Plato's Phaedo

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PLATO'S PHAEDO
PREFACE

The text of this edition is that prepared by me for the Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis with a few corrections and modifications. Such as it is, it is the only text based on the three archetypal MSS., the Clarkianus (B), the Marcianus (T), and the Vindobonensis (W). The readings of T are taken from a photograph in my possession, those of W from the collation of Professor Král of Prague.

In the Introduction and Notes I have chiefly endeavoured to elucidate the argument, and to show the importance of the Phaedo as an historical document. Grammatical points have only been dealt with when they seemed to have a direct bearing on these problems. The interpretation of an ancient document must always be based on grammar, but an edition of the Phaedo is not the place for a full discussion of general grammatical problems like the constructions of ὅμι and ὅμι ὅμι.

I have given references throughout to the second edition of my Early Greek Philosophy (E. Gr. Ph.²), where I have discussed more fully the historical background of the dialogue. I hope to have an early
opportunity of discussing certain textual problems in a more scientific way than is possible in an edition like the present.

The reader will see that I am under great obligations to the editions of Wyttenbach and Heindorf. Of more recent editions I owe most to that of the late Sir William Geddes.

J. B.
sopher who was greater still, and was also one of the most consummate dramatic artists the world has known. It would not be easy to find the match of such a work.

II

But are we entitled to take the Phaedo for what it professes to be? The general opinion apparently is that we are not. It is admitted, indeed, that the narrative portion of the dialogue is historical, but most interpreters doubt whether Socrates talked about immortality at all, and many deny that he held the belief set forth in our dialogue. Hardly any one ventures to suppose that the reasons given for holding this belief could have been given by Socrates; it is assumed that they are based on doctrines formulated by Plato himself at least ten years after Socrates had passed away. I cannot accept this account of the matter. I cannot, indeed, feel sure that all the incidents of the narrative are strictly historical. These are, in my opinion, the very things for which a dramatic artist might fairly draw on his imagination. I have only an impression that they are, broadly speaking, true to life, and that they all serve to bring before us a picture of Socrates as he really was. But the religious and philosophical teaching of the Phaedo is on a very different footing. Whatever Plato may or may not have done in other dialogues—and I say nothing here about that—I cannot bring myself to believe that he falsified

1 I refer mainly to current opinion in this country. Some references to views of another character will be found below (p. xiv, n. 2).

2 It is obvious that we must apply a somewhat different standard to a dialogue like the Phaedo, which is supposed to take place when Plato was twenty-eight years old, and to one like the Parmenides, which deals with a time at least twenty years before he was born. If it can be
the story of his master's last hours on earth by using him as a mere mouthpiece for novel doctrines of his own. That would have been an offence against good taste and an outrage on all natural piety; for if Plato did this thing, he must have done it deliberately. There can be no question here of unconscious development; he must have known quite well whether Socrates held these doctrines or not. I confess that I should regard the Phaedo as little better than a heartless mystification if half the things commonly believed about it were true.

III

The interpretation which finds nothing in the Phaedo but the speculations of Plato himself is based on the belief that 'the historical Socrates', of whom we may get some idea from Xenophon, is quite a different person from 'the Platonic Socrates'. What the latter is made to say is treated as evidence for the philosophy of Plato, but not for that of Socrates himself. This does not mean merely that Plato's Socrates is idealized. That might be allowed, if it were admitted that Xenophon too idealized Socrates after his own fashion. If it were only meant that each of these men drew Socrates as he saw him, and that Socrates was, in fact, a different man for each of them, the truth of such a view would be self-evident. We should only have to ask which of the two had the better opportunity of seeing Socrates as he really was, and which was the more capable of understanding and portraying him. But very much more than this is meant.

shown, as I believe it can, that the latter dialogue is accurate in its historical setting (cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 19a) and involves no philosophical anachronism, the Phaedo will a fortiori be a trustworthy document.
It is meant that Plato has used Socrates as a mask to conceal his own features, and that the Platonic 'Socrates' is, in fact, Plato.

The general acceptance of this view in recent times is apparently due to the authority of Hegel. Speaking of Socrates, he lays down that 'we must hold chiefly to Xenophon in regard to the content of his knowledge, and the degree in which his thought was developed',¹ and this dictum became a sort of dogma with the Hegelian and semi-Hegelian writers to whom we owe so much of the best nineteenth-century work in the history of Greek philosophy. It can only be made plausible, however, by isolating the Memorabilia from Xenophon's other writings in a way which seems wholly illegitimate. We must certainly take the Oeconomicus and the Symposium into account as well; and, in estimating Xenophon's claim to be regarded as a historian, we must never forget that he was the author of the Cyropaedia.

The Apology of Socrates which has come down to us under Xenophon's name raises another question. It is pretty clearly based on Plato's Apology, and it contains a rather clumsy plagiarism from the Phaedo.² This has led many scholars to deny the authenticity of the work; but the more Xenophon's methods are studied the less cogent do such arguments appear, and there is now a growing disposition to regard the Apology as Xenophon's after all. If so, we have to face the possibility that he derived much of his knowledge of Socrates from the writings of Plato.

As for the Memorabilia itself, there is no doubt that it is a strangely constructed work, and the 'higher critics'

¹ Gesch. der Phil. ii. 69. ² Cp. 89 b a n.
have condemned whole chapters as interpolations. It is not necessary to discuss their theories here; I only mention them at all in order to show that the book presents a real problem, and that the time has gone by for speaking of its historical character as something beyond cavil. If, however, we wish to avoid the conclusions of the critics, we can only do so by putting something better in their place. The question we must ask is whether it is possible to give an account of Xenophon's Socratic writings which will explain them as they stand. I believe that it is; but I also believe that it is 'the historical Socrates' who will then appear as the fictitious character.

IV

By his own account of the matter, Xenophon was quite young—hardly more than five and twenty—when he saw

1 It has quite recently been argued that two of the most important conversations (i. 4 and iv. 3) are derived from Plato's *Timaeus*, and were inserted in their present place by Zeno, the founder of Stoicism (K. Lincke, *Xenophon und die Stoa*, Neue Jahrbücher, xvii (1906), pp. 673 sqq.).

2 This view is gradually making its way. Raeder, while speaking of the distinction between the Platonic and the historical Socrates as 'a recognized truth', is equally emphatic in stating that the Platonic Socrates must be distinguished from Plato himself (*Platons philosophische Entwicklung*, p. 53). Ivo Bruns (Das literarische Porträt der Griechen, 1896) insists upon the fact that both Plato and Xenophon give faithful portraits of Socrates as they knew him, only it was a different Socrates that they knew. C. Ritter (*Platon*, i, p. 71) says that Plato's Socrates, 'even though poetically transfigured, is yet certainly the true one, truer not only than the Socrates of comedy, but also than that of Xenophon'. My colleague Professor Taylor's *Varia Socratia* (St. Andrews University Publications, No. IX. Oxford, Parker) came into my hands too late for me to refer to it in detail. Though I cannot accept all his conclusions, I am glad to find myself in substantial agreement with him.
INTRODUCTION

Socrates for the last time.¹ When he made his acquaint-
tance we do not know; but of course Socrates was a
familiar figure to most Athenian lads. We can see pretty
clearly, however, that Xenophon cannot have associated
regularly with Socrates after he reached the age of mili-
tary service. It is very significant that, as he tells us
himself (An. iii. 1. 4), it was the Boeotian Proxenus who
wrote to him suggesting that he should attach himself to
the expedition of Cyrus. That certainly looks as if he
had already served a pretty serious military apprentice-
ship, and in these years most of the fighting was at a dis-
tance from Athens. The fact that a Boeotian professional
soldier knew him to be a likely man for an adventure of
this kind seems to imply that he had already given proof
of such inclinations; and, if so, his intercourse with the
teacher who had not left Athens for years must have been
intermittent at best.

That Xenophon did know Socrates personally, I see,
however, no reason to doubt.² What he tells us on the
subject in the Anabasis rings true, and is in complete
harmony with what we know otherwise. He says (An.
iii. 1. 5) that, when he had read the letter of Proxenus,

¹ The youth of Xenophon at the time of the expedition of Cyrus was
first pointed out clearly by Cobet (Novae Lectiones, pp. 539 and 543). In
the Anabasis (iii. 1, 14 and 23) he tells us himself that he hesitated to
take command of the Ten Thousand because of his youth. Now two of
the generals who had been killed were thirty-five and Proxenus was
thirty, so Xenophon must have been appreciably younger. Cp. also iii.
2. 37; iii. 3 sq., and iv. 2 where he insists upon his youth. As Croiset
says (Litt. grecque, vol. iv, p. 340, n. 1), 'Si l'on se laissait aller à l'im-
pression générale que donne l'Anabase, on attribuerait à Xénophon en
399 plutôt vingt-cinq ans que trente.' The fact that Apollodorus gave his
floruit as the archonship of Xenaenetus (401/0 B.C.) does not weigh
against this; for that is merely the date of the expedition.

² It has been doubted by E. Richter, whose work I have not seen.
he consulted Socrates the Athenian on the matter. Socrates had misgivings. He was afraid—and the event proved him right—that, if Xenophon attached himself to Cyrus, it would damage his prospects at Athens, so he advised him to consult the Delphic oracle. But Xenophon had already made up his mind, and only asked the Pythia to what gods he should pray and sacrifice to ensure a prosperous issue to the journey he had in view and a safe return. The oracle, of course, gave him the answer he sought, but Socrates blamed him for not asking first whether he should undertake the journey at all. As it was, he bade him do as the god commanded. This story throws great light on what Xenophon afterwards wrote in the Memorabilia. We read there (i. i. 4) that Socrates used to warn his friends to do this and not to do that, on the strength of premonitions from his 'divine sign', and that for those who did as he told them it turned out well, while those who did not repented of it later on. We are also told that Socrates used to advise his friends to consult oracles on difficult questions, but in matters within the reach of human intelligence to use their own judgement.

It is not, surely, without significance that Xenophon should tell us this at the very beginning of the Memorabilia, just as the story given above from the Anabasis occurs at the precise point in the narrative where he introduces his own personality. It seems as if it had been the centre round which his personal memories of Socrates naturally grouped themselves. In those days, as we know from other sources, Socrates struck many young men chiefly as one possessed of a sort of 'second sight'. In the Theages (wrongly included in the Platonic canon, but still an early work) we read (128d 8 sqq.) how
Charmides consulted Socrates before beginning to train for the foot-race at Nemea. He neglected the advice given him, ‘and it is worth while to ask him what he got by that training!’ So, too, Timarchus declared, when he was being led to execution, that he owed his plight to disregard of a warning given by Socrates. And there were others. A certain Sannio consulted Socrates, just like Xenophon, before starting for the wars, and Socrates is represented as saying that he expects him either to lose his life or come within an ace of doing so.

It was not his second sight alone, however, that attracted these young men to Socrates. If they had regarded him as a mere clairvoyant, their feelings to him would not have been what they plainly were. No doubt it was Alcibiades who did most to make Socrates the fashion; but we can see from the Symposium that Plato had good grounds for believing that his enthusiasm was based on a conviction that Socrates was a man of no common strength of character. In particular, all these young men knew him to be a brave soldier and a good citizen. His services at Potidaea, where he saved the life of Alcibiades, and at Amphipolis, and above all his personal courage in the field of Delium, were matter of common report. In the dialogue called by his name (181a 7 sqq.), Plato makes Laches express the high esteem in which Socrates was held in military circles, and all that would appeal strongly to the group of young men I am trying to characterize. The close of the war with Sparta had left them without any very definite occupation, and they were very ready to try their luck as soldiers of fortune. They were not all Athenians—the Thessalian Meno was one of them—and in any case they had no local
patriotism to speak of. They were willing to fight for any one who would employ them, and they were naturally attracted by a man who had not only given proof of bravery in the field, but had also a mysterious gift of foreseeing the chances of military adventures.

Nor would these young men think any the worse of Socrates because he was an object of suspicion to the leaders of the Athenian democracy. They were mostly hostile, if not actually disloyal, to the democracy themselves. They would certainly be impressed by the action of Socrates at the trial of the generals after Arginusae. Xenophon was very likely present on that occasion, and he mentions the matter with some emphasis in the Hellenica (i. 7. 15).

That Xenophon belonged to this group we may readily admit, without supposing him to have been a member of the more intimate Socratic circle. As we have seen, he can have had little time for that, and this makes his testimony to the existence of such an inner circle all the more valuable. In dealing with the charge that Critias and Alcibiades had been associates of Socrates, he points out that they were so only for a time and to serve their own ends. Besides these, and others like them, there were many who associated with Socrates in order to become good men, and not to further any political ambitions of their own. The names he gives—Crito, Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, Hermocrates, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedondas 1—are all familiar to the readers of Plato.

1 Mem. i. 2. 48. The mention of the Theban Phaedondas, of whom nothing is known (cp. 59 e a n.), might suggest the suspicion that Xenophon merely took his list from the Phaedo, were it not that Plato calls him Phaedondes, just as he calls Archytas Archyles. It almost seems as if Xenophon knew him personally by his Boeotian name.
With one doubtful exception,¹ they are those of men whom he represents as supporting Socrates at the trial or in the prison or both.

Now, if Xenophon is here speaking from his own personal knowledge, he confirms the statements of Plato in the most remarkable way; for he bears witness to the existence of a circle of true disciples which included the Theban Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes. If, on the other hand, he has merely taken his list of names from Plato’s *Apology, Crito,* and *Phaedo,* he must mean at the very least that Plato’s account of the matter is quite in keeping with the memories of his youth. The reference to Simmias and Cebes in the conversation with Theodote (*Mem. iii. ii. 17*) shows further that he knew they had been attracted to Athens from Thebes by their desire to associate with Socrates, or at least that he accepted this as a true account of the matter.

There is nothing so far to suggest that Xenophon had any special information about Socrates, or that he was in any real sense his follower. His behaviour in the matter of the Delphic oracle is highly characteristic, and he tells the story himself. It represents him as a self-willed lad who thought he might guard against the consequences of his actions by getting a favourable response, no matter

¹ Most editors follow Groen van Prinsterer in changing the MS. Ερμοκράτης to Ερμογένης, which would bring Xenophon and Plato into complete agreement. It is to be observed, however, that, in the *Timaeus* and *Critias,* Plato represents Hermocrates as present, and that he meant to make him the leading speaker in the third dialogue of the trilogy. I do not think it likely that Plato should have invented an impossible meeting, and Hermocrates may have come to Athens and made the acquaintance of Socrates during his exile. If he did, the fact would certainly interest Xenophon.
how, from the Pythia. That is quite human, and we need not be too severe upon him for it; but it hardly inspires confidence in him as a witness to the beliefs of Socrates about things unseen and eternal.

V

Turning a deaf ear to the warnings of Socrates, young Xenophon left Athens to join the expedition of Cyrus, and he never saw Socrates again. He had, therefore, no first-hand knowledge of his trial and death, while Plato was certainly present at the trial. Further, though it is just possible that Xenophon revisited Athens for a short time in the interval between his return from Asia and his fresh departure with Agesilaus, he spent practically all the rest of his life in exile. He was, therefore, far less favourably situated than Plato for increasing his knowledge of Socrates by conversation with others who had known him. Phaedo, indeed, was not far off at Elis, but he never mentions Phaedo at all. He might very easily have made inquiries among the Pythagoreans of Phlius; but, in spite of the exceptional sympathy he shows for Phlius in the Hellenica, he never says a word about Echecrates or any of them. We have seen that he does mention Simmias and Cebes twice (in both cases for a special purpose), but it is very significant that no conversations with them are reported in the Memorabilia. It seems to follow that Xenophon did not belong to the same circle as these men did, and we can very well believe his sympathy with them to have been imperfect. He does appear to have known Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus (Phaed. 59 b 7 n.), but that is apparently all.

Where, then, did he get the conversations recorded in
the Memorabilia? To a considerable extent they are discussions at which he cannot have been present, and which he had no opportunity of hearing about from oral tradition, as Plato may easily have done in similar cases. It does not seem probable that they are pure inventions, though he has given them an unmistakable colouring which is quite his own. In some cases they seem to be adaptations from Plato. It is difficult to believe that what he makes Socrates say about Anaxagoras, and the hazy account he gives of the method of hypothesis, have any other source than the Phaedo. It is highly probable that some of the conversations come from Antisthenes, though I think it a mistake to regard Antisthenes as his main source. We must bear in mind that there were many 'Socratic discourses', of which we get a very fair idea from what Wilamowitz calls 'the Socratic Apocrypha'. If we take up the Memorabilia when we are fresh from the Theages or the Clitopho (to the latter of which there seems to be an allusion in the Memorabilia\(^2\)), we shall find the book much easier to understand in many respects. If I mistake not, we shall have the feeling that Xenophon got the substance of many of his conversations from sources of this kind, and fitted these as well as he could into his own recollections of the

\(^1\) For Anaxagoras cp. Mem. iv. 7. 6 with Phaed. 97b8, and for ἱπόθεσις cp. Mem. iv. 6. 13 and Phaed. 92 d 6 n. That both passages are misunderstood proves nothing against this view.

\(^2\) Clitopho 408 d 2 πῶς ποτὲ νῦν ἀποδεχόμεθα τὴν Σωκράτους προτροπὴν ἥμων ἐπ' ἄρετὴν; ὃς δυτος μόνον τούτου, ἐπεξελθεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἐν τῷ πράγματι καὶ λαβεῖν αὐτὸ τελέως; ... 410 b 4 νομίζας σε τὸ μὲν προτρέπειν εἰς ἄρετής ἐπιμέλειαν κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων δρῶν ... μακρότερον δὲ οὐδὲν. Cp. Xen. Mem. i. 4. 1 Εἰ δὲ τίνες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν, ὡς ἐνια γράφοι τε καὶ λέγωσιν περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαίρωμεν, προτρέβομειν μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἐπ' ἄρετὴν κράτιστον γεγο-νέαν, προσαγαγέαν δ' ἐπ' αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανών κτλ.
brave old man with the gift of second sight, whose advice he had sought in early life without any particular intention of taking it.

VI

It is not even necessary for our purpose to discuss the vexed question of Xenophon's veracity, though it is right to mention that, when he claims to have been an eyewitness, his statements are not to be trusted. At the beginning of his Symposium he says he was present at the banquet which he describes, though he must have been a child at the time. He also claims in the Oeconomicus to have heard the conversation with Critobulus, in the course of which (4. 18 sqq.) Socrates discusses the battle of Cunaxa, though it is certain that Xenophon saw Socrates for the last time before that battle was fought. These things show clearly that we are not to take his claims to be a first-hand witness seriously, but the misstatements are so glaring that they can hardly have been intended to deceive. Xenophon was eager to defend the memory of Socrates; for that was part of the case against the Athenian democracy. He had to eke out his own rather meagre recollections from such sources as appealed to him most, those which made much of the 'divine sign' and the hardiness of Socrates, and occasionally he has to invent, as is obviously the case in the passage of the Oeconomicus referred to. When Plato

1 The banquet is supposed to take place in 421/0 B.C. In Athenaeus 216d we are told that Xenophon was perhaps not born at that date, or was at any rate a mere child. It follows that Herodicus (a follower of Crates of Mallos), whom Athenaeus is here drawing upon, supposed Xenophon to have been only twenty years old at the time of the Anabasis. This is probably an exaggeration of his youth at that date.
reports conversations at which he cannot have been present, he is apt to insist upon the fact that he is speaking at second- or third-hand with what seems to us unnecessary elaboration, but Xenophon's manner is different. He says 'I was there', or 'I heard', but that is only to make the narrative vivid. We are not supposed to believe it.

VII

In view of all this, it is now pretty generally admitted that Xenophon's Socrates must be distinguished from the historical Socrates quite as carefully as Plato's. That seems to leave us with two fictitious characters on our hands instead of one, though of course it is allowed that in both cases the fiction is founded upon fact. But how are we to distinguish the one from the other? We require, it would seem, a third witness, and such a witness has been found in Aristotle. It is pointed out that he was a philosopher, and therefore better able to appreciate the philosophical importance of Socrates than Xenophon was. On the other hand, he was far enough removed from Socrates to take a calm and impartial view of him, a thing which was impossible for Plato. Where, therefore, Aristotle confirms Plato or Xenophon, we may be sure we have at last got that elusive figure, 'the historical Socrates.'

This method rests wholly, of course, on the assumption that Aristotle had access to independent sources of info-

1 Cp. especially the openings of the Parmenides and the Symposium.
2 This is the distinctive feature of Joel's method in his work entitled Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates. Though I cannot accept his conclusions, I must not be understood to disparage Joel's learning and industry.
mation about Socrates. There can be no question of first-hand evidence; for Socrates had been dead fifteen years when Aristotle was born, and a whole generation had passed away before he came to Athens for the first time. He might certainly have learnt something from conversation with Plato and the older members of the Academy, and he might have read Socratic dialogues no longer extant. It is impossible to suggest any other source from which he could have derived his information, and these do not come to much. It is to be supposed that Plato and his friends would represent Socrates much as he appears in the dialogues, while the lost Socratic writings would not take him far beyond Xenophon.

In practice, too, this criterion proves of little value. Aristotle himself does not tell us a great deal, and the Aristotelian Socrates has to be reconstructed with the help of the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia. This seriously vitiates the results of the method; for the considerations urged in support of Aristotle’s trustworthiness cannot be held to cover these later works. As to the remainder, Zeller is clearly right in his contention that Aristotle never says anything about Socrates which he might not have derived from works which are still extant.¹ There is no sign that he had even read the Memorabilia, and in fact the presumption is that, when Aristotle says ‘Socrates’, he regularly means the Socrates of Plato’s dialogues. No doubt, like all of us, he sometimes refers to the Platonic Socrates as Plato, but that is natural enough on any supposition; the really significant fact is that he so often calls him Socrates. Indeed, he was so much in the habit of regarding the dialogues

¹ Phil. der Griechen ³ ii, 94, n. 4.
of Plato as 'discourses of Socrates' that he actually includes the *Laws* under this title. It is surely quite impossible to suppose that he really meant to identify the Athenian Stranger with Socrates. If he was capable of making a blunder like that, it would not be worth while to consider his evidence on the subject at all. It is far simpler to assume that, for Aristotle, Socrates was just the Platonic Socrates, and that, in speaking of the *Laws* as 'discourses of Socrates', he has made a slip which would be intelligible enough on that supposition, but wholly inexplicable on any other. If that is so, and if 'discourses of Socrates' meant to Aristotle 'dialogues of Plato', we can make no use of what he says to check the statements of Xenophon, and still less to support the view that the Platonic Socrates is unhistorical. Aristotle is always ready to criticize Plato, and if he had been in a position to contrast the real Socrates with Plato's, we may be sure he would have done so somewhere in unmistakable language.

It cannot be said either that Aristotle's statements as to what 'Socrates' really meant are of much help to us. He is by no means a good interpreter of philosophical views with which he is not in sympathy. He is, for instance, demonstrably unfair to the Eleatics, and the Platonic Socrates is almost equally beyond his range.

1 *Pol. B. 6. 1265 a 11* τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἔξουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι καὶ τὸ κομβὸν καὶ τὸ καινοτόμον καὶ τὸ ζητητικὸν κτλ. Aristotle has just been speaking of the *Republic*, the paradoxes of which he also ascribes to Socrates, and he goes on to the *Laws* with these words (1265 a 1) τῶν δὲ Νόμων τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν ὑπότε, ὀλίγα δὲ περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἰρήνειν (sc. ὁ Σωκράτης). The editors say that the Athenian Stranger is identified with Socrates, and seem to be unconscious of the absurdity of such an identification.
INTRODUCTION

VIII

It looks after all as if our only chance of learning anything about Socrates was from Plato, but we must of course subject his evidence to the same tests as we have applied to Xenophon and Aristotle. In the first place we must ask what opportunities he had of knowing the true Socrates. He is singularly reticent on this point in his dialogues. We learn from them that he was present at the trial of Socrates but not at his death, and that is all. He has completely effaced his own personality from his writings. We may note, however, that he likes to dwell on the fact that his kinsmen, Critias and Charmides, and his brothers, Glaucon and Adimantus, were intimate with Socrates.

Plato was twenty-eight years old when Socrates was put to death, and we cannot doubt that he had known him from his boyhood. The idea that Plato first made the acquaintance of Socrates when he was grown up may be dismissed. It is inconsistent with all we know about Athenian society, and especially that section of it to which Plato's family belonged. It was common for parents and guardians to encourage boys to associate with Socrates, and to beg Socrates to talk with them. Plato was the nephew of Charmides, and we know that

1 This rests on the authority of Hermodorus (ap. Diog. Laert. iii. 6). Cp. p. ix, n. r.

2 The current story that Plato made the acquaintance of Socrates when he was twenty does not rest on the authority of Hermodorus at all, though it is quoted in Diogenes Laertius just before the statement referred to in n. r. Others said that Plato associated with Socrates for ten years. Both figures, I take it, are arrived at by a calculation based on the solitary datum furnished by Hermodorus. Some counted from the beginning and others from the end of Plato's two years as an ἐφημισ. If that is so, there was no genuine tradition.
Charmides was warmly attached to Socrates when Plato was in his 'teens. Even later, as we know from Xenophon, Socrates prevented Glaucon from speaking in public before he was twenty, 'being well-disposed to him because of Charmides and Plato.' In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that Plato did not meet Socrates over and over again in the gymnasium and elsewhere. Xenophon may have known Socrates in this way too, but the presumption is far stronger in the case of Plato. Moreover, the son of Arisotol would certainly be a far cleverer boy than the son of Gryllus, while his artistic susceptibility and his keen eye for the characteristic would be early developed. The sketches he has left us of the Master's way with boys in the gymnasium are too vivid to be wholly imaginary.

When he grew up, Plato does not seem to have left Athens. No doubt he saw some service; but he tells us himself that his ambitions were political, and by his time the political and military careers were quite distinct. If he had qualified himself, like Xenophon, to be a professional soldier, we should have known something about it.

1 We learn from the dialogue called by his name that Charmides came under the influence of Socrates as a boy, three or four years before the birth of Plato. We learn from Xenophon that he kept up the close relationship to him which began then. It was Socrates who did him the doubtful service of urging him to enter public life in spite of his shyness (Mem. iii. 7), and in the Symposium (1. 3) Xenophon represents him as associating with Socrates along with Critobulus, Hermogenes, and Antisthenes. He is made to say that he could associate more freely with Socrates when reduced to poverty by the war. For the conversation with Glaucon, cp. Mem. iii. 6. 1. These data cover the whole period of Plato's boyhood and early manhood.

2 Ep. vii. 324 b 8 sqq.
Plato, then, had exceptional opportunities of knowing Socrates, but this does not prove that he belonged to the inner Socratic circle.¹ The evidence does not carry us beyond the probability that he belonged to the group of young men—'the sons of the richer citizens, who have most time to spare'²—who gathered round Socrates for the pleasure of hearing him expose the ignorance of pretenders to knowledge. That is a different group from the one to which Xenophon belonged, but it is equally well marked, and it is not the inner circle. We can infer no more from the passage in the Apology where Socrates offers to call Adimantus to prove that Plato had got no harm from associating with him.³ The fact that Phaedo thinks it necessary to explain Plato's absence from the scene in the prison may mean a little more, but that refers to a later date.

If we regard the Seventh Epistle as Plato's—and I do not see who else could have written it—the matter appears in a clearer light. Plato does not say a word in it about having been a disciple of Socrates, though he speaks of him as an older friend for whose character he had a profound admiration.⁴ His ambitions, as we have seen, were political, not scientific. He was in his twenty-fourth year when the Thirty were established, and his kinsmen urged him to take office under them; but the behaviour of Socrates in the affair of Leon of Salamis ⁵

¹ We cannot draw any inference from Xenophon's omission of his name from the list. To mention the kinsman of Critias and Charmides would have spoilt the point he is trying to make.
² Apol. 23 c 2.
³ Apol. 34 a 1.
⁴ Ep. vii. 324 d 8 φίλον ἄνδρα ἐμοὶ πρεσβύτερον Σωκράτη, δν ἐγὼ σχέδον οὐκ ἀλοχωνολομν εἰπὼν δικαιώσαντον εἴπαι τῶν τότε.
⁵ Ep. vii. 324 e 2 ἐπὶ τινα τῶν πολιτῶν μεθ' ἐτέρων ἐπεμπον, βλα ἄξοντα ὡς
opened his eyes to the real character of the oligarchy. When the Thirty fell, he was at first impressed by the moderation of the restored democracy, and once more thought of entering public life, but the condemnation of Socrates proved to him that there was no hope in that direction either. In fact, though his first awakening went back to the year of the Thirty, his final conversion dated only from the death of Socrates. He probably rose a new man from the sick-bed on which he was then lying. It would not be the only case of a man called to be an apostle after the death of his Master.

Such seems to me the most probable account of the relations between Socrates and Plato; but, even if he was not a disciple in the strict sense, his opportunities for learning to know Socrates as he really was were vastly greater than those of Xenophon. Above all, he was at Athens during the last two years of his life, while Xenophon was in Asia. So far as the Phaedo is concerned, the statement of our earliest authority, Hermodorus, that, after the death of Socrates, Plato threw in his lot with the Socratics and retired with them to Megara, the home of Euclides and Terpsion, is of the first importance. We may be sure that he made it his business to hear every detail of the Master’s last words and actions from all who had been present, and he makes Phaedo express the delight they all took in speaking of him, while Echecrates...

1 Ep. vii. 325 a 5 sqq. Plato says that he was prevented from entering public life by the impossibility of effecting anything without a party and, the proved impossibility of acting with either party.

voices the desire of all admirers of Socrates for exact information about him. That Plato was really in a position to give a full and true account of the day described in the *Phaedo* is not, therefore, open to doubt.

**IX**

Still, it will be said, the ancient idea of historical truth was so different from ours, that we cannot look for what is called an 'objective narrative' from such a writer as Plato. It is usual to refer to the speeches of Thucydides in support of this contention, and they are really rather to the point. It seems to me, however, that they prove something different from the position they are supposed to illustrate. Thucydides tells us that he has put into the mouth of each speaker the sentiments proper to the occasion, expressed as he thought he would be likely to express them, while at the same time endeavouring, as nearly as he could, to give the general purport of what was actually said.¹ Even that would carry us a considerable way in the case of the Platonic Socrates in the *Phaedo*. It would surely mean at the very least that Socrates discussed immortality with two Pythagoreans on his dying day, and that implies a good many other things.

