was inflicted on Prince Gorchakov at the Congress of Berlin (in 1878); and we must now proceed to trace Prince Bismarck's connection with the events which led up to that memorable dénouement, and to the humiliation of the statesman whom the ever increasing laurels of the German Chancellor had begun to inspire with a jealous rivalry. Scarcely had the European sky become clear of the storm-omens which vanished, as we have seen, at the touch of the Russian Cloud-Compeller's hand, when Bismarck, from his lofty Mount Carmel in the North, discerned afar off on the Eastern horizon a cloud as yet no bigger than a man's hand. That little cloud floated

of France and Belgium. Even then the aim of that policy was distinctly perceptible, namely, the revival of intimate relations between Russia and vengeance-inclined France, to the end of threatening and exercising pressure upon Germany. France's rejection of this proposal (which does not seem to have had the Czar Alexander's approbation) did not hinder further efforts in the direction indicated. These endeavours culminated in the period between 1875 and 1877, when, entantant, a rumour obtained currency all over the world, to the effect that Russia had rescued the French from a great and imminent peril. It was asserted that, in 1875, Gorchakov had been apprised by Gontaut, then Ambassadour in St. Petersburg, that Germany was on the point of forcing a war upon France. Gorchakov had thereupon expressed his disapprobation of any such undertaking, the Czar had then travelled to Berlin, and succeeded in persuading the Russian military party then urging on the enterprise in question to abandon their projects. Finally, the Russian Chancellor had taken occasion to address a Circular Despatch to his Envoys abroad, beginning with the words: "Maintenant la paix est assurée." Of all the details contained in this report which emanated from St. Petersburg, and was intended to display Prince Gorchakov to the world at large in the light of a benevolent peace-maker and mighty dictator, as well as to recommend him to the French as a friend and desirable ally—only those touching the Czar's journey to Berlin and a high-flying Circular Despatch of his Foreign Minister are founded upon fact."
over the mountain-tops of the Herzegovina, one of the Slavonic provinces of Turkey by the Adriatic Sea, where the Christian inhabitants had risen (July, 1875) against that Islam oppression which had ground them down for centuries, and which they swore they no longer could endure. And the little cloud steadily gathered in bulk and blackness till it began to cast an ugly shadow over the glens of Montenegro, and the plains of Bosnia, and even to intercept the sun-rays of peace that fell on adjacent Servia.

It does not fall within our province to trace the causes and development of that insurrection which, breaking out in the Herzegovina, spread like wildfire all over the Balkan peninsula. Suffice it to say that this uprising did not take European statesmen by surprise; that it was the direct outcome of centuries of Turkish misrule, and of the unnatural presence of a ruling Mahomedan-Turanian race among Christian-Aryan peoples; and that it now re-opened a question which for long years had been to politicians what the squaring of the circle was to philosophers. The Eastern Question had already caused many quarrels and cost much blood; and now again it suddenly became the burning controversy of the hour, absorbing the energy and attention of all the great Powers. But to some minds there was this consolation about it, that the plague of the Eastern Question now seemed to have actually broken out for the last time, and to have resolved itself into the simple, yet perplexing enough inquiry, as to what nations should inherit an
Empire which truly appeared to be on the brink of final disruption. Judging from the fatal-looking eruptions which blotched the body of the old Sick Man of the Bosphorus, it was evident that he was now on the point of long-awaited death; and so his chamber began to be crowded with his anxious neighbours, some of whom openly assumed the mien of the "smiling heir," while others, with a well-affected semblance of grief, fell to feeling his pulse and prescribing medicines with a view to galvanising him, if possible, into a further span of paralytic life.

Of the "smiling heir" class, England was held to be chief; for had not Lord Beaconsfield, asked continental politicians, read aright the signs of the storm that was brewing in the East and threatening to shake the Turkish fruit from off its tree; and had he not, with the commercial acuteness of his race, already assured to England a goodly portion of this fruit before it fell, by buying up (November, 1875) the Khedive's Suez Canal shares, and thus timeously vesting in England a prescriptive right to one of the Sultan's finest dominions? But at the same time, while exercising reasonable caution as to her own future interests, England claimed to be no less anxious than her fellow-watchers in the chamber of disease to preserve the life of the old Sick Man; nor could the world very well doubt the genuine solicitude of these watchers—unless, indeed, upon the supposition that it was their diabolic purpose to poison their patient slowly with excess of medicine—when it heard of the
repeated and rapidly succeeding doses of physic that were administered to him in the shape of Notes, Memorandums, Protocols, Conferences, and other diplomatic remedies, which had to be finally and successfully supplemented by the surgical operation of war.

Of all this long and drastic course of physic the first dose was administered by Austria, who—after previous understanding with the other great Powers, but with the special support of Russia and Germany—handed the Porte a Note (31st January, 1876), which was nothing but a formal demand on the part of Europe for such political and religious reforms as the Sultan had repeatedly promised, but never applied, and as would have the effect of appeasing his rebellious subjects.*

The initiative to this first act of European interference in the affairs of Turkey was naturally taken by Austria, as being the Power most affected by insurrection on her south-eastern borders; while Austria was supported by Russia, who eagerly seized the opportunity of figuring as the religious protector of the oppressed Slavs, and by Germany, who had every interest in preventing a local conflict from developing into a general war. All the Powers had been at the making of this pill, which the Sultan was now required to swallow; and His

* "The proposals of Count Andrassy," wrote Lord Derby to Sir Henry Elliot (Ambassador at Constantinople), "amount to little more than a request that the Porte will execute all the measures for the improvement of the condition of the non-Mussulman and rural populations throughout the Empire which have been publicly proclaimed" (at various times from 1829 till now, but have hitherto been allowed to remain a dead letter).
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 75

Majesty, with a good grace, said he would gulp it down. But, instead of popping it into his mouth, the wily Turk pitched it over his left shoulder, and his physicians looked at each other in dumb and half-indignant surprise. Performance did not follow the Sultan's promise of the required reforms, and meanwhile the Balkan peninsula became more and more wrapped in the flames of internecine war.

What was to be done? The condition of the old Sick Man was growing quite alarming, so disquieting, indeed, that a consultation of his three chief physicians, one of them being accompanied by the Czar his master, was straightway held at Berlin (10th—14th May, 1870). The three Chancellors—Bismarck, Andrassy, Gortchakoff—met at Berlin to compound another dose of physic for their moribund patient; but only a few days before their meeting there had occurred an incident which, as far at least as Bismarck was concerned, must have had considerable influence on their deliberations.

News came that, on the 6th May, the French and German Consuls at Salonica had been murdered by Mahomedan subjects of the Sultan. Both these foreign officials had been suspected of seconding the efforts of the Greek, or Christian, community to rescue from Moham edanism a girl who had signified her deliberate intention of embracing the faith of the Prophet, and they were torn to pieces in a mosque by an infuriated mob. This incident had the effect of still further opening Bismarck's
eyes as to the hopeless state of chaos into which the Turkish Empire seemed to be plunged, as it also gave him another opportunity of repeating his action in the case of Captain Schmidt, and of showing that Germany was not behind other nations in ensuring practical effect to the consciousness expressed in the proud reflection: "Civis Romanus sum!"

A German squadron—which soon formed the nucleus of an international armada—was quick to appear in the Gulf of Salonica, and the Imperial Ambassador at Stamboul was directed to insist on full and ample reparation for the outrage that had been committed. A Turco-German commission at once proceeded to Salonica, and six of the assassins were straightway hanged, while the chief civil and military authorities of the port were sentenced to nominal penalties. But that would not satisfy Bismarck, who demanded rigorous and real punishment; and so the delinquent magnates were again put upon their trial, and sent for long periods to gaol and the galleys. That, however, was not yet enough. For the murdered consul had left a widow, and the Sultan was required to pay her the sum of fifteen thousand pounds.

It was only at this point that His Ottoman Majesty showed symptoms of a desire to disavow responsibility for the crimes of his subjects. It was easy for him to hang and imprison as many of these subjects as ever Bismarck liked, and he had powder enough left to salute the German flag as often as might be required;
but when it came to the paying of a fine of 300,000 francs (not to speak of twice the amount demanded by the French), how in the world, in the painful state of impecuniosity to which misfortune had reduced him, could he raise such an enormous sum by a given day? The Porte prevaricated and advanced all sorts of pleas in extenuation, till it was at last brought to its senses by the following telegram from Bismarck: "Germany's Emperor demands instantaneous satisfaction . . . . . and, in the event of refusal, we shall know what measures to take for upholding the dignity of the Empire." This was quite enough. The money was at once scraped together, and the incident was wound up by another salute to the French and German flags. For France had insisted on having similar satisfaction; and thus, for the first time since the war that had estranged them, there was presented the singular spectacle of the Republic making common cause with the Empire against another Power. The process of reconciliation seemed to have already set in.

It was, as we said, under the immediate influence of the impression produced by the Mahomedan outrage—which was thus at last expiated—that the three Chancellors met at Berlin, to reconsider the means of remedying the evils that threatened to set the Turkish Empire in a blaze which might drop igniting sparks all over the rest of Europe. Their deliberations lasted but a short while, and resulted in the preparation of the so-called Berlin Memorandum, which, in the name of the
three Northern Powers, was at once communicated (13th May) to the Cabinets of London, Paris, and Rome. The structure of reasoning erected in this minatory document was based on the assumption that as the Porte, in reply to the representation of the Powers (of 31st January last), had solemnly promised to carry out certain sweeping reforms in its Christian provinces (but had hitherto failed to do so), therefore the Powers were entitled to insist on the rigorous fulfilment of this moral obligation. Accordingly, certain guarantees for the performance of the Sultan’s promise were suggested; and he was to be told that, unless these preliminary conditions had been complied with before the lapse of an armistice of two months between him and his rebellious subjects, the efforts of European diplomacy on behalf of good order and government in his dominions would be promptly seconded by “more effective measures.”

In what these “more effective measures” were to consist, there could be no manner of doubt. They could only consist of force, but how and by whom this force should be applied, was not explicitly agreed. By all the Powers, or only by one of their number, as the mandatory of the others? There was considerable doubt on this point, and the uncertainty was fatal to the Berlin Memorandum. France and Italy, it is true, hastened to express their adhesion to it; but after a week’s consideration it was rejected by England, and it was therefore never presented to the Porte at all. English pique, as well as
English policy, had been fatal to it. Lord Derby declined to accept a plan in the preparation of which the English Government had not been consulted, and which it did not believe would succeed. *

But the Porte had been privately made aware of its contents all the same, and it saw with pleasure that the coercive policy of the three Chancellors had been baulked by the negative and suspicious attitude of England. The three Chancellors had been unable to convince Mr. Disraeli that a moral obligation was no less binding than a treaty, and might also be enforced by the ultimate reason of all law; and so the European Concert collapsed. Whether the Porte would have yielded to the moral coercion of united Europe, backed as it was, by the threat of "more effective measures," and whether one of the most calamitous wars of modern times would thus have been obviated, can only be conjectured. But it admits, at least, of very little doubt, that the refusal of England to be a party to this coercion had the effect of deepening the indifference of the Sultan's Government to the remonstrances of the other Powers; as it also had the almost immediate effect of further stirring up the oppressed races of the Balkan peninsula to seek, by 'desperate appeal to arms, that

* Wrote Lord Derby to Lord Odo Russell (19th May, 1876): "Her Majesty's Government attach little importance to forms in matters of this kind, and would have readily accepted the present proposals had they appeared to them to afford a feasible plan for the pacification of the insurgent districts; but they cannot accept, for the sake of the mere appearance of concert, a scheme in the preparation of which they have not been consulted, and which they do not believe calculated to effect the object with which they are informed it has been framed."
remedy for their woes which they now saw could not be hoped for from the intervention of Europe.

Within a month after the failure of the Berlin Memorandum, Servia and Montenegro had declared war against the Porte; while Bulgaria, too, had risen, and been drenched with the blood of her massacred sons. Sultan Abdul Aziz himself had been dethroned, and his dominions in Europe were fast falling a prey to murder, insurrection, and general chaos. One would imagine that the Northern Powers would have now more than ever thought of interfering to quench the spreading conflagration. But no. The Emperors of Austria and Russia met at Reichstadt on the 8th July (1876), and agreed upon a policy of "non-intervention in present circumstances." This decision was pretty much the result of their own counsels. Things were now approaching such an acute crisis that Bismarck deemed it best to leave the two Powers chiefly interested to their own discretion. From the very first, Germany had not taken the initiative in any of their common acts of Eastern policy, and now her rôle became more passive than ever. The thoroughgoing European Concert having broken down, Bismarck's primary object was to preserve intact Germany's relations of friendship to the other two Empires, and the task was one of exceeding delicacy. For while the interests of Russia and Austria in the East were very deep, they also began at a certain point to be divergent; and it concerned Germany, who wished to remain on good terms with both her neighbours, to avoid the alternative
of espousing the cause of one or the other. But the international process of reduction had been rapidly going on. The appearance of a European Concert had already shrunk to the semblance of active accord between Russia and Austria, but events were rapidly tending to carry these two Powers also along different paths.

When the Czar and Francis Joseph had agreed to observe a policy of "non-intervention in present circumstances," this only meant that they would meanwhile allow the war between Turkey and her revolted provinces and vassals to take its own course. If the rebels should triumph, good and well; if they might then dictate their own conditions. If not, then Russia and Austria would interpose to shield them from the effects of defeat. But, after all, the "non-intervention" of Russia was only nominal; yet in spite of the unofficial aid she lent to Servia in the shape of men, money and advice, it soon became evident that the Servians had prematurely drawn the sword. With the Montenegrins they invoked the mediation of the Powers, between whom and the Porte there now began a series of negotiations which ended in their proposing an armistice of six weeks. "Six weeks?" replied the Turks (12th October): "No, we cannot agree to that; but, as the winter is coming on, we will accept an armistice of six months, on condition of your engaging meanwhile to prevent the further influx of men and munitions (from Russia) into our Danube provinces." Both by Russia and Servia this was regarded as a mere device on the
part of the Turks for gaining time, and their proposal was rejected both by the Czar and by Prince Milan.

The mediatorial offices of the Powers in favour of peace had come to nothing, and a horrible prospect of war, chaos, and European peril was again opened up. Great was the disappointment in England, where very hard words were applied to Russia for having rejected the Turkish proposal—to Russia, who was more than suspected of making her philanthropic zeal for the Christian subjects of the Sultan a mere cloak to hide her sinister designs of long cherished conquest. The English Government had begged the intervention of Germany to induce the Czar to accept the six months' armistice; but Bismarck had declined to interfere, on the plea that he did not feel justified in seeking to influence the decisions of other Powers.* His attitude, indeed, was one of strict non-intervention; yet, while

*Bismarck refuses the request of England to intervene.

* Wrote Lord Derby to Lord A. Loftus, 30th October, 1876: “Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government thought it right to make an appeal to that of Germany, which had hitherto remained uncommitted to either view. I accordingly requested the German Ambassador to lay the matter before the Cabinet of Berlin, and to inquire whether they saw an opportunity of exerting their influence to procure the acceptance of some compromise which might avert the danger, now to all appearance imminent, of an open rupture between Turkey and Russia. On the 19th instant his Excellency communicated to me Prince Bismarck's reply, which was to the effect that although an armistice of six months appeared to the German Government acceptable, and they would have wished Russia to accept it, they did not think that, taking into account the position they had held till then, they would be justified in exercising a pressure on the resolutions of other Powers. Prince Bismarck suggested, however, that perhaps an armistice of six weeks might offer some chance of a solution.”
striving to be perfectly neutral, he could scarcely be said to be equally impartial.

"One plain word from Bismarck," wrote The Times, "would stop Russia, even on the brink of the abyss into which a very little more pressure would make her plunge. Let him only say that Germany will not permit Russia to plant herself on the Danube, and the Czar will find some means, in the vast resources of his despotic power, to stop the rush of Slavonic enthusiasm which is carrying him and the whole world to war. Let Prince Bismarck only speak, and there will be an end of Russian resolutions to occupy Bulgaria. . . . If Prince Bismarck will only keep the sword of Russia in its sheath, England and Germany could then powerfully help each other in imposing the necessary terms on the Porte. . . . Prince Bismarck's political genius has given him an influence inferior only to that which Napoleon exercised on the morrow of Austerlitz and Jena. . . . By a single word he may save Europe from calamities, compared with which those of all his own wars would seem slight; and his responsibility is as vast as his power."

To this flattering appeal, which proved how profound in England was the belief in Bismarck's power, the Chancellor's personal organ* replied in anything but gracious terms. "In his foreign policy," it wrote, "Prince Bismarck is accustomed to take into account the inmost feelings of the German people, who, remembering the attitude of England and the English to Germany, in 1870 and subsequently, do not advocate an alliance with England against Russia. The German people are animated with anything but sentiments that could encourage their

* The North German Gazette, which unquestionably received its inspiration direct from the Chancellor himself.
Government to pluck the chesnuts out of the fire for England."

Russia might do anything she liked in the East to all appearance, for aught that Bismarck cared. Unmoved, but yet not unamused, he listened to Mr. Gladstone's ferocious fulminations against the "unspeakable Turk" of Carlyle; he smiled at the grave suggestion of the historian of Frederick the Great, that the three Powers mainly interested in the "bag and baggage" policy—England, Russia, and Austria—should submit their claims of inheritance to himself, "as a magnanimous, noble, and deep-seeing man, with no national aims or interests in the matter."* Nothing could induce the German Chancellor to assume the rôle of dictator, arbitrator, or meddler. "I shall not," he said, "advise our participation in the (seemingly inevitable) war, as long as no German interest shall be called in question that may be considered worth the healthy bones of a Pomeranian musketeer."† This phrase, which has now become historical, was only the complement of what the Emperor had said when opening the Reichstag a few weeks previously. "Germany," declared His Majesty, "may rest assured, that the blood of her sons will only be shed to protect her own honour and her own interests." "If war should supervene," further remarked the Chancellor,‡ "Russia and Turkey

† Reichstag, 6th December, 1876.
‡ At a parliamentary dinner, December 1.
will get tired of it in time, and Germany will then be more likely to mediate successfully than she is now. It would be inexpedient to give Russia advice just at present. Such a step would put the Russian nation out of temper, which would be more prejudicial to us than a passing difference with any Government."

Russia, indeed, was in no mood for taking advice from any one, her impatient hand being already on her sword-hilt. Having, as we have seen, with the assent of the Czar, rejected the Turkish proposal for an armistice of six months, Servia again renewed the combat with redoubled fury; but in less than a fortnight she lay crushed and bleeding at the point of the Ottoman sword. And then the Czar could no longer resist the pressure of the Pan-Slavonic stream. "Grant an immediate armistice for two months all along the line," General Ignatieff was commanded to tell the Sultan, "or to-morrow I shall quit Constantinople." It is needless to say that this ultimatum had the due effect on the Porte. The required armistice was agreed to (1st November), and within a fortnight of this date all the Powers had accepted the proposal of England to meet in Conference at Constantinople, with a view to determine the conditions on which the revolted subjects of the Sultan might be asked to make peace with their Sovereign.

Bismarck was well aware that, should the Conference prove fruitless, "Russia would at once proceed on her own account to obtain by force that which the Porte refuses
to concede peaceably." * The Czar’s assurance to his nobles at Moscow that he was “firmly resolved, if necessary, to act independently”—following close upon the bellicose remarks of Lord Beaconsfield at the Guildhall (9th November) †—could leave the German Chancellor in no doubt on this head. But none the less on this account did he believe in the “honour and disinterestedness of the Czar,” and he repelled the insinuation that Russia, “in secret reality, aimed at the conquest of new provinces with the connivance of Germany.”

“For,” he said, “we have the Emperor Alexander’s solemn assurance that he will refrain from conquest and annexation. Russia only asks for our co-operation in a peaceable Conference, with an object which is ours as well as hers. . . . But even if war should break out (in consequence of the failure of that Conference) Russia asks nothing from us but neutrality, which it is our interest to observe.” ‡

On his way to the Conference at Constantinople, Lord Salisbury passed through Berlin and had an interview with Bismarck, but we have already conveyed the substance of what he said to the noble Marquis.§ The German

* Reichstag, 6th December.
† It afterwards appeared that there was no connection of cause and effect between Lord Beaconsfield’s speech and the Czar’s address.
‡ Reichstag, 6th December.
§ Lord Odo Russell wrote to the Earl of Derby, 25th November, 1876: “Lord Salisbury’s reception by the German Court and Government was most cordial, and everything was done to show that his visit was welcome and gave pleasure. The Emperor has expressed his high appreciation of the motives which actuated her Majesty’s Government in authorising Lord Salisbury’s mission to Berlin, and of the language held by his Lord-
The representative at the Conference was instructed "to make common cause with his colleagues, and, in the event of the Porte persisting in its refusal of their common demands, to leave Constantinople with the other Ambassadors." It is needless to record how these instructions were carried out to the letter; to describe how the Porte, by the promulgation of a sham Constitution and other farcical devices, attempted to throw dust in the eyes of the Powers; or to detail how the Conference, which met on the 23rd December, came to a futile close on the 20th January, from the obstinate refusal of the Porte to grant the administrative reforms deemed essential by Europe for the pacification of the Ottoman Empire. Nor is it necessary to enumerate the final efforts that were made in favour of peace. Suffice it to say that the impending avalanche could no longer be arrested, and that, on the 24th April, 1877, Russia declared war against Turkey from motives which the Czar declared to be disinterested, and in the sincerity of which the German Chancellor publicly avowed his belief.

War in the East broke out; but a few weeks before it was declared, the fears of Europe that peace could not be preserved were aggravated by the announce-

ship at the audience of the 23rd instant. In like manner, Prince Bismarck has acknowledged the value and importance of the Marquis's visit in the warmest terms, and has in conversation with leading men paid the highest tribute to his Lordship's great qualities as a statesman and as a negotiator." Lord Salisbury's own account of his interview with Bismarck, if he wrote any to his Government, was not published with other correspondence relative to the Eastern Question presented to Parliament.

* Official Gazette of Berlin (15th January, 1877).
ment that Bismarck had asked leave of the Emperor to resign. In a subsequent chapter we shall have occasion to refer to this "Chancellor crisis," and to show that, apart from considerations of health, it was more connected with the domestic than with the foreign affairs of the Empire. We shall also have to record how the Emperor opposed another emphatic "Never!" to the request of his wearied and worried Chancellor, and how the latter was granted a long respite from the domestic cares of his office, on condition of his still controlling the foreign policy of the nation. For with one accord his alarmed countrymen had cried aloud that their Chancellor, indispensable to them at any time, was now more than ever necessary to shield them from the approaching war-storms; and even the Press of Europe, headed by The Times, declared that "if, in spite of protocols, war should still break out in the South-East, Prince Bismarck must at once return to the helm of State." This was a flattering tribute to his power and wisdom, but the Prince was tendered a still higher recognition of his power. For, if we are to believe those claiming to be well-informed, no less a personage than Queen Victoria herself had twice—but unavailingly—appealed to the Chancellor direct on behalf of peace, before finally invoking the Emperor to forbid Russia from drawing the sword.* We have reasons for doubting the truth of

* Writes Dr. Busch in his "Our Chancellor (English Translation)," Vol. II., p. 126: "In April, when Bismarck had asked his Majesty's leave to retire from office, the Czas (a Polish journal generally kept well informed upon occurrences in Court circles and high society by its patrons
this surprising statement; but, in any case, nothing could induce the German Chancellor to "pluck the English chestnuts out of the fire," by an act which might have revealed a fatal discrepancy between his wisdom and his power. For supposing Russia had refused to obey his "sic volo, sic jubeo," what then?

The war went on, and Bismarck, though attentive to its course, remained perfectly mute till it was over—mute to the public ear, but yet not dumb to the diplomatists of Europe, who dogged his steps to the various watering-places where he spent the greater part of the summer, and made his holiday a mockery. To Kissingen (25th May–30th June), to Berlin, to Varzin (7th July–20th August), to Gastein (23rd August–18th September), and to Salzburg (19th–20th September) he was followed by ministers and ambassadors, all eager to consult the great European oracle; and the oracle spoke with true Dodonian mystery. But to Count Andrassy he may have delivered himself in less ambiguous wise. The

the Radziwills, Czartoryskis, &c.) announced that Queen Victoria, a short time previously, had written direct to Bismarck, urging him to protest against an attack upon Turkey by Russia, and had received an evasive answer; that her Britannic Majesty, thereupon, had addressed a second letter to the Chancellor, on the same subject, couched in still more pressing terms, to which a more definite reply had been returned. This reply not proving satisfactory to the Queen, she had then (according to the Polish journal written to the Emperor, holding him and Germany responsible for the coming war). "We have reason to believe," writes Dr Busch, "in the trustworthiness of the above report." We, on the other hand, have every reason to believe that these alleged letters of Queen Victoria are not on record in the German Foreign Office.
Austrian Minister-President conferred with the German Chancellor at Salzburg in September; and the result of their interviews was semi-officially stated to be "complete agreement of views on all current questions."

Austria had begun to be somewhat fidgetty about the course of the campaign, having interests at stake on the Balkan peninsula which she could not endure to see imperilled by Russian conquest; and it was quite possible that events might compel her to repeat the military policy she had pursued at the time of the Crimean war. What, in such a case, would have been the attitude of Germany, can only be conjectured from what Bismarck is reported to have once remarked, in later years, to Prince Gortchakoff: "Do not compel me," he said, "to choose between you and Austria." When the war began, the relations between the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and Berlin were all that could be desired, as was evidenced, among other things, by the fact that Germany readily undertook to look after the interests of Russian subjects in Turkey during the hostilities;* and yet, before their outbreak, Bismarck had remarked that, "should Austria be compelled to fight in defence of her territory, it would devolve upon Germany to take her part, and, indeed, to stand up for the map of Europe as then defined."

* Lord Odo Russell to the Earl of Derby (April 21, 1877):—"The Russian Government have asked the German Government to undertake the protection of Russian subjects in Turkey during the war, to which the German Government have agreed."
On went the war in its varying course, which Bismarck followed with the critical glance of a soldier, as well as with the vigilant eye of a diplomatist.

"If I were the Czar," he remarked in October, when the fortunes of arms seemed to be against the Russians, "If I were the Czar, I would lead my troops back to the left bank of the Danube, and there remain for the winter. I would, however, at the same time issue a manifesto to the Powers declaring that, if necessary, I was prepared to continue the war for seven years, even if I should be reduced to carry it on with peasants armed with dungforks and flails. I would then begin next spring by taking a few of the large fortresses on the Danube, and gradually work my way further."*

But to these extremities the Czar was not forced. For, thanks to the genius of a man of Bismarck's own race, and strikingly similar to him even in many of his personal qualities, thanks to Teutonic Tod-leben—Plevna at last fell. Plevna fell, the Balkans were crossed, all Turkish resistance was finally crushed, both in Europe and Asia; the Peace-Preliminaries of Adrianople were signed; the Cossacks shouted to behold at last the sparkling minarets of Stamboul; the English fleet, with the speed of alarm, shot up to the Dardanelles; and all Europe held its breath as expecting forthwith to see a fresh conflict, which Bismarck had once remarked would be as absurd and impossible as "an encounter between an elephant and a whale." The Bear actually had its paw on the coveted booty by the Golden Horn, but it was deterred

* Dr. Busch, "Neue Tagebuchsblätter."
from hugging its prey by the threatening attitude of the Lion; and it was in the midst of the excitement produced by this tableau vivant, that the results of the war were embodied in the Treaty of San Stefano (3rd March). In preparing this raw material, General Ignatieff had allowed a most ample margin for future trimming into shape, being well aware, as he was by this time, that Europe claimed to share with Russia the work of cutting into a final coat this diplomatic cloth of hers.

Acting as the mouthpiece, more than the mandatory of Europe, Bismarck had publicly proclaimed its expectation in this respect a few days before the signature of the San Stefano Treaty. One main cause of the excitement and suspense which then prevailed throughout Europe, but especially in England, was uncertainty as to how far the Oriental policy of Germany, the admitted arbitress of the Continent, might not have been modified by the results of the war; and it was to dispel the disquieting effect of this long silence, that Bismarck at last consented to reply to an interpellation on the subject of the Eastern Question in the Imperial Parliament.* It is not too much to say that the eyes of all Europe were, on that 19th of February, directed towards Berlin. No utterances of the Chancellor ever

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* The Chancellor said: "I cannot deny that, at first sight of the interpellation, I doubted whether I could answer it all, because, properly speaking, I have not much to say that has not already been made publicly known, especially through the proceedings of the British Parliament. If I nevertheless reply, it is because the public might otherwise conclude that I had much to conceal, and such an impression would have a disquieting effect."
attracted so much attention abroad, where they were looked forward to with the anxious impatience of a criminal awaiting his doom, or of wranglers assembled to hear the reading forth of an honour-list. Telegraphed in extenso to most European capitals, his speech was studied, conned, and commented on from every point of view; but its general effect was tranquillising, and its essence was conveyed in the famous avowal that, without abandoning the attitude of strict neutrality which he had hitherto observed, the Chancellor would now offer his services to the Powers as an "honest broker,"* or middleman, in the cause of peace.

Germany's attitude during the war had been strictly neutral, but yet her efforts to spare the sensibility of Russia had sometimes almost amounted to passive support of the policy of that Power. When it was alleged, for example, that acts of barbarity had been perpetrated by Turkish troops on wounded Russian soldiers and prisoners, the German Government addressed a communication to the Porte, reminding it of the Geneva Convention, to which it was a party;† but yet the German Emperor had previously declined to convey to the Czar a message from the Sultan entreating His Russian Majesty "to put an end to the shocking cruelties committed by his troops upon the inoffensive Mussulman population of the country which he had invaded."‡ Again, Bismarck,

* "Ehrlicher Makler."
† Lord Odo Russell to Earl Derby, 24th August, 1878.
‡ Same to same, 4th August; vide Blue Books on Eastern Question.
as we have seen, had refused to bring pressure on
Russia to accept the six months' armistice between
Servia and Turkey, as proposed by the latter; he had
likewise—when the Russian war was in progress—
decided to dissuade Servia from again taking the
field; * and when, after the Balkans had been crossed,
the Sultan entreated the good offices of the Powers
for the restoration of peace, the negative attitude of the
German Government rendered joint mediation imprac-
ticable.†

But now that peace-preliminaries had been signed,
and that there was prospect of a Congress of the Powers
—to adjust the results of the war in harmony with the
general interests of Europe, Bismarck came
forward as the “honest broker, who really
wants to do effective business.” Apart
from the commercial freedom of the Dardanelles, and a
humanitarian solicitude for the lot of the Christians in
Turkey, Germany, he said, had no material interest in
the Eastern Question, except, indeed, her interest in
preventing the outbreak of a general quarrel over the
distribution of the spoil, which Russia might provoke by
replying to Europe with a “beati possidentes!” But
he would not imitate the “Napoleonic course of setting up
as the schoolmaster, if not the arbiter of Europe.” All
he aimed at was to play the peace-maker between dis-
sentient Powers at the proposed Congress; and the only
condition he attached to his acceptance of this proposal

* Lord Odo Russell to Lord Derby, 31st August.
† Lord Derby to Mr. Layard, 24th December.
was that, if the Congress met on German soil, it must by courtesy have a German President.

Austria had taken the initiative in the matter of this Congress (7th March), which she proposed should be held in Berlin; and Bismarck replied that he would at once issue invitations to it, as soon as Count Andrássy could assure him of the certainty of its being accepted by all the Powers. But it was nearly three months before the Chancellor received this assurance, the interval being consumed—and how the telegraph worked all the time between the capitals of Europe!—in the settlement of preliminary questions of detail, with which we need not concern ourselves. Invitations were finally issued on the 3rd June, and, on the 13th of the same month, there met at Berlin the representatives of the "Powers who had signed the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, to discuss the preliminary Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and Turkey."*

The Congress sat exactly a month (13th June to 13th July), and these were golden days in the calendar of German history. Since the Congress of Vienna, there had been no such momentous gathering of statesmen; and the fact that

* From the German invitation. The Congress was composed of the following plenipotentiaries:—For Great Britain: The Earl of Beaconsfield, the Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Odo Russell; for Germany: Prince Bismarck, Herr von Bülow, Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst; for Austria-Hungary: Count Andrássy, Count Károlyi, Baron de Haymerle; for France: M. Waddington, Count de Saint-Vallier, M. Despréz; for Italy: Count Corti, Count de Launay; for Russia: Prince Gortchakov, Count Schouvaloff, M. d'Oubré; for Turkey: Alexander Caratheodory Pasha, Mehemed Ali Pasha, Sadoullah Bey.
they met in the German capital, under the presidency of the great Chancellor, was most flattering to the vanity of the nation. At the Conference of Paris (1856), Prussia had only been admitted to a sort of ante-chamber seat; and now, after little more than twenty years, her Prime Minister figured as the directing spirit of a council, on the deliberations of which the fate of Europe hung. Never had transformation so important and complete been accomplished in such a brief space. As a Foreign Minister, Bismarck had reached the climax of his popularity at home, and of his prestige abroad; but yet, as fate would have it, the inequality of success between his domestic and his foreign policy was just at this time indicated by the painful fact, that the Plenipotentiaries of Europe arrived in Berlin to find the Emperor himself lying stricken by the buckshot-pellets of a Socialist assassin.

His Majesty's condition cast a certain shadow over the Congress, but nevertheless the time was brilliant enough with its Court banquets, its ministerial receptions, its diplomatic dinners, its political conferences, and all the other incidents of the memorable occasion. The meeting of the three Emperors at Berlin (in the autumn of 1872) had been a dazzling enough event, but no immediate issues of peace and war depended on their deliberations; and the intercourse of the most powerful monarchs of the Continent did not excite half so much popular interest as the galaxy of European statesmen, of the first magnitude, which lent such a blinding lustre to the German firma-
ment for a whole exciting summer month. With what intense interest the public of two hemispheres followed the proceedings of the Congress, was evidenced by the presence in Berlin of a crowd of newspaper-correspondents from all parts of the world, who minutely conveyed to their readers all the incidents and external details of the momentous meeting: describing the arrangement of the horse-shoe table, in the Chancellor's own Palace, at which the Plenipotentiaries sat, and telling how Bismarck comported himself in private to his various foreign guests; how, for example, he treated Lord Beaconsfield with especial distinction, and afterwards marked his admiration of the British Premier by admitting his portrait to share, with those of the Emperor and his own wife, the honour of being the sole artistic ornaments of his study;* how, moreover, the Chancellor readily took a liking to French M. Waddington for his honest English qualities; how, on the other hand, he snubbed Mehemed Ali Pasha, though a German by birth, for his

* Shortly after the Berlin Congress, Lord Amphill—who told the story to the late Lord Torrington, from whom we had it—was conversing with Prince Bismarck on the character of the first English plenipotentiary, when the Chancellor pointed out that the only three works of art which adorned his room were portraits of his wife, the Emperor, and Lord Beaconsfield! And as a pendant to this interesting story, we may quote the following proof of the analogous admiration enjoyed abroad by Lord Beaconsfield's great English rival, from an account of an interview (in 1882) between General Ignatieff and Mr. Charles Marvin, given in the latter's "Russian Advance towards India" (p. 229): "'See there,' Ignatieff continued, pointing to a portrait in a prominent position on a wall, between the two windows overlooking the river Fontanka and the gloomy palace beyond, in which the Emperor Paul was strangled: 'that is Mr. Gladstone; I admire him very much. It is the only portrait of a foreign statesman that decorates my room.'"
renegade character and his vulgar manners; how he respected the Marquis of Salisbury, and found a congenial colleague in the polished Count Schouvaloff; how he flattered the gaudy yet solid hussar-statesman, Count Andrassy; how his attentions to Lord Beaconsfield were none the less sincere for their being doubtless meant at the same time to gall the jealous Prince Gortchakoff; and how, when the latter once called on Bismarck, the huge mastiff of the house, divining perhaps with the wonderful instinct of its race the secret feelings of its master, sprang at the rickety old Russian Chancellor and had to be held back from its prey.*

"As for the Treaty of San Stefano," said Bismarck to General Grant, who visited Berlin about this time, "I think the whole situation might thus be summed up: Russia has swallowed more than she can digest, and the Congress must try to give her relief."† In other words, the agreement between Russia and Turkey had to be harmonised with the general interests of Europe. That the Treaty of San Stefano had remodelled the map of Eastern Europe, to the detriment of these interests, was contended by all the Powers—and especially by Austria and England.‡ Austria could not reconcile herself to

* "Bismarck showed me" (Bayard Taylor, who had just arrived to take up his appointment in Berlin as United States Minister), "the room where the sessions of the Congress will be. I advised him to put Beaconsfield at one end of the long table and Gortchakoff at the other. He laughed and said, "Yes, I think I shall have to do that.""—Letter to Whitelaw Reid in "Life and Letters of Bayard Taylor."

† Quoted by the author of "Bismarck nach dem Kriege."

‡ In opening the Congress Bismarck said: "The stipulations of this
the proposed new state of things in Bosnia, while the new Bulgaria of Russia's creating was a stumbling-block to England, "as reducing Turkey to a level of absolute dependency upon the Power which has imposed this Treaty on her."*

But it was a hopeful sign that, when the Bulgarian question was under discussion, Prince Gortchakoff carefully absented himself from the sittings of the Congress—a sudden attack of political gout, aggravated by diplomatic indigestion due to the eating of strawberries, being his restraining ailment. "Russia," he said, on re-appearing in the Radziwill Palace, "Russia has brought hither laurels, and I hope that the Congress will convert them into olive-branches."† This process of transformation was facilitated by the energetic manner in which Lord Beaconsfield had acted on the maxim that "if you want peace, you must prepare for war"—as evidenced by the summoning of Indian troops to Malta, the calling out of the reserves, and the voting of the six millions. But the secret Schouvaloff-Salisbury agreement, concluded before the meeting of the Congress, was proof that England had taken more than military precautions to ensure its success.

Treaty are in several points of a nature to modify the state of things as fixed by former European Conventions, and it is for the purpose of submitting the work of San Stefano to the free discussion of the Cabinets, Signatories of the Treaties of 1856 and 1871, that we have assembled. Our object is to secure by common agreement, and on the basis of new guarantees, that peace of which Europe so much stands in need."

* The Marquis of Salisbury.
† Protocol VII., sitting of 26th June.
And yet Prince Bismarck’s task as “honest broker” was difficult enough. In the Congress he had the twofold office of President and Plenipotentiary, and each of these functions had to be exercised in a different manner—with delicacy in the one case, and firmness in the other. Of this latter quality, the Turks, perhaps, had most frequent cause to experience the effect. Thus, when the Ottoman representatives flatly opposed the proposal of England, which had been warmly supported by Germany, that Austria should be entrusted with the administrative occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they were sharply told by Bismarck that, unless they yielded on the point, they would have to submit to the Treaty of San Stefano pure and simple.* This dictatorial ultimatum was not quite consistent, perhaps, with his function as “honest broker;” but his activity in this character was conspicuously displayed in compounding the differences between England and Russia, which threatened to end in war. In spite of the Salisbury-Schouvaloff agreement, these two Powers could not come to terms about Bulgaria, and the story ran that the British Premier ordered a special train to take him back to England. Hearing of this Bismarck hastened, first to Beaconsfield, and then to Gortchakov—a result of his mediation being an understanding between the two choleric old statesmen.

But no sooner had the Bulgarian difficulty been settled, than the question of Batoum threatened to im-

* Despatch of Lord Salisbury, 28th June.
peril peace; and then Bismarck bethought him of how he could incline the ear of the English nation to listen to the counsels of wisdom. For the English nation seemed bent, at all risks, on wresting Batoum from the grasp of the greedy Muscovite, who might otherwise convert that port into another Sebastopol that would prove a standing menace to the commerce of the Black Sea. Sending, therefore, for a correspondent of The Times, Bismarck seriously explained to him that the yieldingness of Russia had its limits; that she had already made most important concessions to England; and that if, instead of meeting Russia in the spirit of conciliation, she chose to go to war with Russia on account of Batoum, she would have to fight her battles alone. The Chancellor had the satisfaction of seeing that this advice was taken in the spirit it was given, and that England contented herself with Russia’s promise to make of Batoum a free port.

These, then, were the chief incidents of the process by which Prince Gortchakoff’s laurels—albeit considerably shorn of their original luxuriance—had been converted into olive-branches; by which also Lord Beaconsfield was enabled to return to London as the boastful bearer of “peace with honour;” and by which the Treaty of San Stefano had been transformed into the Treaty of Berlin. That this unhoped for result had been accomplished within a month—the Congress of Vienna had sat for six—was admittedly due to the tact, the energy, and the firmness with which the German Chancellor had acquitted himself of
his functions as "honest broker."* "He has invariably aimed at securing and consolidating peace," said Count Andrassy, in proposing a vote of thanks to Bismarck in the final sitting of the Congress.

"He has devoted all his efforts to conciliating differences, and to putting an end, as quickly as possible, to the uncertainty which weighed so heavily upon Europe. Thanks to the wisdom, to the indefatigable energy with which our President has directed our labours, he has contributed in a high degree to the prompt success of the work of pacification which we have undertaken in common."

"The spirit of conciliation," said the Chancellor in reply,

"And the friendly feelings with which all the Plenipotentiaries have been animated, have facilitated for me a task which, in the present state of my health, I hardly hoped to be able to bring to a termination. Now that the Congress, to the satisfaction of the Governments represented, and of the whole of Europe, has attained to the hoped-for result, I beg of you to bear me in friendly remembrance. As for myself, the memorable period just elapsed can never be effaced from my memory. . . . . Gentlemen, at the moment of separating, I do not hesitate to affirm that the Congress has deserved well of Europe. If it has been found impossible to realise all the aspirations of public opinion, history will nevertheless do justice to our intentions, and to our work; and the Plenipotentiaries will have the consciousness of having, as far as was possible, given and secured to Europe the great benefit of peace, which was so gravely menaced. This result cannot be diminished by any criticism which the spirit of party may be able to inspire. I have the firm hope that the Euro-

* The character of the various Plenipotentiaries, and of the parts they played, was skilfully transferred to canvas by Professor Anton von Werner (the same who immortalised the Declaration of the Empire at Versailles). The artist received special sittings from the Plenipotentiaries, and his colossal painting—which represents the final sitting of the Congress—now adorns the banqueting-hall of the Rathhaus in Berlin.
pean understanding will, with the help of God, be lasting, and that the cordial personal relations which during our labours have been established between us will strengthen and consolidate good relations between our Governments."

This was a fine hope, but, alas! it was doomed to be incompletely realised. For it soon became painfully clear that the Congress of Berlin had anything but the effect of "strengthening and consolidating the good relations" between Russia and Germany. Quite the contrary, indeed. Between the Treaty of Berlin and the Treaty of San Stefano there was a certain family resemblance, but it was faint. The latter instrument had been treated by the Powers, in the opinion of Russia, like a captive who is sent back to his own camp by a barbarous enemy, with his nose and ears cut off. It was little wonder that Prince Gortchakoff described the Treaty of Berlin as the "darkest page in all his official career," and that he limped home under the influence of feelings which made Bottom say to Quince: "I see their knavery, this is to make an ass of me." If Russia had calculated that the results of the war would facilitate her future acquisition of the Balkan peninsula, she was grievously disappointed. For not only had an independent Roumania and a Bulgaria, the latter but a third of the size of the Russo-Slavonic State of the San Stefano Treaty, been interposed between her and the Sultan's territory; but to Austria also had been assigned a flank position on the Adriatic which dominated the strategic line of southward march to the Dardanelles,
and gave her priority of claim to inheritance of dominion south of the Danube. Not to mention minor curtailments of the Treaty of San Stefano, this copious pruning down of Gortchakoff's "laurels" was gall and bitterness to the Russian soul. Russia had made immense sacrifices, and now she had been thwarted of her full reward. Fierce was the vexation of the Bear at being thus obliged to drop its prey, while in the very act of hugging it. Its baiters were many, but the nearest and largest object within the circle of its view was Bismarck; and at Bismarck, therefore, the indiscriminating Bear now rushed with blindly furious force.

The Chauvinistic Press of Russia foamed at the mouth; the Panslavists were beside themselves. Aksakoff cried out that the Congress had planted a cap and bells on the crown of Russia, and given her a slap in the face to boot. Bismarck was denounced by the Golos and other journals as a traitor to the cause of Russia. "The 'honest broker' has betrayed us," they screamed in vengeful chorus. In vain was it pointed out by the semi-official organs of Berlin that, true to her attitude before and during the war, Germany had done everything she could at the Congress, consistent with her primary duty to Austria, to favour the interests of Russia; that in all the chief points of dispute with the West—Batoum, the Bulgarian frontier, Sofia, and the war indeminty—Bismarck had thrown the weight of his influence into the Russian scale, and that he would even have supported other demands of hers, had he been asked to do
so; but that no one could expect Germany to be more Russian than Russia herself.

"Fie on such impudence and hypocrisy," returned the Journal de Saint Petersburg (organ of the Foreign Office); "Germany harms us whenever she can; she is raising her tariffs, and casting about to rob us of our Baltic provinces. Is this your gratitude for our neutrality in 1866 and 1870?" And even the mighty Czar himself is said to have written reproachfully to his Imperial uncle at Berlin: "Your Majesty's Chancellor has forgotten the promises of 1870." "Constantinople must be conquered in Berlin," "the road to Constantinople leads through Berlin and Vienna," "next time the solution of the Eastern Question must not be attempted on the distant banks of the Bosphorus or the Danube, the Thames or the Seine, but on the much nearer Spree;"—such were the prospects with which Prince Gorchakov's journal sought to console him for the "blackest page in his official career."

The Russian Chancellor felt that his fame had been overshadowed by the greatness of the man whom he had patronisingly initiated in the art of diplomacy more than twenty years ago at Frankfort. "Does Herr von Bismarck still call himself my pupil?"

Prince Gorchakov was wont to inquire on coming to Berlin. "All I can say is that, if ever I was his teacher, it was only in the sense that Perugino was the teacher of Raphael." This was the bitter truth. It may be remembered how deeply mortified was Bismarck with the melodramatic way
in which Gortchakoff had posed before a grateful Europe as the beneficent Cloud-Compeller, in the spring of 1875. The latter had taken credit to himself for allaying the "war-scare" then; and now, in turn, he had to submit to the conditions on which the "honest broker" had maintained the European peace. The two Chancellors were quits; and yet Prince Gortchakoff returned to St. Petersburg with a deep personal grudge against his colleague at Berlin.

How far this animosity was well-founded, we have no materials for judging; nor are we able to determine to what degree the Government of the Czar had well-founded reasons for resentment against the Government of the Emperor William. One thing certain is this, that the services of Russia to the national cause of Germany—in 1866 and 1870—entitled the former to look for a substantial return of the favours which she had repeatedly conferred on her Teutonic neighbour; but whether Germany absolved herself to the full of this debt of gratitude at the Congress of Berlin, is a question on which two sides must naturally be heard. We know what the Czar's Government thought on the subject, and we also know that to the political exasperation of Russia with the friend who, in her eyes, had betrayed her, there was added the personal rage of her Chancellor at deeming himself to have been duped by the German rival of his fame and power. It was, then, from the combined operation of these two causes that the Czar fell away from the Triple Alliance, that the relations
between St. Petersburg and Berlin became cooler and cooler, and that an actual conflict between Germany and Russia grew to be one of the grave and imminent dangers of the time.

A newspaper-war had broken out between the two countries, and this was soon followed by a war of tariffs. The "Russification" of the Baltic provinces was proceeded with in a manner which the Germans construed as a direct provocation to themselves. Gortchakoff, Milutin, and Ignatieff formed the Panslavistic triumvirate from which the whole nation drew the fuel of its anti-German fury, and which made it impossible for Occidentalists like Count Schouvaloff, the Ambassador at London, to remain any longer at their posts. Prince Gortchakoff himself, in the summer of 1877, passed through Berlin without even leaving his card on Bismarck; and when he got to Baden, he hastened to pour out his pent-up feelings to a representative of the Orleanist Solar. "I am deeply fond of France," said the old Chancellor; "indeed, I think I have given convincing proof of this attachment in recent years. I hold it to be an interest of the first order that France should take the position in Europe that is due to her. The degradation of France would be a crime against civilisation." That, moreover, this marked predilection for the hereditary foe of Germany was not confined to Prince Gortchakoff, appeared from the fact that several Grand Dukes passed a large portion of this same summer at Paris, in ostentatious intercourse with French statesmen. France had long been looking
for an anti-German alliance, and now the offer of one with Russia seemed to have suddenly fallen upon her as from the clouds. And, to crown all these ominous symptoms of an impending conflict, the truth gradually broke on the General Staff at Berlin, that the Russian army, which had been vastly increased, was being massed in menacing positions over against the German frontier.

With vigilant eye Bismarck had been watching all these signs of a coming storm; and, deeming that it might soon burst, he made haste, as usual, to house his flock. That Russia had actually made formal offers of alliance to France was at once denied by M. Waddington, whose word no one dared to doubt; but Cabinets in France come and go like the leaves of autumn,* and Bismarck was well aware that a week or two only might suffice to elevate to power a Ministry wholly imbued with the revenge policy of M. Gambetta, and eager to grasp the proffered hand of Russian wooers. Germany would

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* In proof whereof take the following notice:—Jules Favre was Premier from September, 1870, to September, 1871; Dufaure from September, 1871, to May, 1873; the Duc de Broglie from May, 1873, to May, 1874; General de Cissey from May, 1874, to March, 1875; M. Buffet from March, 1875, up to March, 1876; M. Dufaure from March to December, 1876; M. Jules Simon from December, 1876, to May, 1877; the Duc de Broglie from May to November, 1877; General de Rochefoucault from November to December, 1877; M. Dufaure from December, 1877, to February, 1879; M. Waddington from February to December, 1879; M. de Freycinet from December, 1879, to September, 1880; M. Ferry from September, 1880, to November, 1881; Gambetta from November, 1881, to January, 1882; M. de Freycinet from January to July, 1882; M. Duclère from July, 1882, to January, 1883; M. Fallières from January to February, 1883; and M. Ferry from February, 1883, to March, 1885.
thus be exposed to simultaneous attack from two sides, and it was to obviate this serious danger that Bismarck hurried to Vienna. "Do not compel me to choose between you and Austria," the German Chancellor had said to Gortchakoff at the Congress, but the latter had spurned this counsel. The Triple Alliance had been exploded by the Russo-Turkish war, and a Dual Alliance must now take its place as the bulwark of European peace.

Bismarck hurried to Vienna, and he could not doubt that his advances would be well received. Austria, at any rate, had every reason to be grateful to Germany for the support she received from the latter Power at the Congress of Berlin; and, indeed, she had already manifested her gratitude in a most substantial manner, in consenting to the abrogation of the famous fifth article of the Treaty of Prague (1866). By this article, which was the work, it will be remembered, of Napoleon, "the champion of oppressed nationalities," it was stipulated between Austria and Prussia that opportunity should be given to the Danish inhabitants of North Schleswig to signify their free will as to whether they were content to remain under the yoke of their Prussian conquerors, or whether they would rather return to dwell with their own kinsfolk and be ruled, as before, by the Government of Copenhagen. For which of these alternatives the North Schleswigers, being mostly men of Danish race and speech, would decide, if allowed to exercise the right of plébiscite reserved to them by the Treaty of Prague, there
never could have been any manner of doubt. They had repeatedly sent to Berlin petitions—one of them (in 1869) with 28,000 signatures—praying that the enjoyment of this right should no longer be withheld from them; they had even, in 1877, brought forward a motion in the Imperial Parliament to the same effect, and they had otherwise shown marked signs of a preference for Danish rule.

But all this only strengthened the resolution of Bismarck to detain them within the Prussian fold; and, indeed, there is every reason to believe that, in admitting the fifth article into the Treaty of Prague, he was much less influenced by an honest feeling for "oppressed nationalities," than by a desire to appease their meddling champion Napoleon by a hollow concession. But Napoleon, being now dead and buried, could no longer stand up for the faithful performance of an agreement of which he was the author; and the only one with which Bismarck had to reckon was Francis Joseph, the other party to the Treaty. Austria had no material interest to serve by the execution of the fifth article, and what was the wrong that would accrue to the North Schleswigers by her throwing it overboard, compared with the favour she could thus confer on Prussia? The article in question had long stood in Bismarck's way, and it was part of his settled policy to get rid of it. After twelve years of waiting his opportunity at last came, and a promise from Count Andrassy to abandon it was probably part of the price stipulated for the support of Germany to the Eastern policy of Austria. At any
rate, it was annulled by mutual agreement soon after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin (11th October, 1878); and its abrogation was no less a hint to the anti-Prussian demonstrations of the Guelphs and Danes, who about this time had grown unduly bold and hopeful over the betrothal of the Duke of Cumberland to the Princess Thyra of Denmark, than it was also a convincing proof that Austria had now at last buried the war-hatchet of 1866, and completed her reconciliation to new-born Germany.

It was under the firm assurance of this great fact that Bismarck, in the autumn of 1879, hastened to Vienna to repair the bulwark of European peace which had been breached by the breaking up of the Triple Alliance, and which was further threatened by the grave probability of a Franco-Russian compact. But before going to Vienna he had felt his way at Gastein, where he conferred much with Count Andrassy; and by the time he arrived in the ancient Kaiserstadt (21st September), the success of his mission was virtually assured. "From the Emperor and his chief advisers," writes one of his native biographers,*

"down to the crowds that lined the streets and thronged the approaches to his hôtel, one and all displayed the greatest eagerness to honour and gladden their renowned guest by demonstrations of sympathy. In order to receive him in person, Francis Joseph had interrupted his shooting arrangements in Styria. His Majesty sent a special aide-de-camp to meet and welcome him at the station; he returned his visit immediately, and at the diplomatic

* Dr. Busch: "Our Chancellor"
dinner he gave at his castle of Schönbrunn, in honour of the German Chancellor, he advanced to the threshold of the drawing-room when Bismarck was announced, to greet his illustrious visitor—distinctions which constituted striking exceptions to the rules of that strict Spanish etiquette which regulates existence at the Court of Vienna."

And all this only thirteen short years after Königgrätz! "The chronicle of that time," says another initiated writer,*

"details all the festivities given in honour of the German Chancellor at Vienna; but, on the other hand, we hear very little of all the mental labour which went on under that buoyant surface; ... and yet in truth we were then passing through the greatest State crisis which we have experienced since 1866."

But this crisis did not last long—only four days—during which Bismarck was frequently closeted with Francis Joseph, as well as with Count Andrassy and his successor-designate, Baron Haymerle; † and on the 26th September he was back again in Berlin. Nevertheless the hardest part of his task still remained, and that was to procure the Emperor's assent to the agreement he had brought back with him from Vienna. But had he not gone to Vienna, by special command of the Emperor, to conclude this agreement? Well, this is a point which is far from clear, as, indeed, the genesis of the Austro-German Alliance is still wrapt in a certain amount

* "Zwanzig Jahre, 1862-1882; Rückblicke auf Fürst Bismarck's Wirksamkeit für das Deutsche Volk, von Ludwig Hahn (Berlin, 1882)."
† Baron Haymerle succeeded Count Andrassy on 8th October of the same year.
of mystery. But when everything on the subject becomes known, the historian will be in possession of materials that will enable him to throw a flood of light on the relations of the Emperor William to his Chancellor, and to adjudicate on the relative power and force of will of Master and Man.

What we do know is that, about a fortnight before the arrival of Bismarck in Vienna, the Emperor William had an interview with the Czar at the little Russian frontier-town of Alexandrovo, on the Berlin-Warsaw line. The German Emperor had in any case to pass near this point on his way to manoeuvre the first Army Corps at Königsberg; and a few days previously he had sent Marshal Manteuffel to Warsaw, where the Czar was likewise reviewing troops, to express his desire for a meeting with his Imperial nephew— with that nephew who had lately reproached his uncle for having allowed his Chancellor to forget the promises of 1870, and who stood at the head of a well-prepared army eager to be led against the treacherous Power which had robbed it, as it was taught to believe, of the fruits of its hard-won victories over the Turks. This meeting at Alexandrovo was sought by the Emperor William with the view of giving explanations calculated to pacify the Czar, and obviate the danger of a conflict between the two nations which was growing more and more imminent; but there is good reason to believe that, in making this pilgrimage of peace to Russia, His German Majesty acted in direct
opposition to the advice of his Chancellor.* Bismarck saw that, in the pass to which things had come, this Imperial meeting could only have a personal, not a political effect; and events soon proved him right. Nevertheless, the Emperor went to Alexandrovo, while his Chancellor soon thereafter hastened to Vienna.

It is hard to believe that he could have done this entirely on his own responsibility, and yet there can be no doubt that it cost him a hard struggle to obtain his master’s full assent to what he had done. On returning to Berlin he called a Cabinet Council, and explained the European situation as affected by the action of Russia; while Count Stolberg, the Vice-Chancellor, was despatched to Baden—where the Emperor was reposing—to procure His Majesty’s sanction to the Vienna agreement. Of that agreement this much subsequently became known, that it was in the nature of a Defensive Alliance which stipulated that in case one of the contracting parties should be simultaneously attacked by two or more Powers, the other should assist it by force of arms.† Thus, Germany would have the benefit of this agreement, if attacked at once by France and Russia; while Austria would be entitled to help from Germany, if assailed from two sides, say by Russia and Turkey, or by Russia and Italy.

But the Alliance, of course, had more especial appli-

* The Chancellor’s personal organ, the North German Gazette, said as much at least.

† See, however, foot-note, p. 155, post.
cation to Russia, and this was precisely the fact which
made the Emperor William reluctant to be a party to
it. For had he not but lately returned from embracing
the Czar at Alexandrovo; and what would
the Czar think, if his uncle thus early re-
corded his distrust of his nephew’s friendly
assurances? It is probable that these objections were
met by the argument that the Czar himself might be
very well-disposed to Germany, but that, as in the case of
the Turkish war, it might be again impossible for him
to resist the stream of anti-German fury, and that it
behoved Germany to provide for all emergencies. As
arguments of this kind were backed by a threat of
the Chancellor to resign if his alliance-plan were not
sanctioned, the Emperor—whose conference with Count
Stolberg had also been attended by the Crown Prince—at
last gave way, and—"nisi fata fallunt"—signed
(15th October) a Protocol which recorded the heads of
the Austro-German agreement.

All these things were done in secret, but the fact of
the new Alliance was soon made public by the Chan-
cellor’s semi-official prints; for it concerned both con-
tracting parties that Russia should thus get
wind of what had been accomplished, and
trim her sails accordingly. It was only
gradually that the altered situation dawi
on the German mind, but after it had
become quite clear, a loud chorus of praise and thanks
arose from the nation; and even in England the
Marquis of Salisbury hastened to acclaim the news "as
i 2
good tidings of great joy."* The Austro-German Alliance, which had thus been raised on the ruins of the *Drei-Kaiser-Bund*, was the great fact that now began to dominate the political dynamics of Europe. Henceforth no statesman could act without taking into account the circumstance that, on all questions of international moment, Germany and Austria were of one mind and one will. The policy of one of these States being a known quantity, the problem of how they would both act in a given emergency was easy of solution. In all matters connected with the Eastern question, Berlin took its cue from Vienna; while, on most other subjects, the initiative was conceded to Berlin. The Triple Alliance had been based on mere verbal assurances of mutual esteem and common interests; the understanding between Austria and Germany was reduced to writing. In the few days spent by Bismarck at Vienna, his long cherished wish had at last been realised. As if by magic touch of wizard's wand he had changed the whole European situation, and the new tableau displayed the two great Central Powers of Europe standing back to back—one of them looking towards France, and the other towards Russia, with "defence, not defiance" written on their shields. This thrilling transformation-scene was a masterpiece of statecraft, and both by Austrians and Germans it was clapped to the echo.

* Speaking at a Conservative meeting in Manchester on 17th October (1879), Lord Salisbury said, "To those who care for the peace of Europe and take an interest in the independence of nations, I would exclaim that this is 'good tidings of great joy.'"
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 117

England, too, had every reason to hail, with the Marquis of Salisbury, the new Alliance as "good tidings of great joy," seeing that it constituted a barrier to Russian aggression in the direction of the Golden Horn; but still there were voices in England which raised their blatant notes of discord, to the sore detriment of that country, as afterwards turned out. That he who sows the whirlwind shall reap the storm, was never better exemplified than by the consequences of the fit of madness under which Mr. Gladstone swept through Midlothian like a destroying angel—breathing out threatenings and slaughter, among his other ravings, against astounded Austria. Nothing could better have illustrated the strength of the new-sealed friendship between the two Central Powers of Europe, than the fact that the Germans resented the "hands off!" shrieking of the Liberal Premier to the Austrians every bit as much as the Austrians themselves; nor did the apology tendered to the Austrian Emperor and his Ambassador, which was one of the first acts of Mr. Gladstone's reign, remove the feelings of enmity and distrust which had been created in the breast of Prince Bismarck and his countrymen by the vituperations of the Midlothian orator. In Berlin, that apology only had the effect of confirming the impression prevailing there, that the British people were ruled by a sophist instead of by a statesman, by an "unctuous hypocrite" instead of by a hero; and, justly or unjustly—for it is not for us, who chronicle simple facts, to determine which—Mr. Glad-
stone's Government continued henceforth to be suspected and disliked by the whole German people, including their Chancellor—which entailed sad and humiliating consequences for England in due course, as we shall still have occasion to see.

But, meanwhile, it is with the effect of the Austro-German Alliance on Russia that we are more immediately concerned. Backed, as the conclusion of that Alliance was on the part of Germany, by a plan for increasing her army (a plan carried out in the following year, 1880*), it soon acted in St. Petersburg like one of the Chancellor's "cold water-jets." It is true that some organs of the national Press grew more furious than ever, but they were straightway commanded by the Government, on pain of suspension, to observe greater moderation of tone in discussing international questions, especially the relations of the Empire to its neighbours. The barking dogs of Panslavism being thus whipped and whistled in to heel, while the military ardour of the nation found diverting vent in the work of conquering the Tekke-Turcomans, and in pushing the eastern boundaries of the Empire ever nearer the Anglo-Indian frontier, it only remained to re-establish the semblance of those cordial relations between the Courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin which had been destroyed by recent events.

It did not contribute very much to this result that, soon after the conclusion of the Austro-German

* See our Chapter on the Domestic Affairs of the Empire, p. 401, post.
Alliance, the Grand Duke Constantine passed through Berlin without calling on any one; but the bad effect of this demonstration was soon thereafter counteracted by the arrival of the Czarewitch (November, 1879) who, on his way home from Cannes, had spent a few days at Vienna, and now made a detour for the special purpose of paying his respects to the German Court. His example, too, was imitated, if reluctantly, by Prince Gorchakov, fresh from his interview with the French journalist at Baden; and all these external amenities were acknowledged in the spring of the following year (1880), when the Emperor William—in a missive that was countersigned by his Chancellor, and thus invested with political character—conveyed to the Czar a bouquet of compliments and congratulations on the occasion of his "jubilee of rule." *

But, alas! that rule was now doomed to be of short duration, and yet the events which curtailed it had the effect of lessening the estrangement between St. Petersburg and Berlin. However divergent might be the views of the two Governments on certain questions of foreign policy, there was one matter on which they were both agreed, and that was the subject of revolutionary anarchy, Nihilism, Socialism—whatever name it assumed. Recent attempts on the lives of both Emperors had convinced them that there was at least one path they could pursue in common; and the fact that, in the

* The 25th anniversary of his accession to the throne.
pursuit of this path, the Czar did not get all the practical sympathy he claimed from France, only tended to chill the interested affection of Russia for the Republic, and to make her return to her old love. Nothing did so much to dispel the German Chancellor's apprehensions of a Russo-French alliance as the refusal of the French Government (in the spring of 1880) to extradite Hartmann, the Nihilist, who was suspected of having planned the railway-plot against the Czar at Moscow (in December, 1879); and certainly the Chancellor was far from sorry at seeing the Russian Ambassador leave Paris for several months, in token of the Czar's displeasure at the disobliging way in which Hartmann had been denied him, and spirited across the English Channel into the stronghold of defiant freedom.

That Hartmann, if he had been laid hold of in Berlin, would not have been so considerately treated as he was in Paris, can scarcely be doubted when we consider that, when at last the Czar Alexander II. fell a victim to those who had already made five different attempts to take his life (13th March, 1881), Prince Bismarck, by command of the Emperor, immediately took steps for combining the European Powers in common action against political crimes and international anarchy. We have already had occasion to trace the progress of this endeavour, and to show that, one by one, the other Powers fell away and left Germany and Russia to concert their own measures on the basis of the original proposal,
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 121

which ultimately (January, 1885) found expression in the signature of an Extradition Agreement.* But we may now remark that it was this community of action between the two Empires—isolated, as they were, on this subject from the rest of Europe—which acted as a salve to the wounds inflicted on Russia at the Congress of Berlin, and gradually reconciled her to the belief that the Austro-German Agreement would best answer its purpose by serving as a basis for the reconstruction of the Triple Alliance.

That the new Czar, Alexander III., shared this belief, seemed to be all the more a proof of his sagacity and self-restraint, seeing that, as heir-apparent, he had always been credited with a deep aversion to everything German, and that the Panslavists had looked forward to his reign as to the seventh heaven of their hopes. What, then, was their disappointment to see that Alexander III. had not been many months on the throne before he sought and obtained an interview with the German Emperor at Dantzig (9th September, 1881). With the Emperor were the Crown Prince and Prince Bismarck; while the Czar was attended, among others, by M. de Giers, the successor-designate of Prince Gortchakov, who had now virtually resigned the management of affairs. If ever any poor mortal inherited a crown of thorns, it was surely Alexander III.; and there is reason to believe that, apart from the wish to make his peace with Germany, and thus dispose at least of one

* See ante, p. 19.
of his troubles, His Majesty more especially desired to take the advice of one of the wisest statesmen of the age on the domestic ills that might well have perturbed a more perspicacious and resolute soul than his.

That, at least, the conversation at the Dantzig meeting turned less on international relations than on European anarchy would appear from the following telegram, addressed by the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Kalnoky, to Baron Haymerle, his Chief at Vienna:—

"M. de Giers, whom I have just seen, is greatly pleased with the mutual impressions produced by the Dantzig interview. The Emperor Alexander has returned with an increased feeling of tranquillity and inner contentment. In particular, the wisdom and unexpected moderation of Prince Bismarck's language have made a good impression, no less on the Czar than on M. de Giers, and convinced them that in no direction has he anything but peaceful intentions. There being in reality no disquieting question of foreign policy to be dealt with, the conversation mainly turned on the means of combating the revolutionary danger, and here also Prince Bismarck recommended great caution and moderation in the matter of international measures. M. de Giers said the most important aspect of the Dantzig meeting was this, that the Czar had thus openly and unequivocally signified to all Russia his will to pursue a conservative and pacific policy."

That such, indeed, was the Czar's firm will could no longer be doubted when next year (April, 1882) he at last formally relieved Prince Gorchakov from his cares of office, and also accepted (in June) the resignation

* Happily for our biographical purposes this telegram, in the form in which it was sent by Baron Haymerle to Francis Joseph, found its way, by some singular act of indiscretion, into the Egyirteto—a journal appearing at Pesth.
of Count Ignatieff, who was the life and the hope of the anti-German war-party. Great was the jubilation in Germany at the removal of these two statesmen from the council-chamber of the Czar, but not greater than the joy which greeted the Imperial frown incurred by General Skobelev on account of his anti-German speeches. With the laurels of Geok Tepé still fresh upon his heroic brow, the great "White General" of the great "White Czar" had, like another Peter the Hermit bearing a fiery cross, swept across Europe preaching death and destruction to the hated Germans.

"We are not masters in our own house," he cried; "the foreigner is everywhere and everything in Russia, and from his baneful influence we can only be delivered by the sword. And shall I tell you the name of the intriguing intruder—it is the German. I repeat it, and entreat you never to forget it—the German is the enemy. A struggle is inevitable between the Teuton and the Slav; it cannot be long deferred. It will be long, sanguinary, and terrible, but I hold the faith that it will terminate in favour of the Slav."

Launched as they were at Paris, by such a man as one of the Czar's greatest warriors, these fulminations could not fail to excite uneasiness in Berlin; but this uneasiness was quickly dispelled when the Russian Ambassador disavowed all connection of his Government with the tirades of Skobelev; when the official Gazette of St. Peters burg likewise not only published a disclaimer,*

* In a note in the official Gazette it was declared "that private utterances by persons having no authority from their Government to make them can naturally have no influence upon the general course of our foreign policy, nor can they affect our good relations with neighbouring States,
PRINCE BISMARCK.

but forbade the future holding of all political speeches by military persons; and when Skobelev himself was ordered to return home at once and rejoin his Corps. Skobelev returned home as he was commanded, and soon thereafter all Europe was shocked to hear of his sudden death at Moscow.

The death of Skobelev (July, 1882) had been shortly preceded by that of Garibaldi (June), as it was followed, before the year was fairly out, by the decease of Gambetta; while the following spring (March, 1883) beheld Prince Gortchakoff pass away. And it was pointed out with a brutal and unseemly exultation by German writers that to only one of all these implacable foes of Germany—Garibaldi, to wit—was it given to die a worthy death. For, as the irony of fate would have it, the Teutophobe Skobelev succumbed to a riotous carnival of German courtesans; while Gortchakoff breathed his last (at Baden) in the arms of his German mistress; and Gambetta came by his end through the casual bullet of his paramour's revolver. But this mention of Gambetta reminds us that, having now traced the gradual restoration of cordial relations between the Governments (we will not say the peoples) of Germany and Russia as the almost inevitable effect of the Austro-German Alliance, we must now turn to consider the development of the Empire's relations to its Western neighbours, especially to France.

which are based not only upon ties of friendship existing between crowned heads and their clear perception of the interests of their people, but also upon the strict and mutual observance of existing treaties."
CHAPTER XI.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE (continued).

2. Isolation of France; Estrangement from England.

From the particular line of our narrative which followed the development of Germany's relations to her Western neighbour we turned aside in the spring of 1875, when the "war-scare," that seemed to prelude a rupture between the Empire and the Republic, had been allayed; and when thenceforth the attention of the two nations was concentrated, not so much on their own inter-relations, which gave rise to no very memorable incident, as on their respective attitudes to the Eastern Question—the all-absorbing material of European diplomacy for the next few years. We saw how close was the co-operation between the two Governments in pressing the Porte for reparation of the wrong done to their dignity by the murder of their agents at Salonica; and we likewise saw how the work of reconciliation, thus begun, was not interrupted by any collision of interests connected with the Russo-Turkish war, or by any grave divergence of opinion at the Congress.

And while this Congress of Diplomacy was promoting the cause of peace at Berlin, a Congress of Industry no less contributed to the same end at Paris. Nor was
it the fault of the French, if the Germans hung back from grasping the palm-branch now held out to them by their vanquished foes. After some hesitation, it is true, they did send some few meagre works of painting and sculpture to the International Exhibition (of 1878); but Bismarck would not hear of their taking part in the industrial competition at that great world-fair. The French Government pleaded hard, and even sent a special envoy, the Marquis d'Abzac, to urge its prayer; but the powers at Berlin were inexorable. It was pretended that, in thus refusing the earnest request of Marshal MacMahon, the Chancellor wished to revenge himself on the "French hatred of Germany, which had displayed such formidable proportions (in the Press) in the years 1876-7;" * but it is much more probable that the sagacious Prince wished to spare his countrymen—pending the salutary operation of his protective tariff—a repetition of the "cheap and nasty" verdict which had been pronounced on their products at Philadelphia two years before; † and that, suspecting an ambush on the part of the French palm-branch-bearers, he desired to save Germany from an "industrial Sedan."

But notwithstanding this slight jar in the harmony between Paris and Berlin, the concord between the two Governments continued to grow apace. For they were now allied with the other Powers in the pursuit of several common objects, and one of these objects was the strict

* "Our Chancellor," by Dr. Busch. † See p. 460, post.
execution of the Treaty of Berlin. On this Treaty the ink had long been dry, but yet several of its stipulations were still a dead letter; and it concerned the honour of the "honest broker" that the Porte, no less than Russia, should be kept to its engagements. Montenegro, in particular, had not yet (in the summer of 1880) been seised of the Albanian territory accorded to her by Turkey; while the Sultan was equally behindhand with his cession of the districts which the Powers "recommended" him to hand over to Greece. It is true that the Sultan's duty in the former case was based on a treaty-obligation, while in the latter it only reposed on the mere advice of his "friends." But France, who at Berlin had constituted herself champion of the Greeks, was as determined that this protocolled counsel should be acted on, as Germany was resolved to see treaty justice done to the Montenegrins; and, in the achievement of these two ends, France and Germany were all the more certain of energetic support from England, as the Beaconsfield Administration had by this time been succeeded by the Cabinet of Mr. Gladstone, the dearest wish of whose humanitarian heart was to see the European possessions of the "unspeakable Turk" parcelled out among the degenerate descendants of Homer, and the quasi-Homeric heroes of Czernagora.

Can it, therefore, be wondered at, that when the Porte, by no device of diplomacy whatsoever, could be brought to comply with the territorial claims of Montenegro, Mr. Gladstone should have solicited the Powers to join England in
sending a comminatory fleet of ironclads to the Albanian coast? Unwilling to destroy the semblance of the European Concert, Germany, too, at last consented to contribute her quota of guns to the coercive Armada; but neither Germany nor Austria was inclined to do more than point their threatening pistols at the reluctant Turk, or to fire with anything but blank cartridge, if they fired at all; while as to the blockading of Smyrna and the impounding of several Turkish islands in the Archipelago, Bismarck regarded these proposed measures as little else than the methods of a madman, who would infallibly, if allowed to have his own way, involve Europe in a general scramble for the exploded fragments of the Ottoman Empire. Germany joined the naval demonstration off Dulcigno, but without shooting her guns, like England and Russia; which was the more to be wondered at, as it was probably the first time in all the career of her Chancellor where the reality and the appearance of his intentions were not in perfect accord. But at the same time Bismarck took very good care that he should save himself from the shame of having been associated with entire fiasco; and there is every reason to believe that it was more owing to the urgent representations of Count Hatzfeldt at Constantinople, than to the menacing manoeuvres of the international fleet at Dulcigno, that the Sultan at last gave orders for the strict execution of the Treaty of Berlin with regard to Montenegro.

And so it was, too, with Greece. A Confer-
ence, * which sat at Berlin in the same summer (of 1880), had re-delimited the Græco-Turkish frontier in conformity with the "protocolled suggestions" of the Congress; but what was the use of that, when the Porte refused to act on the advice of this Conference—whose decision had been communicated to it in a Collective Note—and to cede some of the fairest portions of her Thessalian territory to Græcia Rapax? From seizing this fair and coveted territory during the happy opportunity when the Sultan was at death-grips with the Czar, the rapacious Greeks had been held back only by the assurance of the Powers, especially of France, that when the war was over their interests would be well looked after; but now that this promise had only been kept to the extent of the academic drawing of a new frontier-line, and of the advice which had been tendered by the Powers to the Porte—said advice being utterly disregarded—there arose a mighty stir in the arsenals of Greece, and a terrific sounding of war-like drums. But not by the bellicose beating of Hellenic drums, nor the raising of war-loans, nor the ostentatious purchase of Krupp cannon, could the Porte be coerced into complying with the demands of Greece; and it seemed as if the plains around Olympus were about to be wrapped in the flames of destructive and unequal conflict.

From this calamity, indeed, they were only saved by Bismarck's intimation to the Greeks that, if they

* Prince Hohenlohe, on behalf of Germany, presided over this Conference of Ambassadors and technical delegates.
chose to go to war with Turkey, they would have to bear the brunt and the consequences of battle alone. At the same time it was clear that, if the Turks would not yield, the disputants could not very much longer be kept asunder; and the Chancellor dreaded the dimensions which their struggle might at last assume. As for Germany (and with Germany, of course, was Austria), he would not hear of her combining with the other Powers to coerce Turkey, seeing that, in the case of Greece, he had not the same treaty-title to do so as in the matter of Montenegro; nor was his conscience quite so elastic as that of some Western statesmen, who had previously proclaimed that "the greatest triumph of our time . . . . would be the enthronement of the idea of Public Right, as the governing idea of European policy."* And thus the Concert of the Powers, with respect to a remedy for the ills of Greece, had to resolve itself into a kind of moral coercion which scarcely rose above the character of friendly persuasion. Nevertheless, after the disputants had refused to submit their quarrel to arbitration, this persuasion had ultimately weight enough with the Porte; and with the aid of another Conference at Constantinople in the spring of 1881, which drew mutual concessions from both the parties, the Græco-Turkish frontier difference was at last settled to the advantage of Pan-Hellenic aspirations. But it is not too much to say that the force which did most to break the will of

* Article by Mr. Gladstone on "Germany, France, and England," in the Edinburgh Review (1870).
the Sultan was the urgent advice of Bismarck, who by this time had achieved an ascendancy in the councils of the Porte comparable only to the influence once exercised by the Great Eltchi on the Golden Horn.*

This ascendancy was denoted by the marked preference which the Sultan now began to show for German officials of all kinds as the reorganising instruments of his army, his administration, and his finances; and by the numbers of his own subjects whom he sent to Germany to be instructed in the arts of making a country great. But, above all things, the Sultan had now come to the firm conviction that, of all his so-called "friends," Germany was the most sincere and the most disinterested, seeing that, of all the Powers, she was the only one who had neither enriched, nor sought to enrich, herself with disintegrating slices of his dominions. Russia had wrung from him a portion of Armenia, Austria was in possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, England had hoisted her standard on the island of Cyprus, Italy was

* The Telegraphos, one of the chief journals of Athens, wrote:—"In the last stage of our national question Prince Bismarck was the warmest advocate of Greece, and his voice has done most to bring about a pacific solution of the question. To his influence is mainly due the unreserved readiness of the Porte tocede to us the disputed territory." So, too, wrote the Neue Freie Presse, of Vienna: "In order to exercise influence over the Turks one must have patience with them. . . . The European statesmen who despised this maxim have always met with diplomatic failure at Constantinople—statesmen, for example, like Ignatieff and Gladstone. Prince Bismarck has been the first to solve the ethnopsychological problem, which lies concealed in the nature of the Oriental, by treating the Turks with indulgence and perseverance, and it is the merit of the German Chancellor that the frontier quarrel between Greece and Turkey will now to all appearance be peacefully settled."
casting longing eyes towards Tripolis, while in Tunis France was preparing to follow the example of all this unscrupulous land-grabbing.

But the wonder is that Bismarck should then have risked his enormous influence with the Sultan by encouraging France to appropriate Tunis. For encourage her—more or less directly—to do this, he certainly did. “Do what you like with Tunis,” said Lord Salisbury to M. Waddington at the Congress of Berlin, “England will raise no objections.” This was said with the view of consoling France for the acquisition of Cyprus by England, and from Berlin also M. Waddington carried away the conviction that Germany would in no way thwart the territorial ambition of France in Africa. For why should she? Was it not rather in the interest of Germany to conciliate her revengeful neighbour in every possible manner, to help restless France in finding a vent for her superfluous energies out of Europe, and to engage her in an enterprise that would divert her eyes from Cologne to Carthage? The integrity of the Turkish Empire was not a matter of indifference to Bismarck, but the integrity of the German Empire was still dearer to him; and if the occupation of Tunis by the French could in any degree tend to impede their recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, Bismarck was not the man—with all his disinterested friendship for the Sultan—to stand in the way of such a happy result.

From him, therefore, came no single word of protest or remonstrance when, in the spring of 1881, on the
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 133

pretext of restoring order on their Algerian frontier, the French marched an army into Tunis and compelled the Bey to sign a treaty of protectorate, which was virtually a treaty of cession. That the Bey was to some extent a vassal of the Sultan, and that his territory, therefore, formed an integral portion of the Turkish Empire, was seriously disputed by none but the French, who had obvious enough reasons for making out the Regency to be an independent realm. But the truth was better stated by the Italians, whose jealousy had been aroused by this accession to the already great preponderance of France as a Mediterranean Power, and who sent out a Circular describing the Bardo Pact as a mere repetition of the Treaty of San Stefano, which Europe, therefore, as the guardian and guarantor of the inviolability of the Ottoman Empire, had a perfect right to revise in solemn Congress.

But this Circular of Signor Cairoli effected nothing. "Tell the Italian Government," was Bismarck's reply to the German Minister at Rome,

"that I am altogether averse from any interference of the Powers in the Franco-Tunisian question, seeing that, having been settled by common agreement, such a question no longer exists. I know not how the other Powers that signed the Treaty of Berlin will look at the matter; but you can already declare to the Italian Government that Germany will not attend a Congress having for its object the undoing or diminishing of concessions already acquired by France in a regular manner."*

Austria, of course, as in duty to her ally bound, echoed these words, while Russia also followed suit; and thus as England would not, and Italy could not go to war with France for the sake of Tunis, there the matter ended. Yet it did not end without the usual protestations on the part of the Porte, and of threats to send a Turkish force to maintain the Sultan's rights in Tunis. When these threats, however, were answered by the German Ambassador with the assurance that, if the Sultan were so mad as to go to war with France, he would be left by the Powers to fight his own battles, his angry valour cooled; and he contented himself by declaring the Bardo Treaty to be null and void, as having been signed by his vassal against the latter's will, and without his own sovereign assent. But the French had no objection to the Sultan and the Bey saying what they pleased, provided it was left free to them by the Powers to do as they liked, and thus then there was consummated an act which rigid moralists denounced as downright robbery. "Steal!" quoth the French, with Ancient Pistol, "foh! a fico for the phrase!" and with that they wound up the successful transaction by a few well-merited words of compliment to their accommodating friends across the Rhine. "We can only praise the behaviour of Germany in this important matter," wrote the French Foreign Minister, M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire (12th May), "and I gladly give expression to the gratitude we owe to the German Government, and to the leading organs of the German Press."
These words indicated a marked advance on the path of rapprochement between the two countries, but Bismarck was well aware of the existence of a very large party in France who regarded his approaches with a "timor-Danaos-et-dona-ferentes" sort of feeling; and of this party the chief was no less a person than the great tribune of the people, Léon Gambetta, the incorporation of all the national hopes of revenge. The career of this wonderful man had been followed in Germany with intense interest. Every word of his was weighed and commented on by the Press of Berlin with as much attention as is bestowed by the professors of the Fatherland on the exegesis of Virgil and of Plato. His speeches were studied, his actions were suspiciously watched, and the barometer of public feeling at Berlin rose and fell in proportion as Gambetta gave forth a peaceful or a warlike sign. Ever since the heroic days of Bordeaux, he had been steadily rising in the popularity of his countrymen; and the Germans looked forward with apprehension to the time when that popularity should place him at the climax of national power.

The Tunis incident had not long been over when it became evident that this time was fast approaching. It was plain that, before the year was out, the destinies of France would be entrusted to the keeping of a Gambetta Ministry; but what was the surprise of the Germans, on waking up one morning, to find that the Democratic Lion of France had been roaming about in their fortified camp overnight, and had even been prowling around the
sacred purlieus of Varzin! Considerable mystery still attaches to the incognito tour made by Gambetta in North Germany in the autumn of 1881; but he himself, at least, afterwards avowed that his only object was to see something of the people who had vanquished France, and especially to make personal inspection of the great Baltic ports. Within a month of his secret visit to Germany, Gambetta had formed a French Ministry and taken to himself the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. "Ah," said the Germans, "now we know what Gambetta's object was in coming thus stealthily to spy out our land. Now we know what to expect."

But, with his usual foresight, Bismarck had already prepared for all contingencies. For shortly before the accession of M. Gambetta to power, the King of Italy had made a pilgrimage to Vienna; and that his visit was partly the result of urgent advice from Berlin, was frankly admitted by Signor Mancini. Vienna, of course, was synonymous with Berlin; and it needed not, therefore, the extension of King Humbert's journey to the German capital, to convince the French that His Majesty's visit concerned them before all others. Between France and Italy the Tunis incident had produced an estrangement which even found expression, among other things, in a bloody fracas at Marseilles, and in a pen-and-paper war between Paris and Rome. Throughout all Italy there was nothing but bitter talk of French perfidy, and of French preponderance in the Mediterranean. Italy had become accustomed to
regard the northern coast of Africa, between Egypt and Algeria, as her natural inheritance; but of this prospective inheritance she had now been suddenly robbed of a good half by the jealous and unscrupulous action of France. She had been duped by the Republic, which, however, she was able neither to chastise nor check alone; and therefore she began to consider the wisdom of throwing in her lot with the German Powers.

It has been said that one of Bismarck's main objects in encouraging the Republic to appropriate Tunis, apart from his primary desire to divert its eyes from the Rhine to the ruins of Carthage, was to produce an estrangement between France and Italy. But if he aimed at the latter result, it could scarcely have been to the extent of provoking an open conflict between them, seeing that, in a war between the two Mediterranean rivals, Germany— as the Chancellor had written a year or two before*— would be bound to support Italy; and Germany longed not so much for an opportunity of attacking France as for the means of completing her isolation, so as to render her innocuous on the Rhine. Thus Germany had an undoubted interest in the supervening of such a coolness between France and Italy as would induce the latter to court the sympathy of the German Powers; and this much at least may be said that, whatever Bismarck's share in producing this result, it had now been fairly brought about.

In visiting Vienna in the autumn of 1881, King

* See p. 30, ante.
Humbert had virtually knocked at the door of the Austro-German Alliance, and the attentions which he received proved that his visit was welcome. Yet his pilgrimage to the Hofburg was far from meeting with the unanimous approval of his subjects, of whom a large section—the Irredentists—still clung to the hope of rounding off the national unity with the Italian-speaking districts of Austria. Republican demonstrations of dissatisfaction greeted the King on his return to Rome, and it was probably this outburst of feeling which caused Bismarck, a few days later, to declare that, "with each successive Ministry in Italy, the centre of political gravity had changed so much from right to left, that it could slide no further in the latter direction without falling on republican ground."* These words being made the subject of comment in the Italian Chamber, Signor Mancini (Foreign Minister) observed that they had nothing to do with the German Chancellor's attachment to Italy, being merely the "outcome of an oratorical promenade through the chief nations of Europe with the view of showing that liberalism everywhere was nothing but masked republicanism." Hereupon Bismarck telegraphed to Mancini to thank him for this correct interpretation of his speech, and to assure him of his friendliness to Italy.† "The Italians," said Mancini, "should unite to sympathise with Germany, as well as to trust and esteem the high wisdom

* Reichstag, 29th November, 1881.
† Told by Mancini himself in the Chamber, 9th December.
and magnanimity of the great statesman at the head of the Imperial Government." This effusive exchange of compliments was a significant hint to Gambetta, who had begun to angle in the republican back-waters of the Peninsula, as it was a proof that Bismarck's policy of isolating France had been crowned with a fresh success.

This success could no longer be doubted when, next year (October, 1882), Count Kalnoky publicly declared that King Humbert's visit to Vienna had been prompted by a desire to identify the cause of Italy with the peaceful and conservative policy of the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet, and when the publication of a Green Book on Egypt showed a most decided tendency on the part of the Italian Government to view the affairs of that country with the eyes of Germany. The understanding between Italy and the German Powers had, indeed, by this time attained to something like the consistency of a new Triple Alliance, though it was only in the spring of

* That the accession of Italy to the Austro-German Alliance dates from the year 1882 is proved, among other things, by the words of Signor Mancini, when interpellated on the 17th March, 1885, as to Italy's policy in the Red Sea. Signor Mancini on that occasion declared the assumption that an estrangement had taken place between Italy, on the one hand, and Germany and Austria on the other, to be quite unfounded. "In all our negotiations with England," he said, "we took care to make it clear that Italy could enter into no engagements which were contrary to the agreement concluded with the two Empires." The Cabinet, he proceeded, arrogated to itself some merit for having contributed to the maintenance of peace in Europe, which appeared to be threatened before the Alliance with the Empires was concluded in 1882. Despite the unpopularity of that Alliance among certain classes of the population, the work of the Government in connection with it could not be destroyed.
the following year (1883) that the fact was authoritatively disclosed to Europe by Signor Mancini himself (speaking in the Senate, 11th April). It was the fact, more than the form, that interested Europe; and of quite subordinate importance was the question whether the adhesion of Italy to the Austro-German defensive alliance had been reduced to writing. "M. Gambetta," Bismarck had said, "works upon the nerves of Europe like a man who beats a drum in a sick-room;" but even now that this dreaded statesman was no more (he had died with the year 1882), the German Chancellor recognised the necessity of still further securing the peace of Europe against the unforeseen dangers that lay in the lottery-bag of French politics. His semi-official organ, therefore, spoke with the language of authority, when it described the new Triple Alliance—Understanding, perhaps, would have been the better expression—as a purely defensive precaution, based on the uncertainty of the three Powers as to whether any two of them would be likely to retain their present measure of independence and security after France should have conquered the other. In short, this new Triple Agreement was rightly interpreted as tantamount to a tacit demand by the three contracting Powers that France should enter into her own recognizances to keep the peace; and this implied request was, of course, followed by an indignant profession of injured innocence on the part of France. The intentions of the Republic might be peaceable enough, but what Bismarck dreaded was
the conversion of that Republic into a Monarchy, from which aggression would be sure, he said, to come.

"It is the foreigner who watches over and supports the Republic in France," cried the Bonapartist Paul de Cassagnac, and there was considerable truth in his lamentation. "To recommend our present form of government to European benevolence," wrote the République Française in the same sense, "as the only preventive against the war-like proclivities of the nation, is to insult France as well as the Republic. There is no Frenchman, be he Republican or Monarchist, who does not feel this insult." Questioned by the Duc de Broglie in the Senate, M. Challemel-Lacour (Foreign Minister) replied that all his knowledge of the nature and objects of the Triple Agreement was gathered from the newspapers; but that its existence was not at all calculated to disquiet France, who relied no less on her innocence than on her army. This was all very fine, but nevertheless the incident had the effect of re-opening for a while the fountains of abuse that periodically flowed from Paris to Berlin. For the advocates of revenge now found themselves further removed than ever from the realisation of their aims, while other patriots deplored the growing state of isolation to which their country was reduced. The climax of this isolation, as far as Italy was concerned, had been betokened by the new Triple Agreement (in 1882); and this understanding, in turn, was ratified on the part of Germany by a visit which the Crown
Prince, acting on the Chancellor’s advice, made to Rome towards the end of the following year, when he was treated by King Humbert and his subjects with every mark of honour and respect.*

To Rome the German Crown Prince had gone straight from Madrid, where he was likewise a highly honoured guest of King Alphonso, and this leads us to speak of another link in the chain of isolation with which Bismarck was slowly, but surely, engirdling the French Republic. The Spanish people had not forgotten the incident of the Hohenzollern candidature, and what Germany had had to suffer on that account; and they were still grateful for Bismarck’s friendly intervention on their behalf when their country, a few years later, was rent with civil war.† Indeed, the attitude of the French seemed to them to be consistently hostile to all stable government in Spain; for it was beyond doubt that the Carlists had received material encouragement from France, while the republican foes of King Alphonso were no less suspected of drawing supplies from Paris. French gold, in particular, was thought to have been at the bottom of the republican risings which took place in various parts of Spain in the summer of 1883; and when King Alphonso extinguished these sparks of rebellion with promptness and energy, suspending, among other measures, the constitutional guarantees, he was flattered by the receipt of congratulatory telegrams from Vienna and Berlin.

To monarchical Spain, separated as she was by

* See p. 365, post.  † See p. 58, ante.
France from all the great monarchies of the Continent, the neighbourhood of the Republic was only a source of political contagion, disquietude, and danger. All the sympathies of King Alphonso were with the aims and methods of these monarochies, and he longed to take rank as the Sovereign of a Great Power. It is known that this ambition of his was encouraged in Berlin, where the transformation of the Spanish mission into an embassy would be sure to carry with it similar results in the other capitals of Europe; and when, therefore, in the summer of 1883, Spain concluded a Commercial Treaty with Germany, very favourable to the latter, this was interpreted as part payment of the price which Bismarck, acting always on the principle of *do ut des*, had tacitly stipulated with the statesmen of Madrid. Following hard on the conclusion of this Commercial Treaty, came the republican risings in Spain above referred to; and no sooner had these insurrections been suppressed—in a manner, as we have seen, which elicited felicitations from Vienna and Berlin—than King Alphonso started off to visit Austria and Germany, in the well-founded hope of being helped by their Majesties to reach the goal of his ambition.

King Alphonso spent several days at Vienna, where every honour was shown him; and from Vienna His Majesty—whose suit included his Foreign Minister, Marquis de la Vega de Armijo,—hastened to join the Court of the German Emperor at Homburg, where the grand autumn manoeuvres were being held in presence of an unusually
brilliant throng of foreign guests. Bismarck was taking the waters at Gastein, but indeed his presence was not urgently required in Homburg, where all the necessary business could be tacitly transacted between the Kaiser and the King. It required the publication of no hard and fast agreement to show that Spain had sought to dwell within the shadow of the wings of the German Powers. Proof enough of this was the simple fact that King Alphonso had gone to Vienna and to Homburg, and that he had been treated at both these places with a marked distinction which excited much carping criticism in France.

But there was one thing, above all others, that sorely tried the patience of the sensitive French. The Emperor had given King Alphonso the command of a cavalry regiment. Now this, in itself, was nothing but an observance of the graceful custom of hospitality which had invariably made His Majesty confer the same honour on similar guests; but when the French reflected that the colonelcy bestowed on King Alphonso was that of a Uhlan regiment which had especially distinguished itself in France, and which was now actually garrisoned at Strasburg, the capital of one of their conquered provinces, they impulsively rushed to the conclusion that they had once more—as alas! how often already—been made the objects of one of “M. de Bismarck’s” studied and gratuitous insults. As a matter of fact, we know that the Chancellor had nothing whatever to do with the selection of the Strasburg regiment, and that the Emperor’s
choice of it was mainly determined by the predilection of King Alfonso for a uniform which had yellow facings, and would thus suit his sallow complexion.* All things considered, however, it may well be doubted whether the Emperor acted with his usual foresight in making King Alphonso colonel of the Strasburg Lancers, but the French populace paused not to discriminate between a possible want of tact and a wilful provocation; and therefore when the King of Spain passed through Paris, on his return to Madrid, he was received with angry howls of execration, which were partly directed against himself, and partly against the author of his German honours.†

It may be that a German event of the preceding day—the unveiling of the great National Monument on the Niederwald, which recorded in eloquent and enduring bronze the victories of 1870—had specially embittered the French with a fresh recollection of their overthrow; but in any case, the sight of King Alphonso—even though driving in the same carriage as the President of the Chamber and M. Challemel Lacroix (Foreign Minister)—was the signal for such a savage and threatening outcry of the Paris mob as made all honest Frenchmen blush for very shame, and drew down upon their capital the reproba-

* Just then, we believe, there were only two cavalry regiments without an honorary chief—a Hussar and a Uhlans one—and as King Alphonso preferred the uniform of the latter, it was innocently given him.

† "I deplore the insult that was offered you at Paris," the Emperor was reported to have telegraphed to the King: "but I know that it was more aimed at me than at you."
tion of Europe. It had come to this, then, with the boasted manners and hospitality of the courteous French! It is true that President Grévy hurried to the King next day, and implored him not to confound the great and noble French people with the base wretches who had so wantonly insulted him with their howls of barbarous fury; but this formal apology could not, of course, altogether reconcile His Majesty to the belief that he was in a land of friends. For the sake of appearances he did, indeed, on the urgent entreaty of M. Grévy, attend a frigid State banquet in his honour at the Elysée; but a shooting excursion, a performance at the opera, and some military manœuvres that had been arranged in his honour, were struck from his programme; and, revenging himself on his insulters by tossing a liberal largesse to the Paris poor,* he hastened home with his bitter mortification tempered by the consoling thought, that he had reaped a much richer political harvest than ever he dreamt of when setting out on his travels.

For all Spain, which had previously been somewhat divided in her allegiance and in her neighbourly affections, now rallied round her King, and threw herself into the arms of Germany. From the frontier to Madrid the King’s journey was a triumphal progress, and in his swarming and illuminated capital he was hailed with frantic shouts of “Long live the Uhlman colonel! Long live Germany!”

* Before leaving Paris, King Alphonso gave 10,000 fr. for distribution among the poor of the capital.
Intense was the indignation with France throughout all Spain, and equally intense was the sympathy with Spain throughout all Germany. The two nations had suffered a common insult, and been knit together by an additional bond of common interest. The Chancellor’s policy of isolating France from Spain had succeeded beyond his expectations and his calculations. But now that the iron had thus been suddenly rendered hot, it behaved him to strike hard before it cooled. And a means of delivering a welding blow was soon devised.

For King Alfonso had barely been a month at home when it was announced that the German Crown Prince, on behalf of his father, would shortly start for Madrid to return the visit of His Spanish Majesty. The Emperor William had only returned the visit of Victor Emmanuel after the lapse of about two years, but his similar debt to the King of Spain was vicariously absolved within the space of two months. As to the meaning of this precipitate compliance with the rules of etiquette, there could be no possible doubt. It was intended to show the Spanish King and people how highly their friendship was prized by Germany, and how deeply her Emperor resented the insult to which an innocent action of his had exposed his royal guest. For the French, too, the prompt return visit had its instructive aspects; and perhaps the most significant of all these was the fact that the Crown Prince did not pass through France on his way to Spain, but travelled to Genoa, whence he was conveyed by a German squadron across the
Mediterranean to Valencia. And from the date of his arrival at Valencia (22nd November), to the day of his re-embarkation at Barcelona (14th December), he received a welcome everywhere like that which greeted the re-crowned and re-patriated Charles II. in his progress from Dover to London. Spanish inventiveness exhausted itself in devising means of honouring the Imperial guest of the nation, and when at last the Crown Prince left for Rome—on an errand of which we have already considered the main object*—he carried with him the conviction that his visit to Spain had most successfully completed the policy begun at Homburg, and that Prince Bismarck’s scheme of assuring the peace of Europe by drawing all the minor Powers within the defensive circle of the Austro-German alliance, had been crowned with another signal triumph: a triumph, at least, for the time being; for within two short years the Hispano-German dispute with respect to the Caroline Islands, with the fountains of bad feeling which it opened up at Madrid (autumn of 1885), was to show how very precarious are the national friendships that are formed so suddenly and so violently, and how deep, after all, is the gulf which renders perfect sympathy impossible between a Romance and a Teutonic people.

Meanwhile, Bismarck’s policy of isolating France had received fresh homage from the rapprochement between Spain and the German Powers; but yet another successful result of this policy had come to

* See p. 142, ante, and also p. 365, post.
light in the Homburg days (September, 1883). For apart from the King of Spain and other Sovereigns who then lent lustre to the suite of the Emperor, there was the lately created King of Servia; and King Milan's arrival at Homburg had been preceded by a visit of the King of Roumania to Vienna and Berlin. The meaning of all this was plain enough. The Danube States, which long wavered between the wooings of Austria and Russia, had now determined to court the benefits of the Central-European League of Peace. To the goodwill of the members of this League it was mainly due that the Princes of Roumania and Servia owed their newly acquired rank of Kings. In the spring of 1881 Prince Charles of Roumania, having in the previous autumn visited Berlin and been frequently closeted with Bismarck, had assumed the regal dignity; and what the Prince of Roumania had done, the Prince of Servia thought he was likewise bound by all the laws of self-respect to imitate.