But it is really the contrast between the speeches of Thucydides and the dialogues of Plato that is most instructive. Broadly speaking, all the orators in Thucydides speak in the same style. Even Pericles and Cleon can hardly be said to be characterized. In Plato

¹ Thuc. i. 22. Observe that he only professes to give ῥὰ δὲ ὑπότα, what was called for by the occasion, not ῥὰ προσχέοντα, what was appropriate to the character of the speakers.
we find just the opposite. Even the Eleatic Stranger and the speakers in the *Laws* have a character of their own, and only seem shadowy by contrast with the rich personalities of the earlier dialogues. This realism is just one of the traits which distinguishes the literature of the fourth century from that of the fifth. Aristotle had observed the existence of the new literary genre and calls attention to the fact that it had not received a name. It had two distinctive marks, it used prose for its instrument and it was an imitation. It included the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and also ‘the Socratic discourses’. This classification of the Platonic dialogue with the mime is one of Aristotle’s happiest thoughts. If the anecdotes which are told of Plato’s delight in Sophron are historical, we can see what suggested it; but in any case, it is true. Plato’s dialogues really are mimes, but with this difference, that the characters are all real and well-known people. They are just the opposite of the speeches in Thucydides.

The critics have, no doubt, discovered a certain number of apparent anachronisms in the dialogues. It is said that, in the *Symposium* (193 a 2), Plato makes Aristophanes refer to the διοικημός of Mantinea which took place in 385 B.C., and that, in the *Meno* (90 a 4), he makes Socrates refer to the enrichment of Ismenias by Persian gold as recent, whereas it happened after the death of Socrates. The latter instance, however, is extremely doubtful; for Ismenias was an important figure at Thebes considerably before the death of Socrates.

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1 *Poet*, 1447 b 2 sqq.
2 The story that Socrates was a student and imitator of Sophron rests on the authority of Duris of Samos (FHG. ii, p. 480).
Socrates,¹ and the former is probably a misunderstanding. Aristophanes does not mention Mantinea, and what he says about the διοικισμός of the Arcadians by Sparta may very well refer to the dissolution of the Arcadian Confederacy, which was quite recent when the banquet described in the Symposium is supposed to take place.² For my part, I am quite ready to accept the dictum of Wilamowitz that there are no anachronisms in Plato; but, even if there were one or two of the kind just mentioned, they would be of little account. They would have to be regarded as slips which no one would have noticed unless he had been looking for them, and which do not detract in the least from the historical character of the dialogues in which they occur.

On the other hand, we must note certain positive features which show that Plato was not only a realist in his character-drawing, but had also a strong sense of historical perspective and a genuine feeling for historical values. In particular, he has avoided completely a very subtle form of anachronism. He has a wonderful way of keeping up the illusion that his dialogues belong to the pre-revolutionary period. The Revolutions of 404 and

¹ Cp. E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alterth. v. §§ 854, 855. The chronology of the Hellenica is certainly at fault in regard to these transactions, and Persian gold may well have found its way to Thebes before the supposed date of the conversation described in the Meno.

² Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Die Xenophontische Apologie, Hermes xxxvi (1897), p. 102, n. 1. He points out that Plato does not make Aristophanes mention Mantinea at all, and that the allusion does not correspond to what we know of the Spartan treatment of Mantinea in 385 B.C. The Arcadian League struck coins with the superscription Αρκαδικών, and these coins cease after the battle of 418 B.C. As the Symposium is supposed to take place in 416 B.C., Aristophanes is alluding in a natural way to an event then recent.
403 B.C. made a complete break in the politics and literature of Athens. A new world had arisen, and the carry-over, so to speak, was far less than at the French Revolution. There is hardly a single statesman or writer of the fifth century whose activity was prolonged into the fourth. Aristophanes is the exception that proves the rule; for the Aristophanes of the *Ecclesiazusae* and the *Plutus* is a different man from the Aristophanes of the *Lysistrata* and the *Birds*. It is important to realize this gap between the centuries and to keep it constantly in view if we wish to understand Plato's art,

The majority of the dialogues are supposed to take place before the Revolutions, and Plato never loses sight of this for a moment, though many of his personages came to play a leading part in the troubled times which he had cause to remember so vividly. Critias and Charmides were kinsmen of his own, and he must have been affected by the tragedy of the life of Alcibiades. Yet there is not the slightest hint of all this in the *Charmides* or the *Symposium*. Critias is still a cultured politician and poet; Charmides is still a modest and beautiful lad; Alcibiades is still at the height of his wild career. Coming events are not even suffered to cast their shadows before, as an inferior artist would have made them do. Like the great dramatist he was, Plato has transported himself back to the age of Pericles and the age of Alcibiades, and portrayed them as they seemed to the men who lived in them, not as they must have appeared to his contemporaries and to himself, when the glamour of the great time had passed away.

Nowhere, perhaps, is Plato's self-restraint in this respect better seen than in the picture he has drawn
of Aristophanes. It is almost the only one of his literary portraits which we can fully appreciate. We can form a fairly clear idea of Aristophanes from his comedies, and there can be no doubt that Plato's Aristophanes corresponds admirably to it. The Platonic Aristophanes is thoroughly Aristophanic, and this raises at least a presumption that the Platonic Socrates is Socratic. But, above all, what strikes us is the relation of good fellowship in which Socrates and Aristophanes stand to one another. The Clouds had been produced some years before, but they are still the best of friends. At that time, there was really no reason why Socrates should resent the brilliant caricature of Aristophanes, and Alcibiades does not hesitate to quote it in his encomium (Symp. 221 b 3). No one in these days would take a comedy too seriously. At a later date, things were rather different. Even if what Socrates is made to say about Aristophanes in the Apology is not to be taken quite literally, the Socratic circle must have felt some resentment against him after the condemnation. Yet Plato keeps all that out of sight; such thoughts belong to the fourth century and not to the fifth.

It seems to me that the reason why Plato's power of transporting himself back to an earlier time has met with such scant recognition is just the success with which he has done it. As we read him, we can hardly realize that he is calling up a time which was passing away when he himself was a boy. The picture is so actual that we feel it must be contemporary. That is why so many writers on Plato speak as if the first half of the fourth century ran concurrently with the second half of the fifth.¹ They

¹ It is no wonder that lesser writers should be deceived, seeing that
think of Plato as the adversary of the 'Sophists', though, when he wrote, there were no longer any sophists in the sense intended. They were merely memories in his day; for they had no successors. Even Thrasymachus belongs to the generation which flourished when Plato was a child. So, too, the problems discussed in the dialogues of Aristophanes, who has done more than any one to make the historical background of Plato's life intelligible, falls under the illusion. He says (Gesch. des Alterthums, vol. iv, p. 429) that the Symposium 'proves nothing as to the relations of Socrates with Aristophanes, but only as to those of Plato. . . . Two such diametrically opposed natures as Socrates and Aristophanes could have no relations with one another, but it is quite natural that Plato and Aristophanes should have found and understood each other.' He finds a confirmation of this in the Ecclesiasusae, which he regards as a parody of Plato's Republic, but which he says is quite free from the bitterness and malice of the Clouds, so that Plato and Aristophanes may have been on excellent terms. Now Meyer also holds (loc. cit.) that Aristophanes was in earnest when he attacked Socrates, and that Plato was quite right in ascribing the chief responsibility for his master's death to him. We must apparently believe then that, some half-dozen years after the death of Socrates (the Ecclesiasusae was probably produced in 302 b.c.), and within a few years of the time he wrote the Phaedo, Plato 'found and understood' the man whom he rightly regarded as mainly responsible for the death of Socrates, and then thought it appropriate to write a dialogue in which he represents Socrates and Aristophanes as boon companions. If that can be true, anything may. The fact is that the Aristophanes whom Plato might very well have 'found and understood' is just the Aristophanes of the Symposium, not the revenant who wrote the Ecclesiasusae and the Platus. But Plato was only a baby when the Clouds was produced, and a mere boy at the time the Symposium took place. What we may really infer is that the references to Aristophanes in the Apology are little more than Socratic persiflage like the similar allusion in the Phaedo itself (70 c 1), and that Plato knew very well that Aristophanes was not in earnest, and that no one supposed he was. Constantin Ritter has, in my opinion, put this matter in a truer light (Plato, i, p. 50, n. 1).

1. Thrasymachus is about the last representative of the 'Sophists' (though Plato never gives him that name), and he was early enough to be satirized in the Δαιμονία, the first comedy which Aristophanes wrote. That was in 427 b.c., before Plato had learned to speak. It is improbable
are those which were of interest at the time they are supposed to take place. That of the Strong Man, for instance, which is the subject of the *Gorgias*, belongs to the end of the fifth century. It is also the theme of the *Herakles* of Euripides.

It naturally follows from this that, when Plato does wish to discuss questions which had come up in his own time, he is quite conscious of the impropriety of making Socrates the leading speaker. If we adopt the chronology of the dialogues now generally received, the *Theaetetus* is, with one striking exception, the latest in which Socrates leads the discussion. In the *Parmenides*, he is quite a youth, and the immature character of his views is shown by Parmenides and Zeno. In form, the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* are a sequel to the *Theaetetus*; but Socrates, though present, takes hardly any part in the argument, which is conducted by an anonymous stranger from Elea. The *Timaeus* and the *Critias* profess in the same way to continue the *Republic*, but here too Socrates is no more than an 'honorary president', as a recent writer puts it. We can see that the same was meant to be the case in the *Hermocrates*, a dialogue which Plato designed but never wrote. In the *Laws*, Socrates disappears altogether, and his place is taken by an 'Athenian Stranger' who seems really to be Plato himself. The only exception to this rule is the *Philebus*, and that exception is easily accounted for, as the dialogue deals with subjects which Plato makes Socrates discuss elsewhere. In fact the *Philebus* is the crucial case. It must

that he was still living when Plato began to write, and the theories which he is made to uphold in the *Republic* are not such as any one is likely to have maintained in the fourth century.
be later than some, at least, of the dialogues just mentioned, and the fact that Plato once more makes Socrates take the lead shows that it was solely in the interests of historical verisimilitude that he refrained from doing so in other dialogues.

X

Of course, if we are to regard Plato as our best authority, we shall have to revise our estimate of Socrates as a philosopher. The need for such a revision has long been felt, though it has never been taken thoroughly in hand. Even before Hegel laid down that Xenophon was our only authority for the philosophy of Socrates, Schleiermacher had suggested a much more fruitful method of studying the question.\(^1\) He started from the consideration that, as Xenophon himself was no philosopher, and as the Memorabilia does not profess to be anything more than a defence of Socrates against certain definite accusations, we are entitled to assume that Socrates may have been more than Xenophon is able to tell us, and that there may have been other sides to his teaching than Xenophon thinks it convenient to disclose in view of his immediate purpose. He goes on to show that Socrates must have been more than Xenophon tells us, if he was to exercise the attraction he did upon the ablest and most speculative men of his time. The question, then, is: 'What may Socrates have been, besides what Xenophon tells us of him, without, however, contradicting the traits of character and principles of life which Xenophon definitely sets up as Socratic; and what must he have

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\(^1\) Ueber den Werth des Sokrates als Philosophen (Works, Section III, vol. ii, pp. 287 sqq.).
been to give Plato the occasion and the right to represent him as he does in his dialogues?’ This is surely the proper light in which to regard the question, and it was formally acknowledged to be so by Zeller, though the consequences of so regarding it have not been fully recognized. I would only add one more question to Schleiermacher’s, and it is quite in harmony with his method. We must ask, I think, very specially ‘What must Socrates have been to win the enthusiastic devotion of the Pythagoreans of Thebes and Phlius and of the Eleatics of Megara?’ That question is forced upon us by any serious study of the Phaedo, and the answer to it reveals Socrates to us in a very different light from Xenophon’s Memorabilia.

XI

For one thing, this consideration suggests that Socrates cannot have stood aloof from the scientific movement of his time. Xenophon does not really say that he did. He tells us, indeed, that Socrates dissuaded his friends from spending their lives in the study of higher mathematics and astronomy, but he adds in both cases that Socrates was not unversed in these subjects himself. It would be quite like Socrates to tell a young man to leave these things alone till he had learnt to know himself, and that would account for all Xenophon says.¹ Nor does

¹ Mem. iv. 7. 3 καὶ τοιού ἀπειρὸν γε αὐτῶν ἢν (sc. τῶν δυσανωτῶν διαγραμμάτων, as Xenophon quaintly calls them), ib. 5 καὶ τοιοὶ οὐδὲ τούτων γε ἀνήκος ἢν (sc. the planetary orbits, their distances from the earth, the times of their revolutions and their causes, i.e. the whole higher astronomy of the Pythagoreans). Certainly Socrates held that there was something more important than this knowledge, and what Xenophon tells us as to his advice not to waste one’s life in such studies would be amply accounted for by the recollection of some such saying as that re-
Aristotle say anything inconsistent with the account given by Socrates of his intellectual development in the *Phaedo* (96a6 sqq.). He only says that he applied his new method of universal definitions to ethical subjects alone; and, as the *Phaedo* represents the discovery of the new method as subsequent to the scientific studies of Socrates, there is no contradiction at all.¹ On the other hand, the narrative in the *Phaedo* is confirmed in a striking way by our earliest witness, Aristophanes. As was pointed out long ago by F. A. Wolf,² Socrates was only about forty-five years old, and Plato and Xenophon were babies, when the *Clouds* came out (423 B.C.), and it is quite possible that Socrates was still known chiefly as a student of natural science at that time. The really decisive argument, however, is this, that, if we take the *Phaedo* and the *Clouds* seriously, making due allowance for comic exaggeration in the latter, we get an account of the scientific position of Socrates which fits exactly into what we know of the intellectual atmosphere of the middle of the fifth century B.C., and which would be inconceivable at any other date.

In the first place, the cosmological theories burlesqued in the *Clouds* are mainly those of Diogenes of Apollonia, who had revived the theory of Anaximenes that Air was

1 Cp. Met. 987b1; 1078b17. *Part. An.* 642a28. These statements only mean that Socrates did not apply his special method to cosmological subjects. Aristotle nowhere denies that Socrates started from the science of his time.

2 See his edition of the *Clouds* (1811), pp. ix sqq.
the primary substance. Indeed, the whole comedy is based on this. According to Diogenes, Air condenses into Mist, and becomes visible in the form of Clouds. That is why the Clouds are the divinities of the Socratic school. Further, Diogenes held that Air was 'what we think with', and that is why Socrates swings aloft in the air. The damp of the earth would clog his thought.

The theories of Diogenes were fashionable at Athens when Socrates was a young man, and it would only be natural for him to adopt them at that date.

Another influence with which we must reckon is that of the Anaxagorean Archelaus. The statement that Socrates was his disciple is far too well attested to be ignored. Ion of Chios apparently said that he visited Samos with Archelaus, and in any case the statement was known to Aristoxenus and (what is more important) to Theophrastus. It is, therefore, no Alexandrian figment. Archelaus is not mentioned in the Phaedo by


2 See E. Gr. Ph. pp. 409 sqq.

3 Cp. Phaedo 96 b 4 n. and Clouds 225 sqq. where Socrates explains that he could not rightly have discovered 'the things aloft', ei μὴ κρεμάσας τὸ νόημα καὶ τὴν φροντίδα | λεπτὴν καταμείβας εἰ τὸν ὄμοιον ἄερα. If he had tried to do so on the ground, he would have failed οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ' ἡ γὰρ βία | ἐλκεὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἱκμάδα τὴς φροντίδος. Cp. Theophrastus, de Sens. 44 (of Diogenes) φρονεῖν δ’, ὥσπερ ἔλεξοθῇ, τῷ αέρι καθαρῷ καὶ ἕτηρι καλύειν γὰρ τὴν ἱκμάδα τὸν νεόν.

4 Diog. Laert. ii. 22 ἐν δὲ ἄνδρον ἤτα (sc. Σωκράτη) ἐλς Σάμον ἀν Ἀρχέλαος ἀποθημένα. Ion may, however, have meant another Socrates, as Wilamowitz suggests (Philol. Unters. i. 24), viz. Socrates of Anagyrus, who was a colleague of Pericles and Sophocles in the Samian War. For the evidence of Aristoxenus, see Diels, Vors. p. 323. 34 sqq. For Theophrastus, cp. Diels, Dox. p. 479. 17 Καὶ Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, ὃ καὶ Σωκράτης συγγεγογιναῖος φαιν, Ἀνατραγόρον γενομένῳ μαθητῇ. See also Chiapelli in Arch. f. Gesch. der Phil. iv, pp. 369 sqq.
name, but Socrates says he had heard the book of Anaxagoras read aloud by 'some one' and had been deeply impressed by it (97 b 8 sqq.).

The narrative in the Phaedo goes on to tell us how Socrates grew dissatisfied with the doctrines of Anaxagoras. That also is characteristic of the time. Gorgias certainly, and Protagoras probably, had given up science in the same way. And we can see pretty clearly that the dialectic of the Eleatic Zeno was what shook the faith of all three. In the Parmenides, Plato has told us this of Socrates in so many words, while the problem of the unit, which had been raised by Zeno, holds a prominent place in the enumeration of his doubts and difficulties in the Phaedo (96 e 7 sqq.).

But there is another influence at work and from a different quarter. In the Phaedo there are several references to the doctrines of Empedocles. Socrates was in doubt whether 'what we think with' was Air or Blood (96 b 4). The latter was the doctrine of Empedocles, and Aristotle tells us it was adopted by Critias. What is more important still is that Socrates was troubled in his youth by the question whether the earth was flat or round (97 d 8), and that implies Pythagorean influence. The philosophers of Ionia all held that the earth was flat, and it was only from some Italian source that Socrates could have learned the other theory.

1 Cp. E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 417. Gorgias had been an Empedoclean (ib. p. 234, n. 4), and Plato at least suggests that Protagoras had been a Heraclitean (ib. p. 188). The experience of Socrates was only one effect among others of the 'bankruptcy of science' in the middle of the fifth century (ib. 406).

2 Arist. de An. A. 2, 405 b 6. As Empedocles joined the Athenian colony of Thurii in 444 B.C., his views may easily have become known at Athens.

3 Cp. 97 d 8 n.
This influence of Western cosmological ideas upon Socrates is confirmed in a curious way by Aristophanes. It is quite natural that Socrates should be classed with those who busy themselves with 'things aloft' (τὰ μετέωρα), but we regularly find that 'the things beneath the earth' (τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς) are associated with these in his case.\(^1\) Now it was Empedocles who first paid much attention to the subterranean. The volcanic phenomena of Sicily and the Orphic interest in the House of Hades both led him to dwell upon the question of the earth's interior;\(^2\) and this double interest is beautifully brought out in the closing myth of the Phaedo. Aristophanes knows this point too, and his words ἐρεβοδιφῶσιν ὑπὸ τὸν Τάρταρον\(^3\) might have been written in ridicule of the very theories which Plato has put into the mouth of Socrates at the end of our dialogue.

Further details as to the science of the Phaedo will be found in the notes; here I only wish to point out that the curious fusion of Ionian and Western theories which characterizes it is inexplicable unless we regard it as belonging to Athens in the middle of the fifth century B.C. At no other date, and in no other place, could such a fusion well have taken place.\(^4\)

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1 Cp. Apol. 18 b 7 τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἄνεξη-τηκῶς, Clouds 188 ζητοῦσιν οὕτω τὰ κατὰ γῆς.


3 Clouds 192. The interest of the myth in the Phaedo is mainly eschatological, but it also gives us a complete theory of τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, explaining incidentally tides, volcanoes, earthquakes, and the like. The subterranean rivers are specially Empedoclean.

4 The Ionians remained unaffected by the more scientific cosmology of the West. Democritus still believed that the earth was a disk hollow in the centre. As explained in the note to Phaedo 109 b 3, the theory of Socrates represents an attempt to combine this view with the theory of a spherical earth. At any date earlier or later than that of Socrates,
INTRODUCTION

XII

According to the *Phaedo*, when Socrates gave up natural science in despair, he found satisfaction in what is generally known as the Theory of Ideas. I have tried to explain this theory simply in the Notes, so far as such an explanation is necessary for a right understanding of the *Phaedo*; we have only to do here with the fact that it is represented in our dialogue as already familiar to Socrates and all his associates, whereas it is generally held to be a specifically Platonic doctrine, and one which was not even formulated by Plato in any dialogue earlier than the *Phaedo* itself. This is evidently a problem of the first magnitude and cannot be treated fully here. I can only restate the conclusion to which I have come elsewhere, namely, that the doctrine in question was not originated by Plato, or even by Socrates, but is essentially Pythagorean, as Aristotle tells us it was.¹ A few further considerations, which tend to confirm this view are, however, strictly pertinent to the present inquiry.

We have seen that there was a point beyond which Plato did not think it right to go in making Socrates the leader of his dialogues. Now, if the 'Ideal Theory' had originated with himself, and if, as is commonly believed, it was the central thing in his philosophy, we should certainly expect the point at which Socrates begins to take a subordinate place to be that at which the theory is introduced. What we do find is exactly the opposite. such an attempt would have been an anachronism, and it is only at Athens that it would seem worth making. The Ionians did not trouble themselves about a spherical earth nor the Westerns about a flat one.

¹ E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 354 sqq.
The dialogues where Socrates falls into the background are just those in which the 'Ideal Theory' is criticized, or in which nothing at all is said about it; where it is assumed and affirmed, Plato has no hesitation in making Socrates its mouthpiece. Indeed, with one remarkable and significant exception, no speaker but Socrates is ever made to expound the doctrine at all, and the exception is the Pythagorean Timaeus.¹

It has been said that to question Plato's authorship of the 'Ideal Theory' is 'to deprive him of his birthright'. It is at any rate a birthright he has never claimed; indeed, he has done everything in his power to bar any such claim on his part. He has made Socrates discuss the theory with Parmenides and Zeno almost a generation before his own birth, and he has indicated that it was not unknown to the Eleatics. Nor is it only Socrates who is represented as familiar with the theory. In the Phaedo, the Theban Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes, know all about it and are enthusiastic believers in it. Men of such divergent views as Antisthenes and Euclides of Megara are present, but no one asks for a proof of it, or even for an explanation. It is simply taken for granted. When Phaedo repeats all this to the Pythagoreans at Phlius, the same thing happens. Echecrates, who shows himself anxious for exact information on other points, asks no questions about this one. As I have argued elsewhere (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 355), it is surely incredible that any philosopher should introduce a novel

¹ Tim. 51c 4 elnai ti φαμεν ειδος ηκαστου νοητον. Here we have the 'we', which is such a marked feature of the discussions of the Phaedo, and this time it is used by a Pythagorean. The Timaeus was written years after the Phaedo, but it still preserves the old way of speaking.
theory of his own by representing it as already familiar to a number of distinguished living contemporaries, and that in reporting a conversation at which he distinctly states he was not present.

Plato's own contribution to philosophy is a great enough thing, quite apart from the theory of 'forms' expounded in the *Phaedo*. This is not the place to discuss it, but it seems worth while to consider how it has come about that in modern times the 'Ideal Theory' of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* has often been regarded as practically the whole of it. In the first place, about the middle of the nineteenth century, most of the dialogues from which we can learn anything of Plato's riper thought, the dialogues in which Socrates no longer takes the leading part, were declared to be spurious. In the second place, the importance of Plato's oral teaching in the Academy, which did not find full expression in his dialogues, was seriously underrated. This was due to a natural reaction against the theory of an 'esoteric doctrine', which had been much abused; but it cannot really be disputed that many of Plato's fundamental doctrines were only expounded orally. Aristotle over and over again attributes to him precise statements which may be implicit in the later dialogues, but are certainly not to be found there in so many words. The task of reconstructing Plato's mature philosophy from the unsympathetic criticisms of Aristotle is a delicate but not, I believe, an impossible one.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the later dialogues were reinstated one by one in the positions from which they had been thrust, and a serious attempt was made to understand Aristotle's criticism of Plato,
It was assumed that there was a 'later theory of Ideas' which in many respects contradicted that set forth in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, and this had one very salutary effect, that of directing attention once more to those dialogues which had always been held in antiquity to contain the genuine philosophy of Plato. At the same time, I am convinced that the theory of an earlier and later theory of Ideas is only a half-way house. Aristotle knows nothing of such a distinction, and he would have delighted to insist upon it if he had. The time has come, I believe, for a return to the older and better view. I prefer, accordingly, not to speak of 'Plato's earlier theory of Ideas', because I do not believe the theory was Plato's at all; and I prefer not to speak of 'Plato's later theory of Ideas', because I am not clear that Platonism proper is adequately described as a 'theory of Ideas', however true it may be that it is based on the Pythagorean doctrine to which alone that name is really appropriate.²

¹ This view is specially associated with the name of Professor Henry Jackson. Though I cannot accept all his results, I must not be taken to undervalue his great services to Platonic study. The genuineness of Plato's later dialogues was first clearly established by my predecessor, Professor Lewis Campbell.

² Aristotle is commonly said to have denied that Socrates held 'the theory of Ideas', but there is really no such statement in all his writings. What he does say is that Socrates did not make universals 'separate' (χωριστά) from particulars, and that is quite true of the Platonic Socrates. In the *Parmenides* he is represented as puzzled about the precise relation of the forms to particular things, and in the *Phaedo* (100 d 5) he is not sure whether παρουσία or κοινωνία is the right term. So, too, particulars 'partake in' or 'imitate' the forms; but always and everywhere the particular thing is what it is because the εἶδος is immanent in it. We know from Plato's *Sophist* that there were 'friends of the εἴδη' who did 'separate' the intelligible from the sensible, and it is with these that Aristotle contrasts Socrates. The true Peripatetic interpretation is preserved
It remains to be added that I have only discussed in the notes that aspect of the theory of Ideas with which we are concerned in reading the *Phaedo*. So far as that dialogue goes, it is a purely logical and scientific doctrine. The possibility of science extends just as far as the theory of Ideas will carry us and no further. Where it can no longer be applied, the region of myth begins. I am well aware that the doctrine has another aspect, to which attention has been specially called by Professor Stewart. In certain dialogues the Ideas are regarded as objects of ecstatic contemplation, and appear, to some extent, in a mythical setting. With that we have nothing to do at present. I may say, however, to avoid misunderstanding, that, while I quite agree with the demand for a 'psychological' explanation of this way of presenting the doctrine, I can by no means admit that the explanation is to be looked for in the ψυχή of Plato son of Ariston. The idea of ecstatic vision is most prominent in the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, that is to say, in just those dialogues where Plato's dramatic art is at its best, and where, therefore, if my general principles of interpretation are sound, Socrates is most truly Socrates. The soul of the man who stood transfixed in silent, brooding thought for twenty-four hours in the camp at Potidæa is surely the soul to which we must look for a psychological explanation of the beatific vision described in the *Phaedrus*. On what else can his thoughts

by Aristocles the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fr. 1) Οὐχ ἦσαν δὲ καὶ Σωκράτης, αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐγένετο πῦρ ἐν πυρί, καθάπερ αὐτὸς ἔφη Πλάτων. εὐφυέστατος γὰρ δὴ καὶ δεινὸς ἀπορήσαι περὶ παντὸς ὄντος, ἐπεισόδευε τὰς τὰς ἡθικὰς καὶ πολιτικὰς σκέψεις, ἐτί δὲ τῇ περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν, πρῶτος ἐπιχειρήσας ὀρθεσθαι πάντα δὲ ἐγείρων λόγον καὶ περὶ πάντων ζητῶν, ἐφθη τελευτήσας.
have been concentrated during that day and night? Surely not on the things he discusses in the *Memorabilia*?

**XIII**

The best book on Greek beliefs about the soul has no chapter on Socrates. Even Plato, the writer says, had not clearly conceived the thought of immortality so long as he continued to regard the world from the standpoint of a slightly developed Socraticism.\(^1\) This view is based on two considerations. It is said, in the first place, that in the *Apology* Plato makes Socrates treat the question of immortality as an open one, and that the *Apology* is more historical than the *Phaedo*. In the second place, it is pointed out that Xenophon does not make Socrates say anything about immortality in the *Memorabilia*. The inference is that the belief was foreign to 'the historical Socrates'.

When, however, we look a little closer at these facts, their significance is seen to be rather different. Plato's *Apology* professes to give us the speeches delivered by Socrates at his trial; and, though it would be absurd to treat it as a word for word report, it is doubtless historical in its main outlines.\(^2\) Even if it is not, it is clear that Plato has taken pains to make it such a speech as might actually have been delivered in an Athenian court, and it is quite certain from the practice of the orators that, in addressing the judges, it was impossible to assume immortality as distinct from mere survival. The old belief in powerful and dangerous ghosts had disappeared, and nothing very definite had

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2. As Gomperz puts it, the *Apology* is 'stilisierte Wahrheit'. 
taken its place. No doubt the average Athenian would allow that the souls of the departed had some sort of existence—the religious observances connected with the dead imply that—but he had lost all faith in the primitive belief that they continued to interest themselves in the affairs of this world. 'If by any means,' says Demosthenes, 'the departed should be made aware of what is now taking place,' and that is the standing formula. Nor is there any evidence that people thought of the next life as a better life, or of the house of Hades as a better world. It was believed, indeed, that those who had been initiated at Eleusis enjoyed a better lot than others. They alone could properly be said to live after death; but even that was a shadowy sort of life, and as far removed as possible from the immortality preached by the Orphic sectaries and the Pythagoreans. According to them, the soul was divine and immortal in its own right, and it was only after separation from the body that it could become truly itself. The soul of the Orphic votary dwelt with God and the saints and attained to complete purity and wisdom, while the initiated of Eleusis were at best a class of privileged shades.