Accordingly, King Charles had not yet lived a fortnight of regal life, when Prince Milan started off on a canvassing tour to the Courts of Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. In the first two of these capitals his ambition was anything but damped, yet the promise to recognise his elevation to the rank of King was not given without tacit conditions; and one of these was that he would prove a little more pliable to the will of his well-wisher, Austria, than he had hitherto been in commercial and
riverain matters. Between the choice of vassal-like subjection to the dictates of Russia, and moderate subordination to the interests of Austria, neither Servia nor Roumania could hesitate for ever; and when, therefore, the Austro-German recognition* of King Milan, in March, 1882, was followed by the thankful visit of His Majesty to Vienna in the autumn, and by Servia’s adhesion next year (May, 1883) to the Convention which gave Austria the advantage of direct railway communication with Salonica and Constantinople, it could no longer be doubted that Servia had made her election.

When King Milan himself, too, went to Homburg to ratify his choice, he sent an aide-de-camp to Gastein to invest Prince Bismarck with his newly created Order of the White Eagle; and what gave this act greater significance was the circumstance that the Minister-President of Roumania repaired to Gastein at the same time to announce the allegiance of his Sovereign to the aims of the Austro-German Alliance. What these aims were, the Chancellor again frankly explained to M. Bratiano in precisely the same words as he had used to him at the Congress of Berlin. “We want peace,” he said, “we are a League of Peace; and if you, too, desire peace, you may find

* “I think,” said King Milan, in reply to an address of the Skupština, “that I shall acquit myself as well as my people of a debt, if in your presence I give expression to my gratitude to their august Majesties the Emperors Francis Joseph and William”—who had given the cue to the other Powers by recognising the King’s new dignity within twenty-four hours of its assumption.
support with us; but if war is your object, then you must go to others.” In repeating the substance of his conversation with Bismarck to the Chamber at Bucharest, M. Bratiano said: “We are for peace, and we will be the foes of whosoever shall provoke a war or seek to invade our country.”

But these allusions to the Danube States would be incomplete without a brief reference to Bulgaria, whose hereditary Prince had been advised by Bismarck to accept the crown that was offered him. “By all means take it,” the Chancellor was reported to have said, “it will always be a nice reminiscence (schöne Erinnerung) for you, even if you do not remain long at Sofia.” The Chancellor seems at first to have had his doubts on this point; but these doubts were to some extent dispelled when Prince Alexander abolished the fantastical Constitution under which he began his reign—a step, of course, did not take without encouragement from the three imperial Courts. This, in the opinion of the autocratic Chancellor, was a coup d’état of the right kind. But the boldness with which Prince Alexander had thrown aside an impossible Constitution was not more gratifying to him than the courage wherewith he sought to keep himself independent of the will of Russia; or to limit the power of Russia in the East (of Europe at least, if not in Asia) was as much the Chancellor’s

Repeated by M. Bratiano (10th November, 1883) in the Romanian Chamber, when interpellated as to the object of the King’s visit to Vienna and of his own conferences with Bismarck at Gastein.
aim, as to frustrate France of her opportunity in the West.

How these two objects were gradually achieved we have endeavoured to show by tracing the origin and development of that Austro-German League which was raised on the ruins of the Triple Alliance, and by detailing how this Central European fortress of peace was successively surrounded by a series of outworks thrown up by Italy, by Spain, by the Danube States, and even to a certain extent by Turkey. Self-interest, as well as the irresistible laws of political gravity, had grouped all the continental Powers—save France and Russia—in more or less immediate proximity around the two Central States of Europe; and even Russia now began to feel the disadvantage of her isolation, and to betray distinct signs of a wish to rally to her old allies. We saw how this desire had already been evinced, among other things, by the Dantzig meeting by the reining in of the Teutophobist Skobelev, as well as by the dismissal from office of Gortchakoff, Ignatieff, and other Panslavonic terrorisers of the Germans.

Great was the joy of the latter when Gortchakoff finally withdrew from the conduct of affairs, but it was not complete until a successor to him was appointed in the person of M. de Giers, a man of Germanic origin, with a well-known tendency to peace. And if there could have been any doubt on this latter head, it was dispelled when, a few months after his appointment, the
new Russian Chancellor hastened to visit the lord of Varzin (November, 1882).* It was well understood that M. de Giers on this occasion carried with him a retty luxuriant olive-branch, one twig of which he left t Varzin, another at Berlin, where he saw the Emperor, nd another at Vienna, by way of which he returned ome to Russia from Rome. And this pilgrimage of eace was repeated in the following year (November, 883), when we again find M. de Giers with the German Chancellor at Friedrichruh—a year that had een rich in tokens of reconciliation between the two impires.

It is true that no slight sensation was caused in Germany when the Czar’s most peaceful assurances, on ce occasion of his coronation at Moscow m May), were followed by his casual meeting at Copenhagen (September) with the English statesman who was perhaps more of a bugbear to the apprehensive Germans than ever Prince Gorchakov had been. Indeed, the sudden appearance of Mr. Gladstone at the de of the Czar in Copenhagen filled the German Press ith something like the panic once inspired by the

A well informed writer remarked of this visit: “Of all the diplomatic visits at Varzin, that of the Russian Minister, M. de Giers, was the only one that could be called really surprising, when one thinks of the egance of Prince Gorchakoff and the vain-boasting of General cobeloff. M. de Giers is a statesman with a very cool head, who no rger belongs to the school of the Czar Nicholas, and never betrayed a sh to be greater than Prince Bismarck, so that it was not too difficult for him to pay a visit to the aged and invalid Chancellor of the German impire.”—Vide Article: “Die Gesellschaft von Varzin und Friedrichruh,” in the December number of the Deutsche Revue for 1884.
ghost of Hamlet's father in the castle sentinels at Elsinore. The public writers of Berlin at once clutched up their partisans; but, the English apparition being so majestical, Bismarck would not have them offer it the show of violence. "Fear not," the Chancellor was reported to have said (at Gastein), "Gladstone is a man of cool blood and sound understanding, and I am convinced that he has exhibited both these qualities even in the highly dangerous atmosphere of Hamlet."

It was said (and with an appearance of truth) that the Czar, on his way home from Copenhagen, wished again to meet the German Emperor at some Baltic port, but that Bismarck prevented the realisation of this plan so as to deprive Russia of the credit accruing from the semblance of perfect amity with Germany, while the distribution of her army on the western frontier was still far from reassuring to the General Staff at Berlin. But if this was still a source of disquietude to the German Government, it was soon thereafter removed by the gradual retirement of the threatening masses of Russian cavalry more towards the interior, as well as by the altered tone of the Moscow Press, which now declared that "a war between Russia and Germany would be the most absurd of all absurdities." It was about this time, too, that M. de Giers made his second pilgrimage of peace to Berlin and Friedrichsruh (November, 1883); and when shortly afterwards a Russian squadron, by special command of the Czar, repaired to Genoa to salute the

* "Politische Geschichte der Gegenwart," for 1883.
German ironclads that were to convey the Crown Prince first to Spain, and thence back to Italy, on the mission we have already had occasion to consider; when Prince Orloff, a persona gratissima to Prince Bismarck, was transferred from the Russian Embassy at Paris to Berlin;* and when, above all things, a Russian gold-loan was brought out at Berlin, under the direct auspices of the Prussian Government—and subscribed for more than ten times over (April, 1884)—there could no longer be any doubt that Russia had at last honestly resolved to walk with her immediate neighbours in the paths of peace.

Austria had latterly acted as a sort of lightning conductor to the surcharged atmosphere of journalistic Russia—to such an extent, indeed, that Count Kalnoky (26th October) had even seen fit to allay the apprehensions of his countrymen by assuring them that, "in the event of being attacked by Russia, Austria would not stand alone." † But there was nothing, he added, in the attitude of the Czar's Government itself to render this contingency even remotely probable. For that result Austria certainly had to thank the German Chancellor, who had thus gradually imposed his pacific will on all European diplomacy, and gathered the nations of the Continent into a Peace League to which it was discreditable, and even dangerous, not to belong. These who had hitherto

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* Prince Orloff died at Fontainebleau, 29th March, 1885.
† These words attracted much attention as suggesting a new reading of the Austro-German Alliance, which had hitherto been believed to stipulate for the assistance of one party to it, in the event of the other being simultaneously attacked from two sides. See p. 114, ante.
believed the secret of the Chancellor's character to be a propensity to intrigue, and to pursue the interest of his country on the path of war, were now confounded by the undeniable fact that, with every opportunity of provoking quarrels, he had nevertheless been the peace-maker and the peace-keeper of Europe for a period of fourteen years. By what masterly combinations, and by what moderate exercise of his vast power, this grand result was achieved, we have endeavoured to trace. We have seen how Bismarck, according to the needs of the hour, combined the Powers of Europe to serve the purposes of his foreign policy with the same successful adroitness as has rarely failed him in creating a favourable majority out of the heterogeneous parties of the German Parliament. We saw how the Triple Alliance, as the bulwark of European peace, was broken up by the Russo-Turkish war and succeeded by the Austro-German League, which grew by the adhesion of several other States to such imposing dimensions that even reluctant Russia at last began to yield to its attractive force; and now the next turn of the European kaleidoscope—always in the hands of Bismarck—shows us the three Emperors, accompanied by their respective Chancellors, again embracing in effusive friendship at the little Polish town of Skierniewice, in the autumn of 1884 (15th–17th September).

Hitherto the newspaper Press had never found much favour with autocrats, but now representatives of the leading journals of Europe were encouraged to dwell within the precincts of the park at Castle Skierniewice,
and to acquaint the world with all but the secret conversations of this fraternal meeting: to telegraph how their Majesties were photographed in one group, and their Chancellors in another; to record how the Emperors William and Francis Joseph, in Russian uniforms, led splendid battalions that bore their names past their devoted friend the Czar; to tell how, when their Majesties went out to slaughter partridges, their Ministers met in serious confabulation; how lofty decorations and compliments were exchanged; how flattering toasts crowned the banquet, and how even the Czar drank to the personal health of Bismarck; how the little theatre looked gorgeous with its parterre of Emperors; with what nice gradation of esteem the Czar distinguished the German and the Austrian Chancellors; and how the former was honoured with the life-sized portraits of the Emperors Alexander and Francis Joseph, as souvenirs of the golden days of Skierniewice. Of these days the general result was thus expressed by one of the three Emperors themselves:—

"For a further period there is a fair prospect of peace, of undisturbed labour, and of augmented general prosperity. Our relations with all the European Powers, especially with the neighbouring States, are most friendly. The meeting which I lately had with the Czar and the German Emperor has not only given me a coveted opportunity of renewing cordial relations with the Imperial House of Russia, but it also shows the resolution of the three Monarchs, and of their Governments, to maintain and secure the conditions of peace and tranquillity so necessary for the welfare of their peoples. Based on the maintenance of treaties and on reciprocal confidence, this unanimity of the three Sovereigns will be a guarantee of peace, the
beneficial effects of which will be of advantage, not only to their peoples, but to all European nations.”

This was so much; but was it all? asked Europe, and especially England, who had reason to consider very closely the nature and objects of this latest turn of the continental kaleidoscope in the hands of the German Chancellor. For had there not lately been dawning on the English people the conviction that they were now fast becoming the best hated nation in Europe, and that a very large share of the continental abuse, which was daily heaped upon them, came from Germany? Had not

* The Emperor Francis Joseph, in his address to the Austro-Hungarian Delegation at Pesth, 28th October, 1885. In the German Emperor’s speech from the throne (opening of Reichstag, 20th November, 1885), his Majesty said: “At the bottom of this goodwill (towards the German Empire) there is a recognition of the fact that the successes in war, which God accorded us, have not led us to seek national happiness in any other way than by cultivating peace and its blessings. I rejoice at the recognition of this, and especially at the fact that my friendship with the monarchs of Austria and Russia, who are so closely related to me by the ties of family tradition and kinship, and by the neighbourhood of their dominions, could be sealed in such a manner at our meeting at Skiernevice as to warrant me in looking upon its undisturbed continuance for a long time as assured.” In the House of Commons (26th March, 1885), in reply to Lord Stratheden and Campbell, who moved “for any diplomatic correspondence which existed from Her Majesty’s representatives abroad as to the new concert or alliance between the Courts of Germany, Austria, and Russia,”—the Earl of Kimberley, in the absence of the Foreign Secretary (Lord Granville), stated that “Her Majesty’s Government had no official knowledge of what passed at the meeting of the three Emperors. The Government were perfectly willing to accept non-official statements that the object of those meetings was for the purpose of showing the union which existed between those three great Powers, and that there was no intention to do anything inimical, but rather that which was favourable to the peace of Europe. As regarded the papers, there were no papers which could be produced. There were a few, but they were of a very confidential character.”
some prominent organs of the German Press* recently declared that, having unified Germany, all that now remained for Bismarck to do, in completion of his life-work, was to federate the Continent, and to direct this coalition against the commercial world-supremacy of England, which was fast robbing the other European nations of vital light and air? The "Continental System," argued one journal,† by which Napoleon tried to strangle the life out of England, had only failed from the inability of the Corsican to hold together a coalition that was founded on the subjugation of its members; but let Germany rally round her all her neighbours on a footing of perfect equality, and the domineering days of haughty Albion would be done. Was adhesion to Germany, with this object, not very much more in the interest of France, than a bootless hankering after provinces which she never could regain? Let France repress her longing for revenge and join the rest of Europe, with Germany at its head, in making front against the monopoliser of all extra-European power, and land, and trade, and in converting London into another Carthage. For the spirit of shopkeeping had emasculated the English, and they were now rapidly declining to the rank of a third-rate Power. Modern science had revolutionised naval warfare, and the proud boast that Britannia ruled the waves was now a mockery and a myth. Of England's previous greatness there was nothing left but the shadow, and the time was

* Notably the Kreuz-Zeitung, the Post, and the Cologne Gazette.
† The Kreuz-Zeitung.
not far distant when Macaulay's New-Zealander would actually take his pensive stand on London Bridge.

Such were the effusions with which the German Press began to teem, long before the question of colonies had produced bad blood between the two countries. But it required very little reflection to show, that the keynote of all these Cassandra prophecies was the paternal relation of the wish to the thought. If the Germans could have believed all the hard things they said of England, they would have been happy; but their irritation arose from their unbelief, and was as natural as that the poor should envy the rich, and the half-free the wholly free. The Anglophobe movement in Germany was in many respects identical with the anti-Semitic agitation which swept over the Empire, and which was nothing but the expression of hatred to a class that had become dominant, by reason of its superior intelligence and its superior wealth. More, perhaps, than any of their neighbours, the ambitious Germans had become infected with the spirit of the time, which has been called a time of international rivalry. Their sudden elevation from political nonentity to political primacy on the Continent had, naturally enough, somewhat turned their heads; and the only wonder was that their successes in war had not made them more conceited, more intolerant, and more dictatorial.

Their dearest possession, their greatest product, their One Man, the exclusive source of their greatness, was Bismarck, who had flattered them, as if with a
ase of their own power, by imposing his will on
the nations of the Continent. But this feeling
self-satisfaction could not be perfect as long as
ular England continued to be a law unto herself,
d as long as England, leaving her continental
ighours to make treaties for the contingencies of
ure, continued to outstrip all competitors in
king money for the necessities of the hour. To
soldier-slave Germans it was a mortifying anomaly
it, while they had nothing but negative benefits
m the immense and necessary army which weighed
on the nation like an over-ponderous coat of mail,
English lightly lorded it all over the trans-
reine world, and held together their huge and wealthy
pire with a mere handful of voluntary troops.
marck had made Germany great and powerful
eed, but the mass of his countrymen had come to
themselves in most extravagant notions of the
pire’s all-compelling power; nor could it but be
ending to their vanity when they were rudely
kened out of their Chauvinistic dream by the
nder of British guns at Alexandria, which convinced
m that, though Germany might be “the one voice
urope,” England still claimed, and had her claim
owed, to speak the first and weightiest word in all
irs of the world beyond the sea.

We have thus endeavoured to indicate the natural
uses of German irritation against England, which
began to manifest itself in an acute form after
bombardment of Alexandria. That apart from
questions of colonies, and from dislike of a particular English Government, the German people had felt out of temper and out of tune with their English cousins for some considerable time before the Imperial meeting at Skiernievice, there cannot be a doubt; and the only question is whether, and to what extent, Bismarck himself shared the passions which his greatness had done so much to create. Did the Chancellor himself, too, dream of federating the Continent against England, and was the Skiernievice meeting a step in this direction? Or was the "Continental System" of his ideal a European Concert, or moral coalition, which England would not dare defy? Had the arbiter of the Continent, in his intoxicating love of power, resolved to give his adoring countrymen a still more flattering proof of his might, by moulding the will of haughty England in accordance with his own, in regions and in affairs where England had hitherto been slow to acknowledge the influence of a purely continental State? We will not seek to do so much as even suggest a reply to all these questions, which can only be fairly answered by the further lapse of time—for we have now come to a point in our narrative which precludes the possibility of judging by the light of the past; but we shall proceed to chronicle several events that may help to foreshadow the future.

While men were wondering what had been done at Skiernievice in addition to the exchanging of peaceful assurances, and the discussion of measures against in-
international anarchy; and while Englishmen, in particular, were pondering on the return of Russia to her old love, as well as on the increased freedom of action she might thus acquire in the East*—said freedom having been very considerably limited by Lord Beaconsfield's Sudden revelation of an agreement between France and Germany.
surruption of the Triple Alliance—while the thoughts of Englishmen, we say, were busy on these things, their attention was suddenly arrested by the revelation that one than a mere rapprochement had been effected.

* "It is not doubted here that the recent marked activity of the Russians in Central Asia is to a great extent the result of the Skiernevice setting, which was held, it must be remembered, after Prince Bismarck had been irritated by the refusal of England to accept his advances. That de Giers was aware of this refusal, and its probable consequences, can be as little doubt as that he was left free, and perhaps even in a certain sense encouraged, to shape the policy of Russia in the East accordingly." So wrote the Berlin Correspondent of the Times in the spring of 85 on the subject of the Afghan frontier dispute between England and Russia, and his words may be supplemented by the following remarks on the Skiernevice meeting by a well-informed writer in the December (1884) number of the Deutsche Revue ("Die Gesellschaft von Varzin und Fried- schernott"): "The recent interview between the three Emperors affords the best proof that the two statesmen (Bismarck and Giers) came to an agreement on pending questions. Public opinion in Russia openly knows that much agitation can be made with the idea of Pan-Slavism, at very little good policy; and that, were the PanSlav idea to prevail, the suit would be much more dangerous to Russia herself than to the other two participants in the division of Poland. It is impossible either to elude the Poles, as the educated factor of Pan-Slavism, from being the authors of Pan-Slavism, or to win over their sympathies by a reckless narcissism of Poland. M. de Giers has therefore always looked towards Asia; and Lord Dufferin's appointment as Viceroy of India leaves no doubt that at the present moment Russian policy is neither troubling itself about Pan-Slavism nor Constantinople, but about Afghanistan—and something else. Here, also, Prince Bismarck knew what were the right words to use, and it is said—we cannot vouch for the truth of it—that he made the following remark a short time ago:—'Our connection with Asia is so close that pulling at it will only draw it tighter.'"
between France and Germany; that, indeed, the Governments of these two States had to this extent, at least, entered into an alliance, that they had agreed to pursue a common policy with respect to certain portions of Africa in which England had a transcendant interest, to wit, the countries watered by the Congo, the Niger, and the Nile.

Ever since the death of Gambetta, the relations of the Republic to the Empire had been steadily improving. Bismarck himself had never lost an opportunity of showing his loyalty, his good-faith, and his good-will to the Government of M. Grévy; while the latter, on the other hand, had been persistent in his efforts to evince his pacific and treaty-abiding sentiments towards Germany. It is true that incidents occurred to provoke occasional bickerings and heart-burnings in the Press of the two countries—incidents like the seditious outbursts of Metz deputies, the tearing down of a German flag from a Paris hôtel, the insult to the “Uhlans King,” the annual demonstration by the Alsatians in Paris in front of the statue of Strasburg, the appointment as French War Minister of a General (Thibaudin) who had broken his parole to his German captors. But none of these incidents had any serious effect on the relations of the two Governments, and, in the summer of 1884,* Bismarck

* Reichstag, 26th June. In the Reichstag also (10th January, 1885) Bismarck said: “With France we have not for many years—I may truly say since the time before 1866—been on so good a footing as now. (Hear, hear.) That is due to the wise and moderate Government in France, which values the blessings of peace as highly as we. Both Governments know
declared that "our relations to France are now as friendly and trustful as with any other State in Europe." The Chancellor himself had even become popular with a certain class in France—especially with the anti-English element;* and not slight, therefore, was the joy of this party at learning † that, shortly before the meeting at Skierniewice, the French Ambassador (Baron de Courcel) had gone to Varzin, and there established "perfect identity of views" between the two Governments as to certain questions of trade and territory on

that there is hardly a greater calamity for the Continent than a Franco-German war. We have gone through that once, and both for the victor and for the vanquished it is a sore misfortune. Even a victorious war of such dimensions is a misfortune for the country compelled to wage it; and I believe there is no temptation to repeat it on either side. Minorities which are rerum novarum cupidæ, and wish to overthrow the existing Government at any price, even at that of plunging their country into foreign wars—why, gentlemen, you find them in every country."

* A correspondent of the St. James's Gazette in France wrote (October 3, 1884): "It seems that we can never avoid falling into extremes. For years Bismarck was a croquemitaine sanguinaire, with whose name nurses used to frighten refractory children. Now he is almost popular. A print and photograph vendor in the Rue de la Paix tells me that up to a few weeks ago the rare purchasers of his photograph were wont to ask for it with a sheepish look and in a guilty half-whisper, much as if they were inquiring for the picture of the 'Women dancing before Borgia,' or some other peculiarly risqué production. Now the demand is so great that he has to keep whole piles of the Iron Chancellor's portrait ready on the counter, while the orders for the photograph of the Trois Empereurs may be counted by thousands. And to think that only a year ago we were insulting the King of Spain because he had accepted a Prussian commission, and that six weeks since the mob was storming the Hôtel Continental to pull down a German flag! If Prince Bismarck were to appear to-day on the boulevards, I verily believe that men calling themselves Frenchmen would be found to cheer him." Considerable sensation was also caused about this time by an article in the Figaro advocating an alliance between France and Germany—a sign of the times!

† On the 14th October, by the publication of a Yellow Book on Affaires du Congo et de L'Afrique Occidentale.
the West Coast of Africa, on the strength of which Germany invited the Powers to a Conference at Berlin.

One peculiar thing about this Conference was that the idea of it did not originate either with France or Germany, but with Portugal,* and that its objects were first suggested by England.

It is well to point out these facts, because the countrymen of Prince Bismarck have been taught by a Chauvinistic and indiscriminating Press to believe that the West African Conference emanated from the brain of the Chancellor, as complete as Pallas Athéné from the head of Jupiter. The main object of that Conference was to secure freedom of trade for all comers in the region of the Congo, and that was precisely the object at which England had been aiming for years back. This object, too, was finally achieved; but to its accomplishment Prince Bismarck contributed no more than Blücher did to Wellington’s victory at Waterloo. The two cases, indeed, are almost perfectly parallel, as will appear from the following statement of facts.

Between England and Portugal, in the spring of 1884 (26th February), there had been concluded what

* Prince Bismarck to Count Münster (7th June, 1884): “Even the Portuguese Government itself seems, as I had the honour to inform your Excellency on the 26th ult., as a consequence of the communications it has received from other Powers, to have become convinced of the necessity of making the Congo question the subject of an international agreement, and has therefore put before certain Powers a suggestion for a Conference.” Similarly wrote Lord Ampthill to Lord Granville (July 25th, 1884): “My French Colleague, Baron de Coureel, also tells me that the proposal for a Congo Conference originated with the Portuguese Government, and not with the German Government.”
was called the Congo Treaty, by which the former Power recognized the doubtful, or at least debated, sovereignty of Portugal over the lower reaches of the Congo and the adjacent territory—but only under conditions which secured to all nations full liberty to enter, travel, reside, and carry on trade in any way they might think fit, subject to the laws of the country, and to the so-called Mozambique tariff, or ad valorem maximum of ten per cent.; and which made the Congo itself, as a waterway into the interior of Africa, next to absolutely free. The observance of these conditions was to be supervised by a mixed Anglo-Portuguese Commission, and it was one of Lord Granville's regrets that the Lisbon Government would not accept the English proposal to place the river under an international control.\* It will, therefore, be seen that the Congo Treaty contained the germs of the stipulations that were afterwards embodied in the General Act of the West African Conference, and that it was not the fault of the British Government if it did not contain them all.†

But the Congo Treaty never became more than mere waste-paper, for the simple reason that Prince Bismarck, constituting himself the spokesman of the general opposition to it, put his foot upon the document and crushed ...

\* Lord Granville to Lord Ampthill (26th May, 1884): "The Portuguese Government are beginning to see that their opposition to the effort made by Her Majesty's Government to introduce a clause establishing an International Commission on the river was injudicious; they are now themselves suggesting that other Powers should be invited to appoint delegates to serve on the Commission."

† Vide, p. 175, post.
its seals. It was tacitly agreed between the parties to it that it would only have validity if recognised by the other Powers, and Germany was quick to pronounce it null and void. Prince Bismarck would hear nothing of Mozambique tariffs, or of any other tariffs, in the region of the Congo; nor would he now admit the claims of Portugal to territory in which the German Government had previously recognised the sovereignty of that Power.* "In our eyes," he said,

"Portugal has no stronger claims to the Lower Congo territories than any other Power which frequents them. . . In the interests of German commerce, therefore, I cannot consent that a coast which is of such importance, and has hitherto been free land, should be subjected to the Portuguese colonial system."

This was quite enough, and Lord Granville at once dropped the innocent thing he held in his hand, as if he had suddenly discovered it to be a viper.† His Lordship

* Lord Granville to Lord Ampthill (30th June, 1884): "I have to request your Excellency to point out to his Highness Prince Bismarck that, but for the persistent opposition of the British Government, unsupported by any other Power, Portugal would in all probability have long since established herself in the Congo district. Great Britain refused the recognition of her sovereignty, and the object of the recent negotiations has been to give that recognition which, as Portugal claimed, was withheld by her alone, in return for substantial guarantees of freedom for the commerce of the world. Germany, in particular, was believed to have recognised the claims of Portugal when, on the 27th December, 1870, the German Representative at Lisbon was instructed to appeal to the Portuguese Government to take the requisite steps for protecting neutral rights, violated by the capture of the German ship Hero by a French man-of-war in the territorial waters of the port of Banana."

† "These objections (of Prince Bismarck) leave no hope that the assent of Germany to the Treaty will be obtained, and Her Majesty's Government have consequently instructed Mr. Petre to inform the Portuguese Government that it would be useless to proceed to its ratification."
had paid his African bill without consulting mine host, and this was the result. His cheque had been dishonoured. So here, then, at last, we have the German Chancellor successfully asserting his will "in regions and in affairs, where England had hitherto been slow to acknowledge the influence of a purely continental State."

This summary extinction (7th June) of the Congo Treaty will be better understood, perhaps, if considered in the light of a most remarkable despatch of Bismarck to Count Münster, written a month previously (5th May)—a despatch to which we shall have further occasion to refer. The colonial policy of the Empire, and the incidents of its development, will form a fitting close to this chapter; but meanwhile the present purpose of our narrative requires us to say, that the obstruction with which this policy was believed by the Chancellor to be met on the part of England had annoyed and incensed him to such a degree, that he had already threatened to throw himself into the arms of France, and to seek in Paris those practical proofs of friendship which he could no longer find in London. The despatch in question to Count Münster (of 5th May)—

"Pointed out that, in the commencement of German colonial enterprise, England might render signal service to Germany, and said that for such service Germany would use her best endeavours on England's behalf in questions affecting her interests nearer home. It pressed these considerations with arguments to show the mutual advantage which such understanding would produce; and it then proceeded to instruct Count Munster to say, if it could not be effected, the result
would be, that Germany would seek from France the assistance which she had failed to obtain from England, and would draw closer to her on the same lines on which she now endeavoured to meet England.”*

We quote these words to show what was the state of Prince Bismarck’s feelings towards the English Government a month before he put his destroying foot upon the Congo Treaty, and six months before Lord Granville was informed by the German Chargé d’Affaires (7th October)—

“That within the next few days, an invitation, agreed upon between the German and French Governments, would be sent to Her Majesty’s Government for a Conference to be opened at Berlin, if possible during the present month of October. The programme of deliberations would be: Freedom of commerce in the Congo territory; application of the stipulations of the Vienna Congress, as respects freedom of river navigation to the Congo and Niger; and determination of the formalities under which new annexations on the coast of Africa are to be considered effective.”

Such, then, was the programme which had been secretly agreed upon between Baron de Courcel and Prince Bismarck at Varzin, a few days before the Imperial meeting at Skierniewice. This invitation naturally came upon the British Government with the shock of a great surprise;† but with that graceful tact and suavity which have never (or, perhaps, only on one occasion.

* These are the words of Sir Edward Malet, who thus summarised to his Government Prince Bismarck’s despatch as read out to him (in German) by the Chancellor in the following January.
† Her Majesty’s Government, according to Lord Granville (writing to Sir E. Malet, 17th October), had only one day’s previous notice that France and Germany proposed to issue invitations.
which we shall soon have to consider) deserted him in
the direst emergencies, Lord Granville hastened (the
same day) to accept in principle the proposal of a Con-
ference: though he hesitated so long before formally
doing so, until he should be perfectly enlightened
as to its true scope and objects, that he at last drew
down upon himself a gruff and ungracious reprimand
from the impatient Chancellor.*

The idea of a Conference, as we said, was sprung
upon England with the shock of a surprise, its pro-
gramme having been preconcerted by France
and Germany without the slightest fore-
knowledge of their scheme on the part of
England.† In similar circumstances, Lord Palmerston
would most probably have been swift to return to the
Franco-German invitation the answer which it deserved;
and we have seen how the Berlin Memorandum was
promptly rejected by the Government of Lord Beacons-
field, for the reason, among others, that the three
Chancellors had been pleased to concoct the document

* "Count Munster proceeded to say that he gathered from the com-
 munications from Berlin, which he found at the Embassy, that Prince
Bismarck was disappointed at his not getting a decided assent to the in-
vitation to the Conference, and had conceived the idea that we were pur-
posefully creating delay."—Lord Granville to Sir E. Malet, 19th October,
1884.

† "I observed to his Excellency [Dr. Busch] that though I had not
heard anything of the sort from your Lordship, I could imagine that there
might be some apprehension that, as the scheme of the Conference had
been arranged between Germany and France without our participation, so
an agreement might have been come to, regarding details, between these
two Powers, and that England might, as it were, be only asked in Con-
ference to consent to a preconcerted arrangement."—Sir E. Malet to Lord
Granville, 11th October.
without consulting England. But the honour and dignity of England were now in the keeping of men of very different character from either Lord Palmerston or Lord Beaconsfield—men whose only excuse for thus consenting to take their humble cue from Berlin was that the objects of the Conference itself were dear to England, and that the securing of the substance was well worth a sacrifice in point of form. But in this case, indeed, the form itself was as important, if not more so, than the substance.

For England had hitherto figured as the philanthropic and enlightened champion of all liberal principles, of free-trade, and of human freedom; and her prestige throughout the extra-European world, among the civilised and the barbarous, the bond and the free, was broadly and firmly based on belief in her power and her will to bring home the greatest blessings of peace to the human race. But now, of a sudden, the initiative in all these things seemed to have passed from the Mistress of the Seas to the Master of the Continent. London had hitherto been the centre where the sun of civilisation shone brightest, but now the luminary appeared to send forth its rays from Berlin. Ask future millions in Africa to what, and whom, they owe the blessings of commercial and personal freedom, and they will reply—to the influence of the great statesman who ruled the destinies of Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century. If there is anything certain, it is that the Conference, which disposed of the fate of an immense
portion of the dark Continent, ought by natural right to have sat in London, and not in Berlin.

But Germany, seizing her opportunity, hastened to anticipate England in picking up the game which the latter had already winged. Hurrying up, like another Blücher, to the field of battle towards the close of day, Bismarck helped the English to win what they had long been fighting for, and had, indeed, already all but won; and, placing himself at the head of the allied forces, he led them on to victory. But though the English had done all the hard, effective fighting, the Germans and the French arrogated to themselves priority of place in the triumphal entry into possession; and it was by this remissness, it was by thus allowing herself to be so easily baulked of her just position of light and leading in this matter of honour and etiquette, that England could not avoid the appearance of having by Bismarck been somewhat shorn of her prestige.

Shorn of her prestige, perhaps, but not of her power. For from the West African Conference,* which

* The Powers that took part in the Conference (all of them being represented by plenipotentiaries and experts) were England, Germany, France, Austria, Russia, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, Turkey, and the United States of America. Said a newspaper note on the day of its opening: "The rooms in which the deliberations of the Conference are to be held are the same in which the Congress sat in 1878. Chief of these is the great banqueting-hall, which occupies the whole central part of the upper story of the Chancellor's palace. Its dimensions are imposing. Its front windows look into the Wilhelmsstrasse, the back ones to the garden. Its furniture and decorations are quite simple, and the same as in 1878. The pillars are adorned with marble, the walls are light gray, the window curtains, chairs, &c., red. It is reached from the entrance-hall by a broad staircase bedecked
was opened and closed, but otherwise not attended by Prince Bismarck himself, and which sat for the better part of four weary months (15th November, 1884—26th February, 1885), England emerged rather the gainer than otherwise in positive results. Germany had won all the honours, but England had got most of the tricks. She had practically secured the ends for which she negotiated the Congo Treaty. She had obtained the recognition of her own commercial principles by all the maritime Powers of Europe and the United States over an immense expanse of Africa; she had procured the

with laurel trees and other large-leaved plants, and through a vestibule containing receptacles for hats, sticks, overcoats, &c. In the Conference-hall itself a large map of Africa, by Kiepert, five metres high, reminds one of the immediate aims which have brought this brilliant assemblage together. The members of the Conference will sit round a horse-shoe table, open at the end nearest the garden, the Chancellor being placed at the middle of the outer side, and behind him, at another table, the secretaries to the Conference. . . . To the right and left of the Chancellor sit the Plenipotentiaries, in the alphabetical order of the French names of their respective States. . . . The ends of the long sides of the table are covered with books, pamphlets, and manuscripts; in short, with everything about Africa that has appeared lately. A clock, with dial and weights of polished copper, completes the equipment of the hall. The rooms in the southern wing of the palace, looking towards the garden, will serve for committee meetings and as conversation rooms. The walls of one of the halls are adorned with life-sized portraits of the Emperors William, Alexander III., and Francis Joseph. The first was given by the Emperor William to the Chancellor after the Congress of 1873, while the other two were presented by the Emperors of Russia and Austria as souvenirs of Skierneyvice. That of the Czar, which represents him in the uniform of a Russian General, is a copy of a portrait in the Winter Palace at St. Petersburg. On the chimney-piece of the same hall stands an enormous elephant’s tusk artistically carved, also a recent gift from the Emperor of China to the Chancellor. In the dining-rooms looking into the conservatory there is a refreshment table at which the members of the Conference may recruit their physical powers.
assent of those Powers to a declaration against the slave-trade; she had also induced them to accept her reading of the rules of future annexation in Africa, and she had established her own right to exclusive influence on the Lower Niger. Considering that France, with the assent of Germany, had specially excluded some of her settlements (the Gaboon, Guinea and Senegal) from the competence of the Conference, England also might well have refused to admit the Niger within the sphere of its deliberations; but she only consented to do so on condition of her authority on that river being left paramount, and Bismarck, the success of whose Conference depended on the hearty co-operation of England, has always been quick to discern when British statesmen are resolved, or only half-resolved.

It was not without a keen sense of the incongruous that the hard-headed Englishmen, who were sent to look after the interests of their country at Berlin, beheld the Protectionist Powers displaying such a mighty zeal for the application of those principles of trade in Africa which they all found to be so terribly detrimental to their own prosperity in Europe; and it was with blended feelings of humour, despair, and ridicule that, week after week, and month after month, they watched the piling up of such a huge and factitious-looking structure of international law as that which was finally called the General Act of the West African Conference.*

* The General Act of the West African Conference—signed 25th February, 1885, comprised:—1. A Declaration relative to Freedom of
Still, if it pleased Prince Bismarck to be the controlling architect of this edifice, they had no objection to join their colleagues in carrying stones to it, especially as

Trade in the Basin of the Congo; 2. A Declaration relative to the Slave Trade; 3. A Declaration relative to the Neutrality of the Territories included in the Conventional Basin of the Congo; 4. An Act of Navigation for the Congo; 5. Ditto for the Niger; 6. A Declaration relative to the essential conditions to be observed in order that New Occupations on the Coasts of the African Continent may be held to be effective; and 7. General Provisions. At the final sitting of the African Conference, Prince Bismarck said:—“After long and troublesome consultations our Conference has attained the object of its labours, and I am happy to be able to state that, thanks to your endeavours, and the accommodating spirit which has inspired your proceedings, a complete accord has been come to on all the points of the programme placed before you. The conclusions which we are about to sanction formally secure to the trade of all nations free access to the interior of the African Continent. The guarantees which will be provided for freedom of trade in the region of the Congo, and the whole of the arrangements which were embodied in the rules relative to the navigation of the Congo and the Niger, have for their object to afford the most favourable conditions for the development and security of the trade and industry of all nations. In another series of regulations you have shown much careful solicitude for the moral and physical welfare of the native races, and we may cherish the hope that the principle adopted in a spirit of wise moderation will bear fruit, and will help to introduce these populations to the advantages of civilisation. The special conditions under which the wide tracts which you have opened up to commercial undertakings have also required special guarantees for the preservation of peace and public order. The coils of war would, in fact, assume a specially fatal character if the natives were led to take sides in disputes between the civilised Powers. In careful view of the dangers which such contingencies might bring with them for the interests of commerce and civilisation, you have sought for the means to withdraw a great part of the African Continent from the fluctuations of general politics, and confine the rivalry of nations to the peaceful labours of trade and industry. In the same manner you have sought to obviate the misunderstandings and disputes to which new annexations of territory on the African coast might give rise. The explanation of the formalities which are to be complied with in order to render these appropriations of territory entitled to recognition introduces a new rule into public law, which is intended to remove causes of misunderstanding and disputes from international negotiations. The spirit of good understanding which has
they had everything to gain by its stability—if stable it could prove.

But, perhaps, the most immediately practical result of the Conference was the ushering into life, as a full-blown State, of that singular enterprise to which the King of the Belgians had devoted his philanthropy and his wealth. The discussion of territorial questions of sovereignty had been specially excluded from the competence of the Conference, which had merely to deal with points of doctrine; but of what use would doctrines be, unless it were known where, and by whom, they were to be applied? For the territory of the Lower Congo there were three claimants—France, Portugal, and the International Association; and, unless their rival demands could be squared before the close of the Conference, a fertile field would thus be left open for future quarrels, and, perhaps, even bloodshed. Bismarck, therefore, took care that, concurrently with the work of the Conference, the three claimants should engage in extra-mural negotiations for the mutual adjustment of their frontiers; and to his influence it was mainly due that Portugal, on the one hand, after a long show of

marked your consultations has in like manner guided the negotiations which have been conducted outside the Conference, in order to solve the question relative to the boundaries between the parties which should have sovereign rights in the Congo region, and which, through their position, appear called upon to take the lead in the work we are about to bring to a close. I cannot refer to this point without expressing my grateful thanks for the noble efforts of the King of the Belgians, the founder of a work now recognised by almost all the Powers, a work which will confer most important benefits on mankind.
obstinacy, made material concessions to the Association, and that the Association, on the other, relinquished its claims to an immense extent of territory in favour of France.

There is reason to believe, indeed, that Bismarck was previously aware of the territorial ambition which France first openly revealed during the Conference, and that, while well-intentioned towards the Association, he resolved to lose no opportunity of conciliating the favour of the French. As Frederick the Great, for purposes of his own, had been the first European Sovereign to recognise the North American Republic, so Bismarck had made a point of hastening to acknowledge the flag of the International Association, to which England was apparently indifferent. Germany having led the way,* the other Powers could not but follow her example; and thus, by a unique and wonderful process of diplomatic accouchement, the International Association was gradually ushered into existence as the Free Congo State. And if ever the future inhabitants of this African State erect a monument to its founders —this unquestionably ought to take the form of a statue of King Leopold, flanked by one of Stanley on his right hand, and by one of Bismarck on his left.

Thus we have seen how the German Chancellor trenchted upon the field of England's prestige by taking the initiative in the matter of the West African Conference, and how, by acting as chief obstetric

* In Europe, we mean, for the Association had been first of all recognised by the United States of America.
ician to the Congo State, he had come to exercise a determining influence in a region which had hitherto been much more within the sphere of French than of German policy. But there was another region in this same continent of Africa where the Chancellor had been gradually endeavouring to make his power a country in which English interests were paramount, and that was Egypt. Here again, too, as in the case of West Africa, this manifestation of Germany's interest was the result of a tacit agreement with, as it was directed to the advantage of, France. Yet it had always been so. There was a time when Bismarck was willing to do almost more for English policy in Egypt than support it with his benevolent neutrality; the causes which induced him to repudiate the Congo, and to invite the Powers to a Conference at which in close pre-concert with France—these and other reasons had operated to convert this attitude of active neutrality into one of something like active activity against England, and practical sympathy with France.

The acute phase of the Egyptian question was exacerbated in 1879 by the abdication, or, indeed, the deposition of the Khedive, Ismail Pasha, who may be said to have owed his fall directly to the action of Bismarck.* For it

*The people here have a very high opinion of the power of The Times. They say, 'that it was not Europe, but The Times deposed Ismail' (and in this they are au fond right), and say 'if this paper can
was the German Chancellor who was the first to protest (18th May) against the high-handed decree of Ismail (22nd April) relating to the international tribunals and the public debt of Egypt; and this German protest being energetically supported by the other Powers, the Khedive at last had no other choice but to resign his authority into the hands of his son, Mohamed Tewfik. It was the opinion of many, including, it was said, even the deposed Ismail himself, that, in acting thus, Bismarck aimed at precipitating the inevitable intervention of France and England in Egypt, and of thus furnishing them with a bone of contention which would prove to them another Schleswig-Holstein.* If this, indeed, was the Chancellor's secret object—but we must remember that the Machiavellian theory of Ismail Pasha belonged to the region of conjecture—his joy at the re-establishment of the Dual Control (November, 1879) must have been turned into bitter disappointment when the France of M. Freycinet refused to co-operate with England in suppressing the rebellion of Arabi (summer of 1882), change one Khedive, why not another? ’ However, I have spoken enough about myself."—Letters from Khartoum, written during the Siege—by the late Frank Power, H.B.M.'s Acting Consul, Correspondent for "The Times," &c.

* It was stated in a communication to The Times from Alexandria, dated August 24th, 1879, that when Ismail Pasha was still Viceroy of Egypt, and was being pressed to sign his abdication, he used these words:—
"You English have made a mistake; whatever I have been or done, I made English interests in Egypt paramount. You have the railways, the customs, the post-office, the telegraphs, and the ports entirely under English administration. To gain more you have called in the French. You then hesitated, and Bismarck, who looks far ahead, pushed you on till you have come to direct intervention. Mark my words, Bismarck sees what I see; that Egypt will become the Schleswig-Holstein of England and France."
and when the Control itself was abolished in the following January (1883).

But we have no evidence that either of these events affected Prince Bismarck with a sense of chagrin; and in justice to him it must be remembered that when M. Gambetta, in his zeal for detaching England from the European Concert, induced Lord Granville (in January, 1882) to give his reluctant signature to a Collective Note to the Khedive—which was tantamount to the intimation of Anglo-French action in Egypt, altogether independent of that country's suzerain and of the other European Powers, the German Government agreed with the Cabinets of Rome, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to protest against the scheme. This is a fact which we would strongly recommend to the consideration of the "Schleswig-Holstein" theorists. But, indeed, these theorists seemed to be as numerous in the Ministry of M. Freycinet, as they had been scarce in the Cabinet of M. Gambetta; and to their existence must to some extent be ascribed the fact, that the France of M. Gambetta's less adventurous successor declined the invitation of England to help her in extinguishing the rebellion of Arabi. For she had seen that her appropriation of Tunis—which was so warmly encouraged by the German Chancellor—had estranged her from some of her previous friends, and she feared lest the despatch of a military expedition to Egypt might further increase her difficulties, to the joy and advantage of Germany.*

* "Much to the surprise of initiated onlookers, France hesitated. A
The very caution with which—when all efforts to rouse the Sultan himself from his torpid inactivity had become hopeless—Bismarck spoke of the proposed Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, seems to have made the French suspect that they were being indirectly incited to imitate the Austro-Prussian occupation of the Elbe Duchies, and they drew back.

"The German Chargé d'Affaires again repeated to the French Ambassador and myself, in very positive terms, that the Northern Governments would never agree to a mandat, that it would be better for us to go forward at once by ourselves, and that everyone admitted that the reserve we had made under the term force majeure would cover anything that we might be obliged to do in Egypt." *

In London, Count Münster held similar language, saying that "the Chancellor desired to give us moral support, although he was not prepared to go the length of a formal mandate." This moral support, indeed, was of a very substantial kind. "Strict orders had been sent to the German Consul General (at Alexandria) to abstain from interference of a character which would

few months before, the invitation (of England) would have been eagerly accepted, but since that time a great change had taken place in the French political world. The dislike to all kinds of political adventures, which had been produced by the disclosures of the Tunis expedition, was now strengthened by a mysterious panic-like apprehension that Bismarck was pushing France into new foreign complications in order to attack her on the eastern frontier; and there was no longer at the head of affairs a strong man determined to uphold French influence in Northern Africa, and capable of imposing his will on the Chamber."—"Egypt and the Egyptian Question," by D. Mackenzie Wallace.

* Lord Dufferin (at Constantinople) to Lord Granville, 21st July, 1882.
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 183

at all impede our action;”* while Count Kalnoky (who only spoke in strict agreement with Bismarck) cordially concurred in the view of Her Majesty’s Government “as to the necessity of instructing the British Admiral to open fire upon the ports of Alexandria, if he were not put in temporary possession of them.”† At the abortive Conference, too, in Constantinople, where the European Concert yielded to that force majeure under the influence of which England was obliged to act in Egypt alone, Germany did all she could to support the policy of the British Government;‡ and when at last the victory of Tel-el-Kebir had made England, for the time being, independent of Conferences, Protocols, and Military Conventions with the Porte, Prince Bismarck hastened to offer his congratulations to Lord Granville.§ At the same time his semi-official organ

* Lord Granville to Sir J. Walsham, 10th July, 1882.
† Sir H. Elliot to Lord Granville, 11th July.
‡ Lord Ampthill to Earl Granville (July 15th, 1882): “The German Representative at Constantinople has been instructed that, in the event of his colleagues at the Conference signing the invitation to the Porte to send troops to Egypt, he should also sign it.”—Earl Granville to Sir J. Walsham July 22nd, 1882: “The German Ambassador informs me that if the British Plenipotentiary proposes in Conference to press the Sultan to issue a Proclamation declaring Arabi a rebel, the German Chargé d’Affaires will be instructed to support him.”—The Earl of Inglis to Earl Granville (August 4th, 1882): “This morning the German Chargé d’Affaires received instructions from his Government to advise the Sultan to come to terms with England. Austria for some time past has been strongly advising the Ottoman Government to act in concert with Great Britain.”
§ Lord Granville to Lord Ampthill (September 15th, 1882): “The German Chargé d’Affaires called upon me this morning to offer Prince Bismarck’s congratulations on the victory obtained by Her Majesty’s forces in Egypt. I said that I received this message with sincere pleasure; that it was entirely in keeping with the friendly course Prince
expressly disavowed the effusions of a certain portion of the German Press which had begun to attack, with great vehemence, the policy and procedure of England in Egypt; while Sir Charles Dilke bore grateful testimony to the friendliness with which that policy had been backed by the German Government.*

Having been the well-wisher and the helper of England in Egypt thus far, Prince Bismarck, in common with the rest of Europe, naturally cast his straining eyes towards the land of the Pharaohs to see how the Gladstone Ministry should turn to account the blood that had been spilt at Tel-el-Kebir. But neither the German Chancellor nor his countrymen, after the most intense concentration of the perceptive faculty, could discern the smallest indication that the Gladstone Cabinet had a will or a plan of its own; and of this lamentable truth the most convincing evidence was the fact, that the rulers of the British Empire were for ever pestering the arbiter of Europe with requests for "advice or hints" as to what they should do with Egypt. It was at once a proof, thought the Germans, of the height of power to which Prince Bismarck had risen, and of the depth of doubt and impotence to which the Gladstone Government had sunk, that the latter frequently appealed for counsel and directions to Berlin. "In each case," said the Chancellor, "the inquiry was

Bismarck had maintained towards us, and I expressed my hope that our success might result in a settlement satisfactory to all parties." * House of Commons, 16th August.
whether I was prepared to give the English Government 'any advice or hint' as to what it might do in Egypt, and which would at the same time meet with our approval."* It is little wonder that this revelation of British subserviency to the Chancellor's will and judgment—which was only one degree less shameful than the dependence of certain seventeenth-century British statesmen on the gold of France—was received in the German Parliament with peals of cheers and derisive laughter; and that, therefore, many patriotic Englishmen felt inclined to vent their sense of their country's humiliation in the words with which Earl Cairns expressed the feelings of the nation, when the keepers of England's honour were held to have struck their flag before a paltry pack of semi-barbarous Boers:

"In all the ills we ever bore,
We grieved, we sighed, we wept; we never blushed before."

By the British Government Prince Bismarck was supplied with questions with respect to Egypt, in much the same manner as his life had been nearly worried out of him by Napoleon on the subject of Belgium. But the Chancellor acted as warily in the former case as he had done in the latter, and declined to give positive advice either to "take it," or "not to take it." What he did at last say is important enough to be recorded here in his own words †:

* Speech in Reichstag, 2nd March, 1885. Vide p. 211, post.
† We may here anticipate our later narrative by stating that these revelations were made by the Chancellor in the Reichstag (2nd March,
"Being then further asked whether I would not give my opinion as to what might be done, I said I could quite imagine my being an English Minister, and if I were an English Minister I would not advise the annexation of Egypt, but at the same time I admitted that it was necessary for England to establish a certain security of position in this connecting link between her European and her Asiatic possessions. In my opinion, however, I said, she could only gain this position through the Sultan, and thus avoid coming into conflict with treaties. Therefore, said I, if I were an English Minister, I would seek the mediation of the Sultan, in order through him to obtain a position in Egypt by means of which English interests would be safeguarded. I also said I was of the opinion that this method of procedure would not be likely to give offence to other nations, partly by reason of its compatibility with treaties, and also because it would probably hold out to those mainly interested in Egyptian finance—namely, to the French and English as well as other bondholders—the prospect of a safe, able, and well-ordered administration of Egypt by the English authorities. Thus, for example, considering the importance of French financial interests in Egypt, French rivalry and discontent would not be provoked. But if, on the other hand, I said, England wished to proceed with the direct annexation of Egypt, there might arise a state of considerable tension between her and several European Powers who had interests there, but especially the Sultan and the whole Mohammedan world. This tension, however, would vanish if the English appeared there in agreement with the Sultan, and I used the English expression 'leaseholders' of the Sultan in Egypt. Thus, I said, the English would avoid putting France and other Powers out of temper, and I added that good relations between England and France were ardently desired by us—a breach between these two great Powers being a calamity for the whole of Europe, especially for us Germans as their nearest neighbours. Therefore I attached great importance to the continuance of good relations between England and France. That would be the way, I said, in which, if I were an English Minister, I should try 'to obtain influence' in Egypt. But I added that, if England should

1885), by way of reply to Lord Granville, who had asserted in the House of Lords (28th February) that Prince Bismarck had advised both the Government of Lord Beaconsfield and of Mr. Gladstone "to take Egypt."
prefer to annex Egypt, we should not regard it as our duty to prevent her. Friendship with England was more important for us than the future fate of Egypt. I was not inclined to give the English any advice; but I foresaw, I said, that by annexing Egypt, England would create difficulties for herself which might be avoided, without abandoning her purpose of securing her line of communications, were she to content herself with exercising her influence in Egypt under Turkish sovereignty. And then came the consideration already referred to—that the great French financiers would be content with this, in the hope that their business interests would be as well secured by the English Administration as they had formerly been by the Dual Control, and that public opinion in France would even, perhaps, in the circumstances, tolerate the annexation of Egypt, but that nevertheless in that case some ill-feeling and uneasiness would remain which might embitter the relations of the two countries and involve dangers for their future peace. I therefore did not advise England 'to take it,' but, on the contrary, dissuaded her from annexing it as urgently as was possible in my disinterested position. I added that the solution of this question devolved beyond all doubt upon the English Government itself. But, whatever England's decision, we would not, I said, stand in her way; we only recommended her to be cautious, and to respect treaties and the rights of the Sultan. I have been forced against my will to give these explanations, in order, once for all, to repel the oft-repeated insinuation that for years back I had made a point of seeking to seduce the English Government from the path of virtue by alluring promises of foreign aggrandisement, and of thus causing trouble in Europe. That is completely wrong. It was only in confidence, and after being expressly asked for my advice on the subject, that I told them what I would do if I were an English Minister. I did so reluctantly, and only on being repeatedly requested to do so, and I only consented at last in the conviction that by giving the English Government counsels of moderation I might thus promote the end at which I aim—namely, the preservation of peace in Europe and among its great Powers. And if this advice had been followed many a complication, perhaps, would not have occurred.
Prince Bismarck immediately after Tel-el-Kebir,* and they were confidentially reiterated in the following year—1883—in a manner "which seemed to me," said Lord Granville,† "to express that it was the wish and hope of the German Government, that England should take upon herself to represent the interests of Europe in Egypt for the future." Lord Granville was quite right in this assumption. "It is perfectly true," wrote the Chancellor's semi-official organ,

"that in the year 1883 the hope prevailed in Germany, and, we believe, in all the other Cabinets, that England would use the position she had gained by her interference in Egypt to maintain order there as negotiorum gestor of European interests, and to administer well and truly the Egyptian finances in the interest of the country itself, as well as of the bondholders. This expectation was general, and was shared by the statesmen of all the Cabinets. France, in particular, was thus induced to await the result of the establishment of order in Egypt by the English forces, and to allow fair play to the English Administration in Egypt, in the exercise of its mandatum presumptum. In Germany it was assumed that, in her gestio negotiorum, England would follow the system alluded to by the Chancellor when he said that, if he were an English Minister, he would seek to exercise influence in Egypt in the name of the Sultan as Sovereign, and under his authority."

But this expectation was cruelly disappointed. The Gladstone Government did not pay the German Chan-

* "Now to these inquiries I always replied—and in some cases I am even in possession of the written directions of our Agents whom I entrusted with the reply—in the sense of a document, dated September, 1882, which I have brought with me here, that in my quality of Foreign Minister of the German Empire, I must refrain from advising England, seeing that such advice tendered in this official manner carried with it a certain responsibility with respect to other Cabinets, and also for its possible consequences."—Reichstag, 2nd March, 1885.
† House of Lords, 6th March, 1885.
cellar the compliment of acting on the guarded advice which, by dint of terrible importunity, it had at last wrung from him; though, if it had, as the Prince himself said, "many a complication, perhaps, would not have occurred."

Instead of seeing Egypt profit by the exercise of English influence, under the authority of the Sultan, Prince Bismarck beheld the interests of that country gradually falling a prey to the vacillation, the cowardice, the rashness, and the Hydra-headed folly of the most disastrous Government that ever played fast and loose with the destinies of a great Empire. Well may the Chancellor have exclaimed, as he is credibly reported to have done,* that if, in the whole course of his life, he had inflicted upon Germany half the ignominy and weakness which Mr. Gladstone had imposed on England in the course of four years, he never would have had the courage to look his countrymen in the face again.

We are not so much concerned to know whether Prince Bismarck was animated towards England's Liberal Premier with a deep dislike, since we have been repeatedly assured by the Chancellor himself, through his accredited

* Speaking at Hatfield, 30th August, 1884, Lord Lytton, Ex-Viceroy of India, said: "Shall I tell you what was said the other day by a statesman whom I take to be the greatest, as he is certainly the most successful and powerful, in Europe? It was only a few weeks ago that I heard, through an acquaintance of Prince Bismarck's, a recent remark of his, that if in the course of his whole life he had inflicted upon Germany half the ignominy and weakness which Mr. Gladstone has inflicted upon England in the course of four years, he, a fearless and resolute man as we know him to be, would not have the courage to look his countrymen in the face again."
organs, that he never could afford to allow his policy to be influenced by his personal feelings. That may be so—though we very much doubt it—but it must have been hard, at least, for the Prince to entertain a separate consciousness of his political sentiments and his personal feelings, while contemplating the persistent and ostentatious manner in which Mr. Gladstone’s Government expressed its preference for a French alliance.

The Chancellor’s standpoint, naturally, was not whether an alliance with France or with Germany would be more advantageous to England, but whether a cordial understanding with England or with France would be the more beneficial to Germany; and all his efforts to complete the isolation of the Republic, by rallying England to the Central European flag, had hitherto been vain. The more he tried to promote British policy in Egypt, the more he beheld England striking the attitude of a spurned yet persistent wooer of France; nor could the affronts she received in Madagascar, nor the repudiation of her Commercial Treaty, nor the native storm of ridicule and indignation which swept away that self-sacrificial Suez-Canal Agreement with the “sagacious M. de Lesseps”—could any of these rebuffs turn the English Government from its infatuated love of its obstinate rival in Egypt. “The same considerations,” wrote a Gladstonian politician, in a magazine article which created much sensation at the time, “that should induce the English Government to disarm the hostility of Russia, should make it unsparing...
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 191

in its efforts to arrive at an amicable understanding with France." * This article had been written with the view of enlisting public opinion in favour of the Anglo-French Agreement (June, 1884), which was well described as "that monstrous and unprecedented capitulation, showing that Mr. Gladstone was willing and glad to sacrifice every British interest in Egypt, and all the fruits of the labour of British statesmen and soldiers during the past hundred years, in the vain hope of conciliating the French."

By this "monstrous capitulation," the Gladstone-

* These words are quoted from an article on "England's Foreign Policy," signed "G," in the Fortnightly Review, for June, 1884; and the initial led many to the conclusion that the writer was no less a person than Mr. Gladstone himself, especially as the views expressed were known to be identical with his. We have reason to believe that the article, which Mr. Gladstone disowned, was the work of Sir Julian Goldsmid. The following passage excited much bad blood in Germany:—"The German Chancellor has recently paid this country some polite and gratifying compliments. He has made a courteous show on several occasions of following our lead, and those who have watched the spectacle may be pardoned if they have involuntarily compared it with that of a gentleman, who, bowing to a lady, gives her precedence in entering a room. But no one can have been deceived as to Prince Bismarck's motive. If England has been the recipient of his ceremonious attentions, Germany is the object of his first and paramount regard. When he has urbanely permitted us to take the initiative in a settlement of the affairs of Greece and Montenegro, and to follow our own course in Egypt, he has done so, we may be sure, from other motives than those of mere civility—because, that is to say, he has been convinced that no supreme German interests were concerned, and because it suited his purpose, although his was the really determining influence in these questions, to leave to us the invidious solution of conflicting claims while he posed to the Porte and the other Powers as the 'honest broker.' To put the matter somewhat differently, the German Chancellor has been deferential to this country exactly in proportion as he saw he could manipulate our simplicity and respect for international ethics to his own advantage. He has, in fact, played upon our honesty with the object of making us his catspaw."
Government promised France to withdraw the British troops of occupation from Egypt by a certain date (1888), to enlarge the powers of the International Public Debt Commission * in such a way as virtually to substitute a Multiple Control for the Dual Control, and to agree to the neutralisation of the Suez Canal (as well as of Egypt itself), which a Committee of English soldiers and statesmen had condemned as detrimental to the interests of the Empire.† Such, then, was the way in which the Gladstone Cabinet had conformed with the wish and hope of the German Government that England should take upon herself to represent the interests of Europe in Egypt for the future; such were the conditions on which France accepted the invitation of England to a Conference of the Powers for considering a reform of the Egyptian finances; and the only consolation of

* Hitherto composed of an Englishman, a Frenchman, an Austrian and an Italian.

† Speaking in the House of Lords (23rd June, 1884), Lord Granville said:—“It was the announcement that it was our intention, not now and certainly not at the Conference, but either before or at the time of the evacuation, to propose the neutralisation of Egypt on the basis of the principles which have been applied to Belgium, and also the adoption of that plan with regard to the Suez Canal, which is contained in the Circular of 3rd January, 1883. I do not think it necessary at this time to go into a discussion of the advantages of the neutralisation of Egypt, and with regard to the Suez Canal I have only to say that, in the autumn of 1882, a very strong Committee was appointed to consider that question. There were Ministers, heads of departments, soldiers, sailors, and engineers on that Committee, and they were universally of opinion that the neutralisation of the Suez Canal would be a detriment to the interests of this country. But we did recommend it, and the Cabinet gave their sanction to it, thinking that it was sound in principle and advantageous to us without being detrimental to others; and it was communicated to the Powers.”
Englishmen was that the validity of these conditions was to be dependent on the success of this Conference.

But the Conference, which met in London on the 28th June, came to an abrupt close at its seventh sitting on the 2nd August, without having done anything but prove the antagonism of the continental Powers to England in matters of Egyptian policy. England had offered to guarantee a loan of eight millions to the Egyptian Government in a manner involving such an alteration of the Law of Liquidation (dated 17th July, 1880) as would affect the immediate interests of the bondholders, but it soon appeared that France would not accept the scheme in its entirety. "The two Powers most interested," said the German Ambassador, "are not in agreement either as to the facts or the principles of the question, and under these circumstances I do not feel able to pronounce an opinion."* The fact was, that whatever contented France would prove acceptable to Germany; and Germany now made no secret of her desire to give her moral support to France rather than to England. For this change of attitude on the part of Bismarck there were various reasons unconnected with Egypt, which we shall presently have to consider; but the Chancellor was by no means pleased with the manner in which England had exercised her stewardship in Egypt itself; and, in particular, it was believed in Germany that, by the use of ordinary quarantine precautions, the British authorities might easily have

* Protocol, No. 4.
warded off from Egypt that serious visitation of the Asiatic cholera which threatened to extend to all Europe.

This was a matter in which the Chancellor now distinctly sought to impose his will on haughty England, but with a want of success which only embittered him all the more against the Government that resisted him. Twice in the London Conference on Egyptian finance did Count Münster rise to propose a discussion of the sanitary question, and twice—though supported by his colleagues—was his motion curtly overruled by Lord Granville, as beyond the pre-arranged scope of their deliberations. A similar fate met M. Waddington's proposal for the settlement of the indemnities due to the sufferers by the bombardment of Alexandria; and then, suddenly "rising from his seat," Lord Granville abruptly terminated a Conference which was the first clear expression of the fact that England now found herself opposed by a moral coalition of the continental Powers.

Lord Granville, it was understood, was at this time suffering from an acute attack of gout, and his friends sought to attribute the unusual brusqueness of his manner to the irritation of his body. But it was fortunate, at least, in this case, thought most of his countrymen, that his Lordship's sense of dignity had been sharpened by the pangs of his disease; and it certainly would have been much better for the interests and the honour of England if,
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 195

when negotiating with certain Powers, he had been under the chronic influence of corporeal pain.

By some, Lord Granville's conduct was described as dignified, while by others it was characterised as insulting; and to the latter category belonged the Governments, especially that of Germany, which had been invited to take part in a confabulation foredoomed to failure. We will leave it to our readers to determine whether Lord Granville or Prince Bismarck was guilty of the greater provocation—the English Minister who was quite within his formal rights in refusing to entertain the German sanitary proposal, or the Chancellor in commanding his agent to return to the charge after his motion had been overruled. But whatever may be thought on this point, it is certain at least that Bismarck felt himself deeply slighted by the abrupt dismissal of the Egyptian Conference, and that he now began to make more ostentatious assertion of his preference for a friendly understanding and co-operation with France.

Of this understanding the first unequivocal sign was not long in following in the shape of the West African agreement, already detailed; while the Republic received another most substantial proof of the sincerity of its new ally about the time of the Skiernievice meeting, when Germany, Austria, and Russia hastened to join France in protesting, and successfully too, against the suspension of the Egyptian Sinking Fund—an act on the part of the Khedive which
had been the first fruits of England's liberty of action restored to her by the failure of the London Conference. But it was a strange freedom of action that was now obliged to conform to the will of the Bismarck coalition of the Powers, which were gradually substituting their united authority over Egypt for that gestio negotiorum of European interests that Bismarck once hoped to see exercised by England alone. One stage in the establishment of this European authority had been reached when Germany and Russia claimed to be represented on the Public Debt Commission, and had their claims allowed; while the Multiple Control may be said to have come into existence soon thereafter (spring of 1885), when all the Powers, in spite of the maxim "beneficia non obtruduntur," insisted on sharing with England the guarantee of a loan of nine millions to the Government of the Khedive, for the purpose of doing for the financial reform of Egypt what the London Conference had failed to accomplish. One noteworthy thing about this international agreement was that it was based, not on the proposals of England, but on the counter-proposals of France.† The English Government had tried hard to

* In the House of Commons (27th March, 1885), Lord E. Fitzmaurice, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said: "The demands of Russia and Germany, to be represented on the Caisse, preceded by some two months the proposal for the suspension of the Sinking Fund. The date of that proposal was, if he remembered rightly, the 13th of September last, but the request of Russia and Germany to be represented on the Caisse was made during the sitting of the London Conference in July last."

† The fresh proposals made by England, subsequent to the failure of the London Conference, were contained in a memorandum sent by Earl Granville on November 24th to the British Ambassadors at the several European Courts. To these proposals the reply of Germany, and virtually also of
duce Germany to accept its scheme, with the view thus bringing the diplomatic pressure of this Anglo-German agreement to bear on France; but Bismarck could on no account lend himself to this "plucking of the Anglo-Egyptian chestnuts out of the fire." What intimated France, said the Chancellor, would also satisfy Germany, and the English must not expect him to do anything that would ruffle the sensibilities of his ends.

We have now endeavoured to show how—by the suit of a common policy with France in the countries stered by the Congo, the Niger, and the Nile—ismarck had carried out his threat conveyed through punt Münster on 5th May, 1884, that unless England owed more complaisant to Germany in a certain new eld of her ambition, "Germany would seek from rance the assistance which she had failed to obtain om England, and would draw closer to her on the one lines on which she now endeavoured to meet ngland;" * and now we shall proceed to close this rapter by telling what that new field of German ntion was.

Of all the great maritime States of Europe, Germany as the only one that had no possessions beyond the

annia and Austria, was to the effect that these countries would accept y agreement which might be arrived at between England and France. January 17th the counter-proposals of France were communicated in despatch by M. Waddington, and accepted in principle by Germany, stria, and Russia, before they were ultimately agreed to by England, d embodied substantially in a despatch of Earl Granville's on January nd.

* See Despatch of Sir Edward Malet, before quoted, p. 169.
sea. Though prolific of children, she had never become a fruitful mother of peoples. England had both colonies and colonists; France had colonies, but no colonists; while poor Germany had plenty of the best colonists in the world, but no colonies to receive them. The stream of emigration from Germany grew to be greater than from any other European country, but Teutonic emigrants became as completely lost to their Fatherland as those of its sons who fattened the battlefields of Bohemia and of France. Like the overflowing Nile, Germany sent forth an annual flood of emigrants, fertilising the countries where it ran; but, in return for this service to the general cause of civilisation, no counter-current of wealth or resources, from communities that were ruled by her laws and devoted to her interests, set for her receptive shores. Not, however, that no endeavours had ever been made by any German race to root itself beyond the sea.

On the contrary, the Great Elector, who passed his youth in Holland, and saw how a people like the Dutch, insignificant in themselves, might become rich and mighty by means of their foreign possessions and their ships, made strenuous efforts to add to the wealth and power of Prussia-Brandenburg by founding colonies and trading settlements. His victory over the Swedes furnished him with the nucleus of a navy, and with his Swedish caravels he sent out an expedition to the Gold Coast, where the flag of Brandenburg was actually hoisted (New Year's Day, 1683), and a fort built called Fried-
richsburg. On the Great Elector's successor, who became the first King of Prussia (Frederick I.), the colonising passion also took so deep a hold, that His Majesty all but acted on the advice of "certain Dutch and English schemers" who urged him to appropriate the isthmus of Panama, so as thus to make himself master of the connecting link between two oceans, and by consequence of the trade of the world.

There is, indeed, reason to believe that the chief of these evil counsellors may have been no less a person than that very William Paterson who devised the Bank of England, and who, with the aid of Fletcher of Saltoun, at last succeeded in persuading his Scottish countrymen to embark on the fell and tragic Darien expedition. What is certain is that, shortly before canvassing his proposal in Scotland, Paterson had visited the Hanse cities and the Courts of several German princes with the view of winning them to his plans;* and as the Elector Frederick grew so enamoured of the Panama enterprise that he only shrank from it on learning that it would be opposed by Spain, it can scarcely admit of a doubt that the scheme must have been suggested to him by that uncanny Scot who led his own countrymen such a disastrous dance after his Darien will-o'-the-wisp.

* In his account of the Darien Scheme, Macaulay writes: "Disgusted by what he considered as the ingratitude of the English, he (Paterson) repaired to the Continent (between 1690 and 1695) in the hope that he might be able to interest the traders of the Hanse towns and the princes of the German Empire in his plans. From the Continent he returned unsuccessful to London."
But, indeed, the success of the Brandenburg Guinea Company had not been such as to justify any new adventure at Panama; and by the time Frederick William (father of Frederick the Great) came to the throne, the affairs of the Gold Coast Colony were in such a hopeless condition, that the King swore he would not spend another farthing on such a bankrupt concern, and sold it to the Dutch. What the King above all things wanted was gigantic grenadiers, cost what they might, and so the first colonies of Prussia were sacrificed to Frederick William's insatiable lust for "lange Kerle." Thus, "as far back even as the time of the Great Elector," as Bismarck himself reminded his countrymen, "Prussia had had settlements on the African coast, but in the period of periwigs and gaiters they had again been given up and sold." *

That they had been given up and sold afflicted no one with more grief than it did Joachim Nettelbeck, a worthy citizen of Colberg, who, after passing most of his long life at sea, had risen to be burgomaster of his native town, and who, to the "sore, jealous, punctilious patriotism"† of Fletcher of Saltoun, added the scheming and inventive brain of William Paterson. In the course of his numerous voyages this brave old Baltic tar had sailed to the Guinea Coast, and there beheld what a blooming settlement the Dutch had made out of the bankrupt company of Kur-Brandenburg; and his soul was filled with an ardent longing to see his own countrymen standing as

* Reichstag, 10th January, 1885.  † Macaulay.
well in the world as the "heavy-bottomed Dutch." "The Prussian patriotism," he related himself in his own memoirs,* "became alive within me, and I pondered and pondered how my King, too, as well as England and France, might come to possess colonies producing sugar, coffee, and other such wares."

Accordingly, Nettelbeck could get no rest until he had presented Frederick the Great with a scheme for founding Prussian colonies on the coasts of West Africa and of South America; but the Great King was always too much occupied with enemies at home to have any inclination to court new adventures abroad, or even to answer the memorial of the Baltic skipper. But this did not damp the zeal of Nettelbeck, who, with the courage of a Columbus, waited until the Great Frederick was no more, and then, with another fine project of colonisation in his hand, waylaid Frederick William "The Fat," as that monarch passed through Pomerania to receive the homage of his estates at Königsberg. Even now, however, his petition became lost in the recesses of the circumference office. Nevertheless the burgomaster of Colberg despaired not, but hoped for better times.

That these times had at last arrived when Napoleon

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* "Joachim Nettelbeck, Bürger zu Colberg: eine Lebensbeschreibung von ihm selbst aufgezeichnet, &c." Under Gneisenau, the Commander of the garrison, Nettelbeck took a prominent part in the defence of Colberg against the French; and altogether he is a rather shining figure in the Prussian history of that time. Paul Heyse has introduced him into his historical play, "Colberg," but his colonising mania has been somewhat overlooked by historians.
was expelled from Germany, and when the allies, in 1814, had advanced on Paris to dictate a favourable peace, Nettelbeck made haste to conclude; and in his eagerness he wrote to his friend and patron Gneisenau, suggesting that part of the French indemnity to his dearly beloved Prussia might be made to consist of some flourishing French colony or other, that would thus enable his country to enter a career which it had already too long neglected. And he (Nettelbeck) himself, though now an old man of seventy-six, would, if his plans were adopted, beg the favour of being permitted to guide the first Prussian vessel to the American coasts. To this Gneisenau replied, that "it was the system of our State to have no colonies in foreign parts, seeing that the possession of such would make us dependent on the Sea Powers." Such, then, was the fate of an idea which had been clung to by its originator so tenaciously and long. Soon after this, brave old Joachim Nettelbeck, skipper, burgomaster, and brewer, died and was buried—he and his idea with him. Yet his idea itself did not die; for from the grave of the humble Nettelbeck, after the lapse of sixty years, it passed into the head of the mighty Bismarck, who was destined to modify the system of the Prussian State as thus expounded by Gneisenau.

But even Bismarck himself was for a long time of the same opinion as Blücher's Chief of the Staff. Referring once during the Franco-German war to the false rumour that he meant to act on the advice which
Nettelbeck had given to Gneisenau, and to demand from France twenty ironclads, with the cession of Pondicherry, the Chancellor said: "I want no colonies. They are good for nothing but supply stations. For us in Germany, this colonial business would be just like the silken sables in the noble families of Poland, who have no shirts to their backs." But a few short years were destined to change his opinion. One of his chief objections to colonies was the same as had been urged by Gneisenau, namely, that without a fleet to protect them, Germany would thus present so many vulnerable and undefended points to her foes. But, perhaps, the most astounding phenomenon connected with the rise of the German Empire was the creation of the German Fleet.

One of Bismarck's sorrows when at Frankfort, as we saw, was that he had to write reams upon reams about the rotten old vessels composing the North Sea Fleet, as to the maintenance of which the Diet fought and squabbled to such a degree that they had at last to be brought under the hammer. In 1848, the Prussian navy consisted of one corvette and two gunboats; and even by 1864, the Danes had war-vessels which made them as complete masters of the sea as the Prussians were by land. Immediately after the French war, the German Fleet only numbered forty-eight vessels of all kinds, with an aggregate of about 380 guns; but within a period of fourteen years from this date, the Imperial navy (on
paper, at least) was the third strongest in the world—being inferior only to that of England and France (though superior to both in torpedo equipment), with a force of about 120 various war-ships, carrying 580 guns and 13,000 men.

Such, then, was the marvellous result of the "Plan for Founding a Fleet" which, formed in 1873, was timed to be completed in ten years; and its punctual completion was ensured by a copious contribution from the millions, as well as by the profound belief of the German people that, if they were to retain the dominating position in Europe which their victories had assigned them, they would have to devise the means of making their power felt at sea no less than on land. It was, moreover, flattering to the vanity of the Germans that, in the construction of their navy, the Admiralty, scorning foreign material and skill, relied almost exclusively on the national resources, and in doing so produced what seemed to be such good results that even the Chinese hastened to order several ironclads at Kiel and Stettin. Intense, too, was the pride of the nation as corvette after corvette, and frigate after frigate, darted from the stocks under the baptismal blessing and hope of the Emperor, that "this new colossus of the deep would carry the German name to far-off lands, and compel respect for German rights in distant seas."

On several occasions already the young but powerful navy had well fulfilled this hope. In the year 1872 a couple of ironclads appearing in the waters of Sabanilla, in Columbia, had lent effective force to the claims of a
Bremen firm which built a railway in that region. Again, in 1878, after the President of Nicaragua had stubbornly refused to give satisfaction for a gross insult which had been offered to the German Consul two years previously, an Imperial squadron anchored off Corinto with an ultimatum on board, which had the speedy effect of inducing the recalcitrant Government of that Republic to apologise to and indemnify the aggrieved official, as well as to salute, with much solemnity, the German flag. In May, 1876, a force of six war-ships assembled at Hong-Kong, and added successful weight to the demands of the Imperial Government for compensation of damage done to German shipping by Chinese pirates; and when, in the following year, a fanatical mob of Mussulmans murdered (as we saw) the German Consul at Salonica, a naval force of 2,250 men, with 52 of the heaviest guns, was swift to steam to the scene of the massacre. About the same time an Imperial squadron cruised off the coast of Syria for the purpose of protecting the German settlers in Palestine from Mahomedan fury; while Dulcigno saw a couple of German ironclads contributing to the coercive force of collective Europe. All these exploits of their upstart fleet had flattered the German people, but still these bloodless achievements did not impress them with a sense of their new-born naval power half so much as when single vessels, in defence of German rights, had been obliged to send a shell crashing through a Chinese pirate-junk, or land a party of marines to castigate a tribe of South
Sea savages, or knock their mud-huts about the ears of predatory negroes on the Liberian coast, and carry away swarthy hostages to be stared at in the streets of Berlin.

And in proportion as their naval power increased, there grew in the German people a desire for a field where that power might be exercised. All the ownerless lands of the earth were being rapidly appropriated, and in Germany those voices multiplied which urged the Government to join in the general scramble for territory before it was too late. Societies for promoting colonisation began to be founded, publications on the necessity of inaugurating a transmarine policy poured from the the Press, and there were other signs of a growing wish on the part of the nation to provide some outlets of its own for the enormous current of emigration which flowed like another Gulf Stream westward across the Atlantic, and otherwise inundated most countries even of the Old World.* The average number of Germans

* According to published statistics there are 95,262 persons of German nationality residing in Switzerland; in Austro-Hungary the number of German subjects amounts to 98,510; in Italy, 5,221; in Norway, 1,471; in Sweden, 953; in Finland, 628; in Bosnia, 698; in Greece, 314; in Chili, 4,033; in Egypt, 879; in France, 81,988; in Holland, 42,626; in Belgium, 31,196; in Denmark, 38,168; in England, 40,371; and in Russia, no less than 394,299. Of the more important European countries Spain has the smallest number of Germans—namely, 962. By far the larger portion of Germans have emigrated to the newer parts of the world, and notably to the United States of America, where they number 1,968,742. In Queensland there are 11,638 Germans; in South Australia, 8,798; in Victoria, 8,571; in New South Wales, 7,521; in New Zealand, 4,819; in Tasmania, 782; in Algeria, 4,201; in the Argentine Republic, 4,997; in Uruguay, 2,225; in Peru, 898; and in Guatemala, 321. Altogether there
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE.

who turned their back upon their country every year was about 200,000; and how to stem, or divert this stream into channels contributory to the general weal of the Fatherland, was a question which had long been engaging the serious attention of German statesmen. "I am no friend of emigration," said Bismarck once,* "and I fight against it as much as I can. A German who can put off his Fatherland, like an old coat, is no longer German for me, and my clansmanlike† interest in him is gone."

With the causes of German emigration we are not here concerned, but the Chancellor himself once set up the astounding theory‡ that emigration rose in proportion to the material prosperity of the nation. The richer the country grew, he said, the more its sons would leave it; for the poor had not the means of doing so, and it was only those whom his economic policy had enriched who could manage to pay their passage across the Atlantic. It would surely have been equally reasonable of the Prince to have added that the practice of suicide in Germany§

are about 3,000,000 Germans recognised in official statistics as established abroad.

* Reichstag, 26th June, 1885.
† "Landsmannschaftliches Interesse."
‡ Reichstag, 7th January, 1885.
§ Says a newspaper note based on official statistics:—"Of all European countries Germany is the country where suicide is most frequent, and in Germany, again, Saxony takes the lead, much though the Germans of those parts are praised for their good spirits. In 1872 the number of suicides in Saxony amounted to 687, or 550 to every 1,000,000 inhabitants, five years after it rose to 1,114, and after five years more to 1,872. Last year 2,004 persons thus ended their lives, 1,081 of whom were of the male sex, and
—much more frequent, like that of emigration, than in any other continental State—kept pace with the material well-being of the Empire, seeing that the wealthy could afford to buy razors, halters, pistols and poison, while these expensive instruments of death were beyond the reach of paupers. Be that, however, as it may, the figures of emigration and the percentage of suicide were undoubtedly among the causes which began to deepen the desire of the German people themselves for the means of increasing their national prosperity, and of these possible means they seemed to think that colonies would be the most powerful.

But there was still another motive at the bottom of this new colonial passion, and that was the spirit of international rivalry which had taken such a deep hold on the German mind. "We are paramount on the Continent," thus they reasoned, "while England still monopolises predominance in the outer world; but is not this outer world also a fair field for our political competition, and for the extension of our influence?" They had drunk the full cup of power and become intoxicated with its fumes, and so delicious was the taste that they wanted more. They longed to encroach on a field which had hitherto been more or less the exclusive domain of England, to rival England in earning the gratitude of uncultured peoples for the
essings of civilisation; and their ambition in this spect was all the more audacious, as their Deutsche dlut, of which so much was said and sung, had been knolled by some of their best judges (including ismarck himself) to be inferior to the English article.*

ew Germans ever reflected on the impossibility of their taining equal pre-eminence in the arts of war and the ts of peace, and what they courageously but incons- stently aimed at, was to outstrip England in the race civilisation, as they had worsted France in the wrestle arms.

We have thus traced the development of the colonis-ion idea in the German people, and we must now eed to glance at the successive stages which Bismarck himself came to be eponent and champion of this aim.

bout the time of the Empire’s birth, as we have already cored, the Prince held that, “for us in Germany, this onial business would be just like the silken sables in c noble families of Poland, who have no shirts to eir backs.” But half-a-dozen years had not elapsed ore his ideas on this head had undergone a marked ange, as was evidenced by an interview he granted two gentlemen who went to him (in 1876) to advote the acquisition of land enough for a German ony in South Africa.

About that time the Boer Republics longed for pro-

* See p. 35, Vol. I. Among others, “Du Bois-Reymond (a celebrated rin professor) spoke very decidedly of the German civilisation as in-rior to the English.” (George Eliot’s Life, as related in her Letters nals, Chapter IV., “Weimar and Berlin.”)
tection by Germany, so the Chancellor was advised by his visitors to take advantage of this state of things in order to subsidise a society which should acquire Delagoa and St. Lucia Bays, and construct a railway between the coast and Pretoria, the better to promote German emigration thither. The Prince said that the colonial question was one which he had already been studying for years, and he was convinced that Germany could not go on for ever without a colony, but as yet he had failed to perceive any deep traces of a movement in this direction in the nation itself, and without that he could meanwhile neither give them a promise nor a hope.*

* An authentic account of this interview was first published in the Berlin Press in the early days of January, 1885. A similar answer had already been returned by the Chancellor to an eminent German in South Africa, who thus wrote:—"It was this free unlimited room for annexation in the north, this open access to the heart of Africa, which principally in-pired me with the idea that Germany should try, by the acquisition of Delagoa Bay, and the subsequent continual influx of German emigrants to the Transvaal, to secure the future dominion over this country, and so to pave the way for the foundation of a German-African Empire of the future. I gave expression to this idea of mine in a memorial, which I sent in March, 1875, from South Africa to the Emperor and Prince Bismarck. . . . My representations had, unfortunately, no result, except that Prince Bismarck expressed his approbation of my patriotic sentiments, but held out no prospect of these projects being entertained by the Imperial Government." The above is a quotation from a remarkable article by Ernst von Weber, published in the Berlin Geographische Nachrichten for November, 1879, which attracted much attention among persons interested in South Africa. In forwarding to the Colonial Office a translation of this article, Sir Bartle Frere wrote:—"It contains a clear and well-argued statement in favour of the plan for a German Colony in South Africa, which was much discussed in German commercial and political circles even before the Franco-German War, and which was said to have been one of the immediate motives of the German mission of scientific inquiry which visited Southern and Eastern Africa in 1870–71."
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 211

But from this time the traces of the colonial movement in the nation began to grow deeper and deeper, and at last the Chancellor resolved to test its extent and force. An opportunity for this purpose presented itself in the spring of 1880, when the failure of the Hamburg house of Godeffroy, popularly known as the "South Sea Kings," threatened to end in the extinction of all German trade and influence, which were admittedly paramount, in Polynesia. The Godeffroys had cherished the scheme of peopling their enormous tracts of land in Samoa with German emigrants. Bismarck had even given practical support to their plan and promised more, but the war of 1870 intervened to upset their calculations, and in ten years afterwards they were bankrupt.* A South Sea Company tried to raise itself

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* Mr. Stonewell Cooper, writing on this subject in his "Coral Lands," says: "It has been a matter of conjecture with many what could have been the object of Messrs. Godeffroy in purchasing such a vast tract of land in Samoa. I have enjoyed peculiar facilities for knowing their exact intentions. Very much of their land is so elevated as to possess a mild temperature well suited to the European constitution. It consists of fertile plateaux, anciently inhabited and cultivated. Their idea was to subdivide it among German emigrants, to whom they could lease it in small lots, with the option of purchase. Godeffroy to provide means of transport and all necessaries to begin with. The Franco-German War of 1870 prevented the realisation of this scheme as at the time intended. The results, there can be no doubt, would have been very beneficial to Messrs. Godeffroy, the white settlers, and the influence of the German Empire. The Government of the then North German Confederation regarded the matter with paternal interest, and several personal interviews and a voluminous correspondence passed between the senior partner of the house of Godeffroy and Herr, now Prince, von Bismarck, who had been great friends in youth, and who did not hesitate to lend his aid in furthering this new field for German advancement. The matter had not been long under discussion when the approval of the Prussian authorities took a
on the ruins of their enterprise, and it was to enable this company to be the national bulwark of German interests in Polynesia, that the Chancellor asked the Reichstag to guarantee payment of its dividends by a maximum annual grant of 300,000 marks for a period of twenty years.

But, by a narrow majority of sixteen, his demand was refused. The Prince himself, who at this time was living within the shadow of one of his periodical "requests for leave to resign,"* appeared not in Parliament to expound his views on the subject; but he afterwards admitted that his experiment with the Samoa Subsidy Bill had bitterly disap-

practical shape. Plans prepared upon the ground by a surveyor of the locality intended for a settlement were laid before the Government of Berlin. A programme of the course of colonisation to be adopted was drawn up. Extraordinary powers were given to the German Consul at Samoa; grants of arms of precision from the royal arsenals were made for the protection of the settlements; the Hertha, the first, it is said, of the Continental ironclads of Europe to pass through the Suez Canal, received orders to proceed from China to Samoa to settle all disputes between the Germans and the chiefs of that group, and by a judicious display of power to prepare the way for the first detachment of military settlers, who were to leave Hamburg as soon as her commander had submitted his report. This was a well-conceived project, but owing to the march of events in Europe, it collapsed before it was put into operation. Messrs. Godfrey, with their business knowledge and amateur statesmanship, severely felt the effects of the war and the blockade, from which not even the patronage of the man of blood-and-iron could extricate them.

By giving his powerful support to the plan of a South Sea Island Company with an Imperial guarantee, Bismarck did his utmost for the firm, but by a majority of sixteen the Berlin Reichstag refused to set Humpty Dumpty up again."

* This *Entlassungsgesuch* was connected with the anomalous state of things in the Federal Council which enabled all the minor States, with only a population of seven millions, to out-vote—a question of taxing Post Office orders—Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony, with a total of 34 million inhabitants.
pointed him, as showing that the nation was not yet ready to support him even with the humble beginnings of a colonial policy. Nevertheless, he drew consolation from the thought that the Reichstag but ill represented the opinion of the nation itself, and from the hope that the next turn of the party kaleidoscope would be all in his favour.

But his hopes were again belied. For that the representatives of the people did not truly represent the people, in whom the colonial passion was now rising to something like fever heat, was proved when, in the summer of 1884, four years after the rejection of his Samoa measure, he presented Parliament with a bill for subsidising several steam-packet lines to Australia and the far East. England did this, and France did this, and there was no reason, thought the Chancellor, why the postal and commercial interests of Germany should not be similarly promoted by a State-supported service of oceanic mails. It was not consistent with the dignity of the Empire that its diplomatic and official correspondence should be carried by the vessels of other, and perhaps unfriendly, Powers; apart from which, the rapid extension of its trading relations demanded this special means of promotion and protection; but, above all things, the new measure was rendered expedient by the circumstance that Germany was now at last about to become a Colonial Power. Not, it was true, in the style of England, France, and other countries. There would be no State colonisation, but wherever, in the wide world
German subjects acquired ownerless land, the ægis of the Empire would be thrown around them. The Imperial flag would not precede private colonial enterprise in distant lands, but it would always follow it; and hitherto unprotected, or badly protected, Germans abroad would now be familiarised with the proud feeling of "Civis Romanus sum."*

Such, in brief, was the character of the colonial policy on which, "after long thinking and beginning late," Prince Bismarck had now resolved to embark, and which he enunciated for the first time in connection with the debates on the Line of Steamer Subsidy Bill.† His declarations

* Writing to Count Münster on 10th June, 1884, Bismarck said:—"Yesterday I discussed the matter with Lord Ampthill, and told him that the German Empire could not refuse to protect the enterprises and acquisitions of its subjects in Africa or anywhere else; that I could not instruct German subjects asking for protection in lands across the sea to apply for it to England in countries not yet brought under English rule; and that where German merchants had settled, in the belief that in so doing they were subjecting themselves to no other European Power, I could not expect them to exchange, so far as their new acquisitions were concerned, their German for an English allegiance. My view was, and is, that a colonial system such as England's to-day, with garrisons, governors, and officials sent from the mother country, would be unsuitable to our existing arrangements in Germany; but that the Empire cannot but extend its protection as far as it is able to those commercial enterprises in which German subjects acquire the possession of territory. I appealed to the analogy of the English East India Company in its first beginnings. To Lord Ampthill's question whether we should go so far as to grant a royal charter to the persons concerned, I answered 'Yes.'" And in the Reichstag Committee, 23rd June:—"Once foreign nations had recognised the firm will of the German nation to protect each German according to the motto Civis Romanus sum, it would not be difficult to afford this protection without any special display of force."

† First in the Select Committee appointed to consider the measure in detail (23rd June, 1884), and afterwards in various sittings of the Reichstag.
were the most momentous to which Parliament had been treated for a long time, and by the nation they were received with general applause. But the spirit of the country was ill-reflect ed in the Reichstag, where factious partisanship still usurped the place of patriotism, and the Steamer Subsidy Bill was rejected by the Liberal Opposition for pretty much the same reasons as had led it to quash the Samoa Scheme. The Chancellor himself had said that, if this new measure were rejected, he certainly would feel discouraged in the matter of his colonial policy "of the moderate and unadventurous kind which had been advocated with such apparent enthusiasm by the nation at large;" but it soon transpired that he had already advanced too far on the path of this policy to be able to recede.

In the Chancellor's eyes, however, the opposition of the German Liberals to his Mail Steamer Measure was nothing compared with the much more serious obstruction which England, as he imagined, had jealously determined to offer to his general colonial policy; and he resolved to conciliate his domestic foes by showing to what extent he had been thwarted by the foreigner. Hitherto, in questions as between Germany and other countries, he had never failed in rallying all parties around him, and in making them present a united front to the meddling or the menacing alien. But it was necessary to show these parties to what extent his colonial policy, in his opinion, had been obstructed by England; and for this purpose, therefore, the re-introduction of the Steamer Subsidy
Bill next session (winter of 1884-85)* was heralded by the issue of a series of White Books, which told the nation a wonderful tale of how Germany began her career as a colonising Power.†

Wonderful was the tale, but one-sided; for the story was not complete until the Chancellor's Sibylline leaves had provoked a similar fit of apocalyptic fury on the part of the British Government; and it was only after the dust and smoke of the Battle of the White and the Blue Books had passed away, that it was possible to see clearly what the embittered combatants had been fighting for, and to pronounce upon the question of right or wrong. Bismarck, at least, had the advantage of opening the duel with a strong appearance of right on his side; and his story of the treatment he had endured at the hands of the Gladstone-Granville-Derby Government, in the matter of a strip of land on the coast of West Africa, evoked the almost universal sympathy of the English

* When it was approved.
† "A thing unique has happened in the Parliamentary history of Germany. The Reichstag has actually at last been presented with a Blue Book—or rather, a White Book, on the foreign affairs of the Empire. Prince Bismarck has frequently expressed his detestation of Blue Books as being nothing but a drag on public business, stones of offence to foreign Governments, and fatal to that absolute secrecy, without which thinks the Chancellor, the conduct of foreign affairs is impossible. It is not surprising, therefore, that some organs of the Press should hail the appearance of this White Book as almost as great a landmark in the constitutional history of the nation as the granting of a Prussian Constitution by Frederick William IV. It is true this White Book does not deal so much with Germany's relations to her great European neighbours as with her bargainings with the negro chieftains of the African coast; but still it marks a new departure in the Parliamentary methods of the Chancellor."—Berlin Correspondent of The Times, 5th December, 1884.
public, with a corresponding contempt for the authors of his woes. Of Angra Pequena—Germany's first colony—the White Book tale was briefly this, and its tenour was not materially modified by any subsequent counter-narrative from an English source.

A Bremen firm having begged for Imperial protection to its settlement at Angra Pequena, Bismarck demanded to know of Lord Granville whether England claimed any previous title to the region thereabouth (between the Orange River and the Portuguese frontier); as well as, if so, on what that title was based, and what means the British Government possessed in those parts for giving protection, if need be, to German settlers.

"While asking these questions," wrote Bismarck, "we know that England ever now has no such means at her disposal on those coasts; indeed, not even at Walvisch Bay, where, as far as I know, there are only three Englishmen in Government employ. My object in making these inquiries was, without causing a shade of mistrust on either side, to obtain from England the official admission that these waste districts were, from the European point of view, resnullius. I wanted to make sure by England's own admission that she had no demonstrable claims or titles of possession in those regions."

That England had no such title to that part of the African coast the Chancellor firmly believed, and his conviction was founded, among other things, on a despatch of the Earl of Kimberley to Sir Hercules Robinson, dated December 30th, 1880; in which the latter was expressly reminded that—

* To Count Münster, 10th June, 1881.
"It is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the Orange River is to be regarded as the north-western frontier of the Cape Colony, and the Government will not give its support to plans for extending British jurisdiction over Great Namaqua and Damaraland."

This was surely evidence enough in point, but, in reply to his inquiries above referred to, Bismarck was now surprised to be told by Lord Granville that—

"Although the sovereignty of Her Majesty had not been proclaimed along the whole coast, but only at particular points, the British Government was nevertheless of opinion that any claims of sovereignty or jurisdiction on the part of any other Power to the territory between the Portuguese border and the frontier of the Cape Colony, would be an encroachment on its (the British Government's) legitimate rights."

Bismarck rejoined by repeating his previous request for evidence of England's title in support of her pretended claims, and for information as to her power to protect German subjects in her territory. But months elapsed without bringing any definite reply to his despatch,* which, in the Chancellor's opinion, "might have at once been answered by a reference to the register of British occupations already effected," but which, instead, was bandied about from pillar to post, from the Foreign to the Colonial Office, from the latter to the Cape, and from the Cape back again to the Colonial Office, till his patience became fairly exhausted, and there was created in him the angry feeling "that we have not been treated by England on a footing of equality," and that "Eng-

* Of 31st December, 1884.
lish statesmen apparently wish to apply the Monroe doctrine against the neighbourhood of other nations in Africa."

But, he wrote, "we must not allow the idea to arise in this country that we are capable of sacrificing the vital interests of Germany to our real and sincere desire for a good understanding with England." If the English Government pursued a dog-in-the-manger policy with respect to Germany's just and reasonable colonial ambition, there was nothing for it but to pelt the dog out of the manger. Accordingly, finding it impossible to extract a simple "Yea" or "Nay" from the circumlocutio office in Downing Street, Bismarck at last took the bull by the horns, and declared the Angra Pequena settlement to have been placed under the protection of the Empire.* But even now a couple of months elapsed before the English Cabinet could make up its mind to recognise this German protectorate, and then, too, only on condition of the Empire agreeing not to establish a penal colony at any point of the coast in question. This condition, however, Bismarck found "so extraordinary, and so utterly incompatible with Germany's newly acquired position in Africa as an independent Power," that he refused even to submit it for consideration to the Emperor, and so Lord Granville was obliged to beat

* On 24th April, the Chancellor telegraphed to the German Consul at Cape Town: "According to statements of Mr. Luderitz, Colonial authorities doubt as to his acquisitions north of Orange River being entitled to German protection. You will declare officially that he and his establishments are under protection of the Empire."
an ignominious retreat by explaining that his meaning had been misunderstood.

But what embittered Bismarck most of all, was not so much the mere fact that he had been compelled to wait for more than six months before getting a definite answer to his inquiries, as his belief that this interval had been utilised by the British Government in “devising competitive schemes of English annexation” in that part of Africa. And, indeed, this belief was borne out by a fair appearance of facts. For Lord Derby’s correspondence with the Cape Government on the subject of Germany’s projects at Angra Pequena had the ultimate effect of making that Government resolve to annex all the circumjacent territory, between the Orange River and the Portuguese frontier. But of this paper act of appropriation, which would have been fatal to the German settlement at Angra Pequena, Bismarck would hear nothing. “We cannot recognise such an annexation,” he wrote, “and we dispute the right to make it.” The German Chancellor knew his own mind, while the English Cabinet did not, and when at last the latter woke up to consciousness of the fact that Bismarck was in earnest and determined to have his own way, it had no choice left but to convert its policy of obstruction and procrastination into one of concession and surrender. Perhaps, however, the unkindest self-inflicted cut of all was when the British Government, on being informed that the German flag had been hoisted on the African coast between Cape Frio and the Orange River,
muttered something about "a misunderstanding altogether," and hastened to recognise that annexation against which Lord Granville had protested as "an encroachment on our legitimate rights," as well as to crave protection for British subjects from the German Government in that territory in which Germany had at first, but vainly, craved the friendly protection of England for her trading sons.

For some considerable time previous to the divulgence of this sad and ignominious story, it had been only too clear that Bismarck was anything but obligingly disposed towards England in matters of her foreign policy, and now the chief cause of his displeasure was apparent. And there were few Englishmen who did not admit that—in the matter of Angra Pequena—he had a real grievance against their Government. Lords Granville and Derby, said their Press, richly deserved the snubbing they had got. For they had been guilty of apathy and neglect, of blindness and vacillation, of dawdling, shilly-shallying, and discourtesy. Lord Granville may have been perfectly sincere in protesting that the English Government viewed without the slightest jealousy the efforts of Germany to raise herself into the ranks of the colonising Powers; but, unfortunately, there was a gross discrepancy between its words and its acts, nor could Prince Bismarck and his countrymen be blamed for attaching greater weight to facts than to phrases.

It is certain, at any rate, that the German people became profoundly convinced that their colonising as-
pirations were viewed in England with jealousy and ill-will, and the publication of the Angra Pequena story only tended to strengthen this belief. But the truth would seem to be, that the Chancellor’s sudden embrace of a colonial policy filled the British Government less with malevolence than with surprise—to a degree, indeed, which engendered the inaction of incredulity.* “That England,” said the Chancellor himself,† “in her consciousness that ‘Britannia rules the waves,’ looks on in some surprise when her landlubberly cousin, as we seem to her, suddenly goes to sea too, is not to be wondered at.” “The English,” he remarked on another occasion, “seem to think that ‘Quod licet Jovi, non licet bori,’ and that we are the bos.”

But this was not precisely what the English thought. If the German “Ox” chose to cross the water, they had no objection whatever to its doing so, provided it did not seek to graze in pastures where their own interests were supreme. But it was some considerable time before their Government could really become convinced that Germany was thoroughly in earnest with her colonial schemes, and

* Lord Granville to Sir E. Malet (7th February, 1885): “The misunderstandings referred to by Prince Bismarck in his conversation with your Excellency are due to the suddenness with which Her Majesty’s Government became acquainted with the departure by Germany from her traditional policy in regard to colonisation; and the misconceptions which have produced a change of attitude on the part of Prince Bismarck towards this country can only be attributed to causes for which, as I will presently show, Her Majesty’s Government are not responsible.”

† Reichstag, 10th December, 1884.
from its uncertainty resulted that appearance of dilatoriness and disobligingness on its part which gave the Chancellor so much offence. The British Ambassador in Berlin—Lord Ampthill—had failed to penetrate the exact intentions of Prince Bismarck in the matter of his new policy; but, on the other hand, the Prince had taken the utmost pains to conceal some of these intentions from what he believed to be a jealous Government. And how well he succeeded in doing this was proved by Lord Ampthill's innocent reference

"to the great and growing impatience of the German people for the inauguration of a colonial policy by Prince Bismarck, who has hitherto shown no inclination to satisfy their desire for colonies beyond sending Dr. Nachtigal to report generally (about the commercial interests of Germany) on the West Coast of Africa."

These guileless words were written on the 30th May, 1884, twelve days after Dr. Nachtigal had received precise and secret instructions from the Chancellor to steam away with almost boiler-bursting speed,* and "protect our commerce from the territorial encroachments of other Powers," by annexing off-hand the Togo region, the coast between the Niger Delta and the Gaboon (Cameroon country), as well as Angra Pequena. This, then, was the "general mission of commercial inquiry" on which Dr. Nachtigal was bound, and for the prompt and successful execution of which he had, at

* "The 'scramble for Africa,' receives a fresh illustration from Dr. Nachtigal's admission that the engines of the 'Move' now required rest from the constant full-speed motion which had brought her from the Togo coast to Cameroon." The Times' summary of White Book.
the special request of his Government, been furnished
by Lord Granville with cordial letters of recommenda-
tion to the British authorities.* Furnished then with
these introductions, obtained, in plain language, on
false pretences, the German Commissary flew to the
West Coast of Africa, and hoisted the Imperial flag
in regions of which (as was well known in Berlin) the
natives had repeatedly craved the protection of England,
and which the English Government had already re-
solved to annex. Well, indeed, might such conduct
have been described as "sharp practice on the part of
Germany, to which the history of civilised countries
offers few parallels."†

Prince Bismarck himself was candid enough to
admit that he concealed the real object
of Dr. Nachtigal's journey, lest he should
be forestalled by the English; and in
justification of this course—which would have re-

* Lord Granville to Sir E. Malet (20th January, 1885): "In the
absence of any official intimation of the intentions of the German
Government in regard to the Cameroons, Her Majesty's Government did
not hesitate, at Prince Bismarck's request conveyed in Count Vitzthum's
note of the 19th April, 1884, to instruct their officials on the West Coast
of Africa to give Dr. Nachtigal all the assistance in their power in the
prosecution of a mission, which was described on the part of the German
Government as having for its object the collection of information on the
state of German trade, and the settlement of certain questions which had
arisen. It is evident that, had Her Majesty's Government supposed that
Dr. Nachtigal was authorised to annex territories in which they took a
special interest, and over which they had then decided to proclaim the
Queen's Protectorate, they would have exchanged explanations with the
German Government, which must have prevented the present state of
things."

† The Times, commenting on the Blue Book respecting affairs in the
Cameroons.
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 2:5

quired no justification at all, had he not induced the British Government to be the unconscious and deluded instrument of his plans—the Chancellor referred

"to what has taken place since our first annexations became known, which proves that English officials would have prevented German acquisitions, if it had been known beforehand at what points it was intended to make them."

But this argument was most effectually disposed of by Lord Granville, who showed that Her Majesty's Government had finally resolved to comply with the urgent and repeated requests of the Cameroon chiefs for British protection several months before Dr. Nachtigal started for their territory (with English recommendations obtained on false pretences), and that

"Consul Hewett would have been wanting in his duty to Her Majesty's Government if, on learning the real object of Dr. Nachtigal's journey, he had not at once fulfilled his instructions and secured to this country what was left of that coast."

The German Commissary had been instructed to appropriate the settlement of Victoria and Ambas Bay; but on landing there he found that he had been forestalled by Consul Hewett, just as the latter, on steaming to Bimbia, only arrived in time to bewail the futility of shutting the stable door after the steed had been stolen. As rude, discourteous, and provocative as it well could be, was the conduct of the German Government in annexing these Cameroon districts where English influence and authority were paramount, and where, as

* Bismarck to Count Münster, 5th Feb., 1885.
the Germans well knew,* the chiefs had expressed a decided preference for English rule; and its only possible excuse was that it was still smarting under the sense of seeming wrong which it had suffered at the hands of England in the matter of Angra Pequena.

In spite of the incredibly sharp and unfair practice to which British interests had been sacrificed, the Chancellor was officially informed that "the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been loyalty to accept the position of the Germans on the Cameroons River, and that they will in no way endeavour to impede its extension inland to the upper country." Yet in speeches and despatches he continued to hurl the bitterest reproaches against England for thwarting him in his colonial policy,† and to threaten to join her foes unless she proved more compliant with his imperious will.‡

* Consul Hewett to Lord Granville (July 30, 1884):—"Dr. Nachtigal told me he was aware of Bell and Akwa's request (for British protection)."

† Bismarck to Count Münster (Feb. 5, 1884):—"We unfortunately cannot avoid the impression that the acquisitions made by England on the coast between Ambas Bay and the Colony of Lagos since our annexation of the Cameroons were intended, in spite of the assurances to the contrary, to prevent the possibility of an extension of our possession."

‡ Earl Granville to Sir E. Malet (December 10, 1884):—"Count Münster called upon me to-day, and told me he had received a letter from Prince Bismarck, in which the Chancellor complained of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the Cameroons. His Excellency observed that the colonial possessions of Great Britain are so enormous that no German Settlement could ever do them harm. But public opinion in Germany was much excited about their Colonies, and his Excellency added that it was to be hoped that England should show herself friendly to Germany, as Germany has been showing herself friendly to England or former occasions in Egypt, and by the way she is
unfortunate Angra Pequena controversy had filled him with a consuming suspicion of British jealousy and obstructiveness; and when, therefore, the Cameroon natives rebelled against their new German masters, and had to be taught a sanguinary lesson of subjection by two Imperial ironclads—one of them bearing his own name—Bismarck never doubted that this insurrection was more due to English instigation than to Prussian masterfulness, and inexperience of rule among savage races.* For it was only under this conviction that he could have sent a peremptory request to the British Government to discharge its consular representative in the Cameroons, whom he accused of anti-German intrigues,† as well as to reprimand the commander of one of Her Majesty's war-vessels for not saluting the German flag.‡

* Rear-Admiral Knorr to Vice-Consul Buchan:—"At the same time I beg to inform you that I have, after information made to me, the suspicion that the English gentlemen residing here have not kept quite away of a lively sympathy with the rebellious negroes."

† February 5, 1885, through Count Münster:—"The Admiral has consequently proposed that Mr. Buchan should be forbidden the further exercise of his official functions in the Cameroons. Before we proceed to this extremity, we ask Her Majesty's Government to be good enough to relieve Mr. Buchan of his functions."

‡ "On the 26th December the English corvette Rapid appeared off the anchorage at Cameroon. As Admiral Knorr reports, this man-of-war omitted to salute the German flag in the usual manner as the territorial
To these demands Lord Granville returned an answer which proved that, though the Chancellor might be an adept at the use of the furious sledgehammer, the English Foreign Secretary was immeasurably his superior in wielding the finely-tempered and equally formidable rapier. No evidence, wrote his Lordship, had been offered in support of charges of anti-German intrigue brought against the English vice-consul in the Cameroons, or of the alleged participation of English missionaries and traders in the recent hostilities there, and consequently Her Majesty's Government were not in a position to discuss them. As for the refusal of the captain of the *Rapid* to salute the German colours as a territorial flag, he was strictly within his rights in not doing so on his own responsibility; while Her Majesty's Government reserved the right, usual in such circumstances, of claiming damages from Germany on behalf of those British subjects who had sustained loss from the action of the German forces at the Cameroons.

The Chancellor could not but wince under these rapier-thrusts, delivered with equal dexterity and cool-

flag. To a question put to him on this subject by the Imperial Admiral, Captain Campbell, the Commander of the *Rapid*, answered that he had only received private information of the German annexation. Her Majesty's Government will not fail to perceive how easily the omission reported by Captain Campbell of an official notification to English officers and officials of the assumption of a German Protectorate of the Cameroons might, without the temperate forbearance of the German Commandant, have led to misunderstandings between the ships of two nations which are at peace with one another, and both of which wish to remain so."
ness; and he began to show signs of losing that temper which must have been of almost heavenly sweetness, thought his countrymen, to have lasted so long. For, apart from the Angra Pequena correspondence and the Cameroon squabble, he had another heart-burning grievance against the English Government of much longer standing than either. This grievance dated as far back as the year 1874, when the unconditional assumption of sovereignty over the Fiji Islands by the British Crown, and the simultaneous issue of a Statute of Limitations with regard to land-claims against previous Governments, alarmed the Germans settled there with the fear that detriment would thus accrue to their invested capital. Into the merits of this purely legal question we will not enter; but we may remark that the German Government, at least, allowing itself to be persuaded by the arguments of its subjects in Fiji, characterised the measure complained of as "something very like a spoliation of our interests."

There ensued a long but fruitless correspondence on the subject; but the dead inertia and dilatoriness of the British Government were more than equal to the importunity of the German Chancellor, with whose demands neither Tory Cabinet nor Liberal Cabinet could be made to comply. At last, however, in 1883, after nearly ten years' experience of the law's delay, Count Münster was told to represent to Lord Granville

"how we, in consideration of the good services done by us to England in other matters (especially in Egypt), thought we might expect that the British Government would seize the opportunity of
complying with our wishes, which, for the rest, have such a clear legal basis."

What the Chancellor insisted upon was a mixed commission of inquiry into Fiji matters, and the renewed correspondence with reference to this demand, which lasted about a year, may best be summarised thus —Prince Bismarck: "We have helped you in Egypt, why not oblige us in Fiji?" Lord Derby: "We can't do it." Lord Granville: "We won't do it." Prince Bismarck: "But you must do it." Lord Granville: "Very well, we will then." Thus the upshot of the Fiji difference was very similar to the result of the Angra Pequena quarrel, the Gladstone Cabinet in each case yielding to demands which it had previously resisted. For the peace-of-mind-at-any-price disposition of that Cabinet had rendered it "squeezeable" to any extent; and it was doubtless more than a remarkable coincidence that it finally struck its colours, both in the matter of Fiji and Angra Pequena, at the very time when it issued invitations to the London Conference, where it hoped to have the continued support of Germany for its Egyptian policy.*

* Invitations to the Egyptian Conference were issued on June 17th (1884), and on that very day Count Münster reported to Berlin that "Lord Derby would to-day (June 17) telegraph to the Cape Government to stop all further action on its part with respect to Angra Pequena;" while on June 22nd Lord Granville told Count Herbert Bismarck that the Cabinet had "yesterday resolved to recognise the German protectorate" over that region. Again, on June 19th, Count Münster telegraphed that he had represented to Lord Granville "how seriously your Highness looked at the (Fiji) matter," and that "his lordship had declared that his Government had the firm intention to accede to the wishes of your Highness." In testimony whereof Lord Granville proposed (what he had at first resisted when suggested by Germany) the appointment of a mixed commission, consisting of a German and an English official, to examine the indemnity claims and
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 231

It surrendered at discretion, trusting to the clemency of its captor; but the stubbornness with which it held out so long had hardened the bowels of his compassion—as we have already seen.

In the Fiji incident we are inclined to look for the main-spring of Prince Bismarck's colonial policy. Had the English Government proved compliant with the Chancellor's demands in this affair—and if it was right in yielding at last, it was surely wrong in refusing at first, or contrariwise—then it would probably never have had to endure the sovereign rivalry of Germany in the South Sea, and elsewhere. The Fiji Statute of Limitations had shaken the Prince's conviction—but whether justly or not, we do not pretend to say—that Germans abroad could not enjoy better guardianship of person and property than under a British Administration; and thus he deemed that the time was now come for the Empire to cease borrowing imperfect protection for its subjects from other Governments, and so throw its own aegis around them, wherever they might pray for it.* It was in

submit the result to their respective Governments. Two days afterwards Count Hatzfeldt telegraphed to Count Munster: "We agree to Lord Granville's proposal."

* Count Munster to Lord Granville: "The Imperial Government regards the extension of British authority in foreign parts with the conviction that it will afford to the subjects of all civilised nations new guarantees for the security of property and for a regular administration of justice. It would not be in harmony with this view if German subjects should be deprived by the British Administration, without judicial sentence, of the property which they had lawfully acquired before the British annexation of Fiji. . . . Should the decisions hitherto arrived at not be rectified in the direction indicated, German subjects would in future
consequence, too, of one of these prayers that the German Government resolved to annex the northern coast of New Guinea—a region to which rumour had been for some time pointing as the chief field of its colonial ambition. As a skit ran:

"O some there were who talked full wise
Of the Germans beyond the sea,
And the purposes dark of the grim Bismarck,
On the coast of New Guinea."*

And these secret purposes, too, were duly carried out in a manner which involved England in another diplomatic conflict with Germany—a conflict which was directly due either to mala fide, or to gross misunderstanding of the English language on the part of the latter Power.

"The chief point at issue," as Lord Granville wrote, "was whether in September, 1884, when Her Majesty’s Government abandoned their original project of establishing a British Protectorate over all the coasts of New Guinea not occupied by the Netherlands, except that portion of the north coast comprised between the 141st and 145th degree of east longitude, and when they consequently restricted their Protectorate to the south coast, there was not an understanding between the two Governments that neither of them should take any

be justified in regarding themselves as threatened in the enjoyment of proprietary rights, acquired by them with sacrifices and dangers, in independent territories, on England taking possession of the said territories. For the Imperial Government, however, it cannot be a matter of indifference if the German trading community be shaken in its confidence in the protection and the regular legal procedure which it expects to find wherever the British flag flies, and if it should consequently feel compelled to appeal to the German Empire for the maintenance of its well-acquired rights."

* "The Lay of the good Lord Rosebery," in the Saturday Review of 11th April, 1885.
step involving the annexation of any portion of the still unoccupied
coasts of New Guinea, without a previous agreement by means of a
Commission or of diplomatic negotiations."

That such an understanding did exist, on the part of
England at least, was a fact. Out of deference to the
representations of Germany, Her Majesty's Government
had decided to restrict the British Protectorate to the
southern coast and contiguous islands, though without
prejudice to any territorial question beyond these limits,
which should be reserved for ulterior discussion; but
Prince Bismarck's reading of this arrangement evidently
was that "Germany should be at liberty to make annexa-
tions in New Guinea and elsewhere in the South Seas,
while England was to be debarred from doing so." For
on no other supposition was it possible for the English
Government to account for the startling announcement
that the German flag had been hoisted at three different
places on the north coast of New Guinea, as well as on
the Admiralty, New Ireland, and New Britain island-
groups. As in the case of the Cameroons, this was
again a piece of astoundingly sharp practice on the part
of Germany—but for England there was only one
possible way of replying to it, and that was by resuming
her liberty of action and running up the Union Jack
without the slightest loss of time on what remained of
the New Guinea coast between Huon Bay and East
Cape. "We protest against your annexation," wrote
Bismarck to the British Cabinet; but all the answer
he got was a bland offer to submit to friendly discussion
the settlement of the best point on the north-east coast
of New Guinea for the boundary of the British and German Protectorates. "As for what we have appropriated in the scanty nick of time," said England, in effect, "j'y suis, et j'y reste."

The Chancellor was naturally enough incensed at having thus been forestalled in New Guinea, and his wrath was intensified by the further fact that, about the same time, the British flag was hoisted at Saint Lucia Bay, on the south-east coast of Africa, as well as over all Pondoland, the hitherto unappropriated coast-region between Cape Colony and Natal. A very little reflection will show that, had the English Government neglected to make these annexations, it would have been traitorous to its highest trust. For Pondoland, in the possession of any foreign State, would have been as a disrupting wedge driven into the body of the British Empire in Africa; while to allow the Saint Lucia Bay coast-line to fall into the hands of Germany, would have deprived Her Majesty's Government of the power of checking the importation of arms to Zululand and the Transvaal. And that Germany was meditating the annexation of Saint Lucia Bay there could be no doubt.

For this annexation the Bremen owner of Angra Pequena had already paved the way by purchasing for an old song an immense extent of land from a native chief, and already the Press of the Fatherland had begun to indulge in jubilation at the prospect of a belt of German territory being drawn across the Dark Continent from the Orange to the Umvolosi river, which should bar the northward
pansion of the British race—when presto! up flew the
ion Jack with the legend—"prior and prescriptive
ghts!" And now disappointment and depression
ized on those who, in the previous summer (1884), had
ointed to see with what evident show of an anti-
glish demonstration a Boer deputation had been
ived in Berlin*—how the Boers had been lodged and
d at the Emperor's expense, and carried about in Court
pages; how they had been fêted, and petted, and
dauded as the heroic destroyers of British despotism;
how they had been taken to witness the laying of the
undation-stone of the new Imperial House of Parlia-
ent; how they had expressed a strong preference for
erman civilisation; and how the chief among them,
resident Krüger, had sat at the Emperor's table next
Bismarck, and talked about the glorious future of the
utch and German races in South Africa.

But the prospects of this future were held in Berlin
be somewhat clouded by the British annexation of
land and Saint Lucia Bay; and Prince Bismarck
oke out anew into his old lament that
British Government was thwarting his
lomial policy of set and malevolent pur-
ose, that it was annoying him at every
|, that wherever Germany hoisted her flag over a

* The deputation went to Berlin for the main purpose of negotiating a
ommercial Treaty.
† Sir E. Malet to Lord Granville:—"He (Bismarck) must believe
at her Majesty's Government had entirely failed to appreciate the
portance which his Government attached to the colonial question, as he
uld not suppose that, if your Lordship had understood it, the successive
beggarly little settlement (or "barren sand-hole," as Angra Pequena had been called in the Reichstag), England immediately applied her "closing up system," depriving it of necessary light, and air, and elbow-room.* It was thus, he said, that she had tried to choke the life out of Angra Pequena, to tight-lace the Cameroons, to monopolise New Guinea, and to constitute herself sole mistress of South-East Africa. All these things, the Chancellor seemed to think, were done against him from a sheer spirit of ugly jealousy and insatiable land-greed, and not in the necessary interest of the British Empire. He therefore lectured, and almost bullied, the British Government as if it had been a parliamentary party of pure negation, as if it had been "der Geist der stets verneint" of his own fractious Reichstag.

It never seemed to occur to him that, apart from the prior and prescriptive title of England to certain waste places of the earth,† the time had now come when it was her highest interest to cultivate closer and more cordial relations with her own offspring, with her own Colonial States, annoyances to which Germany had been exposed would not have been averted."

* Same to same:—"The Prince next reverted to what he termed our "closing-up system," and he mentioned Zululand, observing that the Boers claimed a cession dating from 1840 with King Panda. I said that I feared the Prince's good faith had been imposed upon, as no such State as the Transvaal had existed at that date, and that the only Boers who could have obtained a cession of territory, if such existed, were our own subjects. The Prince replied that it was not a question which a law suit would settle."

† Lord Granville to Sir Edward Malet: "There were also territories to which the British Crown had an inchoate title by cession or otherwise, which had not been perfected by actual possession."
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE. 237

an with the Powers of the Continent; and that, if she
dowed Germany to have it all her own way with her
hemes in South Africa and in New Guinea, she would
sure to estrange the affections of her own Colonies in
ose parts of the world, and perhaps even produce in
em more than a mere longing for secession. That this
no purely fanciful consideration was proved by the
orm of indignation and protest which swept over
ustralia, especially Queensland, when it became known
at Germany had annexed the north coast of New
uinea, after the bold appropriation of all the non-
utch portion of the Papuan Island by the Queensland
overnment had been timidly repudiated by Lord
erby.* But from his particular point of view the
ancellor claimed as much respect for the public
inion of Germany as of Australia; † he denied the
ght of the Australians to apply the Monroe doctrine to

* "H.S.H. replied by asking if I really believed in this supposed
ong feeling in Australia. I told him there could be no doubt of it
ever, that already we had heard that a bitter feeling of resentment
inst the mother country had been aroused, and that his own agents, I
confident, would tell him the same story. I told him I had in
ocket the copy of a telegram from the Prime Minister of Victoria,
e of the most important of the Australian Group. I had not intended,
course, to read it to him, but that under the circumstances I would do so
fidentially. It ran as follows: 'At last the end has come. Informa-
m received reliable source that Germany has hoisted flag on New Britain,
 Ireland, and north coast of New Guinea. The exasperation here is
endless. We protest in the name of the present and future of Australia;
England does not yet save us from the danger and disgrace, as far as
est as New Guinea is concerned, the bitterness of feeling towards her
ill not die out with this generation.'" (Mr. Meade, of the Colonial
ice, in his report of a conversation he had at Berlin with Prince
ismarck on the subject of Anglo-German colonial differences.)
† Prince Bismarck's account of the same interview.
their Polynesian neighbourhood; and thus it was that he came to characterise the due regard of England for the cohesion of her great Empire as wanton obstruction to the colonial expansion of Germany.

Thus, then, we have endeavoured to trace the process by which “the recent attitude of Germany as to Egypt had for the moment changed from the friendly one previously maintained towards this country.” * On his famous principle of *do nt des*, † Bismarck had offered to support the Egyptian policy of England, on condition of the latter favouring his colonial schemes. So at least the Prince explained to the English Ambassador in Berlin, after the misunderstanding between the two Governments had become acute, by reading to him (24th January, 1885) a despatch which he—the Chancellor—had addressed to Count Münster as far back as 5th May, 1884. This despatch, wrote Sir Edward Malet (for it is necessary to repeat part of it)—

“Stated the great importance which the Prince attached to the colonial question, and also to the friendship of Germany and England. It pointed out that, in the commencement of German colonial enterprise, England might render signal service to Germany, and said that for such service Germany would use her best endeavours on England’s behalf in questions affecting her interests nearer home. It pressed these considerations with arguments to show the mutual advantage which such understanding would produce, and it then proceeded to instruct Count Münster to say, if it could not be affected, the result would be that Germany would seek from France the assistance which she had failed to obtain from England, and would

* Lord Granville to Sir E. Malet (7th February, 1885).
† Enunciated in the Reichstag, 10th December, 1884; See ante p. 327.
lraw closer to her on the same lines on which she now endeavoured to meet England. . . Prince Bismarck went on to say that, not being satisfied with the result, and attributing it in part to the Ambassador not having stated the points with precision, he sent his son, Count Herbert Bismarck, to England, in the hope that he might succeed where Count Münster had failed; but that he, unfortunately, had only succeeded in obtaining those general friendly assurances of good-will which were of little value in the face of subsequent occurrences."

Sir Edward Malet was right in describing this despatch of the Chancellor as a "very remarkable" one; but the most remarkable thing about it, as presently turned out, was that its contents had never been communicated by the German Ambassador to Lord Granville at all. "I regret it, if I may say so," said Mr. Gladstone, disavowing all knowledge of it,* "because, if it had been communicated to us, it would have attracted all the friendly attention which it would well deserve." It is true, as appears from Lord Granville's letter† quoted

* House of Commons, March 12, 1885. On that occasion also Mr. Gladstone said:—"I want to say a word upon a portion of the subject which is alluded to in this variety of correspondence, which I feel convinced could never have taken place at all if only there had been that general introduction to the question—a statement of the desire of Germany to become a colonising Power—which Prince Bismarck thought he had made in communicating this despatch. I quite agree, he did believe it had been communicated; but that is now seen to be an error on his part."

† Lord Granville to Sir E. Malet (7th February, 1885) :—"The despatch of Prince Bismarck to Count Münster of the 5th of May, containing an exposition of the policy of Germany as to colonisation and of the understanding which he desired to bring about between England and Germany, was never communicated to me."—A question in the House of Commons on the subject of the unfortunate despatch of 5th May was answered by Lord E. Fitzmaurice, who read the following letter to himself from Lord
below, that "Count Münster and Count Herbert Bismarck not long afterwards" (i.e., after the 5th May), "each told me that the German Government could not maintain a friendly attitude on Egyptian matters if we continued to be unfriendly on colonial questions," but this was a very much milder and more imperfect statement of the case than the Chancellor's exposition of it to Count Münster. A painful misunderstanding between the two Governments was the result, and for this misunderstanding their respective representatives in London and Berlin were mainly, it is to be feared, to blame.

For, on the one hand, Lord Ampthill, with all the good qualities that otherwise fitted him for his post, had

Granville. "March 9, 1885. Dear Fitzmaurice.—I take the unusual course of writing to you a letter in answer to Mr. Labouchere's questions, as they affect me personally rather than the Foreign Office. I never received, nor had I until lately, any knowledge of Prince Bismarck's despatch of May 5. Count Münster and Count Herbert Bismarck not long afterwards each told me that the German Government could not maintain a friendly attitude on Egyptian matters if we continued to be unfriendly on colonial questions. I denied that we had been unfriendly, and gave positive assurances on the part of my colleagues and myself of friendly action for the future. Both Count Herbert Bismarck and Prince Bismarck expressed at the time their satisfaction with these assurances. The tension which has since arisen resulted from the serious difference of opinion on the part of the two Governments as to whether those assurances have been kept or broken. I need not renew that discussion, more especially as I have reason to hope that this friction will be a thing of the past. Count Münster was not present at the conversations which I had with Count Herbert Bismarck. It is not usual for the Ambassador and his first secretary to come at the same time. What I have stated above will show that it was impossible for me to complain to Count Herbert Bismarck of the non-communication of a despatch which I did not know to exist—a despatch which appears to have been secret, and to have dealt generally with the political situation for the guidance of Count Münster. Yours sincerely, GRANVILLE."
completely failed to penetrate the colonial intentions of the Chancellor.* There was certainly a suddenness in the manner in which the Prince openly announced his resolution to embrace a colonial policy; but this resolution had been slowly matur- ing ever since the Samoa Subsidy Bill—four years previously—had indicated his desire to "feel the pulse of the nation" on the subject of colonies, and ever since that time he had been secretly preparing for his new departure. It may be said that an Ambassador cannot tell his Government more than is told to himself by the Government to which he is accredited. But surely, if the function of an Ambassador be restricted to simply repeating what is vouchsafed to him in the way of information, and if he take no further pains to penetrate, by intuition or independent inquiry, the secrets of a foreign policy, his duties, as Bismarck

* Lord Granville to Sir E. Malet (7th February, 1885):—"Until the receipt of a report from Lord Ampt Hill of the 14th June last of conversations he had had with Prince Bismarck, and up to the interviews which I had about the same time with Count Herbert Bismarck, I was under the belief that the Chancellor was personally opposed to German colonisation. The reports of Lord Ampt Hill were continuously and strongly to that effect, and on the 15th March, 1884, his Excellency, referring to the agitation on the subject among the shipping and commercial classes in Germany, stated that it was well known that the Prince was absolutely opposed to their ardent desire for the acquisition of colonies by Germany, and was determined to combat and oppose their growing influence. The anxiety expressed by Count Minster on behalf of his Government, that German subjects should be protected at Angra Pequena, in no way removed the misapprehension on my part. But after the information received in June, Lord Derby and I, together with our colleagues, desired to meet the Prince's views with regard to Angra Pequena in every way compatible with the private rights of British subjects, and I know not how it can be said that we departed from that course."
himself remarked, might as well be performed by an inexpensive postman.*

On the other hand, if Lord Ampthill had failed to make his Government fully alive to the earnestness of Bismarck’s colonial intentions, Count Münster certainly incurred the charge—and, as it would seem, the just charge—of not having done all he could to reflect the mind of the Chancellor on the same subject in Downing Street. The Prince himself, as we have seen, told Sir E. Malet “that, not being satisfied with the result” (of the German Ambassador’s representations to Lord Granville), “and attributing it in part to the Ambassador not having stated the points with precision, he sent his son, Count Herbert Bismarck, to England, in the hope that he might succeed where Count Münster had failed.”

Though of a piece with the Chancellor’s rough methods of imperious discipline, this special mission of Count Herbert Bismarck to London was anything but considerate or respectful to the German Ambassador;

* “You are aware, I presume, that late diplomatic intercourse on the part of England has been mainly, if not exclusively, carried on by means of Notes which are drawn up in England and sent here to be signed by the English Ambassador, who then has to read or hand them to me, or leave a copy, as the case may be. But on the whole it resembles a correspondence which, like a private one, passes directly from the writer to the receiver complete in all its details and beyond the possibility of anything being added to it on the strength of the impression it may make on the Ambassador, who is merely charged with delivering it. Any other official would also be able to do that, and even the Post Office would see to it as safely as the Embassy. But if this is the proper system, then our whole costly service of diplomacy is superfluous—(hears, hear, and laughter)—and the Universal Postal Union of my colleague Stephan (Postmaster-General) can take charge of all our diplomatic intercourse.”—Reichstag, 2nd March, 1885.
and there were many who expected that his resignation would be the result, even if it were not the Prince’s primary aim to get rid of a most amiable, but not sufficiently energetic diplomatist. That in Count Münster’s diplomatic action with regard to the Empire’s colonial policy his Chief beheld the elements of a personal difference such as once ended in the disciplinary transfer of Count Arnim from Paris to Constantinople, was believed by many; and yet this supposition was not altogether compatible with the intense irritation displayed by the Chancellor when the English Blue Books revealed all the impartial facts of the case, as interwoven in our narrative. *

But, indeed, the German White Books had told such an imperfect and one-sided story, that the English Government could not possibly, without renouncing all the laws of honest self-defence, have refrained from publishing counter-statements, even though, in the eyes of Bismarck, these “constituted such an act of indiscretion as must render confidential intercourse between the statesmen of the two countries impossible in the future.” † The

* “We are quite at a loss to imagine what could have induced the authors of the English publication to disclose remarks about the German Ambassador, Count Münster, which the Chancellor is reported to have let fall in the course of private conversation. In this there is a personal malignity for which we can find no explanation.”—North German Gazette.

† Semi-official communiqué in the North German Gazette, which otherwise wrote: “The contents of the last English Blue Books contrast strikingly with the diplomatic customs of the European Powers. If we look back on the fourteen years which have elapsed since the French war, we shall hardly find a public and official correspondence between two Cabinets more in contradiction to diplomatic traditions than the latest.
Chancellor, in particular, was highly incensed at the divulgence of his threat to throw himself into the arms of France in the event of his advances being rejected by England, seeing that this might have the effect—the intended effect, he feared—of making his artificial ally, France, distrustful of a lover plainly obtainable by the highest bidder. And it was under the sense of this irritation that he fought that famous oratorical duel with Lord Granville, of which the rapier-sparks shed so much light on the Egyptian policy of Germany, as already detailed in its proper place. "I must say," Lord Granville had remarked, at an unfortunate moment in the House of Lords,*

"I must say that I have not the slightest right to complain of Prince Bismarck's expressing an unfavourable view of our Egyptian policy, for the simple reason that the policy of the Government has never yet been in accord with the advice, with regard to Egypt, which he gave to the late Government, and to ourselves—namely, to take it."

We have already seen what was the nature of Bismarck's "advice," or at least opinions with respect to English policy in Egypt;† and it will be clear that this advice was covered, though not quite accurately described, by Lord Granville's phrase, "take Egypt." As his Lordship explained on a subsequent occasion,‡

"I might probably have used a better phrase if I had spoken from written notes, although the words certainly apply either to an

publication of the English Blue Books. The Note addressed to Count Münster on February 21st, in which the German complaints of the conduct of English officers, officials, and private persons in the Cameroons, are answered, may, without injustice, be termed a rude snub. No sovereign tribunal could silence frivolous complaints more contemptuously."

* February 26th, 1885. † See p. 185 ante. ‡ March 6th, 1885.
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE EMPIRE.

annexation or a protectorate, or even to an occupation for the future."

But the Chancellor caught at the phrase as if it had been another malicious attempt to discredit him in the eyes of his new French friends, and seized the welcome opportunity to retaliate on the English Government for the indiscretions of its Blue Books by endeavouring to show that, "if his advice with respect to Egypt had been followed by England, many a complication, perhaps, would not have occurred."

That the Chancellor did this under a keen sense of irritation, and a feeling that he had been the object of a personal attack on the part of Lord Granville, was proved by the angry manner in which he girded at the English Government, its rudeness, its unpardonable indiscreetness, its malice, and its abominably long-winded methods of doing business. But before the echo of this explosion had subsided, it became known that the Chancellor had sent his son, Count Herbert, on another special mission to London; and a day or two after his arrival there, the Count had the satisfaction of listening in the gallery of the House of Lords to the declaration of Lord Granville that, "I can conceive nothing more wanting in self-respect, or in respect

* Speech, 2nd March, in Reichstag.
† In the Reichstag on March 2nd, he said: "I hold oral communication to be the more suitable form of the two; the English prefer written intercourse. I have been at pains to count the Notes we have received from them since last summer, for, having to superintend the answering of them, they cause me an immense amount of work. I think the number of these Notes is 128, making a total of from 700 to 800 pages, and I may say that, during the twenty-three years I have been Minister, we have not received as many from all the other Governments together." (Laughter.)
for the great Minister of a foreign and friendly State, than that I should have spontaneously initiated in this place any attack upon such a person as the leading Minister in Germany."

By some, these words were considered as an apology; while by others they were interpreted, and rightly so, as a simple explanation. The period of misunderstanding had lasted long enough; it was now time that two nations, which had every motive of interest and origin to be good friends, should end their lovers’ quarrel. The precise object of Count Herbert Bismarck’s mission to London has not yet been revealed, but we know in general terms that it aimed at effecting an amicable agreement as to the respective spheres of interest of England and Germany in New Guinea and the Cameroons;* and that it drew from Lord Granville the loudly-cheered assurance, “that all my efforts will be exerted in favour of the conciliatory policy which has been sketched out by the German Chancellor,” as well as from Mr. Gladstone the equally applauded utterance:

“If Germany is to become a colonising Power, all I say is, God speed her. She becomes our ally and partner in the execution of the great purposes of Providence for the advantage of mankind. I hail her in entering upon that course, and glad will I be to find her associating with us in carrying the light of civilisation, and the blessings that depend upon it, to the more backward and less significant regions of the world.”

There was even one English journal † which so far

* The territorial disputes of England and Germany, as well as the Fiji land-claims, were soon afterwards submitted to a mixed commission of inquiry in London, and settled to the satisfaction of both parties.
† *Pall Mall Gazette.*
forgot the strength and dignity of the people whose mind it aspired to express, as to utter a craven: "Sine Germaniâ nulla salus;" and in Parliament one member * laid down the doctrine that "if we were to maintain our Empire, it was utter madness to think that we could do so without the assistance or the cordial friendship of Germany." But the Premier more truly expressed the feelings of his countrymen when he said that, while second to none in the value he attached to the friendship of Germany, he was not prepared to admit "that the friendship of any country in the world is necessary, or ever has been necessary, to enable England to maintain her position." These were noble and encouraging words—may their author live long, if he meant to make them good! England can afford to maintain her position in the world without the alliance of any country, if she but retains the friendship of her Colonies, which are rapidly developing into World-Powers. With her colonial children marshalled around her, no envious State, or coalition of States, could any longer "squeeze" her; she could defy the banded world in arms.

The unfurling of the German standard in New Guinea was a sore trial to the allegiance of her Australian offspring; yet, hard as was the trial, their allegiance not only stood the test, but seemed even to acquire fresh strength from the ordeal, as was evidenced by the eagerness of the Colonists to rush to Egypt and rally

* Mr. Onslow.
round the old maternal flag. The "squeezing" process, which had been applied to them by Germany in their own part of the world, had made them all the more determined to help in saving old Mother-England from similar treatment in the antipodean North. The arrival of Anglo-Australian warriors on the shores of the Red Sea denoted the beginning of a new and glorious era in the history of the English-speaking race, for it signified that the foundation-stone of Imperial Federation had already been laid; and there can be little doubt that the impulse to this epoch-making movement had received fresh force from the colonial policy of the man who had federated his own Fatherland, and made such a momentous difference between the past and the present, "when the whole German-speaking population has been brought together, and is subject to the controlling will of one gigantic power, and that gigantic power swayed and moved by the will, I had almost said, of a gigantic man."

We have seen the strength of that will tested by the manner in which Bismarck conducted the foreign relations of Germany to her temporal neighbours, and now we must proceed to see it measured by his great historic conflict with a Spiritual Power.

* Mr. Goschen, speaking at Edinburgh, 3rd February, 1885.
CHAPTER XII.

THE "KULTURKAMPF."

1. With Pius the Ninth.

"Priest, beware your beard!
I mean to tug it and to cuff you soundly;
Under my feet I stamp thy cardinal’s hat:
In spite of Pope and dignities of Church
Here, by the cheeks, I’ll drag thee up and down."

The Empire which had been raised required to be consolidated, to be secured against the assaults of external and internal foes. A strong, re-organised army would keep effectual watch on the Rhine and on the Elbe, but what would prevail against the rancorous owers of the Devil and of Darkness? Germany had scarcely reached the goal of her political aspirations when these powers began to work their baneful will upon her; Bismarck had not long risen triumphant from his "deadly close" with France, when he became locked

* First part of Henry VI., Act I., Scene 3.
in mortal combat with Rome—when Prussia and the Papacy plunged into the furious "Kulturkampf."

But what is the meaning of "Kulturkampf," it may be asked? Well, Kultur is the German word for "culture," "civilisation," "progress of the race;" and Kampf signifies "battle." Kulturkampf, therefore, must mean "civilisation-battle." Good. But is the battle for, or against civilisation? The Protestants take the former view, while the Catholics—forming one-third of the population of Germany—are equally strenuous in affirming the latter. In any case the word, it seems, was first coined in the former sense by Professor Virchow, the hero of the trichina and the cellular system of physiology—a man who has done not a little to advance the cause of true science. But was this "Kulturkampf," then, quite a new thing? No; it was as old as the hills, and had in the course of the world's history caused infinite bloodshed and suffering to freedom-loving mankind. As Bismarck himself once said:* 

"The struggle is purely political, and not one between a Protestant dynasty and the Catholic Church; it is not one between faith and unbelief, it is only the reappearance of the conflict—older than the advent of the Redeemer of the world, as old as the human race itself, the same contest for power as Agamemon waged with his seers at Aulis, and which cost him his daughter while preventing the Greeks from setting sail for Troy; the conflict which raged all through the middle ages between the Pope and the Kaisers till the Empire was ruined, and the last representative of the illustrious Swabian dynasty" (Conradin) "perished on the scaffold under the axe of a French conqueror in alliance with Rome."†

* In the Upper Prussian Chamber.
† Say—Professor Bryce, in his "Holy Roman Empire" (p. 211):—"Is
"It is not a question," said a distinguished American preacher,*

"of any party, civil or ecclesiastical in any land; it is not the question of any one Government, either as to form or policy; it is the question whether there shall be Civil Government to which its subjects yield direct and sole allegiance, or a universal Paparchy—the kingdom of the Pope within every State and over it. Yes, it is the deeper question whether the nation shall exist—the nation in its entirety and its integrity—with its patriotic consciousness, with its self-ordered institutions, its laws, its schools, its arts and sciences, its community of ideas and interests; or whether within every nation there shall be another nation, an ecclesiastical nation, struggling against it and striving for the mastery, even to the destruction of the body politic—in one word, it is the question between Society and the Syllabus!"

The struggle between the principles represented by Church and State is as old, we have seen, as the hills. Who began it in Germany afresh? To answer this question we need go no further back than 1864, the year in which Prussia, under her political Luther, had reduced the number of unknown quantities in the problem of German unity. In December of that year, Pius IX., guided, as he always was, by the Jesuits, issued his Syllabus of Errors, which summed up from his point of view all the "sad fallacies and fatal aberrations" to which human nature had fallen a prey

the last act of the tragedy" (struggle between Pope and Emperor) "were joined the enemy who had now blighted its strength and the rival who was destined to insult its weakness and at last blot out its name. The murder of Frederick's (Barbarossa) grandson Conradin—a hero whose youth and whose chivalry might have moved the pity of any other foe—was approved, if not suggested, by Pope Clement, it was done by the minions of Charles of France."

* Dr. Joseph Thomson, of New York.
since it first attempted to shake off the salutary yoke of the Papacy; but which, in the eyes of Protestant States, condemned all that constitutes modern society. Though not honoured with actual mention in the Syllabus itself, there can be no doubt that King William’s Prime Minister was down on the Index as the greatest living error of his time. With their usual penetration the Jesuits had been the first to recognise in him the rise of a new power in European politics, and they kept their eyes upon him.

In 1865 the inmates of the Vatican branded Herr von Bismarck, in plain words, as “the incarnation of the Devil.”* If this they said before Sadowa, what must they have thought after a battle which broke the military arm of the Papacy, drove Austria out of Italy and Germany, and placed the destinies of the latter in the hands of Protestant Prussia? “The world is collapsing,” exclaimed Cardinal Antonelli on receiving news of Königgrätz. At the outset of the campaign the Ultramontanes did everything they could to sow discord in King William’s camp, to excite the sympathies of Prussian Catholics with their Austrian brethren by representing the impending struggle as a purely religious war; nor did the Pope fail to go down upon his fervent and assiduous knees on behalf of the Hapsburg cause. But Papal prayers were of no avail against the Protestant needle-gun. The ruler of the consciences of more than two hundred millions of his fellow-mortals looked and listened, and he felt like a

* “Der Nuntius Kommt,” by Count Harry Arnim.
hunted thing, driven out of its favourite recesses, cut off from its companions, and threatened by an ever-narrowing circle of toils. Yet one more desperate bound, and he might still be free! But what was the form of this distracted effort? The world was soon to know.

Among his other surprising performances, Pius IX. had already defined and declared the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception; but the wire-pulling Jesuits had a much more astounding feat in store for their Papal puppet. "Ye shall obey God rather than man," said the devoted followers of Loyola to the nations, "and the will of God may be learned from an infallible Pope." But how was the Pope to become infallible? "Oh, by our declaring him to be such," replied the Jesuits. Their reasoning prevailed. In June, 1868, the meeting of an Ecumenical, or Universal, Council of the Church at the Vatican was solemnly proclaimed, and the 8th of December, 1869, fixed for its opening. More than three centuries had elapsed since the last assemblage of the kind—that of Trent—and it would work great doctrinal and other wonders. In the Syllabus, His Holiness had already denounced eighty-four points of modern heresy and error. The Council would bear him out in his ban, and restore the glitter to his fading godhead.

At first, the prospect of all this scarlet dramaturgy excited the laughter of Europe more than its fears. Even had he not been engaged in a task which demanded all his energies, Bismarck would probably have received the news with
a grim sneer. As it was, there is nothing to show that he meanwhile troubled himself very much about the matter. Secure in its principles and resources of action, Protestant Prussia remained calmly silent. But not so Catholic Bavaria, which hastened to sound the first note of alarm. In the spring of 1869, her Foreign Minister, Prince Hohenlohe,* addressed a Circular to all the representatives of Bavaria abroad, with the view of inducing the European Governments to take concerted action, by protest or otherwise, against the dangerous pretensions of the Vatican. The Prince had learned that the Council would be called upon to declare the infallibility of the Pope—"whose superior power over all princes and peoples in secular things would thus become an article of faith," and to convert into regular decrees the anathemas of the Syllabus against "some of the most important axioms of political life."

Europe saw that there was undoubted danger in all this, and the only question was—how to meet it. Should it be obviated, or only dealt with when seriously developed? At first averse from all preventive measures, Austria afterwards informed the Curia that "if it went on to realise its designs, it would create an impassable gulf between the laws of the Church and those of most modern States." France, too—strictly Catholic France—vigorously represented to the Pope that the course he was pursuing would inevitably bring him into disastrous conflict with society and the civil powers at every point. But while

* Afterwards Imperial Ambassador at Paris.
other States were more or less inclined to take preventive action, singly or in concert, Bismarck resolutely declared himself for a policy of strict non-intervention. Yet he was by no means blind to the serious perils ahead.

About a month after the issue of Prince Hohenlohe's warning Circular, Herr von Arnim, German Minister at Rome, recommended to the Chancellor (May, 1869) a distinct plan of action. This proposal is all the more worthy of attention, as it was connected with a most tragic incident in the later career of both statesmen, to which we have already had occasion to refer. Without attaching much importance to the doctrinal question of infallibility, Herr von Arnim pointed out that,

amid the lack of positive data to go by, there was meanwhile one tangible fact on which any Government could and should act—the fact, namely, that a committee was already preparing for the consideration of the Council certain caenons affecting the relations between Church and State, "without consulting the other party to the contract." Arnim, therefore, suggested that a protest against these proceedings should be sent to Rome, accompanied by a demand for the admission into the Council of one or several lay representatives (Oecumenes), who should secure for Germany the legitimate influence she had always exercised in assemblies of the kind. Contrary to previous custom, the Curia had not this time invited the temporal Powers to the Council, and Arnim urged that observance of the practice should still be claimed.

Count Arnim thought and the number of those who shared his belief was large—that much more effective opposition to Papal pretensions could be organised by making the resistance of the German
bishops a State cause to be supported, not outside, but inside the Council. Whether the "Kulturkampf" would have been obviated had his advice been taken, must for ever remain a moot-point. The Jesuits would probably have had their own way in either case. But it is only fair to Arnim's memory to say that his detailed prediction of the internecine struggle that would be sure to result from the policy that was being followed, has been fully verified by events.* Prince Bismarck, however, would not hearken to his words. For the German Government, he argued, to demand lay representation at the Council, would be sure to expose it to an undignified rebuff, and make it look ridiculous.

Besides, what was the use of protesting, if the protester had it not in his power to prevent what he deprecated? The relations between Church and State had become entirely changed since the Council of Trent, and the participation of the Government in any such meeting rested on a foundation which belonged to the past, and no longer existed for Prussia. If Prussia took part in the Council, she would naturally have to reject or accept its decision as part of her public law, and this would be a pretty pass to come to. For Prussia, indeed, there was only one possible standpoint—that of perfect freedom for the Church in ecclesiastical matters, and real protest in the shape of actual opposition to her encroachment on

* In his celebrated Promemoria addressed to Bishop Hefele, of Bottenburg, not to Dr. Döllinger, as generally asserted, and to which we have already referred (see p. 43 ante), Herr von Arnim says: "The field on which the war (between Church and State) will be waged is not difficult to define: endless disputes about the election of bishops and consequent long vacancies of sees, expulsion of the Jesuits, limitation of individual freedom with respect to monastic orders; the clergy forbidden to study at Rome, and, above all, the abolition of all Church influence on schools." Wonderfully prophetic words!
political territory. But, while averse from active intervention of any kind, Bismarck informed Arnim that he had been authorised by the king "to enter into confidential negotiations with Bavaria, and eventually with the other South-German Governments, so as, in the name of all Germany if possible, to make such a combined impression on the Vatican as would convince it that any aggression on its part would meet with determined resistance."

Three months later he informed Prince Hohenlohe that the common representations of the German Governments in Rome had not been without effect—transient as it turned out—on the Pope, a weapon in reserve. who, aware of the opposition that was brewing in Germany, now seemed less inclined to trust himself "to the party" (of the Jesuits) "which is animated with a fixed determination to disturb the religious and political peace of Europe, in the fanatical conviction that the Church will profit by the universal anarchy thus produced." The Chancellor confidently referred to the Legislatures of North Germany as an effective weapon (in reserve) against all ecclesiastical encroachment, but hoped that the spiritual powers would become warned in time. No one can say that the Pope was not sufficiently premonished. The Old Catholic movement had already set in; numerously signed protests against any attempt to restore the "theocratic State-forms of the middle ages" poured in from all parts of Catholic Germany; and the German bishops assembled at Fulda issued a pastoral, in which they sought to allay popular apprehension by declaring that the Church never could, and never would, promulgate any new doctrines inconsistent with political freedom.
and true science. Before leaving for Rome, the Prussian bishops, as well as their Bavarian colleagues, were admonished by their Government to remain mindful, outside their Fatherland, of their rights and duties as subjects of the King.

In December the Council met amid unparalleled play-actor pomp, and went on with its baneful work. It was the gorgeous transformation-scene preceding the fall of the curtain on a gaudy pantomime. We have just seen what was Bismarck's attitude to the Council before it met. Let us now, as briefly as possible, detail his action while it sat. In a despatch to the German Minister at Rome (5th January) he again insisted on a waiting policy, on a watchful attitude, so to speak, of armed neutrality.

"We need have no anxiety," he wrote, "since, supported by the force of public opinion and the growing political consciousness of the nation (the Catholic as well as Protestant part of it), we are sure to find in the field of legislation the means of coping with every crisis, and reducing the claims of our (Jesuit) opponents to a level consistent with our State-life. . . . We require the Pope's assurance that the established relations of the Curia to the Governments shall not in any way be altered by the Council. Any attempt, at least, to modify them would in the end not turn out to our disadvantage."

But he did not wish things to come to such a climax. In the interest of national life, the Government could only sincerely desire the continuance of existing relations between Church and State. But all conservative action in Rome must proceed from the German bishops—in accord, if possible, with their colleagues of Austria and France. All the Government could meanwhile do was
to give them its moral support, with the assurance of legal protection at home, in the worst of cases. At the same time, by way of encouraging them to resistance, they were to be fairly warned of the change in their own political status, which the triumph of the absolutist party at the Vatican would be sure to entail.

It would be beside our purpose to detail the incidents of the Council, which Bismarck naturally followed with the keenest interest. All the Governments again protested against the Declaration of Infallibility, France even threatening to withdraw her troops from Civita Vecchia. Austria warmly supported her representations, which were also backed by Prussia with the assurance of her earnest desire to continue in "peace and amity with the Pope." "We cannot disguise from ourselves," wrote Arnim to Antonelli,

"that this" (the victory of the plus ultra party in the Council) "would be regarded by the German people as the renewal of old struggles; for they would not be satisfied with the argument which assumes that political conduct is entirely independent of the duties inculcated by religion. It might even be possible that the Government of the Confederation would no longer observe that liberality in dealing with religious matters which it has hitherto made use of in the interests of the Catholic Church."

But do not the gods dement those whom they mean to destroy? What can change the predestined course of things? At first, the German bishops stood up for the good cause with an uncompromising scorn of lies, worthy of the land of learning and enlightenment from which they came; worthy of the immortal monk, their countryman who,
on a somewhat similar occasion, unflinchingly exclaimed: "Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise; God help me! Amen!" But they were in a meagre minority, nor could their protests and their "non-placets" avail them. With the prescient care of the shepherd who hastens to house his flock before the blackening storm bursts, the Jesuits—scanning the political heavens, and discerning the speedy descent of a tremendous hurricane (Franco-German war)—rushed the Constitution of the Church of Christ through the Council, and brought it safely under roof. But the German bishops washed their hands of the foul business, and shook the dust off their departing feet as a testimony against sinful Rome. A month later the world was equally surprised and shocked to hear that, on the plea, among other things, of preserving the unity of the visible Church, the dissenting prelates had recanted and conformed—swallowed at a gulp the whole nauseous dose of Papal doctrine. The necessities of their conscience and their office, it has been urged by their apologists, led them to this woeful degradation. That may be. But the necessities of our narrative none the less compel us to leave them in it.

Voted on the 13th, the Dogma of Infallibility, with all its appendages, was ceremoniously proclaimed on the 18th of July. On the following day the official declaration of war was handed to Germany by France. Was ever, in the whole course of history, such an awful conjunction seen? Was this not, in truth, "the appalling union of the
infallibility of Heaven with the infernality of Hell?" The French Government, as we have seen, was opposed to much of the Papal policy, just as the Pontiff was not in all respects in complete accord with the schemes of Louis Napoleon. But if anything is clear and incontestable it is this, that the war of 1870 was the resultant of nearly equal forces emanating from the Tuileries and the Vatican.

While the Oecumenical Council sat, as indeed during the two previous years, the Pope made no secret of his conviction that a great international conflict would shortly be kindled in Central Europe. It would be a formidable ordeal, entailing immense suffering, but chastening the nations and restoring the moral balance of the world. France, who was then earnestly trying to gain Austria's support against Prussia, was in the Pope's opinion sure to take up arms as soon as possible, and might as surely be expected to be the victor. Heretic Germany crushed, and absolutism consolidated at Paris by military success, the day would have arrived for the head of an irresponsible Church to proceed from theory to action, and recover the ancient ascendancy of his predecessor. To be ready, therefore, for this grand opportunity, the Council was convened in the nick of time, and invested its originator with every authority calculated to strengthen his position and back his claim to universal sway.*

Once at Munich, the Nuntius Meglia remarked that "nothing can profit us but revolution." And again:

* Berlin Correspondent of The Times, writing on 3rd January, 1871.
"The Catholic Church has its rights respected only in America, or it may be also in England and Belgium, and therefore nothing can help the Church but revolution." How far the Vatican secretly worked to bring about this saving result, does not appear; but Prince Bismarck once solemnly asserted himself in a position to prove "that the war of 1870 was declared in agreement with Rome, which securely reckoned on the victory of the French; and that the decision of Napoleon for peace, which only lasted half-an-hour, was shaken and undone by the influence of none but the Jesuits."*

* In the Reichstag debate of 5th December, 1874, on the withdrawal of the German mission to the Curia. The Chancellor's statement was confirmed by Herr von Varndorfer, ex-Foreign Minister at Stuttgart, to whom an official report of the conversation quoted was sent from Munich by the Württemberg Chargé d'Affaires. It may be added that the main channel through which the Clericals brought their anti-German influence to bear against the pacific resolution of the Emperor was none other than the Empress Eugénie, who must therefore be held, to a great extent, to have been the author of her own terrible misfortunes. Hear what is said by Lord Mahon as to the final cause of the war:—"The Duke de Grammont was an agreeable and polished man in society, but vain and impetuous, and had more liberty of action than was given by the Emperor during his former régime to his Foreign Ministers. The Duke himself gave me the following account of the last scene on July 14, before the declaration of war: The Hohenzollern candidateship to the throne of Spain was abandoned, and the Emperor was decidedly disposed to accept this renunciation and to patch up the quarrel, and turn this result into a diplomatic success; but his Ministers had avoided no opportunity of publishing the insult to all France, and the Press stirred the anger and vanity of the public to a pitch of madness. None had yet taken advantage of this characteristic temper of the Emperor. Before the final resolve to declare war the Emperor, Empress, and Ministers went to St. Cloud. After some discussion, Grammont told me that the Empress, a high-spirited and impressionable woman, made a strong and most excited address, declaring that 'war was inevitable if the honour of France was to be sustained.' She was immediately followed by Marshal Le Boeuf, who.
Vast and momentous were the issues of that war. For on it depended not only the unity of the Fatherland, and the emancipation of the German race from French tutelage and interference, but also the emancipation of the human race itself from the impudent pretensions of a mitred Man-God. On went the war, upsetting all the calculations of infallible foresight; and down came the Empire with a thundering, splinter-spreading crash. Victor Emmanuel's opportunity came. The French garrison was withdrawn from the Tiber, the Italian troops battered their way into long-coveted Rome, placed the coping-stone upon their country's unity, and abolished for ever the temporal power of the Pope. Poor old Pope, who fondly fancied that the convulsions which he had helped to conjure up would restore him to the pinnacle of earthly glory! The white flag flew from the dome of St. Peter's, but was this the sign of surrender or of parley?

Referring, during the siege of Paris (November 9), in the most violent tone, threw down his portfolio and swore that if war was not declared he would give it up and renounce his military rank. The Emperor gave way, and Grammont went straight to the Chamber to announce the fatal news. Such was his account to me of the most momentous transaction which has occurred in Europe since 1815. In it I do not see in the Emperor the same man who, with so much caution and preparation, bided his time before he attacked Austria in Italy in 1859, and who with such rare perseverance after years of failure and prison raised himself to what appeared to the world an impossible throne. I attribute this change in the Emperor, first to his broken health and acute sufferings, and to a mind which had been weakened since he renounced his personal rule for the advice of responsible Ministers."—"Memoirs of an Ex-Minister." An Autobiography. By the Right Hon. the Earl of Malmesbury, G.C.B. Two vols. London: Longmans, 1884.
to the presence of the Italians in the Quirinal, the Chancellor remarked:—

"I am curious to see what the Pope will do . . . and where he will go to. He has already asked us to act as mediators, and ascertain from Italy whether it would let him leave, and with the dignity due to him. We have done so, and they replied that they would be careful to respect his position, and act accordingly if he wanted to leave. It is certainly their interest that he should stay at Rome, yet he may have to go. But whither? Austria he won't care about. There is Spain, of course. . . There is nothing for him but Belgium or North Germany. Indeed, we have already been asked whether we could give him an asylum. I have no objection to it—he might go to Cologne (Castle Brühl), or Fulda. It would be an unheard of turn of things, but not so inexplicable after all; and it would be a great advantage for us to appear to the Catholics what we really are—the only Power at present able and willing to offer protection to the supreme head of their Church. Every pretext for the opposition of the Ultramontanes would then disappear—in Belgium and Bavaria. . . . Besides, when people of strong imaginations, especially women, are in Rome, with the pomp and incense of Catholicism about them, and the Pope on his throne dispensing blessings, they feel inclined to become Catholics. But in Germany, where they would have the Pope before their eyes as a nice, good old gentleman, in want of help, as one of the bishops, eating and drinking like the rest, taking his pinch, and even smoking his cigar, there would be no such danger. And, finally, even if some people did go back to Catholicism—I shall never do it—that would not matter much, so long as they continued good Christians. Confession is not so much the thing as faith itself. We must be more tolerant."*

Speaking on another occasion of the occupation of Rome by the Italian troops, the Chancellor said of the Pope:—

* Busch.
"Yes, sovereign he must remain, only we are forced to ask how. We should be able to do much for him if the Ultramontanes were not always so active against us. But it is my custom to pay people back in their own coin."*

From these remarks there would seem to be truth in the observation of a Clerical writer,† that Prince Bismarck at this time resembled a slumbering lion which carries peace and hostility in its breast, it depending on external circumstances whether the noble beast shall be impelled to act on one or other of these potentialities. That the former was predominant, at this time at least, there can be no doubt. Fully aware of the danger of Clerical hostility, the Chancellor was equally alive to the wisdom of reconciling the Vatican to the idea of the "Evangelical Empire." And he did everything he could to effect this. His own religious convictions had nothing to do whatever with his attitude to Rome, which was wholly shaped by considerations of expedient statecraft. To the Prince, a Catholic would seem a much better man, a much worthier subject than a Protestant, if more pliant to his political will. Knowing, therefore, that a third of the population of the Empire which had just been founded, and which required to be consolidated, owned the spiritual sway of the Pope, the Chancellor was most fain to avoid collision with His Holiness, and even tried to secure his favour. When the troops of

* Busch.
† "Das evangelische Kaiserthum," &c., by Dr. Paul Majwke, Ex-Editor of the Germania, and member both of the Reichstag and Landtag, of whom more anon in the text of this chapter.
General Cadorna lay straining like impatient hounds in leash within a mile or two of Rome, was it not the Prussian Minister who came out and did his best to mediate between them and their Papal game?* A month or two later, when Paris lay writhing in the iron grasp of the Germans, His Holiness returned the compliment by repeating his offer to mediate between the belligerents; but a Power which ignored him as a negotiator between man and God, was not likely to accept him as an "honest broker" between man and man. Bismarck well knew that if the French had been encamped at Potsdam, as the Prussians were at Versailles, the Pontiff would not have been half so ready with his pacific services.

One other incident only need be mentioned before we shift the scene to Germany. In February (1871) an address of Catholic deputies was presented to the new-made Emperor at Versailles, entreaty him, in effect, to dispossess Victor Emmanuel, restore Rome to its ecclesiastical owner, and support the temporal power of the Pope. This petition may be regarded as the ultimatum of the Jesuits to the Protestant Kaiser. "Grant this our prayer, or——!" It was, of course, refused. Three weeks later the Pope, who throughout the war had earnestly prayed for the success of the French arms, wrote to the Emperor expressing his "great joy" at the unification of Germany under Protestant Prussia. That was what the Pope said. All the world knew what he thought. The ugliest moral sin is that of insincerity.

* G·l·l·ng·s's "Pope and King," i, p. 387.
The victorious German army had scarcely recrossed the Rhine when the Jesuits were up in arms against its work, and busy throwing up batteries both in and out of Parliament. The first session of the Reichstag was signalised by the formation of a new Catholic fraction, about whose attitude to the Empire the Government was not long left in doubt. Calling itself the party of the Centre, and called by others that of the Clericals, Ultramontanes, or "Blacks,"* this fraction—consisting at first of over sixty members, mostly from South Germany, and containing men of the highest position and talents, like Mallinckrodt, Reichen-sperger, and Schlorlemer-Alst—was organised and commanded by Dr. Ludwig Windthorst, who has cut such a prominent figure in the "Kulturkampf," that a word or two about this implacable foe of Bismarck may not be out of place.

When it is told that he was a Minister of the deposed King of Hanover, and that he remained as irreconcilable as the Duke of Cumberland to the idea of his country's absorption by Prussia, we already know more than half the secret of his sympathy with Rome. He is a Guelph first, a Clerical afterwards, and last of all a German. Reading others by the light of his own wick, he has never been at a loss to enlist the Poles, the Danes, the Alsace-Lorraines and other disaffected elements in the service of the Papal cause. With every wish to do the man justice, we cannot help thinking that he is the best party-leader and the worst

* In contradistinction to the "Reds," or Social Democrats.
patriot of his age. An Opportunist of the very first order, he is the parliamentary counterpart of that storied Highland chief who used to restrain his impatient clansmen on some commanding height till fortune should decide the battle in the plain below, and then rush down to slay and plunder the defeated. As if in compensation for his diminutive body, and his homely, almost unlovely looks, nature has endowed him with high mental gifts; but they are the gifts of the "Geist der stets verneint." An orator without action, "the oil of his eloquence," as Bismarck once said, "is of the kind that adds to the fury of flames, not that heals wounds." Enthusiastic yet self-possessed, cynical, relentless, resourceful and full of mother wit; a simple and agreeable old gentleman in private; a blindly-trusted party-leader, admirably skilled in business-forms and fence of speech, combining the starched rigour of the bureaucrat with the mirth-provoking sallies of the buffoon; a statesman of one idea, yet, strange to say, with a multitude of admirers; such, in brief, is deputy Windthorst, the "Pearl of Meppen,"† the German champion of the Pope, the pea in the boot of the Imperial Giant.

The Centre, commanded by Dr. Windthorst, soon showed its colours. In the debate on the address to the opening speech from the throne—which declared that Germany, devoted to her own domestic tasks, would pursue a policy of strict non-intervention abroad—the Clericals strongly

* "The Spirit who always denies."
† Meppen is Dr. Windthorst's constituency.
obj ected to this national selfishness and insularity, averring that the interests of the Catholic population required, at least, the diplomatic interference of the Empire in Italy on behalf of the Pope. In a brilliant historical survey, Herr von Bennigsen recalled the harrowing evils of mediæval Germany's relations to Italy, and induced Parliament by a sweeping majority to express "the hope that, in the new-born Empire, the days of meddling with the internal affairs of other nations should never return, under any pretext or form."*

Baulked inside Parliament, the Clericals endeavoured all the more to assert their ground outside it. At first the struggle was purely doctrinal. We have already seen that, shortly after returning home, the German bishops—who had at Rome most solemnly repudiated all share in the proceedings of the Council—suddenly changed their mind over night, and went bag and baggage over to the Papal camp. Re-assembling again in August (1871), beside the grave of St. Boniface—English Winfried,

* Unabashed by this rebuff, the Clericals at once returned to the charge with a proposal to add to the Imperial Constitution the clauses of the Prussian Charter (of 1850) referring to freedom of the Press, to the right of meeting, and to religious liberty and Church independence. The two former principles—which, strange to say, had been condemned by the Syllabus—were merely intended by the crafty Blacks as a jelly capsule to their ecclesiastical pill; but the ruse would not take. Parliament felt that the Jesuits were trying to fool it; that they had the "fundamental rights" of the people much less at heart than the unlimited sovereignty of the Pope; and after an animated debate of three days it resolved that the Federal States should separately continue to regulate their own religious affairs.
converter of the heathen Teutons—they now solemnly and unreservedly declared that—

"The infallible Church in its capacity as teacher has decided. The Holy Ghost has spoken through its representative Christ and the episcopate; and therefore all bishops, priests, and believers must with firm faith receive its decisions as divinely revealed truths, and profess them with joyful hearts, if they really wish to be and remain members of the one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church."

The bishops themselves, it is clear, had only two available courses—either secession or surrender; leave the Church in obedience to their convictions, or bend the servile knee to it from motives of conscience. That they did not choose the former alternative, must for ever associate their names with weakness and disgrace. But there were still brave and upright minds in Germany who would not stoop to worship Baal. The spirit of Luther was by no means dead.

The submission of the bishops had its inevitable reaction in the rise of the Old Catholic party, which, headed by scholars like Döllinger and Reinkens, emphatically renounced the Vatican Decrees, adhering to what they deemed the pure and pristine constitution of the Church.*

Heralded thus by a schism in the Church itself, the "Kulturkampf" was begun by an attempt on the part of the recanting bishops to force their flocks to

* Their principles were first enunciated at a conference of the party, represented by a number of Catholic professors of theology and philosophy, held at Nürnberg, in September, 1870, about a month after the formal recantation of the bishops at Fulda.
swallow the nauseous doctrinal food which they themselves had made a show of consuming.

What did Bismarck think of their conduct? How did he then view the Vatican Decrees in their bearing on civil allegiance? In precisely the same light as the English statesman who, four years later, wrote that "the Doctrine of Infallibility endowed the Pope with supreme sway in the domain of faith, of morals, and all that concerns the government and discipline of the Church; with the power of determining the limits of those domains, which he did not sever, by any acknowledged or intelligible line, from the field of civil duty and allegiance; and, therefore, with power to demand from every member of his Church that he should place his loyalty and civil duty at the mercy of another, that other being himself." * Nothing could be clearer, and

* For the better illustration of our narrative, it may be useful to quote the doctrine of Papal Infallibility, which is thus enunciated in chap. iv. of the Constitutio de Ecclésiâ:—"We teach and define it to be a dogma divinely revealed that, when the Roman Pontiff speaks ex cathedra, that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Teacher of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority, he defines that a doctrine regarding faith or morals is to be held by the Universal Church, he enjoys, by the Divine assistance, promised to him by the blessed Peter, that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed in defining a doctrine regarding faith or morals; and that, therefore, such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irrefutable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church. And if any one dare to gainsay this decision of ours, which God forbid!, may he be excommunicate and accursed." Chap. iii. may also be quoted, as of almost equal importance: "All, both pastors and faithful, of whatsoever rite and dignity, both individually and collectively, are bound to submit, by the duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, not only in matters belonging to faith and morals, but also in those that appertain to the discipline and government of the Church
proof that these apprehensions were well-founded was soon forthcoming.

The Dogma of Infallibility had not been long proclaimed before the Archbishop of Cologne demanded its recognition by the theological professors of Bonn, all paid servants of the State, on pain of suspension from their office. Appealing to the Government, they were told that two always went to the making of a bargain, and that they could not be disturbed in the exercise of their functions without its consent. This was the first exchange of outpost shots, and they were soon followed by clouds of Clerical skirmishers who, emerging from their well-chosen cover, advanced with great persistency to the attack. The Jesuits became active political conspirators. The population of Poland and Alsace-Lorraine were taught to regard their annexation by Prussia as a great political crime, and to hope for a French war of revenge which would free them and their Church from a barbarous oppressor. From the pulpit the Catholic clergy denounced the Empire as

throughout the world. . . . This is the teaching of the Catholic Faith from which no one can deviate without detriment to faith and salvation. . . . We further teach and declare that he (the Pope) is the supreme Judge of the Faithful and that in all causes of ecclesiastical cognizance recourse may be had to his judgment; and that none may reopen the judgment of the Apostolic See, than whose there is no greater authority; and that it is not lawful for anyone to sit in judgment on its judgment."

"The fourth chapter," says Mr. Gladstone, in his "Vatican Decrees in their bearing on Civil Allegiance," from which we have quoted these translations, "is the Merovingian Monarch; the third is the Carolingian Mayor of the Palace. The fourth has an over-awing splendour, the third an iron grince."
hostile to the Church. The confessional and the school were made the assiduous instruments of Jesuit propaganda. The State was more than patient, but at last it was forced to interfere.

A lay Catholic teacher of Braunsberg in East Prussia, Dr. Wollmann—for his name deserves to be had in memory—refused to teach his pupils the Dogma of Infallibility, and was excommunicated by the Bishop of Ermeland. Now be it noted, for the sake of clearness, that, though regarding the Vatican Doctrines as most dangerous to the State, the Government was tolerant enough not to object to their being taught in schools. All it meanwhile did was, in accordance with its principles of religious liberty, to protect from material harm such of its subjects and servants as, from scruples of conscience, could not see their way to do so. The Government, therefore, would not recognise the episcopal ban, and insisted on all his Catholic pupils receiving religious instruction, as before, from Dr. Wollmann—that being an obligatory subject in all Prussian schools.* To this the bishop replied that, though the State had a share in the appointment of a Catholic teacher, the Church alone had power to teach, and that any opposition to this was interference in its domain of faith.

This was the gist of the whole dispute, which the impartial judge will see was not without its plausible

* By a subsequent general Rescript, Dr. Falk toned down the severity of this order, by formulating certain rules of dispensation from religious instruction.
aspects on both sides. In seeking to enforce conformity with a doctrine which he himself at Rome had solemnly rejected "before man, and the awful judgment of Almighty God," the Bishop of Ermelands, it is true, acted with all the persecuting rigour of a renegade; but Bismarck subsequently confessed that the Government also had been much too hasty in the affair. It was the means, however, of arousing its attention to the real nature of the issues between Church and State, and to the imperative necessity of regulating their common frontiers.

Pending the elaboration of laws to this end, Bismarck took a step which plainly showed the path he meant to tread. In July, 1871, the Catholic Section in the Ministry of Public Worship was formally abolished.* The discarded machinery, which was originally meant to represent and exercise the rights and duties of the State with respect to the Romish Church, had degenerated into a mere instrument for championing the Church within and against the State. The Prince thought that the purpose of the abolished department would have been much better served by the presence of a Nuntius in Berlin.

* The reasons he gave for this measure were much the same as those which had been previously urged by Austria when, after the declaration of Infallibility, she promptly quashed her Concordat with Rome. He referred to the late serious change in the relations between Church and State, and to the firm resolve of the latter to be guided in its dealing with Catholic affairs by principles of law and political exigency alone. But apart, he maintained, from other considerations, the existence of the Catholic Section was a breach of the Constitution, inasmuch as it was inconsistent therewith to make eligibility for certain State appointments dependent on the creed of candidates.
ut public opinion and the Emperor had hitherto been against him in the matter. Methods of the kind were meanwhile out of the question, and he warned the Ultramontanes with the fable of the wanderer and his loaf, "which the sun wheedled from him, when the wind could not tear it off."

The abolition of the Catholic Section was a Prussian act. The next measure, and the first law against the Church, emanated from the Empire.* The first Reichstag had been to a certain extent sacked by South German priests. They had errorised the electors. They had denounced the return of a Protestant candidate as a sin against the Church; they had commanded their congregations to vote for so and so; in fact, they had converted their pulpits into platforms, and their confessionals into witness-boxes. One Clerical deputy—Reichensperger—had the brow to argue, that it was as lawful to seek to influence elections from the pulpit as through the Press. But Parliament was of a different mind. To counteract what had already happened, it quashed the return of several of its Ultramontane members; and, to obviate the recurrence of such scandalous practices as had sent them to Berlin, it passed a law (that of 10th December,

* It may be as well, at this stage, to ask our readers to bear in mind that the legislation against the Romish Church in Germany is of two kinds, Prussian and Imperial; and that the former is by far the most extensive. Within ten years Prussia has issued about thirty various enactments, all tending to define the limits between Church and State; while the Empire is only the author of less than a fourth of this number. The Kulturkampf, therefore, has been mainly waged on Prussian, i.e. more exclusively Protestant ground.
1871) making it a penal offence for clergymen to incite to riot, or otherwise endanger the peace by harangues against the Government. Bismarck was too ill to attend the animated debates on the subject, but he heartily supported the action of Bavaria, which had taken the initiative in the matter.

He was not long after this in advancing his guns on behalf of Prussia. In January, 1872, Herr von Mühler, Minister of Public Worship, resigned, and Dr. Falk was appointed in his stead. All men knew what the change meant. Mühler, who had held his post for ten years, was amiable, orthodox, and clear-sighted enough in his way, but his will was fettered by traditional forms. Dr. Falk, on the other hand, though also trained in the straitest school of Prussian officialism, was much more imbued with the spirit of the nineteenth century. He was a profound jurist, and a liberal politician. In person somewhat resembling Luther, he was also gifted with the energy, the tenacity, and the serious eloquence of the great Reformer. We have had opportunities of listening to most parliamentary speakers of note in Germany, and we were never half so much impressed by the oratory of any one as by that of Dr. Falk. In Dr. Falk, Bismarck found the very man he wanted, and he whose name has been given to most of the anti-Papal legislation of the next seven years accepted office on the understanding, that his own independent views fitted him to be the ready instrument of his master's will.

To that will he was at once required to give ex-
pression. Bismarck began his remedial measures by going to the root of a great public evil. He knew that whoever has the youth of a nation in his hands also has its future. “Being convinced,” he said, when referring to Jesuit intrigues for disrupting the Empire with religious strife, the better to facilitate a successful war of revenge and the restoration of the Pope’s temporal power,

“being convinced that we are confronted with hostile forces, our motto must be, ‘Principis obsta.’ We do not wish, as advised by some, to cut down people, but rather to educate them in such a way as not to make it necessary for us to cut them down.”

To this end, accordingly, the Prussian Parliament was asked to pass a law placing the inspection of all public and private schools entirely in the hands of the State. Hitherto, as a rule, this had been the prerogative of the Church; and the Braunsberg case, already quoted, was one of a thousand proofs of the way in which it began to be abused. Much stress was also laid on the fact that, in the Polish districts of the monarchy, the Catholic clergy—always on the side of disaffection—notoriously encouraged neglect of the German tongue, the best means of political amalgamation. The new measure, therefore, which would equally apply to Protestants and Catholics, simply aimed at making all school-inspectors nominees of the State, and enabling it to dismiss such of these as used their authority to its disadvantage. At the same time, it was not intended to substitute lay for ecclesiastical overseers. The latter might continue to
exercise their functions undisturbed, as long as they did so in a blameless way. But the State must have absolute control of them. The Church was by no means to be excluded from the School. Its exact relation to the State within it was merely to be defined.

The Clericals and their allies, of course, raised a vehement outcry against the measure as heralding the era of irreligion, the end of the world, and all the rest of it. But their arguments were worthless in view of the fact, that the new law left intact that article of the Constitution guaranteeing confessional teaching in primary schools. Bismarck spoke effectively on the subject in both Chambers, alluding to the Ultramontanes as having "mobilised against the State." "Proofs, proofs!" exclaimed Windthorst. "Ach, meine Herren, look for them in your own breasts!" The Feudalists, or high-and-dry Tories, joined the Opposition, but the bill was nevertheless passed by considerable majorities in both Houses. The Catholic bishops had made desperate, but unavailing, efforts to wreck the measure. They petitioned Parliament against it, and implored the Emperor to withhold his sanction from a law which would grievously infringe their traditional rights, and convert the schools into hot-beds of anarchy and atheism. Assembled again at Fulda, they drew up and sent to the Prussian Cabinet a solemn protest against the law, and at the same time wrote to all their clergy bidding them, in substance, to remain at their scholastic posts as hitherto, nor quit them without the approval of their ecclesiastical superiors.
Thus the storm gathered. Meanwhile letters and addresses of sympathy poured in to Bismarck from all parts of Germany, and even from England, Italy, and Belgium. Prominent among the admirers of his ecclesiastical policy was a stout Hanoverian yeoman, who ploughed up a fine specimen of a pre-historic weapon in one of his fields, and sent it to the Prince with the following inscription in Platt-Deutsch:

"With this stone-axe, of ancient make, Smite off the priests and make them quake!" *

The Prince accepted the symbolic weapon, but he still did all he could to avoid the necessity of using it. In the spring of 1872 he gave the Pope to understand that an agreement might still be come to with the Church, if its representatives ceased to support the Poles and Guelphs, but that hostility without hope of reconciliation would result from their continuing to do so.† Another certain proof of the Chancellor's pacific mood at this time was his plan to entrust Cardinal Prince Hohenlohe‡ with the representation of the Empire at the Curia, which had hitherto been in the hands of a mere Chargé d'Affaires. "Such an appointment," he wrote, "will

* "Mit dessen Biel ut de olle Strentiet Da hol' Di von Halse die Papen wiet."
† "Der Nuntius Kommt." by Count Arnim, p. 31.
‡ Younger brother of the Duke of Ratibor, and of Prince Coddwig Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, ex-Prime Minister of Bavaria, and afterwards German Ambassador at Paris, who, as we have seen, first drew attention to the possible dangers of the Vatican Council.
give a fresh proof of our earnest endeavour to live in peace with the Romish Church, since it must be plain to every unprejudiced mind that a Cardinal would never let himself become an instrument of hostility against the Pope;" while the loyalty with which, as German prelate, he had hitherto stood aloof from the Jesuits and the aggressive party in the Church, was a guarantee that he would not compromise the interests of the State.

It was probably for the latter reason that the Pope refused to receive him. Cardinal Hohenlohe himself was quite willing to accept the proffered office, but the Papal courtiers scorned the idea. There were no formal difficulties in the way of the Prince's appointment, but the Pope would not hear of it. "What would you say," asked Windthorst, "if the Pope were to make the Adjutant-General of the Emperor his Nuntius?" Bismarck replied that this would quite content him. The Liberal Press even raised an outcry against the scheme, and there were some who asserted that the Chancellor, foreseeing, as he must have done, that the Pope would reject the Cardinal, acted in a particularly subtle spirit of Machiavelism with the simple view of making His Holiness appear in the wrong. But even Bismarck's greatest foe has declared this insinuation to be wholly baseless.* The incident was a proof of the sincere desire of the State to live in peace with the Church, and of the firm determination of the Church to go to war with the State.

* "Der Nuntius Kommt," by Count Arnim.
It was generally felt that the Emperor, who had never before suffered such a rebuff, had been grievously affronted, and the feeling of bitterness against the Clericals was intensified. In the Reichstag even, a fortnight later (14th May), Herr von Bennigsen urged that all diplomatic negotiations with the Vatican should now be broken off. But Bismarck counselled patience. Concordats were entirely out of the question on the basis of the Vatican Dogmas, but diplomacy might still be of some avail till legislation brought relief. As for the claims of the Catholic clergy to be exempt from the binding force of certain statutes, Bismarck assured Parliament that he would use every means at his disposal to maintain the full and undivided sovereignty of the law. It was on this occasion, too, that he uttered the famous words, more eloquent than volumes, which found a ready echo all over the nation: "Have no fear; we shall not go to Canossa, either in body or in spirit."

* Canossa, an Italian hill-keep (now in ruins) near Perzio, in the former Duchy of Modena, which passed to the Markgraves or Marquises of Tuscany, and afterwards (1268) to the Papacy. It was here where the great struggle between the Emperor Henry IV. and Pope Gregory VII. 1077 came to so inglorious a close for the former. Says Professor Bryce, *Holy Rom. Emp.,* p. 159:—"The Pope cited his opponent to appear and be judged at Rome for his vices and misgovernment. The Emperor replied by convoking a Synod, which deposed and insulted Gregory. At once the dauntless monk pronounced Henry excommunicate, and fixed a day on which, if still unrepentant, he should cease to reign. . . . Shunned, betrayed, threatened, he rushed into what seemed the only course left, and Canossa saw Europe's mightiest prince, titular lord of the world, a suppllicant before the successor of the apostle. . . . That one scene in the yard of the Countess Matilda's Castle—an imperial penitent, standing barefoot and woollen-frocked, on the snow three days
On this very same day Bismarck wrote a confidential despatch to the representatives of Germany abroad as to the next election of a Pope. Pius IX. was growing old, and the time seemed not far off when he would have to yield up his sceptre into other hands. The Chancellor, therefore, wished betimes to raise the question of his succession among the European Governments concerned; to combine them, in fact, against a Jesuit candidate for the Holy Chair.

A Pope, he said, whom all or most of the European States thought it their duty, from formal or material reasons, not to recognise, would be as inconceivable as a bishop who sought to exercise rights in a country which shut its eyes to him. He pointed out that the relations of Rome to Europe—rendered more intimate than ever by recent Concordats—had been entirely changed by the Vatican Decrees, which substituted Papal jurisdiction for that of the bishops, made the latter the mere instruments and irresponsible servants of the Pope, the officials of a foreign Sovereign who, in virtue of his infallibility, was perfectly absolute—more so than any other monarch in the world. Before the Governments recognised a new Pope with such pretensions, Bismarck thought they should consider what guarantees they had against the misuse of his arrogated powers, both in the person of the candidate and the manner of his election, and that they should agree as to the conditions on which they would recognise its validity.

This despatch was directed against the tactics of the Jesuits in Rome. But meanwhile the operations of these gentlemen in Germany itself were by no means

and nights till the priest who sat within should admit and absolve him—was enough to mark a decisive change, and inflict an irretrievable disgrace on the crown so abased."

overlooked. As early as September, 1871, the Old Catholics (in Congress at Munich) had expressed the conviction that peace between Church and State was impossible, as long as this religious Order was allowed to continue "its corrupting and pernicious activity." A month later the celebrated jurist, Professor Bluntschli, set in motion the machinery of agitation by declaring that "a Diet of Protestants at Darmstadt had resolved to take up with all energy the struggle against the Jesuits, and carry it on till they were driven out of the German Empire." Apprised of what was passing, both the Pope and the Prussian bishops issued testimonials of a most flattering kind in favour of the misunderstood followers of Loyola. But thousands of petitions for their expulsion began to pour in to Parliament from all parts of Germany. On the other hand, "two hundred-weight" of Catholic signatures were collected in their favour. The Committee appointed to consider these addresses found in them a clear à priori case against the Order, and begged the Chancellor to act.

The Government, therefore, lost no time in preparing a bill, which, like the Socialist Law of a later day, empowered the police, at will, to refuse a Jesuit residence in any particular part of the Empire. But this did not half satisfy Parliament, which demanded the banishment of the entire Order and all its kindred organisations. It is a rare thing for the German Government to yield to popular movements, but in this case it did so. The animated
debates on the subject were not attended by Bismarck, who was on sick-leave at the time; and if he had had his own way in the matter, it is not quite certain that, masterful and high-handed as he is, he would have followed the venerable example of Catholic Austria and Portugal, or the republican example of Switzerland and Poland, or even the apostolic precedent of Pope Clement XIV., in expelling the Jesuits. At any rate, he seems to have been glad that Parliament took upon itself the main initiative of an act which drew the attention and divided the opinion of the civilised world.

The essence of all the arguments for the measure was that the Jesuits, abusing their religious office, had demonstrably become conspirators against the peace and stability of the Empire, and that, therefore, the Government was entitled to act in its own defence. By the Clericals, on the other hand, who were supported on this occasion by a number of eminent Liberals, including Herr Lasker, learned in the law, it was urged, in substance, that the measure was not so much directed against the Jesuits as against the Church, and that it was an unwarrantable interference with the civil and religious rights enjoyed by all Germans. But the nation was in no nicely juristic mood. Still smarting under the sacrifices entailed by the birth of the Empire, and proud of its unparalleled achievements, the country was perhaps sensitively prone to exaggerate the domestic dangers which threatened to undo them. It therefore acted promptly, and with preventive rigour.
On the 14th of June the Jesuit Law was introduced into Parliament, and on the 4th of July it received the imperial assent at Ems—historic Ems. There speedily followed a series of ministerial rescripts excluding the Jesuits from all priestly and scholastic functions whatever, while a year later their affiliated Orders were included in the general ban. Within six months after promulgation of these edicts, the proscribed servants of the Church were scarce in Germany as wolves or as wild boars in Great Britain. It was said that the Jesuits had left the empire like foxes, and would return like eagles. But, perhaps, it would have been nearer the truth to say that they had departed like convicts, and would come back, at all, like ticket-of-leave men.

A few days after the passing of the Jesuit Bill, the pope, replying to the address of some German Catholics in Rome, poured out all the vials of his pent-up wrath on the head of the sinful chancellor. He painted him in the colours of a Protestant Philip the Second, told his hearers that they were only bound to obey their country's laws when not in conflict with those of God and the Church, and made them be united and of good cheer, for that "a stone would yet come rolling down the hill (of Zion) and bruise the foot of the (Imperial) Colossus!" These malignant words created great excitement throughout Germany, and even made good Catholics regret that their spiritual chief should have so far forgotten himself as to commit an act unworthy of the infallible wisdom
which he claimed. In France, the Press beheld with malicious glee the progress of the plot, and wrote of Bismarck as having at last found his match in a Spiritual Power which would be an ally of the Republic in the coming war of revenge.

Meanwhile the soldiers of the Pope in Germany were growing ever more bold and aggressive. In Cologne there were numerous disciples of Dr. Döllinger, author of the Old Catholic movement; and, by an express order of the Minister of War, they had been permitted the use of a church in which both the Catholic and the Protestant portion of the garrison had long been wont to worship. Hearing of this, the Catholic Chaplain-General of the Forces, Bishop Namszanowski, took it upon him to forbid the divisional clergyman under him the further performance of his functions in the aforesaid house of God, as long as it should continue to be desecrated by an outcast gathering of schismatics. Called upon by his military superiors—whom he was naturally bound by oath to obey—to revoke this unjustifiable command on pain of signal chastisement, Namszanowski appealed to the Pope, who approvingly clapped the rebellious prelate on the shoulder.

On this he renewed his interdict in more peremptory terms than ever, so that, if military discipline was not to appear a mockery, there was nothing left for General von Roon but to execute his threat and suspend from office (Frederick the Great would have suspended them from a gallows) the insubordinate bishop himself and
his inferiors, leaving the Catholic members of the garrison meanwhile to pick up religious consolation where they could. The Chaplain-General refused to be tried by his military superiors, and a disciplinary court, before which the case was brought, declared itself incompetent to act. But not so the Emperor, who, by a Cabinet Order of the following March—the quarrel had become acute in May, 1872—abolished altogether an ecclesiastical office which, though created in 1868 by mutual understanding between State and Church, had come to be exercised by the latter against the former as a captured gun is turned against an assaulted foe.

About the same time Cologne and its neighbourhood became the scene of another serious conflict of authority to which we beg our readers to pay particular attention, as the principle involved in it is the hinge on which turned the whole controversy between Church and State. Careless of the warning he had got from the Government, Archbishop Melchers of Cologne again summoned four Old Catholic professors of Bonn to subscribe to the Vatican Decrees on pain of "greater ban." They refused, and the threatened blow fell—in despite of a clear and emphatic Prussian law that no one shall be excluded from any religious community without the previous assent of the State, when such exclusion would bring detriment to his honour and existence. The Government, therefore, refused compliance with the Archbishop's request to dismiss the obnoxious professors, and all the persecuting prelate could do was to
interdict attendance on their lectures. There thus arose a thorough deadlock; defiance of the law on one side, and defence of it on the other.

It was precisely the same principle that underlay the Braunsberg conflict, which now flamed up afresh and burned fiercely for several months (March to September, 1872). We have already seen how Bishop Krementz, of Ermeland, excommunicated Dr. Wollmann, a lay Catholic teacher, who refused to instruct his pupils in the Dogmas of the Vatican. The same punishment was afterwards inflicted on Professor Michelis. For simply venturing to differ in theological opinion from the chief of their diocese, these men were turned out of the Church, and thus degraded to the rank of social Pariahs. We again repeat that this was done in open scorn of an unambiguous law, which requires the previous assent of the State to any action of the Church affecting the worldly well-being of its members. Dr. Falk, therefore, demanded of the Bishop proper amends for his conduct, on pain of stoppage of his pay. The Bishop replied that, when the civil and canon law came into conflict, he was bound meanwhile to obey the latter. To this the Minister rejoined by again requiring the Bishop to counteract the evil effects of his sentence on the two teachers, and to declare that he would henceforth obey the laws of the State in their entirety. The stiff-necked prelate answered by denying that his ban carried with it

* The faithful were forbidden to hold intercourse of any kind whatever with the outcasts, on pain of "lesser ban."
he injurious results alleged, and by declaring his readiness to declare as much in a formal way to all hisergy.

Meanwhile, a commemoration-festival at Marienburg, to be attended by the Emperor and the Princes of hishouse, was near. It had been resolved tocelebrate the centenary of the recovery of rmeland and West Prussia from the Poles

Frederick the Great, so Bishop Krementz wrote toquire whether he might appear at the head of hisergy to testify their personal devotion to His Majesty.

The Emperor said that he would be very glad to receive him, but only on condition of his previously professing unconditional submission to the laws of the land.

hereupon the Bishop lost no time in assuring His Majesty that, on purely political ground, he was quite prepared to acknowledge the exclusive sovereignty of the temporal power, but that, in matters of faith and discipline, he was equally willed to obey the authority of the Church alone. Bishop Krementz had quibbled with Dr. Falk, and had essayed to split straws with his overign. He was, therefore, now put into the hands of a man against whom neither subtlety nor subterfuge as ever been known to prevail.

Prince Bismarck curtly informed him that he would only be received by the Emperor, if he avowed his allegiance to the law by admitting that he had broken it. Driven thus into a corner, the Bishop at once intimated to the Emperor the impossibility of his appearing at Marienburg,
and at the same time wrote to the Chancellor demanding an explanation of his change of front. The Prince merely returned that, in formulating the Emperor’s conditions as he did, he believed he was helping the Bishop out of a difficulty by altering the tense of the required declaration from the future to the past. Soon after this, the wilful priest was informed that his pay had been stopped. The State was no longer bound to fulfil its obligations towards a man who failed to perform his duties to the State. That was all. The Bishop proceeded against the Treasury for arrears of salary, but lost his case in every court.

In the Clerical camp, of course, the measure acted like a hundred bombs. A loud uproar was at once raised, and “To arms! To arms!” was the cry. The expulsion of the Jesuits, with the treatment of their colleague of Ermeland, had exasperated beyond measure the German bishops, and back they flew to Fulda, where, again assembled round the tomb of St. Boniface, they took counsel of each other what to do. These grave and reverend fathers in God carried no lethal arms, nor scowled ferociously from beneath their dark sombrero hats; and they met and talked with a look, and even with a feeling, of innocence in the face of all the world: yet they were every bit as much political conspirators as the masked and huddled knot of midnight whisperers, who gather in some churchyard-corner to compass treason and contrive sedition.

The outcome of their confabulations was a long and
elaborate memorial on the state of the Church which they sent to all the German Governments, and which, in point of fact, was nothing but a down-right declaration of war. It clearly proved that, despite their previous recalcitrancy, the German bishops had now become the unreserved and willing thralls of the Pope. The document denounced, and encouraged resistance to, all the anti-Papal measures hitherto taken by the State; and it set forth the divine rights and doctrines (dangerous to the civil power in the highest degree) to which the Church would continue to cling, come what might. If the Government had any doubts as to the course it should pursue, they were now dispelled, and it at once began to incorporate its ideas in various draft-laws.

But, meanwhile, its attention was called to the progress of a serious agitation outside the Church itself. At Breslau, at Mayence, and at Cologne, the Catholics had held large meetings and drawn up resolutions, issued stirring appeals to their co-religionists, sent addresses of allegiance to the Pope, and otherwise supported the action of the rebellious bishops. The numerous Catholic societies, which had sprung up in Germany since 1848, began to transfer their activity from confessional to political ground; and with Prince Bismarck, to see a danger was to deal with it. A ministerial decree, therefore, was issued with respect to the Mayence organisation forbidding all State officials to belong to it, "or to any other societies whose aims were hostile to the Govern-
ment.” Thus the autumn passed, in ever-increasing intensity of skirmishing fire, preluding the mingled close of battle.

In the Prussian Chamber the Clericals made repeated attempts to recapture lost positions, but on each occasion they were repulsed. The towering form of Prince Bismarck was not meanwhile visible in the ranks of those combatants whose watchword was “No Popery,” but he continued to give them direction and encouragement. Replying to an address of sympathy from England, the Chancellor said:—

“I agree with you in thinking that, in a well-ordered state of society, every person and every creed should enjoy such degree of liberty as is compatible with the freedom of others and the independence of the nation. In the struggle, too, for this principle, God will protect the German Empire against those opponents who use His holy name as a cloak for their hostility to our domestic peace.”

With the year 1872, one of the acts of the engrossing drama “Pope or Kaiser?” ended with a fine spectacular scene. The curtain dropped on the Papal Olympus with angry lightnings playing round its top. During the past few months the mitred Jove had not been sparing of his thunderbolts against the impious Titan who had dared to assail his heaven of dogmas. We have seen how he prophesied the descent of a stone from the Hill of Zion that would “bruise the foot of the Imperial Colossus.” He had also sneered at the autumn meeting of the three Emperors as a “merely human Areopagus,” “whereof one member was a declared enemy of the Church.” But these were the mere mutterings of his
wrath preceding the outburst of its storm. Addressing a Consistory of two-and-twenty Cardinals (December 23rd), the Pope referred to the cruel persecutions in the German Empire, where "force and fraud" were equally used to annihilate the Church, and to the "unabashed impudence" with which it was asserted that the Catholics themselves were to blame for the action of the Government. To these abusive words the object of their fury at once replied by a significant act. The German Chargé d'Affaires was recalled from Rome. On the very day he left, the Pope received a telegram from "the Catholics of Germany" expressing their deep gratitude for the terms of his abusive allocution. The Author of Evil himself could not have wished for a better thickening of the plot.

On the ninth day of the new year (1873) the curtain again rose and discovered Dr. Falk, with knitted brows and lips compressed, entering the Prussian Chamber with four remedial measures in his hand.

The First of these, which had been drafted in the previous November, was plainly intended to obviate the recurrence of such conflicts between the temporal and spiritual powers as had broken out at Bonn and Braunsberg. Treating of the definition and limitation of ecclesiastical penalties, it secured to each Church its right of discipline within the religious sphere, and the regulation of conditions of membership even to dismissal; but it forbade the Church to pass over into the sphere of civil penalties, and to pronounce against the person, property, freedom, or good name of the citizen; and it declared that the Church should not use its discipline so as to bring in question obedience to the laws of the land, to coerce or intimidate a voter, or degrade a public officer for doing his duty.
The Second and most important Bill, relating to the training and installation of the clergy, provided that no one should be admitted to the sacred ministry, of whatever denomination, who had not passed the final examination at a public High School, studied theology for three years at a German University, and obtained besides from the State a certificate of proficiency in the various branches of a liberal education. It furthermore placed all existing seminaries and monastic colleges under the surveillance of the State, and forbade the opening of new ones. Finally, it bound ecclesiastical superiors to intimate to the State the intended appointment or transference of any clergyman, and empowered the Government to veto either of these acts on the ground of the insufficient education or the criminal or suspected (political) character of the nominee. The main object of this law was to nationalise and Germanise the clergy, and elevate them as public officers; to deal with them as with other professors; to insist that, instead of being shut up as a separate caste from boyhood in monastic schools and colleges where they would be educated for the service of, and in the spirit of, Rome at the cost of the State, they should have an open, manly training with other boys in the free light and air of science and letters, as a broad and liberal preparation for their special theological studies.

The Third Measure has been described as a law to favour and protect dissent. Hitherto in Prussia this process had cost time and patience and money, and involved the loss of social standing. All vexatious restrictions on the subject were now, therefore, replaced by the simple rule that any one might secede, with legal effect, from any Church by declaring his will in this respect before the local judge. This law was primarily meant to open to the Old Catholics a door of escape into liberty, and on that account was bitterly opposed by the Romish hierarchy; but it equally applied to Catholic, Protestant, and Jew.

The Fourth Bill placed all Church reformatories for the discipline of ecclesiastics under the supervision of the State, forbade corporal chastisement, provided against all forms of secret and arbitrary punishment, and created a royal tribunal of revision and appeal for ecclesiastical causes arising out of his law. Far from persecuting the Church, surely such a measure was calculated to protect each of its members.
Such, then, is the substance of the four celebrated enactments, now known as the May Laws. For South Germany, especially for Württemberg and even Baden, they presented little that was essentially new; but they bore a most revolutionary odour in Prussia, where the Church had grossly abused its exceptional privileges, and where its efforts to encroach on the civil power were stimulated by its aggressive feelings towards the Protestant faith. Laid before the Chamber in January, the discussion of these enactments lasted four months, and evoked parliamentary storms such as have not been witnessed since the "Conflict Time."

The whole nation was stirred with strife. "Hi-Guelph!" "Hi-Ghibelline!" again resounded from opposing ranks, as in the days of the Hohenstaufens. All Europe looked on.

Reduced to its narrowest limits, the issue between the combatants was clear. All the arguments ever used, now or afterwards, by the Clericals, may be condensed in the words of the noble lord who, prompted by Cardinal Manning, once exclaimed, that he was "an Englishman, if you please, but a Catholic first." The simple converse of this political theory, and nothing more, was enunciated in detail by Dr. Falk with respect to Prussia and the four measures we have summarised. The Ultramontanes cried out that these laws would

* Strictly speaking, they are only the kernel of the May Laws. In the same month of the following year other similar enactments were passed, and the term, indeed, has now become to be applied generally to the whole series of anti-Papal measures passed during the ministry of Dr. Falk, 1872-79.
violate the Constitution of the country, outrage the conscience of all its Catholic inhabitants, destroy the divine institutions, and frustrate the functions of the Church. They were told, in reply, that the Church had room enough left, if it liked, to perform its proper task—"the perfecting of man in the sight of God." But the Church was animated with the spirit of a sturdy beggar, whom bread, without beef, will not content.

The Prussian bishops were promptly to the front again. Their Fulda manifesto of the previous September had elicited numerous addresses of encouragement from their brethren in all parts of the world. Emboldened by this general sympathy, and further exasperated by the action of the State, they now implored the Emperor to withhold his sanction from measures which the faithful would be bound in conscience to ignore. At the same time they sent in to the Cabinet, as well as to the Chambers, a virtual declaration of non possimus. Meanwhile, the Government strained every nerve to perfect the weapon which would deal with the spirit of rebelliousness thus betrayed. It had been vehemently argued by the Centre that the Falk Laws would violate the Constitution. Certainly this document guaranteed independence to the Church in the administration of its "own affairs."* But, unfortunately, the Government had never carried out its intention of defining by law the region of these "affairs," and to this omission was mainly due the present strife.