Had there been any real belief in a better life, it must have found expression in the Funeral Speeches, and especially in that part of them which was regularly devoted to the consolation of the survivors; but we

1 Cp. Dem. Lept. 87 εἰ τινες τούτων τῶν τετελευτηκότων λάβοιεν τρόπῳ τινὶ τοῦ νυνὶ γιγνομένου πράγματος αἰσθήσιν. At the end of his speech against Eratosthenes (100) Lysias goes so far as to say οἴμαι δὲ αὐτοῦς (τοίς τεθνεῶτας) ἡμῶν τε ἀκρασθαί καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐλευθαί τὴν ψήφον φέροντας, which is the strongest statement in the orators. Cp. also Isocr. 19. 42 εἰ τίς ἐστιν αἰσθήσις τοῖς τεθνεώσι περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε γιγνομένων, Plato, Menex. 248b 7 εἰ τίς ἐστι τῶν τετελευτηκόσιν αἰσθήσις τῶν ζώντων.

2 Rohde, Psyche, ii, p. 203 (495), n. 3.
find nothing of the sort even in the *Menexenus*, which is put into the mouth of Socrates. The writer, whether Plato or another, has felt bound to conform to the usual practice in this respect. Nor is there any trace in Aeschylus or Sophocles of a belief in a blessed immortality. It is Euripides who says ‘Who knows if life be death and death be life?’, and is laughed at by Aristophanes for doing so. We see from this how foreign such a thought was to the Athenian mind. Euripides, like Socrates, had been influenced by strange doctrines, and he, like Socrates, was considered ‘im- pious’.

In the *Apology*, then, Socrates only speaks as he was bound to speak. He wishes to show that death is no evil to a good man, even if the ordinary view of it is correct. At the worst, it is a dreamless sleep, and a night of dreamless sleep is better than most waking days. But that is only one possibility. There are certain ‘sayings’¹ according to which death is really a migration of the soul to another world; and, if these are true, we may hope after death to join the company of Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer. It is surely clear that Socrates himself is more in sympathy with this belief than the other, though he may not say so in as many words, and though he speaks with a certain reserve on the subject. Even in the *Phaedo* he makes certain reservations. He is sure that the soul is immortal, and that the purified soul only leaves the

¹ This, and not ‘popular opinion’, I take to be the meaning of τὰ λεγόμενα in *Apol.* 40 c 7, d 6. Cp. notes on *Phaedo* 63 c 6 and 70 c 5. The term belongs originally to the language of the mysteries, in which τὰ λεγόμενα are opposed to τὰ δρώμενα, and is used elsewhere in Plato of the mystic doctrine or ἱερὸς λόγος.
body to be with the wise and good God; he is not sure that it will enjoy the company of the saints and heroes of old.¹ Both in the Phaedo and elsewhere he steadily declines to commit himself to the details of the Orphic doctrine. It is a ‘probable tale’, and we may hope that it, or something like it, is true. In this respect the Phaedo does not go a step further than the Apology, and the language of the Apology really implies the belief explicitly stated in the Phaedo. Whatever concessions he may make for the sake of argument, Socrates lets it be clearly seen that his beliefs about the soul are not those of the man in the street.

The same considerations help to explain the silence of Xenophon in the Memorabilia. He is seeking to prove that the belief of Socrates about the gods was just the same as that of other pious people,² and it would never have done to suggest that he held peculiar views about the soul. The doctrine of the soul’s immortality was, and remained, a heresy. Even Plato’s brother Glaucon is represented in the Republic as startled when Socrates propounds it as something he seriously believes and thinks he can prove.³ And yet Xenophon knew the doctrine perfectly well. Even in the Memorabilia, he lets slip the statement that the soul ‘partakes in the divine’, a phrase which really implies the whole theory.⁴

¹ Phaed. 63c1.
² Mem. i. 1. 3 ὁ δ’ οὐδὲν καυνότερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων κτλ.
³ Rep. 608d3 Οὐκ ἦσθησαν, ἂν ὁ ἐγώ, οὐτὶ ἄδανατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐ-δέπους ἀπόλλυται; —Καὶ ὅτι ἐμβλέψας μοι καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε· Μὰ Δί’, οὐκ ἔγωγε· σὺ δὲ τοῦτ’ ἔχεις λέγειν;
⁴ Mem. iv. 3. 14 ἄλλα μὴν καὶ ἀνθρώπου γε ψυχή, ἢ, ἐπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν ἄνθρωπῶν, τοῦ θείου μετέχει, οὕτω μὲν βασιλεῖς ἐν ἡμῶν φανερὸν, ὡρᾶται δὲ οὐδ’ αὐτή. The invisibility and divine nature of the soul are just the
Further, this view, which could not safely be developed in the Memorabilia, is worked out at considerable length in the Cyròpaedia, where the dying Cyrus is made to formulate it in language almost identical with that of the Phaedo. Of this fact there can only be two explanations. Either Xenophon is borrowing from the Phaedo, or Plato and Xenophon are drawing from a common source. Further, this source must be Socratic; for the kinship of the dying speech of Cyrus with the argument about the invisibility of the soul ascribed to Socrates in the Memorabilia is patent. It is possible that Xenophon derived it from Hermogenes, from whom he professes to have heard what he knew of the trial and death of Socrates; but, on the whole, it is more likely

points made in Phaedo 79 b 1 and 80 a 8, while βασιλεύει refers to the argument of Phaedo 79 e 8. Cp. Rohde, Psycho, ii, p. 2 (205). 'If the soul is immortal, it is in its essential property identical with God. Among the Greeks, whoever says immortal says God; these are interchangeable notions. Now in the religion of the Greek people the true fundamental proposition is that, in the divine order of the world, humanity and divinity are locally and essentially distinct and must remain so. A deep gulf separates the worlds of man and God.' Even so innocent-looking a phrase as τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχει ignores this gulf, and therefore implies the mystic doctrine. There are some other passages about the ψυχή which seem to be reminiscences of the Phaedo. Cp. i. 2. 4 τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν ὑπὲρ ἐπιστήμην (cp. Phaed, 65 a 10), i. 4. 13 τὴν ψυχήν κρατίστην τῷ ἁνθρώπῳ ἐνέφυε (ὁ θεός), i. 5. 53 τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξελθόντης, ἐν ἡ μόνη γέγενται φύσεις. These go far beyond the popular use of the word ψυχή.

1 Xen. Cyr. viii. 7. 17 sqq. Cp. especially 19 οὕτω έγογε, ὁ παῖς, οὐδὲ τούτο πώσον ἐπείσθην, ὅσ ἡ ψυχή ἐσσε μὲν ἄν ἐν θυτῷ σώματι ἥ, ἡ, ὅταν δὲ τούτου ἀπάλληλην, τεθυμηκέν ὅ, οὐδὲ γε ὅπως ἄφρον ἦσσε ἡ ψυχή, ἐπειδὰν τοῦ ἄφρους σώματος δίχα γέννησα, οὐδὲ τούτο πέπεισμαι ἄλλο οὕτων ἁκρατος καὶ καθάρος ὁ νοῦς ἐκκρηκῆ, τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον αὐτὸν εἶσεν εἶσαι.

2 Cp. Cyr. vii. 7. 17 οὐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοῦ τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἐκφάτε with the passage about the invisibility of the soul quoted p. lii., n. 4.

3 Xen. Apol. a. 
that he simply took it from the *Phaedo*, adding some touches of his own. If so, he at least knew nothing inconsistent with the ascription of such arguments to Socrates.

But we can go much further than this. We have positive evidence, dating from a time when Plato and Xenophon were children, that Socrates was commonly believed to hold strange doctrine about the soul. In the *Clouds* of Aristophanes (v. 94), Strepsiades says, pointing to the house of Socrates—

\[ \psi\upsilon\chi\omicron\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\sigma\omicron\phi\omicron\rho\omicron\upsilon\sigma\omicron\tau\omicron\upsilon \varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota \phi\omicron\nu\tau\iota\iota\sigma\omicron\tau\iota\rho\omicron\omicron\upsilon, \]

and, however natural such a way of speaking may appear to us, it was not natural for an ordinary Greek in the fifth century B.C. It is sufficiently established that the use of the word \( \psi\upsilon\chi\omicron \) to express a living man’s true personality is Orphic in its origin, and came into philosophy from mysticism. Properly speaking, the \( \psi\upsilon\chi\omicron \) of a man is a thing which only becomes important at the moment of death. In ordinary language it is only spoken of as something that may be lost; it is, in fact, ‘the ghost’ which a man ‘gives up’.\(^1\) Yet we find Aristophanes trying to raise a laugh by representing Socrates and his disciples as ‘souls’ or ‘ghosts’ even in their lifetime.\(^2\)

\(^1\) The \( \phi\iota\lambda\phi\upsilon\nu\chi\omicron\omicron\) is the man who clings to life. To risk one’s life is \( \theta\epsilon\iota\iota\upsilon, \tau\rho\acute{\varepsilon}\chi \epsilon\iota\nu\varepsilon\upsilon, \kappa\iota\delta\omicron\nu\nu\epsilon\iota\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\varphi\omicron\rho\iota \psi\upsilon\chi\omicron\omicron\). Cp. Rohde, *Psyche*, i, p. 47 (43), n. 1; ii, p. 141 (432), n. 1. From Homer downwards, the \( \psi\upsilon\chi\omicron \) is so regarded; wherever it means more than this, we may trace the influence of mysticism or philosophy.

\(^2\) Cp. van Leeuwen, *ad loc.* ‘innuit non vivos vegetosque illic habitare homines sed mera \( \epsilon\iota\delta\omega\lambda\alpha\kappa\alpha\mu\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\omicron \), \( \nu\epsilon\kappa\acute{\iota}\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon \) quaedam \( \alpha\mu\epsilon\nu\nu\eta\nu\alpha \) \( \kappa\alpha\rho\rho\nu \) quibus \( \phi\iota\rho\epsilon\varepsilon\upsilon\) \( \alpha\nu\kappa \) \( \epsilon\mu\nu\epsilon\delta\alpha \) \( \epsilon\iota\omicron\upsilon\omicron \), Socrati \( \psi\upsilon\chi\alpha\gamma\omicron\omega\gamma\) (Av. 1555 qui locus omnino est conferendus) obtemperantia. Cf. infra vs. 504, ubi unus ex eorum numero dicitur \( \eta\mu\upsilon\nu\gamma\)ς. This is the popular view of the *μελέτη βανάτου* (81 a 1). See note on *θανάτοι*, *Phaed*. 64 b 5.
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The same point is made in the chorus of the *Birds* where Socrates is represented as calling up the souls of the dead.¹ This, at any rate, cannot be aimed at 'the Sophists', and the caricature would be wholly pointless unless the real Socrates taught even at that date something like the doctrine of immortality and the 'practice of death' (*μελέτη θανάτου*) which, as we know from the *Phaedo* itself, seemed so ridiculous to the mass of men.²

The truth is that, apart from the prejudice which insists on seeing Socrates as a 'rationalist', there is nothing to cause surprise in the fact that he was influenced by mystic doctrines. We have only to remember the character of the man and the times he lived in. The fusion of science and mysticism, to the great advantage of both, had been the characteristic feature of the generations immediately preceding his own, and his youth was passed at a time when it was much in evidence. He had even spoken with Parmenides at Athens,³ and he was only about twenty years younger than Empedocles, who joined the Athenian colony of Thurii when Socrates was about five and twenty.⁴ A little later, the Pythagoreans were expelled from the cities of Magna Graecia, and took refuge at Thebes, Phlius, and

¹ Cp. van Leeuwen, *ad loc.* 'Sic ridetur philosophus de animi immortalitate disputare solitus dum vitae lenocinia aspermatur'. The context makes it clear that *ψυχαγωγεῖ* is to be taken in the strict sense of ghost-raising. Chaerephon 'the bat' is represented as playing the part of the 'spirit'.

² *Phaed.* 64 b 1 sqq.

³ E. Gr. Ph.² p. 192, and, for the connexion of Parmenides with Pythagoreanism, *ib.* pp. 194 and 221.

⁴ E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 229 and 237. It is nowhere stated that Empedocles visited Athens, but it would be strange if he did not, seeing that he went to Thurii.
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elsewhere. All this could not but impress a young man who had a strong vein of mysticism in his own nature, as is shown by what we know of his ecstatic trances and the 'divine sign'. We are told expressly that he had the latter from boyhood. It would be much more difficult to account for all this, if we were to suppose Plato rather than Socrates to have been the mystic. By his time Orphicism had degenerated into a mere superstition, and the barefooted Pythagorists who still maintained the original practices of their order would be quite unsympathetic to him. The Pythagoreans whom he knew had dropped all that, and busied themselves only with science and politics. It is a fine historical touch in the Phaedo that the young Pythagoreans, Simmias and Cebes, are not very familiar with the mystic doctrine, and require to have it explained to them by Socrates.

XIV

But Socrates was no Orphic for all that. He had another characteristic which kept him from turning mystic out and out. That was the Attic elpavela, that shrewd, non-committal spirit, natural to a people of farmers and tradesmen, which Aristophanes has depicted for us in his typical Athenian figures, and which Demosthenes denounced. Enthusiasm tempered by

1 E. Gr. Ph. p. 99.
2 Apol. 31 d 2 ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸν ιστίν ἐν παιδὸς ἀρέμενον. The twenty-four hours trance at Potidaea happened when Socrates was about thirty-seven, five years before Plato was born.
3 E. Gr. Ph. p. 103, n. 2.
4 E. Gr. Ph. p. 319 sq.
5 The proper meaning of elpav is 'sly', 'cunning', malin, and elpavela is not regarded as exactly a good quality. In the Platonic dialogues, it is...
irony (using both words in their Greek sense) may serve as a formula for the Socratic \( \dot{\eta} \theta o\)\( \varsigma \).\(^1\) Xenophon gives us too little enthusiasm and Aristophanes too little irony; it is only in the Platonic Socrates that both elements are harmoniously combined in a character with a marked individuality of his own. The Platonic Socrates is no mere type, but a living man. That, above all, is our justification for believing that he is in truth 'the historical Socrates'.

only the opponents of Socrates who ascribe it to him. The Scots words 'canny' and 'pawky' express something similar. Demosthenes speaks of it as a bad trait in the Athenian character (Phil. i. 7, 37). At its worst, it leads people to shirk their responsibilities; at its best, it is a salutary \( \nu \dot{\alpha} \phi \epsilon \ \kappa \alpha \iota \ \mu \dot{\epsilon} \mu \nu \alpha \sigma \ \delta \acute{a} \mu \sigma \tau \epsilon \iota \nu \). For the way in which Socrates refuses to commit himself to the positive details of the mystic theology cp. §3 c i n. It is clearly a personal trait.

\(^1\) Or, as Gomperz puts it, 'a hot heart under a cool head.'
NOTE UPON THE TEXT

The dialogues of Plato were arranged in nine tetralogies by the grammarian Thrasyllus in the reign of Tiberius. The first tetralogy comprised the *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito*, and *Phaedo*, i.e. those dialogues which deal specially with the trial and death of Socrates.

At some subsequent date the dialogues were edited in two volumes, the first of which contained tetralogies I–VII, the second, tetralogies VIII–IX, with some spurious works. As one or other of the two volumes was apt to be lost, the MS. authority for tetralogies I–VII is quite different from that for tetralogies VIII–IX and the spurious dialogues.

The leading representatives of the first volume are the Bodleian MS., E. D. Clarke 39 (B), the Venice MS. App. class. 4, 1 (T), and the Vienna MS. 54, suppl. phil. gr. 7 (W).

B. The Bodleian MS., commonly called the *Clarkianus* after E. D. Clarke, who discovered it in the island of Patmos, was written for Arethas in the year 895 A.D. It was held by Cobet and others that it was our sole independent authority, and all recent texts of the *Phaedo* are based more or less consistently on this hypothesis.

T. The Venice MS. or *Marcianus* (tenth century A.D.? ) is the original of the great majority of existing Plato MSS., and in particular of the MS. from which the Aldine text was derived. The text of Stephanus also goes back to the same source. These MSS. were arbitrarily classed by Cobet and at one time by Schanz as *deteriores*, and the chief work of Platonic critics
down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century was to bring the text more and more into accordance with B, and to eliminate readings which came from other MSS.

The credit of inaugurating a better method belongs to Schanz himself. In 1877 he showed that T was of co-ordinate authority with B, and that we must take account of both. In some ways T represents the tradition even more faithfully than B. For instance, it contains the old scholia, while B has a new set composed in the ninth century A.D., probably by Arethas himself.

Unfortunately, Schanz had edited the Phaedo before he made this discovery, and he has not republished it since. The readings of T were first published by the present editor in 1899.

W. The importance of this MS. had been seen by Bast, and an imperfect collation of it was used to some extent by Stallbaum, but its omission from Bekker's apparatus criticus led to its being generally ignored till Professor Král of Prague once more called attention to it. Its claims to be regarded as a co-ordinate authority with B and T were warmly contested by Schanz, but on insufficient grounds. The publication of the anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus from a Berlin papyrus showed conclusively that W represented a very ancient tradition of the text. The MS. was brought to Vienna from Florence, and it seems to have come there from Sicily. The Latin version of the Phaedo made by Euericus Aristippus, Archdeacon of Catana, in the twelfth century, A.D., was made either from it or from a very similar MS. It is to be noted further that the corrections made by the second hand in the Clarkianus (B²), which is probably that of Arethas himself, are taken from a MS. closely resembling W, so that it must represent a tradition older than B.

A special feature of W is the number of ancient variants which it records in the margin. If all the other MSS. were lost, we could still construct a good text from W alone, and that is more than can be said either of B or of T.
In this edition, when W alone is quoted, it is to be understood that B and T have the reading adopted in the text; when B and T alone are quoted, it is to be understood that W agrees with B. Thus, on the first page, it may be inferred that B and T have τὸ φόρμακον ἔπιεν and ἀγγεῖλα, while W has ἐγὼ ἀκούσαμι, ὄφει τί ἤν and τί οἴη δὲν ἤν.

An interesting addition to our knowledge of the text was made by the publication by Professor Flinders Petrie of some papyrus fragments which must have been written within a century of Plato’s death (Ars. i.e. papyrus Arsinoitica). On the whole, their text is inferior to that of our MSS., though these are more than a thousand years later. The papyrus represents the cheap texts current in early times, while our costly MSS. are copied from careful editions.

The quotations in ancient writers, especially Eusebius and Stobaeus, sometimes preserve old readings, and often confirm TW as against B. They are, however, taken from MSS. of various degrees of authority and must be used with great caution.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ


**ΦΑΙΔΩΝ**

**ΕΧΕΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΦΑΙΔΩΝ**

EX. Αὐτός, ὁ Φαίδων, παρεγένον Σωκράτει εἰκήν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὧ τὸ φάρμακον ἔπιεν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, ἢ ἅλλου τοῦ ἥκουσας;

ΦΑΙΔ. Αὐτός, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες.

EX. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστιν ἅττα ἐπεν ὁ ἄνηρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου; καὶ πῶς ἔτελεύτα; ἦδεως γὰρ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀκούσαμι. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε [τῶν πολιτῶν] Φλεισίων οὐδεὶς πάνυ τεπιχωριάζει τὰ νῦν Ἀθήνας, οὔτε τις ξένος ἀφίκται [χρόνου συχνοῦ] ἐκείθεν δοτεὶ ἃν ἡμῶν σαφῆς τι ἀγγειλαὶ οἶδος τ' ἢν περὶ τούτων, πλὴν γε δὴ ὅτι φάρμακον πιῶν ἀποθάνοι τῶν ὃς ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἶχεν φράζειν.

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὔδε τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἄρα ἐπιθύμεθα ὅν τρόπον ἐγένετο;

EX. Ναὶ, ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἠγγειλέ τις, καὶ ἐθαυμάζομεν γε ὅτι [πάλαι γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ύπεροῦν φαίνεται ἀποθανὼν] τι οὖν ἂν τοῦτο, ὁ Φαίδων;

ΦΑΙΔ. Τύχῃ τις αὐτῷ, ὁ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη ἐπιχεῖν γὰρ τῇ προτεραλ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρώτῳ ἐστεμμένῳ τοῦ πλοίου ὃ εἰς Δήλου Ἀθηναίοι πέμπουσιν.

ἀ2 ἐπειν τὸ φάρμακον ᾽W a6 ἐγὼ B: om. ᾽T a7 τῶν πολιτῶν secl. v. Bamberg: Φλεισίων secl. Schaefer b1 ἀπαγγεῖλαι ᾽W ᾽hν B: ᾽T ιa5 οὖν B: om. ᾿T a8 πέμπουσιν ὃ BΤ: πέμπουσιν κατ' ἐτος ᾽B3' ᾽W
ΦΑΙΔ. Τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τοῦ πλοίου ὁς φασιν ’Αθηναίοι, ἐν ὧν Ὡθησόν τοτέ εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς “δις ἔπτα” ἐκεῖνως ἤχετο δ ἄγων καὶ ἔσωσε τε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθη. τῷ οὖν ’Απόλλωνι ἡτέχαυτό ὁς λέγεται τότε, εἰ σωθείει, ἐκάστῳ ἔτους θεωρίαν ἀπάξεων εἰς Δήλου ἤν δὴ ἂει καὶ νῦν ἐτι [ε] ἐκεῖνον κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν τῷ θεῷ πέμπουσιν. ἔπειδὼν οὖν ἀρξοῦνται τῆς 5 θεωρίας, νῦμος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πόλιν καὶ δημοσία μηδένα ἀποκτείνων, πρῶς ἄν εἰς Δήλου τὸ ἀφίκηται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεύρο τοῦτο δ’ ἐνίοτε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, ὅταν τύχοσιν ἄνεμοι ἀπο- c λαβόντες αὐτούς. ἀρχῇ δ’ ἐστὶ τῆς θεωρίας ἔπειδῶν οἱ ἀρχεῖς τοῦ ’Απόλλωνος στάθη τὴν πρήμαν τοῦ πλοίου τοῦτο δ’ ἐτυχεῖν, ὡσπερ λέγω, τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης γεγο- νός. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολὺς χρόνους ἐγένετο τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν 5 τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ὁ μεταξὺ τῆς δίκης τε καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

EX. Τί δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αυτῶν τὸν θάνατον, ὦ Φαίδωρ; τί ἢν τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ πραξθέντα, καὶ τίνες οἱ παραγενόμενοι τῶν ἐπιτηδεύων τῷ ἀνδρὶ; ἢ οὖν εἰῶν οἱ ἀρχοῦτες παρεῖναι, ἀλλ’ ἔρημος ἐτελεύτα φίλοι;  

d ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ παρησάν τινες, καὶ πολλοὶ γε.

EX. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα προσμείνεται ὡς σαφέστατα ἢμῖν ἀπαγγείλαι, εἰ μὴ τίς σοι ἀσχολία τυγχάνει οὔσα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἀλλὰ σχολάζω γε καὶ πειράσομαι ὡμίν δινη-5 σαθαν’ καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεμηνύσθαι Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντα καὶ ἄλλου ἀκούοντα ἔμοιγε ἀεὶ πάντων ἤδιστον.

EX. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Φαίδωρ, καὶ τῶν ἀκούσομένους γε τοιοῦτοις ἐτέρους ἐχεῖν· ἀλλὰ πειρῶ ὃς ἄν δὴν ἀκριβεδ- στατὰ διεξελθεῖν πάντα.

e ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μὴν ἐγὼνε βαλμαία ἐπαθὼν παραγενόμενοι. οὔτε γὰρ ὃς θανάτῳ παροῦντα με ἀνδρὸς ἐπιτηδεύων ἔλεος

a 11 ποτὲ θησεῖς W b 7 τε B: om. T o 6 τι ἢν BT: τίνα ἢν B'W d 4 γε B: τε T d 8 ἐτέρους BT: ἐστέρων W d 9 διεξελθεῖν B: διελθεῖν T
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ 58 ε

εἴσηκεν εὐδαιμόνα γὰρ μοι ἄνὴρ ἐφαίνετο, ὁ Ἐξέκρατες, καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὥς ἀδεσός καὶ γενναῖος ἔτελευτά, ὡστε μοι ἐκεῖνον παρίστασθαι, μὴν εἰς "Αἰδοῦ λύστα[ἀνευθεὶς μολῆς] ἱέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενον εὐ πρᾶξειν εἴπερ τις πώποτε καὶ ἄλλος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἔλευσον εἰσήκει, ὡς εἰκὸς ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι παρόντι πένθει, ὡστε αὐτὴ ἡ σοφία ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἡμῶν ὄντων ὀσπέρ εἰσόθηκεν -καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι τουτοῦ τῶν ἕσσαν- ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ἀτοπὸν τί μοι πάθος παρῇ καὶ τὶς ἀνήθης κράσις ἀπὸ τῆς ἡθοῦσα συγκεκραμένη ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς λύτης, ἐνθυμομένῳ ὃτι αὐτίκα ἐκεῖνος ἔμελλε τελευτᾶν. καὶ πάντες οἱ παρόντες σχεδοῦν τι οὕτω διεκείμεθα, τοτέ μὲν γελῶντες, ἐνίοτε δὲ ὀδυροῦντες, εἰς δὲ ἡμῶν καὶ διαφερόντως, Ἀπολλόδωρος- αὐθα γὰρ ποὺ τῶν ἀνδρα καὶ τῶν τρόπων αὐτοῦ.

EX. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ἕκεινος τε τοῖς παντάπασιν οὕτως εἰχεν, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγώγη ἐτεταράγμην καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

EX. Ἐτυχον δὲ, ὁ Φαῖδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ὁδὸς τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἑπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτε Ἐρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης καὶ Ἀλσχήνης καὶ Ἀλθυθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτῆσιππος ὁ Παιανεύς καὶ Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ἑπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ οὕματι ἤσθενε.

EX. Ξένοι δὲ τίνες παρῆκαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Συμμία τε γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ σφαίδωνης καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

EX. Τί δὲ; Ἀριστιππος καὶ Κλέομπροτος παρεγένοντο; ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δήτα· ἐν Αἰγυπτι ἄρα ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

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PLATO, VOLUME 1.
5  EX. Ἄλλος δὲ τις παρῆν;
    ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδόν τι οὖμαί τούτους παραγενέσθαι.
    EX. Τι οὖν δή; τίνες φής ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;
    ΦΑΙΔ. Ἐγώ σοι εἶ ἀρχής πάντα πειράσομαι διηγήσα
dια σθαί. ἀεὶ γὰρ ὑπάντασαν ἡμέρας εἰσώθημεν φοιτῶν
καὶ ἐγώ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι παρὰ τοῦ Σωκράτη, συλλεγόμενοι
ἐσθήνει εἰς τὸ ἔκκαθημέρων ἐν ὧδε καὶ ἡ δίκη ἐγένετο πλησίον
γὰρ ἦν τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου. περιεμένομεν οὖν ἐκάστοτε ἐξω
5 ἀνοιχθεὶ τὸ δεσμωτήριον, διατριβοῦστε μετ' ἀλλήλων, ἀνεφ-
γετο γὰρ οὐ πρὶν ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀνοιχθῇ, εἰσῆμεν παρὰ τοῦ
Σωκράτη καὶ τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύσομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ δὴ καὶ
tότε προφαίτερον συνελέγημεν τῇ γὰρ προτεραίᾳ [ἡμέρᾳ]
e ἐπειδὴ ἐξήλθομεν ἐκ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου ἐστέρας, ἐπιθύμεθα
ὅτι τὸ πλοῖον ἐκ Δῆλου ἀφιγμένον εἰς. παρηγγείλαμεν οὖν
ἀλλήλοις ἦκεν ὡς προφαίτασα εἰς τὸ εἰσώθη. καὶ ἦκομεν καὶ
ηῶν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρός, ὅσπερ εἰσέθη ὑπακούει, εἰπεν περι-
5 μένει καὶ μὴ πρότερον παριέναι ἐγὼ ἃν αὐτὸς κελέσῃ:
"Ἀλώσασι γὰρ," ἔφη, "οἱ ἐνδέκα Σωκράτη καὶ παραγγέλλουσι
ὅπως ἃν τίθη ἢ ἡ ἡμέρᾳ τελευτᾷ." οὐ πολὺν δ' οὖν χρόνον
ἐπισχῶν ἦκεν καὶ ἐκέλευσεν ἦμας εἰσέθη. εἰσοῦντες οὖν
60 κατελαμβάνομεν τὸν μὲν Σωκράτη ἀρτι λελυμένον, τὴν δὲ
ἔξωθετήν—γυναῖκες γὰρ—ἐχουσάν τε τὸ παιδίον αὐτοῦ
καὶ παρακαθημένην. ὑς οὖν εἶδον ἦμας ἡ ἔξωθήθη, ἀνα-
φήμησέ τε καὶ τοιάντ' ἀττα εἶπεν, ολα ὅτι εἰσώθησαν αἰ
5 γυναῖκες, ὅτι "Ὡς Σώκρατης, ὄστατον δὴ σε προσεροῦσι νῦν
οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι καὶ σὺ τούτους," καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης βλέψας εἰς
τὸν Κρίτωνα, "Ὡς Κρίτων," ἔφη, "ἀπαγέτω τις αὕτη
οἴκαε."
κλώνυ συνέκαµψε τε το σκέλος καὶ ἔξτηρυσε τῇ χειρί, καὶ τρίβων ἀμα, ὡς ἀτόπων, ἐφη, ὡς ἀνδρίης, ἐσοκε τι εἶναι τούτῳ δ καιοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι ὡς. ὥς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐναντίον εἶναι, τὸ λυπηρῷ, τὸ ἀμα μὲν 5 αὐτῷ μὴ 'θέλεω παραγγέλεσαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐὰν δὲ τίς διάκρι τὸ ἔτερον καὶ λαμβάνη, σχεδόν τι ἀναγκάζεσθαι αἰὲ λαμβάνει καὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ὡσπερ ἐκ μᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμένω ὡς ὑπε. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Αἰσιωτος, κρυθὸν ἄν συνθεῖναι ὡς δ' θεοὶ βουλόμενοι αὐτὰ διαλλάξαι πολεμοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἔδυνατο, συνήγησι εἰς ταύτων αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφὰς, καὶ διὰ ταύτα ὅ ὁ τὸ ἔτερον παραγένεται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὡστερον καὶ τὸ ἔτερον. ὡσπερ ὅν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι 5 έοικεν- ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἤν εν τῷ σκέλει τὸ ἀλγεψόν, ἤκεν δὴ φανεται ἐπακολουθοῦν τὸ ἥδυ.

Ὁ οὖν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, Νη τὸν Δία, ὡ Σῶκρατες, ἐφη, εὑ τεποίησας ἀναµμήνησας με. περὶ γάρ τοι τῶν πουηµάτων οὐ πεποίηκας έπενίναι τοὺς τοῦ Ἀισιωτοῦ λόγους d καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπώλλω προοίµων καὶ ἄλλῳ τινὲς μὲ ἴδῃ ἤρωντο, ἄταρ καὶ Ἐυήνοσ προφήτης ὅτι ποτὲ διανοῇσθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεύρῳ ἠλθεῖς, ἐποίησας αὐτά, πρότερον οὖδὲν πάστοτε ποιήσας. εἰ οὖν τῷ σοι μέλει τοῦ ἄχεων ἐμὲ Ἐυήνῳ ἄποκρίνασθαι ὅταν 5 με αὐθὶς ἐρωτᾷ—εὑ οἶδα γάρ ὃτι ἐρήσεται—εἰς τῇ χρή λέγεω.

Δέγε τοιώνω, ἐφη, αὐτῷ, ὡ Κέβης, τάληθη, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκέννο βουλόμενοι οὔδὲ τοῖς ποιήσαις αὐτοῦ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησα ταῦτα—ἡδὴ γάρ ὡς οὐν ῥάδιον εἰ—ἄλλα e ἐνυπηύ τωσ ἀποπερίφημος τοί λέγοι, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος 6 αὐτὰ πολλακῖς ταύτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττων ποιεῖν.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

6ο ἦν γὰρ ὅτι ἄττα τοιὰδε· πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν
5 ὕπνιον ἐν τῷ παρελθοῦντι βίῳ, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἄλλῃ ὑφεὶ φαινό-
μενον, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγουν, ""Ὤ Σώκρατες," ἐφη, "μουσικὴν
ποιεῖ καὶ ἐργάζομαι." καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ
ἐπράττον τούτῳ ὑπελάβαμαν αὐτὸ μοι παρακελεύσατα τε
καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελεύομενοι, καὶ
ἐμοὶ οὕτω τὸ ἐνυπνίον ὅπερ ἐπράττον τότῳ ἐπικελεύειν,
μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ὡς φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὕς της μεγήτης μουσι-
κῆς, ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτῳ πράττοντος. τὸν δ' ἐπειδή ἦ τε δίκη
5 ἐγένετο καὶ ἦ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστὶν διεκόλυτε με ἀποθυγμένου, ἐδοξε
χρῆναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάται τὸ ἐνυπνίον ταῦτῃ
τῇ δημῶδῃ μουσικῇ ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθήσαι αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ
ποιεῖν· ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώ-
b σασθαι ποιῆσαι τούματα [καὶ] πιθήμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ.
οὕτω δὴ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα οὐ ἦν ἡ παροῦσα
θυσία· μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννυόσας ὅτι τὸν ποιητὴν δέοι,
εἶτε μέλλοι ποιητῇ εἶναι, ποιεῖν μῦθον τοῦ οὐκ ἀλλὰ
5 καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡ μυθολογίκα, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ προχέλους
εἴχων μῦθος καὶ ἡπιστάμην τοὺς Αλέσων, τοῦτον ἐποίησα
οἶς πρῶτος ἐνύπνυ, ταῦτα οὖν, ὁ Κέβης, Εὐήνω φράζε,
καὶ ἐρρώσθαι καὶ, ἄν σωφρονῇ, ἐμὲ διάκειν ὡς τάχιστα.
c ἀπεμι δὲ, ὡς οἴκε, τῆμερον κελεύουσι γὰρ Ἀθηναίοι.

Καὶ ὁ Συμμῖας, Οἶον παρακελεύη, ἐφη, τούτῳ, ὡ Σώ-
κρατες, Εὐήνως, πολλὰ γὰρ ἦν ἐντυπώκηκα τῷ ἀνδρὶ
σχεδὸν οὐν ἐξ ὅν ἐγὼ ὑπόθημα οὐδ' ὀπωστειοῦν σοι ἕκὼν
5 εἶναι πείσται.

Τῇ δὲ; ἦ δ' ὡς, οὐ φιλόσοφος Εὐήνως;
"Εμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη ὁ Συμμῖας.
"Εθελήσει τοῖς καὶ Εὐήνως καὶ πᾶς ὅπως ἄξιος τούτῳ
τοῦ πράγματος μέτεστιν. οὐ μέντοι ἰσως βιάσται αὐτῶν
8 εἶναι B T : εἶναι εὐφυμοῖον B 3 W πρὶν B T : πρότερον πρὸ τῶν ἐν
B 3 W b i καὶ B T w : om. W et punct. not. τ πειθόμενον
B T W sed e e ex T b 5 δὴ B : om. T b 6 καὶ ἡπιστάμην
μῦθος B 3 T W τοῖς T : τοῖς B b 8 ὡς τάχιστα B : om.
T c 4 σοι B : ἀν σοι T c 9 μέντοι B T Olymp. : μέντοι γε
B 3 W
φαίδων

οὐ γάρ φασὶ θεμιτῶν εἶναι. Καὶ ἀμα λέγων ταύτα καθήκε τά σκέλη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, καὶ καθεξόμενος οὐτως ἤδη τὰ λοιπὰ διειλέγετο.

'Ἡρετο οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Κέβης: Πώς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ μὴ θεμιτὸν εἶναι ἑαυτὸν βιάζεσθαι, ἐθέλειν δ' ἀν τῷ ἀποθηρήσκοντι τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπέσθαι;

Τῇ δὲ, ὁ Κέβης; οὐκ ἀκηκοάτε σὺ τε καὶ Σίμμιας περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων Φιλολάφῳ συγγεγονότες;

Οὐδὲν γε σαφές, ὁ Σώκρατες.

'Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ἐξ ἄκοις περὶ αὐτῶν λέγων, ὃ μὲν οὖν τυγχάνω ἀκηκοῶς φόνος οὐδένες λέγειν. καὶ γαρ ἵσως καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει μέλλοντα ἐκεῖνο ἀποδημεῖν διασκοπεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀποδημίας τῆς ἐκεί, πολαν τω ἀυτῆν οἴομεθα εἶναι τῇ γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοί ἄλλον ἐν τῷ μέχρι ἡλίου δυσμῶν χρῶν;

Κατὰ τῇ δὴ οὖν τοτε οὐ φασὶ θεμιτὸν εἶναι αὐτῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτενῶν, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἣδη γὰρ ἔγγυε, ὡς περ νυνί ὑπ' ἠρον, καὶ Φιλολάου ἥκουσα, ὅτε παρ' ἠμῖν διητάτο, ἣδη δὲ καὶ ἄλλων των, ὡς οὖ δέοι.τοῦτο ποιεῖν σαφές δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδένος πῶς τοτε οὐδὲν ἀκήκοα.

'Ἀλλὰ προσβημεῖσθαι χρή, ἐφη, τάχα γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἀκούσαι. ἵσως μέντοι θαυμαστὸν σοι φανεῖται εἰ τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπαντῶν ἀπλῶν ἔστιν, καὶ οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει τῷ ἄνθρώπῳ, ὡς περ καὶ τάλλα, ἔστω δὲ καὶ οἶς ἑκτέλων ἀδικεί τεβάναι ἢ ζην, οἷς δὲ βέλτινων τεβάναι, θαυμαστόν ἵσωσ 

καὶ φανεῖται εἰ τοῦτοι τοῖς ἄνθρώποις μὴ ὅσιοι αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν, ἄλλα ἄλλον δὲι περιμένει ἐνεργεῖτην.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἥρεμα ἐπιγελάσας, Ἰττω Ζεῦς, ἐφη, τῇ αὐτοῦ φωνῇ εἰπὼν.

καί γὰρ ἂν δόξειν, ἐφῆ δ' Ἡσυχάστης, οὕτω γ' εἶναι ἄλογον" ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν ἀπορρήτως λέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν λόγου, ὡς ἐν τῷ φροντὶ ἐσμὲν οἱ ἀνθρώποι καὶ οὐ δὲι δὴ ἐαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὖ ἀποδιδάσκειν, μέγας τε τὶς μοι φανεται καὶ οὐ βάδιος διδεῖν [οὐ μὲν οὖν ἂν] τὸ δὲ γε μοι δοκεῖ, δ' Κέβης, εὐ λέγεσθαι, τὸ θεοῦ εἶναι ἦμας τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἦμας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι. ἤ σοὶ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως;

τὸ θεοῦ εἶναι ἦμας τοὺς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ἦμας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.
Ἀλογίστως ἄν φεύγων ὁ δὲ νῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ ποὺ ἀν ἂεί εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὐτῷ βελτίων. καίτοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὐναντίον εἶναι οἰκός ἢ ὁ νῦν ἐλέγετο τοὺς μὲν γὰρ 5 φρονίμους ἀγανάκτειν ἀποθυμήσκοντα πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἀφρονας χαίρειν.

'Ακούσας οὖν ὦ Σωκράτης ἡσθήμαν τὴν τοῦ Κέβητος πραγματεία, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, 'Αεὶ τοι, ἔφη, [ὁ] Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνῇ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἔθελε πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἂν τις ἐπι. Καὶ οἱ Ἑμμίλας, Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι 5 ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἁμείνους αὐτῶν φεύγοιειν καὶ ἁρδώς ἀπαλλάττωσιν αὐτῶν; καὶ μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ἁρδώς φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθοῦς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεοῦς.

Δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε· οἴμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρῆ με b πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὃσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὦ Ἑμμίλας.

Φέρε δή, ἢ δ' ὡς, πειραθὼ πιθανότερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ἔφη, ὦ Ἑμμίλα 5 τε καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ φωνὴ ἢξεν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἄγαθοὺς, ἐπειτα καὶ παρ' ἄνθρωποις τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἡδίκουν δὲν ὧν ὁγανακτῶ τῇ θανάτῳ· νῦν δὲ εὐ ἐστε ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἑπτίξω ἀφιέσθαι ἄγαθοὺς—καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν c πάνω διαχυρισάμην—ὅτι μεντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνω ἄγαθος ἢξεν, εὐ ἐστε ὅτι ἐπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων διαχυρισάμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὡστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ' εὐελπίς εἰμὶ εἰναὶ τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καὶ, 5

όσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεων τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς.

Τὰ ὁν, ἐφη ὁ Συμμίας, ὁ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπίεναι, ἢ κἂν ἢμῖν μεταδοθῇς;

d κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἐμοιγε ὁκεὶ καὶ ἢμῖν εἶναι ἁγαθοῦ τὸῦτο; καὶ ἀμα σοὶ ἡ ἀπολογία ἑσται, ἡν ἀπερ λέγεις ἢμὰς πείσης.

'Αλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἐφη, πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τὸνδὲ σκεφώμεθα τὶ ἑστὶν ὁ βουλεσθαί μοι ὁκεὶ πάλαι εἰπεῖν.

Τὶ δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἀλλὸ γε ἡ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσει τὸ φάρμακον ὅτι χρῆ σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλέγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν

e τὸ φαρμάκον· εἶ δὲ µῆ, ἐνίστε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δίς καὶ τρίς πίνων τούς τί τοιοῦτον πουιώτας.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἠς ἐφη, χαίρειν αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ µόνον τὸ ἐαυτὸν παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δίς δῶσων, ἐὰν δὲ δῆν,

5 καὶ τρίς.

'Αλλὰ σχέδον µὲν τι ἦδη, ἐφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ µοι πάλαι πράγματα παρέχει.

'Εα αὐτὸν, ἐφη. ἀλλ' ἦδη δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἕη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦσαι, ὅς µοι φανεῖται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὅντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβησα τὸν βιὸν θαρρείν μέλλων

64 ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπίς εἶναι εἰκεῖ µέγιστα οἰστεῖσθαι ἁγαθὰ ἐπειδὰν τελευτῆσαι. πῶς ἀν οὐν δὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχοι, ἢ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.

Κινδυνεύονσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσι σὸν ὅθως ἀπτόμενοι

5 φιλοσοφίας λειτήθεναι τοὺς ἅλλοις ὃτι οὐδὲν ἅλλο αὐτοῖς ἐπιτηθεόντοι ἢ ἀποδύθηςκε τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθεῖ, ἀτοτοῦ δῆτον ἄν εἰς προθυμεῖσθαι µὲν-ἐν παντὶ τῷ

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8 αὐτὸς ΒΤ: τὸτερον αὐτὸς Β³ W ἐχων ΒΤ: οὕτως ἐχων Β³ W
d.4 ΗΤ: οὕτως ἦ W: om. B ἐσται W: ἐστίν ΒΤ
d.5 δὲ Β³Τ:
8' W: om. B d.6 prius soi ΒΤ: om. W d.7 φράζειν Β³Τ W:
φροτίζειν B d.8 μᾶλλον ΒΤ: μᾶλλον τοὺς Β³ W e.6 µὲν
ti Τ: μέντοι B πάλαι πράγματα B: πράγματα πάλαι Τ e.9 ἦδη
B: om. T e.10 θαρρεῖν Τ: θαρρεῖ B
Καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας, Νή τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὁ Σάκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γε ἐμη γελασεῖοντα ἐποίησας γελάσας. οἶμαι δὲ γὰρ ἄ ὧν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εῖ ὑμῖν εἰρήθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας—καὶ συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ’ ἦμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ—ὅτι τῷ ὑμντὶ οἱ φιλοσο-
φοῦντες θανατῶσι, καὶ σφᾶς γε ὑμῖν λεληθασίν ὅτι δέξιοι εἰσὶν 5 
tοῦτο πάσχειν.

Καὶ ἀληθῆ γ’ ἂν λέγοιειν, ὁ Σιμμία, πλὴν γε τοῦ σφᾶς 
μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοῦς ἃ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ἃ δέξιοι 
eἰσὶν θανάτου καὶ οἷον θανάτου οἱ ὁδὶ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι.
εἴπωμεν γὰρ, ἐφη, πρὸς ἦμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀλλ’ ἔχουσι εἰπόντες ἐκεί-
νοις ἥγουμεθά τι τῶν θανατοῦ εἶναι;

Πάνυ γε, ἐφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας.

Ἀρα μὴ ἀλλο τὶ ἂ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγῆν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθύναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς 5
ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ τὸ σώμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς 
dὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ’ 
αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἄρα μὴ ἀλλο τὶ ἂ τὸ θάνατος ἂ τοῦτο;

Οὐκ, ἄλλα τοῦτο, ἐφη.

Σκέψαι δὴ, ὡγαθὲ, ἂν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἀπερ ἐμοὶ. 10 
ἦ γὰρ τοὺτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἰσεσθαι περὶ ὅν σκο-
pοῦμεν. φανεταί σοι φιλοσοφὸν ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπονδακέναι 
περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε; οἷον σιτῶν [τε] 
kαὶ ποτῶν;

“Ἡκιστὰ, ὁ Σάκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

Τὸ δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων;

Οὐδαμῶς.
Τί δε τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπεῖα; δοκεῖ σοι ἐντύμων ἦγεισθαί ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἶνον ἰματίων διαφερόντων
κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς
tοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἡ ἀτιμάζεως;
καθ' ὁσον μὴ πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ μετέχει αὐτῶν;
'Ατιμάζεως ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὅ γε ὃς ἀληθῶς φιλό-
σοφος.
Οὐκὼν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἐφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιοῦτον πραγ-
ματελά οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὁσον δύναται
ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι;
'Εμοιγε.
'Αρ' ὁν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δῆλος ἐστὶν ὃ
φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ
σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων;
Φαινεῖται.
Καὶ δοκεῖ γε ποι, ὃ Σιμμᾶ, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώπωι
μὴ μηδὲν ἢδυ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον
εἶναι ξῆν, ἀλλ' ἐγγύς τι τελείων τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φρον-
τίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰσώ.
Pάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πό-
τερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἤ οὖ, εάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ
κοινωνίαν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἶνον τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγων ἄρα ἔχει
ἀληθεῖαν των ὑπ' ἑαυτῷ εἰς καὶ ἀκοῆς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε
τοιαύτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἂν θυμοῦσιν, ὅτι οὖν ἄκοουμεν
ἀκριβές οὐδέν οὔτε ὀρώμεν; καὶ τοιούτω περὶ τὸ
σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσώ μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολή
αἱ γε ἄλλαι πάσαι γὰρ ποι τούτων φαιλότερα εἰσώ. ἢ
σοὶ οὖ δοκοῦσιν;
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.
Πότε οὖν, ἢ ὃ ὃς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπτεται; ὅταν

ἐπικεφαλέως (ἐπικεφαλεῖς) TW: καὶ ἀποδοτέων B
ἀπαθείς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου B
μεταξεῖς C Iambl.: μεταξεῖς TW
βοσκοντεῖς διαφεροντων B W
γέγαγον καὶ τοιοῦτον τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπτεται; δὴ καὶ

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μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σῶματος ἐπιχειρή τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι
tότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ.

'Αληθῆ λέγεις:

'Αρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατά-
δηλον αὐτή γίγνεται τι τῶν ὄντων;

Ναι.

Ľογίζεται δὲ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων
μηδὲν παραλυτῆ, μήτε ἀκοί μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀληθῶν μηδὲ
τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ᾽ ὧτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτὴν γίγνεται ἐώσα
χαίρων τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ’ ὃσον ὄνουν μὴ κοινωνοῦσα
αὐτῷ μηδ’ ἀπτομένη ὀρέγγηται τοῦ ὄντος.

'Εστι ταῦτα.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχῇ μάλιστα
ἀτμαζέται τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ξητεὶ δὲ αὐτῇ καθ’
αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι;

Φαίνεται.

Τι δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὡ Σιμμᾶ; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον
αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν;

Φαμέν μέντοι νῦν Δία.
Καὶ αὖ καλὸν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν;
Πῶς δ’ οὖ;

'Ἡδη οὖν τώποτε τι τῶν τοιοῦτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες;
Οὐδαμῶς, ἢ δ’ ὃς.

'Αλλ’ ἀλλὰ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σῶματος ἐφῆψι
αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας,
ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εὐλόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ
τυγχάνει ἐκαστὸν ὃν ἢ ἀρα διὰ τοῦ σῶματος αὐτῶν τὸ
ἀληθέστατον θεωρείται, ἢ δὲ ἐξεῖ ὃς ἢν μάλιστα ἡμῶν
καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευαζόμενα αὐτῷ ἐκαστὸν διανοηθήναι
περὶ οὗ ἐκκοστί, ύποτο ἐν γεγονότα ίοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἐκαστὸν;

Πάντων μὲν οὖν.

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'Αρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἄν τοῦτο ποιήσειν καθαρωτάτα ὡστὶ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ οἱ ἐφ' ἐκαστον, μήτε τῶν ὁδῶν παραπεθέμενον εὐ τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε [τινά] ἄλλην αἰσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίων μετὰ τοῦ λογουσοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν εἰλικρινεὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενον αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰλικρινεῖ ἐκαστον ἐπιχειροῦ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγές ὅτι μάλιστα ὄφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὅταν καὶ ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν σὺμ-5 παντος τοῦ σώματος, ὡς παράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἔως τῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κτῆσασθαι ἀλῆθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὄταν κοιμώμη; ἄρ' οὖν φύτος ᾠστών, ὅ μιμιλα, εἶπερ τις [καὶ] ἄλλος ὁ τευχόμενος τοῦ ὄντος;

'Τερπνώς, ἐφη ὁ Μιμιλα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὃ

10 Σῶκρατες.

b Οὔκοιν ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τω ὑγιείας φιλοσόφως, ὡστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαύτα ἀττα λέγειν, ὅτι "Κινδυνεύει τοι ἀστερὸν ἀτράπος τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς [μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει], 5 ὅτι, ἐξός ἀν τὸ σῶμα ἐξομέν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ἡ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχῇ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησιόμεθα ἰκανῶς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαίνει δὲ τῷ τῶν θαλῆς. μορίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἁγχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαῖαν

c τροφήν· ἐτὶ δὲ, ἃν τινες νῦνοι προσπέτεσθωσιν, ἔμποδίζοντω ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἔρωτῶν δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμίῳ καὶ φόβων καὶ εἴδωλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπλήθωσιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὡστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῦ ὄντος ὑπ' 5 αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονήσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίζεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδέν ἀλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπιθυμίαν. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρη-μάτων κτήσισι πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα

e 6 ποίησειςς·ν) Β ² Τ Υ: ποίησθα B 7 μήτε BΤ: μήτετο W
αναγκαζόμεθα κτάσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου δὲ
θεραπεῖα: καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι
diὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ ἐσχάτων πάντων ὅτι, εάν τις
ἡμῶν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπέζηθα πρὸς τὸ
σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσι ἀν πανταχοῦ παραπτιπτον
θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὡστε μὴ
δύνασθαι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ καθορῶν τάληθες. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅτι 
ἡμῖν δέδεκται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομεν ποσε καθαρῶς τι εἰσεῖσθαι,

Ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτὸν καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ
πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς οὔκεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν
τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἰναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὼν τελευτή-
σωμεν, ὡς ὃ λόγος σημαίνει, ζωῶν ὑπ’ οὕτω. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἴον
τε μετά τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυνώθαιρον,
ἡ οὐδαμῶν ἔστων κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσωσιν
tότε γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρίς τοῦ σώματος,
πρότερον δ’ οὐ. καὶ ἐν ὃ ἄν ζωῆς, οὕτως, ὡς οὔκεν,
ἐγγυντάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν
διμιλῶμεν τοῦ σώματος μηδὲ κοινωνώμεν, ὡς τι μὴ πάσα ἀνάγκη,
μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τοῦτος φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν
ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἔως ἄν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολογῇ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὕτω 
μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλασσόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς 
τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι’ ἡμῶν
αὐτῶν πάν τοῦ εἰλικρίνεια, τούτο δ’ ἐστίν ὅσοι τὸ ἄληθὲς·
μὴ καθαροὶ γὰρ καθαροὶ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἦ.”
τοιαῦτα οὗμαι, ὡς Σιμμία, ἀναγκαίον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους
λέγεων τε καὶ δοξάζων πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖσι. ἢ οὐ
δοκεί σοι οὕτως;

Παντὸς γε μᾶλλον, ὡς Σώκρατες.

Οὐκόν, ἐφὴ ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἄληθῆ, ὡς ἔταιρε,
πολλὰ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἱ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ικανῶς,

a 1 ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται B T: ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ B² W Plut. Iambl. 
b 4 τε B : om. T 
b 8 ἐκεῖ ικανῶς B : ικανῶς ἐκεῖ T W Olymp.
εἰπερ πον ἄλλοθι, κτήσαισαθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἦνeca ἡ πολλὴ
πραγματεία ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ἀφετε ἡ γε
ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος
γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ δὲ ἢ γείται οἱ παρεσκευάζουσι τὴν
dιάνοιαν ἄστερ κεκαθαρμένην.
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμάς.

Κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἄρα ὦ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζεων ὅτι μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τοῦ
σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν...παντα-
χόθεν έκ τοῦ σώματος σωματείος οἱ καὶ ἄθροιζεσθαι,
καὶ οἴκεων κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παράνυτα· καὶ ἐν τῷ
d ἐπείτα μόνην καθ' αὐτὴν, ἐκλυνομένην ἄστερ [ἐκ] δεσμῶν ἐκ
toύ σώματος;
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο γε θάνατος ὁμοιάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς

ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος;
Παντάπασι γε, ἡ δ' ὄς.

Λύσιν δὲ γε αὐτῶν, ὡς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται οἱ μᾶλλον
καὶ μονοὶ οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὄρθως, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ
tou'to ἐστὶ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς
ἀπὸ σώματος. ἡ οὖν;

Φαίνεται,
Οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἄρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν ἕλη ἄνδρα
e παρασκευάζομεν ἐαυτόν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὡντα τοῦ
tεθνάναι οὔτω ἐνην, καπεδώ ἕκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν;
Γελοίουν τῶσ οὖν;
Τῷ ὅτι ἄρα, ἐφη, ὡ Σιμμία, οἱ ὄρθως φιλοσοφοῦντες

ἀποβηθήσεται μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἕκοντα αὐτοὺς
ἀνθρώπων φοβερὸν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ δια-

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εἰ μοι Β: ἐμοί B'TW εἰς τὰ παρασκευάζοντα ΒΤ: παρασκευάζοντα

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Τιμίως φυσικώς B'tW ιαμβ. v. Pyth. ἐς γε μεταβηθήσεται· καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι έκοντα αὐτοὺς
ἀνθρώπων φοβερὸν. ἐκ τῶνδε δὲ σκόπει. εἰ γὰρ δια-

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B'TW Socraté tribuentes: in Ars. spatium septem litterarum
βέβληται μὲν πανταχή τῷ σώματι, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν, τούτου δὲ γιγομένου εἰ προβοῶτο καὶ ἄγανακτοίεν, οὐ πολλὴ ἀν ἄλογα ἐν, εἰ μὴ ἄσμενοι ἐκεῖστε ίοιεν, οἱ ἀφικομένοι ἐπλίσε ἐστών οὐ διὰ βίου ἡρων τυχεῖν—ήρων δὲ φρονήσεως—οὐ δειβεβλητο, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι σωόντος αὐτοῖς; ἡ ἀνθρωπίνως μὲν παιδικῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ νέων ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντες ἠθέλησαν εἰς "Αἰδοὺ μετέλθειν, ὑπὸ ταύτης ἀγόμενοι, τῆς 5 ἐλπίδος, τῆς τοῦ ὀφεσθαὶ τε ἐκεὶ δὲν ἐπεθύμουν καὶ συνέσθαι φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τοῖς τῷ ὄντι ἔρων, καὶ λαβῶν σφόδρα τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἐλπίδα, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι ἐνετεύξεσθαι αὐτῇ ἄξιός λόγου ἢ ἐν "Αἰδοὺ, ἄγανακτῆσει τα ἀποθνήσκων καὶ b οὐχ ἄσμενοι εἴσων αὐτός; ὀδεσθαὶ γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ᾗ, ὥ ἐταιρε, φιλόσοφος· σφόδρα γὰρ αὐτῷ ταύτα δόξει, μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι καθαρῶς ἐνετεύξεσθαι φρονήσει ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐκεὶ. εἰ δὲ τούτῳ οὕτως ἔχει, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, οὐ πολλὴ ἀν 5 ἄλογία εἰς εἰ φοβοῖντο τῶν θάνατον οὐ τοιοῦτος; Πολλὴ μὲντοι νὴ Δία, ἦ δ’ ὅσ.

Οὐκοίν ἰκανῶν σοι τεκμήριον, ἐφη, τούτῳ ἀνδρός, ὅτι ἄν ἕδης ἄγανακτούντα μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι, δι’ οὐκ ἄρ’ ἤν φιλόσοφος ἄλλα τις φιλοσόματος; ὁ αὐτός δὲ ποι c οὕτως τυγχάνει δὲν καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἤτοι τὰ ἑτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα.

Πάνω, ἐφη, ἔχει οὕτως ὡς λέγεις.

'Αρ’ οὖν, ἐφη, δ’ Συμμία, οὐ καὶ ἡ ὁνομαζομένη ἀνδρεία 5 τοῖς οὕτω διακεκμένοις μάλιστα προσήκει;

Πάντως δήπου, ἐφη.

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e8 ἔχειν BΤ et γρ. W: εἶναι W εἰ B: om. T a.4 καὶ ὅνεων ἡ παθῶν ἐνεκα Αρσ. δὴ om. Αρσ. a.5 μετέλθειν BΤ: ἐλθεῖν BWT a.6 τε Κ. τι B (in ras.) T W b.2 εἰσών BWT: οὔσει T γε οῇ Β Αρσ.: om. T W b.3 δόξει B: δόξει T b.4...θαμου ἄλλοθι.....θαρως φρονήσει ευ Αρσ.: γρ. ἄλλοθι δυνατὸν εἶναι καθαρῶς in marg. B (i.e. μηδαμοῦ ἄλλοθι δυνατὸν εἶναι καθαρῶς φρονήσει ενετεύξει) b.5 ἄλογα ἀν Αρσ. b.8 ἐφη τεκμήριον Αρσ. ἀνδρός et μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι om. ut vid. Αρσ. c.2... γχάνει φιλό... Αρσ. c.4 πάνω ΒΤ Stob.: πάνω γ’ W
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἤν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὄνομάζοντες σωφροσύνην, τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας μὴ ἐπτοῆσθαι ἄλλ' ὀλυγάρως ἔχειν καὶ κοσμίως, ἀρ' οὐ τούτοις μόνοις προσήκει, τοῖς μᾶλλον τοῦ σώματος ὀλυγαροσύνῃ τε καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶσιν;

5 'Ανάγκη, ἡφη. Ἐλ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἡ δ' ὁς, ἐνυώσαι τὴν γιὰ τῶν άλλων ἀνδρείαν τε καὶ σωφροσύνην, δόξει σοι εἰναι ἄτοπος. Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες;

10 Οἶσθα, ἡ δ' ὁς, ὅτι τῶν θάνατον ἱγοῦνται πάντες οἱ άλλοι τῶν μεγάλων κακῶν; Καὶ μάλ', ἡφη. Ὅμων φόβοι μειζόνων κακῶν ὑπομένουσιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀνδρείοι τῶν θάνατον, οὗται ὑπομένωσιν;

′Εστι ταῦτα. Τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δεῖ άνδρείοι εἰς πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι καίτοι ἀλογοῦν γε δεῖ τῳ καὶ δειλὰ ἀνδρείων εἰναι.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Τῷ δὲ οἱ κόσμιοι αὐτῶν; οὐ ταῦτα τοῦτο πεπόρθασιν ἀκολασίᾳ τωλ προφορές εἰσιν; καίτοι φαμέν γε ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁμοις αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τοῦτῳ ὁμοίῳ τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ ταύτῃ τὴν εὐθῆ σωφροσύνην φοβοῦμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθήναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦμετε ἐκείνων, ἀλλῶν ἀπέχουσιν ὑπ' ἀλλών καρατμοῦσι. καίτοι καλούσι γε ἀκολασίᾳ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀρχεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ὁμοίς συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς κρατουμένοι ὑπ' ἡδονῶν καρατεῖν ἀλλῶν ἡδονῶν.