* See Prussian Constitution (Arts. 15—18) in Appendix.
THE "KULTURKAMPF."

The Government and its Liberal supporters recognised the force of the Clerical arguments as to the inviolability of the Constitution, but they met them by a proposal that it should be altered. And no sooner said than done. A Bill was brought in which, while leaving the Churches internally autonomous as before, subjected them to the laws and supervision of the State. After much wordy warfare, it was at length passed by large majorities. Descending into the arena of debate, Bismarck made a splendid appeal to the Upper Chamber in a speech which might well pass for an essay by Carlyle on "Kingship and Priestcraft." The boundary, he said, between these two elements must be drawn in such a way as would permit the State to exist. "For in the kingdom of this world it has rule (regiment)\* and precedence." The passing of the Bill for altering the Constitution left no doubt as to the fate of the measures with which it had been brought into harmony, though the Chancellor still deemed it necessary to stand forth again as their ardent advocate in the Upper House, where the Opposition included an uncompromising band of Protestant Feudalists. But here also the four Bills—without which General von Roon, Minister-President, declared the country "could not live"—were finally approved (1st May), and a fortnight later were promulgated as part of the statute-law of Prussia, which every citizen, lay and clerical, was bound at his peril to obey.

\* In the sense used by John Knox when he spoke of the "monstrous regiment of women."
But the bishops were not at all of this mind. They hastened to inform the Ministry that they could no account encourage observance of the laws just made, which violated the principles whereby all Christian peoples, since the time of Constantine the Great, had regulated the relations between Church and State; and that, in fact, they were firmly minded to resort to passive resistance. The Catholic journals which printed their audacious declaration were at once seized. The bishops were requested to send in full details of all the educational institutions under their care, for which they might desire the recognition of the State under the law touching the training of the clergy. But all they sent in were angry protests; and to these the prompt reply was the stoppage of State grants to certain Clerical seminaries.* Instructions were issued to all the local authorities for the vigilant administration of the May Laws, while the Jesuits and their affiliated Orders were sternly dealt with.

At this juncture an amusing incident occurred. The infuriated Pope wrote to the Emperor (7th August, 1873), complaining of these harsh enactments against the Church.

"If your Majesty," said Pio Nono, "does not, as I am told, approve—and the letters you have heretofore written me show that you cannot approve—all that is now being done, how is it that your Government continues in the path that it has entered, constantly increasing the rigour of its measures against the religion of Jesus Christ, which, while they do so much harm to that religion, are only undermining your Majesty's throne—you may rest assured!"

* At Paderborn, Fulda, Treves, Cologne, Posen, and other places.
To this epistle the Emperor, with Bismarck at his elbow, bluntly replied that—

His Holiness must be wholly ignorant of the Prussian Constitution if he supposed that any law could be made without the royal assent; and that his Majesty was firmly resolved to preserve peace and order in His dominions from the "State-imperilling" machinations of ecclesiastical rebels, "with whose aims the religion of Jesus Christ had nothing whatever to do."

The official publication of this exquisite correspondence, which the exasperated Clericals denounced as a breach of faith, elicited a chorus of European praise, and added to the popularity of a Sovereign who seemed to have already won every possible grain of his people's love. On the other hand, the bitterness felt by the Pope at receiving such an emphatic letter from the Emperor was intensified by the visit to Berlin of Victor Emmanuel, who was treated with the most ostentatious distinction.*

On the same day as the Emperor thus replied to the Pope's letter, the Ministry decided to recognise the choice and consecration of the excommunicated Professor Reinkens, as Bishop of the Old Catholics in Germany. He had been chosen by lay and clerical representatives of the sect from all parts of the Empire, and installed by a Jansenist prelate in Holland, unheeding of the Pope. But the Prussian Government, advised by the best authorities on canon law, saw nothing in this to invalidate the episcopal laying on of hands, and its view

* Vide ante, p. 28.
was afterwards taken by Baden, Hesse, and Bavaria. To emphasise its opinion, it gave Bishop Reinkens a donation of 16,000 thalers—an act that was duly stigmatised in the Encyclopaedia of the following November, which hurled bitter reproaches at the Emperor and his chief adviser.

Meanwhile, true to their word, the Catholic clergy acted in scornful defiance of the May Laws. In particular, the bishops continued to install priests without giving the previous statutory notice to the Government. The consequence was that Dr. Falk's directions to strike and spare not were obeyed to the letter. All such appointments, all the official acts of such nominees, christenings, marriages, and even burials, were declared invalid before the law. The Church books and seals of parishes thus irregularly held were impounded. A vista of terrible social chaos was opened up.

Now, of all those who were guilty of creating this confusion, the most lawless and determined was Count Mieciislaus Halka Ledochovsky, Archbishop of Gnesen and Posen. This Polish nobleman mainly owed his position as prelate to Prince Bismarck, who, in the teeth of much opposition, had achieved his nomination to a post of so much influence in a province still deeply disaffected towards the Prussian Crown. It is not often that Bismarck misjudges men, but in the case of Ledochovsky he did so. This subtle ecclesiastic, whose various diplomatic services to the Pope ended in his
appointment as Nuntius at Brussels, had been selected by the Chancellor as the likeliest man to restrain the clergy from political agitation in Prussian Poland. But he soon became their ardent champion, and gave his princely patron ample cause to repeat the words of Queen Elizabeth of England to a rebellious bishop—"Proud prelate, you know what you were before I made you what you are: if you do not immediately comply with my request, by God, I will unfrock you!"*

The events of 1870 soon made Ledochovsky throw off the dissimulation which had cloaked his treason. The source of the Pope's temporal power being now reduced to Peter's pence, the Archbishop of Posen became an importunate canvasser for this precarious fund; and, like a second Tetzel, introduced a kind of beef-tax into his province, by permitting his flocks to substitute the penitence of a money-fine for that of abstention from meat in Lent. It was discovered that, during the Vatican Council, the Pope had created him Primate of Poland—a title which presupposed the independence of that country and procured him a place in the Ultramontane Calendar for 1873 among the Sovereigns of Europe, as representative of the Polish kings. Furthermore, it was found that he held treasonable correspondence with the bishops of Russian Poland, mediating between them and Rome in defiance of a law which reserved this office to their Government. His pastoralis were so full of instigation to rebellion, of sympathy with the national aspirations of the Poles, of

fiery partisanship for the Pope, that the Government was forced to take steps to prevent their reaching the ears of youth. Dr. Falk had decreed that religious instruction in the higher schools should, like that in other subjects, be conveyed in German. Ledochovsky commanded that the Polish tongue should be used as hitherto, and was praised for his impudence by the Pope. Some teachers obeyed him, and were of course dismissed. The Archbishop snapped his fingers at the enactment entrusting the State with the inspection of schools, and mocked at the May Laws. No power on earth, he said, was entitled to prescribe how a Catholic priest should be educated. To this the Government replied by at once shutting up the seminary of Posen, and withdrawing its grant to that at Gniesen.

But the fury of his rebelliousness was chiefly vented in violating the famous Anzeigepflicht, or legal duty of ecclesiastical superiors to pre-intimate to the State the nomination or transference of priests.* Livings in Ledochovsky's province, which had long been vacant, were now suddenly filled without a word of notice to the civil power; while poor curates, who contentedly thought they had settled down for life, were shuffled about in the most arbitrary manner like a pack of cards. In this way the "Primate of Poland" had, with malice aforesaid, thought, committed about sixty distinct breaches of the one law in question, not to speak of others, before it was nine months old. He had been duly warned. He went on acting as before. His pay was stopped. He

* See p. 294 ante.
continued to spite the law. He was called upon by the Government to lay down an office which he exercised to the detriment of the public weal. The contumacious priest merely indulged in vapourings about his divine credentials, and about false shepherds who, at sight of a wolf, forsake their flocks.

Fines came raining down upon him, but, encouraged by the Pope, he would not pay a single jot. The Polish nobility offered to collect subscriptions on his behalf; but he spurned their offers, as Dr. Johnson did the famous pair of eleemosynary shoes. By the end of the year, 1873, all his available property had been distrainted, and he had still 16,000 thalers to pay. He was summoned before a civil tribunal at Posen, but refused to appear. He was requested to pay up the balance of his fines, but answered never a word. Insolence on one side, and patience on the other could go no further. My Lord Archbishop, therefore, was at last arrested and marched off to gaol at Ostrovo, where for the next two years he had ample leisure to reflect on the doctrine, not only of passive but of active resistance to the law, and to work out a new theory of the relations between Church and State in agreement with the advanced ideas of the nineteenth century.*

* Soon after his imprisonment he was deposed from office by the new Court for Ecclesiastical Causes, which, by the way, was composed of six Protestants and four Old Catholics. A year after his incarceration, Ledochovsky was created a cardinal by the Pope, in recognition of his suffering for the sake of the Holy Church, and on his liberation, in 1876, he repaired to the Vatican, where he has ever since lived as pensioner and chief adviser of the Pope, on affairs connected with the "Kulturkampf."
As being not only the first, but also the most typical case of episcopal disobedience to the May Laws that was dealt with, we have devoted much more attention to the rebellious career of Archbishop Ledochovsky than we can to that of any of his colleagues, who similarly sinned and similarly suffered. Whether they ought to be regarded as martyrs or as misdemeanants, we will leave our readers to judge. But none can read the trial of the Seven Bishops, as described by Macaulay, without sharing the exultation of the multitudes which hailed their acquittal, seeing that they had been malignantly arraigned for refusing to contribute to a breach of law. But the proven charge against the Prussian Bishops was that they had sought to exercise that very dispensing power which their English compers had so manfully withstood; and their offence, therefore, was precisely the same as that which justly cost perfidious James his crown.

Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1873, Prussia had gone to the poll, and the Catholics made desperate efforts for their cause. Stooping to bitter party warfare, the rebellious bishops directed their flocks how to bear themselves in the political fray. The result was that the Clericals emerged from the elections almost twice as strong as before. But, on the

In the course of 1877 he was again successively sentenced, in absentia, to imprisonment for periods of two and a half years, seven months, and two years, for "arrogating the exercise of episcopal rights" in his diocese, while a warrant was issued for his arrest. That, with such an adviser as Ledochovsky, Rome should not have distinguished itself by a spirit of conciliation, is not to be wondered at.
other hand, the united Liberals gained most of the seats which the Conservatives had lost, and they still formed a compact majority. More significant, perhaps, than the increase of the Centre, was the return of Dr. Falk in six different constituencies. The Clericals thought to assert their newly-acquired strength by demanding the abrogation of the May Laws; but their motion was rejected by an overwhelming vote, and replied to by a bill for making civil marriage compulsory.

The Clericals, of course, cried out that this measure primarily aimed at destroying the Church by depriving it of its heaven-appointed functions; but its object was as clear as day. It was the necessary complement of the May Laws. We have seen that the Government refused to recognise the appointment, and consequently the official acts, of clergymen installed in defiance of one of these laws; so it followed that many Catholics began to pass for married in the eye of the Church, but not in the eye of the State. To obviate, therefore, the dreadful social confusion thus occasioned, the latter was bound to intervene in the only possible way—by basing the validity of the wedding-tie on a civil contract, instead of on an ecclesiastical ceremony; and by also transferring the registration of births and burials from the Church to the State. For it also resulted that entries and extracts of such domestic events, made by illegally appointed clergymen, were not entitled to public credit. These were the main reasons for the measure, though the
Government also desired to facilitate the conclusion of mixed unions, to enable divorced persons to re-marry, and to provide Old Catholics with such a form of wedding as would not force them to quit the Church of which it still regarded them as members. Marriage, to be valid before the law, must be entered into by all before the magistrate, though the contracting parties might subsequently seek the consecration of the Church; and their omission to do this would merely prove—not that the State had estranged the nation from the Church, but that the Church was failing to keep alive the religious consciousness of the nation.

The Chancellor was quite alive to the grave significance of the new measure, and it was only after a keen mental conflict that he yielded on the subject to the unanimous wish of the Cabinet. His surrender to its will was dictated by the conviction, that it is the duty of every statesman to subordinate his own private views to the exigencies of the public weal. The religious aspect of the question was still viewed by the Chancellor in much the same light as it had been a quarter of a century before, when, as an orthodox Junker, he pleaded with pious eloquence against the institution of civil marriage.

* During the debates on the Prussian Constitution, it had been proposed to add to the Charter a clause making civil marriage compulsory, and Bismarck declared himself against this innovation in a speech which made a deep impression at the time. It was inconsistent of them, he argued, to have in one article guaranteed religious liberty, and in another to have sanctioned confessional servitude; for that was simply what they did in making the validity of the parson's blessing dependent on the previous fiat of a village scribe, thus degrading the Church into the mere
The inconsistency, of course, between his opinions then and his action now, did not escape bitter attack; but he had never, he said, acted like the False Mother in the tale of Solomon's Judgment, insisting on having his will even though the State should be rent asunder in consequence. He was neither too proud nor too obstinate to learn, and to adapt his views to altered circumstances. None who voted for the May Laws, and who valued their reputation for consistency, could possibly withhold their support from the Civil Marriage Act; so, with certain modifications, it was at last passed by large majorities in both Chambers.

The discussion of the subject furnished the Clerical foes of the Chancellor with an opportunity for repeating personal charges against his honour, which the Prince, boiling with rage, denounced as "wicked and audacious lies, invented to train-bearer of an underling bureaucracy. Such a custom might exist in countries whose Constitution was a religious tabula rasa, but it would never do for Prussia to substitute the police-office for the altar, especially in a loose and free-thinking time which offered them an ambiguous moral philosophy for the saving doctrines of Christianity, and taught them in bloody characters that the naked bayonet only intervened between criminal passions and the peaceful citizen. He would not admit that the solution of the difficult question of mixed marriages between Catholics and Protestants could be materially promoted by the proposed change, and regarded it as a real want only in the case of a certain class of Jews. But were millions, who had remained true to the faith of their fathers, to be thus constrained for the sake of a few religious renegades? The Chamber ultimately adopted an amendment reserving the institution of civil marriage for a special law, which was only presented to Parliament in 1859, being approved by the Lower Chamber, but rejected by the Upper. Save in the Rhine Province, and for the Jews and certain classes of Dissenters, civil marriage only came to be a universal law of Prussia and the Empire in 1875.
blacken his character." * If, he said, he were to refute everything that was written against him, he would require the services not only of a Press Bureau and a Guelph ("Reptile") Fund, but also of a special Ministry. It was an honour to him to have made so many enemies in the service of his country, and he was proud to think that, from "the Garonne to the Vistula, and from the Baltic to the Tiber, he was at that moment the best hated man in all Europe."

Nowhere was that hatred more intense than among the Catholics of France, for, to dislike of the man who had destroyed the Empire, they now added detestation of the Power which had dethroned the Pope. The Chancellor was not blind to the new danger thus accruing to Germany on the Seine, and to Paris he addressed serious remonstrances, which we have already had occasion to record.† About the same time, too, the Belgian Government was requested to restrain the inflammatory language of its clergy; but to England it was not necessary to make such an appeal. The Catholic episcopate of Great Britain, it is true, had sent

* Bismarck had described the bishops as "revolutionaries," or men who "placed their judgment above the law;" and, in order to bring the same charges home to its author, Herr von Schorlemer-Alst accused him of having overturned the old Federal Constitution, of having, in 1848, encouraged the defection of the Hungarian and Dalmatian troops, and of having formed the Hungarian Legion under Klapka. Herr von Mallinckrodt followed suit by repeating all the calumnies recently launched against the Chancellor by General La Marmora (in his book about the Austrian campaign, to which we have already referred), and by expressing his "belief in statements which had not been refuted."

† See pp. 91 and 53 ante.
...of encouragement to their rebel brethren in sia; but the great mass of the British people, on the side of law and freedom, heartily sympa-
d with the Chancellor in his efforts to break the ralling power of Rome. There might have been opinions about the propriety of his means, but it was only one as to the praiseworthiness of his

The national feeling, which later on received smanlike expression from the pen of Mr. Gladstone, (January, 1874) found popular utterance at huge influential meetings in London, whereof the re-
ions were communicated to the German Emperor Earl Russell. In acknowledging these, His sty wrote that, when entering on the struggle, he

sure of the sympathies of the English nation, with which ople and his royal house were united by the memories of so hard and glorious common struggles since the time of William age. *

trongly supported at home, and sympathised with al, the Government did not hesitate or look back the path it had entered. On meeting the Prussian Parliament, as in previous year, was asked to deal with two fresh ures of defence against the Romish Church.

The foremost citizens of Berlin also voted an address of thanks for solutions of the St. James’s and Exeter Hall meetings (which were repeated at Glasgow), and replied to the shout of “God bless the or William,” by “God bless old England, our surest ally in the for civil and religious freedom.” Under the presidency of the of Norfolk, the Catholics held a counter-demonstration in St. James’s then the Pope, Lesbochovsky and Company, were glorified, and the of Falk and Bismarck heaped with scorn.
The First of these was a Bill for interpreting and supplementing
the law touching the training and appointment of clergymen; the
other, and more important, being one relating to the administration
of vacant Catholic bishoprics.

Apart from its declaratory causes, the former made it penal for
any priest, unrecognized by the State, to exercise religious functions,
while empowering the State, in certain circumstances, to impute
and hold in trust the revenues of vacant livings, and to appoint
a priest or vicar to a cure of souls on its own account.

The Second measure, which was still more necessary to fill up a
gap in the line of defence formed by the May Laws, provided, in
substance, for the administration of the property of vacant sees, in
the event of a substitute or successor to a deposed or deceased bishop
not being appointed in conformity with the law.

Both these Bills were of a very harsh and penal
character, but they were the necessary and logical com-
plement to the enactments of the previous year, and it
was clear that they would never need to be enforced if
the latter were obeyed. It were useless to describe the
angry and stormful excitement which their discussion
again created, and which ended in their being approved,
by the usual majorities, in both Houses of the Prussian
Landtag.

About the same time, a third and much more severe
measure was added by the Imperial Parliament to this
new series of May Laws. The second general election
to the Reichstag, which was held early in
January (1874), had resulted, as in the case
of the Prussian Landtag, in a large increase
of the Clerical ranks, though the victory still remained
on the National Liberal side.* This new Reichstag

* In Bavaria alone, which had been represented in the previous Reich-
stag by 30 Liberals and 18 Clericals, the former now only gained 16, but
pronounced in favour of civil marriage as the Landtag had done, though an Imperial law on the subject was not passed till next year. But meanwhile it was asked to place the coping-stone upon the edifice of anti-Papal legislation. The frontier between Church and State had been clearly defined by law, and penalties imposed for transgressing it. These, too, had been exacted in the most rigorous manner. Bishops and priests had been deprived of their pay—had been fined, imprisoned, and deposed. But what did this avail, if the recusants continued to act themselves, and be regarded by others as if they were still in legitimate possession of their posts? There was only one possible way of meeting this last and most determined form of contumacy, and consistency demanded that the Government should not shrink from it. It was necessary to fashion a weapon against which Clerical resistance would be wholly powerless. Parliament, therefore, passed a "Law (that of May, 1874) for Preventing the Unauthorised Exercise of Ecclesiastical Offices," which declared, in substance, that any clergyman who ignored the sentence of a court deposing him, might, according to the gravity of his offence, either be refused residence in any particular

the latter 32 seats, seven of which fell to priests. The Centre Party now numbered 101 members, who might always reckon on the votes of the Democrats, Poles, Protesters, Particularists, and other disaffected elements; but these were still confronted by a compact Government majority of 240, including 155 National Liberals, and an auxiliary contingent of Progressists, Imperialists, &c. Alsace-Lorraine, which now also received the right of Parliamentary representation, sent up five French Protesters and ten Clericals, of whom seven were clergymen, including the Bishops of Metz and Strasburg.
district, or forfeit all his subject-rights, and be banished from the territory of the Empire.*

There was truth in the remark of Herr Windthorst, who, as usual, did all he could to intensify the fierce and angry character of the debates on the subject, that the next stage in the policy of repression thus pursued would have to be marked by the guillotine. The extreme severity of the above enactment, compared with which the Socialist Law of a later day might be called a mild measure, was increased by the fact that, though primarily meant to complete the ecclesiastical legislation of Prussia, it applied to all the Empire, and thus entailed on rebellious subjects of the Prussian Crown the loss of their whole German Fatherland.† Under this new law, Catholic clergymen might be prevented from reading mass, administering the sacrament, and even performing the last rites to the dying and the dead. The deplorable results of its application have formed the constant theme of wrathful complaint with the partisans of the Pope; but we will leave our readers to judge which is most to blame—a Government that continues to assert the sovereignty of the law in spite of the unreasoning appeals of wounded sentiment, or a body of priests who declare their only end in life to be the good of their flocks, but who nevertheless work them bane and woe by

* This law was finally passed by a majority of 214 against 108, or about two-thirds of the whole House.

† The readiness, however, with which even the South German Governments supported the measure was a proof that they, in their several circumstances and degrees, hoped to share the advantage thereby mainly accruing to Prussia.
doggedly refusing to recognise a series of laws to which they might very well subscribe, without in the slightest weakening the efficacy of their spiritual ministrations.

The new laws were applied with rigour. But severity on one side was surpassed by obstinacy on the other. The conflict grew hot and fierce. The edge of the new measure had been sharpened by a Royal Order, occasioned by the death of the Bishop of Fulda, which inserted the words "conscientiously observe the laws of the realm" in the episcopal oath of allegiance. The future was thus securely provided for, but the present still caused grievous trouble. Church revenues were impounded and administered by the State. Scores of livings were left vacant. Schools were closed. Flocks mourned the loss of their shepherds. The Bishop of Paderborn, yearning for the martyr's crown, was at last gratified by being thrown into prison like His Grace of Posen. His colleague of Treves suffered the same fate. My Lord Archbishop of Cologne was fined 10,000 thalers and marched off to gaol, when distraint on his effects could no longer meet the penalty of his offences. Other rebellious members of the episcopate were mulcted in ruinous sums. The Pope and the clergy continued to issue circulars, pastorals, letters, and all manner of angry protest and seditious encouragement; while the Catholic laity also began to shriek in most revolutionary and defiant tones. But the Prussian Government, heeding not in the very slightest these whizzing bullets of the brain, pressed on to mount the Papal breach. Yet just
as it was gained, the leader of the storming-party very nearly fell.

Overstrained by the exertions of the "Kulturkampf," Prince Bismarck had fallen ill, and in July (1874) he repaired to Kissingen to take its healing waters. It was the thirteenth of that month, the anniversary of the momentous "day of Ems," and the Prince, as was his afternoon wont, had left his lodgings to drive out in the equipage placed at his disposal by the King of Bavaria. The promenade was crowded with fashionable visitors, ever eager to see and cheer the great Chancellor. His carriage had not advanced far when a man in a clerical garb stepped in front of the horses, causing them to be reined in.* At the same time a mean-looking fellow darted from the throng, and, taking deliberate aim, fired a one-barrelled pistol straight at the Prince's head. The Prince was in the act of returning the salutations of the public, and the bullet of the assassin passed between his right hand and his temples, grazing his wrist and all but opening a pulse-vein. The quiet little watering-place was speedily thrown into a state of frenzy. After a desperate struggle to escape, the would-be murderer was seized and haled away to prison by the maddened crowd, which could hardly be kept from lynching him. The Prince himself, after driving through the town to show that he was unscathed, went and confronted the criminal,

* By accident, as it turned out. The man, a Tyrolean priest named Hauthaler, was arrested, though his complicity with Kullmann could not be proved, and may be disbelieved.
who turned out to be a Catholic journeyman-cooper, all the way from Magdeburg, named Edward Franz Ludwig Kullmann, aged twenty-one.

Partly from what he frankly told the Chancellor himself, and partly from official inquiry,* it appears that his motives were very much the same as those of Balthazar Gérard, who, after years of planning and waiting, winged a bullet into the heart of William of Orange. Questioned by the Prince as to why he wanted to murder him, Kullmann—whose only feeling was one of disappointment that he had missed his aim—avowed that it was on account of the Church Laws, the imprisonment of the bishops, and the fact that the Chancellor had insulted "his fraction" (the Centre). The germ of his resolution to take off the Prince was traced to the time when, in the previous year, he had joined a Catholic Society at Salzwedel (district of Magdeburg), read its polemic literature, and listened to the inflammatory harangues of a priest called Störmann—whose sudden death, however, unfortunately impeded the efforts of justice to discover whether the assassin was really the author of his own crime, or the mere instrument of others. The latter point, it is true, could not be directly established. There was nothing to show that a Jesuit priest had made as clear a bargain with Kullmann, as Macbeth did with the murderers of Banquo. But there was undoubted truth in the statement of a Government print, that "the

* Our account of the Kullmann incident is mainly compiled from the report of the trial, and other official documents.
dark threatenings and the passionate expressions of the Ultramontane Press, with other things which have come to light, give good ground for the belief that the hands which armed Ravaillac and Gérard, the assassins of Henry the Fourth and William of Orange, also loaded Kullmann’s pistol.” That weapon he had bought a whole year before he used it against the Prince, under the influence of impressions made upon a low, ignorant, and fanatical mind by the fierce controversies and complainings of the Catholic world in which he lived. He diligently practised shooting with it, and made ominous remarks as to how he meant turning his skill to account. On the 29th of May he went to Berlin for the express purpose of executing his dastardly will, but on the following day found that his unwitting victim had just left for Varzin. Still, he waited his time, and followed the Prince to Kissingen with the result narrated.*

There is every reason to believe that, though first to lift his hand, Kullmann was not the only abandoned zealot in whom the burning controversies of the time had kindled a fell desire to destroy their illustrious author. In particular, in the previous September, one Duchesne, a

*Duchesne, another would be Kullmann.

On the 29th and 30th October following, Kullmann was tried by jury at Würzburg, and sentenced to fourteen years’ penal servitude—his youth and bad upbringing being regarded as extenuating circumstances—with loss of civil rights and police surveillance for ten years thereafter. The trial was attended, among others, by about forty representatives of the Press of Germany and other countries, including, of course, England—a proof of the deep and universal interest taken in the event. In June, 1885, it was announced that “Kullmann has been guilty of a new offence in the Bayreuth prison, and has just been sentenced to five years’ penal servitude for a grossly slanderous attack on the Bavarian Minister and others.”
Belgian boiler-maker, wrote to the Archbishop of Paris, offering to murder the despoiler of France and the oppressor of the Pope for the sum of 40,000 francs. There may have been no connection between the two events, but it is nevertheless true that the Bishop of Nancy had issued a pastoral shortly before this, most distinctly encouraging the hope of the speedy re-conquest of Alsace-Lorraine. The Prince took the incident to heart, and threatened to denounce the French Government to every Cabinet of Europe, unless it did everything it could to probe the matter to the bottom; which it did, in all good faith and zeal, with no great results.

Great was the joy of Germany at the Prince's escape from the bullet of Kullmann, and the joy of the Fatherland was shared by Europe.

—Pro Nihilo, p. 112.

+ Some time afterwards, another individual named Wiesinger offered to the Chief of the Jesuits in Austria to murder Bismarck for a million of marks. The Jesuits handed his letter to the public prosecutor, and Wiesinger, on being examined, declared that he was not an Ultramontane, but a Liberal, and that, acting on instructions, he merely wished to compromise the Jesuits, and give Bismarck another pretext for proceeding against them. But the affair was involved in obscurity.

§ Addressing a surging multitude the same evening from the balcony of his lodging, with his arm in a sling, the Prince said: "It is not for me to anticipate judgment, but this I may safely say, that the blow aimed at
Nearly two thousand telegrams and letters of congratulation poured in to Kissingen from all parts of the civilised world; but whether the Pope was among the number of those crowned and sovereign heads who hastened to convey to the Chancellor the assurance of their sympathetic satisfaction, is not recorded. Ultramontane journals affected to join the chorus of condemnation raised by the whole Press of Europe; but, while denouncing the crime, they had to vindicate their party from the imputation which it cast upon it.* The Clerical Press waxed eloquent in its self-defence, but fine apologetic writing was of no good. Protestant Germany, and the students of cause and effect in every country, clung to their own opinion on the subject. The "attentat" of Kullmann acted like oil on the flames of controversial strife between Church and State, and up they leaped again with tenfold force.

A debate in the Reichstag in the following December gave some indication of their strength. In

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* "It is not incredible," wrote the Germania, chief Clerical organ, "that in consequence of the steady persecution of our party and our Church, an amount of hatred, rage, and passion may be bred in the breasts of some individuals, which may at last burst forth in rebellion against all law, both human and divine; but it is incredible that any dispassionately thinking man should recklessly impute to a whole party an excess committed by one or several of its members."
the course of a speech, in which the Bavarian (Catholic) deputy, Herr Jörg, savagely assailed what he called the "diplomatic juggling" of the Chancellor, he referred to the Spanish question* as having "fallen from heaven at a time when the crime of a crack-brained fellow had sent a great part of Germany into actual fits of delirium." In his scathing reply the Prince solemnly assured the House that the assassin, whom he had interviewed himself, was in no wise half-witted, but in the full possession of all his faculties, and the self-avowed champion of the Clerical cause. "Yes, gentlemen," he said with a terrible look, "you may push away the man from you as you like, but he himself clings tightly to your coat-tails." On the Right, and on the Left, these words were received with a storm of cheers, whilst the Centre was convulsed with rage. The German Parliament had never yet witnessed such an angry uproar.

Blow followed upon blow in quick and pitiless succession. On the day after that wrathful scene, the Chancellor announced the withdrawal of the Imperial Mission from the Curia. His resolution had been sudden. When first laid before Parliament, on the 4th of November, the budget had contained the usual charge for the salary of the German Minister at the Vatican; but lo! when the estimates now came on for debate, the item had disappeared. The "Blacks" were beside themselves. But their

* Vide ante, p. 55.
leader had speech enough left to pour forth his prophetic ire, and he compared this new attack on the Romish Church to the vain assaults of the Titans against the Gods—a simile which would have much better described the antagonism of the "Pearl of Meppen" himself to the Prince-Chancellor.

The latter was far from unwilling, he said, to recognise the Pope as the spiritual head of the Catholic Church; but the mere fact of His Holiness being the chief of a creed which had adherents in Germany was no reason in itself why Germany should send a diplomatic representative to him, any more than that the Emperor of Russia, who had great numbers of Armenian subjects, should accredit a Minister on their account to the Patriarch of Armenia. It had come to this, that Germany meanwhile had really no more diplomatic business to transact with the Vatican. The erasure of the budget item in question was a matter of sheer "political decency" in view of the outrageous claims preferred by the Pope, the concession of which by any independent State would be tantamount to its passage under an ecclesiastical "Caudine yoke." As long as the Holy Father stirred up subjects of the Empire to rebellion, he must expect his diplomatic existence to be utterly ignored by it.

In less than a week from this time, there occurred a memorable incident in connection with the prevailing struggle. On the 11th December, Dr. Majunké, priest, and editor of the Ultra-montane Germania, was seized and put in gaol on the strength of a sentence of a year's imprisonment for libelling the Government. On the second day after Kullmann's murderous attempt, the authorities had been ordered to deal with the Catholic Press, and with propagandist societies under the influence of the
uits, according to the utmost rigour of the law; and M. Majunké was one of the first and most conspicuous aims of this policy of vigilance and repression. He was found guilty, but eluded immediate arrest, and, relying on the fancied immunity of deputies, returned to his seat in the Reichstag.

Dr. Lasker at once asked whether his imprisonment was in accordance with the Constitution. The proper committee replied that it was not at variance with it. A fortnight previously the House rejected a motion for the liberation of Social-Democratic deputies—Hasenclever, Bebel, Most—on which occasion the Chancellor had declared the basis of the Centre and the Socialists to be identical. But the party mood was now somewhat changed; and at length it was declared "essential to the dignity of Parliament—either by interpretation, or creation of the Constitution—to obviate the possibility of any deputy being again arrested during the session, without the sanction of the House." The acceptance of this motion by a narrow majority was duly extolled by the Catholic Press as a decided victory for its cause. "On a snowy winter day," said a Ultramontane print, "Bismarck has found his first Canossa" (on his bare and penitent knees) "before junké, in the castle-court of Plötzensee." *

Regarding this as a vote of censure, the Chancellor resigned. But the Emperor bade him put his resignation into his pocket, and be of good cheer. Similar

* The Millbank Prison of Berlin.
encouragement was not long in coming from another quarter. The indispensable merits of the Chancellor had lately been more conspicuously than ever brought to light by certain diplomatic revelations in connection with the Arnim trial; and Parliament itself, which the mere rumour of the Prince’s intention had frightened, resolved to relieve him from any apprehension that might have been created in his mind by the Majunké episode. Profiting by a motion of Dr. Windthorst for the refusal of the secret service money, Herr von Bennigsen bitterly rebuked the Clericals for their perverse hostility to the Empire, and asked for a special vote of confidence in the disheartened Chancellor, whose great and ever more apparent merits he warmly eulogised. The Clericals, the Poles, and the Social Democrats were the only ones who opposed the motion, which was overwhelmingly carried. Radiant with fresh confidence and hope, the Prince, in full uniform, hastened from the Palace to the House of Parliament, where he cordially shook hands with its President, and with his Liberal champion, Bennigsen.

But to the regular course of the “Kulturkampf” we must now return. We saw how, on the day following the violent scene in the Reichstag in connection with the “attempt” of Kullmann, Bismarck announced the withdrawal of the Imperial Mission from Rome. The prisoner of the Vatican was vexed enough at this; but what was his rage when, shortly afterwards, Bismarck published his
cular despatch on the election of the next Pope.*

The aim of this despatch, it may be repeated, was to

tly alarm the European Governments against the
tensions of Pius IX., and to induce them to take
precautions against a similar abuse of power on
part of his successor. In a long-winded "collective
\textit{declaration}," the German bishops hastened to protest

inst the assertion that the Vatican Decrees had made
m irresponsible agents and instruments of an absolute
vereign. Meanwhile the Bishop of Paderborn, who
already been imprisoned, was deposed from office;

law for making civil marriage in Prussia compulsory
merged in one for the whole Empire; and the
nderbolt, which the Papal Jove had been wrathfully
ging, was now launched in the shape of the famous
\textit{encyclica} of 5th February, 1875.

In this display of earthly pride and dictatorial pre-

ption, Pius IX. had almost equalled Gregory VII.
stormed at the "godless" chiefs of the
pire, and their policy of "brute force;"

lauded the conduct of the rebellious bishops; and he
demnly declared to the whole Catholic world that the
ay \textit{Laws}, as infringing the divine constitution of the
urch, were "null and void," and of no binding force
any of its members. Here was a foreign potentate

took advantage of his vast power over the con-
ences of his spiritual subjects to stir them up against
\textit{laws} of their temporal rulers. This was surely an

* Of 14th May, 1872, of which we have already given the substance at
\textit{ante}.
attempt with a vengeance to establish imperium in imperio. Well might the official Press of Prussia write that the action of the Pope himself now clearly confirmed the words of the Nuntius Meglia,† that the Catholic Church, if need be, would seek the aid of revolution. On the other hand, the tone of the Clerical journals became more daring and defiant than ever. "Many a one," wrote the Germania, in comparing Kullmann's deed with the acts of the Imperial Government,

"many a one who drove the murderous steel, or winged the deadly lead, will seem morally purer, and fare better before the judgment-seat of God, than those murderers of truth, innocence, and honour."

If ever there had been any doubt as to the real mind of Rome, it was now dispelled. She had boldly dropped

\[ \text{The "Bread-Basket Law."} \]

the conspirator's mask, and stood before the world in all the avowed war-drapery of the Vatican Decrees. The Pope had spoken; Prince Bismarck would act. He would show by one crowning proof who was really sovereign in Prussia. Within a month, therefore, from the appearance of the Encyclical, the Chamber was asked to pass a measure popularly called the "Stoppage of Pay," or "Bread-Basket Law."

* The Westphalian Mercury, which first published the Encyclic, was at once confiscated; and the Clericals, therefore, had recourse to a most crafty device for defeating the order forbidding its publication either from the pulpit or in the Press. Amid a "frightful tumult," one of their number managed to read it aloud in the Landtag, so that the document might be printed with impunity in a fair report of the proceedings. Henceforth, however, it was agreed that no papers could be read out in the House without the approval of the President.

† Vide. p. 261 ante.

‡ Sperrgesetze or Brodkorbgesetze of 22nd April, 1875.
Directed against ecclesiastical rebels, not only in esse but also in posse, it declared, in substance, that thenceforth all payments hitherto made by the State to the Catholic Church would cease, but be resumed as soon as ever the clergy thus deprived of their regular incomes should give written promise of unconditional obedience to all the laws of the realm. The government-grants to the Church of Rome were mainly drawn from the secularised properties of the latter, and were guaranteed under certain conditions by a royal sanction of the Bull De salute Animarum, a diplomatic achievement of the historian Niebuhr. But these conditions, it was now clear, had been flagrantly broken; and so it was equally right and the duty of the State not to salary opposition to its laws. To continue doing so would have been as foolish of Prussia, as it would have been fatal for Germany to subsidise France with men and money during the war of 1870.

The bishops, as usual, laid what was at once an angry protest and an imploring appeal at the feet of the Emperor. But His Majesty, through his Cabinet, answered them with equal dignity and force. The bishops averred that an oath of subjection of the kind required of them was irreconcilable with the conscience of a Christian. They were asked, in turn, how they could reconcile their present attitude with their previous opposition to the Vatican Decrees. They compared themselves with the apostles who preferred death to compliance with laws “forbidding them to preach divine
truth.” It was “untrue,” they were told, that the May Laws did anything of the kind. Parliament did not need much persuasion on the subject of the new measure; and even many Protestant Feudalists in the Upper House, who had previously opposed Dr. Falk’s legislation, now supported a bill intended to enforce respect for existing laws. But it was not passed without desperate opposition on the part of the Clericals. They argued that the stoppage of their pay was a high-handed breach of treaty-rights. Dr. Windthorst accused the Chancellor of not knowing law enough to enable him to pass an ordinary examination. The Prince was willing to admit his comparative ignorance of jurisprudence, but claimed “to know the will of God better than any of them.” He was quite ready to “obey God rather than man,” but he believed he did so in “serving a King by God’s grace in the interests of the public weal.” The law in question would probably not have the desired effect; it might not force the foe to surrender; the clergy would doubtless be more richly salaried by private charity. But the State was bent on doing its duty, irrespective of results. “Acting ‘with God for King and country,’ it was resolved to stand up for the freedom of the German nation against the machinations of the Jesuits and the Pope.”

* A curious incident occurred during the debate on the first reading of the Bread-Basket Bill. Professor von Sybel took occasion to describe the contents of a novel called “Die Reichsfeinde” (Foes of the Empire) by Konrad von Balandien (Konrad Bischoff), an Ultramontane writer who set himself the task of “enlightening the people with romances on the lies of history,” and was rewarded for his pains by being made a Privy Chamberlain to Pius IX. In the “Reichsfeinde,” said Professor Sybel.
THE "KULTURKAMPF." 327

Meanwhile, Dr. Falk had not been idle. The clericals still cried out that all these new laws violated the Constitution. They had been driven out of most of their other positions, and it was now resolved to expel them from this one also. We have already seen that the Constitution had been adapted to the sense of the first series of May laws. But, even in their new form, Bismarck looked upon the altered clauses as diseased limbs, so he determined to cut off what he could not cure. It was a serious thing, he said, to do, but circumstances left him no choice. Perhaps, at heart, he was not sorry to see violent hands laid upon a document, the concoction of which (in 1849) he had beheld with so much aversion and pain. He was doubtless, however, right in saying that, had the Church of Rome in 1850 advanced the claims it urged a score of years later, the articles in question would never have been admitted into the Constitution. Why, then, should they not now be expunged from it? Simply put, he argued, these clauses placed the supreme direction of the Church's affairs in the hands of a usurping Pope, who, as he again most vividly detailed, actually raised taxes in Prussia, and

he author described the persecution of the Christians under the Emperor Diocletian, a good old man but a weak ruler, completely under the malign influence of his Minister Marcus Trebonius, a six-feet high, bald-headed man of devilish cruelty. The latter, always referred to (in the novel) as "Mark," was at last seized by the Nemesis and sank out of sight in a swamp. At this moment the original of "Mark" entered the Hall of Assembly in the person of the Emperor William's great Chancellor, looking his very best, when the House, to his great bewilderment, broke out into uncontrollable mirth and salvos of applause.
was served by an officious Press unsurpassed for its efficiency, by an army of clergy unparalleled for their zeal, and by a network of societies sworn to his interests. The debates on the subject were as fierce and personal as ever. But there was no doubt as to the issue. Liberals who had championed, and reactionaries who had opposed the Constitution, now combined to blot out, as with a brush, those of its articles which the Church had hitherto regarded as the sacred charter of its independence. An important breach in the fortifications of the State was thus built up, and Bismarck declared that, not until all the remaining gaps in his line of defence had been similarly filled, would he think for a moment of holding parley with the besiegers.

But to the filling up of these gaps he at once proceeded. They were three in number, and in each he respectively placed a remedial measure: one, called the "Cloister Law," dissolving and expelling from pure

* All other monasterial societies were to be dissolved within six months, and the establishment of no new ones permitted. Their funds &c., were not to be confiscated, but only administered meanwhile by the State on behalf of the members of the dissolved foundations.
rategic whole, one being meant to cut the enemy off from his commissariat supplies, the other to rob him of the bulk of his troops. The Jesuits and their kindred orders had already been packed out of the country; but what did this avail, if the nine thousand other con
derated agents of the Pope left behind continued their revolutionary work with redoubled zeal? There was nothing for it, in the opinion of the Government, but to act on the advice of John Knox, and drive away the monks by destroying their nests. This was certainly a harsh and high-handed proceeding, but it found ardent support from men who passed for the most liberal and enlightened of their nation. Even the clause permittingisters of Mercy to continue their work on sufferance as but grudgingly approved, and great opposition was offered to the four years' period of grace asked, from obvious reasons, for purely educational Orders.

The second measure above-mentioned was not so much a combative as an organic law, and gave Catholic communes, in conjunction with the State, a large share in the administration of all business, especially money matters, affecting their Churches.* It had been found, without speaking of nothing else, that ecclesiastical peculation, or call it financial disorder, on an enormous scale had been practised in the see of Posen. One Clerical speaker most described this law as "democratising" the government of the Church. Of a piece with it was a

* It may as well be here stated, for the sake of unity, that this measure was supplemented in the following year (7th June, 1876) by a comprehensive and stringent "Law, touching the Rights of the State in the Supervision of the Administration of Means in Catholic Dioceses."
Ministerial Order of Dr. Falk, forbidding the alienation of real property belonging to the Church without the consent of the State. It was to no purpose that the bishops again protested that the Law in question violated the divine rights of the Church, and that Dr. Windthorst solemnly warned pious founders that private property in Prussia was no longer sacred. The Landtag hastened to gratify the Government by passing this, as it initiated the third and remaining Bill, touching the rights of the Old Catholics.

Affecting to be entirely neutral in matters of doctrine, the State still continued to look upon the followers of Dr. Döllinger as no less members of the Romish Church than the adherents of Pius IX. Making no distinction between them in theory, it was also bound to hold the balance evenly between them in practice. We have seen how it had recognised Bishop Reinkens as elected chief of the Old Catholics, and maintained in their posts at Bonn four professors of that sect whom Melchers of Cologne had banned and sought to oust. But it was now asked by Parliament to do more. The Vaticanists might dogmatise and excommunicate as much as ever they liked, but the Government admitted the force of the popular argument that their victims should not be deprived of a place to worship in, or of their rightful share in the enjoyment of the general funds and bounties of the Church.

Such, then, is the substance of the laws that may be said to have completed the works of fortification which Prince Bismarck deemed indispensable for pro-
tecting the State from Papal assault. By the Bread-
Basket Law, the clergy had to choose between hunger
and submission; by the Cloister Law, their auxiliary
forces were swept away; the alteration of the Constitu-
tion deprived them of their last legal resort; a fourth
measure greatly curtailed their budget and administra-
tive powers; and by a fifth they were taught that,
while determined to safeguard civil freedom and alle-
giance from the dogged attacks of a usurping Church,
the Government was equally resolved to secure to all
its subjects the inherited blessings of religious liberty.
Yet, with all these new and necessary shackles on
their limbs, the Romish hierarchy could not show
that they were less free, if they chose, to perform what
Dr. Falk had justly described as their sole and simple
function—"the perfecting of man in the sight of
God."

But while Bismarck had thus made all secure within
his entrenched camp, he was also careful to guard its
approaches from without. In the spring of 1875,
shortly after the appearance of the Encyclica, he had drawn the attention of the
Italian Government to the international
dangers of its law which guaranteed certain political
privileges to the Pope, without imposing conditions that
might restrain him from seeking to infringe the rights
of foreign Sovereigns. It was intolerable, he thought,
that the Pontiff—who had been deprived of his
temporal power—should now really be much better off
than before, seeing that he had been made invulnerable
as well as infallible, and could safely launch his bolts at will from behind the cover of his Italian protector. But, while admitting the disadvantages of the Guarantee Law, the Italian Government was prevented by religious and other considerations from gratifying the desire of Bismarck that it should be modified.*

About this time, however, the Chancellor was more successful in his treatment of another delicate international question arising out of the "Kulturkampf." He had already remonstrated with Belgium as to the inflammatory language of its clergy, and been told that their behaviour was not within convenient reach of any existing law. The same answer was returned to him in the matter of an address of sympathy from the Comité des Œuvres Pontificales at Brussels to the rebellious Bishop of Paderborn, which bristled with insults to the German Government. This was quite enough. Quoting these two cases, and dwelling especially on the offer of a Belgian subject† to murder him, Bismarck signified to the Government of this alien Kullmann that, if its criminal code was powerless to deal with such incipient assassins, it had better be altered as soon as possible.

The Brussels Cabinet was known to be under the influence of Rome, and thought to be subject to that of Paris. Indeed, there were voices in excited Germany which exclaimed that Belgium was acting towards the

* The text of the Papal Guarantee Law will be found in Probyn's "Italy" (published by Cassell and Co.), p. 335.
† Duchesne. See p. 316 ante.
Empire as the outpost of Rome, and the vanguard of France. To a communication which, though couched in the courteous phrases of suggestion, was in reality an imperious demand, the Belgian Ministry replied evasively. For the sum of 40,000 francs Duchesne had offered to the Archbishop of Paris "to shorten the days of that abject monster," the German Chancellor; yet all his Government did, when asked to provide for the future punishment of such acts, was to declare the "probability" of its following the example of other European nations, should they lead the way in that direction.

Bismarck was not the man to be baulked in this way. Taking the other Guarantee Powers into his confidence, he lectured the Cabinet of Brussels on the true principles of international law, and reminded it that the exceptional position of Belgium as a neutral Power carried with it duties as well as privileges. In England — where disquieting rumours of a threatening Note from Berlin to Brussels were allayed by ministerial statements in Parliament — there was little inclination to view the matter differently from Germany; so at last the Belgian Government, without waiting for the legislative initiative "of other nations," hastened to comply with Bismarck's request, and got a criminal amendment law passed in the sense prescribed. Perhaps it thought that the Chancellor's firm but courteously worded despatches were quite as significant as his blunt, and almost brutal, remark to the Duke of Augustenbourg when the latter, in 1864, seemed averse from the cession of Kiel Harbour to Prussia.
"We are quite able to wring the neck of the chickens which we ourselves have hatched."*

We have now completed our account of the famous series of legislative bulwarks thrown up around Prussia and the Empire, against the political encroachments of the Church of Rome. For four years the activity of the Prussian Legislature had been mainly directed to the task of constructing entrenchments around the State, and its lines of defence were now complete. Secure behind its fortifications of law, the civil power could now calmly await ecclesiastical assault. Incressantly still did the sable-uniformed troops of Rome come on with vehement rush and rousing cheer, but each time they were repulsed and mown down by pitiless marksmen behind impregnable parapets. The State made no more sallies; it was content to maintain an attitude of strict defence; and from the spring of 1875 to the spring of 1878—when the death of the Papal commander-in-chief induced his army to make overtures for peace—the history of the "Kulturkampf" is but a tale of the massacre which more than decimated the ranks of the Romish host, in its desperate but vain attempts to recover the positions from which it had been expelled. At first the clergy made a show of compliance with the terms of the Law touching the

* During this diplomatic controversy with Brussels, Bismarck declared "he was so little hostile to Belgium's neutrality, that in the event of war he would be the first to ask the other Powers to strengthen their guarantee to the extent of agreeing that any State which infringed that neutrality would have all the others against it."—Müller's "Polit. Geschichte der Gegenwart" for 1875, p. 80.
Administration of Church Means. Inconsistently enough, the bishops, while condemning that measure, had counselled them to tolerate it, so as to prevent the State from acquiring complete control of their temporalities. But all the other laws passed against them they continued to spite with a steadfast and unselfish defiance worthy of the victims of the Spanish Inquisition, worthy of the mighty spiritual organisation of which they were the ministering members. But it is the cause, more than the suffering, which makes the genuine martyr.

How shall we describe, without lapsing into wearisome details, the troubles that now overtook the Catholics in Prussia—troubles which they themselves compared with the persecution of the early Christians by Diocletian? Schools and seminaries were closed; chairs of theology were left vacant; hundreds of parishes were deprived of their spiritual overseers, while the latter were robbed of their own material support. The Catholic Press was rigorously dealt with; Church processions were controlled by the police. Deserted cloisters and other religious establishments began to dot the land, as if a despoiling enemy had passed over it. The servants of the Church were fined, imprisoned, and banished without mercy. Episcopal palaces were broken into, and their inmates pursued, with warrant of arrest and hue and cry, like thieves and murderers. Tumults broke out in churches; God’s acres were profaned by strife. The crucifix, which, in the age of chivalry and belief, so often shielded fugitives from the sword of the awed pursuer, had no preventive
terror for the merciless law-officers of a State in which Christianity has long ceased to be a vital power. Priests were torn away from the very altar, from the bedside even of death, and from the grave, and flung into prison like common felons, or hustled across the frontier like lepers. "For conscience sake!" shouted one side; "Sovereignty of the law!" was inscribed on the banners of the other.*

The struggle was watched with intense interest by the whole civilised world, for the issues were vast and momentous. Would the policy of "blood and iron," which had made Germany strong, also succeed in breaking the spirit of Rome? The clergy did not stand alone. They were backed by the great mass of the Catholic people, forming about a third of the population of Prussia, and support was naturally most forthcoming where superstition was strongest. Nor did the clergy fail to profit by the ignorance which it has always been their interest to foster. In 1875, shortly after the last Falk Laws were issued, a goodly

* In the first months of the year 1875 alone, the cumulative sentences of imprisonment amounted to 56 years, and of fines to about 28,000 marks. During the same period there were 30 cases of confiscation, 55 of arrest, 74 of domiciliary search, 103 of expulsion—apart from the banished Orders, while 55 societies and meetings were dissolved. These figures will serve to indicate the intensity of a struggle whose victims, lay as well as clerical, continued to increase in arithmetical progression. By the middle of 1877, six out of the twelve Prussian bishops had been deposed; while two other sees, vacated by the death of their holders, could not be refilled. Of about 633,000 marks, normally due by the State to the Church, less than a sixth was paid in the same year. The number of parishes in which all service of religion had ceased soon grew to nearly 800. Of 10,000 Catholic priests in Prussia, the Government could not succeed in bending the will of more than thirty.
band of German pilgrims were led to worship at the shrine of the Madonna of Lourdes, the saintly patroness of French revenge; while in the following year, vast numbers of adoring Catholics flocked to Marpingen, on the Rhine, where the Virgin had appeared—so it was given out—to encourage the faithful in their struggle with the enemies of the Church, though the final result of the alleged Avatar was the placing of the chief devisers of the blasphemous delusion at the bar of a criminal court. It was not to be expected that men who believed in apparitions of this kind should be able to judge on which side lay right in the quarrel between Pope and King, and so the passive resistance of the Catholic clergy was readily seconded by the active sympathy of the laity. Indeed many, if not most incumbents now fared better from the charity of their congregations, than ever they had done from the bounty of the State. The besiegers had cut off the external water-supply of the garrison; but the latter dug within, and came upon an inexhaustible well of private benevolence. Frequent, too, were the co-operative efforts made from without to raise the siege.

In the Chamber, Dr. Windthorst and his men repeatedly returned to the charge with motions for the abrogation of the May Laws, but always in vain. The most hateful and intolerable of all these laws were those which gave the State complete control of the education of youth, and the Catholics made desperate endeavours to clude or undo them. Mass meetings were held; influential
petitions were presented; Catholic leagues were spoken of; new conspiracies against the life of Bismarck were bruited about; but the authors of the May Laws still continued firm as Frederick William's "rocher de bronze." The Catholic Press went mad with rage, and a great portion of it had to be put in strait-jackets. But Prince Bismarck's general popularity was never higher than when the "Kulturkampf" was at its height. The Chancellor's sixtieth birthday—in 1875—was celebrated with unprecedented loyalty, as a kind of national festival; and he was even presented with the freedom of the Catholic city of Cologne, where he now, moreover, stands in sculptured bronze. Two years later, also, when the internecine conflict had already begun to flag, a public monument—bearing the Prince's portrait in relief, with the commemorative words, "Nach Canossa gehen wir nicht"—was erected on the peak of the Harz-hill where formerly towered the castle of that German Kaiser who knelt in degrading penitence at the feet of the Pope of Rome.* Even in Catholic Bavaria, the Prince was almost as popular, in high places, as in his own Protestant Prussia. Addressing—in May, 1877—a company of German pilgrims which included several exiled bishops, the Pope had described the Chancellor as the "modern

* Henry IV. and Gregory VII. See p. 281 ante. The monument was founded on 26th August, and ceremoniously completed on 31st October. 1877, the anniversary of the day on which, 360 years previously, Luther had affixed his famous ninety-five theses to the door of the Schloss-Kirche at Wittenberg. Within this "Canossa-Stein," as it is called, was placed among other contemporary documents and signs of the times, a copy of the correspondence between the Pope and the Emperor William, referred to at p. 288.
Attila."* About this time the Church authorities at Munich proposed to hold a grand procession in honour of the Pope's episcopal jubilee; but the municipality loyaly refused to grant the use of their streets for the purpose of fêting a presumptuous potentate, who had "given the whole German nation a slap in the face."

How long was the country to be troubled and torn by this domestic strife? There was truth in the words of Pius the Ninth, that "these (Catholic) Germans stood as firm as oaks." But what of that, if their rulers remained as inflexible as iron? Would the oak yield, or the edge of the metal be turned? Signs, at least, began to appear that the wielders of the metal were getting tired of relying to rive a substance so unimpressionable to blows. Had the sapient rulers of the Prussian nation, then, gone the right way to work? Had the Chancellor, who had claimed the merit of something very like unerring wisdom for all his past public acts, given further proof of his infallibility in the way he sought to combat preëmptions similar to his own?† Many began to doubt it.

* "In our days," said the Pope, addressing the pilgrims, "I have heard good and honest Prussian Catholics speak of the necessity for some one to come and rouse up the all too lethargic or over-patient nations. God has, indeed, arisen and employed a scourge such as He used many centuries ago. Formerly He made use of an Attila to awaken the nations, and now with a new Attila He has aroused the noble-minded German people. But his modern Attila, who fancied himself a destroyer, has meanwhile helped to build up. This new Attila, who in every way would fain see the religion of Jesus Christ vanish from the face of the earth, has only fortified fresh your belief in it."

† Replying in the Chamber 17th December, 1873, to an attack by his previous feudal ally, Herr von Gerlach, Bismarck said: "I have now, I think, been twelve years at the head of a Government which was begun..."
"Monsieur de Bismarck," said M. Thiers once to Count Arnim,

"Monsieur de Bismarck is a remarkable man, but what I cannot understand from any point of view is his Church policy. He will smart for it, he will indeed. Tell him from me that he is on the wrong track. Towards the end of the battle of Waterloo, when Napoleon was in despair, a great wag (un grand coquin, Monsieur Oudard, le fournisseur) went up to him and said: 'Sire, the English have lost an enormous number of men.' 'Yes,' replied the Emperor, 'but I have lost the battle.' And thus, too, it will one day be with M. de Bismarck and the Church, depend upon it."

There was nothing to show that the Chancellor, even in his most doubting moods, had ever yet taken this view of his own handiwork. That certain provisions of the May Laws were unnecessarily harsh and oppressive, he was the first to admit. After the fury of the conflict had abated and left the combatants the freer use of their judgment. Like a wise statesman, therefore, he was not, perhaps, disinclined to humour the foe by abandoning such of the less salient angles of his defences as were unessential to the impregnability of his citadel. But he vowed that this was the utmost concession he would make. He had himself declared that, "as soon as the breach (made by the Clericals) had been built up," it would be his most earnest endeavour to make peace with the Centre, and especially with the Curia. And as the conflict went on,

and carried on under difficult and stormy conditions: and I am very well pleased to think that no one can reproach me with having, during this period, gone very far wrong in my calculation and judgment of anything of decisive importance for the State."

* Qua'd Faciamus Nos? by Count Harry Arnim, p. 42.
his desire in this respect became more ardent. The May Laws were producing no positive results. They had, on the contrary, sown all the land with civil strife and religious hatred, and the natural harvest was beginning to appear. We need not stop to inquire to what extent the "Kulturkampf" may have contributed to the "fiasco of German industry," or whether it should be held in part accountable for the increasing stream of national emigration from the Fatherland, or how far the rapid increase of an irreligious Social-Democracy was due to the alleged loosening of the Church's hold on the mind and conscience of the people. Perhaps, indeed, it would be difficult to show that five years had sufficed to produce results which rarely manifest themselves under fifty. But apart from these evils—whose cause might be questioned, but whose existence could not be denied—there had arisen another great public danger of unmistakable origin.

The Clericals had extended to the Empire the struggle whose proper arena was Prussia. In the Reichstag, the Centre party, numbering about a fourth of the whole House, was implacably opposed to the Government. No matter what measure Prince Bismarck brought forward, it was sure to be gainsaid by Dr. Windthorst and his devoted band of "Blacks," who were bent, at least, on wreaking revenge, if they could not wrest concessions. This factional opposition by the Clericals was a matter of indifference to the Chancellor, when otherwise sure of the support of the other chief parties, but this was not
always the case. And he found it impossible to go on without the assurance of a steady majority. The National Liberals, who had hitherto been his mainstay, now began to betray a spirit of schism and disaffection, and could no longer be relied on. The Conservatives would remain true to him, but a trustworthy majority was only to be attained by their alliance with one of the other two main fractions, the Centre or the National Liberals. The latter proffered their continued support, in return for measures which the Chancellor deemed inconsistent with the strength and stability of the Empire; while the Clericals were willing to serve him in a Conservative sense, in exchange for a modification of the May Laws. Indicated by expediency, the guiding principle of the true statesman, the Prince’s course was clear. But the time had not yet come for entering on it. For it would have been equally useless and undignified to attempt some kind of a compromise with a bellicose Pope like Pius IX., who had pronounced the May Laws to be “null and void,” and described their real author as the “modern Attila.” Bismarck had previously expressed the hope that the advent of a “Pacific Pope” would enable him to negotiate an armistice, and the opportunity for which he longed seemed to present itself at the very nick of time.
CHAPTER XIII.

THE "KULTURKAMPF" (continued).

2. With Leo the Thirteenth.

Death was busy with the great ones of Italy in the spring of 1878. That year opened with the decease of General La Marmora, Bismarck's ostentatious foe.* A few days afterwards, the bluff King Victor Emmanuel, who was a man completely after the Chancellor's own heart, breathed his last; and on the 7th February there departed this life Pius IX., Pope of Rome, whose demise had been awaited by the friends of peace in Germany with decorous impatience. Pius IX. was succeeded by Cardinal Pecci, as Leo XIII., who seemed to answer to the hopes which Bismarck had formed of the new Pontiff—for he affected to be a pacific and not a fighting Pope, and "the great Chancellor condescended to deal with his agents because he knew that the mind which offered terms was the real emanation of the Vatican, not the mere echo of the Tuileries."†

* See p. 29, ante.
† Gallenga (in his "Pope and King") who further writes:—"Pius IX. had been a Pope-King; he had fought for his earthly throne, and, though succumbing in the contest, he had neither abated his pretensions nor relinquished his hopes of a reversal of his fortunes. He was unsub-
It was characteristic of the situation that, though the Italian Government received no official notice of the election of Leo XIII., His Holiness hastened to notify the event to Russia, Switzerland, and Prussia—with all three of whom his predecessor had ceased to be on speaking terms. In his communication to the German Emperor, conveyed through the Bavarian Government, the new Pope regretfully referred to the interruption of the happy relations which had previously existed between His Majesty's throne and the Holy Chair, and implored His Majesty to restore "peace and calm of conscience" to his Catholic subjects, who would not fail, as directed by their faith, to manifest their loyalty and devotion to his Crown. To this appeal the Emperor, after the dignified lapse of a month, replied by a missive—countersigned, and doubtless written, by Prince Bismarck—which heartily congratulated His Holiness on the dignity he had attained, and expressed the hope that he would use his "mighty influence" to induce his servants in Prussia (i.e., the bishops) to submit themselves to the laws of the land. The Pope rejoined by repeating his earnest desire for the re-establishment of peace, and by suggesting, as the surest
means to this end, the alteration of certain Prussian (Falk) Laws.

Of this epistle no immediate notice was taken. Meanwhile, the Emperor had been laid low by the buck-shot of Nobiling, and the Pope failed not to send to Berlin the assurance of his sorrow and sympathy. In thanking him for his kindly words, the Crown Prince, who had been appointed provisional Regent, took occasion to recur to the terms of Leo's unanswered letters to his father. His communication, which was countersigned by Prince Bismarck, may have also been penned by the Chancellor; but at any rate it could not have better reflected those frank, courageous, and manly virtues which make the German people look forward to the reign of their second Emperor with so much confidence. As plainly as general words could do it, the Crown-Prince Regent told the Pope that "no Italian priest would ever tithe or toll in his dominions." No Prussian Sovereign, he said, would ever consent to alter the laws and Constitution of the land in conformity with the Church, since the independence of the monarchy would suffer grievous attainct were the free course of its legislation to be controlled by a foreign Power. At the same time His Imperial Highness professed, in the name of his Government, to be animated with the love of peace and the spirit of compromise.

The hopes of men were somewhat damped. Was Leo XIII., then, they began to ask, the moderate Pontiff he claimed to be, or was he like those rulers...
King of Prussia included), the liberal opinions of whose heir-apparent youth undergo a marked change the moment they mount the throne? The fears in this respect, which had been raised by the Pope's correspondence with the Berlin Court, were rather aggravated than otherwise by his Encyclica of 21st April, wherein he used very lofty and even arrogant language about the rights of the Church, and spoke bitterly about the laws which, in "certain countries," aimed at its destruction. Nevertheless, Prince Bismarck was not thereby deterred from seeking out the path of compromise, which the Pope likewise professed his readiness to tread. But how could this be done? The German Mission had been withdrawn from the Curia, and there was no representative of the Vatican at Berlin. While speculation was busy as to what form would be employed by the diplomacy of reconciliation, a great sensation was caused by the news that Prince Bismarck, who about the end of July went to take the waters at Kissingen, had exchanged visits there with Masella, the Papal Nuntius at Munich. Both were animated with the spirit of peace, and great was the curiosity to know whether and how "the two fixed ideas would unite." The enemies of the Chancellor began to cry aloud that he had already "gone to Canossa," but their taunts turned out to be very empty when it became known that the repeated conferences of the two diplomatists had resulted in nothing.

It was unfortunate for the Kissingen negotiations
that their very beginning was marked by the sudden death of their direct author, Franchi, the Cardinal Secretary, who was distinguished by the good sense and moderation of his predecessor Antonelli. By some, his death was ascribed to the cholera, and by others to the fingers of the Jesuits, who were fain to hope, at least, that the Pope would view the event as a Divine warning "to give up diplomasing, and return to a policy of non possumus." "The negotiations initiated by Cardinal Franchi," said the hanceller some time afterwards,

promised a certain degree of success, both sides being ready to make concessions. The agent of the Curia was willing to recognise the duty of the bishops to pre-intimate to the Government the ministration of their clergy (Anzeigepflicht); while I, on our side, undertook to resume direct relations with Rome. But all that came nothing by the death of Franchi."

Matters were not very much mended by Nina, Franchi's successor as Cardinal Secretary, whom the Pope—avowing that his "soul would never find rest until peace between Church and State was re-established in Germany"—now directed "work for this great end. What he anted, said the Pope, was not a mere armistice that might leave the way open for fresh conflicts, but a solid and lasting peace, based on "the removal of the obstacles" which had hitherto stood in its way.

armed with this impossible programme Cardinal Nina t to work, and began to devote himself with immense energy to "the polysyllabic art of saying nothing."
His lengthy despatches left on Bismarck's mind the impression that the Vatican was "animated with the undoubted intention of spinning-out the negotiations to an interminable extent," and that there was little prospect of an understanding being reached by the method employed.

It was admitted on all sides, however, that the Pope did his best to conciliate the Chancellor, and tune him to acts of peace. The language of the Vatican about Germany was now respectful, and even flattering. There was no more heard about "stones that would crush the foot of the Imperial Colossus," about the "unabashed impudence" of the Church's persecutors, about "anti-Christian Diocletians" and "modern Attilas." Leo's Encyclicals, Allocutions, and other utterances, were free from studied insults of this kind; and though he committed the mistake of ascribing Socialism to the triumph of the Reformation, which he in turn sought to identify with rationalism, he nevertheless exhorted the clergy in Germany to combat principles that had embodied themselves in open hostility to sovereign heads and civil power. True to his maxim that he "will always accept an ally wherever he can find him"—his political camp has ever been as full of motley elements as "Wallenstein's Lager"—Bismarck welcomed the aid of the Church in his task of countering Social Democracy. But still he only regarded these auxiliary services in the light of a duty, of which the performance needed no reward.
Both sides continued to vie with each other in their professions of peace, but no real progress was made in the desired direction. While the Curia demanded everything of the State and offered nothing in return, Bismarck showed a firm resolution to adhere to the basis of action laid down by the Crown Prince, who had written to the Pope that the principles of the May Laws must under all circumstances remain intact, but that there was room enough for agreement and compromise in the field of practice. That the Centre were by no means satisfied with this proffered measure of concession, was proved by their abortive motion—in December, 1878—for the restoration of the abolished articles of the Constitution affecting the Church, and for the alteration of the Cloister Law. "Such a proposal," said Dr. Falk to the Clericals, "might very well be made to an opponent who had been crushed to the earth and lay bound hand and foot, but certainly not to one who stood, and would continue to stand, upright and strong."

Meanwhile, the Chancellor's Protective Tariff was laid before the Reichstag in the spring of 1879, and its approval or rejection depended entirely on the Centre. For his previous allies, the National Liberals, had become split and untrustworthy, and the Conservatives were not strong enough in themselves to form a majority. The Clericals mainly represented industrial, and therefore Protectionist districts, and that was one reason why they should range themselves for once on the side of Government. But an additional inducement to do so
was the hope that they might thus tend to facilitate the peace-negotiations pending between Berlin and Rome, and place the Chancellor before the alternative of either granting them solid counter-concessions, or forfeiting their future parliamentary support. It was not the business of Prince Bismarck to undeceive the Clericals on the former score, but there is nothing to show that he encouraged them to believe that their aid in creating a new law would be rewarded by the abrogation of an old one. At any rate, he privately informed his friends that he would never pay his Clerical allies with "Canossa coins." The conclusion of this strange and successful alliance—which was, perhaps, all the more attractive to the Catholic party from its object being reactionary—was made known to an astonished country by a long visit that Dr. Windthorst paid to the Chancellor, with whom he had not been on speaking terms for the past ten years. The "two fixed ideas" had at last touched, and even embraced. Would they still unite?

The tide had indeed turned, and its ebbing course was further indicated by the retirement of Dr. Falk from the Ministry of Public Worship (July, 1879). Every one knew what this meant. What the Chancellor now wanted was not a Minister of combat, but of conciliation; and such a Minister (of Public Worship) he found in Herr von Puttkamer—a kinsman of his own, a man of fine presence and polished manners, well combining the suaviter in modo with the fortiter in re, and

Dr. Falk, Minister of Combat, is succeeded by Herr von Puttkamer, Minister of Conciliation.
no less conspicuous for the moderation of his opinions than for the clear and winning eloquence with which he expressed them. Prince Bismarck could not have chosen a better man to carry out a policy of conciliation; and that this was his appointed task, the successor of Dr. Falk soon began to show.

Without forsaking the broad, general principles by which his predecessor had been guided, Herr von Puttkamer took every opportunity of tempering with mercy, and even indulgence, their particular application. What the Catholics mainly complained of was the despotism of the State in the field of education, especially as this was precisely the region in which the May Laws might be most elastically administered. It was, therefore, as encouraging to the Clericals as it was irritating to the ultra-Liberals, to find that the new Minister moderated the zeal of the police and the public prosecutors, opposed the extension of undenominational schools, and directed that the Clergy—subject always to the law—should again be entrusted as much as possible with the religious instruction of youth. Dr. Falk was as liberal in his theology as he had been rigorous in his law. Herr von Puttkamer, on the other hand, belonged to that extreme orthodox sect of which the Emperor has always been a most devout adherent. Like Augustus, therefore, who implored Varus to give him back his legions, the Emperor William had besought his Ministry to restore to his people that religion which the crimes of Hödel and Nobiling convinced him was fast losing its power.
Meanwhile, direct negotiations between the Government and the Vatican were resumed in the autumn of 1879. When at Gastein, Bismarck had several conferences with Jacobini, the Pro-Nuncio at Munich, on the same basis as he had negotiated with Masella the year before at Kissingen. If the Curia undertook to recognise the principle of the "\textit{Anzeigepflicht}"—the hinge and corner-stone of all the May Laws—the Prussian Government would again accredit a representative of the Vatican. That was the Chancellor's offer. It was not immediately closed with, and men began to think that Rome had reverted to its old practice of asking everything and giving nothing. At last, however, a ray of bright hope broke through the clouds of doubt, encouraging the belief that the Vatican was at last coming to its senses, and the "\textit{Kulturkampf}" to an end. In a letter to the ex-Archbishop of Cologne (24th February, 1880), the Pope—to testify his eagerness to promote an agreement between Church and State—declared his readiness to "suffer" clerical nominations to be pre-intimated to the Government for approval. "Incredible!" exclaimed one portion of the Press, "this is really too good to be true." "Hurrah!" shouted another, "let us ring the bells of peace."

Exhibiting a more judicious mood, the Government was neither so sceptical nor so elate. In a resolution (17th March) communicated to Cardinal Jacobini by Prince Reuss, German Ambassador at Vienna, the Prussian Cabinet declared that, while taking note of the pacific sentiments..."
of the Holy Chair, it could only meanwhile attach a theoretic value to its words, but that, as soon as ever these received a practical significance through acts, it would at once respond by applying to Parliament for discretionary full-powers to administer the May Laws in a milder spirit. Bismarck’s caution was soon justified. It struck him as strange that the Pope had spoken of “suffering,” instead of “enjoining,” performance of the Anzeigepflicht, so he enquired on what conditions His Holiness was prepared to “command.” The answer was contained (by anticipation) in a despatch from the Cardinal Secretary to Jacobini, written before the above-mentioned Cabinet resolution had reached the Vatican. From this audacious document it appeared that the Holy Father was only prepared to issue instructions for the partial observance of the “intimation-duty,” and that he claimed the right of final decision in the event of difference of opinion between the bishops and the Government. In return, he demanded counter-concessions tantamount to an almost complete surrender of his adversary’s stronghold.*

By Pius IX., Bismarck had been called a savage; and it was now clear that Leo XIII. thought him insane. But the madness was all on the Papal side. The Prussian Government had been long accustomed to

* Chief of these counter-concessions demanded were: the re-instatement of deposed bishops, the amnesty of all convicted clergymen, the suspension of all pending prosecutions, and the “harmonising of the Prussian statute-book” with the principles of the Catholic Church—especially those concerning the free exercise of “the sacred ministry, the education of our servants, and the religious instruction of its Catholic youth.”
the peculiar ways of Rome, but it fairly stood aghast at this display of arrogant and suicidal unreason. For what had the Pope proposed on his side, as the basis of peace? Simply this: to enjoin observance of a Prussian law, of which, as a condition precedent, he stipulated the repeal. It required no sagacious subtlety to deal with negotiations of this kind. In the mêlée the combatants had exchanged weapons, and it was now Bismarck's turn to take refuge in a simple declaration of non possumus.

There now ensued a diplomatic correspondence between Berlin and Vienna, where the German Ambassador, Prince Reuss, aided by a special envoy, had been endeavouring to come to terms with Cardinal Jacobini. Bismarck pointed out that

a rapprochement between his Government and the Vatican ought to proceed pari passu; that through the mild administration of Herr von Puttkamer, the former had already made decided advances, which had not been returned by Rome; and that, until this had been done, there could be no further progress towards mutual agreement.

Cardinal Jacobini, on the other hand, declared that

the Cabinet decision (of 17th March) had made a most painful impression on the Pope, and he threw out threats—necessarily empty ones—of a complete rupture of negotiations, involving very calamitous effects on the minds of the faithful, unless the Chancellor displayed a still more conciliatory tone. The promise of a Discretionary Full-Powers Law was good enough in its way, but it left everything in uncertainty, afforded no guarantee for the continuance of the good intentions of the Government, and placed the Church at its mercy. What his Holiness wanted was a thorough amendment of the May Laws, and until there was some certain prospect, at least.
that the provisional modus vivendi proposed would lead to this, Rome could not make the desired advances.

Bismarck replied

...ascribing the retrogressive course of the negotiations with Rome to the overwrought expectations of the Romish prelates arising from their ignorance of the real state of affairs in Prussia. He was quite willing, he said, to lay down the weapons given him by the Legislature, but not to destroy them. One sword would have to keep the other in its sheath. The Government contemplated a serious modification of the May Laws—inasmuch as it meant to ask for power to abstain from enforcing them, but it could not do more. For what might not happen to Prussia if the current at the Vatican changed, and a combative Pope like Pius IX. were again to occupy the Sacred Chair? The Government had already made considerable concessions, whereas the Pope had only given vague theoretical promises of no binding force. A single word from him or his bishops would have put an end to the unnatural and dangerous alliance of the Catholic aristocracy and priesthood with the Socialists, whose principles he affected to condemn; whereas the Clericals, declaring their submission to the will of the Pontiff, still openly sided with all the subversive elements in the country—to the utter obstruction of all parliamentary labour. The Pope and the Church, argued Bismarck, were alone answerable for the falling off in the ministration of the clergy.

"The diminution of the clergy, the disappearance of the bishops, the decadence of the care of souls, awake in us the liveliest sympathy for our Catholic fellow-countrymen who are in this way abandoned by their pastors, because the latter refuse to perform their functions from political motives barely intelligible to the laity. . . . In other times, and in other countries, we have seen that the Catholic clergy living under much harder conditions, and even amid dangers and humiliations, did not leave uncared for the faithful who stood in need of them, but carried the tolerari posse very much further than would be necessary for the exercise of their functions in Prussia without their coming into conflict with the May Laws . . . I am sorry if the Pope thinks it possible to gain more from us by battle and menace than by friendly concession; . . . for our political non possumus is just as effective as that of the Church. Neither to
Masella nor to Jacobini have I ever uttered a word capable of being construed into a statement of readiness to approve a revision or repeal of the May Laws according to the standard of the Clerical demands. Peace-loving practice, an endurable modus vivendi based on a mutually accommodating spirit, is all that ever seemed attainable. A return in principle to the laws in force before 1840 I have declared to be acceptable, but to go back to the state of things between that year and 1870 I always most decidedly declined on the three or four occasions when that was demanded of us. . . . As for the re-establishment of our diplomatic relations, if Rome does not seem to think that an advantage worth paying for, we shall refrain from offering it again and not recur to the subject."

Meanwhile, the Pope had formally withdrawn the statement of his readiness "to suffer" performance of the "pre-intimation duty," by affirming that, unless the Prussian Government was prepared to grant more than it offered, his declaration to the Archbishop of Cologne (in his Brief of 24th February) "must be regarded as non avem." Thus the hopeful negotiations, which had been pending between Prussia and the Vatican for the last two years, were suddenly broken off precisely where they began. The "two fixed ideas" had met and done their best to unite, but could not. Folly on one side, and firmness on the other, had stood in the way of their amalgamation. The result was calculated to discourage Bismarck, but he was not cast down. It is the business of the statesman to take account of existing facts. The "Kulturkampf" had created a state of things which loudly called for relief.* That the Pope had proved

* More than 1,400 parishes were entirely without religious ministration --to speak of nothing else.
himself to be graspingly unwise, was no reason why he Chancellor should show himself to be spitefully unpatriotic. To Prince Reuss, accordingly, he intimated that, in spite of the attitude of Rome, a bill for enabling the Prussian Government to administer certain of the May Laws at discretion would be laid before Parliament.

"We shall try," he wrote, "to realise our intentions by legislation, without receiving or expecting from the Curia any counterconcessions, acting simply in the interests of His Majesty's subjects. And should these endeavours of the King's Government be brought to nought through the resistance of the Papalists, or should the clergy not avail themselves of the possibility thus afforded them of exercising the cure of souls, we cannot help that; but neither shall we hold ourselves responsible for the results."

The Landtag met (20th May, 1880), and proceeded to discuss the promised bill. The debates on the subject were extremely passionate, and their character in this respect was intensified by the publication of the correspondence above alluded to. Among other threats, the Pope had hinted that, if the Prussian Government could not come to terms with him, he would be compelled to "faire connaissance aux Catholiques l'issue des negociations;" and Bismarck at once robbed this menace of its effect by anticipating its execution. The country now saw what the Pope wanted, and what Bismarck was willing to give. Rome, it was seen, had indeed stretched out her hand, but only to take, and not to give; though Dr. Vindthorst had the forehead to affirm that "the spirit of conciliation shown by the Pope might almost justify
the statement that His Holiness himself had gone to Canossa."

The Discretionary Powers (or Dispensing) Bill went into battle with eleven clauses, and came out of it with only seven. Great was the manoeuvring and chaffering of parties. The lobbies of the Landtag resembled an auction-room or an exchange. The result was mere chance work. About half of the National Liberals joined the Government party, but their aid was only purchased by the sacrifice, among other things, of the clause empowering the King to restore to office any legally deposed bishop. The practical effect of this torso Act—which only passed the Lower Chamber by a majority of five—was that it conferred on the Government powers of limited duration to provide for the cure of souls, without exacting rigorous observance of the May Laws. It would still, however, argued Dr. Windthorst, keep the Church at the mercy of a capricious dictator, "but the Church could not possibly live under an ever-threatening Damocles-sword, or freely breathe beneath the trembling beam of the guillotine."

The Clericals argued that it was due entirely to party motives; the Chancellor averred its aim to be purely patriotic. Part of both statements may be combined to express the truth. In any case, it was a frank confession that the May Laws, as hitherto administered, had altogether failed of their object. It was a proof that the power of Rome was still much more dreadful and indomitable than her overweening adversary had imagined, and it clearly showed that the political wisdom which
ad made bold to oppose itself to the claims of Papal infallibility was in itself far from perfect. The words of Thiers to Count Arnim had come true.* Bismarck at last discovered that he was really "on the wrong track;" so he struck into another route without altering its direction, and began to move along a bye-path, without, however, losing sight of the main road.

That the Prussian Government had at least lowered its flag, if not struck it—that flag, inscribed with "No compromise," which had so long led on the anti-Papalists to battle—could no longer be doubted when, in the spring of 1882 (24th April), Herr von Schlözer delivered to the Pope his credentials as Prussian Minister. Herr von Schlözer had served under Bismarck at St. Petersburg, where he won the complete confidence of his chief, and under Count Harry Arnim at Rome, where he became thoroughly acquainted with the atmosphere of the Curia. He was the very man for the post, and the German Clericals raised a shout of "Habemus legatum," when he was sent as the messenger of conciliation to the Eternal City.

In the autumn of the previous year, when in Germany on leave of absence from his post at Washington, he had been despatched to Rome to negotiate direct with Cardinal Jacobini, and the results of his mission were soon discernible in a more accommodating attitude of his Government to the question of the vacant bishoprics. Diplomatic negotiations between Germany and the Vatican

* Vide p. 340, ante.
had been broken off, as we saw, in 1874; and, as far as the Empire itself was concerned, they were not now restored, for Herr von Schlözer only went to Rome as Prussian Minister; but his presence at the Curia was a proof that the Chancellor had begun a formal parley with his Papal foes.

This was an advance of a merely formal kind on the part of Prussia, but it was soon followed (31st May) by a substantial enough, if safe, concession in the shape of another Law prolonging the Discretionary Full-Powers Act of July (14, 1880), while adding considerably to the dispensing faculty of the Emperor-King. This new law, of course, was not passed without the usual party conflict and compromise. But though the rules with respect to the education and training of the clergy were now relaxed, and power given to the Crown to re-instate evicted bishops, the May Laws themselves were nevertheless all but left intact.

The Clericals were anything but satisfied with the concessions that had been made them, and the insatiable demands of Dr. Windthorst were only an echo of the claims put forward by the Vatican. What the Vatican wanted was complete organic revision, if not repeal, of the May Laws. In the autumn of 1882 it became known that Herr von Schlözer's mission of conciliation to Rome had proved much less successful than was hoped; and to what this mission owed its failure appeared when, towards the end of the year (3rd December), the Pope addressed a letter
THE "KULTURKAMPF."

1e Emperor William. From the commencement of Pontificate, wrote His Holiness,

enerous sentiments of the Emperor had inspired him with the that religious peace might be restored—a hope which was gthened by the re-establishment of the Prussian Legation at Vatican. After pointing out that religious peace was equally stageous to Prussia, since the Church inculcated a spirit of ence to authority, the Pope stated that the duties of his tolic Ministry compelled him to request that Prussian legislation lesiastical matters might be relaxed and definitely amended, ut in regard to the points essential to the maintenance of the olie religion. This would be the sole means of bringing about l and lasting peace. Religious pacification, urged His Holiness, d have the effect of more solidly attaching to the Prussian ic the hearts of its Catholic subjects: it would be the fitting a of His Majesty’s long and glorious career.

To this epistle the Emperor returned the following y, which was countersigned by his Chancellor (22nd ember):—

I beg to thank your Holiness for the letter which you addressed under date the 3rd current, and I heartily return the good es to which you therein gave expression. It strengthens me in ope that the satisfaction felt with me by your Holiness at the lishment and activity of my Mission" (at the Vatican) "will sh you with a fresh reason for seeking by a corresponding ace to reply to the conciliatory steps hitherto taken by my rmment, which have made it possible for most of the" (Prussian) scopates to be re-occupied. I am of opinion that such an advance, it to be made in the matter of the pre-intimation of clerical intments" (to the State), "would be much more to the interest e Catholic Church than to that of the State, as rendering it ble for the vacancies which have occurred in the service of the ch to be filled up. If, by an advance of the clergy in this ct, I could arrive at the conviction that the readiness to effect a rochement was mutual, I would thus be able to countenance the
reconsideration by the Landtag of my monarchy of such laws as, in the course of the struggle for the protection of contested rights of the State, became requisite, without being permanently necessary, to secure peaceful relations between Church and State. I gladly avail myself of this opportunity to assure your Holiness anew of my personal reverence and devotion."

The direct answer to this Imperial missive was conveyed to Herr v. Schlözer by Cardinal Jacobini (19th January, 1883), who wrote:—

"In testimony of the high value attached by His Holiness to the pacific assurances in the Imperial missive . . . . . . he is prepared to consent to the examination of a limited number of grievances only, and to make his recognition of the episcopal duty of the pre-intimation of clerical appointments proceed pari passu with the revision of the May Laws in question.

"He has, therefore, commanded the undersigned Cardinal-Secretary to declare that the Bishops shall receive instructions to notify to the Government the names of the new titular incumbents of all vacant parishes, who would have to be canonically installed therein, as soon as" (and here was the difficulty) "the legislative bodies" (of Prussia and Germany) "shall have given their assent to measures that effectively guarantee the free exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as well as the free education and instruction of the clergy.

"The duty of the pre-intimation of clerical appointments, which will meanwhile be limited to the cases of actual vacancies, will require a permanent character, under forms to be afterwards settled by mutual arrangement, as soon as the revision of the laws in question shall have been accomplished."

While intimating to the Emperor that these conditions had been conveyed to the Prussian Envoy through the Cardinal-Secretary, the Pope, in repeating their substance, affirmed that the Church, like the State, must
have the means of training its agents on its own system. His Holiness regarded these modifications as indispensable to the very life of the Church, and, when once an agreement upon them was established, it would be easy to bring about a real and durable peace. And this, then, was the outcome of several years of negotiation between Berlin and Rome! The main object of the Prussian Government in binding the Church to notify clerical nominations—the keystone of all Dr. Falk's legislation—was to enable it to veto the appointment of such candidates as had been educated in principles avowedly hostile to the State; and now the Church came forward with an offer to tolerate the existence of the arch, provided the keystone were taken out.

After a further interchange of views between Rome and Berlin—which virtually turned on the question of priority of concession—the correspondence culminated in a Note of the Chancellor (5th May, 1888), which gave the Curia the alternative of coming to a friendly understanding with the Prussian Government by means of private negotiations, or of submitting to see Prussia again resort to independent legislation for the purpose of restoring to her Catholic subjects the highest measure of ecclesiastical freedom consistent with the civil supremacy of the State. But the Curia rejected this ultimatum, and the speedy consequence was another Falk-Law Amendment Act—that of 11th July, 1883—which restricted the "pre-intimation duty" of the Church to the most indispensable limits, curtailed the competence of the
Court for Ecclesiastical Causes, and extended penal immunity for Clerical offences.

Prussia had thus made another most substantial concession to the Curia. Would the Curia respond to it with a counter-step? A tolerable *modus vivendi* had thus been placed within the reach of the Vatican, and Bismarck waited to see whether the Holy Father was animated with the spirit of compromise, or of "no surrender." For some time it seemed as if the Vatican was exclusively under the influence of the latter feeling. In a Note (of 21st June), Cardinal Jacobini spoke most disparagingly of the new Relief Law, and of the one-sided action of Prussia; while the semi-official organ of the Vatican boldly asserted that,

"however gratified the Church might be with this partial restitution of her rights, she could only be satisfied with the restoration of all her liberties; and the Prussian Government, therefore, had the choice between a policy of right or of revolution."

But wiser counsels at the Vatican at last prevailed. Soon after the passing of the second *July Law* (the two chief Falk-Law Amendment Acts are known as the "July Laws"), Herr v. Gossler—who had (in 1881) succeeded Herr v. Puttkamer, as Minister of Public Worship with the same conciliatory task—invited the Prussian bishops to appeal to the State for the exercise of those "dispensing powers" which had now been created for their benefit. The bishops met and resolved to leave the question of
their duty to the decision of the Curia, while conveying to it their unanimous opinion that, in the interest of the Catholic population, use should be made of the discretionary power of the Crown.

Contrary to all expectation, the Pope expressed approval of their view—as far, at least, as the past was concerned; and, on behalf of all his colleagues, the Bishop of Kulm begged dispensation of the Government for those suspended servants of the Church who had not undergone the statutory training for their office. By prompt compliance with this request on the part of the State, a large number of Catholic parishes were at once relieved from a grievance under which they had long complainingly groaned—the lack of all spiritual ministration; and thus one of the greatest miseries of the "Kulturkampf" was to a great extent alleviated. The conciliatory attitude of the Church was responded to by the State with further concessions, and, towards the end of the year 1883, most sees had been re-provided with pardoned bishops, and re-endowed with the means of salarying them.

But a still more significant event marked the close of this year, for, on the 18th December, the German Crown Prince paid a visit to the Pope in his prison-palace, and was closeted with His Holiness for about three-quarters of an hour. It was long since anything had caused so much sensation in Germany as the news telegraphed from Madrid that the Crown Prince meant to visit
Rome before returning to Berlin from his Spanish tour,* and the Liberal Press broke out into lamentations about what it called this "ecclesiastical Olmütz," and repentant "Gang nach Canossa."†

But these lamentations were premature. The real and primary object of the Crown Prince in going to Rome was to absolve a debt of courtesy to the King of Italy, through whose dominions he had to pass in his journey to and from Madrid; but, being in the Eternal City, he could not well avoid paying his respects to the Papal captive in the Vatican without committing an offensive breach of courtly etiquette. And there was nothing in the dynastic relations, so to speak, between the Courts of Berlin and the Vatican, which could render observance of this etiquette undignified on the part of the Crown Prince. His second son, Prince Henry, had been received like

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* Vide p. 141. ante.
† Said one newspaper:—"If we are not to become the laughing-stock of the world, it is time that, under cover of mist and darkness, we silently take away the beastful Canossa monument on the Harz Mountains (erected to commemorate Bismarck's famous saying, 'Nach Canossa gehen wir nicht') and pack it away, until the dawn of a new and better era, in the lumber-room, with other relics handed down by our times for the warning and exhortations of coming generations." Another journal wrote:—"The German Crown Prince will conclude peace in Rome. We are not rejoiced to hear it. The peace which is going to be made will scarcely last long—first, because the Ecclesia Militans never folds its hands in its lap; and, secondly, because this peace will be—a peace of Canossa." The Germania, the leading Clerical organ, remarked:—"The Catholics of Prussia will see with great interest and satisfaction the friendly meeting of the Holy Father with the Heir to the Prussian and German throne; and they also hope that this visit will help to promote the attainment of the Church's peace, to the restoration of which their wishes, their prayers, and their political endeavours have for long been directed."
any other distinguished visitor by His Holiness in April of the previous year; and why should the Crown Prince himself omit to make the personal acquaintance of so conspicuous a personage as the Catholic ruler of the faithful—of those faithful ones, in particular, who form a third of the population of all Prussia; to see and know the redoubtable representative of a Power, against which all the temporal resources of the most formidable and invincible State in Europe had not been able to prevail?

The true significance of the Crown Prince’s visit to the Pope* lay in the circumstance that the relations between Prussia and the Curia had now become such as permitted him to perform this act of courtesy without derogation to his own dignity, or to that of his Imperial father’s Government; but there was nothing whatever to indicate that the heir-apparent to the German crown had been sent to the Vatican as a negotiator on Prince Bismarck’s principle of do ut des. His presence in the Stronghold of Infallibility merely showed that the champions of civil supremacy and papal pretensions had come to see the wisdom of bringing a more accommodating mind to the adjustment of their respective frontiers; but it was no more tantamount to a penitential pilgrimage to Canossa, than Pope Leo’s request for a painting of the Chancellor by Leebach indicated a readiness on the

* His Imperial Highness, with his suite, drove to the Vatican in hired carriages from the Prussian Legation, and not in royal equipages from the Quirinal, where he was lodged.
part of the potenteate of the Vatican to subordinate his will to the lord of Varzin.*

To what extent the conciliatory mood above referred to had possessed the respective champions of Church and State, was evidenced by a debate in the Reichstag about a year (December, 1884) after the Crown Prince’s visit to Rome. “We wish,” said Dr. Windhorst,

“to restore the status quo as it existed in the time of Frederick William IV., and as it was confirmed at Königsberg” (on his coronation) “by William I. With that we should be content . . . . but only with that; and the schools must be reorganised on the basis of the pre-Falk era.”†

* Soon after the Crown Prince’s visit to the Vatican, the Chancellor, at the request of the Pope, sat for his portrait to the celebrated painter, Professor Lenbach. See p. 491, post.
† Writing on September 4th, 1885, the Correspondent of The Times at Berlin said:—“The annual general meeting of the Catholics of Germany, lasting over several days, has just been held at Münster, the capital of Westphalia, and the headquarters of Clericalism in North Germany. It is long since there has been such an enthusiastic demonstration in favour of the Pope and of that imperium in imperio which the Falk Laws aimed at abolishing. The spirit which animated the proceedings was well reflected in a speech delivered by Dr. Windhorst, the Parliamentary leader of the Clericals, who declared that, whatever might be said to the contrary, the Pope of Rome still ruled the world. A French general had said that, though the Old Guard might die, it never could surrender. But the Clerical party in Germany was better than that, for neither would it die nor give in. The Holy Chair, he said, must be made independent of the Powers, which it was only too often required to call to order. ‘We vow,’ exclaimed the Clerical leader in conclusion, ‘to stand steadfastly by the Pope, in life and death; and I ask this meeting to give three cheers for Pope Leo.’” The meeting passed several resolutions, which show that the ‘Kulturkampf’ is as far from being ended as ever, and that the Catholics of Germany, in their conflict with the State, are really animated by more than the spirit of the Old Guard referred to by Dr. Windhorst—resolutions which demand the unconditional repeal of the chief of the May Laws especially those dealing with religious Orders and the education of the
Prince Bismarck, on the other hand, while detailing the remedial operation of the July Laws, declared:—

"As a diplomatist I feel that further yielding on our part would be foolish, and that we can afford to wait until Rome at last shows some trace of conciliation; but, until further concessions are made us, we shall not budge a hair's-breadth from our position."

This declaration of non possumus had more especial reference to the see of Posen, which Bismarck vowed should never be re-occupied by Ledochovsky, or any other prelate who sympathised with the political aspirations of the Poles; but it also had a general application to the main issues at stake in the "Kulturkampf."

How that "civilisation-struggle" is likely to end, cannot yet be foreseen, but our account of it has surely been sufficiently copious to enable our readers to form their own judgment in the matter. By the end of the year 1884, Bismarck had advanced so far on the path of formal concession as to incur the charge of having actually gone to Canossa—in spirit, at least, if not in body; and yet his Papal adversaries were as far from being content as ever. Every session of Parliament beheld them assailing the May Laws with desperate fury—and sometimes, too, with a semblance of success;* but, despite the Remedial Measures of July, these Falk Laws still remain at the

clergy, and which betray anything but a sense of Clerical gratitude for those partial yet important concessions of form recently made to the Romish Church by the Prussian Government."

* On several occasions, motions of Dr. Windthorst for the repeal of certain of the May Laws were supported by Parliamentary majorities, but the Government invariably remained firm in the exercise of its veto right.
optional service of the Government in all their essential particulars. "Prussia had bought the Roman hierarchy by mortgaging her sovereignty. At last Shylock would have his 'pound of flesh,' by cutting out the heart of the Empire; then Bismarck, our Daniel, came to judgment—and not one scruple more, and not one drop of blood."* That was a fine thing to say, but will the papal Shylock be entirely defeated of his demands? The future alone can show; but meanwhile, the ecclesiastical policy of the Chancellor—uninfluenced by the charge that he has virtually had to eat his own words by kneeling at Canossa, and guided by sympathy with the sufferings of the Catholic population of Germany—aims at gratifying the earnest desire of the Emperor-King to leave the heritage of his rule to his successor wholly unencumbered by the mortgage of internecine strife with Rome; with "the Church of the Vatican, the Church which dates from that Council—the Church of the Vatican, whose God is the Pope, whose gospel is the Syllabus, whose apostles are the Jesuits, whose kingdom is of this world, and would be the whole world if it could." † "The Pope still rules the world," exultingly cried Dr. Windthorst in the autumn of 1885; and some little show of truth was shortly afterwards lent to the assertion when Bismarck invoked the arbitration of Leo XIII. in the dispute between Spain and Germany as to the Caroline Islands. Wonders, said bewildered Europe, will never cease.

* Dr. Joseph Thomson, of New York.  † Idem.
CHAPTER XIV.

THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE.

In following the course of the domestic affairs of the Empire, our starting-point must be the 21st March, 1871—twelve days only after Bismarck's return from France—when he stood at the side of the Emperor-King in the throne-room of the Old Palace at Berlin, as His Majesty, amid much affecting pomp, opened the first German Parliament. The ceremony was the natural sequel of the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles, and formed the completion of Bismarck's creative work. He was now as proud a man as his Sovereign was a grateful one; and in token of his gratitude the Emperor (on the day Parliament was opened) raised his Chancellor to the rank of Prince, and presented him with a valuable estate—Friedrichsrup—in Lauenburg, near the democratic city of Hamburg. Democrats he loathed, but rural solitude he dearly loved, and henceforth Friedrichsrup and Varzin alternately shared the honour of sheltering him, when grounds of health or of policy induced his retirement from the capital. At first Herr von, and

* Valued at a million thalers, or about £150,000.
then Graf von, Bismarck, with the title of Bundeskanzler, he was now "Fürst von Bismarck, Reichskanzler," * Imperial Chancellor, or guardian, as for the Federal Governments, of that Constitution under which Germany now began its experimental career as a united nation.

In a previous chapter we gave a summary of the Constitution of the North German Confederation; and that, together with what we said of the conditions under which the South joined the North, will suffice to convey the essential features of the Imperial Charter.† But we may

* The inscription on his visiting-cards.

† So important a factor is the Imperial Constitution in the study of German politics that we have included a translation of the document in our Appendix; but here we may say that under this Constitution all Germany forms a united commonwealth, with an hereditary Emperor, a central Parliament, and a common capital. The jurisdiction of the Empire subject to the exceptions in favour of Bavaria and Württemberg, extends to the following points:—

1. The privilege of residing, exercising political rights, carrying on trade, and possessing real property in every part of Germany; as also all that relates to passports and the supervision of travellers, with the whole legislation on trade, commerce, emigration, colonisation, inclusive of the provisions affecting insurance companies.
2. The tariff and the federal excise and taxes.
3. Coinage, weights and measures, together with the fundamental provisions for the issue of paper money.
4. Banking.
5. Patents of invention.
6. The protection of books and all kinds of intellectual productions from spurious imitations.
7. The protection of German navigation, and the appointment of Federal Consuls.
8. Railways and other means of communication.
9. Inland navigation and water tolls.
11. The carrying out of judicial decisions and requisitions in every State alike.
12. The legislation of public documents.
13. The legislation on criminal law, commercial law, as likewise the law on bills of exchange and obligations, and common rules of judicial procedure in matters civil and criminal.
15. The action of the sanitary and veterinary police departments.

In addition to its legislative functions, the Federal Council represents also
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE. 373

add that the new Constitution was admitted to be anything but perfect either by those who framed, or those who sanctioned it. For, above all things, it made no fresh concessions to parliamentarism. While nominally bestowing on the people parliamentary rights, it virtually made their representatives a merely consultative body. Legislation was assigned to the Bundesrath, or Federal Council—consisting of the representatives of the Sovereigns—and to the Reichstag, or Imperial Diet, composed of 382 popular deputies elected by universal suffrage and ballot votes.* The power of the purse was nominally given to the nation; but, in point of fact, the initiative to all law-making rested with the allied Governments, whose veto has always remained absolute and incontestable. The experience of the last fourteen years shows that the main function of the Reichstag has been

a sort of supreme administrative and consultative board. It prepares bills, and issues such supplementary provisions as may be required to insure the enforcement of the federal laws. The better to superintend the business of the Empire, the Council divides itself into eight standing committees, respectively for army matters; naval matters; tariff, excise, and taxes; trade and commerce; railways, posts, and telegraphs; civil and criminal law; accounts and foreign affairs. Each committee consists of representatives of four States and the Emperor; but the foreign affairs committee includes only the representatives of the three kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemberg. These committees prepare the business for the plenum of the Federal Council, and are, of course, assisted by officials and clerks forming the staff of the Imperial service. The Emperor represents the nation, concludes treaties, and accredits as well as receives envoys. He also declares war in the name of the Empire; but, unless the national territory is attacked, he requires the consent of the Federal Council for the exercise of this latter right. The necessity for such consent, which did not appear in the Charter of 1866, was inserted in the new Charter only at the instance of Bavaria.