69 οὐ εἰς τοὺς οἰκίους οὐδὲν οὐ συμβαίνειν οὐ τοῖς οἰκίους καρατεῖν.
"Εσωκε γάρ.

"Ο μακάριε Σεμεία, μή γάρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθή πρὸς ἄρετὴν ἁλλὰ ἡ, ἥδονα πρὸς ἥδονα καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβου πρὸς φόβου καταλλάττεσθαι, [καὶ] μεῖον πρὸς ἐλάστῳ ὁσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνον μόνον τὸ ὠμόσιμα ὀρθὸν, αὖτι οὐ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρονήμασιν,

[καὶ τούτῳ μὲν πάντα] καὶ μετὰ τούτῳ [ἀνοιμεῖα τε καὶ πιπρασκευα] τῷ ὄρετῳ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ συλληβδήν ἁλληθῆς ἄρετῆς, μετὰ φρονεῖσθαις, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων χωρίζομενα δὲ φρονήμασιν [καὶ] ἀλλατήμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μη-σκια-γραφία τις-ὃ ἡ τοιαύτη ἄρετή καὶ τῷ ὄρετῳ ἀνδροποδώδι τοιούτως τε καὶ <οὐδεν> γυνὲς οὐδ' ἄλληθες ἔχει· τὸ δ' ἄλληθες· τῷ ὄρετῇ ἢ κάθαρσις· τις· τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὕτη ἡ φρονήσεις μὴ καθαρμός τις· ἢ καὶ κινδυνεύοντα καὶ οἱ τὰς τελείας· ἦμικ οὖντο καταστήσατε ὃ ὁ πάλαι· ἀνίψτις· ὃς· ἢν· ἀμύσις· καὶ ἀπέλεστος· εἰς· Αἰδοὺ ἄφακτα· ἐν· βορβόρῳ· κειστατό· δὲ· κεκαθαρμένω· τε καὶ τετελεσμένω· ἕκεισε· ἀφικόμενος· μετα· τεθεόν· οὐκ·

eis tôn γὰρ δὴ, [ὅσ'] φασίν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελείας, "ναρβηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκγοι δὲ τε παύρου" οὖν τε ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀθηνὴ δόξαν οὐκ άλλοι η ἡ σεφιλοσοφίκτας ὀρθῶς. ὡς δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γάρ το πλατωνικὸν απελίτου· εὖ· τῷ βίῳ


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5 προθυμήσει καὶ τὸ ἡγματερὶ, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ σαφὲς εἴσομεθα, ἓν θεὸς ἐθέλη, ὅλουν ὥστεν, ὡς ἐμοῖ δεκεί. 

ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐγὼ, ἐφ’ ὦ Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπολογοῦμαι ὡς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε δεσπότας οὖν 

χαλεπῶς φέρω οὖν ἀγαπατὼ, ἠγούμενος κακεὶ οὖθεν ἢττον ἡ ἐνθάδε δεσπόταις τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντευκοείσθαι καὶ ἐταῖροις [τοῖς ὑπὸ πολλοῖς ἀπιστῶν παρέχει]. εἶ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερος εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ τῇ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὐ ἂν ἔχω.

5 Ἐπίοντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα, ὑπολαβαὶ δὲ Κέβης ἐφὴ ὦ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ ἐμοῖ γενέσθαι, τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίᾳ παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μὴ, ἐπειδῶν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, ὦδαμοι ἐτί, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἁμέρᾳ διαφθειρητὰ τε καὶ ἀπολυτῆται ἢ ἂν ἄνθρωπος ἀποθετήσῃ, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομεῖν τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐκβάλοντο

5 ὁστρ πνεῦμα ἡ κατόσι διασκεδασθεὶσα οἶχθα διαπομεῖναι καὶ οὖθεν ἐτί οὐδαμοῦ ἢ. ἐπεῖ, εἰπερ εἴ θαν αὐτῇ καθ ἀυτὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ ἀπαλλαγῆνε τῶν κακῶν ὁ ὡς πνεῦμα διαθὲς, πολλὴ ἂν εἰπές καὶ καλῆ, ὡ

b Σωκράτης, ὡς ἀλήθη ἔστω ὁ ὑπὸ λέγεις. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ ἢ ὅς ὁ δή λέγην παραμυθίας θεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ψυχῆ ἀποθανοῦτος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ των δύσων ἕχει καὶ φύυνων.

5 ἀλήθη, ἐφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὁ Κέβης ἀλλὰ τῇ δὴ ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τοῦτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἰς eἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἶτε μή;
'Ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἐφή ὁ Κέβης, ἣδεως ἀν ἀκούσαιμι ἣντινα
dόξαν ἐχεις περὶ αὐτῶν.

Οὕκως γ’ ἀν οἶμαι, ἢ δ’ ὅς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν των νῦν
ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ’ ei καμῳδοτοῖς εἶχ’ ὡς ἀδολεσχ’ καὶ ὅθ’
περὶ προσηκούντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ ὁνὶ δοκεῖ, χρή
διασκοπεῖσθαι.

Σκεψόμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ-τῆς πη, εἰτ’ ἀρα ἐν ἈΙδοὺ εἰσὶν ἀι
ψυχαι τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔτε καὶ οὐ. παλαιὸς
μὲν οὖν ἕστι τις λόγος οὗ μεμψήμεθα, ὁς εἰσὶν ἐνθέντε
ἀφίκόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν ἑς δἐντο ἀφικνοῦται καὶ γί-
νουται ἐκ τῶν τεθεωσάντων καὶ εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἐχεῖ, πάλιν
γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἀλλο τι ἢ ἐξεν
ἀν αἱ ψυχαι ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποὺ πάλιν ἐγίγνυτο μὴ
οὗσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ’ εἴπω, εἰ τῷ
ἀντὶ φανεροῦ γίγνοιτο ὅτι ὅδιαμοδέθη ἀλλοθεν γίγνεται οἱ
ζῶτες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθεωσάντων· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἀλλον ἂν
του δεός λόγου.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφή ὁ Κέβης.

Μὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ δ’ ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ
βούλει βαρὸν μαθέων, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῶν πάντων καὶ
ψυχῶν, καὶ συλλογῇ δισταρεῖ ἔχει γέμεστην περὶ πάντων
καὶ ὑιομεν ἀρ’ οὕτως γίγνεται πάντα, οὐκ ἀλλοθεν εἰ ἐκ τῶν
ἐναυτῶν τα ἐναυτίας ὅσοι τυχάναι δι’ τούτοις τιο>ορὸν τὸ
καλὸν τῷ ἀλογοῦ ἐναυτίου τοῦ καὶ δικαιοῦ ἀδίκει, καὶ ἀλλὰ
ἡ μυρὰ ὑιοῦσας ἐχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψόμεθα, ἀρα ἀναγκαῖον
ὅσοι ἐστι τι ἐναυτίου, ἡμιδαμόθεν ἀλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι
καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐναυτίου. οἰον ὅσοι μεῖκνων τις γίγνεται,
ἀνάγκη που εἰς ἐλαττονὸς ὡς τοϋς προτέρους ἐπείτη μεῖζον
γίγνεσθαι;

b 8 ἐγγύες οὖν B : ἐγγύεις Τ : ἐγγύων Ο : ἐγγύων W  εἰ καμῳδοτοῖς pr.
T (ut vid.) W : καμῳδοτοῖς Bt e4 δὲ B : om. T  εἰς λόγος
B : δ λόγος οὗτος Β’ Τ’ Οlymp. : λόγος οὗτος Stob.  δ i αἱ
ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν B : ἡμῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ TW Stob.  δ g γίγνοιτο Β’
Τ’ W Stob.  d 8 βαν B Stob. : βανον TW  εἰ θαμμεν
Olymp. Stob. : εἶδομεν B TW  οὕτως W  πάντα Β’
ε 5 ἐστιν T ΒΤ Stob. : ἐστιν W  εἰδέ έπαινετα W

7*
Ναί.

10 Οὐδεὶς κἂν ἐλαττον γλύπτηται, ἐκ μείζονος οὗτος πρῶτον

71 ἔστερον ἐλαττον γενήσεται;

Εστίν οὖτω, ἐφη.

Καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἁγχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βρα-

dυτέρου τὸ θάττου;

5 Πάνω γε.

Τί δέ; ἀν τι χείρον γλύπτηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἁμείωνοις, καὶ ἂν

dικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικιστέρου;

Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;  

Ἡκαῦσι οὖν, ἐφη, ἔχομεν τὸντο, ὅτι πάντα οὖτω γίγνεται,

10 εξ ἑναυτῶν τὰ ἑναυτὶα πράγματα;

Πάνω γε.

Τί δ' αὖ; ἐστι τι καὶ τοιώθη ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷν μεταξὺ

ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἑναυτῶν δυούς οὗτοι δύο γενέσεις,  

b ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἔτερου ἐπὶ τὸ ἔτερον, ἀπὸ δ' αὖ τοῦ ἔτερου  

πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔτερον μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος  

μεταξὺ αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὖτω τὸ μὲν αὐξά-

νεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν;

5 Ναί, ἐφη.

Οὐδεὶς καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψυχεῖσθαι  

καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὖτω, καὶ εἴ μὴ χρωμεθα τοῖς  

ἀνόμασιν ἑσπερίνοις, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ γρόνῳ πανταχῶ οὕτως ἔχειν  

ἀναγκαίον, γίγνεσθαι τε αὐτὰ εξ ἀλλήλων γένεσιν τε εἶναι

10 ἐκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς.

3 Τί οὖν; ἐφη, τῷ ξῆν ἐστί τι ἑναυτίον, ὡςπερ τῷ  

ἐγγυθορέαι τὸ καθεύδειν;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

Τί;

a 2 οὖτω ἐφη Β: ἐφη οὖτω Τ W Stob.  

a 3 γε Τ Olymp. Stob.:  

om. B  

a 7 ξι ΒΤ: οὐκ ἐξ Τ W Stob.  

a 12 ἐστι Τ ΒΤ: ἐστιν  

ἐτι Β²: ἐστὶ W  

b 2 μὲν Β: γάρ Τ: μὲν γάρ Β² W Olymp.  

b 10 ἐκατέρου Τ: ἐξ ἐκατέρου Β W  

b 11 μὲν οὖν Β: γέ Τ W
Τὸ τεθνάμαι, ἐφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἔξις ἀλλήλων τε γίνονται ταῦτα, εἰπερ ἐναυτία ἔστω, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖς μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὀντῶν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Τὴν μὲν τοῖνυν ἐτέραν συνυγίαν ὡς υπωδὴ ἔλεγον ἐγὼ σοι, ἐφη, ἔρω, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις; σὺ 10 δὲ μοι τὴν ἐτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέαν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγοροῦναι γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγοροῦναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν δὲ τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἰναι, τὴν δὲ ἀνεγερθήσαι. ἦκανός σοι, ἐφη, ἡ οὐ;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Δέγε δὴ μοι καὶ σοῦ, ἐφη, οὗτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. 5 οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φης τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάμαι εἰναι;

'Εγγενε. 9

Γίνεσθαι δὲ ἔξις ἀλλήλων;

Ναι.

'Eex oûn tou ȥοντος τὶ τὸ γιγμόμενον;

Τὸ τεθνηκός, ἐφη.

Τὰ δε, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος;

'Αναγκαίον, ἐφη, ὄμολογεὶν ὃτι τὸ ζῶν. 15

Εἰκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντα τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες γίνονται;

Φαίνεται, ἐφη.

Εἰςίν ἄρα, ἐφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν εἰς 'Αἰδον.

'Εοικεν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦν γενεσεόν των περὶ ταῦτα ἢ γ' ἐτέρα σαφῆς οὖσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθυμήσκειν σαφῆς δῆπον, 5 ἡ οὖ;' 7

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

Πῶς οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσωμεν τὴν

7 αὐτῶν B Stob.: αὐτῶν Τ οί ἐγρηγορεῶν... 12 καθεύδειν
71

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ἐναντίαι γένεσιν, ἄλλα ταύτη χωλή ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀνάγκη

10 ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθητικῶν ἐναντίαι τινά γένεσιν;

Πάντως του, ἐφη.
Τέρα ταύτην;
Τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι.

Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, ἐπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν

72 τεθνεῶτων ἂν εἰς γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας, αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι;

Πάνυ γε.

Ὀμολογεῖται ἂρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν

5 τεθνεῶτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἑτοῦν ἡ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν

ζῶντων, τοῦτον δὲ ὄντος ἱκανὸν ποὺ ἑδόκει τεκμηρίων εἶναι

ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεῶτων ψυχὰς εἶναι ποὺ, οθεὶν ὅτι

πάλιν γίνεσθαι.

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἐφη, ὡς Σῶκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογημένων

10 ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.

' Ἡδὲ τούμν οὕτως, ἐφη, ὡς Κέβης, ὃτι οὖ' ἀδίκως ὀμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἔμοι δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἂξι ἀνταποδῶσθη 

b τὰ ἔτερα τοῖς ἔτεροις γεγομένα, ὠσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιόντα, ἀλλ’

ἐιθείᾳ τις εἰς ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἔτερου μόνον εἰς τὸ κατανττικρύ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἔτερον μηδὲ καμπτή

pοιοῖτο, οἴσθ’ ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἀν σχῆν

5 καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ πάσαστα γεγομένα;

Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφη.

Οὐδὲν χαλεπῶν, ἡ δ’ ὅσ, ἐννοήσαι δ’ λέγω: ἄλλ’ οὖν εἰ 

tὸ καταδραθάνειν μὲν εἰς, τὸ δ’ ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδὸν 

gεγομένου ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἴσθ’ ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ

c ἄν’ λήρον τοῦ Ἐρδυμώνα ἀποδέξεις καὶ ὀδαμοῦ ἂν 

φαύνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ταῦτα ἑκέλου πεποιθήναι;

καθεύδεις. κἀν εἰ συγκρύνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρινόντα δὲ

a 4 ἢμ ΒΤ Stob. : ἢμ ἢμα W a 5 ἔδοκε B Stob. : om. T

a 11 οὕτως B : om. TW b 4 ποιοῖτο B : ποιοῖ T b 7 ἐννοήσαι 

B TW : ἐννοήσεσιν B b 9 πάντ’ ἃν Bekker: πάντα BT W

c 3 διακρινότα T: διακρινοῦντα B W
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

μή, ταύτα διν τοῦ 'Αναξαγόρου γεγονός εἶ, "'Ομοί πάντα
χρήματα." δωσάτος δέ, ὃ φίλε Κέβης, καὶ εἶ ἀποθηγμένοι
5
μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζην μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδή δὲ ἀποθάνει,
μένου ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνήτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν
ἀναβιώσκετο, ἄρι οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα
tεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζήν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀλλών τὰ ἀ
cώτα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ κώτα θυσίαν, τὰς μηχανὰς μὴ οὐχὶ
pάντα καταναλώθηναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι;

Οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφῆ οἱ Κέβης, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μοι
dοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

"Εστώ γάρ, ἐφῆ, ὁ Κέβης, ὃς ὡς δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον
οὕτω, καὶ ἢμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὅν ἔχατομένοι, ὁμολογοῦμεν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώ-
tων τοὺς κώτας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς
ἐίναι [καὶ ταῖς μὲν γε ἀγαθαῖς ἁμένων εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακῶις e
κάκιοι].

Καὶ μὴν, ἐφῆ ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον γε
τῶν λόγων, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἐστώ, δν σοὶ εἰδὼς
θαμδὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἢμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἀνάμμησις
5
tυγχάνει οὕσα, καὶ κατὰ τούτον ἀνάγκη ποὺ ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ
tων χρόνω μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμμηνεύσκεμα. τοῦτο δὲ
ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἢν ποὺ ἢμῖν ἡ ψυχῇ πρὶν ἐν τῶδε τῷ ἄν-
73
θρωπίῳ εἰδεὶ γενέσθαι: ὡστε καὶ ταῦτῃ ἀδύνατον ἡ ψυχῇ
ti ἐξικεν εἶναι.

Ἀλλὰ, ὁ Κέβης, ἐφῆ ὁ Σωμίας ὑπολαβών, ποιοῦ τούτων
αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησθον μεν; οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι
5
μεμνημέναι.

Εἰπὲ μὲν λόγῳ, ἐφῆ ὁ Κέβης, καλλιστῷ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι
οἱ ἀνθρώποι, εάν τις καλῶς ἔρωτα, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ἡ
ἐχεῖ—καὶ τούτῳ εἰ μὴ εὐγενεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμην ἐνοῦσα καὶ
5 μεμημάζειν.

ορθὸς λόγος, οὗ καὶ (οἷος τ’ ἦσαν) τοῦτο ποιήσαι—ἐπετα
ἔαν τις ἔτι τὰ διαγράμματα ἁγη ἢ άλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων,
ἔνα τὰ σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει.
Εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτης γε, ἐφὶ, πείθη, ὃ Σύμμια, ὃ Σωκράτης,
σκέψαι ἂν τίδε πῇ σοι σκοποῦμεν πύωδὲς. ἀποστεῖ τὰ
ὅτι πώς ἢ καλομένη μάθησις ἀνάμειναις ἄστιν;
Ἀπιστῶ μὲν [τοι] εὐγενεῖ, ὡ δ’ ὡς ὃ Σωκράτης, ὃς, αὐτὸ δὲ
tούτῳ, ἐφὶ, δεομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ δὸ λόγος, ἀναμψεῖθι
καὶ σχεδόν γε, εἰς ἄν Κέφις ἀπεδείξομαι λέγειν ἡδὴ μεμιμημα
καὶ πεθομαι μοι μενταν ἥττον ἀκούομι νῦν πῇ σοῦ ἐπ-
10 εξειρθομεὶς λέγειν.
Τὸ τ’ ἐγγενέ, ὡ δ’ ὡς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δῆπος, εἰ τίς τι
ἀναμψεῖθητασται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρὸτερον ποτε ἐπιστασθαί.
Πάντ’ ἓ, ἐφὶ.
Ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παρα-
γίγνεται τρόπῳ τουρίτῳ, ἀναμψεῖν εἰναὶ; λέγω δὲ τίνα
τρόπον; τότε, εἰάν τις τι ἐτερον ἢ ἴδων ἢ ἀκούσας ἢ τίνα
ἀλλήν αἰσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκείνον γνῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἐτερον ἐμπόρησαν οὐ μὴ ἢ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ’ ἄλλη, ἀρὰ
οὕτω τούτῳ δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀειμνήσθη, οὐ τὴν ἐννοιαν
d ἐλάβειν;
Πὼς λέγεις;
1 Oλον τὰ τουάδε’ ἄλλη πού ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας.
Πὼς γὰρ οὐ;
5 Οὐκοῦν οἴσθα ὅτι οἱ ἔρασται, ὅταν ἢσσοίνυ λύραν ἢ ἑμάτιον
ἡ ἄλλο τι οἰς τὰ ταυδίκα αὐτῶν ἐώθη κρίσθαι, πᾶρχομαι
tοῦτο. ἐγυρσάν τι τὴν λύραν καὶ τῇ διανοιᾳ ἐλαβοῦ τὸ

a) to poišeis Hirschig: poišeis B: poišeis T W b 4 soi T W: soi
δι B (sed av punct. not.) b 6 soi B: om. T W b 7 pasei
Heindorf: mabex B T W b 9 main’ av B W: senv ἢ ι θ B T: σὲ τῇ B W c i t’ B T: τὶ δὲ T c 6 tɔδε B:
touton T etepo T: prōtebor B Olymp. h (post etebor) B Olymp.:
ti T c 9 λέγομεν T W: elégomene B d 6 ἄλλο τι B: ti
9αλλο T
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παιδὸς οὐ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δὲ ἔστω ἀνάμνησις:

ὁσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμᾶν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμώνησθη,

καὶ ἀλλὰ που μυρία τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη.

Μυρία μέντοι νη Δία, ἐφι ο Σιμμᾶς.

Οὔκοιν, ὡς ὁ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησις τίς ἔστι; μάλιστα ε

μέντοι ὅταν τις τούτο πάθη περὶ ἕκεινα ἡ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ

μη ἐπισκοπεῖν ἦδη ἑπελέξηστο;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη.

Τῇ δὲ; ὡς ὁ: ἔστω ἱππὸν γεγραμμένον ἱδόντα καὶ 5

λόραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθήναι, καὶ Σιμμᾶν

ἱδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθήναι;

Πάνυ γε.

Οὔκοιν καὶ Σιμμᾶν ἱδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτῷ Σιμμᾶν

ἀναμνησθήναι;

"Εστὶ μέντοι, ἐφη.

"Αρ' οὖν οὐκ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα, συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν

έιναι μὲν ἀρ' ὅμοιων, εἴναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων;

Συμβαίνει.

"Αλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὅμοιων ἀναμμηνήσκεται τῖς τι, ἀρ' 5

οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐνδείκνυσθε ἐπὶ τί ἐλείπει

to to kata τὴν ὅμοιότητα εἴπε μὴ ἐκείνου οὐ ἀναμμηνήσθη;

"Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη.

Σκόπει δὴ, ὡς ὁ οὐ, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν ποι τι

εἴναι ἵσον, οὐ ἔξω λέγω ἔξω οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ σοῦ ἂν 10

tω τοιοῦτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἑτέρον τι, αὐτὸ

to τι ἵσον· φαμέν τι εἰναι τὴν μηδὲν;

Φῶμεν μέντοι χ' Δῆ', ἐφη δ Σιμμᾶς, θαναμαστός γε. b

"Η καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτό δ ἔστων;

Πάνυ γε, ὡς ὁ ὅς.

Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτὸν τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἀρ' οὐκ ἔξ ἐν

μυθῆ ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἔξω η λίθους η ἠλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες 5

b. 9 9. B'TW: om. B 9 αὐτοῦ B: α ὁ τοῦ Τ a io ἀλλο

BT: ἀλλα τι B'TW a 11 ταῦτα πάντα B: πάντα ταῦτα TW

a 12 το B'TW: τε B b 1 μέντοι B: τοιχυν Τ b 2 ἐστιν ΒΤ: 6 ἰσον W: ἰσον in marg. B'Tw
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

ίσα, ἐκ τοῦτων ἐκείνο ἐνενοθήσαμεν, ἐτερον δὲ τούτων; ἢ
οὐχ ἐτερόν σοι φαίνεται; οὐκοπεὶ δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἄρ' οὖν λίθοι
μὲν ἰσοί καὶ ἥλα γενίτες ταύτα ὅτα τοῖς μὲν ἰσα φαίνεται,
τῷ δ' οὖν;

10 Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

t' δὲ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἵσα ἐστίν ὅτε ἀνισά σοι ἑφάνη, ἢ ἢ ἰσοτής
ἀνισότης;

'Ουδεποτέ γε, ὁ Σάκρατες.

Οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ὑστίν, ἢ δ' ὅσ, ταὐτὰ τε τὰ ἵσα καὶ αὐτὸ

5 τὸ ἴσου.

'Ουδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὁ Σάκρατες.

'Αλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τοῦτων γ', ἔφη, τῶν ἰσων, ἐτέρων ὄντων

ἐκείνων τοῦ ἵσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννοηκάς τε
καὶ ἐλπίδας;

10 'Αληθεύτατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίων ὄντως τούτως ἢ ἀνυμοίῳ;

Πάνω γε.

Διαφέρει δὲ γε, ἢ δ' ὅσ, οὐδένων ἔσω ἀν ἄλλο ἰδῶν, ἀπὸ

tαὐτής τῆς ὑμεῖς ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὁμοῖον εἴτε ἀνύμοιον,
ἀναγκαίον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι.

Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Τί δὲ; ἢ δ' ὅσ' ἢ πάσχουμεν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τα ἐν τοῖς

5 εἴλοις τε καὶ οὐς νυν δὴ ἑλέγομεν τοῖς ἵσοις; ἄρα φαίνεται

ἡμῖν οὕτως ἵσα εἶναι ὅσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ἶσον, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι

ἐκείνων τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἰσον, ἢ οὐδέν;

Καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεί.

Οὐκοῦν ὁμολογούμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδῶν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βού-

10 λεται μὲν τοῦτο δ' οὖν ἐγὼ ὅρω εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων,

ε ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὗ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι [Ἰσον] οἷον ἑκείνου, ἄλλ'
"Εστιν φαυλότερος, ἀναγκαῖον πον τὸν τούτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκείνῳ ὅ φησιν αὐτὸ προσευκέει, μὲν, ἑνδεικτέρως δὲ ἔχειν;

'Ἀνάγκη.

Τῇ οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ὅ ὅπερ τε τὰ Ισα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ Ἰσοῦ;

Παντάπασι γε.

'Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδότα, τὸ Ἰσοῦ πρὸ ἐκεῖνον τοῦ χρόνου οὔτε τὸ πρῶτον ἢ οὔτε τὰ Ἰσα, ἑννοοῦσαμεν ὅτι δρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταύτα, εἶναι οἶον τὸ Ἰσοῦν, ἐχεῖ δὲ ἑνδεικτέρως.

"Εστι ταύτα.

'Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐν- νευομέναι, μὴδὲ δυνατὸν εἰναὶ ἑννοοῖ τὰ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἱδείων ἡ ἀναφέρει ἡ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλής τῶν αἰσθήσεων ταύταν δὲ πάντα ταύτα λέγειν.

Ταύταν γὰρ ἔστων, ὁ Σωκρατες, πρὸς γε ὁ βουλείται δηλώσαι ὁ λόγος.

'Ἀλλὰ μὲν ὅτι ἐκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἑννοοῖ τοῖς πάντα ταῖς ἀλλής τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐκείνου τοῦ δὲ ἐστιν ἤτοι, καὶ αὐτῶν ἑνδείκτερα ἐστὶν ἡ πᾶς λέγομεν;

Οὕτως.

Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἀρξασθαι ἡμᾶς, ὅρων καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τῶν αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν εἰς τὸν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἰσοῦν ὅτι ἔστων, εἰ ἐμπληλοῦμεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἤτοι ἡμεῖς ἀνοίξων, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαύτη, εἶναι οἶον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστων δὲ αὐτοῦ φαύλοτερα.

'Ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειδότων, ὁ Σωκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἐσωρώμεν τε καὶ ἡκούμεν, καὶ τὸς ἂλλος αἰσθήσεις εἰχόμεν;

Πάνω γε.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

75 c

"Εδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τοῦ τῶν τὴν τοῦ ἵσου ἑπιστήμην εἰληφέναι;  
Ναὶ.

Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἁρα, ὡς έοικεν, ἀνάγκῃ ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι.

*Έοικεν.

Οὐκόν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἑγενόμεθα, ἢπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εἴθος γενόμενοι οὐ μόνον τὸ ἱσον καὶ τὸ μεῖζον καὶ τὸ ἐλαττὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἱσον νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὅσιον καὶ ὀπερ λέγω, περὶ ἀπάντων ὡς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τὸ "αὐτὸ ἡ ἐστὶ" καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἑρωτώταις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεως ἀποκριόμενοι. ἔστε ἀναγκαῖοι ἡμῖν τοὺς πάντων πάντων τὰς ἑπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι.

*Εστὶ ταῦτα.

Καὶ εἰ μὲν γε λαβόντες, ἐκάστοτε μὴ ἐπιλεξήσεθαμεν, εἰδότας ἢν γλυῖσθαι καὶ ἢν διὰ βίου εἰδέναι: τὸ γὰρ εἰδεναι τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν, λαβόντα τὴν ἑπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολογλεκέναι: ἦσαν οὗ τοῦτο λήθην λέγουμεν, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης, ἐπιστήμης ἀποθελόντα εἰς Πάντων δήποτε, ἐφη, ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης.

Εἰ δὲ γε οἶμαι, λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γινόμενοι ἀπολείπαμεν, ὡστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν χρωμένοι περὶ αὐτὰ ἔκέλυον ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἑπιστήμας ὡς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν, ἡρὴν, οὗ νῦν καλοὶ οἱ μαθήματι εἰκέλαιν ἄν ἑπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὲ ποιοὶ ἀναμιμήσκεσθαι λέγουν ὀρθῶς ἄν λέγουμεν.

Πάντων γε.
Δυστυχώς γὰρ ἡ τούτῳ γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθάμενόν τι ἢ ἴδοντα 76 ἡ ἀκόουσαντα τι των ἀλλήν αἰσθησὶς λαβόντα, ἔτερον τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαν ὅ ἐπελέληστο, ὁ τούτο ἐπιθυμάτευεν ἀνόμων ὃν ἢ ὃς ὢντων ὡστε, ὅπερ λέγε, δυσῶν θάτερα, ἦτοι ἐπι-
τάμενοι γε αὐτά γεγονάμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, 5 ἡ ὑστέρον, οὐς φαμεν μανθάνεις, οὔδεν ἀλλ' ἡ ἀναμνή-
σκοῦται οὕτω, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀναμνήσις διὰ εἰς.
Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς Σώκρατες.
Πότερον οὖν αἱρῆ, ὡς Συμμία; ἐπιστάμενοι ἡμᾶς γεγο-
νέαν, ἡ ἀναμνήσκεσθαι ὑστέρον ὃν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην ἢ
εἶληφότες ἤμεν; εἰς
Ὡς ἔχω, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐλέσθωι.
Τὰ δὲ; τὸδε ἔχεις ἐλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ
[ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος] περὶ δὲν ἐπιστᾶται] ἔχοι δὲν δοῦναι λόγον 5 ἢ
ὤ;
Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες.
" hWnd αἰσθάμενόν τι ἢ ἴδοντα, ἠλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον 10
φοβοῦμαι μή ἀπορεῖς την καθηκόντις ὑπερέτει ἢ ἀνθρώπων οὔδεις
αἷῶν οἷος τοῦτο πηνήσαι.
Ὡς ἀρά δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπιστάσθαι γε, ἔφη, ὡς Συμμία, c
πάντες αὐτά;
Οὐδαμῶς.
'Αναμνήσκοιται ἄρα καὶ ποτὲ ἔμαθον;
'Ανάγκη.
Πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ
γὰρ δὴ ἢ φ' οὐ γε ἀνθρώποι γεγονάμεν.
Οὐ δήτα.
Πρότερον ἄρα.
Ναί.
*Ἡσαν ἄρα, ὥς Σμιμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἶδει, χαρίς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον.

Εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἀμα γιγνώμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὃς Σώκρατες, 15 ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λειτεπτα ἔτι χρόνος.

δ) Εἶπεν, ὃ ἐταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν πολὺς ἄλλος χρόνος;—οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐχουσίτε γε αὐτὰς γιγνώμεθα, ἀστρὶ ὁμολογήσαμεν—ἡ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ὑπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν; ἡ ἐχεις ἀλλον τινὰ ἐπειτε χρόνον;

5 Οὐδαμῶς, ὃς Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἐλαθοῦν ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἶπον.

'Ἀρ' οὖν οὗτοι ἔχει, ἐφη, ἡμῖν, ὃς Σμιμία; εἰ μὲν ἐστιν ἀ θρυλούμεν αές, καλὸν τε τι καὶ ἁγαθὸν καὶ πάσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, ύπάρχονσαν πρότερον ἀνεφράκτους ἡμετέρας ὦσιν, καὶ ταύτα ἐκείνη ἀπεικάσομεν, ἀναγκαίον, οὗτοι ὡσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἑστών, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐστιν ταύτα, ἀλλίως ἄν ὁ λόγος 5 ὦσι τοιομένοις εἶπ' ἀρ' οὗτοι ἔχει, καὶ ἠτα ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε;

Ταπερφῶς, ὃς Σώκρατες, ἐφη ὅς Σμιμίας, δοκεὶ μοι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καλὸς καὶ καλὸς ἅγαθὸς καὶ ἀναταφετεῡ δ λόγος εἰς τὸν οὐσιον εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἴνα σὺ νῦν λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔσωθεν οὕτως οὗτοι εἴρησας ὅτι τοῦτο, τὸ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα εἶναι ὡς οἷόν τε καὶ ἁγαθὸν καὶ τὰλλα πάντα 5 καὶ νῦν ἐλέγεν· καὶ ἐμοιγε δοκεὶ ἰκάρως ἀποδεδείκται.

Τι δὲ δὴ Κέβητι; ἐφη ὃς Σωκράτης· δεῖ γὰρ καὶ Κέβητα πείθειν·

'Ικάνος, ἐφη ὃς Σμιμίας, ὅσ ἔγωγε οὕμα· καὶ δοκεῖς καταφετεύ̄ τὴν οὐσίαν.
οιμαί ούκ ἐνδείξω τούτῳ πεπείσθαί αὐτοῦ, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἡν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή; εἰ μὲντοι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν b ἐγὼ ἔσται, οὐδὲ αὐτῷ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφι, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀποδεδειχθαί, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐνεσθήκην ὁ νυνὶ Ἐκήσης ἔλεγε, τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ὅπως μὴ ἁμα ἀποθησκοῦντο τὸν ἀνθρώπου διασκεδάζεται ἡ ψυχή καὶ αὐτῇ τοῦ εἶναι τοῦ τέλους. ἦ, τι 5 γὰρ κολύει γίγνεσθαι μεν αὐτὴν καὶ συνισταθήθη ἄλλοθεν ποθήν καὶ εἶναι πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπων ὁμάδα ἀφικέσθαι, ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἄφικται καὶ ἀπαλλάττηται τούτῳ, τότε καὶ αὐτὴν τελευτάτῳ καὶ διαφθείρεσθαι;

Εὗ λέγεις, ἐφη, ὁ Σμμίλα, ὁ Κέβης. φαίνεται γὰρ c ὁσπερ ἡμιν ἀποδεδειχθαί οὐ δεί, ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς ἡν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή, οὐδὲ δὲ προσαποδείχθαί ὁτι καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν οὗδ' εἶτον ἐσται ἡ πρὶν γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τέλος ἡ ἀποδείξεις ἐξείλω.

Ἀποδεδεικται μὲν, ἐφη, ὁ Σμμίλα τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ θέλετε συνθείναι τούτων τε τῶν λόγων εἰς ταῦταν καὶ ὑπό τούτου ὁμολογήσαμεν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι πάν τοῦ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεώτος. εἰ γὰρ ἐστιν μὲν ἡ ψυχή καὶ πρῶτου, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἀιώνη τε d καὶ γιγαντιάν, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἡ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνήνα γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὖν ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπεἰδή γε δεὶ αὕτης αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; ἀποδεδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγεται καὶ νῦν. οὕτως δὲ μοι δοκεῖς 5 οὗ τε καὶ Σμμίλαις ἢδεως ἂν καὶ τούτων διαπραγματεύσασθαι τῶν λόγων εἴτε μᾶλλον, καὶ δεδινεῖα τοῖς παῖδοις, μη δος ἄλθος ὁ ἄνεμος αὐτὴν ἐκβαινοῦσαν ἐκ τοῦ σῶματος δια-

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a 9 ἐστιν ...

om. pr. W ὁ σώκρατες ἐφη T b 4 ἀμα B'TW; om. B διασκεδασφόται Matthiae b 6 ἀμόθεν Bekker: άλλοθεν B'TW c 3 δει B: δείν T ὃτι B: ἐτί eti T (el s.v.) W c 5 ἔσεν B c 9 μὲν B: om. TW d 2 καὶ B: τε καὶ en T d 3 αὐτὴν Tb: αὐτῇ B (ut vid.) W d 4 γε B: δε'T sed punct. not. αὐτὴν ἀδῆς W d 5 λέγει Par. 1811: λέγεται B TW
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ε. φυσά καὶ διασκεδάζων, ἀλλως τε καὶ ὅταν τύχῃ τις μη ἐν

γνέμια ἀλλ’ ἐν μεγάλῳ τινὶ πνεύματι ἀποθυμησκών.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγελάσας, ὡς δειδότων, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὅ

πειρῶ ἀναπείθεων μᾶλλον δὲ μη ὦς ημῶν δειδότων, ἀλλ’

ἰσως ἐν τις καὶ ἐν ημῖν παῖς ὥστε τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται.

tοῦτον οὖν πειρῶ μεταπείθεων μη δεδειναι τὸν θάνατον ἀστερ

tὰ μορμολυκεία.

'Αλλὰ χρῆ, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἐπάδεω αὐτῷ ἐκάστης ἤμερας

ἐώς ἄν ἐξεπάνημε.

78 Πόθεν οὖν, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, τῶν τοιοῦτων ἁγαθῶν ἐπιθῶν.

λησάμεθα, ἐπειδὴ οὕ, ἐφη, ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπεις;

Πολλῇ μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ἐν ἥ ἐνείσι ποὺ

ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη, οἷς

πάντας χρῆ διερεύνατε ἃτεύντας τοιοῦτον ἐπιθῶν, μήτε

χρημάτων φειδομένων μήτε πόνων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστων εἷς ὦν

ἀν εὐκαίριοτερον ἀναλάβοιτε χρήματα. ζητεῖν δὲ χρῆ καὶ

αὐτοὺς μετ’ ἀλλήλων ἰσως γὰρ ἄν οὐδὲ βαδίως ἐνροίο

μᾶλλον ἦμῶν δυναμεύον τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

10 Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὦ, ἐφη, ὑπάρξει, ὁ Κέβης· οὲν δὲ

ἀπελεύσομεν ἐπανελθομεν, εἴ συν ἡδομένων ἐστῶν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡδομένῳ γε’ πᾶς γὰρ οὖ μέλλει; Καλώς,

ἐφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν τοιώδε τι, ὡ δ’ ὃ δ’ ὁ Σωκράτης, δεὶ ἡμᾶς ἀνερέοιται

ἐκατόρθως, τῷ πολὺ τῷ ἃρα προσήκει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πᾶσχειν,

tὸ διασκεδάζων, καὶ υπὲρ τοῦ πολοῦ τινὸς δεδειναι μὴ

πάθη αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῷ πολῷ τῳ ὄντι καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐ

ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον [ἡ] ψυχή ἐστιν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων

θαρρεών η δεδειναι υπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς;

10 Ἀλληθή, ἐφη, λέγεις.

c Ἄρ’ οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ ὑπ’ ὃ φύσει

πατ θητεὶν ἐπιτρέπεται λοι β γραφή.

ἐ πειρῶ μεταπείθεων W: πειράμαθε πείθει B T

Vind. a1 T*: ἐθάνατοι T: ἐθάναται W: ἐξάπλωσα B yr. W et in

marg. t a1 ἀγαθῶν pr. T a7 ἀν εὐκαίριοτερον T: ἀναγκαίοτερον

B W yr. T a10 ὑπάρξει ἐφη B3 TW b1 ἀπελεύσομεν T W

b4 ἀνερέοιται T W Olymp. : ἐφέσθαι B b6 ὅτι T W Olymp.: τοῦ B

b7 of add. Heindorf b8 ἃ B: om. TW
προσήκει τούτο πάσχειν, διαμεθήηνα ταύτη ἦπερ συνετέθη: εἰ δὲ τι τυγχάνει σὺν ἀσύνθετων, τούτω μόνῳ προσήκει μη
πάσχειν ταύτα, εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ;

Δοκεὶ μοι, ἐφῃ, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὁ Κέβης.

Οὐκοῦν ἀπερ ἂεὶ κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὁσαίτως ἔχει, ταύτα μᾶλλον εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ ἀγάνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλως ἄλλως καὶ
μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα, ταύτα δὲ σύνθετα;

"Εμοιγε δοκεὶ οὕτως.

"Ἰωμεν δή, ἐφη, ἐπὶ ταύτα ἐφ᾽ ἀπερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεῖ 10
λόγῳ. "αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἡ λόγοι διδόμεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωθητὸν;
τάντας καὶ ἀποκρώμενοι, πότερον ὁσαίτως ἂεὶ ἔχει κατὰ
tαύτα ἴ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλους; αὐτὸ τὸ ἱσον, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ

ἐκατόν ὁ ἐστιν, τῷ ὡς μή ποτε μεταβολὴν καὶ ἐξημοίων
ἐνδέχεται; ἡ ἂεὶ αὐτῶν ἐκατόν ὁ ἐστιν, ἀμοιοεἰδές ὅŭ αὐτὸ 5
καθ' ἂεὶς, ὁσαίτως κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδημάτη
οὐδαμῶς ἄλλους ὁμοίας ἐνδέχεται:

"Οσαίτως, ἐφῃ, ἀνάγκη, ὁ Κέβης, κατὰ ταύτα ἔχειν, ὡ

Σκόρπατες..

Τῇ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν, οἷον ἀνθρώπων ἡ ἱππων ἦ 10
ἠμαίνον ἡ ἄλλων ἀνυσιγνώσου τοιούτων, ἡ ἵσωρ [ἢ καλῶν] ἐ
tάντον τῶν ἐκείνων ὁμοίων γίνομεν; ὃ ἂρα κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ἂν
τοικανγόν ἐκείνως ὀυτέ αὐτά ἄνθρωποι ὀυτε ἀλλήλοι οὐδέποτε
ὡς ἂνοις εἶπεν οὐδαμῶς κατὰ ταύτα;

Οὕτως αὖ, ἐφῇ ὁ Κέβης, ταύτα οὐδέποτε ὁσαίτως ἔχει. 5

Οὐκοῦν τούτων μὲν κἂν ἄγαρο κἂν ἰδιοὶ κἂν ταῖς ἄλλαις 79
αἰσθήσεων αἰσθήματι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταύτα ἐχώντων οὐκ ἔστω

ὀτῶν τοιὸν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοι τῇ τῆς ἄμαλλος λογισμῶν, ἀλλὰ ἔστω ἀιδή σὰ τοιαύτα καὶ ὁ οὗ ὀρᾶται;


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5 Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἀλήθινόν λέγεις. 
Θόμεν όν, βούλει, ἔφη, δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων, τὸ μὲν ὁρατὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀνίδες; 
Θόμεν, ἔφη. 
Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀνίδες ἄεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχον, τὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν 
μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα; 
Καὶ τούτῳ, ἔφη, Θόμεν.

b Φέρε ὅ, ἢ ὁ ὃς, ἀλλὰ τι ἢμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σώμα ἐστι, 
τὸ δὲ ψυχή; 
Οὐδὲν ἄλλο, ἔφη. 
Ποτέρω όν, ὁμοιότερον τῷ εἴδει φαμέν ἂν εἶναι καὶ 
συγγενέστερον τὸ σῶμα; 
Πνεύμα, ἔφη, τούτῳ γε ὤνλον, ὅτι τῷ ὁρατῷ. 
Τί δὲ ἡ ψυχή; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀνίδες; 
Οὐχ ἢ ἔνανθρώπων γε, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἔφη. 
'Αλλὰ μὴν ἡμεῖς γε τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
φῶτον ἐλέγουμεν. ἦ ἀλλῃ τωλί οιεί; 
Τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. 
Τί αὖν περὶ ψυχῆς λέγομεν; ὁρατὸν ἢ ἀόρατον εἶναι; 
Οὐχ ὁρατὸν. 
'Ανίδες ἡρα; 

15 Ναι. 
'Ομοιότερον ἡρα ψυχῆς σώματος ἐστὶν τῷ αἴδει, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ. 

c Πάντα ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σῶκρατες. 
Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦδε πάλαι ἐλέγουμεν, ὅτι ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν μὲν 
τῷ σώματι προσχρηται εἷς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι ἡ ἢ διὰ τοῦ ὀρατοῦ ἢ 
διὰ τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ ἡ ἀλλης τωσ τοις αἰσθήσεσι—τούτῳ γὰρ 
ἐστὶν τὸ διὰ τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δὲ αἰσθήσεσι σκοπεῖν τι—

a 6 βούλει B T Stob.: εἶ διπελεί B^2 W b 4 φαμέν T Stob.: φαμέν B Eus. 
(ante φῶς) Eus. Stob.: λέγομεν B b 12 λέγομεν B Eus. Stob.: 
ἐλέγουμεν B^2 W ἢ ἀόρατον B Eus. Stob.: om. T B 2 ἐλε-
γομεν B T W Eus. Stob.: λέγομεν Theodoretus C 5 αἰσθήσεως 
B^2 T W Stob.: αἰσθήσεως B
πότε μὲν ἔκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐνέποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντα, καὶ αὐτὴς πλαγιάται καὶ ταραττεῖται καὶ ἐλγυγίθ
ωσπερ μεθοδοῦς, ἀτε τοιοῦτων ἐφαπτομένην;
Πάνω γε.

"Οταν δὲ γε αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν σκοπῆ, ἔκεισε οὐκεταί εἰς τὸ καθαρὸν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὑπὸ καὶ ἀδάματον καὶ ὀσατέος ἔχον,
καὶ ως συγγενῆς οὐσα αὐτού ἄει μετ’ ἐκείνου τε γίγνεται,
ὅταν περ ἀυτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν γένηται καὶ ἔξη αὐτῆ, καὶ πέπαυται
τε τοῦ πλάνου καὶ περὶ ἔκεινα, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὀσατέος ἔχει, 5
ἀτε τοιοῦτων ἐφαπτομένην καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῆς τὸ πάθημα φρό
νησις κέκλητα;

Παντάπασιν, ἐφη, καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

Ποτέρφο ὤν ἀυ σοι δοκεῖ ὁ εἶδε καὶ ὕκ τῶν πρὸσθεν καὶ ὕκ
τῶν ὑπὸ λεγομένων ψυχῆς ὁμοιότερον εἶναι καὶ συγγενέστερον; ε

Πᾶς ἂν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢ δ’ ὅς, συγχωρήσαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐκ
ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, καὶ ὁ δυσμαθήσεται, ὅτι ὅλῳ καὶ
πάντ’ ὁμοιότερον ἐστὶ ψυχῆ τῷ ἀεὶ ὀσατέος ἐχοῦτι μᾶλλον
ἡ τῷ μὴ.

Τῇ δὲ τὸ σῶμα;
Τῷ ἐτέρῳ.

"Ορα δὴ καὶ τῇ δὲ ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅσι ψυχῆ καὶ
σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάττει, 80
τῇ δ’ ἐς ἀρχεῖ καὶ δεσπόζειν καὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὅν πότερον τοι
δοκεῖ ὁμοίον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θυτήτι; ἢ οὖν
δοκεῖ σοι τῷ μὲν θείῳ οἷον ἀρχεῖ τε καὶ ἡγεμονεύειν φευ-
κέναι, τῷ δὲ θυτῶν ἀρχεσθαι καὶ δουλεύειν;

"Εμοίγε.

Ποτέρφο ὤν ἡ ψυχή ἐοικείν;

Δῆλα δὴ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ψυχῆ τῷ θείῳ, τῷ δὲ
σῶμα τῷ θυτῷ.
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10 Σκόπει δή, ἡφι, ὡς Κέβης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων

5 τάδε ἡμῶν συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νουτῆς,
καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀέ τοι σώματα κατὰ ταύτα
ἐχοντες ἀετώδες δομιστάτων εἰναι ψυχής τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπωίῳ καὶ
θυγγῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνύπτω καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μιθέτω
κατὰ ταύτα ἐχοντες ἀετώδες δομιστάτων αὐτε οὐκ ἔσσεια σώμα.

5 ἔχομεν τι παρὰ ταύτα ἀλλο λέγειν, ὃ φίλε Κέβης, ἢ ὦν όντως ἔχει; Ὡν ἔχομεν.

Τῇ οὖν; τούτων οὔτως ἐχόντων ἢρ' οὐχὶ σώματι μὲν
tαχύ διαλύσθαι προσήκει, ψυχή δὲ αὐτὸ παράπαν ἀδια-

λύτῳ εἰναι ἡ ἐγνύς τὶ τοῦτον;

5 Πῶς γάρ οὖν;

'Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, ἡφι, ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἀνθρώπος, τὸ μὲν

ςρατὸν αὐτοῦ, τὸ σώμα, καὶ ἐν ὅρατῳ κείμενον, ὃ δὴ νεκρῶν
καλοῦμεν, ὁ προσήκει διαλύσθαι καὶ διαπττέω καὶ δια-

τυείσθαι, οὐκ εὖθυς τούτων οὖν πέπουθεν, ἅλλες ἐπιμελεῖς

ςμοῖραν ἐπεμένει χρόνον, ἔκτις τις καὶ χαρέστως ἐχὼ τὸ

σώμα· τελευτήση καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὁρᾷ· καὶ πάνω καὶ

αλλ' εἰς τὸ σώμα καὶ ταριχευθῆναι, ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν Ἀλγυπτῷ

ταριχευθέντες, ἂλγου οὖν μενεὶ ἀμήχανον ὄσον χρόνον,

5 ἓνα δὲ μέρι τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἁν σατῆ, ὡστα τε καὶ νεόρα
καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα, ὡμοὶ ὡς ἐποίησε εἰπεῖν ἀθάνατά ἐστων

ἡ οὖν;

Ναι.

5 'Ἡ δὲ ψυχή ἢρα, τὸ ἁδές, τὸ εἰς τοιούτου τόπον ἔτερον

ςχόμενον γενναῖον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἄιδη, εἰς Ἀιδοῦν ὡς

ἀλήθως, παρὰ τὸν ἁγαθόν καὶ φρόνιμον θεού, οἴ, ἃν θεὸς


b 6 ἀνήφρο καὶ πολυειδεῖς T W Eus. Stob.: ἀνήφρον ἀνθρώπων, ταῦτα

6 marg. t: ἀνῆφρον ἀνθρώπων, ταῦτα ἀνήφρον B: ἀνῆφρον T W Eus. Stob.

b 3 αὐτοῦ τὸ B Eus.: αὐτοῦ T Stob.

b 4 καὶ διαπττέω καὶ T W b


d 5 εἰς τὸν ἁγαθόν Ars.  d 6 τὸν γενναῖον Ars.  d 7 τὸν ἁγαθόν
"θεὸν (καὶ φρόνιμον) Ars. (ut vid.) οἴ δὴ Ars. (ut vid.)
θέλη, αυτίκα καί τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ἵτευν, αὐτή δὲ δὴ ἢμεῖς ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ οὕτω πεφυκώμενα ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος εὖθες διαπεφυγήσηται καὶ ἀπολολεῖ τῷ φασίν οἱ πολλοὶ ἂνθρωποι; πολλοῦ γε δὲ, ὁ φίλε Κέβης τε καὶ Σιμώνια, ἐὰν πολλὸ μᾶλλον ὑπό ἑξεῖ ἐὰν μὴν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ σώματος συνεφέλουσα, οὔτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἐκούσα εἰναί, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτῷ καὶ συνηθουμένη αὐτῇ ἐς ἑαυτήν, ἀπὸ μελετῶσα δὲν τοῦ— 5 τοῦ δὲ οὐδὲν ἀλλο ὡς ἡ ἄρθρας φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τῇ θεάναι μελετῶσα βαδίως· ἡ οὖ τοῦτ' ἂν εἰς μελέτη 8ι θανάτου;

Παντάπασι γε.

Οὐκόν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα εἰς τὸ ὁμοιός αὐτή τὸ ᾠδῆς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θείον τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον, οἱ 5 ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαιμονεύς, ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἀριστομένας, καὶ φόβων καὶ ἁγίων ἔρωτος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπεῖων ἀπηλειμάτευς, ὡσπερ δὲ λέγεται· κατά τῇ μεμνημένως ἀληθώς τοῦ λοχίου χρόνου μετὰ θεῶν διάγοσα; οὔτω φώμεν, οἱ Κέβης, ἡ ἄλλως;

Οὐτώ νὴ Δία, ἐφη ο Κέβης.

Ἔδω γε οἶμαι μεμισμησμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἄπαλλαττηται, ὡς τῷ σώματι οὐς συνοὖσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρώτα καὶ γονητευμένη ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ τις εἰς τῶν ἐπιθυμίων καὶ ἱδρυών, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἰναί ἀληθές ἀλλ’ ἡ το σωματειδές, οὐ τις ἄν ἄνατο καὶ θάνατο καὶ ποίοι 5 καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀφροδίσια χρῆσαιτο, τὸ δ’ τοῦ ὁμοιάζω σκοτώδες καὶ ᾠδῆς, νοητοῦ δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφικαί αἰρετῶν, εἰς ἀπέραντα οὕτω καὶ πάλιν, 10 καὶ ἄλλως αἰρετῶν, καὶ τῶν θεῶν βια ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι.

e 5 αὐτή εἰς ἑαυτήν (αὐτήν) B T W Eus. Stob. : om. B  
a 8 ἀνθρωπεῖων B T (sed el ex i) W : ἀνθρωπημένων C Ads.  
a 9 θεῶν B T Ads. Eus. Stob. : τῶν θεῶν B  
b 1 οἱ Ads.  
b 4 ἱδρυών καὶ ἐπιθυμών W b 5 ἄλλα] ἄλλα Ads.  
b 7 σοφία Ads.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

touto de elidismenē múreiv te kai tremeiv kai feγeiv, oũtw

ទូទៅ ឬ ប្រឹក្សាមួយ រាប់ពេល និង យូរ ឬ ស្អាត

c de ἔχουσαν οἷεί ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτήν εἰλικρινὴ ἀπαλ-

λάξεσθαι; do you think

Ωὐδ’ ὅπως τοιού, ἐφι.

Ἀλλὰ [καὶ ἡ διεύθυνσις] γε οὐμαί υπὸ τοῦ σωματειῶδος,

5 δ’ αὐτῆς η ὡμίλια τε καὶ συνυπστα τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ

συνεναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε σύμφονον;

Pάνυ γε.

Ἑλθοτιδεὶς δὲ γε, ὧ φίλε, τοῦτο οἴεσθαι χρῆ εἶναι καὶ

βαρὺ καὶ γεώδες καὶ ὀρατόν. ὁ δὲ καὶ ἔχουσα η τουατῆ

ψυχῆ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἐλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον

φόβῳ τοῦ αἴσθος τε καὶ Αἴσθου, ὀστερ λέγεσται, περὶ τὰ

μνήματα τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυκλοφορεῖν, περὶ δὲ καὶ

ἀφθή ἀττα ψυχῶν σκωπεῖν φαντάσματα, οἷά παρέχουσιν αἱ

τουατί τυχαί καὶ εὐκλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ

τοῦ ὀρατοῦ μετέχοντι, διὸ καὶ ὀρῶνται.

5 Εἰκός γε, ὡ Σωκράτες.

Εἰκός μέντοι, ὧ Κέβης· καί οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν

αὐτὰς εἰναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαῦλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τουατία

ἀναγκάζονται πλανάσθαι δίκην τινοσς τὰς προτέρας τρο-

φής κακῆς σύνθεσις. καὶ μὲξρι γε τοῦτο πλανώνται ἢς ἀν τῇ

e τῶν συνεπακολουθοῦντος τοῦ σωματειῶδος, ἀποθέματα πάλιν

ἐνεδράσαν εἰς σώμα· εὐνοεσθήνοι, δὲ, ὀστερ εἰκός, εἰς τουατά

ἡθ ὑπὸν ἀττ’ ἄν καὶ μεμελετηκαί τῆς ὑτὸν ἐν τῷβίῳ.

Τὰ ποια δὴ ταύτα λέγεις, ὡ Σωκράτες;

5 Όιον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τα καὶ ὑβρεῖς καὶ φιλοσοφίας

μεμελετηκαί καὶ μὴ ὑπελαβήμενοι εἰς τὰς τῶν ὄνειριν

καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θρημών εἰκός εὐνοεσθήναι. ἡ οὐκ οἶει;

Pάνυ μὲν οἷον εἰκός λέγεις.


ο 5 τε om. W e 8 δὲ γε τοῦτο (ἄ φιλε)? Ars. οἴσθαί γε W

c 9 δὴ kal BT Stob. : δὴ W da ... χων φαν ... Ars. et mox w ταφ ... σθένειν
d 5 εἰκότως Ars. Σωκράτες] ἐφι Ars. d 7 αὐτὰς


6 διειλαβημένοις T (sed η punct. not.) b : διειλαβομένοις B Stob.
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

Τούς δὲ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρταγώνας προ-
tετειχίσκοτας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἱκτίνων
γένη· ἢ τοι· ἀν ἄλλος φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας λέναι;

Ἀμελεῖ τε, ἐφι ο Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαύτα.

Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' οὐς, δήλα δὴ καὶ τάλλα ἢ ἀν ἐκαστα ίοι
κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὀμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης;

Δὴλον δὴ, ἐφι· τῶς δ' οὐ;

Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονεῖται, ἐφι, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς ἑπτα-
τεταυτοῦ τότον ίοιτες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικήν
ἀρετήν· ἐπιτετειχίσκοτες, ἢν δὴ, καθοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δ
δικαίωσθην, ἐξ ἐθνώς τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονότων ἀνέων φιλο-
σοφίας τε καὶ νεών;

Πὴ δὴ οὐτοὶ εὐδαιμονεῖται;

Ὅτι τούτων εἰκὸς ἐστιν εἰς τοιούτων πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι 5
πολιτικῶν καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἡ που μελιτῶν ἡ σφηκῶν ἡ
μυρμηκῶν, καὶ εἰς ταύτων γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος,
καὶ γιγνεσθαι εξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους.

Εἰκὸς.

Εἰς δὲ γε θεῶν γένοις μὴ φιλοσοφῆσαι καὶ παυτελῶσ ἑν
καθάρο ἀπίστην οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ φιλομαθεῖν. Σ
ἀλλὰ τούτων ἔνεκα, ὡς ἐταίρη Συμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ
ὁρθῶς φιλόσοφοι ἀπεχορτάτων κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμῶν ἀπασών καὶ καρτεροῦνται καὶ όποιοποιόντων αὐτῶν ἑαυτῶν,
οι τι οἰκοθείονται τε καὶ πένιαν δοσομενοῖς ὡσπερ οἱ 5
πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρηματιούν· οὔτε αὐτὰ ἡμῖν τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν
μοιχήρια δεδίδοτε, ὡσπερ οἱ φιλαρχοὶ τε καὶ φιλοτιμοῦ,
ἐπειπε ἀπέχουνται αὐτῶν.

Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἠπροτο, ἐφι, ὡς Σώκρατες, ο Κέβης.