* This number was afterwards increased to 397 by the addition of 15 deputies from Alsace-Lorraine.
to discuss, for form's sake, and sanction bills placed before it by the Imperial Government. True, it has frequently rejected measures; but it has never been able to impose its will on the Federal Council, and its champion the Chancellor. In one word, its office is, as it was meant to be, a purely negative one, as will sufficiently appear in the course of our narrative.

But, at the same time, we would caution our readers against drawing rash comparative conclusions from this fact. The tendency of the English politician is to lament the fate of all nations not so richly blessed with parliamentary government as his own. But it is demonstrable that institutions, which are a blessing to one country, might be a perfect curse to another. It is equally capable of proof that the causes which make certain States unripe for constitutionalism need not be the same in each of those States. Few, we suppose, for example, will contend that the peoples of China, of Turkey, and of Russia are already fit to rule themselves in the English or American sense; and although we are very far from seeking to place the Germans on so low a par of political development with any of the above nations, still we are inclined to think that they have various reasons for being fairly well content with the partial progress they have already made in the march towards a parliamentary régime.

For, in the first place, Germany is, and to all present appearance, must remain in the position of a besieged fortress surrounded by jealous, malicious, and revengeful
neighbours. Now, who is there who will maintain that a besieged fortress, a fortified camp, can be governed in the same free and democratic way as a safe and open town? And if full political and personal liberty seem to be somewhat inconsistent with national security, will the true patriot hesitate in the choice of his sacrifice? On the other hand, however, even in a fortified camp it would be safe enough to rule by majority of the popular voice, where that voice is simply represented by two distinct and clearly defined parties; but where, as in Germany, these two parties are split up into nearly twenty—each more dogged and doctrinaire than the other—would it in every case be altogether wise to entrust the destinies of the State to the hazard-throw of majorities, and would not Democracy be more likely to assume the dangerous form of a Hydra, than the sage, judicial features of a Sphinx?

We offer these reflections, because they sum up the views of Bismarck on parliamentary or party government. By the Imperial Constitution, we repeat, legislation was assigned to the Federal Council and the Diet. But the former body was invested with a decided preponderance of power; and this body, in turn, was subject to the predominating influence of Prussia, whose policy was virtually the will of Bismarck.* *Allemagne, c’est la Prusse!*

* Of the 58 votes distributed among the members of the Federal Council, Prussia with her population of 24,000,000, inhabitants was assigned 17; while the other States, possessing about 15,000,000 of a population, shared the other 41 votes in relative proportion to the extent of their territory. But this curious arithmetical arrangement still left Prussia in
L'Etat, c'est moi! Le Parlement, c'est moi!—such, in reality, was the brief sense of the Imperial Constitution in the eyes of the Chancellor. But, indeed, this was also its essence in the opinion of most of those who sanctioned it. Still flushed with its warlike victories, the nation was in the mood for doing things quickly, and the new Constitution was all but unanimously sanctioned by the Diet without much discussion. With all its deficiencies, the deputies deemed it not ill adapted to the generation it was intended for, and the nation itself was to blame if it afterwards rued the haste with which it had gone to work.

The Constitution, we said, was all but unanimously approved; but, nevertheless, the nation was not long spared the absence of that spirit of faction and of party division which has always been the bane of German Parliaments. It is, indeed, not too much to say that the Empire was no sooner fairly established, than it became exposed to the internal action of disintegrating elements; and the counteraction of these elements now began, as it continued to be, the pivot on which turned all the domestic policy of the Chancellor. The unity which had been achieved was, after all, of a very heterogeneous kind. We are accustomed to look upon Austria-Hungary as the European type of a conglomerate nation—difficult to be held together and to be governed. But Austria-Hungary was only a little worse in this respect than New York, where, it often happens, the votes of all the minor States, and of what may be called a constant majority in the Bundesrath.
Germany, with its Danish, its Polish, and its French-speaking populations; its contrasts of native races; the particularism of its various States; the revolutionary aims smouldering in the breasts of its industrial classes; and, above all, its marked antagonism between the Catholic and Protestant faiths.

This antagonism now received striking expression in the appearance of a completely new party in the Reichstag—that of the Clericals, Ultramontanes, or Centre—of whose activity, and what it all led to, we have already had enough to tell;* "Finita Poloniae!" but meanwhile, as an example of the disintegrating agencies above referred to, we may mention the case of the Poles, these "Irish of Prussia," who actually made bold to move that the province of Posen should not be included in the Empire. Of course the proposal was laughed at, and Bismarck, in administering a cutting reprimand to those who dared to speak in the name of the Polish nation, assured them that the domination of their race had been a thoroughly bad one, and would, therefore, "never, never be restored."

What to do with Posen puzzled no one, but how to garner the territorial harvest of the war—Alsace-Lorraine—was a question which greatly vexed the parliamentary mind. Several possible solutions had presented themselves. The conquered provinces might be made neutral territory, which, with Belgium on one side, and Switzerland on the other, would thus interpose a continuous barrier

* See p. 267 ante.
against French aggression from the mouth of the Rhine to its source. But one fatal objection, among several others, to the adoption of this course, was the utter lack, in the Alsace-Lorrainers, of the primary condition of the existence of all neutral States—a determination on the part of the neutralised people themselves to be and remain neutral. And none knew better than Bismarck that it would take years of the most careful nursing to reconcile the kidnapped children of France to their adoptive parent. For him, the only serious question was whether Alsace-Lorraine should be annexed to Prussia, or be made an immediate Reichsland (Imperial Province).

"From the very first," he said, "I was most decidedly for the latter alternative, first—because there is no reason why dynastic questions should be mixed up with political ones; and, secondly—because I think it will be easier for the Alsatians to take to the name of 'German' than to that of 'Prussian,' the latter being detested in France in comparison with the other."

In its first session, accordingly, the Diet* was asked to pass a law incorporating Alsace-Lorraine with the Empire, and placing the annexed provinces under a provisional dictatorship till the 1st January, 1874, when they would enter into the enjoyment of constitutional rights in common with the rest of the nation. But the latter clause provoked much controversy, and the Social-Democrat, Herr Bebel, even went the length of protesting against the

* We use the expressions Diet, Reichstag, Imperial Parliament, and Federal Parliament in a synonymous sense.
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE. 379

annexation of Alsace-Lorraine as a crime. The period of the dictatorship was voted too long by a year, and the Diet claimed a certain degree of control over the acts of the Government in Alsace-Lorraine, especially in fiscal matters. For what was the use of a Parliament, thought the deputies, if it did not assert its power?

Bismarck looked upon these amendments as tantamount to a vote of want of confidence, and complained bitterly that, though he had presented the country with Alsace-Lorraine free from debt, it now proposed to treat him like a suspected borrower. Under such humiliating conditions, he said, he could not, and would not, assume any ministerial responsibility for the government of the annexed provinces. This took effect, but not before party conflicts threatened to end in a dead-lock; and a compromise was ultimately effected by which the duration of the dictatorship, or period within which the Imperial Government alone was to have the right of making laws for Alsace-Lorraine, was shortened till 1st January, 1873; while the Diet, on the other hand, was only to have supervision of such loans or guarantees as affected the Empire. In the following year, however, the Diet came to the conclusion that, after all, the original term fixed for the dictatorship was the more advisable of the two, and prolonged it accordingly.

For the next three years, therefore, the Reichsland was governed from the Wilhelmstrasse, as India is ruled from Downing Street. Bismarck once said that, of all
forms of government, a "kindly despotism" was by far the best, and this was precisely the form he employed to win the hearts of the Alsace-Lorrainers.

He was by no means sanguine of this proving an easy task, but he trusted for help to gradual recognition on the part of the inhabitants that, on the whole, "the rule of the Germans was more benevolent and humane than that of the French, and that, under their new masters, they enjoyed a much greater degree of communal and individual freedom." For the rest, the Chancellor claimed to have the interests of his new fellow-countrymen deeply at heart; and if, now that his great life-task was virtually done, and his health was failing, he did not retire from office, this, he said, was due to his feeling of responsibility for the million and a half population which he had been mainly instrumental in separating from France, and whose "advocate" and champion he had vowed to be.

The result of this "advocacy" was seen in the beginning of 1874, when fifteen deputies from Alsace-Lorraine—now thus far admitted within the pale of the Constitution—took their seats in the second German Parliament. Of these fifteen deputies, five were out-and-out French Protesters, and the rest Clericals—seven of the latter being clergymen, including the Bishops of Metz and Strasburg. They entered the Diet in a body, with much theatrical pomp, the clergy wearing their robes; and one of the French Protesters—bearing the unfortunate name of Teutsch—immediately tabled a
motion that the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, having been annexed to Germany without being themselves consulted, should now be granted an opportunity of expressing their opinion on the subject by a plebiscite. Unfortunately for this motion, its force was completely broken by the Bishop of Strasburg, who, although he had signed it, now declared that he and his co-religionists did not mean to question the validity of the Treaty of Frankfort. The fact is, that the majority of the Alsace-Lorraine deputies had been returned, not so much in the interest of French nationality, as in that of Papal sway. For the "Kulturkampf" was now fiercely raging, the Jesuits and other religious Orders had been expelled from the conquered provinces, and the religious aspect of their new political yoke was what mainly concerned the greater number of the inhabitants. The motion of French M. Teutsch, who spoke fluent German, was of course rejected; whereupon he and several of his compatriots straightway returned home, and left the Diet to deal with the interests of their constituents as it liked.

Those of his colleagues who remained behind only did so to complain of the "intolerable tyranny" under which the provinces were groaning, and to move for the repeal of the law (of December, 1871) which invested the local Government with dictatorial powers. Bismarck admitted that societies had been dissolved, that newspapers had been suppressed, that seditious persons had been laid by the heels, and that many other acts of rigour had been done; but sought to justify all that on the ground of neces-
sity and expediency. In annexing Alsace-Lorraine, his primary object, he said, was not to make the inhabitants happy and contented, but to secure Germany against future aggression, and their happiness lay in their own hands. This second motion of the recalcitrants was likewise rejected, but only by a shabby majority; and it was no wonder that a French journal drew attention to this fact as a proof of the party passion in Germany, which could not remain inactive even at the call of patriotism. The minority was composed of the Alsatians, the Ultramontanes, the Poles, the Progressists, and the Social-Democrats; and it might be shown that, in the case of each of these fractions, their vote was not given out of regard to the merits of the question, but from sheer party motives. We instance this as but one illustration of the extreme danger to which party rage now began to expose the most vital interests of the Empire.

The admission of Alsace-Lorraine deputies into the Reichstag was a venturesome experiment, but Bismarck looked upon it as a potent means of reconciling the conquered to their fate. It was much better, he thought, that the complaints of the annexed inhabitants should be uttered aloud before the whole nation, and be thus provided with a safety-valve of evaporation, than that they should be cherished in secret at the risk of their finding vent in seditious explosions. The experiment was a hazardous one, but the result of the elections was, on the whole, gratifying beyond hope. For it was clear that, though
renient elements still preponderated, the process of nanisation was making satisfactory progress. The nan University of Strasburg had been restored 2), as the Chancellor admitted, in the exclusive rest of the Empire; but the lapse of time showed this was to some extent a mistake, seeing that the versity only served as a gathering-point for the h of Alsace-Lorraine to study and cherish the tions of the past.

Thus far contented, however, with the result of his iliatory efforts, Bismarck resolved to make a still venturesome bid for the sympathies e Alsace-Lorrainers. Their representa were now entitled to sit in the Imperial iament, though not more than a third hem took advantage of the right; but, unlike the us Federal States, they still enjoyed but a very small sure of local autonomy. Believing home-rule to be of the best guarantees of federal cohesion, Bismarck rmined to try the effect of this cementing agency on newest part of the Imperial edifice; and, in the .mn of 1874, he advised the Emperor to grant the e-Lorrainers (not by law, but by ordinance, which d easily be revoked) a previous voice on all bills to ubmitted to the Reichstag on the domestic and fiscal rs of the provinces. It is true, this voice was awhile to be merely consultative, and it was not to ttered in public; but still, this would be a long stride nds the same degree of self-government in the Reichs-. as was enjoyed by the other members of the Empire.
In the following summer (June, 1875), therefore, there met at Strasburg the first Landesausschuss, or Provincial Committee, composed of delegates, thirty in number, from the administrative District Councils. The party of Protest were furious. They felt that great part of the ground of anti-German agitation had been suddenly taken from beneath their feet; for, say what they liked, there was no denying that, though Alsace-Lorraine still lived under a nominal dictatorship, it now possessed a complete popular representation, and the means of speaking its mind to its rulers. And that this privilege was not a mere mockery, was proved by the fact that the Imperial Diet hesitated not to adopt most of the Committee’s suggestions with respect to the budget of the Reichsland and other matters.

So well, indeed, on the whole, did this arrangement work, that within two years of its creation the Landesausschuss was invested with much broader powers. Ever since 1874, when legislation affecting the Reichsland ceased to be the exclusive right of the Imperial Government, the Reichstag had acted as a sort of Landtag, or home-ruling Diet, for Alsace-Lorraine; but, in 1877, it passed a law empowering the Landesausschuss, with

* This expression must not be misunderstood. There were two senses in which it was used. First, the Reichsland was said to be under a dictatorship until 1st January, 1874, when the Imperial Government had the exclusive right of legislating, by decrees, &c., for the provinces. And it was also said to be under a dictatorship by the special Deere-Law of 30th December, 1871, which invested the Ober-Präsidcnt, or Governor of the Provinces under Bismarck as Chancellor, with discretionary power to deal with “danger to the public security,” declare a state of siege, &c. From 1874 onwards, the word “dictatorship,” as applied to Alsace-Lorraine, could only be used in the latter sense.
certain formal reservations, to pass measures of local application which would receive validity by the simple assent of the Federal Council.

Thus it came about that, while the Reichsland continued to be governed from Berlin, the making of its laws was more and more confined to Strasbourg. It is true, the provinces did not yet possess anything like complete legislative independence, but this did not gall them half so much as the fact that they lived not face to face with their rulers, and that the simplest matters of administration had to pass through a circumlocution office of heart-breaking weariness. This was felt to be all the more oppressive, as the party of the Irreconcilables had been gradually giving way to the Autonomists, or those who subordinated the question of nationality to that of home-rule. Rapidly gaining in strength, this latter party at last (in the spring of 1879) petitioned the Reichstag for an independent Government, with its seat in Strasbourg, for the representation of the Reichsland in the Federal Council, and for an enlargement of the functions of the Provincial Committee.

Nothing could have been more gratifying to Bismarck than this request, amounting, as it did, to a reluctant recognition of the Treaty of Frankfort on the part of the Alsace-Lorrainers. He therefore replied that he was quite willing to confer on the provinces "the highest degree of independence compatible with the military security of the Empire." * The Diet, without

* Speech in Reichstag, 21st March, 1879.
distinction of party, applauded his words; and not only that, but it hastened to pass a bill embodying ideas at which the Chancellor himself had hinted in the previous year.

By this bill, the government of Alsace-Lorraine was to centre in a Statthalter, or Imperial Viceroy, living at Strasburg, instead of, as heretofore, in the Chancellor, and in his subordinate in the Reichsland bearing the title of Supreme President. Without being a Sovereign, this Statthalter was to exercise all but sovereign rights; and he was to be assisted by a Ministry, composed of the officials of the Alsace-Lorraine Section of the Imperial Chancellery (now abolished), as well as by a State Council. Further, it was to be in his power to depute commissaries, with a consultative voice, to the Federal Council. Finally, the bill conferred the right of receiving petitions on the Landesausschuss, and nearly doubled its members, who would have to take the oath of allegiance to the Empire. Home-rule legislation was to remain, as hitherto, the business of the Provincial Committee and the Federal Council; while the law (of 30th December, 1871), which invested the Government with arbitrary, or state-of-siege powers, was still to be at the service of the Statthalter.

For this high office the Emperor selected the brilliant soldier-statesman, Marshal Manteuffel, who had been left in command of the German army of occupation at Nancy until the indemnity should be paid, and of whom M. Thiers, it is said, never
spoke but in terms of the highest admiration.* Certainly, His Majesty could not possibly have chosen a better man for the responsible office, which the Marshal assumed on the 1st October, 1879. Henceforth, the conquered provinces entered an entirely new phase of their existence—a phase with which the name of Bismarck is not prominently associated. For eight years he had ruled a conquered race—the most difficult task that can fall to any statesman, and few will deny that the "man of blood and iron" performed this task with wonderful tact, wisdom, and moderation. Having lifted Alsace-Lorraine into the saddle, he now flung the reins to one of the greatest Captains of the Empire, and turned to more pressing work. Those who have accused him of an all-absorbing love of power should remember the seeming unregretfulness with which he surrendered the absolute rule of the Reichsland to a man of whom, in some respects, he was believed to be jealous, as of one with a genius for statesmanship only second to his own.

The Chancellor now ceased to be responsible for the government of Alsace-Lorraine, but though Marshal Manteuffel was subject to no authority save that of the Emperor, there is every reason to believe that the principles which always guided his action as Statthalter were cordially approved by Bismarck. And these principles may be summed up in the one word—conciliation. To such an

*"M. Thiers, dit on, ne manquait jamais, quand il parlait de lui, de le qualifier d'‘adorable.’"—(L’Alsace-Lorraine et l’Empire Germanique, &c. Paris, 1881.)
extent, indeed, did the Marshal carry this policy, that he
frequently became the object, no less of bitter attack on
the part of the German Press, than of wilful opposition
on the part of his subordinates; and several of the latter
even had to pay for their excess of zeal with their posts.*
The first Statthalter † ruled with a firm yet indulgent
hand, and he repeatedly told his quasi-subjects that he
would give them all they wanted, on one single condi-
tion—frank allegiance to the Empire.

But this allegiance is still a divided love. Gradually,
it is true, there came a time when the Imperial deputies
elected by the Reichsland no longer sulkily absented
themselves from the Diet, but they only
came to swell the ranks of the Opposi-
tion.‡ Many are the longing looks which
the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine still cast towards
France, and great is the perseverance and the skill
with which the French Chauvinists still endeavour
to keep alive in them the hope of the day when weeping
Alsatia shall be restored to her inconsolable step-mother.
But Bismarck saw no reason why the wreaths which are
periodically hung by patriotic hands on the statue of
Strasburg at Paris, should not be sent to deck the Victory
Column at Berlin.

* We may, in particular, instance the case of Herr von Flottwell, vice-
governor of Lorraine, who, in the spring of 1883, received such a sharp
remonstrance from Strasburg as compelled him to resign.
† Died in June, 1885, and was succeeded by Prince Hohenlohe, the
German Ambassador at Paris, who is certain to continue the policy of his
predecessor.
‡ On the question of Protectionism they voted for the Government, for
the first time.—See p. 473 post.
The Domestic Affairs of the Empire.

Whether the Reichsland will ever ripen into an integral part of Prussia, or into a regular Federal State with a Prussian prince for its Sovereign, the future alone can show; but the Prussian system of administration, of education, and military service, is at least fast transforming it into something very different from what it was. Better, as well as different? The enquiry belongs to the sociologist. When German writers* themselves have sought to show that incorporation with the Empire has, in some respects, had a demoralising and debasing influence on the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, it is not surprising that plausible French books† should have been written to prove that, in exchanging the dominion of the French for that of the Germans, these inhabitants have passed from a higher state of civilisation to a lower, from a better to a worse form of civil polity, and that their chronic discontent is a constant peril to the peace of Europe. It is not our business to examine those charges, because, even if they could be made good, they would not affect the German title to have and to hold the provinces. Whether the Germans excel the French in civilisation as in arms, will be seen after a century has afforded material for comparing the Alsatians, as they were under the French, with the Alsatians as they have been refashioned by the Germans. But even if Bismarck were sure that

* See a series of articles in the Courtly and Conservative Kreis-Zeitung towards the end of December, 1883, on "Die Deutsche Politik in Elsass-Lothringen."

† "L’Alsace-Lorraine et L’Empire Germanique, &c."—(Paris, Calmann Léry, 1881), mainly reprinted from the Revue des deux Mondes.
the result would prove unfavourable to the reputation of his nation, that would not induce him to relax his hold of Alsace-Lorraine, which he declared must for ever be and remain the "glacis of the Empire."

Having thus shown how Bismarck garnered the "territorial harvest" of the war, we must now glance at the disposal of the French milliards, which flooded the Empire in streams of gold. Out of these milliards a sum of four million thalers, or about £600,000, was voted for distribution by the Emperor among the leading soldiers and statesmen of the war; while forty million thalers, or about six millions sterling in specie, were appointed to be set aside as a Reichskriegschatz, or Imperial War-Chest Fund, against the coming of another evil day. The bill for this purpose met with considerable opposition, one party objecting to so large a sum of money being allowed to lie fallow. Bismarck, however, pointed out that a dead-lying War-Chest Fund was an absolute necessity of modern warfare, and that, but for the fact of Prussia having had a Kriegschatz (of thirty million thalers), it would have been impossible for her to mobilise her army within a fortnight, and thus anticipate the French on the left bank of the Rhine. While to those who wished to saddle the employment of the war-treasure with parliamentary conditions, he replied that the Reichstag in such matters could not possibly claim more power than the Federal Council, which might, indeed, prevent the Emperor from declaring war, but not from mobilising the army.
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE. 391

For this simple and preliminary purpose, he said, the Kriegsschatz no more than sufficed,* and so the sum of six millions sterling in gold was forthwith consigned to the Julius Tower at Spandau, there to lie like the talent of the wicked and slothful servant that was hid in the earth, secure from the fluctuations of interest and the mishaps of usurers, against the coming of Germany's evil day.

With the rest of the milliards, the victims of the war were generously cared for, fortresses built, new strategic lines of railway constructed, the building of an Imperial fleet begun, and the treasuries of the individual States filled to bursting with plethoric sums. The poor and needy Germans looked up, and lo! the clouds seemed to rain down gold, as once they dropped manna in the hungry wilderness. The land overflowed with money; credit rose with a bound, and ascended ever higher; every branch of industry was seized with a fever of over-production; the capital itself, that ville parvenue, as a Frenchman once described it, became more upstart than ever; and in less than no time the young Empire was in the midst of its "Gründer-Era," or Period of Business Bubbles. The Strousbergs, the Levis, the Aarons, and the Cohens, grew and flourished like green bay-trees. Every Jew became a John Law, and every street in Berlin a Rue de Quinampoix. But the Jews, who have

* If it take six millions sterling merely to mobilise the German army in a fortnight, how much money will it require to wage a war—say that only lasts six months?
a complete monopoly of finance at Berlin, found it difficult to outstrip the Gentiles in the race for wealth, and thus there arose a desperate struggle for the golden harvest. All classes were infected with the prevailing fever, which even seized hold on several who breathed the pure and bracing moral atmosphere of the Court, and the not less unpolluted air of the Prussian bureaucracy.

But at last the "Crash" came, and with it the reaction. The turning point was reached in the spring of 1873, when the Liberal Deputy, Herr Lasker, in several speeches of great eloquence and power delivered in the Prussian Chamber, essayed to show to the scandalised nation that some high officials, notably in the Ministry of Commerce, had been guilty of grave malpractices in the matter of railway concessions. Of these malpractices Herr Lasker, a Jew, undertook the exposure all the more readily, as the delinquents were not members of his own speculating and gambling race, but blood-proud Junkers and titled Christians. The Chamber demanded an inquiry, but appearances were saved by the Crown claiming to take the initiative in the matter itself. Lasker's arraignment turning out to have some slender basis of truth, it resulted in the resignation of Count Itzenplitz, Minister of Commerce, and in the pensioning of one of his chief officials.

This was the first instance in the parliamentary history of Prussia where public opinion had forced the King to part with one of his Ministers. Though obliged
in decency to resign, it was proved that neither Count Itzenplitz, nor his subordinate, had done anything really very culpable as public servants; but what invested the case of the latter official, Privy-Councillor Wagener by name, with so much interest, was the fact that he was the intimate friend and partisan of Bismarck. Wagener had been the founder and editor of the Conservative Kruz-Zeitung, to which Bismarck was a frequent contributor,* and the two had lived in close community of political ideas and interests for many years.† But what was to be inferred from this? Opposition journals made bold to insinuate that, in the matter of the railway concessions, the Chancellor had brought his influence to bear on the Minister of Commerce in favour of Wagener; but no one believed it, nor could, indeed, any one well believe it, considering that nobody pressed more urgently for a searching inquiry into the whole affair than Bismarck himself. And that the Chancellor looked upon the offence of his old supporter as very slight, was proved by the fact that, though Wagener was henceforth shunned like a leper by most of his previous friends, he continued

* Vide, p. 71, Vol. I.
† Much interesting information about this community of political ideas and interests will be found in some lately-published Reminiscences by Wagener, entitled "Erlebtes: Meine Memoiren aus der Zeit von 1848 bis 1860, und von 1873 bis jetzt 1884, von Hermann Wagener, Wirklichen Geheimen Ober-Regierungsrath." These Reminiscences contain some characteristic and hitherto unpublished letters of Bismarck to Wagener, written during the time of the Revolution. Wagener, who, through his position as editor of the Kruz-Zeitung, was well acquainted with the springs of political action of those days, has also written an interesting work on "Die Politik Friedrich Wilhelm IV."
to enjoy the sympathy and even the companionship of Bismarck, who frequently invited him to Varzin.

The Chief Minister of the Crown who had stood in the breach, while lisping Lasker delivered his assaults against official corruption and Tory privilege, was General von Roon; for, a few days previously (New Year’s Day, 1873), the King had relieved Bismarck from the post of Minister-President—with an assurance of his “never-dying gratitude,” and the Black Eagle in brilliants. The Chancellor, such was the ostensible reason for his retirement, had found it impossible to do justice to the duties of his Imperial office as well as preside over the Prussian Cabinet, and so Count Roon, the War Minister, was appointed to the latter post. But if the Chancellor found it impossible to perform both functions to his heart’s content, the nation found it more impossible still to do without him at the head of Prussian as well as of Imperial affairs, and so, before the year was out, (November) he was again installed, to the general relief, in his presidential office.

But, indeed, there was a large and growing party who would have rejoiced to see him fall like Wolsey, or “like Lucifer, never to rise again.” He had sworn enemies at Court, and he was an object of intense hatred to a clique of medieval Tories and Ultramontanes, who aimed at bringing about his fall, or at least at “worrying him to death.” This, too, only four short years after the Peace of Frankfort! He was already paying
the inevitable price of his power and his greatness. The Clericals loathed him for having placed their Church in bonds; there was a strong aristocratic faction who resented his treatment of his audacious rival, Count Arnim; and the Prussian Feudalists had risen up in arms against some of his liberal reforms—notably his bill for extending local self-government, a scheme which only passed the Upper House by a threat to create new life-peers. He was denounced by the Conservatives as the "patron of Lasker;" and the bombs which Lasker had pitched into the financial camp of the Conservatives, were quickly followed by Conservative shells that burst among the flesh-pots of the Liberals. Men like Delbrück, Camphausen, and Bleichröder the Berlin banker, financed for Prussia and the Empire; and the rancour of the Conservatives culminated in the charge that the Chancellor had farmed out the German Budget to this worthy triumvirate, and that, as regards the banker in question, he was now thus requiting him for the substantial support he had received from him in the days when he was an obscure and needy diplomatist. Speaking in the Reichstag (9th February, 1876), Bismarck angrily characterised this charge as a wicked and a baseless libel, and called upon all the subscribers of the *Kreuz-Zeitung*, in which it had appeared, to testify their disgust by ceasing to take it in. But this bold attempt to "boycot" his own old journal was only answered by an indignant protest on the part of several hundreds of its aristocratic readers—whose names, *per contra*, were pilloried in the official *Gazette*—to the effect that they
refused to take their notions of honour and decency from the Herr Reichskanzler."

This philippic of the Chancellor against the Kreuz-Zeitung was part of a general lamentation on the license of the Press, and the inability of the law to reach some of its excesses. It is to be feared, indeed, that Bismarck still looked upon the Press in the same light as he regarded Parliament—as a necessary evil, in spite of the apparent zeal which he had shown years before in promising a Newspaper Law for the Empire. This was in the session of 1873, when the Government consented to make a move in the matter, but only after the Liberals themselves had taken the initiative by framing a bill. As, however, the Liberals had shown no great eagerness to discuss matters held by Bismarck to be of infinitely more account than the liberty of unlicensed printing, he paid them out by disappointing their hopes till next year (1874), when a Press Law was passed after the usual compromise between Parliament and the Government. By this law, the Press of all Germany was relieved from some vexatious restrictions—such as stamp-duty, censorship, and bail for good behaviour—under which it had hitherto groaned; but still it remained subject to a series of severe penal provisions, calculated to establish in the mind of every public writer a wholesome equilibrium between the sense of freedom and the sense of fear.

"Security before freedom" was, indeed, the main legislative maxim of the Chancellor, as could not have been better proved than by the Bill for re-organising the
Army, which was debated about the same time as the Press Law, in the spring of 1874. Bismarck himself, it is true, was prevented by severe illness from taking part in these debates; but none the less on that account can we omit to trace the progress of a measure, on the origin and fate of which he had so much determining influence. The power of the public purse, as we formerly had occasion to remark, was nominally conferred by the Imperial Constitution, as in England, on the people; but of this right the people had already been asked to make a very peculiar use. It was their prerogative, as it is that of Her Majesty’s faithful Commons, to vote the budget every year; but they had freely alienated a portion of this privilege in 1871, when, instead of passing the military estimates for a twelvemonth, they granted a lump-sum to maintain the army in undiminished strength for a provisional period of three years. The object of this lump-sum, as the Government said, was “to convince the whole world (but especially France), that in the year 1874, Germany, under all circumstances, would be as strong and formidable as she was at the end of the war.”

The year 1874 had now arrived, and it therefore again behoved the Government to look to the joints and fastenings of its armour. This it did, too, by asking the nation to fix the strength of the army at its then peace-establishment (of about 101,659 men), “until otherwise provided by law;” or, in other words, it invited Parliament to surrender its
right of control over the military estimates until such
time as the Government should think fit to restore it.
By the Imperial Constitution, the peace-establishment
of the army had been provisionally fixed at about one
per cent. of the inhabitants, on the basis of the census
of 1867; but though, since this year, the population of
Germany had greatly increased, it was not yet proposed
to raise the defensive power of the Empire in due
proportion. No. Numerically speaking, the German
army was still only the third largest in Europe; but
what it lacked in numbers it possessed in efficiency, and
the military leaders were quite content that it should
remain so, provided only that it should not be exposed to
the economic caprices of artificial majorities, to the whims
of the Joseph Humes and the short-sighted apostles of
an impossible millennium in the popular Assembly.

It was in vain that Moltke, the greatest strategist of
the age, the man whose patriotism was above suspicion,
the soldier whose opinions were accepted as law by all
but Radical laymen; it was to no purpose,
we say, that Moltke—reviewing the Euro-
pean situation—urged that "what Germany
had won with the sword in half a year, she would require
to defend with the sword for half a century." In vain
did he plead for the army as the best means of national
education, and strive to show that it was the State—
"which disciplined the minds and bodies of its subjects
much more than the boasted 'schoolmaster'"—that had
fought Germany's battles and made her one. In vain did
he implore the Opposition not to make a budget-question
f the strength of the army, which was the first condition of Germany’s very existence, and which would also enable her to dictate peace to all Europe.

Moltke’s speech made an extraordinary impression in the mind of Europe, but it had little effect on the ill of the parliamentary doctrinaires in the German Diet. The peace-establishment of no other army, argued the Progressists, was fixed beyond a year, and why, then, should it be in Germany? Did not the demand of the Government strike at the eyestone of all parliamentary power, reasoned the asker fraction of the National Liberals, and could any parliament submit to that? Was it consistent with civil and religious freedom, exclaimed the Ultramontanes, thus to give further power to Bismarck, the Imperator on the Ministerial bench”? It was not to be expected, on the other hand, either that the Danes, the Poles, or the Alsace-Lorrainers should be moved with anything but ill-will towards an institution which had been made the instrument of their own subjection; and thus the Military Law was opposed by a coalition which not only threatened to throw it out, but also proposed a reduction, no less of the army itself, than of the period of military service.

A serious crisis supervened, and it almost seemed as if the Conflict Era was about to return. For weeks and months the country was in a state of fierce controversial excitement, but the addresses and other forms of manifestation that came pouring in from all parts of the Empire admitted of
little doubt that the feeling of the nation, on the whole, was with the Government. The German people are proud enough of their Parliament, but they are far prouder of the army which made it possible for them to have this Parliament; and if they were placed before the alternative of choosing between these two institutions, there is not the very slightest doubt as to which of them they would rather see go by the board.

Writhing with physical pain, Bismarck lay on his sick-bed, feeling like a wounded warrior that can no longer plunge into the fray, storming at the unpatriotism of the Opposition, and muttering threats of resignation and dissolution. The Emperor, too, was in anything but a yielding mood. Parliament might do what it liked with other matters, but the army was a thing as to which he would brook no interference. Events, he said, had proved him to have been right in refusing to be bound by the will of the country with respect to the army on the eve of the Danish and the Austrian campaigns, and that was a reason why the Opposition should now acknowledge itself to be in the wrong. To his Generals, therefore, who came to offer him the usual birthday congratulations (22nd March), he poured out his feelings, said that his life-task culminated in the Military Law, vowed that he never could die happy unless it were duly fulfilled, and appealed to them to stand by him to a man. To his Chancellor's bedside also he repaired, and begged counsel of the prostrate giant whether he should appeal to the country, or accept the compromise which,
with the view of obviating another Conflict Era, had been proposed by the Bennigsen section of the National Liberals.

Adopting a middle course, these deputies suggested that, while it was in the interests of the nation not to make any reduction of the army, the fixing of its present peace-strength might meanwhile very well be limited to seven years. The Emperor himself was anything but willing to accept this compromise; but on this, as on many other occasions, he ultimately yielded to the moderate counsel of his Chancellor, who argued that of two evils, dissolution or compromise, the latter, on the whole, was the least. Popular manifestations on the subject of the Army Law had made it plain that a general election might swell the ranks of the Conservatives at the expense of the Radicals, but that, on the other hand, a fresh shoal of Clericals were likely to be rolled into the Reichstag on the waves of Catholic disaffection created by the prevailing struggle between Church and State. The Emperor gave way; the compromise was effected after months of bitter wrangling, and a majority—which included all but the irreconcilable elements in the Opposition: to wit, the Clericals, the Poles, the Danes, and the Social-Democrats, with a score of Progressists—passed the Law of what, in allusion to Marshal MacMahon’s tenure of office, was called the Military Septennate.

By this law, Parliament freely signed away its right to control the army-budget for the space of seven
years; and at the end of this period, though by a smaller majority, it scrupled not to renew its bond of renunciation. It was wise of it to recognise the truth—as applicable, at least, to Germany—that military security is a higher blessing than parliamentary power; and that, whatever the constitutional longings of the nation, it was well that they should remain ungratified, as long as there might be danger in their realisation. "The theory," said Professor Gneist, a mine of constitutional lore, "the theory of determining the strength of the army by an annual budget is incompatible with the idea of conscription." So, too, again thought Parliament in the spring of 1880, for then it cheerfully renewed the Military Septennate; and not only so, but by taking the census of 1875, instead of that of 1867, as the basis of its calculations, it added about 20,000 men to the peace establishment, thus raising it to the figure of 427,274—apart from officers and one-year volunteers.

In acting thus, the Diet was influenced by reasons which it would have been the height of folly to ignore. The irritation of Russia against her German neighbour, for an alleged display both of treachery and ingratitude at the Congress of Berlin, was now at fever height—as manifested, among other things, by the threatening concentration of troops on her western frontier, the bellicose tone of her Press, the sulky attitude of her statesmen, and the angling of her Grand Dukes for a French alliance.* A French—

* See p. 104, ante.
Russian coalition against Germany was one of the grave possibilities of the time, and the prospect of such a coalition appeared all the more formidable when it was considered that the standing armies both of France and Russia were each vastly superior, in point of numbers, to that of Germany. In 1880 the German army was exactly what it was in 1870. While the neighbours of the Empire had been steadily adding to their already enormous armaments, Germany remained content with her peace-footing strength of something slightly over 400,000 men. France, on the other hand, which had met Germany in the great war with only eight Army Corps, was now in a position to encounter her with eighteen. Since 1874, as Moltke pointed out, France had more than doubled her army, and had about 100,000 men more under arms than her vanquisher; while the peace-establishment of Russia was exactly double that of Germany.*

These are figures which ought to be taken into serious consideration by the political philosophers who set themselves to apportion blame for the bloated armaments under which all Europe is bending to the earth with sweatful groans; but they are figures, at any rate, which soon convinced patriotic deputies in the German Diet that it was their clear duty, not only to renew the Military Septennate, but also to renew it with an extra annual charge.

* These figures are taken from Count Moltke's speech (1st March, 1880), in favour of the Military Septennate and an increase in the peace establishment of the army.
for 26,000 men on the public purse. When the Reichstag was in this mood, it may well be imagined what effect was produced upon it by the proposal of a Württemberg member, that Germany should call a Congress of the Powers and propose a general disarmament. The author of this motion, Herr von Bühler by name—an eccentric, Quaker-sort of person who acts as a kind of annual "Derby-dog" to the German Diet, and may be met with every year at the meetings of the Society for Promoting International Arbitration, and other assemblages of well-meaning fools; the author of this motion, we say, had previously sent it to Bismarck, and this was the answer he got:

"I am much obliged to you for sending me your disarmament motion. Unhappily, however, my attention is at present so much engrossed with urgent practical business, that I cannot concern myself with a future which I fear neither of us will live to see. It would be only after you had succeeded in gaining over our neighbours to your plan that I, or any other German Chancellor, could undertake, for our ever-defensive Fatherland, the responsibility of any such proposal. But even then, I fear that the mutual control of the nations over the armaments of their neighbours would also be a difficult and slippery matter, and that it would be hard to establish a tribunal which could effectively exercise this control."*

* Compare the above with the following characteristic utterance of Mr. Gladstone on the same subject—communicated to the International Peace Conference held at Berne, in the autumn of 1884:—"10, Downing Street, Whitehall, 4th August, 1884. Sir,—I am directed by Mr. Gladstone to acknowledge the receipt of the communication which you addressed to him on the 31st ult. on behalf of the International Arbitration and Peace Association, and to say, in reply, that, while referring to his public action as the most trustworthy indication of his sentiments, he thinks it hardly consistent with his public position to express an opinion which might be liable to misconstruction.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant, Horace Seymer."
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE. 405

We have said that the whole domestic policy of Bismarck, after the French war, was summed up in the single aim—to perfect and consolidate the national unity which he had created. He was aware that disintegrating elements were already at work on the comparatively insecure edifice of his construction, and all his endeavours were devoted to the task of housing the harvest before the storm came on. Already well advanced towards the scriptural span of life, he was a frequent sufferer from bodily ailments, and his superhuman exertions were beginning to tell on his working powers. His all-absorbing wish was to place the Empire beyond the danger of dissolution before he passed away, and, fearing lest his days might be short, he laboured at the perfection of his life-task with a feverish and incessant activity.

We have shown how the main supporting pillar of the Empire, the Army, was made immovably firm; and now we must proceed to enumerate—but scarcely more than enumerate—the chief hasps and rivets that were driven into the edifice. Of these rivets, the most important was that formed by the new Judicature Acts. No nation could be said to be one within itself which lived under a hundred various systems of law. The Government of the North German Confederation, it is true, had compiled both a Criminal and a Commercial Code, which were adopted by the Empire; but a Code Civil was still wanting,*

* And is still wanting, though one is in course of preparation.
and the boldest hearts shrank from an undertaking which seemed to be as impossible as it was patriotic. Meanwhile, it was seen that much might be done in the field of legal procedure, and already, in opening the Reichstag in the autumn of 1874, the Emperor had dwelt upon the necessity of establishing unity in this respect, as one of the most pressing tasks of legislation.

In that same session, accordingly, Parliament was presented with a series of Judicature Acts, or bills for establishing uniform legal tribunals and procedure in matters of civil, criminal, and bankruptcy law all over the Empire. These bills were referred to a committee, of which Professor Gneist and Herr Lasker, two profound jurists, were prominent members; and, however much Bismarck may have hated Lasker from the bottom of his very soul for the tricks of opposition which he had repeatedly played him, he could not, at least, but have been grateful to the learned and laborious little Jew for the eminent share he took in framing the Judicature Acts. Indeed, the over-exertions Lasker now made sowed the seeds of that mental and physical malady which carried him (in 1884) to a premature grave, and relieved the Chancellor from a foe to whom, even in death, he refused to be reconciled.*

* We refer here to the refusal of Bismarck to communicate to the Reichstag a resolution of condolence with the death of Lasker passed by the American House of Representatives, and ordered to be sent to the German Parliament through the Chancellor. In vindicating his refusal to comply with this request, Bismarck spoke to the Diet of his deceased opponent with great bitterness.
The task of the Judicature Committee was one of immense difficulty, but it was well suited to the German genius, and by the winter of 1876 it presented the Reichstag with the result of its labours. It might have been expected that so technical a subject as legal procedure would have been disposed of, even by a German Parliament, without heated and acrimonious debates; but this was far from being the case. The Committee had proposed that offences by the Press should be assigned juries instead of to the ordinary courts, and that the printers and writers of periodicals should not be compelled to give evidence as to the true authors of libels, who had hitherto been able to screen themselves behind mere dummy editors. Both these suggestions were warmly approved by the Reichstag, but neither of them was to the taste of Bismarck. The liberals said "Yea," but the Chancellor said "Nay," and his asseveration was uttered in the more emphatic manner of the two. The Press, he thought, had been made free enough already, and did not want more freedom. The Government was willing enough to drop all of its other objections, but on the two above-mentioned points it was inexorable.

Another conflict seemed impending, but at last, after much bargaining, it was obviated by what Bismarck once called the soul of all constitutional Government—a compromise. By this middle course, which

* Hitherto, i.e., before the passing of the Imperial Press Law before referred to. See p. 396, ante.
was suggested, as usual, by the National Liberals, the trial of Press-offences by jury was to be continued where already practised (in South Germany), but not introduced elsewhere; while the principle of compulsory evidence in cases of libel was also retained. This compromise gave rise to the direst party recriminations; but it was supported by two-thirds of the House, which also fixed the 1st October, 1879, for the Judicature Acts to come into operation.

But the controversy on the subject was not yet over, and the next session (spring of 1877) furnished a striking illustration of those centrifugal forces which, as we previously remarked, began to act upon the Empire as soon as ever it had been fairly fixed in its national orbit. The Judicature Acts had created a Supreme Imperial Tribunal, with a jurisdiction of first instance and appeal over a limited field, but now there arose a burning controversy as to where this Court should have its local habitation. To Bismarck, in his simplicity, it never occurred that any objection would be taken to Berlin, which was the nominal capital of the whole Empire, the residence of the Kaiser, the seat of the Legislature, the growing focus of social and intellectual life. But he was cruelly mistaken; for, lo and behold, Prussia was out-voted on the subject in the Federal Council by a majority of two. The Federal Governments would not hear of Berlin as the seat of the Supreme Court, and proposed Leipzig instead. Their ostensible motive for this extraordinary proposal was
that the Supreme Tribunal for Commercial Affairs, founded in 1869, which served as the germ of the new growth, had sat at Leipzig, and that there was now no reason why the full-blown tree should be transplanted to Berlin. But no one was deceived by this shallow and unsatisfactory reason.

The truth is that there was now a recrudescence of that particularist feeling which had been the traditional bane of Germany. The Federal States looked with a jealous eye on the progress of centralisation, and thought that Prussia had done enough in this respect. These reasons, too, were repeated and emphasized in the Reichstag; but with the addition that justice, above all things, required to be pure, and that the judges of the Supreme Court would be none the worse for being removed from a possible source of intimidation and corruption. This was a convincing proof that the integrity of the bench was not yet viewed in the same light in Germany as it is in England, but, at any rate, the champions of particularism and the advocates of a pure justice had it all their own way. It was impossible for Bismarck to stand up and plead for Berlin instead of Leipzig, seeing that the Imperial Government was in the anomalous position of having had, in conformity with the vote of the Federal Council, to ask the consent of Parliament to a Bill in the matter of which Prussia had been outvoted. So the Chancellor held aloof from the debates, dumbfounded and grieved; grieved to think that, in spite of all he had done for his nation, it still seemed resolved to continue
the "hole and corner" existence which it had led in a hundred different capitals; grieved to think that Germany, unlike France or England, laid no apparent store on possessing a chief city in which should center all the elements that tend to make a nation one and indivisible; and grieved to think that his countrymen had acted as absurdly as Englishmen would do, if they insisted on transferring their Supreme Courts of Law from London to Liverpool.

But notwithstanding this incredible manifestation of that centrifugal force at work upon the Empire, which Bismarck, in this particular case, was wholly powerless to counteract, there was thus brought home to the nation the consciousness of closer political unity springing from the feeling that it was offered the enjoyment of all but a common system of law. But even while this great work of national reform was in progress, the Chancellor was taking another mighty stride in the same direction. Wallenstein swore that he would take Stralsund, even if it were chained to heaven; and Bismarck vowed that the domestic foes of the Reich would certainly not burst it asunder again, if hasps and hoops of hammered iron could help to hold it together. Not metaphorical bands of iron, but literal and downright clasps of metal from English Darlington and German Essen that had been used in laying the railways of all the German States. It was a fine idea of the Unifier of the nation to ensure

* The expression used by a deputy, Herr Bamberger, who spoke for Berlin as the seat of the Court.
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE. 411

The cohesion of its component parts by enclosing them one huge iron net, through the meshes of which the most recalcitrant captive could not wriggle—a very fine idea, if it could only be realised!

But there was the rub. If Germany had now ceased to a great extent to live in a labyrinth of laws, she was ill hopelessly lost in a railway-chaos. What were a hundred different systems of law, compared with about fifteen hundred railway-tariffs? Was this national unity? By the Imperial Constitution, the Federal Governments had bound themselves, in the general interest, to convert all the German lines into a systematized net; but half-a-dozen years had passed by, and the article in question was still an absolutely dead letter. Already, in 1873, an Imperial Railway Board had been created to serve as the crystallizing point of other endeavours in the desired direction; but this as like opening a shop without wares, and three years' experience had shown that the dictates of this Department were utterly discarded. The only field of its positive jurisdiction were the railways of Alsace-Lorraine; but its authority was mocked at by the "sixty-three railway-provinces" into which, as Bismarck bitterly complained, Germany was still mediævally divided. The traveller from Berlin to Karlsruhe had to pass through the hands of half-a-dozen independent railway administrations, while upon the sender of a parcel from Königsberg to Metz it was incumbent to calculate the sight of this consignment according to the rates of early fifteen hundred different tariffs. Commercially,
the Zollverein had taken the place of the thirty-eight sovereign States of the old Bund, all separated from each other by Chinese walls of customs-tables; but what was to supplant the sixty-three sovereign railway-provinces, with their conflicts of administration and their internecine tariff-wars? To evolve order out of all this chaos was a task, he knew, whereof the performance did not merely depend on his own will, and which would test his energies much more even than the political unification of the nation had done. He had no hope that the Herculean labour would be accomplished in his own lifetime, and yet he vowed that he would do all he could to convert the railway-article of the Constitution into a living truth before he died.

His greatest difficulty was the lukewarmness, and even the positive opposition, of some of the Federal Governments themselves. What was to be expected, for example, of Saxony, in the matter of an attempt to systematize the German railways—of Saxony, who actually objected to change the colour of her passenger-tickets as being detrimental to the patriotic, that is, the particularist, consciousness of her subjects! * It was soon seen that no progress whatever could be made with the endeavour to reduce all the national lines into one administrative net. A bill for this purpose had been drafted by the first president of the Railway Board, but its only positive result was the dismissal of its author. For Prussian

* These tickets bore the Saxony national colours.
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE. 413

Officials are like the citizens of the ancient State, who
urst only come forward with a new law if they had a
pe round their necks. The next president of the Rail-
ay Board, Herr Maybach,* hastened to work out
other project; yet this, too, was anything but to the
ste of the Federal Governments.

The railways in some of the States were of two kinds,
ivate or State property. Now Bismarck, in the inter-
est of the Empire, aimed at reducing and
ystematizing the tariffs of all these lines; ut it soon became clear that, while the
ederal States had no objection to seeing all the private
mpanies brought under Imperial control, they obsti-
tely refused to expose their own domestic budgets to
 danger of diminution by subjecting their State
ilroads to a whittling process of assimilation. On
he other hand, it was certain that any bill which did
ot treat private and State lines on the same footing,
ould have no chance whatever of passing the Imperial
arliment; and thus, after tentative steps in various
rections, Bismarck came to the conclusion that the
oblem could only be solved if the Empire bought over
oth the public and private lines in the various States, nd became the sole railway-proprietor in the nation.

Buy over was easily said, but the chief question was
ther railway-owners were prepared to sell; and, un-
fortunately, neither the Governments nor
he companies showed any alacrity in going
o the market. Bismarck admitted that, with all its

* Afterwards Prussian Minister of Public Works.
power, the Imperial Government could not compel rail-
way-proprietors to vend their lines to it, and that his
chief standpoint was formed by the hope that, in this
case, they would at last see the wisdom of subordinating
their pockets to their patriotism. True patriots surely
are they who can bring themselves to do this, but the
railway-proprietors claimed to be true patriots without
doing this. Some of them, indeed, claimed to be the
better patriots of the two by refusing to do this, and
thus saving their country from a flood of ills.

What these apprehended ills were, appeared from the
arguments of the Opposition. By taking all the rail-
ways into its hands, urged the foes of the Chancellor's
Evils of State policy, the Imperial Government would
railways. acquire far too much political and financial
power. With a railway-revenue of 800 millions, it could
tytrannize over the money-market; it would make the
budget-rights of Parliament a hollow mockery; and it
would have at its beck and call an army of officials who
could influence the result of any election. The Empire
was suffering acutely enough already from centralisation,
and ought to be spared a further aggravation of its
malady. That Government was best which governed
least, but now the German people were threatened with
a further display of that spirit of meddling on the part
of their rulers which had gradually deprived them of all
power of initiative, and converted them into the mere
passive and de-individualized units of a huge State-
machine.

It was to no purpose that, in answer to these objec-
tions, Bismarck contended that his railway-policy was much more economic than political in its aims; in vain did he scoff at the notion that "German freedom and unity would be swept away with the first Imperial locomotive." No; he could not persuade the Federal Governments to look at the matter in the same light as himself. He felt that he was a man before his time, and yet he resolved to take time by the forelock, so as not to be wholly baulked of his patriotic purpose. There was no immediate prospect of his railway-policy being espoused, either by the Federal Governments, or by the Reichstag; and meanwhile he determined to hasten the opening up of this prospect by counselling Prussia alone to prepare for doing what he called "an act of abdication in favour of the Empire."

To their credit it must be said that, with the exception of a narrow-minded crowd of fossilised Feudalists, the Prussians had never been much addicted to the sin of particularism; and least of all could this sin be laid to the charge of Bismarck, who had ceased to be a Prussian with the trumpet-call of Königgrätz. Devoted as he was to the institutions of his "engeres Vaterland"—Prussia—the interests of Germany, as a whole, were nevertheless very much nearer his heart, and we have even seen how his broad and patriotic views in this respect had swelled the number of his foes among the Prussian Junkers. "I hold it," he said, "to be my primary duty to strengthen the power of the Empire, and not that of a Grand-
Prussianism (Gross-preussenhum).* Animated with such sentiments, it was little wonder that he called upon Prussia to prepare for doing "an act of abdication in favour of the Empire;" and this preparatory act took the form of a Bill for empowering the Prussian Government to sell to the Reich all the railways which it owned itself, and make over to it all the administrative and supervisory rights which it exercised over private lines. If the other States, said Bismarck, refused to part with their railway-property in a similar manner, and (in the words of Lasker) "looked upon the Empire as a mere Insurance Office for guaranteeing to them their individual sovereignty," this was no reason why Prussia should be a party to an act of omission which made one important article of the Imperial Constitution a lie and a mockery.

The Bill above-mentioned was debated by the Prussian Parliament in the spring of 1876, and for six months all Germany was absorbed with its aim; for it was admitted that a revision of the Constitution even could not be more momentous than this aim. It is unnecessary for us to follow its progress, or to do more than record that it was ultimately passed by unexpected majorities in both Chambers. After much acrimonious opposition it became law, but up to the time we write—a lapse, that is to say, of nine years—this law has not yet been acted on. The railways that belong to the Empire are still only those of Alsace-Lorraine. The law

* Debate in Prussian Diet on railway policy, April, 1876.
been acted on, but that was not the fault of Bismarck. He had been empowered to sell the Prussian railways to the Empire, but the Empire has never yet shown any inclination to purchase either the Prussian or any other lines. The apathy of the Federal Governments, as well as the procrastination of his Prussian colleagues, were too much for the Chancellor, with all his power and with all his imperious will. When, in the spring, he begged that a move might at last be made in the matter, he was told that nothing could be done till the autumn; and when the autumn came, he was always informed that unforeseen circumstances had rendered imperative a postponement of the business till the following spring. Thus, from year to year, his dearest hopes were deferred; but though his heart was sickened with the deferring of his hopes, his hand was not stayed with the palsy of inaction.

The day must come, he knew, when the railway-article of the Imperial Constitution would be a living truth, and meanwhile there was a means at his disposal, not only of accelerating the approach of that day, but also at the same time of obviating the evils under which public traffic suffered by reason of its non-arrival. Prussia was equal to two-thirds of the whole of Germany, and, of the sixty-three railway-administrations which distracted the Empire, forty of these were in Prussia. Pending, therefore, the ripening of a resolution on the part of the Empire to take upon itself the cares of universal proprietorship, it was plainly, thought Bismarck, the
duty of Prussia to simplify the process of transformation by converting all the Prussian lines into one homogeneous system, or in other words, to buy up all her private companies, and thus make the State the exclusive railway-owner in the kingdom. Apart from ultimate aims of an Imperial nature, this step was all the more necessary as it behoved Prussia, in her own interest, to imitate the example of States like Saxony, Württemberg, Baden, and Oldenburg, which tolerated no private lines.

For the next few years, therefore, a prominent feature in the proceedings of the Prussian Diet was the discussion of contracts by which the Government had purchased the lines of private companies. Having to deal with general principles merely, it would be going beyond our province to detail the financial transactions by which this railway transfer was effected—to set forth the enormous debt which the Government thus incurred, and to enumerate the favourable conditions under which shareholders consented to convey their proprietary rights. The companies were not actually threatened with expropriation unless they accepted the offers of the Government, but the freedom of their will was necessarily restricted by the certainty of a fall in their dividends should they choose to compete with the low-pitched tariffs of the State-lines. Coactus voluit. He who, in Prussia, attempts to compete with the State, is a ruined man. In all cases the above-mentioned treaties were approved by the Chamber, though not, of course, without strenuous
opposition from the champions of free-trade and free competition; and, by the spring of 1882, the principle of the State-system of railways in Prussia had completely triumphed.

Moltke had pointed out that, from a military point of view, the triumph of this system would be an additional bulwark of defence to the nation, "railways having become in our time one of the most important means of warfare." On this head, too, Bismarck was quite at one with Moltke; but the standpoint from which he preferred to look at the question was the economic one. It was a fatal error, he argued, to regard railways as primarily meant to serve the ends of financial competition more than the wants of traffic and intercourse. The public weal was the all in all to him, and an omnipotent State was the best promoter of the public weal. By taking all the railways into its hands, the Prussian State certainly added immensely to its power; but Bismarck declared that it merely meant to hold this additional power in trust for the Empire until such time as, emerging from its minority, it should declare itself ready to assume those duties and responsibilities with respect to all the railways of Germany, plainly prescribed to it by the Imperial Constitution.

In thus holding high the banner of the State-railway system, Bismarck was guided by two main motives, and it is hard to say which of them was the primary one. He was certainly moved by an anxious desire to see every article of
the Imperial Constitution become a reality; but he was equally eager to improve the finances of the Empire, and he knew that the fulfilment of one wish would bring with it the attainment of the other. If it owned and managed all the national railways, the Empire would thus open a source of revenue which would go far to make it financially independent of its component parts, and this was a result which Bismarck had warmly at heart. The sources of income available to the Empire were few, but, on the other hand, the field of its outlay was not so very extensive. Nevertheless, in the first years of its existence, its income always fell considerably short of its expenditure, and yet it never had to suffer from a deficit. For, by the Constitution, its minus figures had to be made up by the Federal States in proportions relative to their populations. These quotas were called "matricular contributions," and were nothing but the compulsory clubbing together of a family of prosperous children to keep an impecunious parent from the shame of pauperage. Financially, this was how the Empire began its existence; but Bismarck recognised it as one of his primary and most pressing duties to relieve it from the necessity of begging for this outdoor relief, to create the sources of an income that would cover all its wants, and, in short, to make it self-supporting and fiscally independent. "An Empire," he said in 1872,* "which is founded on the theory of 'matricular contributions,' lacks the strong bond of cohesion that is furnished by a common system of finance."

* Reichstag, 1st May.
With Bismarck, to recognise defects was to remedy them; and, indeed, some progress had already been made in the work of regulating the finance of the Empire—in its outward form at least. The basis of a national system of coinage had been established in 1871 by a law which paved the way for a gold currency, instead of the double system hitherto prevailing, and fixed the mark as the decimal unit of the new gold coins. During the discussion of this law, the Chancellor gave a remarkable proof of his power to distinguish between the essential and the immaterial aspects of a question, and of his readiness to spare sensibilities where nothing could really be gained by wounding them. Count Münster had proposed that all the new coins should bear the Kaiser's image, but Bismarck warmly objected to this, and pleaded successfully that some consideration might also be shown to his Federal allies. It would be quite sufficient, he said, if each token were stamped with the Imperial eagle, and bore on the reverse side the head of the Sovereign in whose mint it was coined. "Could the King of Bavaria," he asked, "more plainly or emphatically express his allegiance to the Reich, than by stamping his image on a coin graven with the Imperial arms?"

This law of December, 1871, was supplemented two years afterwards by another, which created a new silver coinage and reformed the paper issue; while, in 1875, there was established the Imperial Bank, a State institution which, in addition to regulating and controlling the currency of the whole
Empire, added to its annual income an average sum of two million marks.

Apart from this revenue from the Imperial Bank, that annual income was mainly derived from customs and excise, bill-stamps, posts and telegraphs, the railways of Alsace-Lorraine, and the interest on the Reichs-Invaliden-Fonds, consisting of a sum of 561 million marks set aside from the French milliards for military pensions. Now, for the budget-year, 1876, the total income expected from these various quarters was roundly about 312½ millions, while expenditure for the same period was calculated at 399½ millions. This left a deficit of 87 millions to be supplied, as usual, by the "matricular contributions"; but as this deficit exceeded the usual quotas of the Federal States by about 18 millions, and as Bismarck, far from wishing to increase their burden, was resolved, as we have seen, to pave the way for abolishing them altogether, he seized this opportunity of pointing out to the nation the pressing necessity of opening fresh sources of Imperial income. So in the winter of 1875 he made a first serious attempt at fiscal reform.

But this first attempt ended in complete failure. The Chancellor proposed to increase the beer-tax, and impose a tax on Bourse transactions; but to neither one nor the other of these proposals would the country lend a willing ear. What Parliament contended was, not that either of these imposts, especially the latter, would be unjust, but that they were unnecessary. If the Government wanted to save itself
from deficits, and to spare the treasuries of the Federal States, it might practise greater economy. Bismarck said some very flattering things to the Reichstag about its omnipotence in the fiscal field, but it would not listen to his blandishments; so he waved it an apparently good-humoured "as revoir," with the assurance that "the ideal at which I aim is to meet the wants of the State as exclusively as possible with indirect taxes."

But the stubbornness of the Opposition, the luke-warmness of his colleagues, and the engrossing nature of his labours in connection with the foreign affairs of the Empire, prevented him from doing much to realise this ideal for the next few years. Indeed, he began to despair of ever being able to realise it at all, and in his despondency he was driven to the resolution to quit the helm of the State-vessel, which he could no longer steer according to his mind. In the spring of 1877 he reminded Parliament that he was meditating a thorough scheme of financial reform, adding that he never would be happy until it was carried through; and in a few days afterwards the nation was no less astonished than alarmed to hear that he had sent in his resignation to the Emperor.

The Chancellor's patience was exhausted. He was being thwarted on every hand. The perversity of his countrymen in selecting Leipzig as the seat of the Supreme Court had worried him beyond measure. His foes at court were malignantly active. His health was shattered, his temper was embittered, and he spoke of himself as a "broken old man."
old man." His ministerial colleagues would not all
dance as their master sifed, and the pressure of official
"frictions" was sore upon him.

Of these "frictions" may be mentioned the Chan-
cellar's characteristic dispute with General von Stosch,
Chief of the Admiralty. The Prince
would have it that war-vessels, in time of
peace, being put into commission merely in
the interest of the diplomatic service, ought to look for
commands to himself, the Chief of that service. Herr
von Stosch, on the other hand, argued that such a state
of things was wholly incompatible with the rules of
military subordination; and, what was more, he suc-
cceeded in making good his argument. It was to no
purpose that Bismarck waged a long "dialectical contro-
versy" with the Chief of the Admiralty, in order to
move him from his "preposterous contention." Herr von
Stosch was firm, but he could not help wincing under
the lash of sarcasm and complaint which Bismarck
applied to him in Parliament. If the application of
this lash was meant to lead to an open rupture, it did
not fail of its aim. Stosch sent in his resignation, but
the Emperor would not accept it. Both parties to the
quarrel handed His Majesty a statement of their case.
but, while expressing his conviction that the Chancellor
did not mean to offend the Chief of the Admiralty, the
Emperor would not part with Stosch. Stosch remained
in office, though a few weeks later he had to undergo
the singular penance of having to christen a new iron-
clad corvette by the name of "Bismarck." He remained
in power, but the causes which had induced the Chancellor to bring about his fall were not removed. That tenacity of purpose is more a special virtue of Bismarck than forgivingness, was proved by the ultimate retirement of Herr von Stosch a few years later (in 1883); but meanwhile his continuance in office was held to be one of the causes which, as we have seen, induced the Chancellor to send in his resignation in the spring of 1877.

A cry of alarm and of protest at once arose throughout all Germany, and the feelings of Germany were to a great extent shared by Europe. The Russo-Turkish war was just on the point of beginning, and it was felt that the absence of Bismarck from the helm of affairs would involve a great additional danger to the peace of Europe.* Even in Paris it was said that Bismarck might die, but that he never could resign. The leading English journal declared that, if war broke out, the German Chancellor must return to office. Of the vain Lord Brougham it is known that he caused to be circulated a rumour of his death, in order to see what the Press, as representing posterity, would say of him; and certainly, in threatening to resign, Bismarck elicited a chorus of panegyric such as is only drawn forth by great men when they die. The vast bulk of his countrymen pronounced his loss to be utterly irreparable, and his further services to be indispensable. Even Dr. Windthorst warmly denied that the prospect of the Chan-
cellor's retirement had "brought joy and gladness into the camp of the Clericals." It is not, indeed, employing the language of exaggeration to say, that the nation conjured the man who had done such great things for it to continue at its head; and when the wish of the nation was so unanimous and clear, the Emperor could have no hesitation in asserting his own will.

His Majesty, therefore, sent back to the Chancellor his petition for leave to resign, with a brief and emphatic "Never!" written on the margin. That famous "Never!" relieved the nation from a horrible anxiety, and was received with joy by Europe. The Chancellor might take a long holiday for the restoration of his health, but he durst not take his leave. The Prince, accordingly, saw that there was nothing for him but to comply with the will of the nation, and doubtless he felt all the less reluctant to do this, as discerning that he had now discovered an infallible means of inclining the nation to comply in future with his will—a means of which he was afterwards not slow to make repeated use. So leaving Herr von Hofmann in charge of the domestic department of the Imperial Chancellery, and Herr von Bülow at the head of the Foreign Office, Bismarck withdrew to Varzin. Yet his furlough was a mockery. Prometheus might escape from his rock, but the eagle of public care continued to pursue him.

His nominal holiday gave him nothing but an opportunity of confining his attention to matters of international moment, more especially to the Eastern
uestion, of which the development had to be watched with incessant diligence. But with this we have already dealt in another chapter, and we need only here remark that during the ten months (April 1877, to February 1878) when the Chancellor was supposed to be relieved from the cares of office, this exemption only applied in reality to the domestic affairs of the Empire.

It was during this period of partial repose that Bismarck compared himself to a "wearyed hunter," worn out with fatigue after a bootless search for game all day. But, just when ready to drop, the beaters sing out to him their discovery of a couple of splendid boars, and away at once he starts in pursuit of his tusky prey with liethome step and re-awakened zeal. And so, too, would (the Chancellor) buckle to his work again with renewed energy, in order to finish what he had taken in and, if but he had the assistance of the necessary eaters to drive before his gun the running game.

By "beaters," the Chancellor meant a compact and bedient majority in the Reichstag, without which he felt he could do nothing; and yet among the moors of Sleswiger-Holstein he continued to brood over his schemes of financial reform, and to devise means by which, to use his own expression, he might be able to "make the Empire fiscally stand on its own legs." Nevertheless, he remained like chilles in his wrathful tent, vowing that, unless he received "assurance of spontaneous help from all competent authorities in Prussia" in the execution of his
tax-reform plans (railway-policy, etc.), he "would, indeed, health at all permitting, appear in Parliament when next it met, but only to set forth the reasons of my final retirement from office."* Shortly after this, however, he was visited by a sort of Patroclus in the person of Herr von Bennigsen, and the two discussed the conditions under which the National Liberals would combine with the Conservatives to form a Bismarck party sans phrase, or, in other words, a diligent and obedient body of Government "beaters." The better to cement this union, the Chancellor even held out to Bennigsen, and his partisan Forckenbeck, the prospect of portfolios on certain terms; but with these terms the Liberal Chiefs could not clearly see their way to comply.

The negotiations in Varzin mainly turned on the formation of a Conservative-Liberal coalition to act as a steady Government majority, on the introduction of indirect taxes, and the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor; and the parliamentary session, opened shortly afterwards (February, 1878), was to show to what extent the nation was prepared to accept this programme. With respect to the third point above-mentioned, the Prince at last succeeded in asserting his will. The appointment of a Vice-Chancellor, he argued, was not only theoretically

* Letter to Herr von Bülow, dated 15 December, 1877—published with several others referring to this period by the North German Gazette, 17 January, 1880, with the avowed object of proving that the Ministers Camphausen and Delbrück resigned of their own accord, and were not forced to take this step by the Chancellor.
matter of constitutional perfection, but was also absolutely necessary to relieve him from a fast-increasing burden of business that was growing unbearable. What he wanted in reality was to reserve to himself the right of attending to such matters as he had a mind to, and of leaving others in the hands of specially appointed substitutes; or, in other words, he wished to continue in the exercise of his plenary power, as sole responsible Minister of the Empire, while saddling others with the execution of his authority. But such redistribution of labour was not effected without the rue amount of academic debating, so intensely abhorrent to the Chancellor's mind. The Federal Governments, on the one hand, had their particularist scruples in certain scores; while the Liberals argued that the rue way to lighten the labours of the Chancellor was to create a series of constitutional and responsible Ministers. But to such a proposal the Imperial Government would not listen, and at last mutual concessions led to the passing of the Substitute Law (Stellvertretungsgesetz) very much, in the main, after the Chancellor's mind.

While the chief departments of the Imperial Chancellery were vicariously entrusted to various high Prussian officials, Count Stolberg-Wernigerode, one of the wealthiest and most powerful noblemen in all Germany, was persuaded to exchange the pleasant and comparatively independent position of Ambassador at Vienna for the post of Vice-Chancellor-in-Chief—a post which he resigned after
an experience of three years had convinced him of the imprudence of ever having yielded to the solicitations of the Emperor in defiance of his own doubts and fears. For he must be a man of peculiarly constituted mind and character who, as a colleague or subordinate of the Chancellor, can at once retain for any length of time the favour of his Chief and a sense of his own independence. Many had tried to perform this double feat, but most had failed; and the Wilhelm-Strasse, so to speak, began to be strewn as thickly with the bodies of these adventurous men, as is the Hyperborean Sea with the bones of those rash and multitudinous explorers who have struggled to reach the North Pole.

Two years before (in 1870), Dr. Delbrück, President of the Chancellery, whom Bismarck called his "Gneisenau," had resigned from well-understood "motives of health"—a wonderfully frequent motive with Prussian Ministers, with whom no class of men can compare for strength of constitution and power of work; but no such reason was alleged for the retirement of Herr Camphausen, Minister of Finance, who surrendered his portfolio in the middle of the session of which we have been speaking.* From the published letters of Bismarck to Herr von Bülow † before referred to, we gather that his conception of the duties of a Finance Minister differed materially from those of Herr Camphausen. "As President," he wrote,

* Spring of 1878, when the Substitute Law was passed.
† See p. 428, ante.
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE.

"I am not called upon to devise financial programmes, or to stand up for them, and am merely answerable for the post of Finance Minister being filled in conformity with the general policy of the Cabinet."

And again:—

"If Camphausen admits that we want fifty millions of marks more (I should have thought one hundred millions, but he is the best judge of that), then he cannot doubt that it is his duty, and not mine, to draw up and defend a programme of financial reform." . . . "I should not like to bring things to a crisis—with, for example, the retirement of Camphausen; preferring, as I would, to see the desired reforms taken in hand by my present colleagues. I have no desire to bring about a change of ministers, and merely want to get the thing itself done. But if this is not feasible, then I will go."

Bismarck had begged his correspondent (Herr v. Bülow) to take an opportunity of submitting these considerations to the Emperor,* and they had their usual effect. His Majesty sent his aide-de-camp to Varzin; the necessary pressure "from above" was brought to bear on Herr Camphausen and his lukewarm colleagues; and the speech from the Imperial throne (opening the spring session of 1878)—which the Finance Minister, as Vice-President of the Ministry, was selected to read himself—announced the introduction of bills for increasing the tobacco-tax, and for the levying of further stamp-dues with the object of rendering the Empire independent of "matricular contributions." But the chief positive result of these

* "I have enemies at Court," the Chancellor wrote, "but not on that account will I abate the respect I owe to my most gracious master." (15th December, 1877.)
measures was merely the fall of their author. Parliamentary criticism was too much for him. He resigned, and with him went out of office his colleagues of Commerce and of the Interior. Herr Camphausen maintained that, in yielding obedience to the Chancellor's system of ministerial discipline, he had none the less acted in strict accordance with his own economic convictions; but, in any case, this congruity of action brought him to the end of his tether.

Bismarck himself frankly admitted that a "tobacco monopoly" was the ideal at which he aimed, and that the present measure was a mere transition step in that direction. But this confession only rendered Parliament all the more averse from his schemes. What the nation wanted was compensation for the constitutional guarantees, of which the abolition of the "matricular contributions" would deprive it; and this compensation could only be granted in the shape of a regular and responsible Ministry of Finance—the condition precedent of thorough financial reform. So Bismarck had meanwhile to content himself as best he could with the granting of a shabby tax on playing-cards, and with the reluctant appointment of a commission of inquiry into the tobacco industry. It was no wonder, therefore, that the Chancellor now again began to lose heart, and to despair of ever being able to realise his dream of rendering his beloved Empire wholly "independent of outdoor relief;" when suddenly there occurred an event which, while interrupting for a while the current of his ideas in this direction, only gave him
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE. 433

Additional stimulus and resolution to translate them into accomplished facts.

On the evening of the 11th May, 1878, Bismarck—Hödel and his pistol. who had returned to Varzin to brood over the rejection of his indirect taxes—was shocked by the receipt of a telegram informing him that on that afternoon the Emperor, as he drove down the Linden with his daughter, the Grand Duchess of Baden, had been twice fired at by a young man, who had, however, happily missed his aim. The spot where this outrage occurred was within a few yards of the place where Lind had levelled his revolver at the Chancellor on the eve of the Austrian campaign,* and the motives of the votes—be assassins were not at all dissimilar. Blind med at ridding the nation of a man who seemed to be sing all he could to plunge it into an impolitic and atrocidal war; while Hödel, the tinker, who now raised is pistol against the Emperor, believed that in this ay he would turn the tide of hopeless battle which the proletariat poor were beginning to wage with savage solution against the rich and the ruling classes, as his representative he singled out the venerable and ameless monarch.

For Hödel was a revolutionary—there can be no doubt about that, nurtured on, and inoculated with, all he anarchic spirit of his time; of that spirit which, in the first German Parliament, 871) shouted out “war to palaces, peace to hovels, path to want and idleness, as the watchword of the

* See p. 358, Vol. I.
whole European proletariat," and which three years later described "our party Press as the burning torch hurled into the powder-magazine of social suffering, in order to ignite whatever is combustible in the working classes." Hödel carried about with him the photographs of the authors of these exclamations,* as Catholics hug the images of their saints, and none had been more industrious than he in swinging about the torch of anarchy thus kindled by his heroes. He had been a diligent canvasser for Social-Democratic prints; he had belonged to Social-Democratic societies; and so bad was his moral character, that he was even cast out of community with those whose unscrupulous ends he desired to serve. But brainless, heartless, low, uneducated, and contemptible, as Hödel was,+ his crime must unquestionably be accepted as the direct and logical outcome of a movement which had hitherto been making as insidious progress as an advancing tide, and which now suddenly arrested attention as if by a thunder-roar that made Bismarck turn and start to find himself confronted with one of the direst and most destructive monsters of the time.

* The photographs of Bebel, Liebknecht, and other Social-Democratic leaders, were found among the effects of Hödel.

+ Hödel (born in Leipzig in 1857) was an illegitimate child, and even his mother testified to his worthlessness. He spent several years of his boyhood in a reformatory, and afterwards he received ten lashes for picking pockets. Though he contrived to learn the trade of a plumber or tinker, he led the life of a mere tramp, visiting, among other countries, Austria and Hungary, whence he was forcibly sent home the year before he committed his crime. Experienced criminals vowed they had never seen such a shamelessly impudent specimen of humanity. He was beheaded at Berlin three months after the commission of his crime.
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE.

It is as little part of our plan to detail the genesis of this monster, as it was incumbent on the poet of the Faërie Queen to describe the anatomy of the dragon dire encountered by the Red Cross Knight. What interests us is not physiology but fighting, and so impatient are we to see the Chancellor at close grips with the formidable monster, that we can scarcely stop to glance at the various stages by which Germany, in the year 1878, had come to possess a perfect species of the genus Anarchy, indigenous to every country in Europe—a political force which in Russia is called Nihilism, in France Communism, in Ireland Fenianism, in Italy Carbonarism, and in Spain the Black Hand. But this much we will say, that this political force in Germany, under the name of Social-Democracy, dates its organic existence almost exactly from the time (1862) when Bismarck became Prime Minister of Prussia. Yet the coincidence is merely accidental.

And it owed its organic existence to Ferdinand Lassalle, the first outsider who discovered the genius of Bismarck, as the latter was also quick to detect and admire the character and intellectual ideas of Lassalle, in virtue of the law which makes all great minds gravitate toward each other. "Even if we come to exchange musket-shots with Herr von Bismarck," said Lassalle, "common justice would compel us, while firing at him, to admit that he is a man, while the Progressists (to whom Lassalle in-
Prince Bismarck.

clined) are old women.” “Lassalle, said Bismarck. on the other hand,*

“Lassalle is one of the cleverest and most agreeable men I ever met—a man of lofty ambition, by no means a republican, but animated by strongly marked national and monarchical feelings. His ideal which he strove to realise, was the German Empire, and that was one point of contact between us.” †

This tribute to the memory of the great social reformer, whose career was so suddenly and so lamentably cut short (in 1864) by the bullet of a rival for an unworthy woman’s love, was elicited from the Chancellor in the autumn of 1878 by an accusation that he was to a great extent himself responsible for the alarming growth of Social-Democracy, seeing that, on first entering office, he had coquetted with Lassalle, and, in the belief that all was fair in love and war, endeavoured to enlist the reformer’s disciples in a league against his own parliamentary foes, the Progressists. To this charge, the Chancellor gave the lie indignant and direct.

* Speech in Reichstag, 17th September, 1878.
† Such was Bismarck’s opinion of Lassalle; which may now be supplemented by Lassalle’s opinion of Bismarck, if we can trust the second-hand evidence of the philosopher’s mistress, Helene von Racowitza, who thus writes at p. 111 of her Memoirs (Meine Beziehungen zu Ferdinand Lassalle, von Helene von Racowitza, geb. von Donnigen—Breslau and Leipzig, 1879). “Is it true,” asked the lady, “that you have seen Bismarck, and been awfully charmed with him?” . . . . “Yes,” said Lassalle, after a pause. “I was at Bismarck’s.” “And how did you like him? Do you find him clever?” Clever? What do you mean by that? If you and I are clever, then Bismarck is not, but he is ponderous and full of incisive momentum (schneidig, wuchtig); in fact, he is made of iron. Iron when refined, becomes steel, and then weapons can be made of it, yet only weapons. But I am fonder of gold.” . . . . (which is not to be wondered at, considering that Herr Lassalle was a Jew.)
"Anybody," he said, "who remembers those days, will recollect that it was my policy during the winter of 1862-3, to come to terms with the Diet, not to combat it."

And again:

"I can assure you that I never had any business transaction with a Social-Democrat in my life, nor a Social-Democrat with me: for I do not reckon Lassalle as having belonged to that category. His was a much nobler character than any of his satellites; he was a remarkable man, to converse with whom was highly instructive."

And not only to Bismarck was Lassalle’s conversation instructive, but it was also, to some extent, convincing; for there can be no doubt that in the Chancellor’s mind were now sown the germs of those ideas which subsequently sprouted forth into his policy of social reform. A fundamental principle of the Lassalle philosophy was recognition of the State—"that primeval vestal fire of all civilisation, which I will defend with you against those modern barbarians" (of the Manchester School) "who hate the State."* To Lassalle, the State was the All-Mother, with whose beneficent aid he proposed to better the lot of the working classes. Not so much in self-help, as in State-help, did he look for the salvation of society, and his views were in a measure shared by Bismarck. "It seemed to me," said the Chancellor in 1878,

"and perhaps the impression was conveyed to me from Lassalle’s reasonings, or perhaps by my experiences gathered during my (short) stay in England, in 1862, that a possibility of improving the working

* Lassalle’s speech in his own defence before a Prussian tribunal.
man's lot might be found in the establishment of productive (co-operative) associations, such as exist and flourish in England."

Indeed, so interested was Bismarck in the matter at that time, that he

"persuaded the King, who has a natural and inborn feeling for the working classes, to grant a sum of money out of his pocket in aid of an experiment in that direction, on the solicitation of a deputation of operatives from Silesia who had lost their employment through differing with their employer in politics."*

But, interested as Bismarck then was in these subjects, his attention now began to be wholly absorbed with the current of his foreign policy; and meanwhile Lassalle died, leaving in other and less competent hands the Universal German Working Men's Union, by the founding of which (1863) he had enabled Social-Democracy to enter upon the organic phase of its existence. Generally put, it may be said that the aim of this Union was to organise labour against capital, and to fight its battle on legal grounds; but soon after its creation there began to take definite shape the social doctrines of a party whose revolutionary ideals, not applying to Germany merely, but to all civilised States, could never be realised by any other means than force. This was the Social-Democratic or Communist, Party, that drew its inspiration from the

* "To attempt anything of the sort on a large scale might entail an expenditure of hundreds of millions; but the notion does not seem to me an intrinsically absurd or silly one. We make experiments in agriculture and manufacture; might it not be as well to do so with respect to human occupations and the solution of the social question?"—Speech in the Repeal, 17th September, 1878.
teachings of Karl Marx, the founder of the "International"—a man who, like Lassalle, was of Jewish origin, which is worth thinking of in considering the religious and social movements that have changed the history of the world.* Broadly stated, the original disciples of Lassalle, while demanding a thorough reconstruction of the framework of society, were content that this should be done by scaffolding and repair; while the followers of Marx insisted on the whole fabric of modern life being torn down, blown up, swept away—anything, at least, but left standing, and built up anew on their own principles of social architecture. Lassalle and Marx were the fountain-heads of the two main streams of popular aspiration which, rising pretty far apart, gradually neared each other till they blended their waters in the rolling flood of revolutionary aims, which Bismarck was now called upon to stem

More, perhaps, than any of his countrymen, despite his manifold distractions, he had marked the swelling of this flood—watched it with lively apprehension, with occasional warnings, and even with positive efforts to dam it up. For nine uncertain years he had watched it with straining eyes—like a sentry who cannot quite make out whether an approaching figure looming through the dusk is the form of a friend or a foe, a burglar or a beggar. But soon after the war with France his doubts were set at rest. "It was at the moment," he said, "when deputy Bebel, in

* Bebel and Liebknecht were the most advanced, and therefore most violent and uncompromising representatives of the Marx school.
a pathetic appeal to the” (first German) “Reichstag, held up the French Commune as a model of political institutions, and openly avowed the creed professed by the Parisian assassins and incendiaries. Thenceforth I clearly perceived the extent of the danger threatening us; . . . and I instantly recognised the fact that Social-Democracy is an enemy against whom the State and society are bound to defend themselves.”

With the promptness, therefore, which has always distinguished him in action, Bismarck lost no time in showing front to the approaching foe, and in shouting for the guard to turn out. But the European guard, he found, were mostly under the influence of deafness or indifference. In the early summer of 1871, the German Chancellor addressed the European Cabinets on the necessity of concerting common measures to combat the spirit of international revolution, and there is reason to believe that his action was not uninfluenced by a circular in which M. Jules Favre had represented the Commune as but the local outbreak of a great European pestilence.* But be that as it may, England would not listen to Bismarck’s overtures, and the other Governments were lukewarm. And yet his efforts were not wholly vain. For international anarchy formed the subject of serious conversation between the Prince and Count Beust, when the two Chancellors accompanied their respective Sovereigns to Salzburg, in the autumn of 1871.† The

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* Bismarck nach dem Kriege, p. 96.
† See p. 17, ante.
German Chancellor felt the necessity of renewing the old alliance between the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs, and he saw that this could not better be done than by uniting the two Empires in a coalition against the common enemy—as, indeed, he had already sought to do this after the Treaty of Olmütz (1850).

The result of the Salzburg interview was a conviction on the part of both statesmen that the spirit of revolution, which had begun to assert itself so loudly, could only be combated by the double-edged weapon of repression and reform. Bismarck was not blind to the fact that the Social-Democrats demanded much that was reasonable and just, and he determined to comply with these demands as far as was compatible with the integrity of existing institutions. As a matter of fact, too, the Prussian and Imperial Governments did now seriously take in hand certain reforms for allaying popular discontent and bettering the lot of the poor—reforms which were the germs of the Chancellor's subsequent State-Socialism. But, meanwhile, his attention was again monopolised by other burning questions, and yet from the consideration of these he was frequently roused by the admonitions of the Red Spectre, which, like the ghost of Hamlet's father, ever and again made its appearance to remind him of his unfulfilled purpose.

Ever since the French war, that Red Spectre had been making rapid strides. The milliards had not arrested it, as Milanion's golden apples stayed the course of Atalanta; the "Crash" of 1873 had quickened its pace;
the industrial depression of the nation had added to its stature; and the grinding militarism of the Empire had lent it the appearance of a grinning skeleton in armour. At the general election in 1871, only three per cent. of the votes had been given by Social-Democrats, and within six years this percentage had been trebled. At the election in 1877, nearly half a million of the voters belonged to this party. Two of their representatives sat in the first German Parliament, twelve in the third. It was little wonder that this rate of progression was viewed by Bismarck with dismay, and, pending compliance with the fair demands of the Spectre, he made repeated attempts to arrest its pace.

But the Liberalism of the young Empire was too proud to sanction penal clauses in the Press Law against a particular class. Already, in the spring of 1876, when a bill for amending the Criminal Code was under discussion, the Chancellor pleaded warmly, but vainly, for a more repressive clause against the Social-Democrats, to whose unreasonable ideals of the future he attributed in a great measure that spirit of restlessness among the labouring classes, which had ended by rendering the “German working-day very much less productive than the French or English one.” And, meanwhile, he urged Parliament to combat this evil with “means as yet quite independent of the hangman,” whose hands, he evidently thought, would be full enough by-and-bye if things were allowed to go on as they were. But his
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE.

warnings were unheeded, and they remained so until the savage murmurs of dissatisfaction among the working-classes, growing ever louder and louder, at last found imperious expression in the double report of Hödel's revolver.

These pistol-shots were the starting-signal for Bismarck to run a new race; they marked the commencement of what has been called the "Economic Era" of his career. The thunder-loud growling of the Red Monster, he saw, could not be any longer disregarded; so he at once resolved to turn aside and parley with it, but only after he had rendered it mute and innocuous by compressive muzzle and compulsive chains. Not his the method pursued by sentimental statesmen with respect to Ireland—the method of reform first, and respect for the law afterwards. Hödel fired his pistol on the 11th of May; next day from Varzin to Berlin came the peremptory order to draft a law for repressing the excesses of Social-Democracy; and in the course of forty-eight hours this bill was before Parliament. The Press of Germany—not to speak of Europe—had burst out into one unanimous cry of execration against Hödel's crime; and Bismarck thought that the tide of popular indignation and sympathy thus created would, if taken at the flood, lead him on to the attainment of his legislative aim. But he was sadly mistaken.

The Chancellor himself came not to Berlin to advocate his measure—he was too ailing to do that—but, even
if he had, his efforts would have been vain. Not the serious representations of the Government itself, not the simple but powerful eloquence of Moltke—nothing could as yet persuade Parliament to pass a law which struck at the most recently-acquired, and most highly-prized, pledges of popular liberty—the right of public meeting, and freedom of spoken and written speech. All admitted the evil which the law was meant to combat, but most contended that the law itself would be a greater evil than the one it was intended to cure. The brief debates on the subject only gave the Liberals of all shades an opportunity of declaiming against exceptional measures, while the Clericals—groaning themselves under the bonds of repressive laws—affected to sympathise with those of their fellow-subjects who were threatened with similar coercion, and ascribed the growth of Social-Democracy to the restrictions put upon the educational influence of the Catholic Church. The Chancellor's repressive measure was rejected by a majority of about 200. He had been baulked of his resolution to muzzle and chain up the Red Monster before proceeding to parley with it; and meanwhile the Monster, grown all the more wildly exultant at beholding this, began to rage and roar with redoubled fury. Nor was its fury long in making itself appallingly felt, and in the same way as before.

On Sunday, the 2nd June—within little more than a week from the day when Parliament had emphatically refused to repress the license of revolutionary tongues
—the Emperor went forth alone for his usual afternoon drive, still sore at heart from the apparent indifference of his subjects to his personal safety, and wan from the sleepless nights caused him by the sinking of the "Grosser Kurfürst" in the English Channel (31st May). Forth drove the Kaiser to seek relief from these depressing cares, but he had not proceeded far along the Linden when his heart became a prey to a greater sorrow. For down from an upper storey poured upon him, in quick succession, the buckshot charge of a double-barrelled fowling-piece, and back to his palace he was slowly driven, half-unconscious, scared, and streaming with blood. "I cannot understand why they always shoot at me," said His Majesty, on being bandaged up, "at me, who have never given any cause for hatred."

But his would-be murderer, Dr. Karl Nobiling, knew why, for the mad theories with which his head was crammed afforded him a sufficient motive for the crime. Hodel was a low, ignorant tramp, but Dr. Nobiling was a man of good family and education—a man who, when at the university, had openly boasted of his revolutionary aims and been known as the "petrolist," and had visited the chief European capitals with the object of studying the progress of international anarchy. About the social and political theories of Dr. Nobiling there could be as little doubt, as that the crime—from the consequences of which he tried to save himself by taking his own life—was the direct outcome of those theories.
We do not pretend to say that the Social-Democratic party, as a party, must be held responsible for the crimes of Hödel and Nobiling, in the sense that a society of conspirators is accountable for the execution of their murderous will by one chosen instrument—for there is nothing to show that either of the would-be assassins of the German Emperor did not act on his own independent impulse. But it is demonstrable, on the other hand, that, in the case of both miscreants, this impulse was generated by the hope of hastening the realisation of those revolutionary ideas preached by the most extreme and dangerous section of the Social-Democrats.

Another storm of wrath and execration, louder and more furious than before, now swept over Germany.

What was humanity coming to? "I should have thought," said Bismarck to General Grant, who visited Berlin about this time, "that the Emperor could have passed through the whole of his dominions alone without danger, and now they seek to kill him."* Horror and

* The conversation on this occasion between the Chancellor and Ex-President Grant, was so interesting, that we make no apology for quoting a portion of it as given by the anonymous author of "Bismarck nach den Kriegen"—"Grant: I hope his Majesty will soon get better." Bismarck: "The prospect is as good as it can be; the Kaiser has a strong constitution, as well as much courage and patience, but you know he is an old man." Grant: "This circumstance only increases the horror inspired by the crime." Bismarck (with evident emotion): "Here you have an old man, one of the best men on earth, and yet they try to take his life. There never was a man of simpler, more magnanimous, and more humane character, than the Emperor. He is totally different from those who are born to such a high position, or at least from many of them. You know that persons of his rank, princes by birth, are inclined to look upon themselves as something wholly different from other men, attaching but little value to the feelings
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE. 447

stupefaction reigned at Berlin. The Emperor had not been mortally wounded, but his condition was such as to render him meanwhile incapable of holding the reins of Government; and these, therefore, were at once entrusted to the Crown Prince, who, on hearing of his

and wishes of others. But the Emperor, on the contrary, is a man in all things. He has never in his life wronged any one, nor hurt any one’s feelings, nor acted with severity. He is one of those men whose kindly disposition wins all hearts, and he is always occupied with, and mindful of, the happiness and welfare of his subjects, and of those about him. It is impossible to imagine a finer, nobler, more amiable and beneficent type of a nobleman, with all the high qualities of a Sovereign and the virtues of a man. I should have thought that the Emperor could have passed through all his dominions alone, without danger, and now they seek to kill him.

. . . . In certain respects the Kaiser resembles his ancestor, Frederick William, the father of Frederick the Great; inasmuch as the old King had the same homely sort of character, lived simply and retired, and led a true family life, possessing all republican virtues. And so it is with our Kaiser, who is in all things so republican that even the most incarne democrat would admire him, if his judgment were impartial." **Grant** remarking that there was only one remedy—the gallows—against the principles which had endangered the life of the Emperor: "I do not see why a person who commits such a crime, that not only imperils the life of an aged Sovereign, but also fills the world with horror, should not be visited with the severest punishment." **Rummet** : "That is precisely my view, and my conviction on this head is so strong, that among other reasons I resigned the reins of power in Alsace so as not to have to exercise mercy in cases of capital punishment. It was impossible for me to forgo my conscience. Well now, look at this aged nobleman, this Emperor of ours, whose subjects sought to murder him—such is his largeness of heart that he never will confirm a sentence of death. It is impossible to imagine anything more unique—a monarch, whose clemency, so to speak, has abolished capital punishment, becoming himself on that very account the victim of a murder, or an attempt to murder? That is a fact, but in this respect I cannot agree with the Emperor; and in Alsace, where I, as Chancellor, had to countersign acts of mercy, I always inwardly rebelled against doing so. In Prussia, that is the business of the Minister of Justice, but in Alsace it fell to me. I feel, as the French say, that we owe justice something, and that in the case of crimes like this they must be severely punished." **Grant** : "There is only one means of dealing with such people; they must be destroyed." **Rummet** : "Exactly so."
father’s grievous plight, had hastened home from London—where, by the way, he had himself been exposed to an insulting demonstration on the part of some German Socialists. As for Bismarck, prostrate with illness as he was himself, he started up and hurried from his country-seat to the camp-couch of his beloved Sovereign. The rejection of his anti-Socialist Law had renewed within him the desire, if not, indeed, the determination, to withdraw from the service of a people whose will in some things proved stronger than his; but these thoughts vanished when he came to Berlin. "After beholding my lord and King lying there in his blood," he once said, "I made a silent vow that never against his will would I leave the service of a master, who on his part had thus adventured life and limb in the performance of his duty to God and man."

Bismarck left the Palace nervèd with the spirit of resolute and instantaneous action. Thrice in the course of the last five years he had vainly implored Parliament to grant him legal means of counteracting the agencies which had thus, for the second time, found vent in such a terribly explosive manner, and now he saw that the evil had to be cured instead of prevented. He would give the representatives of the people one more chance of complying with his will, and then, if they refused a fourth time, what then? Would he have advised the Government to take the remedy into his own hands, as he had done in the "Conflict Time"? Probably he would, but meanwhile

* "Speech in Reichstag," 13th June, 1882.
he resolved to give the Reichstag one more chance. A Cabinet Council was held, serious and urgent words were spoken, and Parliament was dissolved to make way for one more alive to the necessities of the time, and more pliable to the Chancellor’s iron will.

Favoured by the feelings of horror which still possessed the nation, the new elections resulted in a decided strengthening of the Conservative element in the Reichstag, at the expense of the various Liberal fractions, and even the Social-Democrats themselves lost several seats. But still the National Liberals had the casting vote in their hands, and the views of this party on the subject of Social-Democracy had undergone a complete change since the commission of Nobiling’s crime. Of two necessary evils—Socialism, or the means proposed for its repression—the followers of Herr von Bennigsen had formerly looked upon the latter as the greater evil, but now they thought contrariwise. Though differing in some respects from its predecessor, the new measure was of a very sweeping, incisive, and despotic character—empowering, as it did, the Government to dissolve societies and meetings, to confiscate and forbid publications of a revolutionary tendency, as well as to declare certain localities in a state of siege, and to expel from their places of residence all those held to be dangerous or obnoxious under the law. The law, in fact, gave the police absolute power to prevent the self-assertion of Social-Democracy by pernicious acts of any kind, or by the spoken and written word; power to fasten it com-
pletely under hatches, so to speak, and to convert it from an open into an underground current.

Though supported by the Conservatives and the National Liberals, the measure, as before, was opposed by the Progressists and the Clericals—the former contending that the existing penal laws of the Empire should be adapted to meet the new danger; while the latter, with characteristic factiousness, again capped this argument by urging the abrogation of the May Laws as the best means of restoring the influence of the Church over the masses, and of thus thinning the ranks of anarchy and sedition. But the conversion of the National Liberals to the repressive policy of the Chancellor decided the fate of his measure. It is true, they insisted on certain amendments in the shape of executive guarantees, and, as in the case of the Military Senate, on the duration of the law being fixed for a provisional period of two and a half years, instead of for an indefinite time. But the Government was animated by a reasonable spirit of compromise, and after Bismarck, in two masterly speeches—whereof we have already interwoven the substance into the web of our narrative—had dilated on the nature and causes of the social revolution, which he described as "one of the worms that never die," Parliament at last passed his measure by a majority of seventy-two. On the same day (19th October) it was dismissed, with thanks.:

* The Reichstag met on the 9th September, and finished its labours, which were solely confined to the Socialist Law, on the 19th October. Hence that measure is frequently referred to as the Law of October 21st.
and Germany was committed to an experiment of a most momentous kind, which could not fail to be watched with interest by all European peoples.

But before glancing at the results of the Socialist Law, we must allude to another measure of an analogous kind which was meant to supplement it. This was the notorious "Muzzle Measure," * as it was called, by which Bismarck proposed to gag the mouths of Social-Democrats in Parliament itself. Outside they had already been deprived of every channel of expression, and the only place where they could still ventilate their ideas, as from the securely defiant house-tops, was the orator's pulpit in the popular Assembly. But hunted as they now had been from every other aggressive hold and coign of vantage, the vengeful Chancellor furthermore essayed, so to speak, to smoke them out of, or even suffocate them to death in, their hitherto inaccessible mountain-cave.

With this in view, he begged the Reichstag to invest itself with statutory powers of a severely penal nature against its offending members—powers even of excluding them for a certain time from its midst, and of forbidding the reproduction of their obnoxious utterances in the public Press.† But

* Bill relating to the Penal Powers of Parliament over its members, nicknamed "Maulkorbgesetz," or "Muzzle-Measure," laid before, and rejected by, the Reichstag in the spring session of 1879.

† Knowing that the Press was free to print the entire proceedings in Parliament, the Social Democrats confessedly made use of this immunity to escape the penalties of the Socialist Law, and to keep the nation au courant of their very wildest doctrines. In fact, they admitted that this,
the Reichstag most emphatically refused to have any hand in the fashioning of this disciplinary sceptre. The Clericals and the Liberals feared that if, on this pretence, they forged parliamentary fetters for others, they might one day come to be bound therewith themselves. The Chancellor himself entered the lists and broke a study lance for his offspring, but it was of no good; and the flickering life of that feeble offspring was blown out by a storm of opposition which has rarely been so sharp and irresistible; nor did the Chancellor reap anything for all his pains but hearty abuse, not only in Germany, but also in most European countries, as the determined foe of parliamentary privilege.

But for the liberty which was thus left them within the walls of Parliament itself, the Socialists had to pay with the complete suspension of their freedom without. The law against them was at once administered with relentless severity. Their societies were dissolved, their meetings were forbidden, their publications were suppressed, their literature was declared contraband, and they themselves in great numbers were summarily expelled from their places of residence, and cast into the stream of life to sink or swim. Never did the Inquisition exercise its power with greater vigilance, or greater effect. Opposition was utterly out of the question, as, indeed, it had been pronounced by the Social-Democrats themselves to be impolitic; and it was not long before the channels of

and not the hope of being able to influence legislation, was the sole motive which made them seek entrance into Parliament.
THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE EMPIRE. 453

their public agitation had all been effectually stopped up, and this agitation itself rendered as invisible as the fish-torpedo which only reveals its destructive course by a faint ripple on the surface of the sea.

To what extent has the repressive measure, which Bismarck devised to help in averting what one speaker called the "Sedan of Society," achieved its aim? The answer to this question must be shaped by the fact that the Law of October has been twice prolonged—in 1880 and 1884—and that the minor state of siege, which was originally confined to Berlin, has successively been extended to several other large cities, like Hamburg, Leipzig, and Dresden. And not only has the Socialist Law been repeatedly prolonged, but in the spring of 1884 it was also found necessary to supplement it by the passing of an Explosives Act of great penal severity—an Act which received the cheerful assent of all parties (except, of course, the Socialists), and was understood to be mainly the outcome of the appalling discovery that some miscreants had conspired to blow up the Imperial family with dynamite, on the day of the unveiling of the National Monument on the Niederwald (September, 1883).*

These are facts, and to them may be added the annual reports presented to Parliament by the Government on the application of the Socialist Law, of which the sum and

* These dynamitards were tried at Leipzig in December, 1884, and two of them, who admittedly belonged to the Party of Anarchy, were sentenced to death.
substance has invariably been this—that the measure
had hitherto done nothing but transform Socialism from
an open into an underground organisation.