Οὐ μέντοι μᾶ Δία, ἢ δ' οὐς· τοιγάρτοι τοιτῶν μὲν δ

a 3 ὄμ. W a 4 τε ὄμ. W a 5 λέναι B T: εἶναι B
a 7 ὑ T BW Eus.: ἢ T Stob.: η ὅτε rec. ἐκαστά
T Eus. a 11 καὶ B Eus.: τε καὶ T Stob. b 5 ὅτι B T BW Eus.
Stob. ὅτι οὗ B ἐστίν ὄμ. Ars. ἀφικέσθαι Ars.
b 6 καὶ T Eus. Stob.: τε καὶ T (ἡμὲν) τεροῦ Ars. (ut vid.)
Stob. c 3 φιλόσοφοι T Ars. Iamb.: φιλοσοφώντες B ἀπέχονται
T W Ars. Iamb.: εἶχονται B c 4 πασῶν W c 5 ότι B T BW:

οὐχὶ Iamb.: ὅτι B
persona, ὃς Κέβης, ἐκείνοι οίς τι μέλει τῇς ἐαντῶν ψυχῆς ἄλλα μὴ σώματι πλάττοντες ζωοὶ, χαιρεῖν, εἰπόντες, οὐ κατὰ ταῦτα πορεύονται αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐκ εἴδοσιν ὡς ἐρχόνται,

5 αὐτὸι δὲ ἡγούμενοι οὐ δεῖν ἐναντία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ πράττειν καὶ τῇ ἔκεισι λύσει τε καὶ καθαρμῷ ταύτῃ δὴ τρέπονται ἐκείνῃ ἐπισμένοι, ἡ ἔκεισι υφηγεῖται.

Πῶς, ὃς Σωκράτες;

Ἐγὼ ἔρω, ἐφη, γιγνώσκουσι γάρ, ἡ δ' ὅς, οἱ φιλομαθεῖς

ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκαλλημένη, ἀναγκαίως

διασέβεσθαι ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ προσκεκαλλημένη, ἀναγκαίως

δομένη, καὶ τοῦ εἴργματι τῆς δεινότητας· καταδίδουσα, ὅτι δὲ

ἐπιθυμίας ἑστὶν, ὡς ἄν μᾶλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος συλληπτῶν

83 εἰς τὸ δεδέσθαι—ὁπερ οὖν λέγω, γιγνώσκουσιν οἱ φιλομαθεῖς ὅτι αὐτῶν παραλαβοῦσα ἡ φιλοσοφία ἄνθρωπον τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα μείξαναρμαθεῖς, καὶ λύσει ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐνδεκυμένη ὅτι ἀπαίτησιν μὲν μεσθῇ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὁμομάχων σκέψις,

5 ἀπαίτης δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ τῶν ἀλλών ἀλφθήσεως,

πείθονται δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν, διὸν μὴ ἀνάγκῃ

αὐτῶς ἤρθον, αὐτὴν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν συλλέγονται καὶ

ἀθροίζονται παρακελευσμένη, πιστεύει τῇς μοιραίοις ἀλλ' ἀλλ'

ἡ αὐτὴν αὐτῇ, ὅτι ἂν νοησῇ αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν αὐτὸ καθ'

αὐτὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν συμπενθῇ ἐν ἀλλοίς διὸ

ἀλλοί, μηδὲν ἤγείρονται ἀληθεία: εἰσὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν τουτοῦν,

5 ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ λύσει οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἀλλομένη δεῖν ἐναντιώσθην, ἡ τοῦ ὁσ

oppos.

Τῇ τούτῳ, ὡς Σώκρατες; ἐφ' ὁ Κέβης.

"Οτι ψυχῇ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἀμα τε ἡσθήναι, ὁ σφόδρα ἡ λυπηθήναι ἐπί τι χωρὶς καὶ ἰδιὰν περὶ ὃν μαλίστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τοῦτο ἐναργεστάτων τε εἶναι καὶ ἀληθεστάτων, οὔχ οὕτως ἔχουσ' ταύτα δὲ μάλιστα (τὰ) ὀρατά: ἢ οὐ;

Πάνω γε.

Οὕκον εἰς τοῦτο τῷ πάθει μάλιστα καταδείκται ψυχῇ ὑπὸ δ σώματος;

Πῶς δ' ἂν;

"Οτι ἔκαστῃ ἡδονῇ καὶ λυπῇ ὁσπερ ἡλιον ἔχουσα προσηλοὶ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ προσπεροῦν καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, 5 δοξάζονται ταύτα ἀληθὴ εἶναι ἀπερ' ἂν καὶ τὸ σῶμα ψφῇ, ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὀμοροδεσμῶν τις σάματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρει ἀναγκάζεται ομάι ὀμοροποποῦ τε καὶ ὀμοροφόρος γίγνεσθαι καὶ οία μηδέποτε εἰς Ἄθου καθαρὸς ἀφίκεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δει τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἔξειναι, δοτε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς 10 ἀλλο σῶμα καὶ ὁσπερ σπειρομενή εμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ε ἀμοιροὶ εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνονθίασιν.
'Αληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Κέβης, ἡ Σώκρατες.

5 Τούτων τοίμων ἔνεκα, ὁ Κέβης, οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς κόσμῳς εἰσί καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐχ ὃν ὅι τολλοὶ ἔνεκά φασιν ἡ σὺ οἴει;

84 Οὐ δήτα ἐγώγε.

Οὐ γάρ ἀλλ' ὅτως λογίσαις ἄν ψυχῆ ἄνδρός φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὖν ἂν οἴσθεις τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι αὐτήν λύειν, λυνόσης δὲ ἐκείσθη, αὐτήν παραδίδοναι ταῖς ἢδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἐαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταθεῖν καὶ ἀνήγυτον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης τια ἐναντίως ἰστοῦ μεταχειρισμοῦντος, ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τοῦτῳ παρασκευάζοντα, ἐπομενὴ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἄει ἐν τούτῳ ὀφθα, τὸ ἀλλήθες καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἄδοξαστὸν

b θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ὥν τε οἴεται ὅτως τέθεν ἐκς ἄν θη, καὶ ἑπεδαιαὶ τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγενέσ καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν. ἐκ ὅ πό τοι αὐτῆς τροφῆς όυδὲν δεινον μὴ φοβηθῇ

5 [ταῦτα δ' ἐπηρμηνεύσασα] ὁ Σωκράτης, δὸς ἠμαεὶς διασταθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὁπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυγηθεῖσα καὶ διαποτεμένῃ οἶχται καὶ οὔθεν ἐτί οὐδαμοῦ ὑπ' ἡ

c Σωκράτης ὄν πάλιν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους, ἔπει πολλὸν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτὸς τέκ πρὸς τῷ εἰρήμενῷ λόγῳ ἢμὸς ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅδε ἐπιφανετο, καὶ ἢμῶν οἱ πλείστοι. Κέβης δὲ καὶ Συμμᾶς ἔτι μεταχειρισμοὺν τὸς ἀλλήλων διελεγέσθησον καὶ δ

5 Σωκράτης ὄν τι τῆς ἡρετος, ὅ τε, ὅμως τα λεγέσθαι μὸν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεικτοὺς λέγεσθαι; πολλὰς γὰρ ἢτα ἐτί ἐχεῖ υποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβέσθαι εἰ γε τίς αὐτὰ μέλλει ἢκαϊνως διεξεῖναι; εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπείσθοι, οὔθεν λέγω; εἰ δὲ τί περὶ

e 5 ὁ Κέβης om. Ars. e 6 kal BT: τε kal B 3 W φασιν om. Ars. a 3 aὐτὴν Ars.: ἐστιν̣ ΒΤ Iambi. a 4 aὐτὴ Ars. a 5 αὐτῇ B Iambi.: om. W ἐγκαταθεῖν] ὅτι in marg. Ḅ̣ a 6 μεταχειρισμοῦντος Ḅ W Ars. Iambi.: μεταχειρισμοῦντος vulg. a 8 τὸ alterum et tertium om. Ars. a 1 i oἰεται oἰεται oἰεται οἵ W Iambi.: oἰεται 8 oἰεται BṬ Iambi.: οἰεται 5 ι] γ' ci. Stephanus: inclusa secl. Ast c 6 λέγεσθαι B T: λελέχθαι B 3 W t 8 δε τι B: δε T
πορείαν, μηδέν ἀποκρήστητε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐλπεῖς καὶ διέλθησιν, ἐκ τῆς ὕμων φαίνεται βέλτιον (ἂν) λέγηται, καὶ δ’ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖσθαι, εἰ τι μάλλον οἴσθηε μετ’ ἐμοῦ

Καὶ ὁ Συμμάχος ἔφη: Καὶ μήν, δ’ Ὀκρατεῖς, τάληθῇ σοι ἑρώ. τάλαι γὰρ ὕμων ἐκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἔτερον προσβῆει καὶ κελευθε ἐρέθθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκούσαι, ὅσιεν δὲ ὑγίων παρέχειν, μή σοι, ἀλλ’ ἡ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφορὰν.

Καὶ δ’ ἀκούσας ἐγέλασεν τε ἡρέμα καὶ φησιν’ Ἁδαι, ὁ Συμμάχος: ἃ ποι χαλεπῶς ἃν τοὺς ἀλλούς ἀνθρώπους πεί- σαιμι, ὡς οὗ συμφορᾶν ἡγούμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε ε’ γε μὴν ὕμας δυναμί μπεθεῖς, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολο- 

terόν τι νῦν διάκεισθαι ἡ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίω’ καὶ, ὡς ἐνυκτε, 
tων κύκων δοκό φανότερος ὕμων εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν, οἱ 

εἰπεῖναι οἴσθωντο ὃτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ὁμοίες καὶ ἐν 5 
tῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλείστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἄρωσοι, 85 

γεγνώστε ὃτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπείναν ὀστὲ εἰς 

θεραπεύσεις. οἱ δ’ ἀνθρωποὶ διὰ τοῦ αὐτῶν ἰδεὸς τοῦ θανάτου> 
kαὶ τῶν κύκων καταφεύγειν, καὶ φασὶ αὐτοὺς θρηματίζειν 
tὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λυπῆς ἐξάθειν, καὶ οὐ λυγίζεται ὅτι οὐδὲν 5 

ὄργεον ἄνει τῇ τε πείνῃ ἡ ῥίγη ἡ τῶν ἄλλην λυπῆν λυγίται, 
νοῦν αὐτὴ ἡ τοῖσ’ ἀρχῶν καὶ χείλοις καὶ ὁ ἐπογ’ ᾗ δὴ 

φασὶ διὰ λύπην θρηματίζειν ἄρωσον. ἀλλ’ ὅστε ταῦτα μοι 

φαίνεται λυπούμενα ἄρωσον ὅστε οἱ κύκων, ἀλλ’ ἃτε ὅμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλ- 

λωνος ὄντες, μαντικὸν τε εἰς ἀν προσερχότες τὰ ἐν ᾗ Ἀιδοῦ 

ἀγάθα ἄρωσι καὶ τερποῦται ἐκείνη τὴν ἠμέραν ἰαφερότως 

ἣ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι 

ὀμόδουλος τε εἶναι τῶν κύκων καὶ ἵππος τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, 5 

κακοῦ κεφῶν ἐκείνην τὴν μαντικὴν ἐχεῖσαι τὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, 

κατὰ τοὺς ἐκείνους ἔχεσαι τὴν μαντικὴν ἐχεῖσαι παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου,

ο 9 τοῦτων B: τοῦτω T d i διελθεῖν B: τι διελθεῖν B2 W t 

εν add. Cl. Heindorf e 3 τι om. Stob. a i κάλλιστα W (conic- 

cerat Blomfield) : μάλιστα B T Stob. et s. v. W a 6 ρηγοὶ B T W 

a 7 δ om. W b 3 καὶ B: τε καὶ TW b 4 ἡγοῦμαι Tb Stob. : 

πον ἐσμαι B (ut vid.) W b 5 τε TW Stob. : γε B b 6 χείρων' 

Hermann
οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι. ἀλλὰ
τούτου γὰρ ἐνεκαλλέγεσθαι τε χρὴ καὶ ἔρωταν ὅτι ἄν βούλησθε,
ἐὼς ἄν Αἴφαμοι βιᾶσθω ἄνδρες ἅπεικα.

10. Καλῶς, ἐφ', λέγεις, ὁ Σμώμας· καὶ ἔγω τέ σοι ἔρω δὲ
c ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὐτὶ δὲ, ὅσον ἀποδέχεσθαι τὰ εἰρημένα, ἐμοὶ
γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὅν Σωκράτες, ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἰσως ὡσπερ καὶ
σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι· ἐν τῷ νῦν βῆμα ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι
ἡ παγχάλεσθαι τί, τὸ μέντοι αὐτὰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ
5 ὦντι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχεω καὶ μὴ προαφιστάσαι πρὸς ἄν
πανταχὺ συκοῦν ἀπειδή τις, πάνυ μαθαίκνισθαι εἶναι ἀνδρός·
δεῖ γὰρ περὶ αὐτόν ἐγίνε τε τούτων διαπράσασθαι. ἢ μαθεῖν
ὅτι ἔχει ἢ ἐφεξῆς·, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τῶν γούν βελτιστῶν
tῶν ἀνθρωπῶν λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτ
tατον, ἐπὶ τούτων ἄχομενον ὡσπερ ἐπὶ σχέδιας κινούνεινον
d διαπλέσαι τοὺς βίους, εἰ μὴ τις δύνατο ἀσφαλεστρεον καὶ
αἰκὼνομέτερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρων ὀχύρως, [ἡ] λόγων βεβαι
tινῶς, διαπορεύθητι. καὶ ὁ καὶ νῦν ἐγών ὡς ἐπάνω
tοις ἔρξομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδὲ ἐμαυ
tοῦν αἰτήμασαι ἐν υστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἡ ἡμεῖς
5 δοκεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὅν Σωκράτες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτον
cαὶ πρὸς τόνδε συκοῦν τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνω φαίνεται ἰκανῶς
e εἰρήσθην,

10. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἰσως γὰρ, ἐφ', ὅ ἐταίρε, ἄλλη θείο
θεὶς ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἠμοσυμενῇ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ' ἡ λύρα καὶ

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αἱ χορδαὶ σῶματά τε καὶ σωματειδὴ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θυτοῦ συγγενῆ. ἔπειδὰν οὖν ἡ κατάξη
tis τὴν λύραν ἡ διατέμη καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδὰς, εἰ τις
δισχυρίζοιτο τὸ αὐτὸ λόγῳ ὡσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἐτὶ εἶναι 5
tὴν ἀρμονίαν ἔκεισθην καὶ μὴ ἀπολολέναι—οὐδεμιὰ γὰρ
μηχανὴ ἢν εἰ τὴν μὲν λύραν ἐτὶ εἶναι διερρογών τῶν
χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θητοειδεῖς οὐσασ, τὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν
ἀπολολέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ θανάτου ὀμοφυὴ τε καὶ
συγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θυτοῦ ἀπολομένην—ἀλλὰ φαί
ἀνάγκη ἐτὶ που εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ
ἐξαλ καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπηθεσθαι πρὶν τὶ ἐκείσθην
παθεῖν—καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σκώρατες, οἴμαι ἐγώγε καὶ αὐτὸν 5
σε τοῦτο ἐντεθημέθαται, ὅτι τοιούτου τι μᾶλλον ὑπολαμ-
βάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὡσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος
ήμων καὶ συγκεκομένου, ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ἔρροι
καὶ ὑγρο καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρμονίαν
αὐτῶν τοῖτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἦμων, ἔπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ
c μετρῖος κράβῃ πρὸς ἀλληλα—εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει τῇ ψυχῇ οὕσα
ἀρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἦμων
ἀμέτρος ἡ ἐπιταθή ὑπὸ νόσου καὶ ἀλλῶν κακῶν, τὴν μὲν
ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολολέναι, καλέρ οὖσαν 5
θειστάτην, ὡσπερ καὶ αἱ ἀλλαὶ ἀρμονίαι αἱ τ' ἐν τοῖς
φθόγγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πάσι, τὰ δὲ
λεβάνα τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου πολῶν χρόνων παραμένειν,
ἐως ἂν ἡ κατακαυθή ἡ κατασταθῆ—ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοὺς τῶν
d λόγου τὶ φήσωμεν, ἐάν τις ἀξίως κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν
tῶν ἐν τῷ σῶματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρῶτην ἀπόλ-
λυσθαί.

Διαβλέψας οὖν ὦ Σωκράτης, ὡσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰσδεί, 5
καὶ μειδιάσας, Δίκαια μέντοι, ἐφη, λέγει ὁ Σμμίλας. εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορότερος ἐμοὶ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο; καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλος ἔοικεν ἀπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου. δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἢτι πρὸτερον Κέβητος ἀκούσαι εἰ τι αὖ ὄντε ἔγκαιλε τῷ λόγῳ, ὡς χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τί ἐρώμεν, ἔπειτα [δὲ] ἀκούσατας ἡ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς εάν τι δοκῶσι προσάδειν, εὰν δὲ μὴ, οὕτως ἢδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου. ἀλλ' ἄγε, ἡ δ' ὡς, ὁ Κέβης, λέγει, 5 τι ἢν το σὲ αὖ θράττων [ἀπιστίαν παρέχει].

Δέγω δὴ, ἡ δ' ὡς ὁ Κέβης. ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται ἐτὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος εἶναι, καὶ, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἔλεγομεν, 87 ταῦταν ἔγκλημα ἔχεων. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἢν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς τὸν τὸ ἐλέθεων, οὐκ ἀνατίθημαι μὴ οὐχὶ πάνω χαριέτως καὶ, εἰ μὴ ἐπαχθές ἔστων εἴπεσι, πάνυ ἱκανὸς ἀποδεδείχθαι. ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποθανόντων ἡμῶν ἐτὶ που ἐστιν, 5 οὓ τις δοκεῖ τῇδε. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἰσχυρότερον καὶ πολυχρονιότερον ψυχὴ σώματος, οὐ συγχωρῶ τῇ Σμμίλῳ ἀντιλήψει: δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι πᾶσι τούτοις πάνω τολύ διαφέρειν. τὶ οὖν, ἄν φαίη τὸν λόγον, ἐτὶ ἀπιστεῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὅρος ἀποθανόντως τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ γε' ἀσθενεστέρον ἐτὶ οὖ; τὸ δὲ πολυ- b χρονιότερον οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐτὶ σφέζωσαι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ; πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο τὸν ἐπίσκεψαι, εἰ τι λέγω, εἰκόνος γὰρ τοὺς, ὡς ἔοικεν, καὶ γὼ ὅπερ Σμμίλας δέομαι. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ταῦτα ὅπερ ἄν τις περὶ 5 ἀνθρώπου ὑφάντου πρεσβύτου ἀποθανόντως λέγοι τούτῳ τοῦ λόγου, ὡς οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἀλλ᾽ ἐστι που σῶς, τεκμήριον δὲ παρέχοι ποιματίων ὁ ἡμπείχετο αὐτὸς υφηγώμενος ὅτι ἐτὶ σῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν, καὶ εἰ τις c ἀπιστοῦν αὐτῷ, ἀνερωτήθη πότερον πολυχρονιότερον ἐστιν.
τὸ γένος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἰματίου ἐν χρεία τε ὑποκρινόμενον, ἀποκριναμένου δὴ [τινός] ὅτι πολὺ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκετὶ ἀποδεδείξθαι ὅτι πρὸς ὑπό ἰδίου παύτως ἀρα μᾶλλον οὐκ ἀπόλωλεν. 5
tὸ δὲ οἶμαι, ὡς Σιμμεία, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει· σκόπει γὰρ καὶ σὺ ἀλέγω. πᾶς γὰρ ὑπολαβόν ὅτι εὕηθες λέγει ὁ τοῦτο λέγων· ὁ γὰρ ψυχής οὕτως πολλὰ κατατρέψας τοιαῦτα ἰμάτια καὶ ὑφημάμενος ἑκεῖνων μὲν ὢστέρος ἀπόλωλεν πολλῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ· τοῦτο τοῦτον εἶνει ἀνθρώπος ἢ ἰματίον φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἀσθενέστερον. τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην οἶμαι εἰκόνα δέχασθαι ὅτι ψυχὴ πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ τις λέγων αὐτὰ ταύτα περὶ αὐτῶν μέτρι' ἂν μοι φαίνεται λέγειν, ὡς ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ 5

polυχρώνιον ἔστιν, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ὀλιγοχρωνιώτερον· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἂν φαίνῃ ἑκάστῃ τῶν ψυχῶν πολλὰ σώματα κατατρέψεως, ἀλλος τε καὶ πολλὰ ἔτη βιώ—εἰ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπόλλυον ἢτι διὸ τοῦτον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ἡ ψυχὴ ἀεὶ τὸ κατατρέβομενον ἀνυφαίρετον—ἀναγκαῖον μενταν εἰς, ὅποτε ἀπολλύοιτο ἡ ψυχή, τὸ τελευταῖον ὑφασμα τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν καὶ τοῦτον μόνον προτέραν ἀπόλλυοι, ἀπολομένης δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τότ' ἢδη τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἀσθενείας ἑπιδεικνύοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταχώ σαπεὶ διόχουτο. 5

ἀστε τοῦτῷ τῷ λόγῳ οὔπω ἄξιον πιστεύων ταρρεώς ὡς ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐτί που ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ 88
tις καὶ πλέον ἐτί τοῦ λέγοντι ἢ ἀν λέγεις συγχρηστέεις, δοὺς αὐτῷ μη μόνον ἐν τῷ πρῶτῳ καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρώνῳ εἰμαι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς, ἀλλὰ μὴν κωλύς καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἑτί εἰμαι καὶ ἐσεθῶ καὶ πολλάκις γενήτι 5

σεθαί καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὕτης—οὐτώ γὰρ αὕτῳ φύσει

ος ἀποκριμένου T
dή om. W
tivos seclusi
c7 γὰρ
B: om. TW
e9 ὀστέρος B T et s. v. W: ὀστέρον B2 TW
d3 ταύτην B4 TW: om. B
d5 αὐτῶν B2 TW: τῶν αὐτῶν B
μὲν ψυχῆ B: ψυχῆ μὲν TW
d8 καὶν B2 TW: καὶ el B
biφή B W
ai ἡ ψυχῆ ημῶν TW
a4 τὰς ψυχὰς B: τῆς
ψυχῆς TW
ισχυρόν εἶναι, ὡστε πολλάκις γινομένην ψυχήν ἀντέχειν —διόσ δὲ ταύτα ἔκεινο μηκέτι συγχώροι, μή οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεωι καὶ τελευτῶσαν γε ἐν τοῖς τῶν θανάτων παντάπασι ἀπόλλυσαν, τούτον δὲ τὸν.

b θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἢ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὀλέθρον μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι—ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁτρῶν αἰσθήσεθαι ἥμων—εἰ δὲ τούτο οὕτως ἔχει, οὐδεὶς προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μή οὐκ ἀνοίητος θαρρεῖν, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδείξει ὃτι ἔστιν ψυχὴ παντάπασι ἀδύνατον τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἀεὶ τοῦ μέλλοντα ἀποθανεῖσθαι δεδείναι ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς μὴ ἐν τῇ νῦν τοῦ σώματος διαξεῖξει παντάπασι ἀπόληται.

c Πάντες οὖν ἀκούσαντες εἰσποντίσαντες αὐτῶν ἁρδῶς διετέθη-μεν, ὡς ὅστερον ἐλέγομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅτι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐμπροσθεν λόγον σφόδρα πεπευσμένους ἡμᾶς πάλιν ἐδόκοις ἀναταράξας καὶ εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοῖς προερημένοις λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ὅστερον μέλλοντα ῥήθησεν, μή οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι εἶμεν κριταί ἡ καὶ τὰ πρά-

EX. Νη τοὺς θεοῦς, ὦ Φαίδων, συγγνώμην γε ἐξὼ ἢμῶν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτῶν με νῦν ἀκούσαντα σου τοιοῦτον τι λέγειν πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἐπέρχεται: "Τίνι οὖν ἔτι πιστεύσωμεν λόγῳ; ὡς γὰρ σφόδρα πιθανός ὄν, ὅτι ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν οἷς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκεν." θαυμαστῶς γὰρ μοι ὁ λόγος οὗτος ἀντιλαμβάνεται καὶ νῦν καὶ ἄει, τὸ ἀρμονίαν τύλα ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ὅσπερ ὑπέμνησεν μὲ νηθεῖς ὅτι καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ταύτα προωθέσκετο. καὶ πάνω δέομαι πάλιν ὅσπερ ἐς ἀρχής ἀλλον τῶν λόγων ὃς με πείσει ὡς τοῦ ἀποθαναντός οὐ σωμαποθηήσει ε ἡ ψυχή. λέγε ὦν πρὸς
Διὸς τῇ ὁ Σωκράτης μετῆλθε τὸν λόγον; καὶ πότερον κάκεινος, ὥσπερ ὑμᾶς φής, ἐνδηλόσ τι ἐγένετο ἀχόμενος ἢ 
οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρῶς ἐβοήθη τῷ λόγῳ; [ἡ] καὶ ἰκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν 
ἡ ἐνδεῖς; πάντα ἤμων διέλθε ὡς δύνασαι ἀκριβέστατα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Καὶ μή, ὁ 'Εχέκρατες, πολλάκις θαυμάσας 
Σωκράτη οὐ πώποτε μᾶλλον ἡγάσθην ἡ τότε παραγενομένος. 5 
tὸ μὲν ὁν ἔχεω ὅτι λέγοι ἐκεῖνος ἱσως οὐδὲν ἀτοπον· ἀλλὰ 
ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐθαύμασα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν τούτο, ὡς ἤδεως 
καὶ εὔμενῶς καὶ ἀγαμένως τῶν νεανίσκων τὸν λόγον ἀπ- 
edεξατο, ἐπείτα ἡμῶν ὡς δέξασ ὅσθετο δ’ ἐπούθμεμεν ὑπὸ 
tῶν λόγων, ἐπείτα ὡς εὐ ἡμᾶς ἱάσατο καὶ ὡσπερ πεφευγότας 
καὶ ἦττημένους ἀνεκαλέσατο καὶ προὔπερεθεν πρὸς τὸ παρ- 
ἐπεσθαί τε καὶ συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

EX. Πῶς δὴ;

ΦΑΙΔ. 'Εγὼ ἐρώ. ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐν δεξία αὐτοῦ καθη- 
μενος παρὰ τὴν κλίνην ἐπὶ χαμαιζήλου τινός, ὃ δὲ ἐτὶ πολὺ 
ὑψηλοτέρου ἢ ἐγώ. καταψήφισα ὁν μου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ 
συμπιέσας τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ αὐχένι τρίχας—εἰδαθε γάρ, ὅποτε 
tόχοι, παλάξεω μου εἰς τὰς τρίχας—Ἀδριων δὴ, ἐφή, ἱσως, ὁ 
Φαίδων, τὰς καλὰς ταύτας κόμας ἀποκερβή.

"Εοικεν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ Σώκρατες.
Οὐκ, ἂν γε ἐμοὶ πείδη.
’Αλλὰ τί; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ.

Τήμερον, ἐφη, κάγῳ τᾶς ἐμᾶς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ γε 
ἡμῶν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυσώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώ- 
το σαθαί. καὶ ἐγὼγ’ ἂν, εὶ σὺ εἶν καὶ με διαφέγοι ὁ 
λόγος, ἐνορκοῦν ἂν ποιήσαίμην ὡσπερ ’Αργείου, μὴ πρότερον 
κομήσειν, πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ 
Κέβητος λόγον.

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81 τῇ B: om. T 62 ἢ B: ἢ T: om. al. Heindorf 85 τότε 
B²_TW: ποτέ B 69 καθήμενος εν δεξίᾳ αὐτοῦ TW 61 πολύ 
B: πολλῷ B b 5 ταύτας B²_TW: om. B b 7 γε ἐμοὶ BT: 
ἐμονή W, b 10 δυσώμεθα B²_TW: δυσώμεθα B c 1 διαφύγωι TW 
3 ἀναμαχόμενοι in marg. T

PLATO, VOL. 1.
5 'Αλλ’, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὖδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς οἷς τε εἶναι.

'Αλλὰ καὶ ἐμὲ, ἐφή, τὸν Ἰόλεων παρακάλει, ἔως ἕτι φῶς ἐστὶν.

Παρακαλῶ τοῖς, ἐφην, οὐχ ὡς Ἡρακλῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς Ἰόλεως τὸν Ἡρακλῆ.

Οὐδὲν διοίκει, ἐφη. ἀλλὰ πρώτον εὐλαβηθῶμεν τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν.

Τὸ ποίον; ἢν δ’ ἐγώ.

d Μὴ γενώμεθα, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, μισόλογοι, ὁσπερ οἱ μισανθρωποὶ γιγνόμενοι ὡς οὖκ ἐστὶν, ἐφή, ὅτι ἂν τις μεῖζον τοῦτο κακὸν πάθοι ἡ λόγους μισήςας. γίγνεται δὲ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τρόπου μισολογία τε καὶ μισανθρωπία. ἢ τε γὰρ μισανθρώπια ἔνυδεται ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα τινὶ πιστεῦσαι ἀνευ τέχνης, καὶ ἡγήσασθαι παντάπασι γε ἄληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ύγιὴ καὶ πιστὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐπειτα ὄλγους ὑστερον εὑρεῖν τοῦτον πονηρόν τε καὶ ἀπιστον, καὶ αὕθες ἔτερον καὶ ὅταν τοῦτο πολλάκις πάθη τις καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦτων μάλιστα οὖς ἂν ἡγήσαιτο

ε οἰκειοτάτους τε καὶ ἐκταιροστάτους, τελευτῶν δὴ θαμὰ προσκρούων μισεῖ τε πάντας καὶ ἡγεῖται οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ύγίες εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. ἢ οὖν ἰησθησαί σὺ πω τοῦτο γιγνόμενον;

Τάνυ γε, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ.

5 Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, αἰσχρόν, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τάνθρωπεια τοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπεχείρει τοῖς ἄνθρωποις; εἰ γὰρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἔχρητο, ὁσπερ ἔχει οὕτως ἄν ἡγήσατο, τούς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα ὄλγους εἶναι ἐκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφήνι ἐγώ.