At the elections in 1881, the united number of
their votes was less by about 100,000 than before the
passing of the law—a circumstance partially accountable
for by the fact that the Anarchists ostentatiously re-
frained from going to the poll; but, on the other hand,
the number of Social-Democrat seats in the Reichstag
was raised from nine to fourteen, while the elections of
1884 increased this latter figure to twenty-four. These
are facts which speak for themselves, and seem to
justify the conclusion of a competent writer,* that “in
spite of the Law of October, German Socialists display
a certainty of victory which they never had before, and
enjoy an organisation, in respect of funds and the means
of intercommunication, which makes them envied by
similar parties abroad.” They have repeatedly met in
Congress—at Wyden in Switzerland, for example (in
August, 1880), and at Copenhagen (in the spring of
1883), and on each of these occasions they proclaimed
their continued adhesion to the principles which were
declared by Bismarck to constitute a serious danger to
the State.

It was, perhaps, natural for the Chancellor, as well as
for his countrymen—whose military past has familiarised
them with force and State-interference as the predomi-
nant factors in the national life—to believe that the

* Die rothe Internationale (The Red International), von Dr. Zacher.
Regierungsauflöser (Berlin, 1884).
Socialist Law would do more than it really has done in eradicating the evils against which it was directed. But, in any case, the attempt to forcibly suppress the thoughts of men, which are surely their dearest possessions, was a much less hazardous experiment in Germany—where the people, with all their political progress, have not yet become thoroughly accustomed to the blessings of freedom—than it would have been in a country like England, which Liberty has selected for her throne. Looking at the matter, as is their robustly insular wont, only from their own particular point of view, none were more severe than Englishmen in their criticism of the Socialist Law; and yet it was not very long before the assassination of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Burke, at Dublin, taught them a lesson in humility of judgment, by forcing them to deal with rebellion in Ireland in a much more repressive manner than that adopted by Prince Bismarck—backed by the willing majority of his countrymen—to combat the excesses of as implacable a foe to the State as any Fenians that ever stepped.

The Socialist Measure has been compared with the May Laws, and the necessary failure of the one has been implied from the proved futility of the other. But this is an erroneous inference. For whereas the latter Edicts are of a purely repressive nature, the Socialist Law forms only part of a programme of action, of which the co-relative is reform. The Catholic clergy were placed in bonds without the hope of any subsequent indulgence to reconcile them to
their chains, or even the prospect of a "ticket-of-leave;" while the Social-Democrats, though caged up like so many wild beasts, were told that their freedom would be restored, and their reasonable demands complied with, as soon as their perilous ferocity abated. Prince Bismarck never surrendered himself to the illusion that the social problem of the nineteenth century could be solved as the Inquisition sought to settle the religious question of the Middle Ages. All he aimed at with the Socialist Law was avowedly to prevent the revolutionary movement from spreading, and to render it as innocuous as possible the while he devised radically remedial measures. He was well aware that reform must go hand in hand with repression, as he had no doubt as to the proper order in which these methods of cure should be employed; and having shown how he tried to circumscribe the area of the conflagration, we must now proceed to show by what means he endeavoured to extinguish it altogether.

The pistol-shots of Hüdel, as we remarked, were the starting-signal for Bismarck to run a new race. From that moment, his thoughts acquired a new concentration and a new shape. Hitherto his attention had been mainly devoted to questions of foreign policy, but now he was quick to perceive that, if he was to retain his position as the foremost statesman of his age, he must transfer his energies to utterly fresh fields and pastures new. The old political and dynastic issues, which had for so many centuries convulsed Europe, were practically exhausted.
l the old forces of society had lost, or were losing, their hold upon mankind. The nations, though armed to the teeth, had no longer any confidence in armies, and even the hamlet had its church, the spiritual power had ceased to mould the conscience and shape the destinies of mankind. For the first time in the world's history, statesmen were face to face with an educated proletariat, with a keen passion for material well-being, without any active hope of a life beyond the grave. To waste resources of statesmanship on the barren issues of politics or of frontiers, was suicidal. The solution of the social problem was the task on which the whole energies of the State should be concentrated, and if the Sovereigns and statesmen of Europe did not lay aside their differences, and devote themselves to the task of ameliorating the condition of the people whom they had ruled, they would not continue to rule long.

So thought Bismarck, and with him to think was act. "A great man struggling with the storms of life," said an eloquent American, "has been called a sublime spectacle; but surely a great man wrestling with these new forces that have come into the world, mastering them and con-

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*Such was the substance of an article in a Berlin journal (summarised in the 'Pall Mall', or the 'St. James's Gazette' in the above words), attributed to direct inspiration of Prince Bismarck, but in any case it expressed ideas in a wonderfully precise manner.

† Mr. James Russell Lowell, in his inaugural address on Democracy, as President of the Midland Institute at Birmingham, October 6th.
trolling them to beneficent ends, would be a yet sublimier.” This, then, was the sublime task to which Prince Bismarck now addressed himself with all the Herculean energy of his nature. After a life spent in struggles that would have consumed the strength of a score of ordinary men, he now set himself to grapple with a problem which none of the boldest of his contemporaries had ever yet had the courage to tackle. It is still impossible to foresee whether the Unifier of Germany will also be hailed by posterity as the “Saviour of Society;” but even his contemporaries will not deny that he, at least, was the first statesman who took the salvation of society seriously in hand. Every nation in Europe was beginning to be agitated to the depths by its land and labour questions, by its aggressive antagonism between poor and rich, by the flaring up of its revolutionary embers; but, while other statesmen were blindly indifferent or comparatively inactive, the German Chancellor went straight to the root of the common evil with all the thoroughness and impetuous earnestness of his nature. Europe, too, was all the more surprised, and all the more sceptical of the Chancellor’s chances of success, as it now beheld him embark on an undertaking which was as different from the line of his previous activity, as is a delicate surgical operation from the reduction of a fortress. But the essence of true genius is its versatility, and the Chancellor himself never doubted that, though he had risen breathless and faint from his futile wrestle with the Romish Hydra, he would nevertheless succeed in taming, if not in exterminating.
the Red Monster of Revolution. All the world had admired him for the masterly way in which he had made his countrymen one and indivisible, and the world now began to watch with an eager suspense the process by which he proposed to make them contented and happy.

Now, of happiness and contentment the chief sources, in this unspiritual age, are unquestionably wealth and material comfort. How, therefore, to open up to his countrymen fresh sources of this kind, began to be the Chancellor's one absorbing thought; and he came to the conclusion that his aims in this direction could best be realised by the pursuit of two distinct, yet parallel, lines of action. In the first place, he aimed at a thorough re-organisation of the State finance; and secondly, he cast about to devise new State institutions of a beneficent, protecting, and paternal nature, with the object of bettering the lot of the poor and disaffected classes. The former line of policy was that of the Chancellor's Financial Reform; the other that of his State-Socialism; and we must now proceed to detail, as briefly as may be consistent with clearness, and in the order in which they are here characterised, these separate currents of the Chancellor's action in what is called the "Economic Era" of his career.

And first, then, as to Bismarck's policy of Financial Reform. The object of this reform was, in the main, two-fold—aiming, as it did, at realising his long-cherished idea of making the Empire financially independent of
its component States; and also, at the same time, at re-adjusting the burden of national taxation in such a manner as, without lessening, to make it feel less. The personal impedimenta of a soldier are much less oppressive to the bearer if deftly distributed all over his body, instead of accumulated in one unwieldy hump upon his back. Now this was precisely the principle which Bismarck wished to apply to the tax-payer regarded as a weight-carrier, and he sought to realise it by transition from the direct to the indirect system of taxes. He was all the more anxious to effect this change, as believing that, while eradicating one cause of popular discontent, he would also create a new source of prosperity and contentment in the stimulus which might thus at the same time be given to the national industry. The products of this national industry had already been described by a competent judge as "cheap and nasty,"* a reproach which stung the patriotic soul of Bismarck, and made him reflect on the means of wiping it out. There was, in his opinion, only one way of doing this, and the nation awoke one morning to find that the Chancellor overnight had inscribed "Protection" on his banner.

Of this momentous fact the nation was made aware towards the end of 1878, by the publication of what was

* Professor Reuleaux, the German Commissioner (and Juror) at the Philadelphia Exhibition of 1876, admitted in his Report that there was only too much truth in the complaint of the Americans that, in comparison with the exhibits of other nations, the industrial products of his own countrymen were "billig und schlecht"—a phrase which became notorious. See p. 126, ante.
called the "Chancellor's Christmas card," in the shape of a communication to the Federal Council (dated 15th December) giving an outline of his scheme of financial reform. In less than a fortnight after the passing of the Socialist Law, the Federal Council, on the motion of Prussia, had appointed a Committee to consider a revision of the Customs Tariff; but, in acting thus, the Bundesrath only conformed with the decision of the Finance Ministers of the various States who had met in conference at Heidelberg in the previous August, and unanimously come to the conclusion that "an increase in the revenue of the Empire was indispensable, and that this increase should be sought for in the field of indirect taxation." It will thus be seen that, in standing forth as the champion of financial reform, Bismarck was only making himself the exponent of views which had already taken deep root in every capital of Germany.

The Chancellor proposed to surround the Empire with a Chinese wall of custom-houses, and to tax almost every article of merchandise crossing the frontier, with the exception of such raw materials—cotton, for example—as were absolutely necessary for native production. "Our sole aim," runs the motto of the Cobden Club, "is the just interests of England, regardless of the objects of other nations." "In revising our tariff," wrote Bismarck, "our own interest is the only thing that can guide us." And this interest, as he was careful to explain, was primarily financial; protection would be
a secondary result. What he desired above all things, was to shift the centre of gravity of taxation from the Federal States to the Empire. Hitherto, the Empire had to some extent subsisted on the charitable contributions of these States; but what the Chancellor now aimed at, was not only to make the Empire entirely independent of this "outdoor relief," but also to furnish it with a surplus revenue of its own which it might distribute among its children, so to speak, who would thus in turn be in a position to lighten the burden of the direct taxes under which their subjects groaned. The nation, on the whole, was not to pay less tribute-money than hitherto, rather, indeed, more; but, according to Bismarck's method of financing, it would actually feel easier than before under some additional millions.

This, then, expressed in brief and general terms, was the merely financial aspect of the question; while, from the commercial point of view, Bismarck deemed that, as things were, "Germany could no longer be expected to remain the dupe of an honest conviction." This honest conviction had inclined her to practise free-trade, or, at least, moderately protective principles; but when almost every other nation worth speaking of, with the exception of England, had taken to high protective, and even prohibitive, tariffs, Bismarck deemed that it would be suicidal folly on the part of Germany to seek to breast the universal current of commerce.† "In the field of

* Speech of 2nd May, 1879.
† "I will not seek to discuss the question," wrote Bismarck, in his
itical economy," he said, "the abstract doctrines of
ence leave me perfectly cold, my only standard of
gment being experience." This experience had
tught him—though plenty of Cobden-Club writers
pared to show had falsely taught him—that under
ystem of comparative free-trade, and almost isolated
-trade, German industry was being well-nigh ruined;
, unlike thousands of his theoretical countrymen, he
ot the man to destroy his country for a doctrine.
actingly, he was not a protectionist pure and simple;
ere is nothing in all his speeches and writings con-
cted with the German tariff to show this; but he was
rm believer in the principles of fair-trade, or recipro-
y, and adhesion to these principles made it a bounden-
ty with him to combat the disciples of Richar-den as energetically as he had warred against the
owers of Ignatius Loyola.* In the judgment of
marck, the doctrines of the Cobdenites were as-
gerous to the German State as the theories of the
uits; and the "Ultramaritimes"—as the English
e-traders began to be called in Germany—were ranked
the same hostile category as the Ultramontanes.†

er to the Federal Council of 15th December before referred to,
hether a state of complete mutual freedom of international commerce,
as is contemplated by the theory of free-trade, would not serve the
est of Germany. But as long as most of the countries with which
ade is carried on surround themselves with customs-barriers, which
is still a growing tendency to heighten, it seems to me that in the
omic interest of the nation, we should not allow ourselves to be re-	ed in the satisfaction of our financial wants by the apprehension that
man products will thereby be but slightly preferred to foreign ones."
* See our chapter on the "Kulturkampf."
† Writes the anonymous author of "Bismarck; zwölf Jahre Deutscher
A new *ad valorem* customs-tariff on the basis of the old Zollverein principles which had been gradually abandoned since 1865, a scheme for regulating railway freights throughout the Empire with the view of preventing the effects of this new tariff from being neutralised, together with bills for increasing the beer and tobacco taxes—these were the measures which caused Bismarck to say,* that “he had presented the nation with a Christmas tree hung with all sorts of pretty things, from which Parliament could pick and choose what it liked.”

But it was not till after Easter (1879) that the Reichstag set to work to select its favourite objects from the Chancellor’s Christmas tree, and meanwhile his gifts had been subjected to a most searching scrutiny on the part of the nation. If the “mere doctrines of political economy left Bismarck himself perfectly cold,” they had the effect of

*Politik, 1871—1883* (Twelve Years of German Politics). p. 372:—“From Rome to Manchester is a long leap. Yet it is only a step from one international society to another—from the ‘Ultramontanes’ to the ‘Ultramaritaines’—from those who are actually at home beyond the Alps; mountains, to those who dwell on the other side of the sea (or Channel). Against the German conception of the State these two parties wage battle alike from different positions, doing all they can to combat this conception—the one on behalf of the Church, the other in favour of the (economic individual. ‘State-Omnipotence’ is the red rag which enrages them both.”

. . . “Not quite homogeneous in their organisation, the Cobden Club and the Jesuit Order are alike in their activity and influence. . . . The Cobden Club is the citadel and centre of Liberal-minded progress—that is, of progress by certain means called Liberal. But Germany, as the land of Luther, is not more obnoxious to the Ultramontane, than is Germany, the land of Bismarck and of large armaments, to the economists of the Manchester school.”

* At one of his Parliamentary *soirées.*
ring up his opponents to a flaming pitch of controsial frenzy. For seven long months the Empire, with the contending shouts of Protectionists and Re-Traders, as it had once been rent by Guelphs and ibellines. Polemical pamphlets poured from the ss; the newspapers were engrossed with one subject; nation groaned in spirit, as with the travail-pains of ew birth. The Liberal Press, of course, was prompt answer the author of the "Christmas tree" with a nimous alarm cry of "timeo Danaos et dona ferentes." e new tariff, it said, was only a wooden horse, from ich the Chancellor himself would steal overnight and n the gates of the citadel of popular freedom to the ieging legions of reaction. What he really aimed it argued, was to procure the means of making the ipire financially independent, not of the Federal tes, but of Parliament itself. In vain did Bismarck e that, if reaction was his object, he could have easilyieved this in 1866 and 1871, but that an absolute ime was now impossible and unnecessary.* At the

* Speaking in the Reichstag on the 9th July (1879), the Chancellor :—"On returning from the war of 1866 it would have been easy for o say, 'Prussia has now expanded, her Constitution no longer suits her, must amend it;' in short, I was in a position to carry out the boldest most incisive policy of reaction with the success and etat which still shed to me from Königgrätz. But, as you know, I did the opposite, in doing so incurred the aversion of a large portion of my old political ids; it cost me a hard struggle to do the reverse of what they wished, sk for a bill of indemnity and to go on with the constitutional system. tlemen, I will not make myself better than I am. . . . I am no of constitutionalism; on the contrary, I hold it to be the only possible t of government, but if I had thought that absolutism in Prussia ld have better promoted the work of German unity, I should most dededly have counselled recourse to it. But after bitter struggles to over-
same time, in ruling with the aid of a Parliament, he "would not scruple to accept allies wherever he found them."

And, true to this maxim, he sought for auxiliaries in the Ultramontane camp. With the aid of the Conservatives alone, it was impossible for him to storm the fortress of free-trade. The National Liberals, on the other hand, who had staunchly stood by him on many a hard-contested field, were now shaken in their courage and loyalty when confronted with this disagreeable and ugly bit of war-work; so his only alternative was to ask for volunteers from the ranks of the Clericals. The Ultramontanes and the "Ultramaritimes," as we have seen, were held to be equally hostile to the German conception of the State; but on certain points they were also opposed to one another, and Bismarck was quick to profit by this antagonism. "Be friends a while," he said to the soldiers of the Pope, "be friends a while, and both conjointly bend our sharpest deeds of malice on this town"—to "wit, of Manchester, and its pernicious apostles among us." Nor did the Clericals turn a deaf ear to his recruiting Cajoleries. Still, their offer to form part of the Chancellor's storming-column was anything but disinterested.

Negotiations were at this time pending between Berlin and Rome, with a view to ending the "Kulturkampf," and Dr. Windthorst thought it might be worth come influences that were dear to me. I came to the conclusion that we must continue on the path of constitutional law."
to try the experiment of inclining Bismarck to
further diplomatic concessions to the Curia by the
− method of a little parliamentary
. In consenting, for the nonce, to
olled among the legislative troops of
ancellor, the Clericals seem to have
for granted that they would be treated, not as
ers, but as mercenaries, and receive their pay in
pe of "Canossa coins;" nor was it in the interest
r generalissimo to disabuse them of any illusion
ay have cherished on this score. But, apart
nis, it happened that most of the Clericals repre-
industrial districts, which were naturally eager to
he promised blessings of protection; so that, with
factiousness, they could not very well dare to
their habitual tactics of opposition in a matter
after all, was of much more concern to their
 rents than spiritual and religious interests. For
is the man who, seeing his factory and his fane
aze, shall first seek to save the temple of his
? Of this nineteenth-century truth, alas!
y was made vividly aware by a long interview
r. Windthorst now had with Bis-
− the first words these implacable
ries had exchanged in private for
long years. Windthorst's ostensible motive in
on the Chancellor was to intercede with the
in a pecuniary sense, on behalf of the dowager
of Hanover;* but soon thereafter the "Pearl of
result of this negotiation was that the Prussian Government

\textit{The Clericals hope to be paid with "Canossa coins," and Bismarck destroys not their illusion.}

\textit{The "Pearl of Meppen" is entertained by the Chancellor.}
Meppen" was the guest of honour at one of the Prince's parliamentary soirées, when there could be no longer any doubt that the Clericals had joined the Chancellor's storming-column, and that the Fortress of Free-Trade was doomed.

It were too tedious to detail the incidents of the assault—to describe the gallant defence made by the defenders, and the causes of confusion which sometimes unsteadied, and even stopped, the storming-column. Of the floods of eloquence employed by the opponents of the new tariff, the distilled essence was two pellucid drops of argument—one political, the other economical. In the first place, they contended, it was despotic and reactionary, as calculated to give the Government too much financial power; and secondly—but are all their reasonings from the economic point of view not to be found in the penny pamphlets of the Cobden Club? The Chancellor's standpoint we have already in general terms described. Whether his speeches teemed with economic fallacies, the future results of his protectionist policy alone can show; but it was admitted on all hands, at least, that he displayed an acquaintance with the bearings and technicalities of his subject which was truly surprising.

readily agreed to pay the widow of the dethroned and deceased King George V., her stipulated dower of 180,000m. (about £3,000) a year, and each of her daughters 30,000m., out of the sequestrated moneys of her husband—an act of complaisance on the part of Prussia which Bismarck must have been all the readier to recommend, as knowing that it could not but favour to some extent the success of his recruiting operations in the Clerical camp.
in one to whom this subject was next to absolutely new.*

By offering the landed interest acceptable duties on grain, wood, and cattle, Bismarck had little difficulty in combining the Conservatives and Clericals to support his protective taxes in favour of industry; but the question of the merely financial dues on such articles as tobacco, petroleum, and coffee threatened at one time to explode the alliance between these two parties, as it had already split the National Liberals, and to imperil the whole of his new tariff. It was to the tobacco-tax that Bismarck mainly trusted for such an increase of revenue as would enable him to carry out his policy of financial reform; and this was precisely the tax which the Clericals wished to lower by more than a half, while refusing altogether to raise the dues on coffee and petroleum. But in assuming this negative attitude, the Clericals were seemingly much less influenced by consideration for the welfare of consumers, than by apprehension for the budget-rights of the people.

Nominally, the Imperial Parliament had the right of granting supplies; but, as the ordinary sources of revenue were fixed by law once and for all, this right was in reality restricted to the power of apportioning the yearly deficits among the Federal States, or in other words, of voting

* "Gentlemen," said Bismarck (21st Feb., 1879), "I should be proud if, as is alleged, I had had 'economic tendencies' of this kind in 1862 (the year of his entrance into office); but I must confess, to my shame, that I had none at all."
the "matricular contributions." Now, if the Reichstag granted Bismarck such new taxes as would render the Empire independent of these contributions, what would become of the partial, but yet effective enough, fiscal rights hitherto exercised by Parliament? And thus there arose the burning question of what was called the "constitutional guarantees," that is to say, the question as to how the Chancellor proposed to compensate Parliament for depriving it of its partial power of granting yearly supplies, and as to the pledges which the nation were entitled to exact that annual surpluses would not be disposed of in a manner prejudicial to the liberties or the domestic economy of the Empire. But had the Chancellor not promised that Imperial surpluses would be distributed among the various States, for the remission of their direct taxes? Yes, but the Reichstag wished to see that promise take the form of a legal guarantee, and the supporters of this demand were of two kinds: those who, while as devoted to the Chancellor as a bride to her betrothed, thought the bonds of love would be all the firmer if well secured by the clauses of a marriage-settlement; and those who, for ever suspecting the Chancellor of dark, ulterior, and despotic designs, would as soon have thought of entrusting him with the uncontrolled means of power as of exposing themselves to the artful enticements of the confidence-trick.

How, therefore, to solve the question of the "constitutional guarantees" was the problem which formed the most attractive, because popular and political, aspect
of the debates on the protective tariff. Of the various solutions proposed, Parliament had at last to decide between two. According to the first of these, which was brought forward by Herr von Bennigsen on behalf of that section of the National Liberals who had declared for the new duties, the Reichstag should have the right of fixing the yearly tax on salt and coffee, and any resulting surplus would then be distributed among the Federal States; while Herr von Frankenstein, on the part of the Clericals, proposed that the fiscal, like the protective, duties, should be assessed once and for all, and that whenever the revenue from the new customs and the tobacco-tax exceeded 130,000,000 marks in any year (the average annual income from customs had hitherto been about 109,000,000), the excess of this sum should not primarily flow into the treasury of the Empire, but into those of the various States, in amounts proportionate to their population. By the former of these methods, the "matricular contributions" would have been formally abolished, yet the budget-rights therewith connected still preserved—and in a more rigorous form—by the dependence of the Imperial Government on the annual will of Parliament for some of its best sources of supply; while the adoption of the "Frankenstein motion" involved the formal, but only formal, retention of the "matricular contributions," while not exposing the Imperial revenue to the risks of parliamentary diminution.

We will illustrate the meaning of the "Frankenstein
motion,” which stands as an historical land-mark in the field of German State-finance, by a few imaginary figures. Let us suppose that the Imperial outlay for any one year was 500 (millions always understood), and the total income 700, whereof 400 resulted from the new customs-duties and tobacco-tax. It would therefore follow, according to the Frankenstein device, that only 130 of these 400 millions were in possession of the Empire, and the other 270 in the treasuries of the Federal States, leaving the Empire with a total of only 430 to cover its expenditure of 500, and with a consequent deficit of 70 millions. Well, then, this deficit would, as before, have to be met by the matricular quotas of the States; but as we supposed them to have already received 270 millions from the Empire, it is plain that they would retain the balance of 200 millions for the relief of their own treasuries.

Such, then, is the cumbrous and roundabout way in which Parliament resolved to second the Chancellor’s endeavour to make the Empire financially independent, and which resembled the suspicious caution of a generous father, who, while willing to allow his scapegrace son a yearly competency to keep him from beggary, nevertheless insists on paying the same in weekly instalments through the hands of a solicitor. But form has never appeared to Bismarck of half so great account as essence, and so he assented to the Frankenstein guarantee as the lesser of two evils. On the ground of this guarantee
the Conservatives and Clericals effected a compromise by which the former consented to a slight reduction of the tobacco-tax, while the latter agreed to a considerable increase of the coffee and petroleum dues; and this achieved, the Chancellor's battle was won.*

But he did not harangue his followers on the walls of the captured citadel, and thank them for the courage and devotion which had enabled him to storm the Fortress of Free Trade. No. What he did was to read friends and foes alike a cutting lecture on the sin of oversubtlety in matters of constitutional form. To him, he said, the question (of constitutional guarantees), which had divided Parliament, was "one of bonnet blanc or blanc bonnet," and while breath was in his body he would never cease from his efforts to realise his simple ideal. "The story of Robert Bruce and the spider" would always serve to encourage him to carry out his task, and "whether he earned the love or hatred of his countrymen in doing so, was a matter to him of complete indifference."

Prince Bismarck's Protective Tariff may be regarded from three distinct and different points of view: (1), regarded as a scheme to protect and encourage native industry—that is, to improve the circumstances of capitalists and producers; (2), regarded

* The new Tariff Law was passed by 217 against 117 votes, the majority being composed of the Conservatives, the Clericals, part of the National Liberals (Bennigsen section), and the Alsace-Lorrainers, who now for the first time showed they were not a party of pure negation; while the bulk of the minority was formed by the Progressists, the Social-Democrats, and other permanent elements of disaffection.
as part of a general plan for bettering the lot of the poor and the working class—that is, consumers; and (3), as the corner-stone of a complicated State-structure of financial reform. But this complicated system of social and financial reform has been on its trial too short a time to enable us to judge of its soundness by its results; and before proceeding further on this line of our narrative, we prefer to wait until the process of experiment now going on shall have yielded the unequivocal fruits of experience. Like Bruce's spider, the Chancellor has made repeated efforts to reach the goal of his ambition, and, like Bruce's spider, he has repeatedly missed his aim—sometimes by the merest shade. He has hitherto failed to realise his "ideal of a tobacco monopoly," as he has hitherto failed to establish biennial budgets, and "to make the Empire stand upon its own fiscal legs." But, on the principle of "robbing Peter to pay Paul," he has already lightened the burden of taxation falling on the poorer classes in Prussia; and, after several most determined efforts, he has also succeeded in laying the foundation-stone of his edifice of State-Socialism in the shape of Government-directed institutions for insuring the working classes against the effects of accidents and indigence, as he has likewise inspired the poor with the hope that the State will one day recognise their "Recht auf Arbeit," and pledge itself to find all able-bodied men in work. Though the protagonist of quasi-autocratic rule, the Prince has constituted himself the friend and champion of the misera contribuens plebs, as
believing, doubtless, that the continuance of the one must to a great extent depend on the contentment of the other. But Europe is still following with curious eye the endeavours of the Chancellor's spider to fix its web on the opposite beam; Europe is still attentively watching, with an eager suspense, the course of the process by which, having already made his countrymen one and indivisible, he proposed to make them contented and happy, and unanimous in exclaiming with the poet—

"Wir wollen sein ein einig Volk von Brüdern,
In keiner Noth uns trennen und Gefahr."
CHAPTER XV.

CHARACTERISTICS.

In order to complete our biographical picture, it only now remains for us to focus the miscellaneous rays of light which have been shed by himself and others on the personal character of the man whose political career we have essayed to trace in the preceding pages. We do not know whether Bismarck, like Cromwell, would prefer to be painted with his warts; but, in any case, it cannot be expected that his contemporaries should have the means of producing a likeness which can only be made perfect by the employment of materials reserved for a more impartial and a less sensitive posterity.

There have been men of higher intellectual powers than Prince Bismarck, and men of greater physical endowments, but surely there never was any man in whom the mental and the physical were so largely and so equally developed as in the Unifier of Germany. What impresses every one on seeing him for the first time, is his air of vast bodily strength. Appearances are never more deceitful than when Bismarck and Moltke, the two main pillars of the Empire, were seen together. A stranger who had merely
read of their respective achievements, without deriving from art some familiarity with their features, would, on first beholding them, infallibly mistake the diplomatist for the soldier. In the tall figure, the broad shoulders, the thick neck, the grisly moustache, the bushy eyebrows, and the grim determined look of the Prince, he would at once be sure of the victor in three unparalleled campaigns; while the slender form, the studious stoop, the smooth-shaven face, with the pensive and magnificently poised head of the Count, would correspond with his preconception of the man who thought out the grand political plans which had been executed at the point of the sword by his Herculean companion.

And not only has Bismarck the body, but also the spirit of a soldier, as take the following testimony on the latter head, tendered by the Emperor when investing his Chancellor with the highest military order in His Majesty's gift, on the thirteenth anniversary of Sedan (1st September, 1881):

"To-day's anniversary, which recalls one of the most prominent events in the period of twenty-two years during which we have worked together, also reminds me that on this day, as well as during two wars, you stood by my side, not only as a highly-proved man of counsel, but also as a soldier, and that there is in Prussia an "Order for Merit" which you do not yet possess. It is true, this Order has a special military meaning, but nevertheless you ought to have had it long ago, for truly at many a grievous time you have shown the highest courage of the soldier, and you have also thoroughly and completely proved at my side in two campaigns that, apart from everything else, you have the fullest claim to conspicuous military dis-
tinction. I will, therefore, now make up for what I have hitherto neglected, by conferring on you the accompanying *Ordre pour le Mérite*, and that, too, with oaken leaves, in token that you ought to have had it long ago, and that you have repeatedly deserved it. Knowing, as I do, how much you are imbued with the spirit of a soldier, I hope it will gratify you to receive this Order, which several of your ancestors proudly wore; as I, for my part, derive satisfaction from thus bestowing this well-merited soldier's reward on the man whom God in His gracious providence has placed at my side, and who has done such great things for the Fatherland. I shall, indeed, be most heartily glad to see you in the future wearing the *Ordre pour le Mérite*.

Largely inheriting the instincts of a warrior ancestry and a military nation, Prince Bismarck is a soldier by nature, a statesman only by chance; and even his statesmanship is of the military order. Above all things, his figure is that of a very powerful fighting-man — a William Wallace or a Wallenstein; and no more perfect idea could be got of a mediæval knight in armour, terrible to foes, than when the Chancellor appears mounted on a heavy charger, in his shining cuirass and eagle-crested helm. He never allows his countrymen to forget that, though the highest civil-servant of the Empire, he is also a Prussian General of Cavalry; and Parliament is reminded of the predominating nature of the Government which it supports, when it is addressed by the Reichskanzler in the undress uniform of his regiment, with a sword at his side. Often in the course of his career, when crossed and thwarted, he has bitterly regretted that he did not enter the army when young; and talking once of the Duc de Gramont and the
shameful fiasco he made in 1870, he vowed he would have acted very differently in 1866 had things gone against him. "He would have at once joined a regiment," he said, "and never more let himself be seen alive again, to be flouted by the old wives of Berlin and pelted with their dishclouts."

When the Prince celebrated his seventieth birthday (1885), one very formidable contingent of his congratulators was formed by the Gens Bismarkiana, or Clan Bismarck, which had gathered from all parts of Germany to present the illustrious head of the house with an album containing the portraits of all these members of his tribe. The Chancellor said he was glad to see about him so many of those bearing his name in the King's uniform. They had all had the honour and advantage of serving, no less the Markgraves and Electors of Brandenburg, than the various Kings of Prussia, as well as the present German Emperor, with feelings of loyalty and obedience; and as long as the race of Bismarck continued to be represented by such men, it would be well with it. His confidence in the army, he said, was steadfast, and it was this trust which had supported him in the execution of his policy. Thought and action (Rath und That) must go hand in hand. The army might have had no warlike work to do for the last fourteen years, but still the officers of the German army were the best in the world, and powerful instruments for preserving peace; and he was proud to feel that he, too, was a Prussian officer.
But there is no Prussian officer who does not feel equally proud of him as a comrade, for, taken all round, there is probably no man of finer physique in all the German army. At a Court where the Princes are all tall, and some of the Generals look like giants, there is no one who outtaps or outweighs the honorary Colonel of the Magdeburg Cuirassiers. For he stands six feet two in his boots—and, though a septuagenarian, as straight as an iron rod—is broad in proportion, and when heaviest (in 1879) scaled close upon twenty stone.† The Chancellor's

* On one of the posts of the door of the study at Friedrichshain the height of each member of the Chancellor's family was solemnly registered on the last day of 1880 by the Prince himself; and the pencilled inscriptions, which are still to be seen there, are as follows, the measurements being given in centimètres:—Prince Bismarck, 6 ft. 2 in.; Count Herbert (his older son) 6 ft. 1¾ in.; Count William (his second son) 6 ft. 0¾ in.; Rantzau (Count Rantzau, the Prince's son-in-law) 5 ft. 10½ in.; Johanna (Princess Bismarck), "standing on tip-toe," 5 ft. 8½ in.; Marie (Countess Rantzau) 5 ft. 8 in. Thus we find that the average height of the six members of the family is slightly over 5 ft. 11 in.

† In 1883 a Kissingen newspaper published the following statistics of the Chancellor's weight, as taken during the few previous years at that watering place:—In 1874, 207 lb. (German); 1876, 219 lb.; 1877, 230 lb.; 1878, 243 lb.; 1879, 217 lb.; 1880, 237 lb.; 1882, 232 lb.; 1883, 202 lb. The English pound is equal to about 1 lb. of the German dito. Commenting on these figures, a note-writer in the Pall Mall Gazette remarked:—"In 1874, when the Kulturkampf was at its height, he weighed 207 lb. (German), rising gradually to 243 lb. in 1878, out of satisfaction presumably at the results of the Berlin Congress and his victory over Prince Gortschakoff, and even to 247 lb. in 1879, when he had secured Austria for an ally. The domestic squabbles of succeeding years, however, seem to have told upon him somewhat, for from the climax of 1879, he sank slowly to 232 lb. in 1882, and then, with a tremendous drop, to 202 lb. in the present year (1883). The loss of 30 lb. in a twelve-month is quite portentous, and calculated to agitate a nervous world even more than an article in the North German Gazette. But considering the international importance of Prince Bismarck's weight, ought we not to have bulletins concerning it more frequently—say, once a fortnight?"
CHARACTERISTICS.

growing bulk and obesity had begun to tell seriously on his health and power of work, but a new lease of vigorous life was granted him when, after long and heart-breaking search among drugs and doctors, he at last discovered his "Banting" in the person of Dr. Schweninger—a physician whom he rewarded with a chair at Berlin, in spite of a storm of protest from the Faculty against the appointment of a man whom they deemed unworthy to be in their midst, both on scientific and moral grounds. When questioned on the subject in the Prussian Chamber, the Minister of Public Worship was forced to admit that the Chancellor's "Banting" had once come into conflict with the criminal law, but contended that the services of the "nameless doctor," as he was called, "to the person of our leading statesman, were meritorious enough to make it possible for us to overlook his moral delinquencies." Ingratitude to his benefactors is certainly not one of the Chancellor's failings: and the Schweninger incident, more, perhaps, than anything else in his whole career, proved that, when his mind is made up, he is not to be baulked of his purpose by the mere wagging of the world's prudish tongue.

By a process of treatment which was as effective as it was simple—consisting mainly, it is understood, in the interdiction of liquids at his patient's meals—Dr. Schweninger succeeded in mitigating the various nervous and stomachic ailments which had begun to make life a physical burden to the Chancellor, as well as in restoring his frame to something like its previous
symmetry. Of that frame the most imposing feature is
naturally the head, which looks as if it had been rough-
hewn out of a rugged block of granite, and
firmly planted on a bust of iron. A cele-
brated sculptor at Berlin—Professor Fritz
Schaper—has modelled the Chancellor's bust according
to accurate measurements taken, and we cannot do better
than present our readers with the following remarks on
that work of art from the pen of a leading German
lithérateur: *—

"Apart from its conspicuous artistic qualities, this bust is dis-
tinguished by its perfect truth to nature. The sculptor succeeded in
inducing the Chancellor—who, with his manifold occupations, has a
well-founded and intelligible aversion to all artists, photographers,
&c.—to place himself patiently at his disposal for artistic purposes:
and thus he enjoyed the rare favour of being allowed to take precise
and detailed measurements of the Chancellor's head. The result is a
bust corresponding in every respect to its living prototype.

"Prince Bismarck's cranial formation is a very extraordinary one.
The head of our Chancellor, as its measurement shows, is by no
means so big as it seems to be, and in proportion to the rest of his
body is, indeed, rather small than large. Of uncommonly strong
development is the lower part of the frontal bone. Above the eyes
and the root of the nose the forehead forms itself into a most re-
markable protuberance, and then, receding pretty sharply, rises, and
forms, in its line to the apex of the skull above the ears, the segment
of a circle almost regular. The occiput falls away pretty abruptly" (and flatly), "and is of exceptional strength about where it joins the
neck. Of classic beauty of outline are the eyes and the profile of the
nose." (The high-cut, arching nostrils of the Chancellor give him
the appearance in photographs of having something like a retroussé
nose—with which, indeed, he generally figures in French and English

* Dr. Paul Lindau, in his "Berliner Briefe" (dated 6th June, 1885) to
the Cologne Gazette.
CHARACTERISTICS.

caricatures; but his nasal organ is of quite aristocratic form, though a trifle small, perhaps, in proportion to the size of his head.) "But most striking of all is the massive, clean-cut chin, which seems capable of splitting iron, and the bushy eyebrows of most unusual length and strength" (looking, indeed, almost like horns). "The lower half of the brow is deeply furrowed, the upper one remarkably smooth and shiny.

"I thought it would be interesting to bring the skull-formation of Prince Bismarck to the test of phrenology, and the result of my investigation was certainly well calculated to strengthen considerably the adherents of the much-contested doctrines of Gall and Scheve in their belief of this science. Some of their principles, indeed, were startlingly confirmed. According to Scheve, the knotty protuberance of the lower part of the brow, above the root of the nose and the eyebrows, denotes "objective sense," "sense of facts," "time-sense;" and he explains it to mean that persons with a strong development of this bump are particularly capable of estimating things and events in their true and unadulterated light. Likewise the (Chancellor's) sense of order, figures, and especially jest, is strongly marked. The upper portion of the brow recedes a little at first, but then assumes a strikingly vaulted form; and to cranial shapes of this kind, phrenology assigns the faculty of comparison (middle of the upper brow) and of deduction, and finally, the ideal-sense, enthusiasm, patriotism, &c. (highest and most forward part of side head); and these portions of Bismarck's head are of disproportionately strong development. On the other hand, the bump of veneration, top of the forehead, is but moderately marked" (the sculptor himself thinks otherwise); "stronger is benevolence, uncomumly strong is self-appreciation (S. haufig), and firmness is quite abnormally so. In these respects the configuration of Bismarck's head is quite extraordinary. Besides this, the occiput has two very prominent convexities about as high as the concha of the ear and these, according to the craniologists, denote love of children, as well as power of mental concentration on any particular object. But the cranium of our Chancellor shows perfect hollows where the phrenologists look for hope, love of praise, and the artistic sense. . . . Most strongly of all developed, therefore, in this wonderful head—to recapitulate briefly—are the sense for events and things, the faculty of deduction, firmness (of purpose), and love of children.

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"As accident would have it, when I entered the sculptor's studio, the three busts of Bismarck, Moltke, and Richard Wagner, confronted me in a row—truly three of the most marvellous heads that one can see anywhere—and beside which all others look more or less insignificant." (We may here remark, as the result of our own inquiries and examinations in the sculptor's studio, that Wagner had a much bigger head than either Bismarck or Moltke. What strikes one chiefly about Moltke's head, is its beautifully symmetrical form and perfect poise; while that of Bismarck is mainly remarkable for its rugged bulk and strength, and for its abnormal breadth above the ears. Neither the line from the chin to the crown, nor that from the nose to the occiput, is, said the sculptor, of phenomenal length. Speaking of heads generally, Professor Schaper expressed his preference for the proportions and form of Goethe's.) *

It is not too much to say that, in spite of all the qualities lodged in this wonderful head of Bismarck's, he never could have accomplished his work without that Herculean frame and iron constitution which have carried him beyond the allotted span of human life, while so many of his subordinates have been literally crushed to death by the burden of Empire-making. Minister after minister has gone to the wall. Diplomats have died of softening of the brain, and overwork has carried off many of his mere mechanical helpers; but, after a long life of superhuman care and toil, the master still walks erect, and is still ever found in the thickest of the fray. "Patriae inserviendo consumor" is a favourite motto of the Chancellor's (which he once wrote in an album); but there is no one of his age who

* A Berlin hatter once related, as the result of his phrenological experience, that, of all German tribes, the Mecklenburgers had the biggest heads; but that no Mecklenburger ever required so large a hat as the lord of Varzin.
has emerged from the political battles of the last five-
and-twenty years, so unscathed and unconsumed as
himself.

"If I were only to do half my duty," said Bismarck
once, in Parliament (March, 1877), "I should have to work
from ten to fifteen hours a day; and I did so, too, for a
long time. But there is a limit to the strength of the
strongest, and I can do it no longer." Once (in 1880)
he complained of being "dead-beat" (todt-müde), and in
recent years his physical decrepitude has been a favourite
theme for him to descant upon, especially when he found
it necessary to manipulate his parliamentary foes with
the prospect of his resignation. But with all his bodily
ailments he still gets through an immense amount of
work, and, however fagged out he may feel, the cheery
sound of the beater's hollo, to quote his own fable of the
wearyed huntsman, * never fails to inspire him with fresh
activity and zeal. But it is not merely work of the most
difficult kind ever performed that has failed to kill him;
he has survived a mode of life to which millions of
imitators would have long ago succumbed, for Bismarck
has probably been the hardest liver of his day and
generation.†

He has always been a great eater, a deep drinker,
and a heavy smoker. In his earlier days, indeed, he was

* See p. 427. ante.
† Says Dr. Busch:—"In April, 1878, one day at dinner he spoke of
himself as 'an old man;' the Princess interposed, 'Why, you are only
sixty-three;' and he rejoined, 'Yes; but I have always lived hard and fast;'
then, turning to me, added, 'By hard, I mean that I always did what I
had to do with all my might; whatever really succeeded I paid for with
my health and strength.'"
what the Germans call a "chain-smoker"—a species of the weed-consuming genus whose morning and night is connected by a cable of cigars, each link of which is lighted at the stump of its predecessor. Bismarck has related that in this way he has, for example, smoked all the way from Cologne to Berlin, a railway journey of about ten hours. "Happy man!" once sighed Gambetta to a friend who was talking to him about the German Chancellor; "Happy man! beer and smoke agree with him." He might have added that everything agreed with him, and that the more he drank the better he felt.

During the French war Bismarck related how he had once grown "all wrong in the inner man," and how even "two days' hunting and fresh air had done nothing for him." But at last, according to Dr. Busch, he hit upon a remedy—

"I went the day after to the cuirassiers at Brandenburg, who had been getting a new cup. I was to drink out of it first and handed it, and then it was to go round. It might have held a bottle. I held my breath, drank it out to the last drop, and set it down empty. I astonished them greatly, for they didn't expect much from men of the pen. But it was the Göttingen way. The remarkable thing, though perhaps there was little in it, was that I was never so right inside as in the four weeks after that. I tried to cure myself in the same way on other occasions, but I never had such delightful success again. I remember too, once when we were at the Letzlingen hunt with Frederick William IV., one of those puzzle-bottles of the time of Frederick William I. was emptied at a draught. It was so made that the drinker could not put the mouth of the horn, which might hold three-quarters of a bottle, to his lips, and yet he was not allowed to spill a single drop. I took it up and emptied it, though it was very dry champagne, and not a
CHARACTERISTICS.

ingle drop fell on my white waistcoat. The company stared when said, 'Another.' But the King said, 'No, there must be no more,' Ad the thing had to remain so. Formerly, seats of that sort were e indispensable passports into the diplomatic service. They drank e weak-headed ones below the table, then they asked them all sorts ' things which they wanted to know, and forced them to make all rts of concessions which they had no authority to make. They en made them sign their names, and when the poor fellows grew ber they could not imagine how their signatures got there."

"Once," said the Chancellor, "I never thought of he amount I was drinking. What things I used to o—the heavy wines, especially the Burgundies!" In is wild youth a mixture of champagne and porter used o be his favourite beverage, but gradually he improved n this potation. With a heavy drinking friend (Dietze) ear Magdeburg, "he had once, in five or six hours, shot hundred and sixty hares. After the sport was over, he ad been with Moltke, where he had tasted a new kind f drink, a sort of punch made with champagne, hot ea, and sherry, an invention of the great strategist."

Once he laid it down that "red wine was the natural drink of the North German," and he preferred o see his countrymen drinking honest brandy to auddling their heads with beer. "The wide-spread use of beer," he remarked, "is much to be deplored. Beer-drinking makes men stupid, lazy, and impotent. t is the cause of all the democratic pot-politics which people talk over it. Good corn-brandy would be better." So, suitin the action to the word, he asked his servant, after once returning from dining with the King (at Versailles), "to pour him out a glass of corn-brandy,
and then told us that a General, talking of drinks, had laid down the principle: 'Red wine for children, champagne for men, Schnaps for Generals.' About the same time some one suggested that Sauer-kraut was not wholesome, and the Chancellor said, 'I do not think so. I eat it precisely because I believe it to be wholesome. But, Engel, give us a Schnaps.' A couple of Germans living in Warsaw wagered a hundred roubles as to whether their Chancellor drank more wine or beer, and applied to him directly for a settlement of the point. 'His Highness,' replied his secretary, 'directs me to inform you that you are both right, as he is equally fond of good wine and good beer, and, with the exception of those days when he is ill, drinks the one as well as the other.'

Not his the heart that could be cheered by blue-ribbon liquors; not his the frame sustainable by the aesthetic cates of lily-worshippers. It is part of the man's attributes which have secured him the love and admiration of his countrymen, that in an age of dyspepsia and dainty pecking at hygienic dishes, their hungry Chancellor sits down to his meals like an Homeric hero, or a Saxon lord in 'Ivanhoe,' and feeds his faithful dog with his own hand from the trencher-remnants of his copious board. It is also interesting to learn that the chief representative of the 'one-man power' in politics is also virtually a 'one-meal' man. 'To-day,' he once said musingly during the French war, referring to the amount he had eaten,

* We quote this story from the Kurzer Warschowski.  † Busch.
CHARACTERISTICS.

'to-day a beefsteak and a half, and two slices of pheasant. It
is a good deal, but not too much, as it is my only meal. I break-
fast, certainly; but only on a cup of tea without milk, and a couple
of eggs; after that nothing till the evening. If I eat too much, then
I am like the boa-constrictor, but I can't sleep.”

And again:

“I see that I eat too much, or perhaps too much at a time. I
can't get out of the stupid habit of eating only once a day. Some
time ago it was even worse. I used to drink my cup of tea early in
the morning, and tasted no food at all till five o'clock at night. I
smoked ‘even on,’ and it did me a great deal of harm. Now my
doctors make me take at least a couple of eggs in the morning, and
I don't smoke much. But I ought to eat oftener, only if I take
anything late I am kept awake all night digesting it.”

An irreverent Frenchman once remarked that, “if
the Colossus ever died, it would be in consequence of a
colossal fit of indigestion;” and, indeed, the Chancellor
has frequently exposed himself to danger in this respect.
Once he remarked that he was very fond of “hard-
boiled eggs, though now he could only manage three,
but the time was when he could make away with
eleven.” “In our family,” he said upon another
occasion, “we are all great eaters. If there were many
in the country with such a capacity, the State could not
exist. I should have to emigrate.” And again, “If I
am to work well, I must be well fed. I can make no
proper peace, if they don't give me proper food and

* Writing to his wife in 1859, from Lazienki, in Poland, he testified
to the heartiness of his appetite: “Above-mentioned tea, which I just
lurk, consisted, by the way, not only of tea, but also of coffee, six eggs,
three kinds of meat, cakes, and a bottle of Bordeaux; and from the breach
which I have already, early in the morning, made in it, you would see that
he journey has not done me any harm.”
drink; that is part of my pay,"—which reminds one of
the reply of Clearchus to the envoys of the Persian
King—"that there was no one who would dare to talk
to the Greeks of a truce without first supplying them
with a breakfast."*

"My only objection to their house," wrote Bismarck
of his French colleague at Frankfort (Count Montessuy),
"is that there is bad eating and worse drinking in it."
And that no one is a better judge of good fare, may be
seen from the gastronomic disquisitions with which he
frequently treated his companions in France. Once,
speaking of his own preferences, "he came to talk of
caviare, the different kinds of which he characterised
with the feeling of an amateur." "In my young days,"
he said upon another occasion, "when I lived at Aix-
la-Chapelle,† I conferred a benefit on the inhabitants,
such as Ceres did when she revealed the art of agricul-
ture to mankind; in fact, I taught them how to roast
oysters."

But, à propos of agriculture, this brings us to speak
of Bismarck's devotion to everything connected with
that heaven-sent art. The Chancellor's Elysium is the
country. It is told how the tears came into
his eyes when, in one of his suburban walks
when at school in Berlin, he once more saw a plough.
"Believe me," said the Princess of her husband once,
with natural exaggeration, "a turnip interests him more
than all your politics." "I am quite home-sick," he

* Xenophon's "Anabasis," book ii., chap. 3.
† See p. 23, Vol. I.
wrote in one of his earlier letters, "for country, woodside, and laziness, with the indispensable addition of loving wives, and trim, well-behaved children." "What I like best," he once said, "is to be in well-greased top-boots, far away from civilisation." The sight of nature makes him happiest, and inspires him with his finest thoughts. Thus it was that his features assumed that nobly serious and almost prophetic expression which marks his portrait by Lenbach—one of the best extant.

"We were engaged in conversation," said the Prince to Dr. Busch, "and I happened to look upwards at a passing flight of birds. Suddenly Lenbach exclaimed, 'Hold hard! that will do capitally; keep quite still!' and so forthwith made the sketch"—which is regarded as betraying more of the inner soul of the man than any of the numerous other portraits of the Chancellor.*

We have already had incidental occasion to refer to Bismarck's athletic accomplishments—to his prowess as a fencer, his enduring strength as a swimmer, his graceful skill as a rider, and his triumphs in rural pursuits. But these were the passions

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* This portrait by Lenbach hangs in the National Gallery at Berlin; and another by the same hand was subsequently executed for Pope Leo XIII. See p. 368, ante.

† We might even have added his force as a pugilist, as will appear from the following story told by the Chancellor himself, according to Dr. Busch. "I was going home late one evening—it must have been in the year 1847—when I met a man who had had too much, and wanted to pick a quarrel with me. When I upbraided him for his offensive language I found he was an old acquaintance. I think it was in the Jagerstrasse. We had not met for a long time, and when he proposed to me to go to such-and-such a place, I went with him, though he had clearly had enough. After we had our beer, however, he fell asleep. Well, near us was a party
and amusements of his youth and middle age. It is true he may even yet be seen taking a constitutional canter of an afternoon in the Thiergarten, and with a seat, too, as firm and straight as the youngest cavalry lieutenant; but his Ninrode days are over, his taste for bodily feats is spent. What now delights him most is, in "well-greased boots," with sturdy staff in hand, to wander about among his woods and fields—noting the changing aspects of Nature and the progress of his agricultural operations, or the state of his numerous industries. For "he is at once farmer, forester, manufacturer, soldier, diplomatist, and parliamentarian; he owns and manages breweries, distilleries, and saw-mills, and means to turn paper-maker as well." *

As a consequence of these multifarious occupations, this close connection of his with the practical and material world, Bismarck has managed to preserve that

of people, one of whom had also had more than was good for him, as was evident from his boisterous behaviour. I was quietly drinking my beer. My being so quiet vexed him, so he began to taunt me. I sat still, and that made him only the more angry and spiteful. He went on taunting me louder and louder. I did not wish for a 'row,' but I would not go lest they should think I was afraid. At last his patience seemed exhausted, he came to my table and threatened to throw the jug of beer into my face, and that was too much for me. I told him he must go, and when he then made a gesture as if to throw it. I gave him one under the chin, so that he measured his length on the floor, smashed the chair and the glass, and went clean to the wall. The hostess came in, and I told her she might make herself quite easy, as I would pay for the broken articles. To the company I said, 'You see, gentlemen, that I sought no quarrel and you are witnesses that I restrained myself as long as I could, but I was not going to let him pour a glass of beer over my head because I had been quietly drinking mine. If the gentleman has lost a tooth by it, I am sorry. But I acted in self-defence. Should any one want more, here is my card.'"

* Dr. Busch
VEN balance of mind, the lack of which has prevented one of the most belauded statesmen and parliamentarians of his time from ever rising above the level of mystics and professors. In all the German Parliament there is no man who shows himself more at home than Bismarck in matters relating to agricultural and kindred interests, and many a Liberalist has come to woeful grief in the ash attempt to catch the Chancellor tripping in the field of farming or of forestry. If ever there was a man who found "tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, and sermons in stones," it surely was the lord of Varzin; who scruples not, moreover, to take Plattdeutsch lessons in political economy from his tenants and labourers, and to question the rustics on his property as Hamlet conversed with the gravediggers. And when he is worried with the cares of his office, his "Pomeranian Tusculum," as it has been called, rises up before his mind's eye like a soothing vision.

"This is the first time for many a day," he once said, "that I have had a couple of hours' sound and satisfying sleep. I used at first to lie awake full of all sorts of thoughts and troubles. Then Varzin would suddenly come up before me, perfectly distinct in the minutest particulars, like a great picture with even all its colours fresh—the green trees, the sunshine on the stems, the blue sky above. I saw every individual tree. I struggled to shake the thing off, but it came back and worried me, and when at last I ceased to see it other things came in—reports, notes, despatches, and so on, till I fell over about morning."

And in this connection we may here quote from the
same authority what the Prince said upon another occasion, with reference to his habits of mental work:—

"Even as a child, and always since then, I have gone late to bed, seldom before midnight, then I usually fall over quickly, but I wake up soon after to discover that it is hardly more than one or half-past, and all sorts of things come into my brain, especially if any injustice has been done me. I have to turn them all over. I then write letters and despatches, naturally without getting up, in my head. Formerly, shortly after I was first made Minister, I used to get up and write them down. When I read them over in the morning, they were worthless, mere platitudes, trivial confused stuff, such as you might find in the Gazetted (of Berlin). I don't want to do this, and would much rather sleep. But thinking and speculating keep going on in my brain. When the first grey dawn begins to shine on my bed, I fall over again, and sleep straight on till ten o'clock and sometimes later."

This description of the Chancellor's mode of work may be supplemented by the minute picture presented to us by Dr. Busch* of his hero's habits in his Varzin retreat—that retreat to which the autumnal steps of ministers and diplomats are bent, as to the Mecca-shrine of modern diplomacy.

"His Highness devotes himself chiefly to seeking refreshment from overwork and friction in the rural repose and pure air of his Pomeranian home, occupying himself in his favourite pursuit of agriculture, and gratifying his ardent love of Nature. He does not wear here his usual town dress, a cuirassier uniform, but in the house a black suit, and white cravat with pale red and blue flowers, and out of doors a thick grey jacket and broad-brimmed hat with high crown. As is well known, he suffered for some years from sleeplessness, but he derived much benefit in this respect as in others from his stay at Gastein in the summer of 1877. This improvement

* "Neue Tagebuchblätter" (New Leaves from my Diary).
enabled him to rise during my visit much earlier than formerly. Soon after nine o'clock he would be out for a walk, accompanied by his knobbed stick and his dogs.

"The day passes somewhat as follows:—Between ten and eleven o'clock the Chancellor with his family and the visitors that may be staying sit down to an English breakfast. He himself usually takes a glass of milk and then one or two cups of coffee, with toast and two soft boiled eggs. Letters and telegrams are brought to him during the meal, and he then gives instructions how they are to be dealt with. Shortly afterwards business is transacted with the farmers, bailiffs, and woodmen of the estate. Between one and two o'clock a ride or a drive is taken in an open carriage. This is sometimes often extended far into the country, perhaps to look at a new farm building, a young plantation, or the progress of field work; at another time to be present at the fishing of one of the pools, or to pay a visit to the wood paper mills, but very frequently the object is merely exercise and fresh air. Visits to or from neighbours are the exception; possibly political differences may account for this.

"Previous to the Prince's stay in Varzin in the summer and autumn of 1877, he could not bear the fatigue of much riding, particularly at a gallop. But the benefit derived at Gastein strengthened him, too, in this respect. In the October days of that year—the time to which my description relates—we took a circuitous drive over wood and field round a great part of the estate. The Chancellor, with Count Herbert, accompanied us on horseback, frequently galloping considerable distances.

"The dinner hour is about half past five. The Chancellor feeds his two dogs from the table with his own hands, and the sight of this suggested to me pictures of Woden with his two wolves. . . . After dinner, a cup of coffee is taken in the billiard-room, where the Prince, as has been mentioned, usually sits smoking a pipe in front of the fire, which he occasionally replenishes with a log from the basket standing near. At about ten o'clock tea is served in the Princess's boudoir, of which during my stay the Prince did not partake, preferring a glass of milk; and at about half-past eleven the family retire to rest.

"It may be mentioned, finally, that the Prince's table is provided almost exclusively with what has been reared, grown, and killed upon
his property. 'Almost everything eaten here,' said the Prince to me one evening, 'comes from my estates—meat, game, vegetables, fish, peaches, artichokes, and walnuts. I am obliged occasionally to buy a sheep from one of my tenants, and my family is not large enough for me to kill my own beef. I get that from Ditzte, who employs so many people in his sugar refinery.' . . . Though he has for some time past abandoned outdoor sports, leaving these to his sons, he is as fond as ever of wandering about his park, which well justifies his inclination. It is as extensive as it is beautiful, presenting the most varied and attractive scenes. Splendid beeches, oaks, and, in some places, groups of red bark firs rear their tops above the underwood of the hills or the grass and moss of the gentle declivities. Winding paths over hill and dale lure the rambler on, and make him forget fatigue. Occasionally one emerges on a carriage road affording a view of a distant wooded hill. On the edge of that portion of the park adjacent to the grubbed-up wood before referred to, conspicuous by its dark grey furrows, is a large waveless lake, with rushes and water lilies, in which tree summits and clouds are reflected with remarkable vividness. Here and there a bench fixed on the mossed and sheltered side of a fine beech invites to rest and meditation. The Prince knows every large tree on the place. He seems to have made himself acquainted with every inch of his territory. The night, the moon and the stars, too, not unfrequently witness his wanderings, and we may well imagine that, in such undisturbed solitude, many a pregnant thought has arisen within him, to be afterwards carried into action for the benefit of us, the people whom he so wisely leads. He often spoke to me of his observations and reflections in his park. One day he pleasantly described how he had watched his daws teach their young to fly, how he had then seen them lead their little ones to the neighbouring field to their wormy diet, and how ultimately they went like grand folks, to spend their winter in the town, in the towers of Stolp and Seldaw.'

"In the public-house of Varzin live the police sent from Berlin to protect the Prince from attempts on his person. It need scarcely be said that Varzin has telegraphic connection with the capital, and a postmaster, through whose hands in a recent year no fewer than 630,000 letters and packets and some 10,000 telegrams passed.

"The Prince being accustomed to regard Varzin as a place for holiday and change of air, it might have been hoped that the world
would have left him as far as possible at peace during his stay there. But this is by no means the case. 'You would scarcely believe your eyes,' related one of the Prince's suite to me; 'it is enough to terrify one, the sight of the load of letters with which an officious public try to rob him of his summer holiday.' In vain did a notice appear in all the journals, deprecating the continuance of these troublesome communications. This only seemed to augment them, and the subjects dealt with were almost as numerous as the envelopes. Every device was employed to induce the Chancellor himself to open these letters. They were registered, they were marked 'to be personally opened,' or 'important contents—please to read yourself.' Sometimes such correspondents addressed themselves to the Prince's secretary, beginning thus: 'I am well aware that you have little time, and that his Highness has still less, but I venture to hope that as an exception you will favour me with your attention.' This evil gradually took such appalling dimensions that the Prince felt necessitated to issue a public order declining to receive all private letters not evidently emanating from relations or particular friends."

Having thus fortified himself against epistolary beggars, the Prince found it equally necessary to take measures against the personal importunity of bores. "On the same side of the passage," continues Dr. Busch,

"we noticed a mysterious looking little gate, from which a spiral

*Says the well-informed writer of "Prince Bismarck, by one of his own Countrymen" Rudolph Lindau: "The begging letters received by a man like Prince Bismarck may be literally reckoned by thousands. Some time ago, when the Chancellor was ill at Varzin, all letters addressed to him, which were not of a strictly private character, were sent back to Berlin, to be there read and answered. The greater number of these letters contained 'most humble requests'—germane to the business of the Prince, who, however, could not possibly have any claim on the Prince. One of the officials whose business it was to read these petitions—an orderly man, and apparently a master of statistics—amused himself by drawing up a list of all the requests for money only. They amount to half a million sterling! The Prince did not laugh when he was told this, but he shrugged his shoulders with a look of bitter contempt."

II J
staircase descends into the darkness below. 'Is that the dungeon!' I inquired. 'My door of escape,' replied the Prince. As he afterwards explained, it enables him to beat a retreat when suddenly threatened with an unwelcome but not-to-be refused visitor. . . . In what way the Prince evades other undesirable visitors, the following example will show. When I shook hands with him in the breakfast room on my arrival he said, after a pause, 'I was going for a walk in the wood when I heard your postilion's horn, and I thought—that comes another Magyar or Croat to have a political discussion and assist me with his proposals, and was just about to run away when I remembered we were to expect you to-day. One day a man came, who sent me word, on my declining to see him, that if he could not come in he would go and hang himself. I sent a message to say that if he could not help doing so I would have the newest and strongest rope fetched for him, but see me he should not. He then took his departure, without, to my knowledge, having done any harm to himself.'"

As a pendant to the above may be given the following story. An ambassador of one of the Great Powers—we mention no names—one day called on Bismarck, and, in the course of a rather long conversation, asked the Prince how he managed to get rid of troublesome visitors. "Oh, that is very simple," replied the Chancellor; "when my wife thinks any one is staying too long, she merely sends for me, and thus the interview ends." At that very moment a servant entered, and, bowing low, begged his master to favour the Princess with his presence for a few minutes. The ambassador blushed, as much as any diplomatist can or ought to blush, and at once withdrew, as gracefully as possible in the trying circumstances.

But Varzin is not the only country-seat to which Bismarck escapes whenever he can. He has another rural
CHARACTERISTICS.

The forest-estate of Friedrichsruh, situated on the railway line seen Berlin and Hamburg, was the Emperor William's gift to the necllor. After the arrangement with the Landtag of Lauenburg, it been assigned to the Emperor as his personal property. Immediately taking possession of it, in 1871, the Emperor gave it to Bismarckoken of his gratitude for the services rendered him by the Chan-. When Bismarck in his turn took possession, he found that the teau of Friedrichsruh, and a cloth manufactory on the premises, were private property of some one else, so he purchased both to make hiserty complete. Friedrichsruh stands close to the main line been Berlin and Hamburg, and yet it is as tranquil a solitude as if were situated in a remote corner of the Empire. The house initied by the Prince is close to the railway-station, and is surrounded in a regular wall of red brick. A short carriage-drive leads directly the station to the mansion gates, which are by no means ingle. In front of the house is a well-kept lawn planted with nsal trees, and surrounded by paths thickly strewn with sand and dust. The building consists of two large wings meeting at right ses, at the back of which there is a verandah looking out upon a d, green meadow encircled by the forest. Although the woods wild, they impress the visitor with the idea that the house is ated in the centre of an English park. As yet gardeners have or nothing to do with the surroundings of Friedrichsruh, ch are wholly entrusted to the care of the forester. It is difficult ive the reader an idea of the general appearance of Prince Bis-

* From the pen of a writer in Unser Zeit for October, 1884.

66 2
Prince Bismarck.

marck's house, the extreme simplicity of which is quite astonishing. Our first impression was that what met our eye was rather the ample home of a forester, and that we should have to go further to find the so-called Château. Prince Bismarck has added to the original building, but without much regard to symmetry or architectural beauty.

"On entering the house we are surprised to find that all the walls and ceilings are simply whitewashed; no wall paper, no stucco ornaments, not even a coloured border to make the rooms and corridors look warm and comfortable. The furniture looks bleak and uninviting on this cold background, and some of the articles are of more than classic simplicity. The impression we received was that the members of the Bismarck family have not been able to make up their minds to indulge in comfort of any kind which they do not consider due to their guests. The rooms which they above all use are cold and uninviting, the only luxury they contain being thick carpets, as in every other part of the house. Entering by the large door we first come to a small ante-room, at one side of which is the wardrobe, at the other the butler's room. Walking straight on, we enter the large ante-room, leading into a small chamber, the audience-room of the Chancellor, one of the best-furnished apartments in the house. The first object that meets our eye is the portrait of the Earl of Beaconsfield, a chalk-drawing, dated 1878, under which Bismarck has written the British Premier's name in a large, firm hand. On the opposite wall hangs a French portrait:

* See p. 97. *ante. Describing a visit made to Friedrichshuh by the members of the "Conference for the Reform and Codification of International Law," held at Hamburg in August, 1885, one of their number wrote to The Times: "It will gratify members of the Primrose League to know that, on turning from the modest entrance-hall into the reception rooms, the first thing that strikes one's eye is a portrait of Lord Beaconsfield; opposite to it hangs that of M. Thiers. Portraits of the Emperor, the Prince himself, the Princess, their three children—Counts Herbert and Wilhelm von Bismarck and a married daughter—and some old family portraits, among which that of the Prince's great-grandfather, a typical country gentleman, with fowling-piece in his hand, is noteworthy, decorate the walls; and among the articles of furniture are many interesting souvenirs of the great events connected with the unification of Germany.

Frederick the Great appears to be a hero of Prince Bismarck's, if one may judge from the fact that several representations of him are on the walls. The only battle-scene that I observed was a painting of a charge at Mars-la-Tour, in which the portraits of the Chancellor's two sons are co-
CHARACTERISTICS.

Thiers, d'après le tableau de M. Bonnat.' In a corner we find his bust in bronze, almost concealed under an enormous laurel th; above it an oil painting of Cardinal Prince Hohenlohe. On mantelpiece stands a very good cast of Schlüter's statue of the ser Kurfürst, and a small plaster cast of the equestrian statue of Charlemagne's original portrait is supposed to have been discovered. The room also contains a cabinet full of rifles, a case with maps, two chairs, and a small round table. Every room used exclusively by the master of Friedrichsruh produces an imposing impression, as if not one thought had been given to external appearances, and necessity and practical use were all that was taken into consideration. The rooms in which company is kept show a more careful hand and a more aesthetic mind. One door in the audience-room opens into the study of Count Rantzau, the Chancellor's son-in-law. It is furnished like the rooms of German squires who have spent a couple of years at a University, and is a mixture of the learned and the agricultural.

Another door in the audience-room leads to Prince Bismarck's apartments, the first of which is the library, containing books of subjects of general interest, and presenting by no means the aspect of a bookworm's favourite 'den.' The Prince's study is a large room, with several mahogany tables, well able to bear loads of manuscripts and documents. The windows look towards the south, and close to them stands an enormous writing desk, with an uncomfortable chair that has no back to it. A bronze quill, blue sand, and paper, are the only implements, besides a steel nibs. In a corner of the window-recess, just opposite Chancellor's seat, stands a bureau, above which hangs the underor's portrait. At the other end of the room, where the light of the windows does not well penetrate, stands several couches and chairs, in which Bismarck loves to rest, with a pipe in his mouth, deep thought on his earnest brow. The walls of this sanctum decorated with portraits of the Chancellor's only daughter, Princess Rantzau, Princess Bismarck, and Counts Herbert and Liman. In a dark corner stands a small card-table, which Bis-
marck brought home from the Franco-German war. On it was
signed the Preliminaries of Peace between Germany and France,
February 26, 1871. The next apartment is Bismarck's bedchamber,
which is furnished with still more simplicity than the two rooms
leading to it. The walls are ornamented with several family portraits,
and a comfortable couch is the only superfluous piece of furniture in
the room. To the English eye, perhaps, the large quantity of
feathers in the four-poster would not seem altogether indispensible.

"On the first and only storey of the house we find several well-
furnished and comfortable sleeping and sitting-rooms, reserved for
Prince Bismarck's guests. They have been occupied in turn by the
Russian Chancellor, Giers, by Prince Orloff, Count Schouvaloff,
Count Kalnoky, and many others. On the same floor are the rooms
of the brothers Bismarck, and the family Rantzau. The suite of
apartments in which Prince Bismarck lodges his guests is large and
luxurious, when compared with that part of the house which is
devoted exclusively to the use of the family. The dining-room can
accommodate thirty guests. Its walls are decorated with seven
landscape views of Friedrichsruh. The room also contains a very
handsome bronze statue of the Großer Kurfürst, the Emperor's
Christmas present to Prince Bismarck in 1880. In another large
room we find several pictures of Bismarck's ancestors. Among the
family portraits we noticed, with much interest, that of Bismarck's
mother, from whom, rather than from the father, he seems to have
inherited his indomitable will and greatness of mind. A small
portrait of Queen Louise, the Emperor's mother, in the exceedingly
low dress of the first Empire, is also very attractive. But what we
considered the most remarkable object in the whole house is a large
bronze cast of the Niederwald Monument, which stands on an oak
cabinet in the smoking-room, and to which is attached a sheet of note-
paper, with the following inscription in the aged Emperor's own
hand:—'Christmas, 1883. The keystone of your policy; a cere-
mony which was chiefly dedicated to you, and at which you could
not, I am sorry to say, be present.—W.'"

What with Varzin, Friedrichsruh, and Schön-
hausen, Bismarck has come to rank as one of the most
extensive proprietors of land in Prussia; and though his
CHARACTERISTICS.

503

ates are by no means unencumbered—for he still has pay about £6,000 a-year in mortgage interest—they've greatly increased in value under his Worldly circumstances. s income, therefore, is worthy of his high position. he annual revenue from the timber on his Friedrichsh- h estate—which mainly consists of the extensive chsenwald, or Saxon Forest—amounts* to about ,000; the agricultural produce of the same estate isirth nearly £1,000; the farms at Varzin bring in not s than £1,500; those at Schönhausen will return at st £1,000; and from his manufactories and other vestments the Prince is supposed to derive £10,000 rear. In addition, he receives as Imperial Chancellor salary of £2,700; and as a late Minister of Lauenburg, vious to its incorporation with Prussia, a pension of 50. Prince Bismarck's gross annual income, therefore, iches the comfortable total of considerably more than 0,000—a sum which in Germany would go somewhat ther than in England—and he may be said to owe nost every penny of it to the gratitude of his country. is Varzin estate he purchased out of the sum of £60,000 anted him, in 1866, after the Bohemian campaign; ile the Emperor presented him with Friedrichsrüth, rth a million thalers, or about £150,000, in lieu of further donation out of the French milliards.

From having, therefore, once been a very poor man, is now one of the richest men in a comparatively poor

* According to a writer in the St. James's Gazette, commenting on a report of an inquiry into the income of the Chancellor.
nation; and no one can accuse him, or indeed has ever sought to accuse him, of having amassed his fortune by unfair means. Greatness he has conquered, and wealth he has had thrust upon him.

Unlike some French statesmen, he has never indulged in the manoeuvres of the Bourse. He has confessed that once, and once only—it was before he became a Minister—did he turn his knowledge of State secrets to account by speculating in stocks, but with so little success that he never tried to repeat the experiment.* Once, indeed, he owned that he used to be very fond of cards, "especially when the stake was high, but high play was not the thing for the father of a family," and that he had even played twenty rubbers of whist, one after the other, for seven hours at a stretch. But even card playing he converted to the purposes of diplomacy.

"In the summer of 1865," he once related, "when I concluded the Convention of Gastein with Blome (the Austrian), I went in for quinze so madly that the rest could not help wondering at me. But I knew what I was about. Blome had heard that this game gave the best possible opportunity for discovering a man's real nature, and wanted to try it on with me. So I thought to myself, here's for you then, and away went a few hundred thalers, which I really might have charged as spent in his Majesty's service. But at least I thus put Blome off the scent, so he thought me a reckless fellow and gave way."†

We have said that the Prince has never sought to subordinate his private interests to his State policy, and we may add that his domestic life has always been

as pure as his public acts have been patriotic. Slander and suspicion, ever busy with his political motives, have never turned their foul breath on his private character. Once, indeed, the gossips thought they had at last caught him in their toils, but their malicious glee turned out to be as short-lived as it was ill-founded. Chancing once to meet Madame Lucca, the prima-donna of the Berlin Opera, at Gastein—it was after Bismarck had negotiated the Convention of that place (1863)—this lady, with the chartered freedom of her class, proposed to "His Excellency" that two such celebrities as they should be photographed together. His Excellency good-humouredly consented, and the likeness of the heterogeneous couple went forth with the inscription: "Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst" (Life is earnest. Art is gay). The voice of scandal at once grew busy, and one of Bismarck’s apprehensive friends (André von Roman:* took the liberty of asking him for an explanation of his unconventional conduct. With all the pleasure in the world, thought Bismarck, who at once replied (26th December, 1865):—

"As for the Lucca photograph, even you would probably think less severely of it, if you knew to what an accident it owed its origin.

* Once in the Reichstag, 14th February, 1883, a deputy (Dr. Dohrn) referred to an agitation for the German colonisation of Paraguay as being mainly fomented at Stettin by "a bankrupt land-owner, André Roman by name." (Commotion on the Right, among the high-old Conservatives.) Herr v. Kleist-Retsow: "This André von Roman is a friend of mine, and it is a calumny to call him a bankrupt land-owner." Dr. Dohrn: "Then I withdraw the expression, as being evidently based on inaccurate information."
Besides, the present Frau von Rahden" (her married name), "though a singer, is nevertheless a lady to whom, just as little as to myself, objectionable conduct has never been imputed. But, notwithstanding that, had I, in a calm moment, reflected on the annoyance which this frolic was likely to give to many faithful friends, I should have stepped back from the range of the lens that was directed at us. From the circumstantiality with which I answer your questions, you will see that I look upon your letter as a well-meant one, and that I in no wise seek to raise myself above the judgment of those who profess the same belief as myself. But from your friendship and your own Christian principles, I expect that on future occasions you will recommend to my censors the practice of prudence and charity. We all have need of them. Though among the full number of those sinners who come short of the glory of God, I hope that His mercy will not take away even from me, among the doubts and dangers of my career, the staff of humble belief by which I endeavour to find my way; but this trust shall make me neither deaf to the censorious words of friends nor angry with unaffectionate and vain-glorious criticism."

We are rather inclined to think that the feminine nature—in any of its aspects—never had very much attraction for Bismarck, and certainly, at least, his policy has never run the risk of being ruled by the wiles or the wisdom of a woman. As one writes who enjoys a good opportunity of judging:

"His domestic life has been thoroughly pure, and it is well known by all who surround him that he shows unflinching severity towards all breakers of the seventh commandment. While indulgent to most youthful extravagances and frolics—of which his own early days were full—he cannot tolerate libertines, who seem to inspire him with a natural antipathy bordering on disgust. Though always

* "Prince Bismarck, by One of his own Countrymen" (Councillor of Legation, Herr Rudolph Lindau, of the German Foreign Office, in Blackwood's Magazine for August, 1878.
kind and courteous in female society, Bismarck has never distin-
guished any of the numerous beauties he has met in his life so as
to justify a suspicion even that he paid special attention to any
woman, still less that he courted any. He has had affectionate and
respected female friends among whom the Grand Duchess Helena
of Russia must be reckoned—but the only women who, to all
appearance, have found and retained a place in his heart are his
mother, his sister, his wife, and his daughter.

"His love for his wife and children is very great, and these
attend on him and take care of him in a way which shows that the
deepest affection unites them to the head of the family. They look
on all those who bring hard work, trouble, or anxiety to the Prince,
as personal enemies; they protect his sleep, his rest, his leisure
even, as the most precious thing in the world. When he is ill, they
nurse him with untiring care; his slightest wishes are respected
laws; they enjoy his pleasures; and if any man has succeeded in
amusing the Prince, or even in making him smile, you may be
sure that the Princess and her children will thank him as though
he had done them a personal service.

"As for the Prince, he has during his life given constant proofs
not only of true and honest love for the wife he has chosen and
the children she has borne him, but also of a delicate, and, one may
say, chivalrous tenderness towards them. Years have made no
change in this. Every one who has been admitted into the intimacy
of the Bismarck family is able to judge of the affectionate, and, at
the same time, dignified character of the relations between the Prince
and Princess.

"Princess Bismarck has preserved all the simplicity of her
youth. She is a perfect specimen in the best sense of the word—
of the German Hausfrau (housewife). She is very quiet, bears her
honours as the most natural thing in the world, holds fast by the
old friends of humbler days, and has but one great object in life
to make her husband and children happy. She cares for them
in a peaceful, motherly way; and her serenity and patience, which
have always secured for Bismarck a quiet home, have certainly
contributed to his success through life. 'She it is,' he once said
to a friend, 'who has made me what I am.'

"Sometimes, when he is sitting among his personal and intimate
friends—he has, besides his family, some five or six of these—free
from all restraint, smoking his long pipe, patting the head of his huge dog, attending listlessly to a conversation going on around him in subdued tones, there passes over his cold face a something like a soft transparent veil, behind which his hard features relax and assume an unlooked-for expression of wistful sadness. . . . Though one of the most matter-of-fact men the world has ever known, he carries within his breast a hidden vein of deep feeling: and though that feeling is certainly not of the kind which gives birth to morbid sentimentality, and it is difficult to believe that young Bismarck ever addressed complainings to the moon, still it enables him to feel keenly all that a sensitive heart has to endure during the passage through life."

This sensitiveness even extends to sympathy with the lower animals, especially such as form part of the Chancellor’s household. Once (in 1877) when a favourite dog, “Sultan,” was dying, Bismarck watched beside his poor attendant with such an appearance of deep sorrow, that his eldest son at last endeavoured to lead his father away. The Prince took a few steps towards the door, but, on looking back, his eyes met those of his old and faithful friend. “No, leave me alone,” he said; and he returned to poor “Sultan.” When the dog was dead, Bismarck turned to a friend who was standing near, and said: — “Those old German forefathers of ours had a kind religion. They believed that, after death, they would again meet in the celestial hunting-grounds all the good dogs that had been their faithful companions in life. . . . I wish I could believe that.”

As another instance of Bismarck’s sensitiveness and sympathy with the misfortunes of others, may be quoted
the letter which he addressed to his brother-in-law (Oscar von Arnim, 16th August, 1861), on hearing of the death of his favourite child:

"I have just received the news of the terrible misfortune which has befallen you and Malwine. My first thought was at once to come to you, but in wanting to do so I overrated my powers. Such a blow goes beyond the reach of human consolation. And yet it is a natural desire to be near those we love in their sorrow, and to lament with them in common. It is the only thing we can do. A heavier sorrow could scarcely have befallen you. To lose such an amiable and thriving child in such a way, and to bury along with him all the hopes which were to be the joys of your old days—sorrow over such a loss will not depart from you as long as you live on this earth. This I feel with you, with deep and painful sympathy. We are powerless and helpless in God's mighty hand, as far as He will not Himself help us, and can do nothing but bow down in humility under His dispensations. He can take from us all that He gave, and make us utterly desolate, and our mourning for it would be all the bitterer the more we allowed it to run to excess in contention and rebellion against His almighty ordinances. Do not mingle your just grief with bitterness and repining, but bring home to yourself that a son and a daughter are still left to you, and that with them, and even in the feeling of having possessed another beloved child for fifteen years, you must consider yourself blessed in comparison with the many who have never had children nor know a parent's joy. I do not want to trouble you with feeble grounds of consolation, but only to tell you in these lines how I, as friend and brother, feel your suffering like my own, and am moved by it to the very core. How all the petty cares and vexations, which attend our daily life, vanish at the iron appearance of real misfortune! And I feel like so many reproaches the reminiscences of all complaints and covetous wishes, over which I have so often forgotten how much blessing God gives us, and how much danger surrounds, without touching, us. We should not attach ourselves to this world, and regard it as our home. Another 20 or, in the happiest case, 30 years, and we shall both of us be beyond the cares of this life; our children will have reached our
present standpoint, and find with astonishment that the freshly begun life is already going down hill. It would not be worth while to dress and undress if it were over with that. The thought that death is the transition to another life will certainly do little to alleviate your grief, for you may think that your beloved son might have been a true and dear companion to you during the time of your sojourn in this world, and would, by God’s blessing, have continued your memory here. The circle of those we love contracts itself, and receives no increase till we have grandchildren. At our time of life we form no fresh bonds capable of replacing those that fall away. Let us, therefore, keep the closer together in love until death separates us also from one another, as it now separates your son from us. Who knows how soon?

Like Luther, Bismarck is devoted to the comforts and exclusiveness of his own fireside, as he himself once wrote in the genealogical album of Count Stillfried (3rd March, 1869):

“Beatus ille homo
Qui sedet in sua domo,
Qui sedet post fornavem
Et habet bonam pacem.”

Which we may translate:

“Oh, happy is that man and blest
Who sits in his own home at rest,
Who snugly sits at his fireside
In tranquil peace whate’er betide.”

So fond, indeed, is he of his own fireside, that he never deserts it to enjoy the hospitality of others. It is long since the Chancellor has sat at the table of any host but the Emperor, and His Majesty’s wishes in this respect are naturally commands. The Emperor himself, each winter season, is
graciously pleased to honour with his genial presence the banqueting boards of the chief magnates of his capital; but his Chancellor never accepts such invitations, and breaks festive bread under no roof but his own. At no ball, or dinner, or diplomatic entertainment, or theatrical performance, is his towering form ever seen. As far, indeed, as the society of the capital is concerned, he might as well be dead. The Olympus-peak on which the Jupiter of European statesmanship sits enthroned is shrouded in a perpetual veil of mist. For these habits of social seclusion the Chancellor has his own good grounds, into which it is not the business of the world to pry. Considerations of health and physical comfort to some extent, no doubt, underlie his motives; but he, at any rate, of all others, has surely no reason whatever to dread any diminution of his fame from condescending familiarity with his fellow-men.

Nevertheless, though the mountain will not go to Mahomet, the prophet may, from judicious time to time, approach the mountain. For Bismarck himself is by no means averse from the exercise of that hospitality which he will not accept from others. But his hospitality takes a very peculiar form. Only once in the year, as a rule on the Emperor's birthday, does he give an official dinner to the chiefs of missions (without their wives); and it must be a very exceptional case, indeed, if any of these diplomatists has an opportunity of exchanging a word with the Chancellor, whether on business or pleasure, before the anniversary of the same day again
comes round. Yet the Chancellor rarely dines without one or two favoured guests, who are invited to share with him la fortune du pot; and serious talk, more than tedious ceremony, then gives the tone to his table. To deputies he is much more hospitable than to diplomats. If an ambassador wants an interview with the Chancellor, he must apply for it by writing, and have an hour appointed for the meeting; but, several years ago, Bismarck gave orders for the immediate admittance of any deputy who wanted to speak with him.*

In like manner, whereas diplomats are restricted to the enjoyment of only one annual meal at the table of the man whom they equally admire and dread, the delegates of the German people are the frequent guests of their Chancellor at what is called his parliamentary soirées and "forenoon-glass" (Frühchoppen) parties, which are nothing in reality but the continuation, on a lesser scale, of that Tobacco Parliament in which the business of the Prussian nation was exclusively conducted under the father of Frederick the Great. English members of Parliament are treated in well-assorted batches at a time to ceremonious full-dress dinners by the Speaker; but German legislators flock in one heterogeneous body to the Radziwill Palace, to be at once fed and instructed—to listen to the words of wisdom which fall from the lips of their host, and to form the actors in a scene well

* "Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, von Herr von Unruh;" sub. "Die Abgeordneten-Soireen bei Bismarck."
calculated to remind one of the revelling suitors of Penelope, who spent their days in eating up the substance of the "godlike, much-enduring man."

A scene of this sort has been so graphically described by an eye-witness, that we need not seek to do better what has already been done so well:—*

"As the term implies, these soirées are held during the session, and always in direct aid of some pending scheme of legislation, or in connection with the general policy for which the Prince desires to enlist the sympathy of the Diet. It is natural, therefore, that they should have an easy, democratic character, in the German sense. The guests are selected, formal invitations are issued, and black dress-coats are de rigueur; so much is due to prejudice. But they are not Buff parties or Blue, High Church or Low, patrician or plebeian, Radical or Conservative, free-trade or protectionist; are not a collection of either personal or political friends; are not the result of any partiality which could give them a marked partisan colour or shape. It is not enough that the aspirant to an invitation be a deputy, nor necessary that he be favourable to some particular measure. Friends are of course preferred to enemies; but, in addition to the converts whom the Prince wishes to reward, one may also see among the guests the men who are still doubting, though open to conviction; others whom it is impossible to convince, but impolitic to affront; and some even who are not members, not officials, and not connected at all, except by the tie of general interest, with political affairs. Journalists will be found hobnobbing with grave professors from the university. Art may have a representative in a painter who is about finishing the host's portrait, or an architect who has just won the contract for building improvements at Varzin. The family doctor, a general or two in stiff uniform, attachés of the foreign office, the cabinet-ministers, bank-presidents, country gentlemen—these and other varieties are to be met; but the greater number are

* "Some Traits of Bismarck," in the Atlantic Monthly for February, 1882, by Mr. Herbert Tattie—an American writer of much polish and penetration, who for several years represented at Berlin a prominent London journal.

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deputies, and the political interests of the session form, as already observed, the purpose and the key of all the proceedings. With a glass of 'Klosterbräu' one seems to swallow indigestible pamphlets on the railway project. The wine is flavoured with the tariff controversy, and persistent Liberals choked over the fish salad as they choked over the Socialist Bill, or other measures which were forced down their throat. The hospitality of the Chancellor and his family is nevertheless perfectly frank, generous, and indiscriminating. In so large a number of guests it is of course impossible that each one can be specially noticed, and, the entertainment being of a stern political character, the host is bound to make the most judicious use of his time. But the rooms are free, and the etiquette unconstrained. Excellencies are easy of approach, and converse affably on the political situation with obscure men who neither cast nor control a vote. The great buffet, temporarily set up in one of the principal rooms, is supplied with cask after cask of salubrious beer from Bavaria, and is visited with growing frequency as the evening wears away. A long table will be spread with a cold collation, and Germans have good appetites. Such of them, finally, as desire more gentle pleasures and are not above the weakness of gallantry, can stroll into the great Salile, made famous by the sittings of the Congress, and pay court to the Princess or the few scraggy dowagers about her.

"The most characteristic part of the feast is reserved, however, until late in the evening, after the ladies have been dismissed. Cigars are then handed around, but the Chancellor prefers a long Turkish pipe, which a discerning lackey will bring him at the right moment, filled and ready for use. The Tobacco Parliament is opened. Debate there is, indeed, none; for, although suggestions and inquiries may now and then be thrown out timidly by the listeners, the proceedings consist practically of a sustained monologue, which the Prince addresses to the group sitting near him in chairs, or standing farther away in a semicircular fringe about the chairs; nor are any formal conclusions adopted. There is nevertheless a well-considered method in the programme. Unable to speak without entertaining, the Prince has the art and the privilege of blending instruction with entertainment, the useful with the pleasant; and thus compels the most frivolous guest to pause at some grave practical truth, while laughing at incomparable jokes. Indeed, the kernel of the discourse is perhaps to be found only half concealed, in
the jokes themselves, or the stories. With him, these are something besides a mere rhetorical device. He not only puts his hearers in good humour by pleasureries, thus gaining a favourable ear for his cause, but he actually combines precept and illustration with such art, and in such proportions, that his hearers are already convinced, while they think they are only amused. That anecdote was not the setting of his proposition; it was the proposition itself. This pun is not an insignificant jeu d'esprit, but a vital truth, or a sophism which the Prince wishes to see accepted as a truth. And thus the last hour of the evening passes away. A score or more of admiring guests, in full evening costume, dimly visible through the smoke, listen to the words of a very unmilitary-looking giant in military clothes, who discourses of the tariff or the currency in a delightfully varied stream of humour, wit, and story; of illustrations from history and incidents from his own experience; of shrewd common sense, lofty political reason, and fallacies made attractive and almost respectable, until the morning hours begin to strike, the lackeys dare to yawn, and with a parting joke, washed down with a final libation, the circle is broken up and the lights extinguished."

Bismarck is probably the best table-talker of his time. His fund of stories is inexhaustible. After one of his parliamentary soièèes, the journals of Berlin overflow with all the fine things he said. At these receptions every man becomes a Bismarck as a table-talker. Boswell; and as the deputies leave his mansion long after midnight, they are waylaid by reporters, who implore the Chancellor's guests to repeat some of the wisdom-words which had fallen from the mouth of the master. But, as above remarked, his talk, as a rule, takes the form of monologue. It matters not whether his guests be officials of humble and obsequious mind, or ambassadors of the proudest and most independent Powers of Europe, the conversation is almost entirely
on one side—a timid and occasional suggestion may, indeed, come from the other—and the immense power which the Chancellor has acquired over the mind of his time is never more clearly betrayed than on occasions like these. Good breeding, it is true, forbids any man to be argued with and silenced at the head of his own table, but the guests of Prince Bismarck are never in any danger of transgressing this law. For they all come, not to speak, but to listen; and their silence is simply the effect of their conviction that a much better talker than themselves, and one well worth listening to, is in the room. All they have to do is to suggest topics, and the oracle holds forth, to their delight or their despair, till the subject is exhausted. When Herr von Bismarck represented Prussia at the Frankfort Diet, he once visited Prince Metternich at the Johannisberg on the Rhine, and on returning some one asked him how he had got on with the old despot. "Oh, charmingly," replied Bismarck; "I listened quietly to all his stories, only striking the bell every now and then till it rang again. That pleases these garrulous old gentlemen." And so it is precisely with all the guests of the Chancellor, who has now usurped the place of Metternich as the political oracle of his day and generation.*

One great feature of the Prince's talk is what may be called its contents. He gets through an immense amount of facts and ideas in a short time. His conversation has been compared to "condensed meat." During the Congress of Berlin, the correspondent of an

* See p. 129, Vol. I.
English newspaper was received by the Chancellor, who talked to him freely on all the topics of the hour. His journal at once published an account of the interview, which naturally attracted much attention, and it was taken for granted that the writer had repeated all he had heard. But as other questions cropped up during the next year or two, the correspondent recurred to his notes, and regaled the world with ever fresh revelations of the Prince’s mind. This, however, was too much for the envious journalists of Berlin, who began to wonder when their English colleague was to come to the end of his tether, and to hint that the public were being treated to the fictions of a strong imagination more than to the facts of a retentive memory. But then they had not taken into account the “condensed meat” quality of the Prince’s talk.

This same quality, moreover, distinguishes in a high degree the parliamentary speeches of the Chancellor, who, unlike some democratic statesmen we could name, has never indulged in “the polysyllabic art of saying nothing,” or in the intoxicating luxury of “government by gabble.” Bismarck never speaks for speaking’s sake, and when he says anything, he always means it. With him matter is everything, manner nothing. -His oratory is of the style of Mark Antony’s:—

"I come not, friends, to steal away your hearts;
I am no orator, as Brutus is;
But, as you know me all, a plain blunt man,
That love my friend; and that they know full well
That gave me public leave to speak of him.
For I have neither wit, nor words, nor worth,
Action, nor utterance, nor the power of speech,
To stir men's blood: I only speak right on;
I tell you that which you yourselves do know."

And, indeed, the Chancellor himself once paraphrased these words of the Roman Triumvir in describing his own manner of parliamentary speech:

"I have already pointed out that I am no orator. I cannot work upon your feelings, or render facts obscure by playing upon words. My speech is simple and plain."

It is hard to say whether Bismarck has squared his theory of public speaking with his own practice, or whether his practice be the studied result of his theory; but, in any case, we may quote a few of his own utterances on the subject of parliamentary eloquence. At Versailles, during the war, he remarked, in the hearing of Dr. Busch:

"The gift of eloquence has done a great deal of mischief in parliamentary life. Too much time is wasted, because everybody who fancies he knows anything will insist upon speaking, even if he has nothing new to say. There is too much empty loquacity, and too little is said to the point. Everything that has really to be done is settled beforehand in the "fractions," and the speeches in the House are delivered for the public, in order to show what you are capable of, and still more for the newspapers, in the hope that they may praise you. It will come to this—that eloquence will be regarded as a misdemeanour, and long speeches will be punishable by law. There is the Federal Council, now, which makes no display of eloquence, and yet has done more than anybody for the cause of Germany. I remember that at first it made some experiments in that direction, but I cut them short by saying: 'Gentlemen, there is nothing to be achieved here by eloquence or persuasive speeches
because every one of you brings his convictions along with him in his pocket, that is, his instructions. Oratory is only a waste of time. Let us limit ourselves to statements of fact.' And they did so. Nobody made a long speech after that, and so we got on quickly with our business."

Again, addressing the Reichstag (April 29, 1881), the Chancellor said:

"I appeal to your own experience. You have all, doubtless, felt that you know a good deal more than the best speaker amongst us. Perhaps even to-day you have firmly made up your mind to tell him so; but, just as you were about to have it out with him, he fell foul of some other deputy with such conspicuous vigour that you said to yourself, 'Perhaps I had better not tackle him to-day.' It is the same thing everywhere. The strongest wrestler, even in the field of oratory, worsts the others. But the orator is not always the best judge of politics. To be a good speaker, you must have the gift of improvisation. We have all of us often witnessed public entertainments—music, varied with extempore declamation—at which a subject with which the improvisatore was totally unacquainted was given to him, and he delivered such a brilliant oration upon it as, but for my entourage, would almost have succeeded in convincing me for the moment. All I mean to say is that we cannot—with open eyes, at least—confide the guidance of public affairs to masters of mere eloquence any more than to professional improvisers; still less can we trust to them as party leaders or Ministers. I only mention this in order to point out that eloquence is a gift which is now-a-days overestimated, and exercises greater influence than is its due. A good speaker must be somewhat of a poet, and therefore cannot adhere mathematically to the truth. He must be piquant and exciting—easily inflamed, that he may be inflammatory—wherefore, to my mind, a good speaker can but seldom be a safe statesman. Sensibility, not sense, must predominate in his nature; and I believe it incompatible with the physical constitution of humanity that any man should be at once a good speaker and a cool judge. Eloquence frequently, and to a perilous extent, outweighs discretion; but a man of cool reflection and sure, exact calculation, to whom the management of important business may be confidently entrusted, can scarcely
be an accomplished orator. Whether there be any remedy against the evils of eloquence in our present state of high civilisation, I know not; but it is half the battle to recognise those evils for what they are. . . . Let me warn you, therefore, against wasting so much time as heretofore upon exhibitions of eloquence in our parliamentary work, which gives us enough to do as it is. I repeat that speeches are useful as conveying information; but they must not be allowed to govern. The elector has a right to be represented by a person who is independent of eloquence, neither stimulated nor terrorised by it."

"When a man has the misfortune to be eloquent," he said upon another occasion, "he makes speeches too often and too long. . . . These eloquent speakers are like a good many gentlemen with small feet, who always wear shoes too small for them and stick out their feet to be looked at."

In spite of the sober theory of the rhetorical art above set forth, we are not quite sure that the Chancellor has not sometimes envied those of his parliamentary foes pre-eminently endowed with the gift of glamouring eloquence. And yet, if persuasiveness be the essence of this art, even Demosthenes can scarcely have excelled him much in producing an effect upon his hearers. For in listening to Bismarck every one must feel that it is not the mouth which is speaking, but the man. Conviction, being clearly and deeply stamped on every word he utters, communicates itself irresistibly to his audience. It is acknowledged that "la comparaison n'est pas la raison," but we know no example of any public speaker who ever reasoned so much, and so well, by comparison and analogy as Bismarck. His mind, indeed, frequently betrays a truly poetic faculty in clothing his ideas with the rich and
CHARACTERISTICS.

attractive robes of concrete images; and some of his similes, metaphors, and instances, in their telling aptness, are quite worthy of Shakespeare. But while moving at his ease in the realm of fancy, whence he draws the arrows of his argument, he is more at home in the region of facts, which furnish him with the thunderbolts of his own peculiar eloquence. And that eloquence has been well described by a competent judge: *—

"Bismarck lacks some of the qualities which are considered almost indispensable to an orator. He not only speaks slowly, he actually stops—at the beginning of his speeches, at least—at every third or fourth word; one might suppose he had to overcome some organic difficulty in pronouncing his words. He sways himself gently backwards and forwards, he twirls his thumbs, and from time to time he looks at a scrap of paper upon which he has put down notes before speaking. To one who did not know him well, he would certainly appear to be embarrassed—nay, even intimidated. But this is not the case. He takes due account of those who are listening to him, but he is probably less disturbed by their presence than any other public speaker. He puts heart and soul into his work, he wants to say all he thinks about the question, and he does not much care whether his way of speaking is pleasant or not. When he comes to a stop, his auditors feel that after all they have heard something worth listening to, and that every word Bismarck has used, and which he has taken so much pains to find, was the right one, bearing directly on the question. Somebody interrupts him; he does not retort quick as lightning, but after a few seconds—the time for weighing what he has just heard—there comes a crushing reply which falls heavily on the interrupter, and not unfrequently raises a laugh at his expense. After a while he warms to his work, and the conclusion of some of his speeches is very good, even from an exclusively oratorical point of view. The greater part of what he has said in debate reads well; it is full of sound common-sense and logic, and is utterly free from high-sounding, empty phrases. If what Bismarck

* "Prince Bismarck, by one of his own Countrymen," already quoted.
says were not good and forcible, no one would attend to him; but
generally what he says appears from the first so weighty that, though
he speaks badly, there is no orator more attentively listened to. And
this was the case even before he became a great man."

Indeed, whenever Bismarck rises to speak—or even
when he speaks sitting, as his physical ailments have in
recent years repeatedly compelled him to do*—the hall
of the Reichstag presents a memorable sight.

There is a general stampede of members
from the lobbies into the House, the hum
of conversation is hushed, a pin might be heard to fall,
and the deputies of all shades crowd up in front of the
Chancellor's seat with the seriously attentive air of
students of surgery watching their teacher performing
a delicate operation. It is curious to note the play of
countenance in his auditors as the Prince proceeds with
his speech, moistening his throat with tumbler after
tumbler of his favourite parliamentary beverage—a light
mixture of brandy and water, or Moselle. The Chancel-
lor's remarks may take the form of a disposition on the
fading doctrine of divine right, or of a dirge on his own

* During one or two recent sessions, indeed, his physical ailments
compelled him to abstain from attending the Reichstag altogether; and, in
allusion to one or two written communications from the Prince to the
House, one Opposition journal (May, 1883) twitted him with having, in a
disrespectful spirit of petulance, degenerated into a mere "corresponding
member of Parliament." "Why," asked the same journal, "could not Bis-
marck have himself carried into Parliament, as Appius Claudius and the
great Earl of Chatham both did?" To this the Chancellor's organ replied
that the Roman Censor was only blind, and the elder Pitt merely afflicted
with the gout—ailments which still left to both their victims the use of their
tongues; but that the Prince's neuralgic sufferings had positively deprived
him of the power of speech. Further argument on the subject of Bismarck's absence from Parliament was impossible.
failing powers, or of a cutting lecture on the sin of fractious partisanship. They may convey a most audacious reprimand of some malevolent Government, or a sympathetic appeal on behalf of the *misera contribuens plebs*. Perhaps, with his huge frame shaking with emotion, he may stride along the gangway, and, with threatening voice and attitude, demand to know who it was that hissed or interrupted him.\* Or he may raise his voice with the declamatory tones of an indignant peroration, and declare that he will thwart and combat the aims of Liberalism to his dying day. He may do all or any of these things; and even those deputies who scorn to swell the resounding peal of "Bravos!" that bursts forth from the Right, betray a bewildered sort of silent admiration for the Titanic force of character in the man whom they persistently oppose yet cannot do without.

We will complete this picture by the following description of Bismarck's habits and appearance in the Reichstag:†

"The Chancellor is not a frequent attendant in the Diet, nor even a regular one. To a foreigner the motives which cause his appearance, or his absence, seem often incomprehensible. He seldom announces his purpose in advance to his nearest friends, and inquiry of them proves invariably fruitless; yet with no apparent clue to guide them, except a vague opinion as to the course which discussion on any given day is likely to take, the public have an almost infallible instinct for the visit and participation of the Prince. The society of the capital seems charged, as by an electric current, with a subtle prescience of the event. Unfaithful deputies, whose faces are

\* He has repeatedly done this.

† "Some Traits of Bismarck," by Mr. Herbert Tuttle, already quoted.
seldom seen, slip into their seats at the sound of the President's bell: an adjutant or secretary from the palace listens as proxy in the name of the Emperor; the diplomats finger their gold-headed canes while they await the most consummate master of their art; the reporters look nervous and important; and from the general galleries a thousand eager eyes concentrate their gaze upon the Chancellor himself, or the place which he usually takes.

"Such an audience is very rarely disappointed. It may be early or late in the proceedings, the progress of which will have been faithfully reported to the Prince at his house, but at the critical moment—shortly before a vote, perhaps, or during the speech of some favourite adversary—a door in the rear of the hall swings open, and from a room behind the President's chair emerges a tall figure.

* It may be as well here to consider Bismarck as a public speaker from the shorthand-writer's point of view, and we are enabled to do this by the following extract from an essay on the subject by Dr. Raetzsch, a member of the official Stenographic Bureau in the Reichstag:—"The cry, 'Prince Bismarck is there!' generally creates a certain uneasiness at the official reporter's desk." (which stands beneath the Federal Council Bench, on which sits the Chancellor, who has, therefore, to speak over the heads of the stenographers). "It is not the speed with which he speaks that makes the reporters' task of taking down his words an especially difficult one—for there are swifter talkers than he—but Prince Bismarck speaks at a very unequal rate, and as a rule it is quickest at those very places which are most to the point. Not unfrequently, too, he interrupts himself with intermediate sentences; and he has a peculiar style of his own, with quite unexpected turns of speech; in addition to which he often interweaves quotations—sometimes in foreign languages—with his remarks, and occasionally, towards the end of a sentence, speaks so low as makes him difficult to be understood at our desk" (in his immediate vicinity). "The task of the stenographer is also hampered by the fact that during a speech of the Chancellor our table is generally surrounded by a crowd of deputies who interrupt the sound, and disturb our activity by their exclamations of praise or disapproval. And then the stenographer cannot altogether get rid of the feeling that he is working under the pressure of the weight and importance of what he is taking down, as well as under the consciousness that he is preserving the words of the man at whom all Europe is looking. But a speech by Bismarck also occasions the stenographer twice the trouble of others, seeing that, in copying it out" (for his correction, a task he generally performs before leaving the House) "we must, by order of the 'iron Chancellor,' write twice as large as ordinarily—a duty which deprives us of the rest that we should otherwise have between the turns."
CHARACTERISTICS.

wearing the undress uniform of a cavalry general, and resting his hand upon the hilt of a massive sabre. A quick glance over the hall, a bow to the President, and he strides forward to his place at the head of the elevated seats reserved for the members of the Government. His entry seems to conform almost to a scheme of discipline, so loyal is he to his mannerisms. He settles himself in his chair; glances first over the notes taken by a subordinate; reads such letters as he finds on his desk; scans the latest telegrams, conveniently disposed for his use; and after these formalities he is ready to lean back in his seat, throw one leg over the other, and examine the audience through his eye-glass. All this may take ten minutes, and the Prince then begins serious work. If the debate is languid, and his intervention is not at once needed, he opens the portfolios, if any have been sent down from the Foreign Office, and looks at the despatches and other original drafts submitted for his correction or signature. Otherwise he listens closely to the speeches, and makes frequent notes, in a coarse, scrawling hand, with a pencil about twenty inches long.

"He is a singularly fair mark for the shafts of a malicious rival. In Parliament, under the keen personal thrusts of men like Windthorst or Richter, the admirable self-command which makes him so accomplished a diplomatist seems entirely to desert him: he becomes nervous and restless; fumbles with his pen, his handkerchief, sometimes ominously even with his sword; and betrays his irritation in many little ways that would be fatal to a man without other opportunities than those of the debater and the orator. Adulation would say that his is the weakness of the lion, which, vexed by the gnat, is condemned to resist only with the weapons and tactics of the gnat. Yet, when he is aroused, he can sting with a repartee equal to the best that the House produces. Unsparing of persons and prodigal of wit, he has one power not possessed in an equal measure by any of his foes—the power of putting some impressive truth, some vivid national aspiration, into a terse, homely, yet picturesque form, which at once becomes a maxim, endowed with eternal life. In general, he hates phrases, even patriotic phrases; and, rightly shunning a style of address in which hundreds of paltry rhetoricians, ancient and modern, are his rivals, prefers a grotesque and caustic humour, which is more natural and not less effective. In this he has never had a superior. All his speeches are seasoned with it, and never fail,
accordingly, to be entertaining, in spite of the exasperating sophisms which they now and then offer to the specialist. With all his pugnacity, his temper and his wit, he is nevertheless very unskilful in the use of invective. He lacks the power of pathetic and indignant declamation; and the outbursts of childish petulance with which he answers hostile criticism pain the House by their contrast with his vast proportions, physical and political. His passion finds too easy expression in sneers, which defeat their own purpose. Justly sensible of the difficulties of his place, and knowing that he enjoys the confidence of the country, he resents even the proper suggestions of the country's deputed counsellors as fresh obstacles ungratefully thrown in his way. To escape the speeches of Eugene Richter, a persistent but perfectly decorous critic, he had nothing better than the expedient of running out of the hall. Lasker and Scholeimer invariably put him into a furious passion. Yet when most angry he is least eloquent in manner and in matter; so that his more judicious friends never fail to be uneasy when, with trembling voice and twitching hands, and a frame swaying with fierce emotion, he strives to answer the personal attacks of cool and practised debaters."

As an orator, Bismarck may be compared with Cromwell. He has no rhetorical action, his motions are not graceful; his voice, a husky tenor, is neither musical nor imposing. He stammers, he coughs, he often stops for a word—it is always the right one when he has found it—while some of his sentences are terribly involved, and (when printed) nearly a foot long. But, as a writer, he may be compared with Luther or with Schiller. Few living Germans can write their mother speech more clearly, more idiomatically, more gracefully, more expressively, than their great political Chief. Frederick the Great raised high his native country, but he very nearly ruined his native tongue. The creator of the German
Empire has penned some things which must rank as masterpieces of the German language. Of this class were the despatches he wrote to Count Arnim, after the war, on the relations of the Empire and the Republic; and to this class also must be added many of the reports which he drew up at Frankfort, and which so good a judge of style as Professor von Sybel pronounced to have "a classic worth unsurpassed by the German prose-writers of any age." As the Marquis of Salisbury, when a young man, trained himself for the composition of eloquent State-papers by writing for the Saturday Review, so did Bismarck's steady contributions to the Kreuz-Zeitung, in his early parliamentary days, enable him to develop that literary power which is stamped with exceptional brilliancy on all his despatches. But as to the manner and method of his diplomatic composition, we had better yield the word to one of his own immediate subordinates, well situated to judge:*

*Bismarck's official correspondence is remarkable for its lucidity. He does not leave a doubt as to what he means to say; and he is so concise that, from his longest despatches, it would be difficult to strike out even a few words without impairing the sense of the whole document. He has a strong objection to exaggeration, and seldom employs a superlative of any kind. But when he does use a strong expression, you may be sure he means it. Of late, Prince Bismarck has given up writing his despatches himself. On very important occasions only does he now take up the pen. Sometimes he notes down in pencil certain short sentences to be used in a despatch. He does this only when he wishes his opinion on

* Herr Rudolph Lindau, Councillor of Legation in the German Foreign Office, the author of "Prince Bismarck, by one of his own Countrymen," already quoted.
some point to be expressed in the very words chosen by himself. But in most cases he is content to give his secretaries, who are well trained to their work, a few verbal instructions. While doing so he either walks up and down the room, or sits at his desk playing with a paper-knife. The attendant official, often himself a functionary of high rank, listens while the Chancellor speaks, and takes short notes of his words. The countenance of Prince Bismarck during this kind of work is very curious. If he could be painted at such a time, and an abstract name were given to the picture, it might be entitled 'Concentration of Thought.'

"Like all men who have accomplished great things, Bismarck has the power of concentrating, at a given moment, all the strength of his mind on one special point, and it is wonderful how clearly and how well he then sees that one point. He certainly could not dictate half-a-dozen letters at once, as it is said that Cesar and Napoleon I. were able to do; it is even probable that he would consider it as a kind of humbug, well fitted to astonish bystanders, but of very little use for the acceleration of work. Bismarck has frequently expressed the opinion that a thing is not well done, unless it is done as well as possible; and that no thing, not even a small one, can be done as well as possible, unless thorough attention is given to it. But while he objects to doing more than one thing at a time, he is able to pass quickly from one to another. Just as his eye, which seems to be fixed on the object upon which it rests, does not on that account dwell long on the same point, so his mind looks fixedly and through and through, so to speak, a special question, leaving it, nevertheless, suddenly and entirely as soon as attention is required by some other subject. The exhaustiveness of Bismarck's despatches, which seldom leave any part of a question unelucidated, should be attributed to the fact that he has trained himself always to attend thoroughly to the one special matter he has in hand."

We have said that Bismarck must have acquired facility as a writer from his practice as an early contributor to the Kreuz-Zeitung; and we saw how, at the outset of his diplomatic career in Frankfort, he had been entrusted with the management
of the Prussian Press Bureau, an institution for converting the journalism of the day, such as it was, to the ends and purposes of his Government. In the course of our narrative, moreover, we have had repeated occasion to detail his attitude to the newspaper Press—to tell how, at one time, he denounced it as a source of moral blood-poisoning; how, at another, he advocated its unrestricted liberty in Prussia as a means of combating the pretensions of Austria; how again, during the "Conflict Time," he gagged it with measures similar to the July Ordinances of Polignac; and how at last he was mainly instrumental in passing an imperial Press Law "calculated to establish in the mind of every public writer a healthy equilibrium between the sense of freedom and the sense of fear."*

But we are now not so much concerned with what the Chancellor thinks of the Press and its functions, as how he uses it for the purposes of his policy, and we cannot do better than allow him to speak for himself on this subject: †

"It cannot be denied," he said in the Reichstag (9th February, 1876), "that every Government—particularly that of a great country—desires the support of the Press in its foreign as well as home policy. Nothing, therefore, is more natural than that Governments should keep a certain amount of space at their disposal in journals well-afflicted to them, wherein to put forward views which they do not exactly want to publish in their Official Gazette. Formerly, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was rendered available to the Prussian Government for this purpose by its proprietors, acting upon

* See p. 396, ante.
† We use here (as at p. 519) the rendering of the accomplished English translator of "Our Chancellor."
their convictions and not asking for any remuneration. The Government took advantage of their offer, and the paper profited largely by its official connection. But what was the consequence? Most people believed that every article appearing in that paper was either written by the Prime Minister or read over by him before publication, so that he could be held responsible for every word of its text; and it was this which compelled me to forego the pleasure of promulgating my opinions extra-officially in the Press. The Minister gives instructions to his secretary, who impart them to the newspaper; and the result of the connection, thus established, is that items of intelligence are sometimes communicated to the journal in question, not at the immediate instance of the Minister, but quite permissibly and correctly. Thenceforth, no matter what editorial padding may be inserted in such a newspaper—even if it should only have received a single official communiqué—it is spoken of as 'an organ closely related to Government circles,' 'a journal notoriously supplied with official intelligence,' and, in the French papers, as 'la feuille de M. de Bismarck'—which lends its statements as much authority as if they had appeared in the Staatsanzeiger. Serious inconveniences, however, accrue from attributing an official character to announcements which really possess none; a proceeding sometimes the outcome of error, but more frequently of sheer ill-will and desire to cast discredit upon the Governmental policy. ... There is no conceivable piece of stupidity which has not been imputed to me in this manner by the simple word 'official,' wherefore I take this opportunity of positively declaring that the Foreign Office does not own an official paper, and does not impart official communications to any paper. I admit the inconvenience of being unable to make known my views to public opinion otherwise than through the Staatsanzeiger, or sometimes through a recognised official organ, the Provinzial Korrespondenz; but thus, at least, I am sure that no cuckoo's eggs will be laid in my nest, and that I can only be held answerable for what I myself (or one of my colleagues) have said."

The Prince's declaration "that the Foreign Office does not own an official paper" may have been true enough at the time, but certainly it would require to be very materially altered now. For, if anything is better
CHARACTERISTICS.

known than another in connection with his one-man system of rule, it is the fact that the Nord-Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung ("North German Gazette") acts as his devoted personal organ, and more especially in the field of foreign politics. It is furthermore an open secret that some of its threats, its hints, its remonstrances, and its fulminations, are directly inspired, and even dictated by the Chancellor himself, who is a master at the art of conveying truths to foreign Governments by a channel free from all the forms, restraints, and responsibilities of diplomatic intercourse. The Chancellor likes plain speaking, and he can indulge his love of this habit without stint in the columns of what is well known by all the world to be his accredited organ. Despising the Press—such as it is in Germany, at least—and regarding its servants as so many social Pariahs and "Catiline existences," there is nevertheless no statesman in Europe who makes a more judicious and a more persistent use of its power. "I will accept an ally," he once said, "wherever I can find one." And certainly, in some organs of the Press, he has found auxiliaries who perform the service expected of them with unflinching and ferocious zeal.

That service is mainly defensive, and consists less in assertion than denial. Formerly, there was a regular Bureau for facilitating the performance of this function of the "Geist der stets vernet"; but the Chancellor once remarked that, "if he were to refute all the lies and calumnies directed against him, he would require the services, how the Chancellor dealt with Polish calumny, and damaged American enterprise.
not only of a Literary Board, but of a regular Press Ministry." Once he adopted quite a novel method of denying disagreeable statements about his character and policy. In the year 1881, a Polish Clerical paper, the Czas, published what professed to be the report of an interview between the Chancellor and a Polish "High Tory" on the relations of Poland and Russia; and, by way of encouraging belief in the genuineness of this conversation, the journal in question actually gave the French text of the letter by which the Prince invited the magnate to Varzin. Letter and report of conversation were copied into a purely paste-and-scissors book on "The Chancellor's Policy during the last Twelve Years," which seemed to remove from the Polish mind every doubt as to their credibility; but this credibility was rudely shaken by the North German Gazette, which, in the name of the Prince, offered a sum of 100,000 marks for the production of the alleged letter of invitation to Varzin, and a further considerable reward to any one who would reveal the author of the whole imposture. As a pendant to this story, it may be mentioned that the Chancellor himself was once tempted with as high a sum as that which he himself offered for the exposure of a Polish falsehood, to furnish an American journal with the communication of political truths. But the manifold occupations of the Prince left him no time to encourage this astounding spirit of enterprise in Yankee journalism.*

* Writing on 18th May, 1880, the Paris correspondent of The Times forwarded to his journal the following "amusing passage from a friend of
Apart from his journalistic productions and his diplomatic despatches, we are not aware that Bismarck has contributed anything whatever to the literature of his time. But, indeed, one who has been the cause of so much book-writing in others had excuse enough for refraining from the use of his own constructive or creative pen. The personality of Bismarck mine in Berlin,” and we have reason to believe that the story is true: — "Contemporary journalism recently very nearly obtained a colleague who would certainly have contributed to raise the dignity of the profession, and who would speedily have monopolised universal attention. A short time ago an American arrived in Berlin, and addressed to Prince Bismarck a letter couched in the politest terms, and written with undoubted seriousness. In this letter the American traveller announced to the Prince that he had come to Berlin in fulfilment of a mission, the importance of which the Chancellor must not underrate, and one which might have the most important consequences for his own policy, as well as for public opinion in general. He had been sent to Prince Bismarck by a very great American newspaper, which solicited his co-operation. It placed its columns at his disposal once a week for the uncontrolled publication of an article, short or long, as the Prince might determine, which, starting from America with the greatest possible éclat, would convey the Prince's views to all the corners of the globe, would give rise week after week to the most animated controversies, and would thus afford the Chancellor a means of knowing the general opinion on his views; while these, by a weekly dose, would be gradually instilled into the mind of Europe may, of the whole civilised world. Moreover, as practical Americans thinking even a Chancellor of Germany might find these reasons too Platonic, the proprietors of the newspaper, through their ambassador, offered the Prince for each of these articles, and for the whole time during which he might write them, even should they not exceed twenty lines, the sum of $2,500 that is, $130.00 a year. They declared themselves ready to, in positot, refund $50,000, the Prince thus being placed in possession of the two years' compensation, even should the paper, despite the stipulations to the contrary, not publish a line of what the Prince wrote. On receiving this curious and seriously expressed offer, the Prince laughed very much, and had a serious reply sent, stating that his numerous occupations prevented him from accepting any more. When his reply had been sent off, the Prince, suddenly turning to Count Herbert Bismarck, his son, exclaimed: "How stupid of me, we might have proposed to them to have a letter from you for half the sum."
has already become the centre of a mass of literature as great as that which has crystallized round the name of Homer, or Junius, or Shakespeare; * but he himself has never betrayed signs of an ambition—like that of a Caesar or a Louis Napoleon, a Burke or a Beaconsfield—to add to his victory-wreath as a statesman the laurels of a littérature. Nor is there anything he ever said or did which enables us to form an accurate idea of his attitude to the intellectual currents of his time. But as far as the belles lettres, at least, are concerned, we are inclined to agree with one writer, † that “Prince Bismarck doubtless regards a pamphlet upon the cor

* At Berlin, in April, 1885, in connection with the festivities in honour of his seventieth birthday, there was held an Exhibition of all the known or at least all the attainable, products of art and literature on the subject of the Chancellor. The collection comprised countless books, photographs, prints and paintings, busts and statuettes, short biographies by the scores, stories of the Prince’s boyhood and anecdotes of his old age, “festival editions” of his speeches and despatches, with odes, hymns, “sonnet-wreaths,” and other apostrophic effusions of the patriotic and hero-worshiping Muse, in catarracts. One good result of this Exhibition was the preparation, by the booksellers of Berlin, at whose instance it was devised, of as complete a catalogue as possible of all known Bismarckiana, and a formidable compilation it is. Among the exhibits was an album belonging to the German National Museum, and containing, in the Chancellor’s large bold handwriting, the following characteristic summary of his life and triumphs:—“Leopold Edward Otto Von Bismarck, born at Schoenhausen, in the Altmark, April 1, 1815; member of the United Prussian Landtag, 1847; Royal Prussian Envoy to the German Bundestag, Diet, 1851; Ambassador to the Imperial Court of Russia, 1859; Ambassador to the Imperial Court of France, 1862; Royal Prussian Minister of State, September 23 in the same year; Chancellor of the North German Confederation, 1867; Chancellor of the German Empire, 1871. Fert und donec regitur.”

† The writer of an article on “Fürst Bismarck und sein Verhältniss zur Deutschen Literatur” (Prince Bismarck and his relations to German Literature), in the “Berliner Monatshefte für Literatur, Kritik und Theater,” for April, 1855.
duties as a much more important production than a new and original drama."

And yet the Chancellor is by no means devoid of literary tastes and sympathies. In his youth, indeed, he is even said to have indulged in versifying to a considerable extent, though we have only come across two effusions of his Muse. One of these, which dates from the years of the Revolution, is supposed to be the address of a cup—a birthday-gift of Bismarck's—to a Pomeranian friend and neighbour (Herr v. Kleist-Retzow), and thus begins:—*  

``Nicht ganz so schwarz wie Ebenholz,
Doch braun wie Mahagonig,
Wünsch' ich Dir, aller Pommern Stolz,
Ein Leben süß wie Honig."

* * * * *

``Und schein' ich Dir zu gross und weit
Für ein so kleines Landrathlein,
So dünk, es ist die höchste Zeit
Dir eine Gattin anzufabien."

The other effusion of the Chancellor's Muse, to which we referred, belongs to a later day, and is at once more polished and more epigrammatic. In the album of a lady of title Count Moltke had written the words, "Schein vergeht, Wahrheit besteht," (i.e., Falseness fades, but Truth endures); and immediately underneath this reflection Bismarck inscribed the following quatrains:—†

* The puns and local allusions in these familiar vers d'occasion render their translation impossible.
* Published by the Cologne Gazette (June, 1882) with the remark that the lines bear evidence of not being the first that Bismarck has ever
PRINCE BISMARCK.

"Ich glaube dass in jeuer Welt
Die Wahrheit stets den Sieg behält;
Doch mit der Lüge dieses Lebens
Kämpft unser Marschall selbst vergebens."

Which may be rendered:—

"Believe I do that, by'ond the grave,
Truth always will her banners wave;
But with the falsehoods of this life
E'en Moltke must wage bootless strife."

But whatever the Chancellor's own merits as a versifier, he has shown at least that he can appreciate the poetry of two others—and these two are Goethe and Shakespeare. He could pass many years upon a desert island, he once said, with some of Goethe's works for his sole companions. "Schiller," we are told, "is less attractive to him, probably by reason of his pronounced dislike to a pompous and declamatory style." We have heard the Prince quote Goethe in Parliament, but not so often as we have heard him cite Shakespeare, whose works he would seem to have studied with almost philological care; and nothing could have been more telling than when, "breathless and faint" from his deadly close with Austria, he compared the constitutional quibbles of the Liberals to the fastidious questionings of the foppish lord who accosted Harry Hotspur "when the fight was o'er."* But the Chancellor can find relaxa-

His favourite poets and novelists.

written; and indeed, in his younger years, he is even said to have thrown off frequent effusions in verse, some of them pretty long." See also the Latin rhyme quoted at p. 510, ante.

* See p. 418, as well as p. 357, Vol. I of this work.
tion in the sensations of fiction, as well as in the sublimities of poetry. "Send me a novel to read," he wrote to his wife on the day before Sadowa, "but only one at a time." During one of his illnesses he read through the works of Emile Gaboriau, who has been called the "French Poe;" and we also happen to know that he is familiar with the fictions of his friend, Lord Beaconsfield, in one of whose novels ("Endymion") he himself, indeed, has been made to figure as the Count Ferrol (quasi a ferro et igni).* The productions of modern German literature in this particular field, are not, we are told, to the Prince's taste; and we are not surprised at it.

We know not exactly what has been the range of the Chancellor's reading in philosophy and general literature, but we are quite sure that for a knowledge of history, ancient and modern, his equal is not to be found in the German Parliament: and that is saying a good deal. How and when the Prince, in the course of his busy life, could have contrived to become such a brilliant specialist in this field, we have no idea; but we can only say that he has frequently been the despair of those Liberal and learned professors who would fain believe that knowledge need not go with wisdom in others, but that nevertheless knowledge cannot exist without wisdom in themselves. No one knows Roman history so well as Professor Mommsen, nor is any one better acquainted with the constitutional lore of England than Professor Gneist.

* See foot-note to p. 279, Vol. I.
But great as is the erudition of both these scholarly parliamentarians, each of them has had repeated occasion to envy the brilliant manner in which the Chancellor has illustrated the political necessities of Germany by pertinent instances taken from the history of England and the annals of Rome. If any one would like to take a lesson in the study of comparative history, let him turn to the despatches and memorandums written by Bismarck during his diplomatic career at Frankfort. Some of his speeches, too, read like historical lectures by Professor Seeley—so far-sweeping is his range of view, so masterly are his generalisations; and their merit is enhanced by the fact that they do not at all smell of the laborious and preparative lamp, but bear unmistakable evidence of having been marshalled from the speaker's memory on the spur of the moment. For the vast historical knowledge of the Chancellor is like the German army, and can be mobilised for fighting purposes at a minute's notice.

With languages, which have been justly called the eyes of history, Bismarck is also extensively acquainted. His accomplishments as a linguist.

French he speaks with the purity and fluency almost of a native, and the same may be said of his English. In the Reichstag we have heard him quote in the original from Shakespeare, from Wheatstone, and from Kent. It was fortunate for the interests of England, during the Congress of Berlin, that Bismarck could talk so well the language of Burke; for neither Lord Beaconsfield nor Lord Salisbury knew a word of German, and their
French was so faulty that the Foreign Secretary is said to have asked a friend for the Gallic equivalent of "compromise," while the Premier, desiring to breakfast on a fried sole, requested the waiter to bring him une âme frite. But let us trust that these stories are more significant than true. Not so fluent is the Chancellor's Italian as his French, but yet he can read the journals of Rome.

"I came here (from San Sebastian) in the diligence," he wrote to his wife in 1852, "rather uncomfortably packed between nice little Spanish women, with whom I could not talk a syllable. So much Italian, however, they understood that I could demonstrate to them my satisfaction with their exterior."

Once, too, he boasted that he was "about the only man in the Foreign Office who understands Russian"—a language which he, as we have already seen, suggested might be substituted for Greek as a means of educational discipline, and which he himself acquired during his residence at St. Petersburg, where two favourite inmates of his house were a native tutor and a bear. And not only did he master Russian, but he also learned Polish to a degree enabling him to make himself understood.*

* A good story is told of the Chancellor's varied linguistic powers. Once at Frankfort he chanced to sit at a table d'hote opposite a couple of young ladies from the Baltic Provinces, who began conversing with considerable abandon in the Lett tongue; and Bismarck suspected that he himself was the main object of criticism on the part of his fair, but rather provincial-natured companions, who never imagined that a barbarous dialect like theirs would be understood by any one in a civilised city like Frankfort. The commenting mood of the ladies having reached its climax with the dessert, Bismarck whispered to his neighbour to hand him a key whenever he heard him utter some unintelligible words. "Habt man zu attack," said Bismarck presently to his friend, who at once replied by
Once during the French war a Polish sentry refused to allow the Chancellor to enter a particular house, and it was only when he addressed the man in his own Slavonic dialect that he was permitted to pass.

"In the hospital," said Bismarck, "I tried a couple of days since to talk with the Polish soldiers, and they seemed quite to brighten up when they heard a General using their native tongue. It was a pity that I could not go on, and had to leave. Perhaps it would be well if their commander could talk to them."

When President Krüger, at the head of a Boer deputation, came to Berlin (in the summer of 1884) and sat at the table of the Emperor beside the Chancellor, the latter managed to make himself understood in Platt-Deutsch to the Dutch Chief of the Transvaal, who could converse in no language but his own. In former times, Latin used to be the means of communication between those who had no other common medium of speech; and Bismarck himself once said that "when I was in the highest form at school I wrote and spoke Latin very well, though now it has become difficult to me, and I have quite forgotten my Greek." But still this youthful familiarity with Latin manifests itself in his speeches, which are frequently interlarded with most recondite phrases from Justinian and other writers—all of them expressing pithy truths, like his "beati possidentes," his "do ut des," his "misera contribuens plebs," and a hundred others.
CHARACTERISTICS.

Frederick the Great aspired to be thought a Latin scholar, but Bismarck has an infinitely better title to the name; and yet, in some things, there is a certain affinity between the native style of each. German, as spoken and written by the Great King, seemed to be a language more of Romance than of Teutonic origin; but though the Chancellor is a purist in this respect, in comparison with Frederick, his choice of words nevertheless is by no means such as would please philological Chauvinists like Lessing, or the German Postmaster-General, Herr von Stephan. In several towns of Germany there are clubs of which the members agree to pay a halfpenny every time they are found using a French or Latin word that might easily have been avoided—the fines accruing for the benefit of shipwrecked sailors; but, if the Chancellor belonged to one of these puristic leagues, we suspect his forfeits would very soon amount to the price of a lifeboat. For his sentences often teem with verbs ending in "iren," thus indicating a French or English origin; but the Prince is much too wise a man, and too profound a believer in the doctrine of expediency, to subordinate his power of expression to the prejudices of a silly patriotism.

The principle on which these purists act is expressed in the verse:

« Wollst Du ein echter Deutscher sein,
So sprich auch deine Sprache rein;
Latin, Französisch, hast und krass,
Sicht wie 'ne Narrenjacke aus.»

We know Germans so Chauvinistic as to prefer articles of native manufacture to foreign ones, even though the latter be better and, in the long run, cheaper. But the Chancellor is above weaknesses of this sort.
And yet, in some things, he is intensely Chauvinistic. Thus, for example, he is a decided opponent of the new-fangled system of German orthography, of which a prominent feature is the frequent elimination of consonants that are held to be superfluous. It is, in fact, a cautious advance in the direction of phonography. Thus *Rath* (Council) becomes *Rat* with certain writers and newspapers, and *todt* (dead), *tot*. Bismarck, however, is stiffly opposed to this arbitrary mutilation of his beloved guttural tongue, and extends his political Conservatism to its very alphabet. The characters of this alphabet—being pretty identical with the old English black-letter type—are nothing but a relic of monkish and mediæval barbarism, unworthy of an age of international intercourse and enlightenment; and there can be little doubt that the shortsightedness from which so large a proportion of the Germans suffer is partly, if not wholly, due to the fact that they still use printed characters which repel other nations from learning their powerful and expressive tongue. But Bismarck seems to think it better that large numbers of his countrymen (himself included) should wear spectacles, than that they should throw down one of the barriers which still segregate them from other nations. On this subject, however,

Thus, for example, we read in a newspaper telegram from Vienna (April 2, 1885): "This morning, at the quarterly meeting of the Viennese Tailors Trade Guild, the chairman made this unexpected announcement, that for the last twelve years—that is, since a visit to the Vienna Exhibition of 1873, Prince Bismarck has had all his clothes made in the Austrian capital. Much patriotic applause followed."
let the Chancellor speak for himself. Having been presented with a copy of an elaborate work on natural history printed in Roman characters, he acknowledged the gift as follows (Varzin, 4th October, 1882):

"I am very much obliged to you for your kindness in sending me a copy of your work. The descriptive charms of your style, and the accurate illustrations you supply, have enabled me to overcome the aversion which would otherwise prevent me from reading German books in Roman characters, as I must deal economically with the time left at my disposal by health and business. I find that I require eighty minutes to read the amount in Roman type, which only takes me an hour when printed more cursively. French or English printed in German letters, or German in Greek, would cause the same difficulty to every reader, even to those who are equally acquainted with all alphabets. The educated reader does not see letter-signs, but word-signs. To him a German word in Latin letters is as strange a phenomenon as a Greek word in German characters would be to you, and compels one to read more slowly, just as does the arbitrary and mutilating mode of spelling lately introduced among us. Pardon this out-break of the suppressed discomfort of a single reader, and pray do not regard it as a sign of ingratitude to you for your kind present, in the reading of which I shall readily forget the nationality of the type in which it is printed."

"Prince Bismarck," we are told by Dr. Busch, "has always entertained a predilection for history, geography, and political economy. He is posted up in their literature, and reads new historical works, such as Taine's admirable account of the first French Revolution, with keen interest." Believing, to all appearance, with Pope, that "the proper study of mankind is man," the Chancellor does not seem to have devoted much, or, indeed, any attention to the material world. We cannot remember that he ever sought to
illustrate a point by quoting a simile or an argument from the field of physical science. "People," he once said, when referring to his student-days at Göttingen, "people at that time thought a good deal of Leopold von Buch (the geologist), and fancied themselves going about through the world like him, chipping off bits of rock with a hammer. But nothing of the sort ever happened with me."

And while indifferent to science, there is nothing to show that he was ever an enthusiast for art. "At Frankfort," says Dr. Busch,*

"he associated a good deal with painters and sculptors, especially with Professor Becker, who has painted his portrait. But I remember nothing in his letters referring to these matters, and I have but seldom heard him mention artistic subjects or personages. . . . Moreover, his apartments in Berlin, Varzin, and Schönhausen, by no means abound in artistic adornments, unless photographs, lithographs, and steel-engravings, may pass as such. A few oil-paintings decorate his study in Berlin; but up to 1877 there was not a single picture in his Schönhausen sanctum, and the new buildings in Pomerania and the Sachsenwald have been fitted up in the simplest possible style. I infer from these facts that he does not take any very great pleasure in painting, sculpture, and architecture—not that he has no taste for them."

Once, during his student days in Berlin, Bismarck acted as the eicr one to a young lady, the country-cousin of one of his friends; and long afterwards, when his fair charge—now grown into a venerable dame—called on the great Chancellor to remind him of the incident, she was presented to the company by the Prince as "the lady to whom I owe a great part of

* "Our Chancellor."
my education, for it was with her that I entered the Berlin Museum for the first and last time in my life.”

Of all the arts music, perhaps, is the one which has most attraction for Bismarck, and we are told that—

“The classical composers, with Beethoven at their head, are his favourites. He does not play any instrument himself, but delights in the playing of others. Writing to his wife, in 1851, he described his condition as ‘sound and hearty, but tinged with Fondness for melancholy, homesickness, yearnings for forest, ocean, desert, you and the children, all mixed up with sunset and Beethoven.’ In another letter he said:—‘Yesterday after dinner I sat alone with Kendell in the blue drawing-room, and he played.’ Two years later he wrote from Baden: ‘This evening a quartet-party at Count Fleming’s, with Joachim, who really plays the fiddle wonderfully.’ In Versailles Herr von Kendell, the accomplished pianist and Councillor of Legation, played soft fantasias to the Chancellor on the drawing-room piano whilst we were taking coffee. On my asking him subsequently whether the chief took much pleasure in such performances, he replied—‘Yes, although he is not musical;’ adding, ‘You will have remarked that he hums all the while; that is good for his nerves, which are a good deal upset to-day.’ In the autumn of 1881, as the Prince and I were walking together along the winding paths of the park behind his Berlin palace, and talking about the newly-elected Reichstag, he began to hum the air of the student-song ‘Wir hatten gehauen ein stattliches Haus’ (A stately mansion we had built); and a little later on he began talking about the ‘Lack of Edenhall,’ to which he compared the German Constitution. The melody obviously suggested to his mind the simile and the moat connected therewith.”

From art to religion the transition is natural. But if the serious creed of any man is to be considered, his

* This story we quote from the Nation’s Zülung, which evidently had good authority for it.

† "Our Chancellor."
superstitions had better first be noticed. And of these
—if we are not to regard his own confessions as having
been made in jest *—the German Chancellor
is the victim of a very peculiar number.
For to the strong good sense and sagaci-
cy which stamp him as by far the most practical
statesman of his age, he unites opinions that became
extinct with the last of the astrologers. He has, for
example, hinted at his belief in ghosts,† and avowed his
firm conviction in the influence of the moon on the
growth of plants and human hair, in the mystic
qualities of numbers, in the unluckiness of doing busi-
ness on Fridays, and of thirteen sitting down to table.
The war of 1866 having been virtually finished in a
week, the Prince thought it possible in the early stages
of the French campaign that it might be ended in seven-
times-seven days. Again, being told once that the
Pomeranians had been under fire before Paris, his High-
ness exclaimed: “Ah, and probably also my good
fellows from Varzin. . . Forty and nine, seven-
times-seven; how are they getting on, I wonder?”

* In 1883, several years after these superstitions confessions had been
before the world in the pages of Dr. Busch, the Chancellor remarked to
the former: “All that nonsense about my superstitionness has no more
solid foundation than mere jokes or my” (alleged want of?) “considera-
tion for other people’s feelings. I will make one of thirteen at dinner
as often as you please; and I transact the most important and critical
business on Fridays, if necessary.”

† A ghost story having once been referred to in his hearing, and one
of the company having made light of it, the Prince remarked, very gravely,
that “it was better not to scoff or jest at such matters; there might very
well be something true in the tale, for he himself had undergone a similar
experience.”
CHARACTERISTICS.

Writing to his wife, in the winter of 1852, he complained that, "I have not done so well this time at Letzlingen in shooting as three years ago. It was Friday." An aide-de-camp of Bazaine having come from Metz to Versailles on business, the Chancellor was averse from receiving him, because it was the sixth day of the week, and the anniversary of Hochkirch and Jena—both disastrous days for the Prussian arms. On another occasion he protested that he knew the exact age at which he would die, a conviction which probably contributed to his peace of mind when exposing himself so recklessly in France to the bullet of the lurking franc-tireur. It must also have been an immense relief to the Chancellor when he was raised from the rank of Count to that of Prince, seeing that, during all the time he bore the former dignity, he was under a lively apprehension that his house was doomed to die out. This, he said, had been the fate of nearly all the families in Pomerania who had risen to the rank of Count; and he had at first struggled hard against exposing his line to this inevitable destiny, but without avail. While, however, professing to cherish these singular opinions of the Cabalists, the Prince is careful to distinguish them from the principles of Cagliostro; and it having once been reported to him that Home, the Spiritualist, was prowling about Versailles, he commanded that he should be watched as a spy and a swindler, and cast into prison.

Such being the superstitions of the Chancellor, what are we to expect will be the nature of his religion? In the course of our narrative we have had occasional
glimpses of his politico-religious views. We saw how, in the times of the Revolution, he defended the idea of the Christian State, regarded as a purely political institution; and, in describing the "Kulturkampf," we detailed his theory of the relations between Church and State. All he ever said or did with reference to the various sects of his time—be they Jew or Christian, Catholic or Quaker—betrayed a spirit of tolerance such as that which made Frederick the Great once declare that every one of his subjects, for all he cared, might take their own peculiar way of getting to Heaven.* After all, however, these principles of the Chancellor only indicated his attitude to the religious beliefs and practices of others. But what now interests us is his own religious creed. Is the greatest doer of the age also a deep believer? And in what does he believe? In himself exclusively, and his big battalions—like Napoleon; or in a God as well, like Cromwell? Some light may be thrown on the subject by the studied opinion of an anonymous judge of character, quoted by Dr. Busch:—

"Bismarck is manifestly a dilettante in religious matters; he is no theologian, and has not put together for his own use any system of coherent convictions. His religiousness is that of a practical person, who endeavours to cover his rear as best he can. His capacity of achievement is great; but still he feels that he cannot do everything, and that things and circumstances innumerable escape him. When this feeling possesses him, he seeks and finds a supplement to his forces; that supplement which Napoleon I. called l'ordre des choses, and Bismarck calls God. Both these great men have now and

* "Jedermann muss nach seiner Façon selig werden."
then felt uneasy, despite all their power and foresight; they have experienced a sense of loneliness, and have plunged from time to time into materialism and generalities, shaking off the fetters of their individual entities. Bismarck owns a God besides himself." *

And Dr. Busch himself, who has had a good opportunity of judging, thus expresses himself on the subject of the Chancellor's religious views:—

"It may be confidently assumed that Bismarck has not always entertained the same view of these matters, and that he has never been quite able to make up his mind about them. He himself acknowledges that, in religion as well as in politics, he has successively arrived at different stages of development. First of all he passed through a rationalistic phase; then came a time during which he was an unbeliever, or, at least, experienced no religious requirements at all; later on he gave expression to such decided opinions that no doubt could be entertained as to his views, obviously those of a man whose standpoint was Christian and even confessional; and of late years he appears to have retained only as much positive belief as entitles us to consider him a profoundly religious spirit, believing firmly in God, divine order, and a personal existence continued after death; doing his duty in conformity with this faith, and deriving from it strength wherewith to fulfil his earthly mission; but making small account of creeds, absolutely condemning intolerance, and exhibiting no very conspicuous yearning to fortify his soul with ecclesiastic observances or by partaking freely of the means of Grace." †

As far, indeed, as the immortality of the soul is concerned, Bismarck once delivered himself on this subject in a most unequivocal manner. This was in the spring of 1870, during a debate in the Reichstag on the abolition of capital punishment, which he opposed with all the power at his command, and said: ‡

* "Our Chancellor." † Idem. ‡ See p. 473, Vol. I.
"The impression I have derived from this discussion, briefly summarised, is that the opponents of the death-penalty exaggerate alike the value of life in this world of ours, and the importance of death. I can conceive that capital punishment may appear harder to those who do not believe in the continuance of individual life after physical decease, than to those who believe in the immortality of the souls granted to them by God; but, looking more closely into the matter, I can scarcely even accept that view of it. For him who does not believe—as I do from the bottom of my heart—that death is a transition from one existence to another, and that we are justified in holding out to the worst of criminals in his dying hour the comforting assurance, mors jamua vise; for him, I say, who does not share that conviction, the joys of this life must possess so high a value that I could almost envy him the sensations they must procure to him. His occupations must appear to him so teeming with promise of reward that I cannot realise to myself what his state of feeling must be, if, believing that his personal existence terminates for ever with his bodily demise, he considers it worth while to go on living at all. I will not in this place refer you to Hamlet’s tragical monologue, which sets forth all the reasons capable of inducing him to put an end to himself, but for the contingency of dreaming—perhaps of suffering—after death; who knows what! He who has made up his mind that no other existence succeeds this one can scarcely expect a criminal—who, in the words of the poet, ‘gazes steadfastly into nothingness from the gallows,’ * and for whom death is the peace, the slumber yearned for by Hamlet—to carry on the necessary phosphorisation of his brain for any length of time within the narrow limits of a prison cell, bereft of all that lends a charm to existence. . . ."

As a supplement to this, may be quoted what the Chancellor once said (Reichstag, October, 1878) with reference to the materialistic belief of the party of anarchy:—

* A quotation from Schiller’s “Robbers,” of which the clever English translator of “Our Chancellor” (whose version we have generally used in citing from that work) does not altogether convey the sense by the rendering: “gazes steadfastly into night from the Rabenstein.”
"If I had come to entertain the belief attributed to these men" (the Social Democrats)—"well, I live a life of great activity, and occupy a lucrative post—but all this could offer me no inducement to live one day longer, did I not, as the poet" (Schiller) "says, 'believe in God, and a better future.'"

Once during the Franco-German war, the Chancellor expressed his Christian creed in such clear and succinct terms, that we cannot refrain from quoting it here:

"If I were not a Christian, I would not continue to serve the King another hour. Did I not obey my God and count upon Him, I should certainly take no account of earthly masters. I should have enough to live upon, and occupy a sufficiently distinguished position. Why should I incessantly worry myself, and labour in this world, exposing myself to embarrassments, annoyances, and evil treatment, if I did not feel bound to do my duty on behalf of God? Did I not believe in a divine ordinance, which has destined this German nation to become good and great, I had never taken to the diplomatic trade; or, having done so, I would long since have given it up. I know not whence I should derive my sense of duty, if not from God. Orders and titles have no charms for me; I firmly believe in a life after death, and that is why I am a Royalist; by nature I am disposed to be a Republican. To my steadfast faith alone do I owe the power of resisting all manner of absurdities which I have displayed throughout the past ten years. Deprive me of this faith, and you rob me of my Fatherland. Were I not a staunch Christian, did I not stand upon the miraculous basis of religion, you would never have possessed a Federal Chancellor in my person. Find me a successor animated by similar principles, and I will resign on the spot... How gladly would I retire from office! I delight in country life, the woods and nature. Sever my connection with God, and I am the man to pack up my trunks to-morrow and be off to Varzin to reap my oats."

A man with the vital principles of Christianity stamped so clearly and firmly on his heart as that, may
well dispense with the external observances of religion; and, accordingly, we find that the church-going practice of the Chancellor has gradually fallen into complete abeyance. But even twenty years ago he had grown so remiss in his performance of this Christian duty, that a friend (André von Roman) ventured to take him to task for the omission; and he replied—

"As regards church-going, it is not correct to say that I never frequent the house of God. For the last seven months, almost, I have either been away (from home) or ill; who, then, has been my observer? I am ready to admit that it might happen oftener, but it is not so much from want of time as from considerations of health that I omit to go, especially in winter; and to those who feel called upon to sit in judgment on me in this respect I shall be glad to vouchsafe particulars on the subject; but you yourself will believe me without medical details."

But, though not a church-goer, there is evidence that Bismarck has remained a pretty zealous Bible-reader, and some of his speeches are interlarded with illustrations from the Old Testament in a fashion which would please a Scottish divine. But the Bible is not the only book from which his religious nature seeks to draw sustenance. On the morning of the capitulation of Sedan, after the Chancellor had galloped away to negotiate the terms of surrender, his secretary entered his bed-room and found it littered with hymn-books and religious tracts—with the "Daily Watchwords, and Texts of the Moravian Brethren for 1870," and with the "Daily Refreshment for Believing Christians." This was the literature from which the iron Chancellor had sought distraction through
CHARACTERISTICS.

the sleepless night of a terrible day. On the other hand, the representative of an English newspaper next morning entered the château where Louis Napoleon had spent, not slept, his last night on his native soil, and found on a table by the fallen Emperor's bed a translation of Bulwer Lytton's "Last of the Barons."* The contrast was significant.

It was to the correspondent who received his self-justification on the subject of church-going that Bismarck likewise addressed the following epistle, which might very well pass muster among the "Letters and Speeches" of Oliver Cromwell:

"Though my time is limited, I cannot refrain from answering an 'interpellation' which is put to me out of an honest heart and in the name of Christ. I am sincerely sorry if I give offence to believing Christians, but certain I am that this is inevitable in my calling. I will not speak of the circumstance that, in the camps necessarily opposed to me in a political sense, there are doubtless many Christians far ahead of me on the road to salvation, with whom I have nevertheless to live in combat in virtue of what we both have of the earth in common. I will merely refer to what you yourself say: 'Nothing that is done or left undone remains unknown to the outside world.' Where is the man who, in such a position, would not give offence, justly or otherwise? . . . . Would to God that, apart from what is known to the world, I had no other sins upon my soul, for which I only hope to be forgiven by trusting in the blood of Christ. As a statesman, I feel that I am not even unscrupulous enough, but cowardly rather, and that, too, in consequence of its not being always easy for me to gain, in the questions with which I have to deal, that clearness of insight on the

* "My Experiences of the War between France and Germany," by Archibald Forbes, *sub* "Sedan before and after."
soil of which grows confidence in God. He who calls me an unconscionable politician does me wrong; he should first of all put his own conscience to the proof on this arena."

But, à propos of battle-fields, we may here quote a characteristic trait of the Chancellor. At Varzin one evening,* after sitting for some time sunk in profound reflection, he lamented that he had derived but small pleasure or satisfaction from his political activity, but on the other hand, much vexation, anxiety, and trouble. He had, he said, made no one happy by it—neither himself, his family, nor any one else. "But probably," he continued, "many unhappy. Had it not been for me, there would have been three great wars the less; the lives of eighty thousand men would not have been sacrificed; and many parents, brothers, sisters, and widows would not now be mourners. That, however, I have settled with my Maker." Settled with my Maker! That, we fancy, expresses the religious creed of Bismarck better than all his public and private avowals on the subject; and, for the rest, we had better generalise the Chancellor's faith in the words which Lord Beaconsfield puts into the mouth of one of his characters.† "‘As for that,' said Waldsee, ‘sensible men are all of the same religion.' ‘And pray what is that?' inquired Prince Florestan. ‘Sensible men never tell.'"

We suspect that, if Bismarck himself did tell what his true religion was, it would be found, like that of

* According to Dr. Busch.
† In "Endymion," Chap. xix.
CHARACTERISTICS.

Gambetta, to be his country; not, indeed, as in the case of the great French Tribune, to the exclusion of all other creeds, but to their subordination to his one ruling faith and passion. * For Bismarck loves Germany, to quote what Macaulay said of that English statesman who may be placed nearest him, † "as an Athenian loved the city of the Violet Crown, as a Roman loved the City of the Seven Hills." He has taught his countrymen to be patriots of the most Chauvinistic type. "My country—right or wrong"—has ever been his motto. Bismarck, unlike Edmund Burke, was never born for mankind, but only for Germany; and, to do him justice, he has never professed to be inspired by that abstract love of humanity which some consider has so often led cosmopolitan statesmen like Mr. Gladstone (in an age of intense international rivalry, mistaken by them for an era of millennial communism) to plunge their country into woeful plights. But on this head let us take the evidence of a diplomatist long resident at the Court of Berlin, who prophesied, when

* Said Mr. Frederic Harrison, in lecturing on Gambetta, after his death:—"Gambetta was the one European statesman of this century who systematically and formally repudiated any kind of acceptance of theology. His idea of a State Church was wrong in principle; his persecution of the Catholic orders was wrong in principle and in practice; but about his formal rejection of all theology there could be no doubt whatever. His life, his death, and his burial, all alike bore witness of that. They saw here in Gambetta a new thing. They saw a statesman of the first rank in Europe who formally repudiated theology in every shape: the first ruler of France in this century who had chosen to rest his right to rule on purely human sanctions. But the soul of Gambetta was not the soul of the scoffer. He had a religion in his soul, though he had neither God nor saint, and that religion was France."

† The great Earl of Chatham.
Bismarck first came to power (in 1862), that "he would either become a Richelieu or an Alberoni," and who had exceptional opportunities of studying the character of the Chancellor:*

"As for the part Bismarck is expected to play in the settlement of the Eastern Question" (it was the spring of 1877), "all that can be said is that he is dominated by the fear of a Franco-Russian alliance. . . . Had he an elevated mind and a generous soul, one might indulge in conjectures; but the Chancellor is not ruled by the interests of humanity, nor even by those of Europe. He is nothing but a German statesman. To him politics are nothing but a dynamic force. He despises men; he has only two aims—to maintain himself and his work, the greatness of Germany and his own. . . . He says he is profoundly unhappy, and so he is. All his equilibrium is gone. He has just made a pretence of wanting to lay down his power, but he could not live without it. He could not do without public admiration, as is proved by the attention he pays to the Press. The slightest thrust chafes him. I search in vain for the like of him in all history. The man cannot be judged apart from his temperament, as developed by his unparalleled success. His power has become a sort of ministerial Caesarism. . . . Is he physically at so low an ebb as he affects to be? Many doubt it. He would be all right if he could but employ his time and portion out his day better, and knew how to govern himself. He goes to bed at four o'clock in the morning, falls asleep at seven, and rises in the afternoon. By this time business has accumulated, and he regards it with repugnance, if not with wrath."

That Bismarck, like Achilles,† is capable of wrath,

* Baron Nothomb, Belgian Minister, who died at Berlin in 1881. The letter of this diplomatist, from which we quote the above characterisation of the Chancellor, was published in a Memoir of the deceased in the "Revue des deux Mondes" for October 1, 1882.

† Says Dr. Busch of a tea-table conversation during the French war:—"Kendell spoke cleverly—and indeed, charmingly—about certain qualities in the Chancellor which reminded him of Achilles—his genial, youthful nature; his easily excited temperament; the deep sympathies which
we learn from one who has doubtless himself had frequent cause to experience the force of its explosion. "The Chancellor," writes Dr. Busch, "is of a choleric disposition; the least vexation is apt to provoke him to volcanic outbursts of temper. But the eruption rapidly subsides, and is never succeeded by sulkiness or rancour."* "It is not always agreeable (for my subordinates) to be with me," said the Prince once, "only people should not attach too much importance to my irritability." In the Prince's own dealings with the world, the fortiter in re generally predominates over the suaviter in modo, although he has frequently laid down that a just equilibrium should be observed in the practice of these two maxims. "You do not write politely enough for me," said the Chan-

he not infrequently manifests; his inclination to take himself away from the pressure of business, and his victorious way of carrying things through."

* The following incident—which we have on the authority of the late Lord Ampthill (October, 1882), though we cannot vouch for the accuracy of his Lordship's own information—is characteristic of the Prince's temper. At one of his entertainments he sharply rebuked a member of the Federal Council, who had officially incurred his displeasure. Smarting with shame and wounded pride the unfortunate diplomatist at once withdrew, and wrote his host a high-toned letter of expostulation. The Chancellor replied to this by requesting the Government of his offended guest to recall him from Berlin, and his Government hastened to comply with the Chancellor's demand by transferring its representative to St. Petersburg, where Bismarck himself had been similarly "placed in ice" about a score of years before. The Prince regretted this issue of the affair, but vowed he could not help it. "Had the man shown more spirit in the matter," he said afterwards, "it would have been different. It is true, I may have spoken to him somewhat rudely, but he ought to have answered me still more rudely there and then, and the thing would have been over. Instead of that he went away and wrote me an insolent letter in cold-blood, which I could not pardon."
cellor to his Press-secretary during the French war, "and yet you told me you were a master at the art of fine malice. Here there is more malice than fineness. You must reverse this. Write like a politician, and in politics it is not one's object to affront people. Write diplomatically; even in declaring war men are quite courteous." And again: "Politeness as far as the last step of the gallows, but hanging for all that. One can afford to be gruff only to one's friends, being convinced that they won't take it ill. How much sharper, for instance, one is with one's own wife than with other ladies."

Perhaps the most prominent and pleasing feature in the complex character of the Chancellor is his habit of plain speaking. "M. de Bismarck," wrote M. Jules Favre*—who certainly had a good opportunity of judging,—"appreciates above all things simplicity and precision in any one he is talking with. I have often seen him take credit to himself at having outwitted his adversaries by telling them the truth." And he is completely frank and outspoken even to perfect strangers—provided, of course, they are properly accredited. When Bayard Taylor went to Berlin (in 1878) as American Minister, he was perfectly astounded at the freedom with which the Chancellor conversed with him.†

"Yesterday," he wrote, "when I had my first interview with Bismarck, he began with, 'I read one of your books through with

† "Life and Letters of Bayard Taylor."
my wife during my late illness.' I passed an hour with him alone, in the garden behind his palace, and felt in ten minutes as if I had known him for years. I was astounded at the freedom with which he spoke, but I shall honour his confidence, and say nothing for years to come."

And again:

"On Saturday I had an hour's talk with Bismarck in the garden behind his palace; he being accompanied by a huge black dog, and I by a huge brown bitch. I tell you he is a great man! We talked only of books, birds, and trees, but the man's deepest nature opened now and then, and I saw his very self."

Further:

"I made the acquaintance of all the members of the Congress. After Gortchakoff. . . . I was most impressed by Beaconsfield. . . . But Bismarck is still a head higher than all these. . . . Think of seeing and talking with Bismarck, Gortchakoff, Beaconsfield, Andrassy, Waddington, Mehemet Ali Pasha, Curtius, Mommsen, Lepsius, Helmholz, Grant, &c., &c., the same day! They are all pleasant and accessible people, but Bismarck is an amazing man."

An amazing man, indeed! But yet one more to be dreaded and admired than loved; as, indeed, we are told by one who knows him well,* that "among the great personages who approach him—privy counsellors, ministers, ambassadors, princes even—there are many who fear him to an almost incredible degree, and who literally tremble before him." Men are his servants, not his companions; and woe to any of them who dares to cross or disobey his will. He acknowledges only one nominal master—

* "One of his own Countrymen," before quoted.
the Emperor; he has only one object in life—the greatness of his country. To this end all his thoughts and actions are subordinated; his feelings, his conscience, his health, his consideration for others—all are immolated on the altar of his patriotism and his power. He has few bosom-friends, apart from the members of his own family; and even these are not admitted into the inner circle of his political thoughts. Intensely jealous of his power and position, he has trained no one to be his successor; and his greatness seems to gain from the smallness of those around him. His relations to those who helped him to found the Empire—to the Moltkes, the Manteuffels, the Roons, and others—have been compared to a range of lofty Alpine peaks illumined by the golden rays of the setting sun, but separated from the central “monarch of mountains” by sunless valleys of snow. What Emperor of Rome, what Autocrat of all the Russians, ever exercised such absolute control over their subjects as the statesman who wields the one-man power in German politics, as well as in European diplomacy? And what representative of one-man power ever exercised his enormous influence so wisely and so well as the great phenomenal statesman who, in the graphic words of an English writer, has now become “a solitary Colossus with a continent for a pedestal?”

Many are the offerings of admiration which have been laid at the feet of this Colossus: but from the piles of eulogy that surround his pedestal we select the following wreath
of praise, which was woven by the hand of an English lady:—*

"When we speak of the German of the present day, we have all of us, unconsciously, the grand modern prototype in our minds—the man of blood and iron, the Hammer-man, the Thunderer, the Barge-sark, the Bismarck—the great typical heroic figure, that will go down to future ages colossal, momentous, immortal. He, the greatest, comes home to the smallest, to men's business and bosoms in a special manner; the likeness of him hangs in the humblest hut. But for him, Hans and Michel had not laid down their lives in French mire and clay; but for him, food were not so dear, nor widows so many, nor wives so few; but for him, taxes had not been so rigorous, nor money so scarce. Yet he is the idol of the populace—of that populace which erewhile stoned, lampooned, caricatured, and reviled him; of that populace that was nothing more than mud-seas at his feet on the vast field of the Fatherland.

"Now he reigns supreme; the contempt he once showed for them is become the enemy's portion; the people are grown his willing instruments. He has known how to read the signs of the times, to seize the chances of the moment, to wield and to weld; to mould the old order of things into a new order; to root out the republican rubes; to crush down the Radical spirit; to grasp the national mind; to hold the nation's heart; to venture, to succeed, to dare, and to do. The national vanity, the popular pride, have been flattered by his miraculous successes; surely a grateful people will foster their hero. Their good old Emperor is well enough, but even he had not been but for Bismarck. He, gallant old gentleman, has scruples, hesitations, tendernesses of conscience, regrets; is not much other than any private man—him we do not specially care to go out and greet. As for princes, clothed in soft raiment, dwelling in kings' palaces, their name is legion; but this man, der Einzige, the only One, unique; his like not again to be seen this side of eternity; a prophet, and more than a prophet—him we will worship, before him we will fall down. A gigantic mass of all that

* The author's of "Prince Bismarck: Friend or Foe?" as well as of "German Home Life," from the chapter of which, dealing with German Men, this extract has been taken.
makes Manhood, he carries a high look with him; fire and reality, as well as blood and iron, are in that great figure and big brain. He speaks, and it is as though the king of beasts sent his leonine roar before him through the forests of which he is lord. That orator, erst so eloquent, seems now but froth and fribble. The attempted epigram of the penultimate patriot dwindles into mere spite. Prudence becomes pedantry; warning, the mumblings of blind senile leaders of the blind; threat, the mere futile squeak of peevish incompetence. The little sneers have struck too low, they fall unheeded at his feet; he will not stoop to notice them; let them lie: but from his height, god-like, demonic, he will pour forth his lava-stream of scathing eloquence, which, by mere attraction of gravitation, reaches its destination in the infinite flats beneath him. This stinging tongue, this arrogant intellect, this ruthless will, this keen daring and restless ambition, what are they but the outcome of the ages? In him you see the typical German; the guerre-man, the war-man; the gar-man—the whole man; nay, rather a demi-god unfathomable, terrible. There is, in all modern history, no figure like this figure, no mind like this mind, unless it be the brief apparition of a Mirabeau or a background of unaccomplished destiny. A man for men to fear, for women to love; for, beside that primeval Titanic force, there dwells another man in him in strange and striking contrast with the Briareus of the Tribune—a gentle, genial, human-hearted man; witty, winning; loving the soft sound of women's voices, the beauty of bright eyes, the prattle of children, the yellowing woods, the setting sun."

But we have now reached the line which separates characterisation from criticism, and this line it is neither our duty nor our intention to cross. It is not necessary for us here to characterise Bismarck as a statesman as well as a man, seeing that this portion of our task has been sufficiently performed in the chapters devoted to his political activity. But when his actions as a statesman command such admiration from foreigners as is expressed in the
CHARACTERISTICS.

above extract, it can readily be fancied how the German people themselves think and feel towards the man but for whom they would lack all that now makes them the first nation on the Continent of Europe. Not that Bismarck has no foes and detractors among his own countrymen—his sleepless nights, his bilious attacks, and his fits of jaundice, prove the contrary of that. But the vast bulk of his countrymen regard him with something very much akin to feelings of prostrate admiration, and the fervency of their hero-worship is the principal source of his power over them. Gratitude can take no higher form, surely, than the complete subordination of will and judgment to its object. The German people, as a whole, have evinced their thankfulness towards their Chancellor, their Einzige, their Unique One, by freely surrendering the exercise of their discretion in fields of action wherein their Unifier has come to be regarded as simply infallible; and, after such a proof of their feeling, all other forms of manifesting it must seem feeble.

Yet their gratitude has not stopped here. For they have loaded him with riches; they have erected several statues to him while still alive; * they have given his name to a hundred different objects, including steam-engines, ironclads, Archipelagoes in the South Sea, and even cities in the Far West whither the tide of their emigration deeply flows; † and, to crown all, when his

* At Kissingen, Cologne, Magdeburg, at the Donnersberg in the Palatinate, and on one of the Harz mountains.
† In 1883 the territory of Dakota, in the United States, received a new capital in the City of Bismarck, instead of Yankton, which has hitherto
seventieth birthday, with all its triumphs of colonial policy, came round (1st April, 1885), they presented him with the munificent sum of £137,502, which had been contributed in small sums within the Fatherland, as well as by its wandering sons all over the world. With the greater part of this sum the Testimonial Committee redeemed that portion of the old ancestral property of Schönhausen, in the Mark of Brandenburg, which the Chancellor's father had been forced to part with. The Chancellor, said the Duke of Ratibor most happily, had restored Alsace-Lorraine to the German nation, and it was now meet and fitting that the German nation should evince its gratitude by restoring to its Chancellor the alienated portion of his own family estate.*

been the chief town. Bismarck is on the Missouri, and is one of the important railway stations of the Northern Pacific line, which crosses the Missouri at this point. Dakota has an area of about 230,000 square miles, being larger than France. It was first organised as a territory in 1861, the first white settlements having been established at Vermilion, Yankton, and Sioux Falls in the course of 1858-59. The census of June, 1880, gives 162,000 as the population of the whole territory, including Indians. The city of Bismarck is a specimen of rapid Western development.

* The residue (1,200,000 marks) of the sum collected was unselfishly devoted by the Chancellor to the endowment of what is called the "Schönhausen Foundation," intended to assist German candidates for University chairs, who, on passing the State examination, may not be in receipt of salaries, students preparing for University chairs, and widows of University professors. Prince Bismarck is the present administrator of the institution, and at his death this office will devolve upon the member of his family inheriting the Schönhausen estate. The celebration of Bismarck's seventieth birthday otherwise took the form of something like a national festival, of which the chief feature was a grand torchlight procession of historically-costumed students and guilds at Berlin. Among the congratulations received by the Chancellor on his birthday were telegrams from the Emperors of Russia and Austria, the Kings of Saxony, Sweden, Roumania, Württemberg, Bavaria, Siam, and of the Belgians, and the Sultan of
CHARACTERISTICS.

It was on this occasion that the Emperor, who had already exhausted all his ingenuity in devising means of evincing his gratitude to his Chancellor— who had lavished upon him all the copious armoury of his decorations, made him a Count and a Prince, as well as dowered him with expansive acres, and always loyally clung to him through evil and through good report—it was on this occasion, we say, that the aged Emperor, at the head of all the Princes of his House, repaired to the residence of his septuagenarian Chancellor, and, affectionately embracing him with tears in his eyes, begged him to accept a reduced and finely-executed copy of Anton von Werner's colossal painting of the "Proclamation of the Empire at Versailles," which was accompanied with the following autograph missive:—

"BERLIN, April 1, 1885.

"My dear Prince,—The German people having shown a warm desire to testify to you, on the occasion of your 70th birthday, that the recollection of all you have done for the greatness of the Fatherland lives in so many grateful hearts, I, too, feel strongly impelled to tell you how deeply gratified I am that such a feeling of thankfulness and veneration for you moves the nation. I am rejoiced at this, for you have most richly earned this recognition, and my heart is warmed at seeing such sentiments manifested in so great a measure, for it dignifies the nation in the present, and strengthens our hopes of its future, when it shows appreciation of the true and the great, and when it celebrates and honours its most meritorious men.

"To me, and to my House, it is an especial pleasure to take part in such a festival; and, by the accompanying picture, we wish to

Zanzibar. Altogether Prince Bismarck received on his birthday 2,100 letters of congratulation, and over 3,500 telegrams, the latter containing a total of about 100,000 words, from all parts of the world.
convey to you with what feelings of grateful recollection we do this. seeing that it calls to mind one of the greatest moments in the history of the House of Hohenzollern—one which can never be thought of without at the same time recalling your merits.

"You, my dear Prince, know how I shall always be animated towards you with feelings of the fullest confidence, of the most sincere affection, and of the warmest gratitude. But, in saying this, I tell you nothing which I have not often enough already repeated to you, and methinks that this painting will enable your latest descendants to realise that your Kaiser and King, as well as his House, were well conscious of what they had to thank you for.

"With these sentiments and feelings, which will last beyond the grave, I end these lines.

"Your grateful, faithful, and devoted Kaiser and King,

"Wilhelm."
APPENDIX A.

Treaty concluded at Vienna on the 30th October, 1864, between Austria (Emperor Francis Joseph I.) and Prussia (King William I.) on the one side, and Denmark (King Christian IX.) on the other.

Article 1.—Peace and friendship shall exist from this time forth between their Majesties the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Denmark, and between their heirs and successors, their States and subjects.

Article 2.—All stipulations and agreements which existed between the contracting Powers before the war shall again come into force, in so far as they have not become annulled or modified by the sense of the present Treaty.

Article 3.—His Majesty the King of Denmark gives up all rights in the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg, in favour of their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, and binds himself to acknowledge any arrangements relative to these Duchies which their aforementioned Majesties may make.

Articles 4 to 23 refer to the details of cession, delimitation, debt of the Duchies, political status of the ceded population, &c., all of which may be omitted here as not bearing on our central line of historical narrative.

APPENDIX B.

CONVENTION OF GASTEIN.

Article 1.—The common right obtained by the high contracting parties by Art. 3 of the Treaty of Vienna of the 30th of October, 1864, is transferred, as respects the Duchy of Holstein, to
APPENDIX B.

his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and as respects the Duchy of Schleswig, to his Majesty the King of Prussia, without prejudice to the continuation of these rights of both Powers to the whole of both Duchies.

Article 2.—The high contracting parties will propose in the Diet the establishment of a German fleet, and appoint the port of Kiel as the Federal harbour. Until the putting in execution of the consequent Dietal decree, this port to be made use of by the ships of war of both Powers, the commandship and police of the port to be exercised by Prussia. At Friederichsort, opposite the entrance, Prussia is authorised to erect the necessary defensive works, as well as to construct such marine establishments on the Holstein shore as are requisite for a port of war. These fortifications and establishments are to be likewise under Prussian command, and the Prussian marines and sailors required for garrisoning and protection thereof may be quartered in Kiel and the vicinity.

Article 3.—The high contracting parties will propose at Frankfort to establish Rendsburg as a Federal fortress. Until the Diet has regulated the mode of garrisoning this fortress, the garrison is to be composed of Imperial Austrian and Royal Prussian troops, with the command alternating yearly, on the 1st of July.

Article 4.—Until the carrying out of the partition stipulated by Art. 1 of this Convention, the Prussian Government shall have possession of two military roads through Holstein; the one from Lübeck to Kiel, the other from Hamburg to Rendsburg. Special regulations as to the places of halt are to be made as soon as possible by a separate convention, as well as for the transporting and providing for the troops: until this is done, the existing regulations for the Prussian march-routes through Hanover to be in force.

Article 5.—The Prussian Government has the privilege of using a telegraphic wire for communication between Kiel and Rendsburg, and the right for its Post-office carriages, with its own employés, to circulate on both railway lines throughout the Duchy of Holstein.

Inasmuch as the construction of a direct railroad from Lübeck to Kiel across the boundary of Schleswig is not yet assured, the concession for the same shall be granted on the usual conditions if requisition is made by Prussia so far as regards Holstein territory
CONVENTION OF GASTEIN.

—without any demand of sovereign rights, as respects the railroad, on the part of Prussia.

ARTICLE 6.—The high contracting parties hold the common intent, that the Duchies shall accede to the German Customs Union. Each Duchy, until further arrangement, maintains the system of customs hitherto subsisting, with equal partition of revenue, until union with the Zollverein. In case it seems expedient to the Royal Prussian Government to open negotiations for the accession of the Duchies to the Zollverein, pending the duration of the separation which has been agreed upon by Art. 1 of the present Treaty, his Majesty the Emperor of Austria is ready to name a plenipotentiary to take part in such negotiation.

ARTICLE 7.—Prussia has the right of directing through Holstein territory the intended North Sea Canal, which is to be built after the plans of the technical surveys instituted by the Royal Government; that is to say, Prussia has the right of prescribing the direction and the dimensions of the Canal, to acquire—by way of expropriation and for payment of its value—the land required for the construction, to direct the building, to have the supervision and maintenance of the Canal, and to exercise the faculty of enacting all regulatory ordonnances.

No transit duties or imposts on vessel or cargo, beyond those similar normal ship-tolls for use of the Canal which Prussia will establish for the vessels of all nations, are to be exacted upon the whole extent of the Canal.

ARTICLE 8.—This Convention makes no change in the stipulations of the Vienna Treaty of 30th of October, 1864, as to the financial services to be respectively at the charge of the Duchies of Denmark, and of Austria and Prussia; but the Duchy of Lauenburg shall be freed from all contribution to war costs. The repartition of these costs between the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig shall be made in proportion to the population.

ARTICLE 9.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria gives over to his Majesty the King of Prussia the rights accruing to him, by the oft-cited Treaty of Vienna, to the Duchy of Lauenburg, in exchange for which cession the Royal Prussian Government binds itself to pay the Imperial Austrian Government the sum of two millions five hundred thousand Danish rixthalers, payable in Berlin in
APPENDIX C.

Prussian specie, within four weeks after ratification of the present Treaty by their Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia.

ARTICLE 10.—The execution of the hereinbefore-agreed-upon partition of the joint sovereignty shall follow as speedily as possible upon the ratification of this Convention by their Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, and at latest be carried out by the 15th of September.

The hitherto subsisting common commandership-in-chief shall be dissolved at latest on the 15th of September, after termination of the evacuation of Schleswig by the Austrian and of Holstein by the Prussian troops.

Signed at Gastein, the 14th of August, 1865,

(Signed) G. Blome, M.P.
(Signed) V. Bismarck, M.P.

APPENDIX C.

TREATY OF PRAGUE.

In the name of the Holy and Indivisible Trinity.

His Majesty the King of Prussia and His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, animated by a desire of restoring the blessings of peace to their dominions, have resolved to convert the Preliminaries signed at Nikolsburg on the 26th of July, 1866, into a definitive Treaty of Peace.

To this end their Majesties have appointed their plenipotentiaries as follows:—

His Majesty the King of Prussia:—

His Kammerherr, Effective Privy Councillor and Plenipotentiary, Charles Baron von Werther, Grand Cross of the Royal Prussian Order of the Red Eagle with Oak-leaves, and of the Imperial Austrian Order of Leopold; and,

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria:—

His Effective Privy Councillor and Kammerherr, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Adolph Marie Baron von Brenner
Tilsach, of the Imperial Austrian Order of Leopold, and Knight of the Royal Prussian Order of the Red Eagle, First Class, &c.

Who have met in Conference at Prague, and having exchanged their powers, drawn up in good and proper form, have agreed to the following Articles:—

**ARTICLE 1.**—For the future there shall be lasting peace and friendship between His Majesty the King of Prussia and His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, as well as between their heirs and descendants, their States and subjects.

**ARTICLE 2.**—That the 6th Article of the Preliminaries of Peace signed at Nikolsburg on the 26th of July of this year may be carried out; and inasmuch as His Majesty the Emperor of the French, by his authorised emissary to His Majesty the King of Prussia, officially declared at Nikolsburg on the 29th of the same month of July, qu'en ce qui concerne le Gouvernement de l'Empereur la Vénise est acquise à l'Italie pour lui être remise à la paix, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria on his part conforms to this declaration, and gives his consent to the union of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom with the Kingdom of Italy, without imposing any other condition than the liquidation of those debts which have been acknowledged charges on the territories now resigned, in conformity with the Treaty of Zurich.

**ARTICLE 3.**—The prisoners of war shall be at once released on both sides.

**ARTICLE 4.**—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria recognises the dissolution of the late German Bund, and gives his consent to a new formation of Germany, in which the Imperial State of Austria shall take no part. Moreover, His Majesty promises to recognise the closer Federal relations which His Majesty the King of Prussia is about to establish north of the line of the Main, and also agrees that the German States to the south of this line shall form a Union, the national connection of which with the Northern Confederacy is reserved for a more defined agreement between both parties, and which is to maintain an international independent existence.

**ARTICLE 5.**—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria transfers to His Majesty the King of Prussia all the rights he acquired under the Peace of Vienna on the 30th of October, 1864, to the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig, with the understanding that the people of
the northern district of Schleswig, if, by free vote they express a wish to be united to Denmark, shall be ceded to Denmark accordingly.

ARTICLE 6.—At the desire of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, His Majesty the King of Prussia declares himself willing, on the approaching changes in Germany, to allow the territory of the Kingdom of Saxony to remain within its present limits, reserving to himself the right of settling in a separate Treaty of Peace with the King of Saxony the share to be contributed by Saxony towards the expenses of the war, and the position henceforth to be held by the Kingdom of Saxony within the North German Confederation. On the other hand, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria promises to recognise the changes about to be made in North Germany by His Majesty the King of Prussia, territorial changes included.

ARTICLE 7. —In order to settle the property of the late Bund a Commission shall meet at Frankfort-on-the-Main within, at most, six weeks after the ratification of the present Treaty, at which all formal claims and demands upon the German Bund are to be made, and to be liquidated within six months. Prussia and Austria will be represented in this Commission, and all the States belonging to the late Bund are allowed the same privilege.

ARTICLE 8.—Austria is at liberty to take from the forts of the late Bund all that belongs to the Empire, and from the movable property of the Bund the proportionate share of Austria, or otherwise to dispose thereof. This provision extends to all the movable property of the Bund.

ARTICLE 9.—The civil officers, servants, and pensioners of the Bund will receive the pensions already accorded in due proportion, but the Royal Prussian Government undertakes to manage the pensions and allowances hitherto paid from the Treasury of the Bund to the officers of the late Schleswig-Holstein army and their families.

ARTICLE 10.—The allowance of the pensions granted by the Imperial Austrian Government in Holstein is agreed upon. The sum of 449,500 dollars Danish in 4 per cent. Danish bonds now lodged in the hands of the Imperial Austrian Government, and belonging to the Holstein Treasury, will be repaid immediately after the ratification of this Treaty. No adherent of the Duchies of
Holstein and Schleswig, and no subject of their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, is to be prosecuted, troubled, or in any way molested in his person or his property on account of his political position during recent events and the recent war.

**Article 11.**—In order to defray a portion of the expenses incurred by Prussia on account of the war, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria promises to pay to His Majesty the King of Prussia the sum of 40,000,000 Prussian dollars. From this sum, however, the amount of the costs of war which, by virtue of the 12th Article of the before-mentioned Treaty of Vienna of the 30th of October, 1864, His Majesty the Emperor claims from the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and which are valued at 15,000,000 Prussian dollars, together with 5,000,000 Prussian dollars as an equivalent for the free maintenance of the Prussian army in the Austrian States which it occupied till the conclusion of the peace, is to be deducted, so that only 20,000,000 Prussian dollars remain to be paid. Of this sum half is to be paid on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, the other half three weeks afterwards.

**Article 12.**—The evacuation of the Austrian territories now occupied by the Royal Prussian troops will be completed within three weeks after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty. From the day of such exchange the Prussian General Governments will confine their operations to purely military matters. The details with respect to the manner in which this evacuation is to be effected are settled in a separate protocol, which forms an appendix to this Treaty.

**Article 13.**—All treaties and agreements made by the high contracting parties before the war are hereby revived in full force, so far as they are not invalidated by the dissolution of the German Bund. More especially the General Convention between the States of the German Confederation on the 10th of February, 1831, together with more recent resolutions thereto appertaining, will remain in full force as between Prussia and Austria. The Imperial Austrian Government declares, however, that the Coinage Treaty of the 24th of February, 1857, is deprived of its chief value for Austria by the dissolution of the German Bund, and the Royal Prussian Government declares itself ready to join with Austria and the other interested parties in the negotiations that may arise on the abolition of
APPENDIX D.

this Treaty. The high contracting parties likewise agree that as soon as possible they will enter into negotiations for a revision of the Commercial Treaty of the 11th of April, 1865, with a view to a further alleviation of burdens on both sides. In the meanwhile, the said Treaty is restored to its full force, with this provision, that both the high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to cancel it after six months' notice.

ARTICLE 14.—The ratifications of the present Treaty shall be exchanged at Prague within a week, or, if possible, within a shorter period.

In witness whereof, &c. WERTHER.

BRENNER.

PRAGUE, August 23rd, 1866.

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APPENDIX D.

Traité de paix entre l'Empire allemand et la France.

Du 10 Mai 1871.

Le Prince Othon de Bismarck-Schoenhausen, Chancelier de l'Empire germanique,
le Comte Harry d'Arnim, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de S. M. l'Empereur d'Allemagne près du St. Siège,
stipulant au nom de S. M. l'Empereur d'Allemagne,
d'un côté,
de l'autre
M. Jules Favre, Ministre des affaires étrangères de la République française,
M. Augustin Thomas Joseph Pouyer-Quertier, Ministre des finances de la République française, et
M. Marc Thomas Eugène de Goulard, Membre de l'Assemblée nationale,
stipulant au nom de la République française,
s'étant mis d'accord pour convertir en traité de paix définitif le traité
TREATY OF FRANKFORT.

de préliminaire de paix du 26 février de l'année courante, modifié
ainsi qu'il va l'être par les dispositions qui suivent,
on arrêté :

ARTICLE 1.—La distance de la ville de Belfort à la ligne de fron-
tière telle qu'elle a été d'abord proposée lors des négociations de
Versailles et telle qu'elle se trouve marquée sur la carte annexée à
l'instrument ratifié du traité des préliminaires du 26 février, est
considérée comme indiquant la mesure du rayon qui, en vertu de la
clause y relative du premier Article des préliminaires, doit rester à la
France avec la ville et les fortifications de Belfort.

Le Gouvernement allemand est disposé à élargir ce rayon de
manière qu'il comprenne les cantons de Belfort, de Delle et de
Giromagny, ainsi que la partie occidentale du canton de Fontaine à
l'ouest d'une ligne à tracer du point où le canal du Rhin au Rhône
sort du canton de Delle au sud de Montreux-Château jusqu'à la limite
nord du canton entre Bourg et Felon où cette ligne joindrait la limite
est du canton de Giromagny.

Le Gouvernement allemand, toutefois, ne cédera les territoires
susindiqués qu'à la condition que la République française, de son
côté, consentira à une rectification de frontière le long des limites
occidentales des cantons de Cattenom et de Thionville qui laisseront
à l'Allemagne le terrain à l'est d'une ligne partant de la frontière du
Luxembourg entre Hussigny et Redingen, laissant à la France les
villages de Thil et de Villers-le-Bocage, se prolongeant entre Erronville et
Aunez, entre Beuvillers et Boullange, entre Trieu et Lommeringen,
et joignant l'ancienne ligne de frontière entre Avril et Moyeuvre.

La Commission internationale dont il est question dans l'art. 1er
des préliminaires, se rendra sur le terrain immédiatement après
l'échange des ratifications du présent traité pour exécuter les travaux
qui lui incombent et pour faire le tracé de la nouvelle frontière
conformément aux dispositions précédentes.

ARTICLE 2.—Les sujets français originaires des territoires cédés
domiciliés actuellement sur ce territoire qui entendront conserver la
nationalité française, jouiront jusqu'au premier octobre 1872 et
moyennant une déclaration préalable, faite à l'autorité compétente,
de la faculté de transporter leur domicile en France et de s'y fixer,
sans que ce droit puisse être altéré par les lois sur le service militaire,
aucuel cas la qualité de citoyen français leur sera maintenue. Ils
APPENDIX D.

seront libres de conserver leurs immeubles situés sur le territoire réuni à l'Allemagne.

Aucun habitant des territoires cédés ne pourra être poursuivi, inquisité ou recherché dans sa personne ou dans ses biens à raison de ses actes politiques ou militaires pendant la guerre.

**ARTICLE 3.**—Le Gouvernement français remettra au Gouvernement allemand les archives, documents et registres concernant l'administration civile, militaire et judiciaire des territoires cédés. Si quelques-uns de ces titres avaient été déplacés, ils seront restitués par le Gouvernement français sur la demande du Gouvernement allemand.

**ARTICLE 4.**—Le Gouvernement français remettra au Gouvernement de l'Empire d'Allemagne dans le terme de six mois à dater de l'échange des ratifications de ce traité :

1° le montant des sommes déposées par les départements, les communes et les établissements publics des territoires cédés ;

2° le montant des primes d'enrôlement et de remplacement appartenant aux militaires et marins originaires des territoires cédés qui auront opté pour la nationalité allemande ;

3° le montant des cautionnements des comptables de l'État ;

4° le montant des sommes versées pour consignations judiciaires par suite de mesures prises par les autorités administratives ou judiciaires dans les territoires cédés.

**ARTICLE 5.**—Les deux nations jouiront d'un traitement égal en ce qui concerne la navigation sur la Moselle, le canal du Rhin à la Marne, le canal du Rhône au Rhin, le canal de la Sarre et les eaux navigables communiquant avec ces voies de navigation. Le droit de flottage sera maintenu.

**ARTICLE 6.**—Les Hautes Parties contractantes, étant d'avis que les circonscriptions diocésaines des territoires cédés à l'Empire allemand doivent conserver avec la nouvelle frontière déterminée par l'article 1er ci-dessus, se concertèrent après la ratification du présent traité, sans retard, sur les mesures à prendre en commun à cet effet.

Les communautés appartenant, soit à l'église réformée, soit à la confession d'Augsbourg, établies sur les territoires cédés par la France, cesseront de relever de l'autorité ecclésiastique française.

Les communautés de l'église de la confession d'Augsbourg établies
dans les territoires français cesseront de relever du consistoire supérieur et du directeur siégeant à Strasbourg.

Les communautés israélites des territoires situés à l’est de la nouvelle frontière cesseront de dépendre du consistoire central israélite siégeant à Paris.

**Article 7.—** Le payement de cinq cent millions aura lieu dans les trente jours qui suivront le rétablissement de l’autorité du Gouvernement français dans la ville de Paris. Un milliard sera payé dans le courant de l’année et un demi-milliard au 1er mai mil huit cent soixante-douze. Les trois derniers milliards resteront payables au 2 mars mil huit cent soixante-quatorze, ainsi qu’il a été stipulé par le traité de paix préliminaire. À partir du 2 mars de l’année courante, les intérêts de ces trois milliards de francs seront payés chaque année, le 3 mars, à raison de cinq pour cent par an.

Toute somme payée en avance sur les trois derniers milliards cessera de porter des intérêts à partir du jour du payement effectué.

Tous les payements ne pourront être faits que dans les principales villes de commerce de l’Allemagne et seront effectués en métal, ou en argent, en billets de la banque d'Angleterre, billets de la banque de Prusse, billets de la banque royale des Pays-Bas, billets de la banque nationale de Belgique, en billets à ordre ou en lettres de change négociables de premier ordre valeur comptant.

Le Gouvernement allemand ayant fixé en France la valeur du thaler prussien à trois francs soixante-quinze centimes, le Gouvernement français accepte la conversion des monnaies des deux pays au taux ci-dessus indiqué.

Le Gouvernement français informera le Gouvernement allemand, trois mois d’avance, de tout payement qu’il compte faire aux caisses de l’Empire allemand.

Après le payement du premier demi-milliard et la ratification du traité de paix définitif, les départements de la Somme, de la Seine-Inférieure et de l’Eure seront évacués en tant qu’ils se trouveront encore occupés par les troupes allemandes. L’évacuation des départements de l’Oise, de Seine-et-Oise, de Seine-et-Marne et de la Seine, ainsi que celle des forts de Paris, aura lieu aussitôt que le Gouvernement allemand jugera le rétablissement de l’ordre, tant en France que dans Paris, suffisant pour assurer l’exécution des engagements contractés par la France.
Dans tous les cas, cette évacuation aura lieu lors du payement du troisième demi-milliard.

Les troupes allemandes, dans l'intérêt de leur sécurité, auront la disposition de la zone neutre située entre la ligne de démarcation allemande et l'enceinte de Paris sur la rive droite de la Seine.

Les stipulations du traité du 26 février relatives à l'occupation des territoires français après le payement de deux milliards resteront en vigueur. Aucune des déductions que le Gouvernement français serait en droit de faire ne pourra être exercée sur le payement des cinq cents premiers millions.

Article 8.—Les troupes allemandes continueront à s'abstenir des réquisitions en nature et en argent dans les territoires occupés; cette obligation de leur part étant correlative aux obligations contractées pour leur entretien par le Gouvernement français,—dans le cas où malgré des réclamations réitérées du Gouvernement allemand le Gouvernement français serait en retard d'exécuter lesdites obligations, les troupes allemandes auront le droit de se procurer ce qui sera nécessaire à leurs besoins en levant des impôts et des réquisitions dans les départements occupés et même en dehors de ceux-ci, si leurs ressources n'étaient pas suffisantes.

Relativement à l'alimentation des troupes allemandes, le régime actuellement en vigueur sera maintenu jusqu'à l'évacuation des forts de Paris.

En vertu de la Convention de Ferrières du 11 mars 1871, les réductions indiquées par cette convention seront mises à exécution après l'évacuation des forts.

Dès que l'effectif de l'armée allemande sera réduit au-dessous du chiffre de cinq cent mille hommes, il sera tenu compte des réductions opérées au dessous de ce chiffre pour établir une diminution proportionnelle dans le prix d'entretien des troupes payé par le Gouvernement français.

Article 9.—Le traitement exceptionnel accordé maintenant aux produits de l'industrie des territoires cédés pour l'importation en France sera maintenu pour un espace de temps de six mois, depuis le 1er mars, dans les conditions faites avec les délégués de l'Alsace.

Article 10.—Le Gouvernement allemand continuera à faire rentrer les prisonniers de guerre en s'entendant avec le Gouvernement français. Le Gouvernement français renverra dans leurs foyers...
TREATY OF FRANKFORT.

ceux de ces prisonniers qui sont libéraux. Quant à ceux qui n'ont
pas achevé leur temps de service, ils se retireront derrière la Loire.
Il est entendu que l'armée de Paris et de Versailles, après le
rétablissement de l'autorité du Gouvernement français à Paris et
jusqu'à l'évacuation des forts par les troupes allemandes, n'excédera
pas quatre-vingt mille hommes.

Jusqu'à cette évacuation, le Gouvernement français ne pourra
faire aucune concentration de troupes sur la rive droite de la Loire,
mais il pourvoira aux garnisons régulières de villes placées dans cette
zone, suivant les nécessités du maintien de l'ordre et de la paix
publique.

Au fur et à mesure que s'opérera l'évacuation, les chefs de corps
conviendront ensemble d'une zone neutre entre les armées des deux
nations.

Vingt mille prisonniers seront dirigés sans délai sur Lyon, à la
condition qu'ils seront expédiés immédiatement en Algérie après leur
organisation pour être employés dans cette colonie.

ARTICLE 11.—Les traités de commerce avec les différents États
de l'Allemagne ayant été annulés par la guerre, le Gouvernement
allemand et le Gouvernement français prendront pour base de leurs
relations commerciales le régime du traitement réciproque sur le
pied de la nation la plus favorisée.

Sont compris dans cette règle les droits d'entrée et de sortie, le
transit, les formalités douanières, l'admission et le traitement des
sujets des deux nations ainsi que de leurs agents.

Toutefois, seront exceptées de la règle susdite les faveurs qu'une
des parties contractantes, par des traités de commerce, a accordées ou
accordera à des États autres que ceux qui suivent : l'Angleterre, la
Belgique, les Pays-Bas, la Suisse, l'Autriche, la Russie.

Les traités de navigation, ainsi que la convention relative au
service international des chemins de fer dans ses rapports avec la
douane et la convention pour la garantie réciproque de la propriété
des œuvres d'esprit et d'art seront remis en vigueur.

Néanmoins, le Gouvernement français se réserve la faculté
d'établir, sur les navires allemands et leurs cargaisons, des droits de
tonnage et de pavillon, sous la réserve que ces droits ne soient pas
plus élevés que ceux qui grèveront les bâtiments et les cargaisons des
sus-mentionnées.
APPENDIX D.

Article 12.—Tous les Allemands expulsés conserveront la jouissance pleine et entière de tous les biens qu’ils ont acquis en France.

Ceux des Allemands qui avaient obtenu l’autorisation exigée par les lois françaises pour fixer leur domicile en France sont réintégrés dans tous leurs droits et peuvent, en conséquence, établir de nouveau leur domicile sur le territoire français.

Le délai stipulé par les lois françaises pour obtenir naturalisation sera considéré comme n’étant pas interrompu par l’état de guerre pour les personnes qui profiteront de la faculté ci-dessus mentionnée de revenir en France dans un délai de six mois après l’échange des ratifications de ce traité, et il sera tenu compte du temps écoulé entre leur expulsion et leur retour sur le territoire français, comme s’ils n’avaient jamais cessé de résider en France.

Les conditions ci-dessus seront appliquées en parfaite reciprocité aux sujets français résidant ou désirant résider en Allemagne.

Article 13.—Les bâtiments allemands qui étaient condamnés par les conseils de prise avant le 2 mars 1871 seront considérés comme condamnés définitivement.

Ceux qui n’auraient pas été condamnés à la date sus-indiquée seront rendus avec la cargaison en tant qu’elle existe encore. Si la restitution des bâtiments et de la cargaison n’est plus possible, leur valeur, fixée d’après le prix de la vente, sera rendue à leurs propriétaires.

Article 14.—Chacune des deux parties continuera sur son territoire les travaux entrepris pour la canalisation de la Moselle. Les intérêts communs des parties séparées des deux départements de la Meurthe et de la Moselle seront liquidés.

Article 15.—Les Hautes Parties contractantes s’engagent mutuellement à étendre aux sujets respectifs les mesures qu’elles pourront juger utiles d’adopter en faveur de ceux de leurs nations qui, par suite des événements de la guerre, auraient été mis dans l’impossibilité d’arriver en temps utile à la sauvegarde ou à la conservation de leurs droits.

Article 16.—Les deux Gouvernements, allemand et français, s’engagent réciproquement à faire respecter et entretenir les tombes des soldats ensevelis sur leurs territoires respectifs.

Article 17.—Le règlement des points accessoires sur lesquels un accord doit être établi, en conséquence de ce traité et du traité
préliminaire, sera l'objet de négociations ultérieures qui auront lieu à Francfort.

ARTICLE 18.—Les ratifications du présent traité par Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne
d'un côté,
et de l'autre
par l'Assemblée nationale et par le Chef du Pouvoir exécutif de la République française, seront échangées à Francfort dans le délai de dix jours ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signé et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs armes.

Fait à Francfort, le 10 mai 1871.

V. Bismarck. (L.S.)        Jules Favre. (L.S.)
Arnim. (L.S.)             Pouver-Quertier. (L.S.)
                        E. de Goulard. (L.S.)

ARTICLES ADDITIONNELS.

ARTICLE 1.—§ 1. D'ici à l'époque fixée pour l'échange des ratifications du présent traité, le Gouvernement français usera de son droit de rachat de la concession donnée à la Compagnie des chemins de fer de l'Est. Le Gouvernement allemand sera subrogé à tous les droits que le Gouvernement français aura acquis par le rachat des concessions en ce qui concerne les chemins de fer situés dans les territoires cédés, soit achevés, soit en construction.

§ 2. Seront compris dans cette concession:

1° tous les terrains appartenant à ladite Compagnie, quelle que soit leur destination, ainsi que : établissements de gares et de stations, hangars, ateliers et magasins, maisons de garde de voie, etc. etc.;

2° tous les immeubles qui en dépendent, ainsi que : barrières, clôtures, changements de voie, aiguilles, plaques tournantes, prises d'eaux, grues hydrauliques, machines fixes, etc. etc.;

3° tous les matériaux, combustibles et approvisionnements de tout genre, mobiliers des gares, outillages des ateliers et des gares, etc. etc.;

4° les sommes dues à la Compagnie des chemins de fer de l'Est à titre de subvention accordées par des corporations ou personnes domiciliées dans les territoires cédés.
§ 3. Sera exclu de cette cession le matériel roulant. Le Gouvernement allemand remettra la part du matériel roulant avec ses accessoires qui se trouverait en sa possession au Gouvernement français.

§ 4. Le Gouvernement français s'engage à libérer envers l'Empire allemand entièrement les chemins de fer cédés ainsi que leurs dépendances de tous les droits que des tiers pourraient faire valoir, nommément des droits des obligataires. Il s'engage également à se substituer, le cas échéant, au Gouvernement allemand, relativement aux réclamations qui pourraient être élevées vis-à-vis du Gouvernement allemand par les créanciers des chemins de fer en question.

§ 5. Le Gouvernement français prendra à sa charge les réclamations que la Compagnie des chemins de fer de l'Est pourrait élever vis-à-vis du Gouvernement allemand ou de ses mandataires par rapport à l'exploitation desdits chemins de fer et à l'usage des objets indiqués dans le § 2 ainsi que du matériel roulant.

Le Gouvernement allemand communiquera au Gouvernement français, à sa demande, tous les documents et toutes les indications qui pourraient servir à constater les faits sur lesquels s'appuieront les réclamations susmentionnées.

§ 6. Le Gouvernement allemand payera au Gouvernement français, pour la cession des droits de propriété indiqués dans les §§ 1 et 2 et en titre d'équivalent pour l'engagement pris par le Gouvernement français dans le § 4, le somme de trois cent vingt-cinq millions (325,000,000) de francs.

On défalquera cette somme de l'indemnité de guerre stipulée dans l'article 7. Vu que la situation qui a servi de base à la convention conclue entre la Compagnie des chemins de fer de l'Est et la Société Royale Grand-Ducale des chemins de fer Guillaume-Luxembourg en date du 6 juin 1857 et du 21 janvier 1868, et celle conclue entre le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg et les Sociétés des chemins de fer Guillaume-Luxembourg et de l'Est français en date du 5 décembre 1868 a été modifiée essentiellement de manière qu'elles ne sont applicables à l'état des choses créé par les stipulations contenues dans le § 1, le Gouvernement allemand se déclare prêt à se substituer aux droits et aux charges résultant de ces conventions pour la Compagnie des chemins de fer de l'Est.

Pour le cas où le Gouvernement français serait subrogé, soit par le rachat de la concession de la Compagnie de l'Est, soit par une
entente spéciale, aux droits acquis par cette société en vertu des conventions sus-indiquées, il s'engage à céder gratuitement dans un délai de six semaines ces droits au Gouvernement allemand.

Pour le cas où ladite subrogation ne s'effectuerait pas, le Gouvernement français n'accordera des concessions pour les lignes de chemin de fer appartenant à la Compagnie de l'Est et situées dans le territoire français que sous la condition expresse que le concessionnaire n'exploite point les lignes de chemin de fer situées dans le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.

**Article 2.**—Le Gouvernement allemand offre deux millions de francs pour les droits et les propriétés que possède la Compagnie des chemins de fer de l'Est sur la partie de son réseau située sur le territoire Suisse, de la frontière à Bâle, si le Gouvernement français lui fait tenir le consentement dans le délai d'un mois.

**Article 3.**—La cession de territoire auprès de Belfort, offerte par le Gouvernement allemand dans l'article 1er du présent traité en échange de la rectification de frontière demandée à l'ouest de Thionville, sera augmentée des territoires des villages suivants : Rouge-mont, Leval, Petite-Fontaine, Romagny, Félon, La Chapelle-sous-Rougemont, Angot, Vauthiermont, La Rivière, La Grange, Reppe, Fontaine, Frais, Foussemagne, Cunelières, Montreux-Châteaux, Bretagne, Chavannes-les-Grands, Chavanatte, Suarce.

La route de Giomagny à Remiremont passant au ballon d'Alsace restera à la France dans tout son parcours et servira de limite, en tant qu'elle est située en dehors du canton de Giomagny.

Fait à Francfort, le 10 mai 1871.

**Jules Favre, Puyer-Quertier, E. de Goulard.**

Fait à Francfort a. M., le 10 mai 1871.

Les soussignés, après avoir entendu la lecture du traité de paix définitif, l’ont trouvé conforme à ce qui a été convenu entre eux.

En vertu de quoi ils l’ont muni de leurs signatures.

Les trois articles additionnels ont été signés séparément. Il est entendu qu’ils feront partie intégrale du traité de paix.
Le soussigné Chancelier de l'Empire allemand a déclaré qu'il se charge de communiquer le traité aux Gouvernements de Bavière, de Würtemberg, et de Bade et d'obtenir leurs accessions.

V. Bismarck. Jules Favre.
Arnim. Poulter-Quertier.
E. de Goulard.

APPENDIX E.

PRUSSIAN CONSTITUTION OF 31ST JANUARY, 1850,
WITH SUBSEQUENT ALTERATIONS.

We, Frederick William, &c., hereby proclaim and give to know that, whereas the Constitution of the Prussian State, promulgated by us on the 5th December, 1848, subject to revision in the ordinary course of legislation, and recognised by both Chambers of our Kingdom, has been submitted to the prescribed revision; we have finally established that Constitution in agreement with both Chambers.

Now, therefore, we promulgate, as a fundamental law of the State, as follows:

TITLE I.

Touching the State Territory.

Article 1.—All parts of the Monarchy in its present extent form the Prussian State Territory.

Article 2.—The limits of this State Territory can only be altered by law.

TITLE II.

Touching the Rights of Prussians.

Article 3.—The Constitution and the laws determine under what conditions the quality and civil rights of a Prussian may be acquired, exercised, and forfeited

Article 4.—All Prussians are equal before the law. Class privileges there are none. Public offices, subject to the conditions
imposed by law, are equally accessible to all who are competent to hold them.

**Article 5.**—Personal freedom is guaranteed. The forms and conditions under which any limitation thereof, especially arrest, is permissible, will be determined by law.

**Article 6.**—The domicile is inviolable. Intrusion and search therein, as well as the seizing of letters and papers, are only allowed in legally settled cases.

**Article 7.**—No one may be deprived of his lawful judge. Exceptional tribunals and extraordinary commissions are inadmissible.

**Article 8.**—Punishments can only be threatened or inflicted according to the law.

**Article 9.**—Property is inviolable. It can only be taken or curtailed from reasons of public weal and expediency, and in return for statutory compensation which, in urgent cases at least, shall be fixed beforehand.

**Article 10.**—Civil death and confiscation of property, as punishments, are not possible.

**Article 11.**—Freedom of emigration can only be limited by the State, with reference to military service. Migration fees may not be levied.

**Article 12.**—Freedom of religious confession, of meeting in religious societies (Art. 30 and 31), and of the common exercise of religion in private and public, is guaranteed. The enjoyment of civil and political rights is independent of religious belief, yet the duties of a citizen or a subject may not be impaired by the exercise of religious liberty.

**Article 13.**—Religious and clerical societies, which have no corporate rights, can only acquire those rights by special laws.

**Article 14.**—The Christian religion is taken as the basis of those State institutions which are connected with the exercise of religion—all religious liberty guaranteed by Art. 12 notwithstanding.

**Article 15 (abolished by one of the Falk Laws, 18th June, 1875).**

—The Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches, as well as every other religious society, regulate and administer their own affairs in an independent manner, and remain in possession and enjoyment of
APPENDIX E.

the institutions, foundations, and moneys intended for their purposes of public worship, education, and charity.

Article 16 (likewise abrogated as above).—Intercourse between religious societies and their superiors shall be unobstructed. The making public of Church ordinances is only subject to those restrictions imposed on all other publications.

Article 17.—A special law will be passed with respect to Church patronage, and to the conditions on which it may be abolished.

Article 18 (abrogated as above).—Abolished is the right of nominating, proposing, electing, and confirming, in the matter of appointments to ecclesiastical posts, in so far as it belongs to the State, and is not based on patronage or special legal titles.

Article 19.—Civil marriage will be introduced in accordance with a special law, which shall also regulate the keeping of a civil register.

Article 20.—Science and its doctrines are free.

Article 21.—The education of youth shall be sufficiently cared for by public schools. Parents and their substitutes may not leave their children or wards without that education prescribed for the public folk-schools.

Article 22.—Every one shall be at liberty to give instruction, and establish institutions for doing so, provided he shall have given proof of his moral, scientific, and technical capacity to the State authorities concerned.

Article 23.—All public and private institutions of an educational kind are under the supervision of authorities appointed by the State. Public teachers have the rights and duties of State servants.

Article 24.—In the establishment of public folk-schools, confessional differences shall receive the greatest possible consideration. Religious instruction in the folk-schools will be superintended by the religious societies concerned. Charge of the other (external) affairs of the folk-schools belongs to the Parish (Commune). With the statutory co-operation of the Commune, the State shall appoint teachers in the public folk-schools from the number of those qualified (for such posts).

Article 25.—The means for establishing, maintaining, and enlarging the public folk-schools shall be provided by the Communes.

* We cannot translate Volkshule better than by "folk-school."
THE PRUSSIAN CONSTITUTION.

which may, however, be assisted by the State in proven cases of
parochial inability. The obligations of third persons—based on
special legal titles—remain in force. The State, therefore, guarantees
to teachers in folk-schools a steady income suitable to local circum-
stances. In public folk-schools education shall be imparted free of
charge.

**Article 26.**—A special law will regulate all matters of education.

**Article 27.**—Every Prussian is entitled to express his opinion
freely by word, writing, print, or artistic representation. Censorship
may not be introduced; every other restriction on freedom of the
Press will only be imposed by law.

**Article 28.**—Offences committed by word, writing, print, or
artistic representation will be punished in accordance with the
general penal code.

**Article 29.**—All Prussians are entitled to meet in closed rooms,
peacefully and unarmed, without previous permission from the
authorities. But this provision does not apply to open-air meet-
ings, which are subject to the law with respect to previous permission
from the authorities.

**Article 30.**—All Prussians have the right to assemble (in
societies) for such purposes as do not contravene the penal laws.
The law will regulate, with special regard to the preservation of
public security, the exercise of the right guaranteed by this and
the preceding article.

**Article 31.**—The law shall determine the conditions on which
corporate rights may be granted or refused.

**Article 32.**—The right of petitioning belongs to all Prussians.
Petitions under a collective name are only permitted to authorities
and corporations.

**Article 33.**—The privacy of letters is inviolable. The necessary
restrictions of this right, in cases of war and of criminal investiga-
tion, will be determined by law.

**Article 34.**—All Prussians are bound to bear arms. The extent
and manner of this duty will be fixed by law.

**Article 35.**—The army comprises all sections of the standing
army and the Landwehr (territorial forces). In the event of war,
the King can call out the Landsturm in accordance with the law.

**Article 36.**—The armed force (of the nation) can only be em-
ployed for the suppression of internal troubles, and the execution of
the laws, in the cases and manner specified by statute, and on the
requisition of the civil authorities. In the latter respect exceptions will have to be determined by law.

Article 37.—The military judiciary of the army is restricted
to penal matters, and will be regulated by law. Provisions with
regard to military discipline will remain the subject of special
ordinances.

Article 38.—The armed force (of the nation) may not deliberate
either when on or off duty; nor may it otherwise assemble than
when commanded to do so. Assemblies and meetings of the Land-
wehr for the purpose of discussing military institutions, commands
and ordinances, are forbidden even when it is not called out.

Article 39.—The provisions of Arts. 5, 6, 29, 30, and 32 will
only apply to the army in so far as they do not conflict with military
laws and rules of discipline.

Article 40.—The establishment of feudal tenures is forbidden.
The Feudal Union still existing with respect to surviving fiefs shall
be dissolved by law.

Article 41.—The provisions of Art. 40 do not apply to Crown
fiefs or to non-State fiefs.

Article 42.—Abolished without compensation, in accordance
with special laws passed, are:
1. The exercise or transfer of judicial power connected with the
possession of certain lands, together with the dues and
exemptions accruing from this right;
2. The obligations arising from patriarchal jurisdiction, vassalage,
and former tax and trading institutions.

And with these rights are also abolished the counter-services and
burdens hitherto therewith connected.

Title III.

Touching the King.

Article 43.—The person of the King is inviolable.

Article 44.—The King's Ministers are responsible. All Government acts (documentary) of the King require for their validity the
approval of a Minister, who thereby assumes responsibility for them.

**Article 45.**—The King alone is invested with executive power. He appoints and dismisses Ministers. He orders the promulgation of laws, and issues the necessary ordinances for their execution.

**Article 46.**—The King is Commander-in-Chief of the army.

**Article 47.**—The King fills all posts in the army, as well as in

* In connection with this Article, the course of domestic and parliamentary politics drew forth the following Declaratory Rescript from the German Emperor and King of Prussia, in 1882:

"The right of the King to conduct the Government and policy of Prussia according to his own discretion is limited by the Constitution (of January 31, 1850), but not abolished. The Government acts (documentary) of the King require the counter-signature of a Minister, and, as was also the case before the Constitution was issued, have to be represented by the King's Ministers; but they nevertheless remain Government acts of the King, from whose decisions they result, and who thereby constitutionally expresses his will and pleasure. It is therefore not admissible, and leads to obscurcation of the constitutional rights of the King, when their exercise is so spoken of as if they emanated from the Ministers for the time being responsible for them, and not from the King himself. The Constitution of Prussia is the expression of the monarchical tradition of this country, whose development is based on the living and actual relations of its Kings to the people. These relations, moreover, do not admit of being transferred to the Ministers appointed by the King, for they attach to the person of the King. Their preservation, too, is a political necessity for Prussia. It is, therefore, my will that both in Prussia and in the Legislative Bodies of the realm (or Reich), there may be no doubt left as to my own constitutional right and that of my successors to personally conduct the policy of my Government; and that the theory shall always be gainsaid that the [doctrine of the] inviolability of the person of the King, which has always existed in Prussia, and is enunciated by Article 43 of the Constitution, or the necessity of a responsible counter-signature of my Government acts, deprives them of the character of Royal and independent decisions. It is the duty of my Ministers to support my constitutional rights by protecting them from doubt and obscurcation, and I expect the same from all State servants (Beamten) who have taken to me the official oath. I am far from wishing to impair the freedom of elections, but in the case of those officials who are intrusted with the execution of my Government acts, and may, therefore, in conformity with the disciplinary law forfeit their situations, the duty solemnly undertaken by their oath of service also applies to the representation by them of the policy of my Government during election times. The faithful performance of this duty I shall thankfully acknowledge, and I expect from all officials that, in view of their oath of allegiance, they will refrain from all agitation against my Government also during elections. Berlin, January 4, 1882. Wilhelm. Von Bismarck. To the Ministry of State."
other branches of the State service, in so far as not otherwise ordained by law.

**Article 48.**—The King has the right to declare war and make peace, and to conclude other treaties with foreign Governments. The latter require for their validity the assent of the Chambers in so far as they are commercial treaties, or impose burdens on the State, or obligations on its individual subjects.

**Article 49.**—The King has the right to pardon, and to mitigate punishment. But in favour of a Minister condemned for his official acts, this right can only be exercised on the motion of that Chamber whence his indictment emanated. Only by special law can the King suppress inquiries already instituted.

**Article 50.**—The King may confer orders and other distinctions, not carrying with them privileges. He exercises the right of coinage in accordance with the law.

**Article 51.**—The King convokes the Chambers, and closes their sessions. He may dissolve both at once, or only one at a time. In such a case, however, the electors must be assembled within a period of 60 days, and the Chambers summoned within a period of 90 days respectively after the dissolution.

**Article 52.**—The King can adjourn the Chambers. But without their assent this adjournment may not exceed the space of 30 days, nor be repeated during the same session.

**Article 53.**—The Crown, according to the laws of the Royal House, is hereditary in the male line of that House in accordance with the law of primogeniture and agnatic succession.

**Article 54.**—The King attains his majority on completing his 18th year. In presence of the united Chambers he will take the oath to observe the Constitution of the Monarchy steadfastly and inviolably, and to rule in accordance with it and the laws.

**Article 55.**—Without the consent of both Chambers the King cannot also be ruler of foreign realms (Reiche).

**Article 56.**—If the King is a minor, or is otherwise lastingly prevented from ruling himself, the Regency will be undertaken by that agnate (Art. 53) who has attained his majority and stands nearest the Crown. He has immediately to convene the Chambers, which, in united session, will decide as to the necessity of the Regency.
ARTICLE 57.—If there be no agnate of age, and if no legal provision has previously been made for such a contingency, the Ministry of State will convene the Chambers, which shall then elect a Regent in united session. And until the assumption of the Regency by him, the Ministry of State will conduct the Government.

ARTICLE 58.—The Regent will exercise the powers invested in the King in the latter's name; and, after institution of the Regency, he will take an oath before the united Chambers to observe the Constitution of the Monarchy steadfastly and inviolably, and to rule in accordance with it and the laws. Until this oath is taken, the whole Ministry of State for the time being will remain responsible for all acts of the Government.

ARTICLE 59.—To the Crown Trust Fund appertains the annuity drawn from the income of the forests and domains.

TITLE IV.

Touching the Ministers.

ARTICLE 60.—The Ministers, as well as the State officials appointed to represent them, have access to each Chamber, and must at all times be listened to at request. Each Chamber can demand the presence of the Ministers. The Ministers are only entitled to vote in one or other of the Chambers when members of it.

ARTICLE 61.—On the resolution of a Chamber the Ministers may be impeached for the crime of infringing the Constitution, of bribery, and of treason. The decision of such a case lies with the Supreme Tribunal of the Monarchy sitting in United Senates. As long as two Supreme Tribunals co-exist, they shall unite for the above purpose. Further details as to matters of responsibility, (criminal) procedure (thereupon), and punishments, are reserved for a special law.

TITLE V.

Touching the Chambers.

ARTICLE 62.—The legislative power will be exercised in common by the King and by two Chambers. Every law requires the assent of the King and the two Chambers. Money bills and budgets shall first be laid before the Second Chamber; and the latter (i.e.
APPENDIX E.

budgets) shall either be wholly approved by the First Chamber, or rejected altogether.

Article 63.—In the event only of its being urgently necessary to maintain public security, or deal with an unusual state of distress when the Chambers are not in session, ordinances, which do not contravene the Constitution, may be issued with the force of law, on the responsibility of the whole Ministry. But these must be laid for approval before the Chambers at their next meeting.

Article 64.—The King, as well as each Chamber, has the right of proposing laws. Bills that have been rejected by one of the Chambers, or by the King, cannot be re-introduced in the same session.

Articles 65-68.—The First Chamber is formed by royal ordinance, which can only be altered by a law to be issued with the approval of the Chambers. The First Chamber is composed of members appointed by the King, with hereditary rights, or only for life.

Article 69.—The Second Chamber consists of 430 members.* The electoral districts are determined by law. They may consist of one or more Circles (Arrondissements), or of one or more of the larger towns.

Article 70.—Every Prussian who has completed his 25th year (i.e. attained his majority), and is capable of taking part in the elections of the Commune where he is domiciled, is entitled to act as a primary voter ('Wähler). Any one who is entitled to take part in the election of several Communes, can only exercise his right as primary voter in one Commune.

Article 71.—For every 250 souls of the population, one (secondary) elector (Wahlmann) shall be chosen. The primary voters fall into three classes, in proportion to the amount of direct taxes they pay—and in such a manner as that each class will represent a third of the sum-total of the taxes paid by the primary voters. This sum-total is reckoned:—

(a) by Parishes, in case the Commune does not form of itself a primary electoral district. *

* Originally 350 only—a number which, in 1851, was increased by 2, for the Principality of Hohenzollern, and in 1867 by 80 for the annexed provinces.
(b) by (Government) Districts (Bezirke), in case the primary electoral district consists of several Communes.

The first class consists of those primary voters, highest in the scale of taxation, who pay a third of the total. The second class consists of those primary voters, next highest in the scale, whose taxes form a second third of the whole; and the third class is made up of the remaining tax-payers (lowest in the scale) who contribute the other third of the whole. Each class votes apart, and for a third of the secondary electors. These classes may be divided into several voting sections, none of which, however, must include more than 500 primary voters. The secondary voters are elected in each class from the number of the primary voters in their district, without regard to the classes.

**Article 72.**—The deputies are elected by the secondary voters. Details will be regulated by an electoral law, which must also make the necessary provision for those cities where flour and slaughter duties are levied instead of direct taxes.

**Article 73.**—The legislative period of the Second Chamber is fixed at three years.

**Article 74.**—Eligible as deputy to the Second Chamber is every Prussian who has completed his thirtieth year, has forfeited none of his civil rights in consequence of a valid judicial sentence, and has been a Prussian subject for three years. The president and members of the Supreme Chamber of Accounts cannot sit in either House of the Diet (Landtag).

**Article 75.**—After the lapse of a legislative period the Chambers will be elected anew, and the same in the event of dissolution. In both cases, previous members are re-eligible.

**Article 76.**—Both Houses of the Diet of the Monarchy shall be regularly convened by the King in the period from the beginning of November in each year till the middle of the following January, and otherwise as often as circumstances require.

**Article 77.**—The Chambers will be opened and closed by the King in person, or by a Minister appointed by him to do so, at a combined sitting of the Chambers. Both Chambers shall be simultaneously convened, opened, adjourned, and closed. If one Chamber is dissolved, the other shall be at the same time prorogued.

**Article 78.**—Each Chamber will examine the credentials of its
members, and decide thereupon. It will regulate its own order of business and discipline by special ordinances, and elect its president, vice-presidents, and office-bearers. Civil servants require no leave of absence in order to enter the Chamber. If a member of the Chamber accepts a salaried office of the State, or is promoted in the service of the State to a post involving higher rank or increase of pay, he shall lose his seat and vote in the Chamber, and can only recover his place in it by re-election. No one can be member of both Chambers.

**Article 79.**—The sittings of both Chambers are public. On the motion of its president, or of ten members, each Chamber may meet in private sitting—at which this motion will then have to be discussed.

**Article 80.**—Neither of the Chambers can pass a resolution unless there be present a majority of the legal number of its members. Each Chamber passes its resolutions by absolute majority of votes, subject to any exceptions that may be determined by the order of business for elections.

**Article 81.**—Each Chamber has the separate right of presenting addresses to the King. No one may in person present to the Chambers, or to one of them, a petition or address. Each Chamber can transmit the communications made to it to the Ministers, and demand of them an answer to any grievances thus conveyed.

**Article 82.**—Each Chamber is entitled to appoint commissions of inquiry into facts—for its own information.

**Article 83.**—The members of both Chambers are representatives of the whole people. They vote according to their simple convictions, and are not bound by commissions or instructions.

**Article 84.**—For their votes in the Chamber they can never be called to account, and for the opinions they express therein they can only be called to account within the Chamber, in virtue of the order of business. No member of a Chamber can, without its assent, be had up for examination, or be arrested during the Parliamentary session for any penal offence, unless he be taken in the act, or in the course of the following day. A similar assent shall be necessary in the case of arrest for debts. All criminal proceedings against a member of the Chamber, and all arrests for preliminary examination, or civil arrest, shall be suspended during the Parliamentary session on demand from the Chamber concerned.
THE PRUSSIAN CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE 85.—The members of the Second Chamber shall receive out of the State Treasury travelling expenses and daily fees, according to a statutory scale; and renunciation thereof shall be inadmissible.

TITLE VI.

Touching the Judicial Power.

ARTICLE 86.—The judicial power will be exercised in the name of the King, by independent tribunals subject to no other authority but that of the law. Judgment shall be executed in the name of the King.

ARTICLE 87.—The judges will be appointed for life by the King, or in his name. They can only be removed or temporarily suspended from office by judicial sentence, and for reasons foreseen by the law. Temporary suspension from office (not ensuing on the strength of a law), and involuntary transfer to another place, or to the retired list, can only take place from the causes and in the form mentioned by law, and in virtue of a judicial sentence. But these provisions do not apply to cases of transfer, rendered necessary by changes in the organisation of the courts or their districts.

ARTICLE 88 (abolished).

ARTICLE 89.—The organisation of the tribunals will only be determined by law.

ARTICLE 90.—To the judicial office only those can be appointed who have qualified themselves for it as prescribed by law.

ARTICLE 91.—Courts for special kinds of affairs, and, in particular, tribunals for trade and commerce, shall be established by statute in those places where local needs may require them. The organisation and jurisdiction of such courts, as well as their procedure and the appointment of their members, the special status of the latter, and the duration of their office, will be determined by law.

ARTICLE 92.—In Prussia there shall only be one supreme tribunal.

ARTICLE 93.—The proceedings of the civil and criminal courts shall be public. But the public may be excluded by an openly declared resolution of the court, when order or good morals may seem endangered (by their admittance). In other cases publicity of proceedings can only be limited by law.

m m 2
APPENDIX E.

Article 94.—In criminal cases the guilt of the accused shall be determined by jurymen, in so far as exceptions are not determined by a law issued with the previous assent of the Chambers. The formation of a jury-court shall be regulated by a law.

Article 95.—By a law issued with the previous assent of the Chambers, there may be established a special court whereof the jurisdiction shall include the crimes of high treason, as well as those crimes against the internal and external security of the State, which may be assigned to it by law.

Article 96.—The competence of the courts and of the administrative authorities shall be determined by law. Conflicts of authority between the courts and the administrative authorities shall be settled by a tribunal appointed by law.

Article 97.—A law shall determine the conditions on which public, civil, and military officials may be sued for wrongs committed by them in exceeding their functions. But the previous assent of official superiors need not be requested.*

Title VII.

Touching State Officials not belonging to the Judicial Class.

Article 98.—The special legal status (Rechtsverhältnisse) of State officials (including advocates and solicitors) not belonging to the judicial class, shall be determined by a law which, without restricting the Government in the choice of its executive agents, will grant Civil servants proper protection against arbitrary dismissal from their posts or diminution of their pay.

Title VIII.

Touching the Finance.

Article 99.—All income and expenditure of the State must be pre-estimated for every year, and be presented in the Budget, which shall be annually fixed by a law.

Article 100.—Taxes and dues for the State Treasury may only be raised in so far as they shall have been included in the Budget, or ordained by special laws.

Article 101.—In the matter of taxes there must be no privilege
of persons. Existing tax-laws shall be subjected to a revision, and all such privileges abolished.

**Article 102.**—State and Communal officers can only levy dues on the strength of a law.

**Article 103.**—The contracting of loans for the State Treasury can only be effected on the strength of a law; and the same holds good of guarantees involving a burden to the State.

**Article 104.**—Budget transgressions require subsequent approval by the Chambers. The Budget will be examined and audited by the Supreme Chamber of Accounts. The general Budget accounts of every year, including tabular statistics of the National Debt, shall, with the comments of the Supreme Chamber of Accounts, be laid before the Chambers for the purpose of exonerating the Government. A special law will regulate the establishment and functions of the Supreme Chamber of Accounts.

**Title IX.**

*Touching the Communes, Arrondissement, District, and Provincial Bodies.*

**Article 105.**—The representation and administration of the Communes, Arrondissements and Provinces of the Prussian State, will be determined in detail by special laws.

**General Provisions.**

**Article 106.**—Laws and ordinances become binding after having been published in the form prescribed by law. The examination of the validity of properly promulgated Royal ordinances is not within the competence of the authorities, but of the Chambers.

**Article 107.**—The Constitution may be altered by ordinary legislative means; and such alteration shall merely require the usual absolute majority in both Chambers on two divisions (of the House), between which there must elapse a period of at least twenty-one days.

**Article 108.**—The members of both Chambers, and all State officials, shall take the oath of fealty and obedience to the King, and swear conscientiously to observe the Constitution. The army will not take the oath to the Constitution.

**Article 109.**—Existing taxes and dues will continue to be
raised; and all provisions of existing statute-books, single laws, and ordinances, which do not contravene the present Constitution, will remain in force until altered by law.

Article 110.—All authorities holding appointments in virtue of existing laws will continue their activity pending the issue of organic laws affecting them.

Article 111.—In the event of war or revolution, and pressing danger to public security therefrom ensuing, Articles 5, 6, 7, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 36 of the Constitution may be suspended for a certain time, and in certain districts—the details to be determined by law.

Transition Provisions.

Article 112.—Until issue of the law contemplated in Article 26, educational matters will be controlled by the laws at present in force.

Article 113.—Prior to the revision of the criminal code, a special law will deal with offences committed by word, writing, print, or artistic representation.

Article 114 (abolished).

Article 115.—Until issue of the electoral law contemplated in Article 72, the ordinance of 30th May, 1849, touching the return of deputies to the Second Chamber, will remain in force; and with this ordinance is associated the provisional electoral law for elections to the Second Chamber in the Hohenzollern Principalities of 30th April, 1851.

Article 116.—The two supreme tribunals still existing shall be combined into one—to be organised by a special law.

Article 117.—The claims of State officials appointed before the promulgation of the Constitution shall be taken into special consideration by the Civil Servant Law.

Article 118.—Should changes in the present Constitution be rendered necessary by the German Federal Constitution to be drawn up on the basis of the Draft of 20th May, 1849, such alterations will be decreed by the King; and the ordinances of this effect laid before the Chambers, at their first meeting. The Chambers will then have to decide whether the changes thus provisionally ordained harmonise with the Federal Constitution of Germany.
THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION.

Article 119.—The Royal oath mentioned in Article 54, as well as the oath prescribed to be taken by both Chambers and all State officials, will have to be tendered immediately after the legislative revision of the present Constitution (Articles 62 and 108).*

In witness whereof we have hereunto set our signature and seal.
Given at Charlottensburg, the 31st January, 1850.

(Signed) FRIEDRICH WILHELM.

Graf v. Brandenburg, v. Ladenberg, v. Manteuffel,

APPENDIX F.

THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION.†

His Majesty, the King of Prussia, in the name of the North German Union, His Majesty the King of Bavaria, His Majesty the King of Württemberg, His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Baden, and His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Hesse and by Rhine for those parts of the Grand Duchy of Hesse which are situated South of the Main, conclude an eternal alliance for the protection of the territory of the Confederation, and of the laws of the same, as well as for the promotion of the welfare of the German people.

This Confederation shall bear the name of the German Empire, and shall have the following Constitution:—

* It need only be said that most of the special laws referred to in the various Articles of the Constitution, as necessary to supplement and complete it, were duly passed.

† This translation of the Imperial Constitution is taken from the Reports of the American Legation at Berlin (printed in the "Foreign Relations of the United States" for 1871), but we beg to disavow all responsibility for any inaccuracies that may be found in this rendering of the German document. The Prussian Constitution is our own translation.
APPENDIX F.

I.— Territory.

Article 1.—The territory of the Confederation shall consist of the States of Prussia (with Lauenburg), Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Saxe-Weimar, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Anhalt, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Waldeck, Reuss (elder branch), Reuss (younger branch), Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe, Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg.

II.— Legislation of the Empire.

Article 2.—Within this territory the Empire shall have the right of legislation according to the provisions of the Constitution, and the laws of the Empire shall take precedence of those of each individual State. The laws of the Empire shall be rendered binding by Imperial proclamation, such proclamation to be published in a journal devoted to the publication of the laws of the Empire (Reichsgesetzblatt). If no other period shall be designated in the published law for it to take effect, it shall take effect on the fourteenth day after the day of its publication in the Law Journal at Berlin.

Article 3.—There is one citizenship for all Germany, and the citizens or subjects of each State of the Confederation shall be treated in every other State thereof as natives, and shall have the right of becoming permanent residents, of carrying on business, of filling public offices, and may acquire all civil rights on the same conditions as those born in the State, and shall also have the same usage as regards civil prosecutions and the protection of the laws.

No German shall be limited in the exercise of this privilege by the authorities of his native State, or by the authorities of any other State of the Confederation. The regulations governing the care of paupers, and their admission into the various parishes, are not affected by the principle enunciated in the first paragraph. In like manner those treaties shall remain in force which have been concluded between the various States of the Confederation in relation to the custody of persons who are to be expelled, the care of sick, and the burial of deceased citizens.

With regard to the performance of military service to the various States, the necessary laws will be passed hereafter.
All Germans in foreign countries shall have equal claims upon he protection of the Empire.

ARTICLE 4.—The following matters shall be under the supervision of the Empire and its Legislature:—

1. The privilege of carrying on trade in more than one place: domestic affairs and matters relating to the settlement of natives of one State in the territory of another; the right of citizenship; the issuing and examination of passports; surveillance of foreigners and of manufactures, together with insurance business, so far as these matters are not already provided for by Article 3 of this Constitution (in Bavaria, however, exclusive of domestic affairs, and matters relating to the settlement of natives of one State in the territory of another); and likewise matters relating to colonisation and emigration to foreign countries.

2. Legislation concerning customs, duties, and commerce, and such imposts as are to be applied to the uses of the Empire.

3. Regulation of weights and measures, and of the coinage, together with the emission of funded and unfunded paper money.

4. Banking regulations in general.

5. Patents for inventions.

6. The protection of literary property.

7. The organisation of a general system of protection for German trade in foreign countries; of German navigation, and of the German flag on the high seas; likewise the organisation of a general consular representation of the Empire.

8. Railway matters (subject in Bavaria to the provisions of Article 46), and the construction of means of communication by land and water for the purposes of home defence, and of general commerce.

9. Rafting and navigation upon those waters which are common to several States, and the condition of such waters, as likewise river and other water dues.

10. Postal and telegraph affairs; but in Bavaria and Württemberg these shall be subject to the provisions of Article 52.
APPENDIX F.

11. Regulations concerning the execution of judicial sentences in civil matters, and the fulfilment of requisitions in general.

12. The authentication of public documents.

13. General legislation with respect to the whole domain of civil law, criminal law; likewise legal procedure.

14. The Imperial army and navy.

15. The surveillance of the medical and veterinary professions.

16. The Press, trades' unions, etc.

ARTICLE 5.—The legislative power of the Empire shall be exercised by the Federal Council and the Diet (Reichstag). A majority of the votes of both bodies shall be necessary and sufficient for the passage of a law.

When a law is proposed in relation to the army, or navy, or to the imposts specified in Article 35, the vote of the presiding officer shall decide in case of a difference of opinion in the Federal Council, if said vote be in favour of the retention of existing arrangements.

III.—FEDERAL COUNCIL.

ARTICLE 6.—The Federal Council shall consist of the representatives of the States of the Confederation, among whom the votes shall be divided in such a manner as that Prussia (including the former votes of Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse, Holstein, Nassau, and Frankfort) shall have 17 votes; Bavaria, 6 votes; Saxony, 4 votes: Württemberg, 4 votes; Baden, 3 votes; Hesse, 3 votes; Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 2 votes; Saxe-Weimar, 1 vote; Mecklenburg-Strelitz, 1 vote; Oldenburg, 1 vote; Brunswick, 2 votes; Saxe-Meiningen, 1 vote; Saxe-Altenburg, 1 vote; Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, 1 vote; Anhalt, 1 vote; Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, 1 vote; Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, 1 vote; Waldeck, 1 vote; Reuss (elder branch), 1 vote; Reuss (younger branch), 1 vote; Schaumburg-Lippe, 1 vote; Lippe, 1 vote; Lübeck, 1 vote; Bremen, 1 vote; Hamburg, 1 vote—total 58 votes. Each member of the Confederation may appoint as many delegates to the Federal Council as it has votes; nevertheless, the total of the votes of each State must be cast by only one delegate.

ARTICLE 7.—The Federal Council shall take action upon—
THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION.

1. The measures to be proposed to the Diet, and the resolutions passed by the same.

2. The general provisions and regulations necessary for the execution of the laws of the Empire, so far as no other provision is made by said laws.

3. The defects which may be discovered in the execution of the laws of the Empire, or of the provisions and regulations heretofore mentioned. Each member of the Confederation shall have the right to introduce motions, and it shall be the duty of the presiding officer to submit them for deliberation.

Legislative action shall take place by simple majority, with the exceptions of the provisions in Articles 5, 37, and 78. Votes not represented or instructed shall not be counted. In the case of a tie, the vote of the presiding officer shall decide.

When legislative action is taken upon a subject which does not affect, according to the provisions of this Constitution, the whole Empire, the votes only of those States of the Confederation interested in the matter in question shall be counted.

ARTICLE 8. The Federal Council shall appoint from its own members Permanent Committees:

1. On the army and the fortifications;
2. On naval affairs;
3. On duties and taxes;
4. On commerce and trade;
5. On railroads, posts, and telegraphs;
6. On affairs of justice;
7. On accounts.

In each of these Committees there shall be representatives of at least four States of the Confederation, besides the presiding officer, and each State shall be entitled to only one vote in the same.

In the Committee on the army and fortifications, Bavaria shall have a permanent seat; the remaining members of it, as well as the members of the Committee on naval affairs, shall be appointed by the Emperor; the members of the other Committees shall be elected by the Federal Council. These Committees shall be newly formed at each session of the Federal Council, i.e., each year, when the retiring members shall again be eligible.
APPENDIX F.

Besides, there shall be appointed in the Federal Council a Committee on Foreign Affairs, over which Bavaria shall preside, to be composed of the plenipotentiaries of the Kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg, and of two plenipotentiaries of the other States of the Empire, who shall be elected annually by the Federal Council. Clerks shall be placed at the disposal of the Committees to perform the necessary work appertaining thereto.

ARTICLE 9.—Each member of the Federal Council shall have the right to appear in the Diet, and be heard there at any time when he shall so request, to represent the views of his Government, even when the same shall not have been adopted by the majority of the Council. No one shall be at the same time a member of the Federal Council and of the Diet.

ARTICLE 10.—The Emperor shall afford the customary diplomatic protection to the members of the Federal Council.

IV.—OFFICE OF PRESIDENT.

ARTICLE 11.—The King of Prussia shall be the President of the Confederation, and shall have the title of German Emperor. The Emperor shall represent the Empire among nations, declare war, and conclude peace in the name of the same, enter into alliances and other conventions with foreign countries, accredit ambassadors, and receive them. For a declaration of war in the name of the Empire the consent of the Federal Council shall be required, except in case of an attack upon the territory of the Confederation or its coasts.

So far as treaties with foreign countries refer to matters which, according to Article 4, are to be regulated by the Legislature of the Empire, the consent of the Federal Council shall be required for their ratification, and the approval of the Diet shall be necessary to render them valid.

ARTICLE 12.—The Emperor shall have the right to convene the Federal Council and the Diet, and to open, adjourn, and close them.

ARTICLE 13.—The convocation of the Federal Council and the Diet shall take place annually, and the Federal Council may be called together for the preparation of business without the Diet; the latter, however, shall not be convoked without the Federal Council.

ARTICLE 14.—The convocation of the Federal Council shall take place as soon as demanded by one-third of its members.
ARTICLE 15.—The Chancellor of the Empire, to be appointed by the Emperor, shall preside in the Federal Council, and supervise the conduct of its business. The Chancellor of the Empire shall have the right to delegate the power to represent him to any member of the Federal Council.

ARTICLE 16.—The necessary Bills shall be laid before the Diet in the name of the Emperor, in accordance with the resolutions of the Federal Council, and they shall be advocated in the Diet by members of the Federal Council, or by special commissioners appointed by the said Council.

ARTICLE 17.—To the Emperor shall belong the right to prepare and publish the laws of the Empire. The decrees and ordinances of the Emperor shall be published in the name of the Empire, and require for their validity the signature of the Chancellor of the Empire, who thereby becomes responsible for their execution.

ARTICLE 18.—The Emperor shall appoint Imperial officials, require them to take the oath of allegiance, and dismiss them when necessary. Officials appointed to any office of the Empire from one of the States of the Confederation shall enjoy the same rights as those to which they are entitled in their native States by their official position, provided no other legislative provision shall have been made previously to their entrance into the service of the Empire.

ARTICLE 19.—If States of the Confederation do not fulfil their constitutional duties, proceedings may be instituted against them by military execution. This execution shall be ordained by the Federal Council, and enforced by the Emperor.

V.—THE DIET (REICHSTAG).

ARTICLE 20.—The members of the Diet shall be elected by universal suffrage and by direct secret ballot. Until regulated by law, which is reserved by section 5 of the Election Law of May 31, 1869, 48 deputies shall be elected in Bavaria, 17 in Württemberg, 14 in Baden, 6 in Hesse-south of the River Main, and the total number of deputies shall be 382.*

* Including, that is to say, those deputies returned by the States of the North German Federation.
APPENDIX F.

Article 21.—Government officials shall not require leave of absence in order to enter the Diet. When a member of the Diet accepts a salaried office of the Empire, or a salaried office in one of the States of the Confederation, or accepts any office of the Empire or of a State involving higher rank or salary, he shall forfeit his seat and vote in the Diet, but may recover his place in the same by a new election.

Article 22.—The proceedings of the Diet shall be public. Truthful reports of the proceedings of the public sessions of the Diet shall subject those making them to no responsibility.

Article 23.—The Diet shall have the right to propose laws within the jurisdiction of the Empire, and to refer petitions, addressed to it, to the Federal Council or the Chancellor of the Empire.

Article 24.—Each legislative period of the Diet shall last three years. The Diet may be dissolved by a resolution of the Federal Council, with the consent of the Emperor.

Article 25.—In the case of a dissolution of the Diet new elections shall take place within a period of sixty days, and the Diet shall re-assemble within a period of ninety days after its dissolution.

Article 26.—Unless by consent of the Diet, an adjournment of that body shall not exceed the period of thirty days, and shall not be repeated during the same session without such consent.

Article 27.—The Diet shall examine into the legality of the election of its members, and decide thereon. It shall regulate the mode of transacting business, as well as its own discipline, by establishing rules therefor, and elect its president, vice-presidents, and secretaries.

Article 28.—The Diet shall pass a resolution by absolute majority. To render the passing of a resolution valid, the presence of a majority of the statutory number of members shall be required.

Article 29.—The members of the Diet shall be the representatives of the entire people, and shall not be bound by orders and instructions from their constituents.

Article 30.—No member of the Diet shall at any time suffer legal prosecution on account of his vote, or on account of utterances made while in the performance of his functions, or be held responsible outside the Diet for his actions (in it).

Article 31.—Without the consent of the Diet, none of its
members shall be tried or punished during the session for any offence committed, except when arrested in the act of committing the offence, or in the course of the following day.

The same rule shall apply in the case of arrests for debt. At the request of the Diet, all legal proceedings instituted against one of its members, and likewise imprisonment, shall be suspended during its session.

 ARTICLE 32.—The members of the Diet shall not be allowed to draw any salary, or be compensated as such.

VI.—Customs and Commerce.

 ARTICLE 33.—Germany shall form a Customs and Commercial Union, having a common frontier for the collection of duties. Such territories as cannot, by reason of their situation, be suitably embraced within the said frontier, shall be excluded. It shall be lawful to introduce all articles of commerce of any State of the Confederation into any other State of the Confederation without paying any duty thereon, except so far as such articles are subject to internal taxation therein.

 ARTICLE 34.—The Hanseatic Cities, Bremen and Hamburg, shall remain free ports outside of the common boundary of the Customs Union, retaining for that purpose a district of their own, or of the surrounding territory, until they shall request to be admitted into the said Union.

 ARTICLE 35.—The Empire shall have the exclusive power to legislate concerning everything relating to the customs; the taxation of salt and tobacco manufactured or raised in the territory of the Confederation; concerning the taxation of manufactured brandy and beer, and of sugar and syrup prepared from beets or other domestic productions. It shall have exclusive power to legislate concerning the mutual protection of taxes upon articles of consumption levied in the several States of the Empire; against embezzlement; as well as concerning the measures which are required in granting exemption from the payment of duties, for the security of the common customs frontier. In Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden the matter of imposing duties on domestic brandy and beer is reserved for the Legislature of each country. The States of the Confederation shall,
however, endeavour to bring about uniform legislation regarding the
taxation of these articles.

**Article 36.**—The imposing of duties and excise on articles of
consumption, and the collection of the same (Article 35), is left to
each State of the Confederation within its own territory, so far as this
has been done by each State heretofore.

The Emperor shall have the supervision of legal proceedings
instituted by officials of the Empire, whom he shall designate as
adjuncts to the Custom or Excise Offices, and board of directors of
the several States, after hearing the committee of the Federal
Council on customs and revenues. Notes given by these officials as to
defects in the execution of the laws of the Empire (Article 35) shall
be submitted to the Confederate Council for action.

**Article 37.**—In taking action upon the rules and regulations
for the execution of the laws of the Empire (Article 35), the vote of
the presiding officer shall decide whenever he shall pronounce for
upholding the existing rule or regulation.

**Article 38.**—The amounts accruing from customs and other
revenues designated in Article 35 of the latter, so far as they are sub-
ject to legislation by the Diet, shall go to the Treasury of the Empire.

This amount is made up of the total receipts from the customs
and other revenues, after deducting therefrom—

1. Tax compensations and reductions in conformity with existing
   laws or regulations.
2. Re-imbursements for taxes unduly imposed.
3. The costs for collection and administration, *viz.:
   a. In the department of customs, the costs which are required
      for the protection and collection of customs on the
      frontiers and in the frontier districts.
   b. In the department of the duty on salt, the costs which are
      used for the pay of the officers charged with collecting
      and controlling these duties in the salt mines.
   c. In the department of duties on beet-sugar and tobacco, the
      compensation which is to be allowed, according to the
      resolutions of the Confederate Council, to the several State
      Governments for the cost of the collection of these duties.
   d. Fifteen per cent. of the total receipts in the departments
      of the other duties.
THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION.

The territories situated outside of the common customs-frontier shall contribute to the expenses of the Empire by paying an aversum (or sum of acquaintance). Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden shall not share in the revenues from duties on liquors and beer, which go into the Treasury of the Empire, nor in the corresponding portion of the aforesaid aversum.

Article 39.—The quarterly statements to be regularly made by the revenue officers of the Federal States at the end of every quarter, and the final settlements (to be made at the end of the year, and after the closing of the account-books) of the receipts from customs, which have become due in the course of the quarter, or during the fiscal year, and the revenues of the Treasury of the Empire, according to Article 38, shall be arranged by the boards of directors of the Federal States, after a previous examination in general summaries, in which every duty is to be shown separately; these summaries shall be transmitted to the Federal Committee for Accounts. The latter provisionally fixes every three months, taking as a basis these summaries, the amount due to the Treasury of the Empire from the Treasury of each State, and it shall inform the Federal Council and the Federal States of this act; furthermore, it shall submit to the Federal Council annually the final statement of these amounts, with its remarks. The Federal Council shall deliberate upon the fixing of these amounts.

Article 40.—The terms of the Customs-Union Treaty of July 8, 1867, remain in force, so far as they have not been altered by the provisions of this Constitution, and as long as they are not altered in the manner designated in Articles 7 and 78.

VII.—Railways.

Article 41.—Railways, which are considered necessary for the defence of Germany, or for the purposes of general commerce, may be constructed for the account of the Empire by a law of the Empire, even in opposition to the will of those members of the Confederation through whose territory the railroads run, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of that country; or private persons may be charged with their construction, and receive rights of expropriation. Every existing railway company is bound to permit new railroad lines to be connected with it, at the expense of these latter. All laws
granting existing railway companies the right of injunction against the building of parallel or competitive lines are hereby abolished throughout the Empire, without detriment to rights already acquired. Such right of injunction cannot be granted in concessions to be given hereafter.

Article 42.—The Governments of the Federal States bind themselves, in the interest of general commerce, to have the German railways managed as a uniform network, and for this purpose to have the lines constructed and equipped according to a uniform system.

Article 43.—Accordingly, as soon as possible, uniform arrangements as to management shall be made, and especially shall uniform regulations be instituted for the police of the railroads. The Empire shall take care that the administrative officers of the railway lines keep the roads always in such a condition as is required for public security, and that they be equipped with the necessary rolling stock.

Article 44.—Railway companies are bound to run such passenger trains of suitable velocity as may be required for ordinary traffic, and for the establishment of harmony between timetables; also to make provision for such goods trains as may be necessary for commercial purposes, and to establish, without extra remuneration, offices for the direct forwarding of passengers, and goods trains, to be transferred when necessary, from one road to another.

Article 45.—The Empire shall have control over the tariff of fares. The same shall endeavour to cause —

1. Uniform regulations to be speedily introduced on all German railway lines.

2. The tariff to be reduced and made uniform as far as possible, and particularly to cause a reduction of the tariff for the transport of coal, coke, wood, minerals, stone, salt, crude iron, manure, and similar articles, for long distances, as demanded by the interests of agriculture and industry, and to introduce a one-penny (pfennig) tariff as soon as practicable.

Article 46.—In case of distress, especially in case of an extraordinary rise in the price of provisions, it shall be the duty of the railway companies to adopt temporarily a low special tariff, to be fixed by the Emperor, on motion of the competent committee, for the
forwarding of grain, flour, vegetables, and potatoes. This tariff shall, however, not be less than the lowest rate for raw produce existing on the said line.

The foregoing provisions, and those of Articles 42 to 45 shall not apply to Bavaria.

The Imperial Government, however, has the power also, with regard to Bavaria, to establish by means of legislation uniform rules for the construction and equipment of such railways as may be of importance for the defence of the country.

Article 47.—The managers of all railways shall be required to obey, without hesitation, requisitions made by the authorities of the Empire for the use of their roads for the defence of Germany. In particular shall troops, and all material of war, be forwarded at uniform reduced rates.

VIII.—Posts and Telegraphs.

Article 48.—The posts and telegraphs shall be organised and managed as State institutions throughout the German Empire. The legislation of the Empire in regard to postal and telegraphic affairs, provided for in Article 4, does not extend to those matters whose regulation is left to managerial arrangement, according to the principles which have controlled the North German administration of posts and telegraphs.

Article 49. The receipts from posts and telegraphs are a joint affair throughout the Empire. The expenses shall be paid from the general receipts. The surplus goes into the Treasury of the Empire. (Section 12.)

Article 50. The Emperor has the supreme supervision of the administration of posts and telegraphs. The authorities appointed by him are in duty bound and authorised to see that uniformity be established and maintained in the organisation of the administration and in the transaction of business, as also in regard to the qualifications of employees.

The Emperor shall have the power to make general administrative regulations, and also exclusively to regulate the relations which are to exist between the post and telegraph offices of Germany and those of other countries.

It shall be the duty of all officers of the Post-office and Telegraph
Department to obey Imperial orders. This obligation shall be included in their oath of office. The appointment of superior officers (such as directors, counsellors, and superintendents), as they shall be required for the administration of the posts and telegraphs in the various districts; also the appointment of officers of the posts and telegraphs (such as inspectors or comptrollers), acting for the aforesaid authorities in the several districts, in the capacity of supervisors, shall be made by the Emperor for the whole territory of the German Empire, and these officers shall take the oath of fealty to him as a part of their oath of office. The Governments of the several States shall be informed in due time, by means of Imperial confirmation and official publication, of the aforesaid appointments, so far as they may relate to their territories.

Other officers required by the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, as also all officers to be employed at the various stations, and for technical purposes, &c., shall be appointed by the respective Governments of the States.

Where there is no independent administration, or inland mails or telegraphs, the terms of the various treaties are to be enforced.

Article 51.—In assigning the surplus of the Post-office Department to the Treasury of the Empire for general purposes (Article 49), the following procedure is to be observed in consideration of the difference which has heretofore existed in the clear receipts of the Post-office Departments of the several territories for the purpose of securing a suitable equalisation during the period of transition below named.

Of the post-office surplus, which accumulated in the several mail districts during the five years from 1861 to 1865, an average yearly shall be computed, and the share which every separate mail district has had in the surplus resulting therefrom for the whole territory of the Empire shall be fixed upon by a percentage.

In accordance with the proportion thus made, the several States shall be credited on the account of their other contributions to the expenses of the Empire with their quota accruing from the postal surplus in the Empire, for a period of eight years subsequent to their entrance into the Post-office Department of the Empire. At the end of the said eight years the distinction shall cease, and any surplus in the Post-office Department shall go, without division, into
the Treasury of the Empire, according to the principle enunciated in Article 49.

Of the quota of the Post-office Department surplus resulting during the aforementioned period of eight years in favour of the Hanseatic towns, one-half shall every year be placed at the disposal of the Emperor, for the purpose of providing for the establishment of uniform post-offices in the Hanseatic towns.

**Article 52.**—The stipulations of the foregoing Articles 48 to 51 do not apply to Bavaria and Württemberg. In their stead the following stipulation shall be valid for these two States of the Confederation. The Empire alone is authorised to legislate upon the privileges of the Post-office and Telegraph Departments, on the legal position of both institutions toward the public, upon the franking privilege and rates of postage, and upon the establishment of rates for telegraphic correspondence into Hanseatic towns. Exclusive, however, of managerial arrangements, and the fixing of tariffs for internal communication within Bavaria and Württemberg. In the same manner the Empire shall regulate postal and telegraphic communication with foreign countries, excepting the immediate communication of Bavaria and Württemberg with their neighbouring States, not belonging to the Empire, in regard to which regulation the stipulation in Article 49 of the postal treaty of November 23, 1867, remains in force.

Bavaria and Württemberg shall not share in the postal and telegraphic receipts which belong to the Treasury of the Empire.

**IX.**—**Marine and Navigation.**

**Article 53.**—The navy of the Empire is a united one under the supreme command of the Emperor. The Emperor is charged with its organisation and arrangement, and he shall appoint the officers and officials of the navy, and in his name these and the seamen shall be sworn in.

The harbour of Kiel and the harbour of the Jade are Imperial war harbours.

The expenditure required for the establishment and maintenance of the navy and the institutions connected therewith shall be defrayed from the Treasury of the Empire.

All seafaring men of the Empire, including machinists and hands
employed in ship-building, are exempt from serving in the army, but obliged to serve in the Imperial navy.

The appointment of men to supply the wants of the navy shall be made according to the actual seafaring population, and the quota furnished in accordance herewith by each State shall be credited to the army account.

**Article 54.**—The merchant vessels of all States of the Confederation shall form a united commercial marine.

The Empire shall determine the process for ascertaining the tonnage of sea-going vessels, shall regulate the issuing of tonnage-certificates and sea-letters, and shall fix the conditions to which a permit for commanding a sea-going vessel shall be subject.

The merchant vessels of all the States of the Confederation shall be admitted on an equal footing to the harbours, and to all natural and artificial water-courses of the several States of the Confederation, and shall receive the same usage therein.

The duties which shall be collected from sea-going vessels, or levied upon their freights, for the use of naval institutions in the harbours, shall not exceed the amount required for the maintenance and ordinary repair of these institutions.

On all natural water-courses, duties are only levied for the use of special establishments, which serve for facilitating commercial intercourse. These duties, as well as the duties for navigating such artificial channels, which are property of the State, are not to exceed the amount required for the maintenance and ordinary repair of the institutions and establishments. These rules apply to rafting, so far as it is carried on on navigable water-courses.

The levying of other or higher duties upon foreign vessels or their freights than those which are paid by the vessels of the Federal States or their freights does not belong to the various States, but to the Empire.

**Article 55.**—The flag of the war and merchant navy shall be black, white, and red.

**X.**—Consular Affairs.

**Article 56.**—The Emperor shall have the supervision of all consular affairs of the German Empire, and he shall appoint consuls after hearing the committee of the Federal Council on Commerce and Traffic.
No new State consulates are to be established within the jurisdiction of the German consuls. German consuls shall perform the functions of State consuls for the States of the Confederation not represented in their district. All the now existing State consulates shall be abolished, as soon as the organisation of the German consulates shall be completed, in such a manner that the representation of the separate interests of all the Federal States shall be recognised by the Federal Council as secured by the German consulates.

XI.—Military Affairs of the Empire.

Article 57.—Every German is subject to military duty, and in the discharge of this duty no substitute can be accepted.

Article 58.—The costs and the burden of all the military system of the Empire are to be borne equally by all the Federal States and their subjects, and no privileges or molestations to the several States or classes are admissible. Where an equal distribution of the burdens cannot be effected in natura without prejudice to the public welfare, affairs shall be equalised by legislation in accordance with the principles of justice.

Article 59.—Every German capable of bearing arms shall serve for seven years in the standing army, ordinarily from the end of his twentieth to the beginning of his twenty-eighth year; the first three years in the field army, the last four years in the reserve; during the next five years he shall belong to the militia (Landwehr). In those States of the Confederation in which heretofore a longer term of service than twelve years was required by law, the gradual reduction of the required time of service shall take place in such a manner as is compatible with the interests and the war-footing of the army of the Empire.

As regards the emigration of men belonging to the reserve, only those provisions shall be in force which apply to the emigration of members of the militia.

Article 60. The strength of the German army in time of peace shall be, until the 31st December, 1871, 1 per cent. of the population of 1867, and shall be furnished by the several Federal States in proportion to their population. In future the strength of the army in time of peace shall be fixed by legislation.

Article 61.—After the publication of this Constitution the
complete Prussian military system of legislation shall be introduced without delay throughout the Empire, as well the statutes themselves as the regulations, instructions, and ordinances issued for their execution, explanation, or completion; thus in particular, the military penal code of April 3, 1845; the military orders of the penal court of April 3, 1845; the ordinance concerning the courts of honour of July 20, 1843; the regulations with respect to recruiting, time of service, matters relating to the service and subsistence, to the quartering of troops, claims for damages, mobilising, &c., for times of peace and war. Orders for the attendance of the military upon religious services is, however, excluded.

When a uniform organisation of the German army shall have been established, a comprehensive military law for the Empire shall be submitted to the Diet and the Federal Council for their action in accordance with the Constitution.

Article 62.—For the purpose of defraying the expenses of the whole German army, and the institutions connected therewith, the sum of 225 thalers shall be placed at the disposal of the Emperor until the 31st December, 1871, for each man in the army on the peace footing, according to Article 60. (See Section 12.)

After the 31st December, 1871, the payment of these contributions of the several States to the Imperial Treasury must be continued. The strength of the army in time of peace, which has been temporarily fixed in Article 60, shall be taken as a basis for calculating these amounts until it shall be altered by a law of the Empire.

The expenditure of this sum for the whole army of the Empire and its establishments shall be determined by a budget law.

In determining the budget of military expenditure, the lawfully established organisation of the Imperial army, in accordance with this Constitution, shall be taken as a basis.

Article 63.—The total land force of the Empire shall form one army, which, in war and in peace, shall be under the command of the Emperor.

The regiments, &c., throughout the whole German army shall bear continuous numbers. The principal colours and the cut of the garments of the Royal Prussian army shall serve as a pattern for the rest of the army. It is left to commanders of contingent forces to choose the external badges, cockades, &c.
THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION.

It shall be the duty and the right of the Emperor to take care that, throughout the German army, all divisions be kept full and well equipped, and that unity be established and maintained in regard to organisation and formation, equipment, and command in the training of the men, as well as in the qualification of the officers. For this purpose the Emperor shall be authorised to satisfy himself at any time of the condition of the several contingents, and to provide remedies for existing defects.

The Emperor shall determine the strength, composition, and division of the contingents of the Imperial army, and also the organisation of the militia, and he shall have the right to designate garrisons within the territory of the Confederation, as also to call any portion of the army into active service.

In order to maintain the necessary unity in the care, arming, and equipment of all troops of the German army, all orders hereafter to be issued for the Prussian army shall be communicated in due form to the commanders of the remaining contingents by the Committee on the army and fortifications, provided for in Article 8, No. 1.

Art. 64.—All German troops are bound implicitly to obey the orders of the Emperor. This obligation shall be included in the oath of allegiance. The commander-in-chief of a contingent, as well as all officers commanding troops of more than one contingent, and all commanders of fortresses, shall be appointed by the Emperor. The officers appointed by the Emperor shall take the oath of fealty to him.

The appointment of generals, or of officers performing the duties of generals, in a contingent force, shall be in each case subject to the approval of the Emperor. The Emperor has the right with regard to the transfer of officers, with or without promotion, to positions which are to be filled in the service of the Empire, be it in the Prussian army or in other contingents, to select from the officers of all the contingents of the army of the Empire.

Art. 65.—The right to build fortresses within the territory of the Empire shall belong to the Emperor, who, according to Section 12, shall ask for the appropriation of the necessary means required for that purpose, if not already included in the regular appropriation.

Art. 66.—If not otherwise stipulated, the Princes of the
Empire and the Senates shall appoint the officers of their respective contingents, subject to the restriction of Article 64. They are the chiefs of all the troops belonging to their respective territories, and are entitled to the honours connected therewith.

They shall have especially the right to hold inspections at any time, and receive, besides the regular reports and announcements of changes for publication, timely information of all promotions and appointments concerning their respective contingents.

They shall also have the right to employ, for police purposes, not only their own troops, but all other contingents of the army of the Empire which are stationed in their respective territories.

**Article 67.**—The unexpended portion of the military appropriation shall, under no circumstances, fall to the share of a single Government, but at all times to the Treasury of the Empire.

**Article 68.**—The Emperor shall have the power, if the public security of the Empire demands it, to declare martial law in any part thereof, until the publication of a law regulating the grounds, the form of announcement, and the effects of such a declaration, the provisions of the Prussian law of June 4, 1851, shall be substituted therefor.

**XII. — Finances of the Empire.**

**Article 69.**—All receipts and expenditure of the Empire shall be estimated yearly, and included in the financial estimate. The latter shall be fixed by law before the beginning of the fiscal year, according to the following principles:

**Article 70.**—The surplus of the previous year, as well as the customs duties, the common excise duties, and the revenues derived from the postal and telegraph service shall be applied to the defrayal of all general expenditure. In so far as these expenditures are not covered by the receipts, they shall be raised, as long as no taxes of the Empire shall have been established, by assessing the several States of the Empire according to their population, the amount of the assessment to be fixed by the Chancellor of the Empire in accordance with the budget agreed upon.

**Article 71.**—The general expenditure shall be, as a rule, granted for one year; they may, however, in special cases, be granted for a longer period. During the period of transition fixed in Article 60,
the financial estimate, properly classified, of the expenditures of the army shall be laid before the Federal Council and the Diet for their information.

Article 72.—An annual report of the expenditure of all the receipts of the Empire shall be rendered to the Federal Council and the Diet, through the Chancellor of the Empire.

Article 73.—In cases of extraordinary requirements, a loan may be contracted in accordance with the laws of the Empire, such loan to be granted by the Empire.

XIII.—Settlement of Disputes and Modes of Punishment.

Article 74.—Every attempt against the existence, the integrity, the security, or the constitution of the German Empire; finally, any offence committed against the Federal Council, the Diet, a member of the Federal Council, or of the Diet, a magistrate or public official of the Empire, while in the execution of his duty, or with reference to his official position, by word, writing, printing, signs, or caricatures, shall be judicially investigated, and upon conviction, punished in the several States of the Empire, according to the laws therein existing, or which shall hereafter exist in the same, according to which laws a similar offence against any one of the States of the Empire, its constitution, legislature, members of its legislature, authorities, or officials is to be judged.

Article 75.—For those offences, specified in Article 74, against the German Empire, which, if committed against one of the States of the Empire, would be deemed high treason, the superior court of appeal of three free Hanseatic towns at Lübeck shall be the competent deciding tribunal in the first and last resort. More definite provisions as to the competency and the proceedings of the superior court of appeals shall be adopted by the Legislature of the Empire. Until the passage of a law of the Empire, the existing competency of the courts in the respective States of the Empire, and the provisions relative to the proceedings of those courts, shall remain in force.

Article 76.—Disputes between the different States of the Confederation, so far as they are not of a private nature, and therefore to be decided by the competent authorities, shall be settled by the
Federal Council, at the request of one of the parties. Disputes
relating to constitutional matters in those of the States of the Con-
federation whose Constitution contains no provision for the settle-
ment of such differences, shall be adjusted by the Federal Council, at
the request of one of the parties, or if this cannot be done, they shall
be settled by the legislative power of the Confederation.

Article 77.—If in one of the States of the Confederation
justice shall be denied, and no sufficient relief can be procured by
legal measures, it shall be the duty of the Federal Council to receive
substantiated complaints concerning denial or restriction of justice,
which are to be judged according to the constitution and the existing
laws of the respective States of the Confederation, and thereupon to
obtain judicial relief from the Confederate Government in the matter
which shall have given rise to the complaint.

XIV.—General Provision.

Article 78.—Amendments of the Constitution shall be made
by legislative enactment. They shall be considered as rejected
when fourteen votes are cast against them in the Federal Council.
The provisions of the Constitution of the Empire, by which fixed
rights of individual States of the Confederation are established in
their relation to the whole, shall only be modified with the consent
of that State of the Confederation which is immediately concerned.
INDEX.

Absolutism of Bismarck, 55, 64, 70, 74, 96, 252 (o), ii. 430.
Affections of Bismarck, 135.
Afghan Question, ii. 163 (n).
Alexander II., 443; ii. 113; death, ii. 18, 120.
Alexander II. and Bismarck, 246.
Alexander III., ii. 23, 119.
Alexandria bombarded, ii. 162.
Alexandria meeting, ii. 113.
Alice, Princess, ii. 67 (n).
Alliance, Austro-German, ii. 112, 155, "Triple, ii. 20, 106, 107, 149.
Alphonso XII., 441; ii. 142.
Absence and the Bismarcks, 7 (n).
Alsen, 338.
Ambassador, Bismarck as, 229, 240, 274.
Ambition of Bismarck, 274.
American enterprise, ii. 532 (n).
Amphill, Lord, 584; ii. 223, 240, 557 (n).
Annexations of Bismarck, 28, 33, 139.
Annexation, European, ii. 17.
Ancestry of Bismarck, 4, 6; ii. 478.
Anhava, ii. 16, 25.
Anglo-French action in Egypt, ii. 181.
Anzelaebism, German, ii. 159, 215, 227, 243.
Austria, ii. 217, 246 (n).
Autonomi, ii. 252.
Appetite of Bismarck, ii. 488.
Arab, ii. 150.
Aristocratic feeling of Bismarck, 149 (n).
Armies, European, ii. 402.
Armistices, 1865, 400 (n) (1870), 573, 578, (1871) 625.
Army, ii. 587, 615.
Army, Bismarck's regard for, 80.
Army Law (1874), ii. 397.
Army reform, 270, 283, 289, 415, 419.
Arndt, 488.
Arnim, Heinrich, ii. 34.
Arnim, 191 (n); ii. 13, 32 (intrigues), 36 (disgrace), 45 (end), 49 (n).
"(Papacy), ii. 255.
"("Pro memoria"), ii. 256.
Assassinations of Germans, ii. 11.
Attainments of Bismarck, 116, 126.
Attempts on Bismarck, 358, ii. 314, 317.
Audacity of Bismarck, 33, 144, 196.
Augustus v. Bismarck, 7 (n).
Augustenburg, Prince of, 323, 343, 362, 379.
Augustenburg, Duke of, 224.
Auscultatorship of Bismarck, 22.
Australian feeling, ii. 237, 247.
Austria, 89, 97, 107, 145 (Schleswig), 316, 328, 363.
Bismarck in, 190, 337.
and and the Crimea, 200.
and France, 177.
and and Germany, ii. 14, 63.
and and Russia, 3, 145, 170, 172, 188, 193, 200, 212 (Neuchâtel), 217 (1859), 233 (Schleswig), 329, 343, 347, 363, 378, 391, 400; ii. 367, 570.
and and Turkey (1876), ii. 74, 90.
Austrian Constitution, 88.
and diplomacy, 157, 170, 184.
INDEX.

Austrians in Italy, 264.
Austro-French War, Bismarck's views, 236, 254, 257.
. German opinion, 237.
. (Prussian action), 256.
Austro-German Alliance, ii. 112.
"Autonomists," Abatian, ii. 385.

B
Bach (Minister), 192 (n).
Baden, 403, 414.
Balkan States, ii. 149.
Baltic provinces, ii. 13 (n), 105.
Bank, Imperial, ii. 421.
Banking, ii. 601.
"Barbadian," ii. 31.
Bardo Treaty, ii. 133.
Baton, ii. 100.
Bavaria, 403, 608.
"King of, 611.
Bayard Taylor, ii. 98 (n), 558.
Beauvoir, 532, 591, 594.
Beechfield, ii. 73, 500.
. and Bismarck, ii. 97, 100, 278.
Beaufort d'Hautefoulle, 608.
Belgium, ii. 439.
Belgium, 655.
Belgian Question, 602 (n).
Belgians, King of, ii. 177 (n).
Belgium, ii. 332.
. partition treaty, 492.
. proposed annexation, 522.
Bellevue, 561.
Benedek, 363, 391.
Benedetti, 371 (n), 396 (n), 423, 480 (n), 501, 511.
Bennington, 417, 432 (n); ii. 269, 322.
Berenger, 443.
Berlin Congress, ii. 95.
. entry (1871), ii. 6.
. M운moundum (1870), ii. 77.
"Best hated man in Europe," ii. 307, 315.
Beust, 195, 344, 440 (and Russia), 601; ii. 14, 448.
Bi-loy, Franz, ii. 41.
. German, ii. 258, 269, 290, 296, 313, 323, 325, 364.
Bismarck and South Africa, ii. 210, 234.
. Alsace-Lorraine, 568; ii. 379.
. Ambassador, 229, 249, 274.
. Amusements, 357, 358, 571; ii. 504.

Bismarck, Appearance, 410 (n), 527; ii. 476, 480, 494, 524.
. Appetite, ii. 488.
. and Armin, ii. 32, 40.
. Attempts on, 358; ii. 314, 317.
. in Austria, ii. 23, 109.
. Authors, ii. 536.
. Beer, love of, 337; ii. 488.
. Birthplace, 2.
. Bluntness of, 312, 347, 362, 392; (n), 554, 556, 603; ii. 518, 558.
. Campaining, 527, 538, 544.
. Cardplayer, ii. 504.
. Caution, 394, 400 (n), 484, 626, 631 (n).
. Character, ii. 506.
. Colonial policy, ii. 169, 197, 203, 213.
. Congo, ii. 173.
. Conversation, 341 (n), 347; ii. 486, 515.
. Correspondence, ii. 497.
. Courage, 355, 359, 392 (n), 410 (n), 443, 537, 642, 638 (n); ii. 477, 491 (n).
. Decorations, 30, 168, 340; ii. 477.
. Despatches, 146 (1884); ii. 169, 282, 355, 527.
. Dictatorial character, ii. 430.
. and Diet, 313, 366.
. Diplomacy, 434, 484; ii. 242, 504.
. Domestic Relations, ii. 506, 510.
. Dress (see Appearance), ii. 494, 542.
. as Drinker, 29; ii. 486.
. Duels, 17, 355; ii. 491 (n).
. Eastern Question, ii. 83, 90.
. as Eater, ii. 488.
. Education, 12, 16, 21.
. Egyptian policy, ii. 180, 186.
. and Empire, proclamation of, 615.
. English policy, 322; ii. 83, 162, 169, 186, 196 (n).
. European policy, ii. 16.
. Finance, ii. 419, 431, 460.
. Firmness, 619.
. Fiscal policy, ii. 422, 469, 469.
. Foreign policy, 302, 476; ii. 1, 18.
. Foresight, 211, 491, 556.
INDEX.

Bismarck, Fortune, ii. 503, 564.
  " Franco-German War, 500, 525
    (n), 544, 553, 568, 570 (Versailles), 581, 618, 626.
  " French, his dislike of, 587.
  " French policy, 310, 335, 351, 398, 426, 433, 483, 500, 556, 568; ii. 9, 32, 132, 169, 196
    (n), 214.
  " and French Republic, ii. 9, 32, 141.
  " Fraschoppen, ii. 512.
  " and Gortchakoff, ii. 98, 103.
  " Gratitude, ii. 481.
  " Habits, 583; ii. 494, 495, 501, 510, 556.
  " Health, 111, 249, 253, 272, 410
    (n), 525 (n), 528, 544; ii. 284,
    314, 397, 522.
  " Height, ii. 480 (n).
  " History, knowledge of, ii. 537.
  " Hohenzollern candidature, 500.
  " and "Home Rule," ii. 383.
  " Honours of, 168, 270, 271, 274, 283, 287, 318, 340, 350, 410, 412, 527; ii. 22, 24, 150, 371,
    394, 477, 605.
  " Humanity, 557, 545.
  " Ideas, ii. 473.
  " Italian policy, 480, 490; ii. 26, 138.
  " as Journalist, ii. 528.
  " "Kulturkampf," ii. 236, 279, 320, 326, 355, 336 (n), 352.
  " as Linguist, ii. 538.
  " Luxembourg, 428, 433, 663.
  " Manns of, 341 (n), 347, 392
    (n), 527.
  " Mastiffs, ii. 98, 488, 495, 508.
  " Meals, 529.
  " Minister, 287.
  " Music, love of, ii. 545.
  " and Napoleon III, ii. 312, 373, 558.
  " Nervous nature, 315, 389, 400
    (n), ii. 508, 525.
  " on Ostracism, ii. 519.
  " Oratory of, ii. 520.
  " Palace, ii. 173 (n).
  " in Paris, 415 (n), 637; ii. 165 (n).
  " Parliamentary views of, 313, 316, 357; ii. 373.
  " Patriotism, 374, 398, 434, 468; ii. 555.
  " Peace policy, ii. 21, 61, 109, 129; 150, 156.

Bismarck, Political views, 267.
  " Popularity of, 383, 638; ii. 338, 563.
  " Powers of, 528; ii. 484, 494.
  " Presence of, 211.
  " Pride, 196.
  " Principles of, 267, 302, 355 (n), ii. 375, 379, 383.
  " Protection, ii. 349, 460.
  " and Railways, ii. 413, 418.
  " Religion of, 355 (n), 395, 474, 525; ii. 506, 509, 548, 554.
  " Resignations, ii. 394, 400, 423, 448.
  " Resolution of, 305, 310, 355, 359, 376, 410 (n), 443, 471, 534, 572, 575, 618; ii. 7 (n), 12, 32,
    48, 481, 498.
  " Revengefulness, ii. 32, 40, 406, 425, 557.
  " in Russia, 240; ii. 23.
  " Russian policy, 304, 334, 398, 426, 494 (1870), 600, 604; ii. 13, 59, 90.
  " Rustic tastes of, ii. 491.
  " Schleswig, ii. 109, 341 (n), 446.
  " Sensitiveness, ii. 508.
  " Skull of, ii. 482.
  " Sleeplessness, 528; ii. 494.
  " as a smoker, ii. 486.
  " and Social Democrats, ii. 435, 439, 442, 450.
  " Soldierly tastes, 386, 513, 523, 537 (n); ii. 91, 477, 478.
  " Speeches, 385; ii. 297, 517, 521.
  " Sportsman, 140, 248, 340, 571.
  " Strength, 240.
  " Style, 148.
  " Superstitions, 350 (n); ii. 546.
  " Sympathy, ii. 509.
  " Table-talker, ii. 515.
  " Travels of, 337, 445; ii. 23.
  " Unpopularity of, 291, 299, 305, 331, 356, 361 (n), 395.
  " Vanity of, ii. 478, 491.
  " Versifier, as, ii. 535.
  " War-maker, 500 (n); ii. 554.
  " Weight, ii. 480 (n).
  " Wit, 347, 350, 454, 473, 613, 623; ii. 222, 479, 498, 558.
  " and working-men, ii. 437, 474.
  " Writer, as, ii. 226.

"Bismarck," origin of name, 3.
INDEX.

Bismarck, Princess, 38; ii. 408, 507.

-Bohlen, 559.

-Charles A von, 8.

-Charles W. F. (father of Bismarck), 8, 36.

-Claus, 4, 5.

-Count H., 38 (n), 535; ii. 240

(n), 242, 245.

-Count W., 535, 564.

- General F. W. von, 6.

Bittenfeld, 384, 412 (n).

-Black Sea Clause,” 599, 622 (n).

-Black Sea Treaty, 308.

-Blacks,” ii. 267.

-Bleichröder, 650; ii. 395.


-Blume, ii. 504.

-“Blood and iron,” 290.

-Bloomfield, 163.

-Blumenthal, 555.

-Bockum-Dolffs, Hat of, 296.

-Boers, ii. 210, 235.

-Bombardment of Paris, 580, 596, 618.

-Bonapartists (1870-1), 592; ii. 32.

-Borries, 261 (n).

-Brodmann, 138.

-Bourgois, i. 422.

-Boyce, Gen., 500.

-Brandenburg Guinean Co., ii. 200.

-Bratiano, i. 130.

-Braunenberg case, ii. 273.

-“Broad-banked Law,” ii. 324.

-Breslau, 123.

-Bryce offered to Bismarck, 261.

-“Bundesgesetz,” The, ii. 324 (n).

-Bronsart von Schellendorf, 551.

-Bruno’s speech, 17.

-Brunswick, 180.

-Budget, military, ii. 397.

-Bühler, ii. 404.

-Bulgaria, i. 151.

-Bulow, 139; ii. 426.

-Bund, 185 (Bismarck’s views) 267.

-209.

-Buntenrath, 414; ii. 212 (n), 373.

-Bansen, 60.

-Bud, 188, 213.

-Bureau-mancy, 105.

-Commerce of Germany, 188.

-Commune, i. 8.

-Congress of Vienna (1877) ; ii. 79.

-Conferences, Berlin (Greece), ii. 129.

-Congo, ii. 166.

-Constantinople (1867), ii. 85, 183.

-London (1871), 606, 622 (n).

-(London, 1884), ii. 193, 230 (n).

-“Conflict,” The, 271, 283, 289, 298.

-357, 408 (1874); ii. 400.

-and Bismarck, 293, 355.

-Congo Conference, ii. 166.

-Treaty (1884), ii. 166.

-Conferences of Berlin, ii. 95.

-Frankfort, 314.

INDEX.

Conservatives, 467.
Constantinople Conference (1876), ii.
85.
Constituent Assembly, 69.
Constitutions, 70 (Frankfort), 87, 91;
ii. 327 (Federal), 414, 419 (1850);
ii. 584 (Imperial); ii. 372, 599.
Constitutions, Bismarck's views, 78,
91, 295, 337; ii. 327.
"Constitutional guarantees," ii. 470.
Contraband of war, 603.
Control, Egyptian, ii. 181.
Convention, "The February," 304.
" of Gustein, 349; ii. 567.
Country life of Bismarck, 25, 27, 28,
37; ii. 491, 493, 496.
oup d'Etat of 1851, 174.
Courcelles, 533.
Courts, Prussian, ii. 598.
Crete, 477.
Crimean War, 195.
Crisis (1874), ii. 399.
Crown Prince, 288, 388, 390, 438, 530,
539; ii., 67 (w), 147, 345, 365, 447.
Curland, Bismarck in, 140.
Customs, ii. 460, 607.
" Unity, 193.

D
Dalwigk, 164, 455.
Danish Question, 222 (1863), 318, 327,
330, 338.
Dantzig interview, ii. 121.
Danube, 293.
Darmstadt coalition, 190.
"and Prussia, 165.
Decazes, ii. 54.
Decorations, Bismarck's, 30, 168, 340;
ii. 477.
Delbrück, 689; ii. 428 (a), 430.
"Delegation Scheme," 313.
Denmark, Bismarck in, 139.
Denmark and Prussia, 223, 228.
Derby, Lord, ii. 66, 79 (w), 82 (w).
Der Nietzsche kommt, ii. 49 (w).
Descriptive powers of Bismarck, 184,
136.
Despatches of Bismarck, 146, 211 (1884);
ii. 169, 292, 355, 527.
Dict (see "Reichstag").
"of Frankfort, 107, 115, 117, 121,
144, 163, 173, 213 (1859), 239
(Schleswig), 326, 379.

Diet, (Reichstag), 313; ii. 605.
"Die Wacht am Rhein," 519, 524.
Diplomacy of Bismarck, 115, 166, 177,
191, 228, 229, 240.
Diplomatic salaries, 251.
Dismantlement, 489; ii. 404.
"Discretionary Powers Act," ii. 358,
394.
Disraeli and Bismarck, 278; ii. 97,
100, 278, 537.
Disintegrating forces, ii. 376, 381, 408.
Divine Right in Prussia, 42, 269.
Döllinger, ii. 270.
Donchery, 558.
D'Oubrè, 494.
Do ut des, 601; ii. 238.
Drinking feats of Bismarck, 29; ii.
486.
Drouyn de Lhuys, 407.
Duchesne, ii. 316, 332.
Ducrot, 487.
Duellng, 355 (w).
Duels of Bismarck, 17, 355; ii. 491
(w).
Dulcigno, ii. 127.
Düppel, 335.

E
Eastern Question, 195, 198, 205, 206;
ii. 25 (1875); ii. 72, 92.
Eastern Railways, ii. 150.
Eater, Bismarck as an, ii. 488.
"Economic Era," ii. 443.
Education, ii. 277.
Education of Bismarck, 12, 16, 21.
Egypt, ii. 179, 186.
Elbe Duchies, 222, 228, 318, 327, 330,
338.
Elections, French (1871), 628.
Elector, Great, ii. 198.
Electors, ii. 592.
Emancipation Edict, 44.
Emigration statistics, ii. 206 (w).
Emperor, 23, 65, 127, 288.
"and Bismarck, 28, 127, 229, 286,
269, 284; ii. 116, 477, 502,
565.
Emperors' Alliance, ii. 14, 20, 121, 167.
Empire, domestic affairs, ii. 371.
foreign relations of, ii. 1.
proclamation of, 614.
Emu, 493, 505, 611.
"Encyclopädie," The (1876), ii. 323.
"Ex dymion," Bismarck in, 279 (w).
INDEX.

England, Bismarck's views, 34, 35 (n), 76, 163, 183, 277.
. Colonies of, ii. 230, 247.
. and Germany (1870), 602; ii. 139, 215, 227, 243.
. and Prussia, 206.
. and Schleswig, 332, 351.
Entry into Berlin (1871), ii. 6.
. into Paris, 637.
Erfurt Parliament, 98, 99 (n).
Ermeland, Bishop of, ii. 273, 288.
Esteha, ii. 55.
Eugénie, Empress, 209, 592; ii. 32, 262 (n).
European Concert, 197.
Evacuation of France, ii. 10, 50, 577.
. Treaty (1873), ii. 37.
Exhibition (Paris, 1867), 436, 445; (Paris, 1878), ii. 126.
. Bismarck, ii. 554 (n).
Explosives Act, ii. 433.
Extradition, ii. 18, 120.

F

Fabricius, Bismarck as, 194.
Falkenstein, 383, 412 (n).
Falk, Dr., ii. 273 (n), 276, 288, 350.
. " Falk Laws," ii. 293, 310, 327, 328, 358.
Favre, Jules, 567, 574, 578 (n), 621, 624, 629; ii. 3.
Federal Constitution, 414, 419.
Federal Council, ii. 212 (n), 372 (n), 518, 602.
Ferrières, 570.
Fedalsists, ii. 278, 395.
Fiji, ii. 229, 246 (n).
Finance, ii. 596, 618.
. Imperial, 567, 419, 460.
. "Fire and sword," 239.
Fiscal reform, ii. 422.
Fleet, German, 183, 186, 356, 470; ii. 203.
Foreign affairs, views of Bismarck, 78.
France and Austria, 177, 284.
. Bismarck in, 200, 219 (n), 275, 289.
. (isolation), ii. 26, 141.
. and Germany, 174, 196, 485, 511; ii. 3, 7 (n), 11, 125, 164, 378 (commercial), 579.
. and Italy (1881), ii. 136.
France and Luxemburg, 428.
. and Prussia, 211 (Neuchâtel), 219 (customs), 310 (Schleswig), 371, (Austria) 392, 398, (1870) 517, 616.
. and Russia, ii. 107.
. and Schleswig, 351, 371.
Franchi, ii. 347.
. and William I., 314.
. and Bismarck, 193.
France-German Concert, ii. 193.
France-German War, 496, 501; ii. 262 (n).
Francois-tireurs, 589.
Frankenstein motion, ii. 471.
Frankfort, 400.
. Bismarck at, 152, 178, 237.
. Congress, 314.
. deportation from, 83, 88.
. despatches, 146.
. Diet, 163, 173, 213.
. Treaty, ii. 5, 574.
Frederick of Augustenburg, 323, 343.
Frederick-Charles, Prince, 331 (n), 384, 530.
Frederick I., ii. 199.
Frederick-William II., 42.
Frederick-William III., 43.
Frederick-William IV., 26, 46, 50, 60, 63, 89; succession of, 26; madness, 221; death, 266.
Frederick William IV. and Bismarck, 201, 205.
Frederick VII., 318, 322.
Freedon of speech, 469.
Free trade, African, ii. 173.
. Bismarck on, ii. 462 (n).
French abuse of Bismarck, 585.
French Elections (1871), 628.
. Ministries, ii. 108 (n).
. patriotism, 567, 590.
. presumption, 485, 492, 511.
. vanity, 576.
Freyinet (1882), ii. 181.
Friedrichsburg, ii. 199.
Friedrichsruh, ii. 499, 503.
Fressard, 531.
Frühchoppen, ii. 512.
Fulda Pastoral, ii. 257.
Fürstenag, 314.

G

. " G.'s" article, ii. 191.
Gabelenz, 331 (n), 392.
INDEX.

Hanover, 380, 400, 460, 466; ii. 467 (p).
Hanoverian Legion, 462.
"Hard-hearted villains," 537.
Hartmann, ii. 119.
Health of Bismarck, 141, 249, 253, 272, 410 (n), 525 (n), 528, 544; ii. 284, 314, 397, 522.
Hegemony, Prussian, 290, 415.
Holtz, V. Bismarck, 38 (n), 535; ii. 246 (n), 292, 243.
Hertegovina, ii. 72.
Hesse-Cassel (1863), 300, 381, 400.
Hesse-Darmstadt, 455, 464.
Hesse, G. Duke of, 166.
Hessian Revolution, 108.
Hewett, Consul, i. 223.
Hödel, ii. 433.
Holm, ii. 426.
Hohnenlohe, Cardinal, ii. 279.
"Prince, 459; ii. 254, 398 (n).
"Ingeffingen, Prince, 274.
Hohenzollern, Prince A. of, 265; (and Bismarck), 263.
"Hole and Corner policy," ii. 409.
Holland, King of, 428.
Holstein, 326, 338, 378, 400.
Holzhausen, 160.
Homburg meeting, ii. 143, 149.
Home Rule, 415; ii. 383.
"Honest broker," Bismarck as, 224; ii. 93, 100, 111.
Horsemanship of Bismarck, 15.
Humbert, King, ii. 27.
Hunter, Bismarck as, 248.

I
Ignatieff, ii. 85, 122.
"Immaculate Conception," ii. 253.
Imperial Crown, 83, 89.
Income of Bismarck, ii. 503.
Independence of Bismarck, 196.
Indemnities, War, (1866), 403; (1871), 626, 630.
Indemnity, Bill of, 409.
"Infallibility," Papal, ii. 253, 271 (n).
Infamy of Bismarck, 12.
"Influence (political) of Bismarck, 201, 205, 206.
"Interior arrangement," 97.
"International Association," ii. 177.
Intervention, (1866) 396, (1870) 566, 579, 596, 620.
Insurance, State, ii. 474.

II
Habits of Bismarck, 583; ii. 494, 510, 556.
Halfter, 344.

Hanover, 380, 400, 460, 466; ii. 467 (p).
Hanoverian Legion, 462.
"Hard-hearted villains," 537.
Hartmann, ii. 119.
Health of Bismarck, 141, 249, 253, 272, 410 (n), 525 (n), 528, 544; ii. 284, 314, 397, 522.
Hegemony, Prussian, 290, 415.
Holtz, V. Bismarck, 38 (n), 535; ii. 246 (n), 292, 243.
Hertegovina, ii. 72.
Hesse-Cassel (1863), 300, 381, 400.
Hesse-Darmstadt, 455, 464.
Hesse, G. Duke of, 166.
Hessian Revolution, 108.
Hewett, Consul, i. 223.
Hödel, ii. 433.
Holm, ii. 426.
Hohnenlohe, Cardinal, ii. 279.
"Prince, 459; ii. 254, 398 (n).
"Ingeffingen, Prince, 274.
Hohenzollern, Prince A. of, 265; (and Bismarck), 263.
"Hole and Corner policy," ii. 409.
Holland, King of, 428.
Holstein, 326, 338, 378, 400.
Holzhausen, 160.
Homburg meeting, ii. 143, 149.
Home Rule, 415; ii. 383.
"Honest broker," Bismarck as, 224; ii. 93, 100, 111.
Horsemanship of Bismarck, 15.
Humbert, King, ii. 27.
Hunter, Bismarck as, 248.

I
Ignatieff, ii. 85, 122.
"Immaculate Conception," ii. 253.
Imperial Crown, 83, 89.
Income of Bismarck, ii. 503.
Independence of Bismarck, 196.
Indemnities, War, (1866), 403; (1871), 626, 630.
Indemnity, Bill of, 409.
"Infallibility," Papal, ii. 253, 271 (n).
Infamy of Bismarck, 12.
"Influence (political) of Bismarck, 201, 205, 206.
"Interior arrangement," 97.
"International Association," ii. 177.
Intervention, (1866) 396, (1870) 566, 579, 596, 620.
Insurance, State, ii. 474.

II
Habits of Bismarck, 583; ii. 494, 510, 556.
Halfter, 344.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDEX.</th>
<th>629</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malet, Sir A., 162, 207.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. Sir Edward, 573; and Bismarck, ii. 236 (n), 238.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mancini, ii. 138.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manning, Cardinal, 61.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mantfeld, Minister, and Bismarck, 109, 204.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mantfeld, Marshal, 362, 383, 509; ii. 386.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage of Bismarck, 38.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage, Civil, ii. 306.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshfield, 138.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;&quot; Marshal's Council,&quot; 365.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mars-la-Tour, 534.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marx, Karl, ii. 439.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masella, ii. 346.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masterfulness of Bismarck, 232 (n); ii. 430.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Matricular contributions,&quot; ii. 420, 431, 462.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meddeb, 15, 15 (n).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximilian, 450.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maybach, ii. 413.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayence, 407.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;May Laws,&quot; ii. 293, 310, 327, 328, 338.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meade, Mr., ii. 237 (n).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meglia, ii. 324.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Ali Pasha, ii. 97.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melchers, Archbishop, ii. 287, 313.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meinraundum, Berlin (1870), ii. 77.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menudorf, 304.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merton, 479.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metimieux, Prosper, 352.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metternich and Bismarck, 129.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metz, 533: surrender, 568, 591, 594, 631 (n).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico, 151 (n).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microwlaski, 302.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military reform, 270, 283, 289, 413, 419.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Military System,&quot; ii. 401.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.. Serries, ii. 587, 615.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millar, Tho Five, 630; ii. 10, 50, 390, 577.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich, iii. 28.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister, Bismarck as, 272, 283, 287.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministers, Prussia, 235, 298; ii. 591.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry, Catholic, abolished (1871), ii. 271.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization, 368, 524; ii. 390.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molendat, 70.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molte, 364, 382, 388, 412 (n), 434 (n), 443, 17, 1870, 525, 531, 556, 569; ii 22, 308, 419, 447.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro, ii. 80, 127.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montessuy, 161.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow, Bismarck in, 255.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motley and Bismarck, 19.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mouraviev, 309.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mühler, ii. 274.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Münch-Bellinghausen, 159.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Münster, Count, ii. 239, 421.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N

Nachtigal, Dr., ii. 223.                          |
Naníasowski, Bishop, ii. 286.                    |
Napoleon III., 174, 178, 208 (in 1870), 546, 552; ii. 553. |
Napoleon III., Austrian War, 232.                |
   .. and Bismarck, 174, 178, 208.                |
   .. Designs, 372, 399, 404, 420, 428.          |
   .. Duplicit, 375, 399, 407, 421.              |
   .. and Germany, 262, 372, 392, 404, 452 (n). |
   .. Indecision, 485.                           |
   .. and Italy, 352, 392, 479; ii. 571.         |
   .. Luxemburg, 428, 435.                       |
   .. Mexico, 451 (n).                           |
   .. Neuchâtel, 220 (1862), 275, 284, 312, 351, 373, 558. |
   .. and the Poles, 307.                         |
   .. Policy of, 372.                            |
   .. and Prussia, 234, 284.                     |
   .. Roman Question, 478.                       |
   .. and Russian policy, 601.                   |
   .. and Schleswig, 227, 371, 392, 448.         |
   .. Surrender of, 552; ii. 553.                 |
   .. and William L., 262, 443, 562.             |

Nassau, 400.                                    |
National Defence, Government of, 575.           |
National Liberals, 416; ii. 342.                |
National Union, 417.                           |
Navy, ii. 613.                                 |
Nervous Nature of Bismarck, 315, 389, 400 (n); ii. 508, 525. |
Nettelbeck, 200.                               |
Neuchâtel, 214.                                |
   .. Conference, 219 (n).                      |
   .. "Never," ii. 426.                         |
   .. New Guinea, ii. 232, 246 (n).             |
   .. Nicholas of Russia, 108.                  |
   .. Nicolasburg, 397, 400.                    |
   .. Treaty of, 400.                           |
Nebuhra, ii. 325.                              |
Niederwald monument, ii. 145, 453; plot, ii. 453, 502. |
Niger, ii. 175.                                |
Nihilists, ii. 18.                            |
INDEX.

Nina, ii. 347.
Nobility, ii. 345, 445.
North German Confederation, 414.
North German Gazette, ii. 529.
Nuntius question, ii. 274.

O
Oecumenical Council, ii. 253, 258.
Old Catholics, ii. 257, 270, 287, 299, 328.
Olivier, 493, 496.
Olmutz (1850), 109, 289.
Orange, Prince of, 431.
Orator, Bismarck as, ii. 520.
Oratory, Bismarck on, ii. 518.

P
Paderborn, Bishop of, ii. 313, 323.
Paris, 566, 595, 618, 637.
Parthenay, i. 313, 413.
Bismarck in, 275.
Partitions, i. 73, 76, 83, 98, 292, 408, 414, 417, 436, 467; ii. 118, 122, 321, 397, 591.
Parliamentary life of Bismarck, 39, 41, 52, 66, 73, 91, 293, 298, 353.
views of Bismarck, 79, 268.
Parties, 416.
Particularism, 474; ii. 408.
Patent," The Danish (1863), 322.
Patriotism of Bismarck, 81, 267.
Payment of Members, 469.
Peace (1839) 298; (1864) 342; (1866) 400: (1871) conditions of, 625, 653; ii. 163, 9.
Peace negotiations (1870-1), 573, 578, 595, 621, 625, 637.
"Pearl of Meppen," ii. 268.
Pen, The Golden, i. 630.
Petty States, 170, 269.
"Phenomenal chart" of Bismarck, ii. 183.
Picard, 629.
Pins IX., 523; ii. 251, 263, 285, 293, 298, 323, 339, 343.
thoughts of flight, ii. 264.
and Germany, ii. 264.
Plotting, ii. 91.
Poles, ii. 301, 377.
and Bismarck, 68, 153, 303, 305.
"sympathy with, 307.
Polish Insurrection of 1863, 302.
Political asylum, 183; ii. 18.
"Pomeranian Musketeer," ii. 84.
Pope and Bismarck, 130.
Portugal and the Congo, ii. 166.
Poschinger, 147 (n).
Post, The, ii. 65.
Posts and Telegraphs, ii. 611.
Pouyer-Quertier, ii. 10.
Pracht-bericht, 211.
Prague Treaty of, 403 (n); ii. 570.
Prescience of Bismarck, 211.
Press, 298, 464; ii. 587.
Bismarck and, 151, 154, 173, 190, 453; ii. 528.
"Law (1874), ii. 396, 407.
Preuss, Die, Armist, ii. 43.
Pride of Bismarck, 196.
Priests in elections, ii. 275.
Prim, 503.
Prince Consort, 202, 278.
Proclamation of Empire, 616.
Progressists, 417.
Pro-Memoria, Armist's, ii. 43.
Pro Nihil, ii. 49 (n).
Prokesch, 154, 156, 173.
Promotion of Bismarck, 270, 271, 274, 283, 287; ii. 605.
Protection, ii. 349, 460.
Prussia, King in, 614 (n).
"aggrandisement of, 398, 402.
"Prussianism," 96, 100, 103.
Prussian railways, ii. 416, 418.
"Pulpit Law," ii. 275.
Puttkamer, ii. 350, 364.

Q
"Quadruple Alliance," 98.
Queen Victoria and Bismarck, 209.
Quid faciamus non? ii. 49 (n).

R
Radovitz, 111.
Railway Board, ii. 411.
Railways, Eastern, ii. 150; German, 410, 601, 609.
Rantzau, ii. 480 (n).
Rechberg, 218.
Red Sea, ii. 139 (n).
"Red Spectre," ii. 441.
Referendary, Bismarck as, 24, 32.
Reichstag, 414 (1871), 612 (1880); ii. 212, 321, 373, 397, 449, 602, 695.
Reichskriegschatz, The, ii. 390.
INDEX.

Reichebrecher, 86, 97.
Reille, 552.
Reinhard, 158.
Reinkens, ii. 270, 299.
Religious views of Bismarck, 134, 355
(a).
"Reptile fund," 465.
Republic, French, 567.
Requisitions, 472.
Reuss, Prince, ii. 332.
Reuache, ii. 11, 26, 31, 51.
Revolution of 1848, 63, 70, 85.
Revolutionists, 61.
Rochow, 126.
Romani, Andre von, ii. 505.
Roman Question, 478; ii. 27, 265, 266, 269.
Roon, 289, 296, 412 (a); ii. 394.
Rothan, 427 (a).
Rothschild, Baron, 570.
Rouher, 481.
Roumania, ii. 149.
Rule Bismarck, 4.
Russia, 304, 334.
"and Austria (1877); ii. 103.
"Bismarck in, 229, 240, 253.
"and France, ii. 107.
"and Germany (1877); ii. 103, 154, 402.
"and Prussia, 199, 304.
Russian policy, 600.
Russo-Turkish War, ii. 87.
Rustic tastes of Bismarck, 491, 493, 496.

S
Sabotau, 387.
Salisbury, Lord, ii. 86 (a), 115, 132.
Salonica, murders, 75.
Salzburg (1871), ii. 15.
Salzburg interview, 450.
Samos, ii. 211.
San Stefano, 1. 92, 98.
Sauerkraut, Bismarck on, ii. 488.
Savigny, 348 (a).
Saxon, 344, 380, 401.
"King of, 540.
Schlesitz and Bismarck, 260.
Schleswig, 92, 109, 378, 400, 446, 448.
ii. 109.
Schleswig-Holstein, 222, 225, 228
(1863), 318, 327, 330, 338.
Schlozer, ii. 359.
Schmilt, Captain, murder of, ii. 55.
Schmuts, Bismarck on, ii. 488.
Schonhausen, 2, 9.
"Schonhausen foundation," ii. 564 (a).
School life of Bismarck, 12, 13.
Schools, ii. 277.
Schouvaloff, ii. 98.
Schouvaloff-Salisbury agreement, ii.
99.
Schenck, 157.
Schulze-Dolitzsch, 328 (a).
Schwarzenberg, 109, 150.
Schweninger, ii. 481.
Sedan, 549.
Sentry over nothing, A, 248 (a).
"September Convention," 479.
"September," Military, ii. 401.
Serrano, ii. 57.
Servia, ii. 80, 85, 149.
Sheridan, General, 559, 590.
Simson, 82, 612.
Sinking Fund, Egyptian, ii. 195.
Sister of Bismarck, 11.
Skiercinevicze (1859), 248; (18 ii.
156.
Skobeleff, ii. 123.
Slave-trade, ii. 175.
Smoker, Bismarck as, ii. 486.
Social Democrats, ii. 433, 442, 454.
Socialist Laws, ii. 443, 449.
Social Question, The, ii. 457.
Society, Bismarck in, 242, 253.
Solfertino, 255.
Sortie from Paris, 620 (a).
South Africa, ii. 210, 234.
South Germany, 190.
South Sea Company, ii. 211.
Southern States, 403, 447, 555, 508.
Spain, 444, 496; ii. 54.
"Bismarck in, 281.
"and Germany, ii. 142, 146.
Speeches of Bismarck, 27, 52, 91.
"Sperrgeetz," ii. 324 (a).
Spicheran, 531.
Spies, 487.
Sportsman, Bismarck as, 140, 248, 340, 571.
Stadt-vertiger, 65.
State railways, ii. 414, 418.
State Socialism, ii. 441.
Statthalter, The, ii. 386.
Steamers Subsidy Bill, ii. 213.
Steinmetz, 412 (a), 530.
"Stellvertretungsgesetz," The, ii. 429.
Steuer-vereen, 189.
St. Gotthard line, 490.
St. Lucia Bay, ii. 210, 234.
Stock-dealing of Bismarck, 221.
Stolberg, ii. 429.
INDEX.

Stosch, ii. 424.
St. Petersburg, Bismarck in, 241.
St. Privat, 534, 536.
Strafford and Bismarck, 292.
Strasbourg, Surrender, 568, 580, 631.
Strasbourg University, ii. 383.
Strength of Bismarck, 240.
Studies, 13.
Style of Bismarck’s writing, 148.
Suez Canal, ii. 190.
Suez Canal shares, ii. 74.
Suicide statistics, ii. 207 (a).
Superstition of Bismarck, 213.
Sybel, ii. 329 (a).
Syllabus, ii. 44 (a), 251.

T
Talleyrand, 177.
Tariff Law, ii. 471.
Taufkirchen, 441.
Taxation, ii. 431, 460.
Taxes, ii. 469, 596.
Telegraphs, ii. 611.
Tyl-el-Kebir, ii. 183.
Temporal Power, ii. 27, 263, 266, 269.
Teplitz interview, 263.
Trotzki, ii. 389.
Tweed, ii. 180.
Thessaly, ii. 130.
Threat of war, ii. 7 (a).
Thun, 122, 142.
Thurn and Taxis post, 155.
Titles of Bismarck, 270, 283 ; ii. 371.
Tobacco Monopoly, ii. 431, 474.
Toledano, ii. 91.
Toul, 380.
Transvaal, ii. 235.
Travels of Bismarck, 34, 35, 139, 240, 286, 337.
Treaties of Berle, ii. 133.
" Benedetti, 373 (a), 405 (a), 423, 522.
" Berlin, ii. 101, 127.
" Black Sea, 398, 599.
" Evacuation (1873), ii. 37.
" Frankfort (1871), ii. 1, 574.
" Gastein (1865), 349.
" London (1832), 324, 236 (1867), 441.
" Niesburg, 400.
" Paris (1856), 599.
" Prague, 403 (a) ; ii. 109, 570.
" San Stefano, ii. 92.
" Vienna (1864), 378 ; ii. 567.
Treaties, Villafranca, 258.
Triple Alliance, ii. 29, 106 ; Turkey.
77, 90.
" New, ii. 140.
" Tri-regal Alliance, 94.
Trott, 158.
Tunis, ii. 132.
Turkey (1875), ii. 74, 127.
" disintegrated, ii. 132.
" and Egypt, ii. 182, 186.

U
" Uhlan King," The, ii. 144.
Ultimatum (1876), ii. 85.
" Ultramaritimes," 463.
Ultramontanes, 60 ; ii. 463.
Ultramontanism, 150.
Unification, 413 (a), 454, 475, 517, 565, 607 (1871), 609, 611.
" "One-man Ministry," 473.
University life of Bismarck, 17, 21.
" in Germany, 16.
Unpopularity of Bismarck, 291, 294.
Usedom, 480.

V
Varzin, ii. 494, 496, 503.
Vatican Council, ii. 43.
" Decreas, ii. 260, 271 (a).
" and Germany, ii. 293, 319, 344, 352, 362.
" and Revolution, ii. 262.
" and War of 1870, ii. 262, 266.
Vendresse, 564.
Venetia, 369, 392 ; ii. 571.
Versailles (1871), 589, 607.
Victor Emmanuel, ii. 28, 64, 343.
Victoria, Queen, 434 (a) ; ii. 88.
Vienna, Treaty of, ii. 567.
Villafranca, 258.
Vionville, 534.
Virchow, 293 (a), 355, 489 (a) ; ii. 250.
Visconti-Venosta, ii. 28.
Volutariast of Bismarck, 24.
Votes of Bismarck, 53.

W
Wagener, 71 ; ii. 393.
Waldsee, ii. 7 (a).
Wars, Austro-French, 255.
" Danish, 328.
INDEX.

Wars, Austro-Prussian, 382, 400.

" Franco-German, 496, 501.

" Russo-Turkish, ii. 87.

" War-chest Fund," ii. 390.

War preparations (1868), 487.

" scare (1873), ii. 67.

" in sight," ii. 65.

" signs, 438.

" threats (1874), ii. 53.

Weissenburg, 531.

Werner, ii. 102.

Werther, 496.

West African Conference, ii. 173.

White-hoods, ii. 216.

Wrangelski, 360 (a).

Wife of Bismarck, 38.

Wilhelmshöhe, 563.

William I., 66, 72, 127, 229 (a).

" accession, 266, 269; army reform, 270, 283.

" and Alexander II., ii. 113.

" Army reformer, 270, 283, 289.

" and Bismarck, 23, 127, 229, 266, 284; ii. 113, 477, 502, 565.

" campaigning (1814), 541; (1864), 535; (1866), 389; (1870), 541, 552, 560.

" caution, 348, 377.

" character, 288, 377, 397, 402, 439, 507, 563; ii. 67 (a), 446 (a).


" courage, 389, 539.

" despotic action, 298, 409, 589.

" elected Emperor, 612, 616; ii. 604.

" enters Berlin (1871), ii. 6.

William I., France, 520.

" Franco-German War, 541, 552, 570.

" and French Republic, ii. 39 (a).

" generosity, 461, 562.

" humanity, 439; ii. 446 (a).

" in Italy, ii. 31.

" and "Kulturkampf," ii. 299, 351, 361.

" military qualities, 389.

" and Parliament, 298.

" peace lover, 507; ii. 67 (a), 84.

" piety, 377, 543, 617; ii. 307 (a), 331.

" pride, 351, 512 (a).

" wounded, ii. 96, 445.


Wimpffen, 552, 556.

Windischgratz, 191.

Windhoesl, ii. 66, 267, 320, 322, 350.

" (a).

" Wit of Bismarck, 36, 75, 103, 114, 238.

Wollmann, Dr., ii. 273.

" Working-classes, Bismarck on, 277.

Wörth, 531.

Wrangel, 331 (a).

" Writer, Bismarck as, ii. 526.

Wurttemberg, 403.

Z

Zollitz, 344.


Zollverein, 188, 193, 311, 370.

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