"Ωσπερ, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, περὶ τῶν σφόδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων

5  ὅ Ἡρακλῆς λέγεται Β" TW
9  τοῖνυν ἐφην Β" W: τοῖνυν
10 ἐφή B: ἐφην τοῖνυν T ἀσ B: ἄσ ὅ T e11 ἐφη B: om. T
13 d6 γε Β" TW: τε B ε3 σύ τω] σὺ B et in marg. gr. W: οὕτω T W: οὕτω Stob. e6 ἐπεχείρει Stob.: ἐπιχείρει B TW ἀνθρώποι B" TW: ἀνθρωπεῖοι B a1 ἡγῆσατο B Stob.: ἡγῆσατο Tb a3 ἐφην B: ἢν δ’ TW
οικε τι σπανιοτέρων εἶναι ἡ σφόδρα μέγαν ἡ σφόδρα σμικρὸν 5
ἐξευρέω ἀνθρωπον ἡ κώνα ἡ ἀλλο ὅτιον; ἢ αὐ ταχὺν ἡ
βραδὺν ἡ άλεχρὸν ἡ καλὸν ἡ λευκὸν ἡ μέλανα; ἢ οὐχὶ
θητηναι ὅτι πάντων τῶν τοιούτων τὰ μὲν ἀκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων
σπάνια καὶ οἶλγα, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ ἁφθονα καὶ πολλά;
Πάνυ γε, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ.
Οὐκοῦν οἰεῖ, ἐφη, ἐν πονηρίας ἀγῶν προτεθείη, πάνυ ἀν
ἀλγίους καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς πρῶτος φανήναι;
Εἰκός γε, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ.
Εἰκός γάρ, ἐφη. ἀλλὰ ταστη μὲν οὖν ὅμου οἱ λόγοι
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ σοῦ νῦν ὅτι προάγοντο ἐγώ ἐφεστῶμι, 5
ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνη, ἢ καὶ ἐπειδὰν τις πιστεύῃ λόγῳ τῷ ἀληθεί
εἶναι ἀνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, κάπετα ἀλγίῳ
ὑστερον αὐτῷ δόξη ψευδής εἶναι, ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁν, ἐνίοτε δ᾽
οὐκ ὁν, καὶ αὖθις ἑτερος καὶ ἑτερος—καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ
περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρήσατε οὐσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευ-
τάτης οὖνται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι καὶ κατανεονκέναι
μόνον ὅτι οὗτο τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδένος οὐδέν οὐγίς οὐδὲ
βέβαιον οὗτο τῶν λόγων, ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ὅντα ἄτεχνος ὅστερ
ἄν Εὐρίπη ἄνω κάτω στρέφεται καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα ἐν
οὐδέν μὲνε.
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἐφην ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Οὐκοῦν, ὃ Φαίδων, ἐφη, οἰκτρῶν ἄν ἐγ τὸ πάθος, εἰ
ἀντος δὴ τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βέβαιοι λόγοι καὶ διηνατοῦ
κατανοῆσαι, ἐπείτα διὰ τὸ παραβγῆσθαι τοιούτως τισὶν
λόγους, τοὺς αὐτοὺς τὸς μὲν δοκοῦσιν ἀληθεῖς εἶναι, τοτὲ
de μὴ, μὴ ἔαντον τις ἀλτυτό μηδὲ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ἀτεχνίαν,
ἀλλὰ τελευτῶν διὰ τὸ ἰάγειν ἀσμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀφ'
5 έαυτού τήν αιτίαν ἀπώστατο καὶ ἥδη τῶν λοιπῶν βίων μισῶν
tε καὶ λοιδορῶν τοὺς λόγους διατελού, τῶν δὲ ὑπὸν τῆς
ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης στερηθείν.

Νὴ τὸν Δία, ἥν ὁ ἐγώ, οἰκτρῶν ὑδτα.

Πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς, ἐφη, τούτῳ εὐλαβηθῶμεν, καὶ μὴ
ἐ παρόμενεν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν ὡς τῶν λόγων κωνδυνεύει οὐδὲν
ἀναιρεῖ εἰναι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἡμεῖς σὰν τὸν ψυχῶς ἔχομεν,
ἀλλὰ ἀναρταστεῖν καὶ προβουμετέουν ψυχῶς ἔχειν, σοὶ μὲν οὖν
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ τοῦ ἐπείτα βίου παντὸς ἕνεκα, ἔμοι δὲ

91 αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦ βαθαντοῦ, ὡς κωνδυνεύῃ ἔγγονεν εἰς τὸν
παρὼντι περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐ διαφοράς ἔχειν ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ οἱ πάνω
ἀπαίδευσαν φιλονίκως. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι ὅταν περὶ τοῦ ἀμ-
φιστηρῶσιν, ὅτι μὲν ἔχει περὶ δὲν ἂν ὁ λόγος ἡ οὐ φροντί-
5 ζουσιν, ὅπως δὲ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐθεατο ταῦτα δόξει τοῖς παρώσιν,
tοῦτο προβουμοῦνται. καὶ ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ ἐν τῷ παρῴλτι
τοσοῦτον μόνον ἐκείνων διοίκεσιν οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παρώσιν
δ’ ἐγὼ λέγω δόξει ἀληθῆ εἰναι προβουμισμοῖ, εἰ μὴ εἰπ
πάρεργον, ἀλλ’ ὅπως αὐτῷ ἔμοι ὅτι μάλλοντά δόξει οὕτως

b ἔχεων. λογίζομαι γὰρ, ὡς φίλε ἐταῖρε—θέσασι ὡς πλεο-
exekikos—εἰ μὲν τυχάνει ἀληθῆ οὔτα δ’ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ
᾿ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἔστι τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ’ ὅν τοῖνι
γε τῶν χρώμων αὐτοῦ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ βαθαντὸν ἔτους τοῖς
5 παρώσιν ἀπὸς ἐσομαι δυναμοῖν, ἡ δὲ ἀνοια μοι αὐτὴ οὐ
συνδιατελεῖ—κακὸν γὰρ ἂν ἢ—ἀλλ’ ἄλλον ὡσπερ ἀπο-
λεῖται. παρεσκευασμένοι δὴ, ἐφη, ὡς Σιμμίλα τε καὶ Κέβθης,
οὕτωσι ἐρχομαι ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων· ὅμεις μέντοι, ἂν ἔμοι πελ-
thēse, σμικρὸν φροντίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ ἀλήθειας
πολὺ μᾶλλον, έαν μὲν τι ύμῶν δοκῶ ἀλῆθες λέγειν, συνομο-
λογίσατε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε, εὐλαβοῦνειν

d 6 τοὺς λόγους B3 TW: om. B d 9 εὐλαβηθῶμεν BT: εὐλα
βηθῶμεν B3 W (sed δόμεν s. v.) a 3 φιλονίκως Bτ: φιλον
φιλοβοτήσωσιν T W a 8-9 δόξει T: δόξη B a 8 προβουμοῖ: T: προβο
μισμοῖ B b 1 ὡς BT: ὡσπερ W b 4 γε B3 TW:
d B b 5 ἄνοια B3 TW: διάνοια B b 7 ἄν B: μὲν ὅθ T
b c 2 λέγειν ἀληθεῖς T c 3 εὐλαβοῦνειν Β3 TW: om. B
διως μὴ ἐγώ ὑπὸ προθυμίας ἀμα ἐμαυτόν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἔξα-
πατήσας, διότερ μέλιτα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλιπὼν οἰχήσομαι. 5
'

'Αλλ' ἰτέου, ἔφη. πρῶτον μὲ ὑπομνήσατε ἃ ἐλέγετε, ἐδι
μὴ φαίνωμαι μεμνημένος. Συμμίασ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ ἦμα, ἀπιστεῖ τε καὶ φοβεῖται μὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅμως καὶ θειότερον καὶ
κάλλιον διὸ τοῦ σώματος προαπολλύσην ἐν ἀρμονίας εἶδει
σῶσα. Κέβης δὲ μοι ἐδοξέ τούτο μὲν ἐμοὶ συγχωρεῖν,
pολυχρωμώτερόν γε εἶναι ψυχῇν σώματος, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδηλον παντὶ, μὴ πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις κατα-
tρύφασα ἡ ψυχῇ τὸ τελευταῖον σῶμα καταλυτοῦσα νῦν
ἀυτὴ ἀπολλύσην, καὶ ἡ αὐτὸ τοῦτο θάνατος, ψυχῆς ὀλε-
θρος, ἐπεὶ σῶμά γε ἂν ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται. ἀρα
ἀλλ' ἡ ταύτ' ἐστίν, δὲ Συμμίαι τε καὶ Κέβης, δ' δεὶ ἡμᾶς
ἐπισκοπεῖσθαί;

Συνωμολογεῖτην δὴ ταύτ' εἶναι ἀμφώ.

Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθε λόγους οὐκ
ἀποδέχεσθε, ἡ τους μὲν, τους δ' οὖ;

Τοὺς μὲν, ἔφατην, τοὺς δ' οὖ.

Τι οὖν, ἡ δ' ὅσ, περὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου λέγετε ἐν ὧν
ἐφαμεν τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον οὕτως
ἐχοντος ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἀλλοθι πρότερον ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν
ψυχήν, πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδεχῆναι;

'Εγὼ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καὶ τότε θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην
ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ νῦν ἐμμένω ὡς οὐδεὶ λόγφ.

Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας, καὶ αὕτος οὕτως ἔχω, καὶ πάνυ
ἀν θαυμάζομι εἰ μοι περὶ ὑγείας καὶ ὅτι δόξειν.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη σοι, ἔφη, ὡς ἔγενε Θηβαῖε,
ἀλλὰ δοξαί, ἐάνπερ μενή ἢδε ἡ οὐχίσις, τὸ ἀρμονίαν μὲν εἶναι
σύνθετον πράγμα, ψυχήν δὲ ἀρμονίαν τιμᾷ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸ

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*e7 γάρ B: om. T δὲς ἔγιναι om. W: ἔγιναι s. v. w d1 καλ-
λιστὸν W d5 νῦν ante τὸ τελευταίων transp. T d8 δὲ e
δὴ T e4 ἐφάτην Tb Stob. φάτην B W e5 λέγετε T Stob.:
λέγεται BW e7 ἄλλωθι T: ἄλλο τι B Stob. ἄλλοι παῦ W
a3 ἐμμενὼ W a5 ἄλλο Tb: ἄλλα B W Stob. ποτὲ τι scripsi:
potὲ ἐτι T Stob.: ποτὲ BW a7 ἄλλα] ἄλλο Stob. δοξαί T
Stob. (sed δοξαὶ en pr. T): δοξάσαί B W*
σῶμα ἐντεταμένων συγκείσθαι οὐ γάρ ποὺ ἀποδέξῃ γε 5 ἑκένω εἶναι εἴς ὧν ἑδεῖ αὐτὴν συντεθήναι. ἢ ἀποδέξῃ;
Οὐδαμώς, ἐφη, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς.

Αἰσθάνῃ οὖν, ἢ β' δ', ὅτι ταῦτα σοι συμβαίνει λέγειν,
5 ὅταν φῆς μὲν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπων εἶδός
tε καὶ σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, εἶναι δὲ αὐτὴν συγκείμενην ἐκ τῶν
οὐδέτω ὄντων; οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἀρμονία γέ σοι τοιοῦτον ἐστιν ὧν
ἀπεικάζεις, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ καὶ
c οἱ φθόγγοι ἔτι ἀνάρμοστοι οὕτως γίγνονται, τελευταῖον δὲ
πάντων συνίσταται ἡ ἀρμονία καὶ πρῶτον ἀπόλλυται. οὕτος
οὖν σοι ὃ λόγος ἐκεῖνος πῶς συνάστεται;
Οὐδαμώς, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας.

5 Καὶ μήν, ἢ δ' δ', πρέπει γε εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ συνώδῃ
εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἀρμονίας.
Πρέπει γάρ, ἐφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
Οὕτος τούτων, ἐφη, σοι οὐ συνώδος ἀλλ' ὃρα πότερον
αἵρῃ τῶν λόγων, τὴν μάθησιν ἀνάμιμησιν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴν
10 ἀρμονίαν;

Πολὺ μάλλον, ἐφη, ἐκείνον, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς. ὃδε μὲν γὰρ
μοι γέγονεν ἄνευ ἀποδέξεως μετὰ εἰκότων τινὸς καὶ εὑπρε-
tελαῖ ὃθεν καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκεῖ ἀνθρώπων ἐγὼ δὲ τοῖς
dιὰ τῶν εἰκότων τὰς ἀποδέξεις ποιομένοις λόγοις σύνοδα
οὖσαν ἀλαζόσω, καὶ ἄν τις αὐτοὺς μὴ φιλατίτηται, εὖ μάλα
5 ἔξαπατώσω, καὶ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄπασιν.
δὲ περὶ τῆς ἀναμνήσεως καὶ μαθήσεως λόγον δὴ ὑποθέσεως
ἄξιας ἀποδέξασθαι ἐξητεί. ἐρρήνη γὰρ ποὺ οὕτως ἢμων
εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὀσπερ αὐτῆς
ἐστιν ἡ οὖσια ἔχουσα τὴν ἑπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ "δ ἐστιν"

ξασθαι W sed à supra d 8 αὐτῆς] αὐτῆ Mudge
ΦΑΙΔΩΝ

92 ε.

ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην, ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, ἵκανός τε καὶ ὁρθῶς ἀποδειγμαί. ἀνάγκη οὖν μοι, ὡς ἠοίκε, διὰ ταύτα μὴ τε ἐμαυτῷ μὴτε ἄλλου ἀποδέχεσθαι λέγοντος ὡς ψυχή ἐστιν ἄρμονία.

Τί δὲ, ἢ δ' ὦς, ἢ Σιμμία, τήδε; δοκεῖ σοι ἄρμονία ἢ ἄλλη τυλι συνθέσει προσήκεις ἄλλως πως ἔχεις ἡ ὡς ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἐχῦ ἐξ ἂν ἂν συγκέπτας;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Οὐδὲ μὴν ποιεῖς τι, ὡς ἔγγυμαι, οὐδὲ τι πάσχεις ἄλλο παρ' ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἢ ποιῇ ἢ πάσχῃ; Συνεφή.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἤγείσθαί γε προσήκει ἄρμονίαν τούτων ἐξ ἂν ἂν συντεθῇ, ἄλλ' ἔπεσθαι. Συνεδόκει.

Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἑναντία γε ἄρμονία κυνηγήσαι ἂν ἡ φθέγγασθαι ἢ τι ἄλλο ἑναντιοθῇ τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν.

Πολλοῦ μέντοι, ἐφη.

Τί δὲ; οὖν οὕτως ἄρμονία πέφυκε εἰναι ἐκάστη ἄρμονία ὡς ἂν ἄρμοσθῇ;

Οὐ μανθάνω, ἐφη.

"Ἡ οὐχὶ, ἢ δ' ὦς, ἂν μὲν μᾶλλον ἄρμοσθῇ καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον, εἴπερ εὐνέχεσθαι τούτῳ γλύνεσθαι, μᾶλλον τε ἂν ἄρμονία εἰη καὶ πλεῖων, εἰ δ' ἢπτῶν τε καὶ ἐπ' ἐλαττοῦ, ἢπτων τε καὶ ἐλάττων;

Πάνω γε.

"Ἡ οὖν ἐστὶ τούτῳ περὶ ψυχῆν, ὡστε καὶ κατὰ τὸ σμικρότατον μᾶλλον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πλέον καὶ μᾶλλον 5 ἢ ἐπ' ἐλαττοῦ καὶ ἢπτον αὐτὸ τούτῳ εἶναι, ψυχή;

Οὔθ' ὅπωςτόιοι, ἐφη.

Φέρε δή, ἐφη, πρὸς Διός: λέγεται ψυχή ἢ μὲν νοῦν τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄρετήν καὶ εἰναι ἀγαθή, ἢ δὲ ἄναιάν τε καὶ μοχθηρίᾳ καὶ εἰναι κακή; καὶ ταύτα ἀληθώς λέγεται;

"Αληθῶς μεντοι.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

Τών οὖν θεμένων ψυχῆν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι τί τις φήσει
ταῦτα ὡντα εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τὴν τε ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν
5 κακίαν; πότερον ἀρμονίαν αὕτω τινα ἄλλην καὶ ἀναρμοστίαν;
καὶ τὴν μὲν ἥρμοσθαι, τὴν ἀγαθὴν, καὶ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ
ἀρμονία σοφὴ ἄλλῃ ἀρμονίᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἀναρμοστὸν αὐτήν τε
εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῇ ἄλλῃ;

Οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγ’, ἔφη ὁ Συμμίας, εἰπεῖν δὴ δὴν ὁτι
10 τοιαύτ’ ἀττ’ ἄν λέγοι ὁ ἐκείνῳ ὑποθέμενος.

ὁ ἄλλα προωμολόγηται, ἔφη, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ’ ἦττον
έτέραν ἐτέρας ψυχήν ψυχῆς εἶναι· τούτῳ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμο-
λόγημα, μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδ’ ἐπὶ πλέον μηδ’ ἦττον μηδ’ ἐπ’
έλαττον ἐτέραν ἐτέρας ἀρμονίαν ἀρμονίας εἶναι. ἡ γάρ;

5 Πάνω γε.
Τὴν δὲ γε μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἦττον ἀρμονίαν οὕδαν μήτε
μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἥρμοσθαι· ἔστω οὕτως;

’Εστιν.

Ἡ δὲ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἦττον ἥρμοσμένη ἔστω ὅτι πλέον
10 ἢ ἐλαττῶν ἀρμονίας μετέχει, ἡ τὸ ἴσον;
Τὸ ίσον.

Οὐκοῦν ψυχῆ ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδ’ ἦττον ἄλλη
e ἄλλης αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχῆ, ἐστὶν, οὐδὲ δὴ μᾶλλον οὐδὲ ἦττον
$header: Η' άρμοστάι;

Οὐτω.

Τούτῳ δὲ γε πεπονθεῖα οὐδὲν πλέον ἀναρμοστίας οὐδὲ
5 ἀρμονίας μετέχοι ἄν;

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Τοῦτο δ’ αὖ πεπονθεῖα ἄρ’ ἄν τι πλέον κακίας ἡ ἀρετὴς
μετέχοι ἐτέρα ἐτέρας, εἰπερ ἡ μὲν κακία ἀναρμοστία, ἡ δὲ
ἀρετὴ ἀρμονία εἰς;

α3 θεμένων B: τιθεμένων T
Stob. α5 πότερον B: πότερα T
Stob. α9 ἐγὼνε, φησιν Stob. d BΤW: 2 B
d4 ἀρμονίας secl. Schmidt 6-7 μήτε . . . μήτε Stallbaum: μηδὲ . . . μηδὲ BΤW
ε1 οὐδὲ] οὐδὲν Bekker
Οὐδὲν πλέον.
Μᾶλλον δὲ γέ που, ὅ Σιμμία, κατὰ τὸν ὅρθον λόγου κακιάς οὐδεμία ψυχή μεθέξει, εἰπερ ἄρμονία ἐστὶν ἄρμονία γαρ ὅποιν παντελῶς αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὖσα, ἄρμονία, ἀναμοστίας οὖσον' ἀν ἐμετάσχοι.
Οὐ μέντοι.
Οὐδὲ γε ὅποιν ψυχή, οὖσα παντελῶς ψυχή, κακιάς.
Pῶς γὰρ ἐκ γε τῶν προειρημένων;
'Εκ τούτου ἄρα τοῦ λόγου ἡμῖν πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ πάντων ζων ὀμολογῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἐσονται, εἰπερ ὀμολογὸς ψυχαὶ πεφύκασιν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ψυχαὶ, εἶναι.
'Εμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἐφη, ὅ Ὢσκρατες.
'Η καὶ καλῶς δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτω λέγεσθαι, καὶ πάσχειν ἂν ταῦτα δ' λόγος εἰ ὅρθὴ ἡ ὑπόθεσις ἢ, τὸ ψυχήν ἄρμονίαν b εἶναι;
Οὐδ' ὀπωσιτιοῦν, ἐφη.
Τι δέ; ἦ δ' ὅς τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων ἔσοι' ὃτι ἄλλο λέγεις ἄρχειν ἢ ψυχὴν ἀλλως τε καὶ φρόνιμον;
Οὐκ ἔγωγεν.
Πότερον συγχωροῦσαν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσιν ἢ καὶ ἐναντιομένην; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνυς, οἶνον καθήματος ἐνότος καὶ ὀ λύσουσ ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἐλκευν, τὸ μὴ πίνειν, καὶ πείνης ἐνυόψης ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ ἔσθελεν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία ποὺ ὀρῶμεν 10 ἐναντιομένην τὴν ψυχὴν τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα: ἦ οὔ;
Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
Οὐκοῦν αὖ ὀμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μῆποτ' ἂν αὐτὴν, ἄρμονίαν γε οὖσαν, ἐναντία ᾧδειν οἷς ἐπιτελεύτο

5 καὶ χαλύτω καὶ ψάλλω το καὶ άλλο ὅτι οιν πάδος πάσχειν ἓκεινα ἐξ δι τυγχάνοι οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἐπεσθαί ἓκεινας καὶ οὔτων δι' ἵγμοινεῖς;

'Ωμολογήσαμεν, ἔφη· πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

Τὶ οὖν; νῦν οὖ πάν τοῦντιν ήμῖν φαίνεται ἐργαζομένη, ἵγμοινεῖς τα ἓκεινων πάντως ἐξ δι' θη πίς τις αὐτὴν δ εἶναι, καὶ ἐναντιομένη ὁλίγον πάντα διὰ παντός τοῦ βίων καὶ δεσπόζουσα πάντας τρόπους, τὰ μὲν χαλεπώτερον κολάζουσα καὶ μετ' ἀλγηδόνων, τὰ τε κατὰ τὴν γυμναστικὴν καὶ τὴν λατρικὴν, τὰ δὲ πρότερον, τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ 5 υποθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὀργαῖς καὶ φόβοις ὡς ἄλλη οὖσα ἄλλῳ πράγματι διαλεγομένη; οὗν ποῦ καὶ Ὁμηρος ἐν Ἐκατονταπλεῖον, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὁμηρος ἐν τοῦ Ὁμηρος ἐν Ἐκατονταπλεῖον, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὁμηρος ἐν Ἐκατονταπλεῖον, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὁμηρος ἐν Ἐκατονταπλεῖον, οὗ λέγει τὸν Ὁμηρος ἐν τοῦ Ὁμηρος ἐν 95 ἄρ' οἴει αὐτὸν ταῦτα ποιῆσαι διανοούμενον ὡς ἀρμονίας αὐτῆς οὖσας καὶ οίας ἀγεσθαὶ ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος παθημάτων, ἀλλ' οὐχ οίας ἀγεως τα ταῦτα καὶ δεσπόζειν, καὶ 5 οὖσας αὐτῆς πολὺ θειότερον τινὸς πράγματος ἣ καὶ ἀρμονίαν;

Ἡ Δία, ὁ Σωκράτες, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Οὐκ ἄρα, ὁ ἄριστε, ἡμῖν οὐδαμῇ καλῶς ἔχει ψυχήν ἄρμονίας τινὰ φάναι εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ ἄν, ὡς ἐοικεν, Ὅμηρος θεῖῳ ποιητῇ ὀμολογοῦμεν οὔτε αὐτοῖ ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς.

'Εχει οὕτως, ἔφη.

Εἰ ἐν δὴ, ἣ δ' ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης, τὰ μὲν Ἀρμονίας ἡμῖν τῆς Ἡθορίης ἐκέασ πως, ὡς ἐοικε, μετρίως γέγονεν· τὶ δὲ δὴ τὰ Κάδμου, ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης, πᾶς ἰλασόμεθα καὶ τινὶ λόγῳ;

Σὺ μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἐξευρήσεσθαι· τοποῦν γοῦν

c 5 ψάλλω το pr. T (ut vid.) Stob.: πάλλων B TW e 6 τυγχάνοι T: τυγχάνει B Stob. a 9 νῦν B TW Stob.: ἐν τοῖς ἐν τοῖς W d 1 ἐναντιομένη B TW Stob.: ἐναντιομένῃ B d 3 τε B TW Stob.: τοῦ W e 3 παθημάτων B TW Stob.: παθῶν B e 5 πράγματος B: om. T Stob. e 7 ἔμοιγε B Stob.: ἐμοι T a 3 ἔχει T W Stob.: ἔχει B t a 7 τοποῦ B: τοῦ T
τον λόγον τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἀρμονίαν θαυμαστῶς μοι ἔπες ὡς παρὰ δόξαν. Συμμιλός γὰρ λέγοντος ὅτε ἦπορεί, πάνω ἐθαύμαζον εἰ τι ἔξει τις χρῆσαθαί τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ· πάνω οὖν μοι ἀτόπως ἔδοξεν εὐθὺς τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον οὕτω δέξασθαι τοῦ σοῦ λόγου. ταῦτα δὴ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζαμεν καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κάδμου λόγον εἰ πάθοι.

Ὡγαθέ, ἐφή ὁ Σωκράτης, μὴ μέγα λέγε, μὴ τις ἢμῖν 5 βασκανία περιτρέψῃ τὸν λόγον τὸν μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι. ἄλλα δὴ ταῦτα μὲν τῷ θεῷ μελήσει, ἁμεῖς δὲ Ὀμηρικῶς ἐγγύς λόντες πειρώμεθα εἰ ἁρὰ τι λέγεις. ἐστὶ δὲ δὴ τὸ κεφάλαιον δὲν ξητεῖς. ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδεικνύσαι ἦμῖν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρον τε καὶ ἀθαναστὸν οὕσαν, εἰ φιλόσοφος ἀνήρ μέλησαι τοῖς ἀποθανεῖσαι, τραχῶν τε καὶ ἤγουμεν ἀποθανοῦν ἐκεῖ εὔ πρᾶξεις διαφερόντως ἦ εἰ ἐν ἀλλῷ βίῳ βίους ἐτελεύτα, μὴ ἀνόητόν τε καὶ ἡλίθιον τάρρος παρρήσει. τὸ δὲ ἀποφαίνειν ἃτι ἱσχυρῶν τὶ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ θεοεἶδες καὶ ἢν ἐτι 5 πρότερον, πρὸς ἢμᾶς ἀνθρώπους γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν καλύτερον θὰ πάντα ταῦτα μηνύει ἀθανασίαν μὲν μὴ, ὅτι δὲ πολυχρώμισιν τὲ ἐστὶν ψυχὴ καὶ ἢν ποὺ πρῶτερον ἀμήχανον ὄσον χρῶνον καὶ ἢδει τε καὶ ἐπραττεν πολλά ἀπατα· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἄθανατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπου σῶμα ἔλθειν ἀρχῇ ἡν αὐτῇ ὀλέθρου, ὡσπερ νόσος· καὶ ταλαιπωρομένῃ τε ὅταν τοῦ τὸν βίον ξῆ καὶ τελευτῶσα γε ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ ἀπολλύοντο. διαφέρειν δὲ δὴ φῆς οὐδὲν εἴτε ἀπαξ εἰς σῶμα ἔρχεσθαι εἴτε πολλάκις, πρὸς 5 γε τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἢμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσῆκει ἢμ.tensor. εἰ μὴ ἀνόητος εἰς, τῷ μὴ εἰσῆθαν μὴδὲ ἔχουτί λόγον διδόναι ὡς ἄθανατόν ἐστι· τοιαύτ' ἀπατ' ἐστίν, οἷμαι, ὁ Κέβης, ὃς εἰς ἀρχήν ἔρχεται· προσῆκει ἢμ. εἰς πολλάκις, πρὸς γε τὸ ἐκαστὸν ἢμῶν φοβεῖσθαι· προσῆκει ἢμ. ἀστῆ Β.: τοιαύτ' ἀπατ' ἐστίν, οἷμαι, ὁ Κέβης, ὃς εἰς ἀρχήν ἔρχεται· προσῆκει ἢμ.
Λέγεις· καὶ ἐξεπίπηδες πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνω, ἵνα μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἰ τὲ τι βούλει, προσθῆκε ἡ ἀφέλης.

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης, Ἀλλ’ οὖν ἐγώγε ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἐφη, 5 οὕτως ἀφελεῖν οὕτος προσθείναι δέομαι· ἐστὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἡ λέγω.

Ὁ οὖν Σωκράτης συνχύον χρόνον ἐπισχῶν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τι σκέψαμενος, ὡς φαύλον πράγμα, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, ζητείς· ὁλως γὰρ δεῖ [περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν] δια- πραγματεύσασθαι. ἐγώ οὖν σοι δλεμι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐὰν βούλῃς, τὰ γε ἐμά πάθης· ἐπειτα ἂν τί σοι χρήσμου φαύνηται ὃν ἄν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθώ περὶ ὃν ὑπ λέγεις χρήση.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, βούλομαι γε.

Ἀκοντο τούτον ὃς ἑρότυτος. ἐγώ γάρ, ἐφη, ὁ Κέβης, νέος δὲν βαμαστᾶς ὃς ἐπεθύμησα ταυτὴς τῆς σοφίας ἂν ὁ ἀλοῦσιν [περὶ φύσεως] ἱστορίαν ὑπέρήφανος γὰρ μοι ἐδόκει εἶναι, εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τὶ γίνεται ἐκαστον καὶ διὰ τὶ ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τὶ ἐστὶ καὶ πολλάκις

ἔμαντον ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοπῶν πρῶτον τὰ τοιάδε· ὡς ἐπειδὰν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν σημεῖον· τινὰ λάβῃ, ὃς τις ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ἡμι συντρέφεται; καὶ πότερον τὸ αἱμά ἄστιν ὃς φρουρίζει, ὁ δὲ ἀλη ἃ τῷ πῦρ; ἡ τούτων μὲν οὖν ὑδέν, ὃ γέγεφαλὸς ἐστὶν ὃς τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἀκούς καὶ ὑδραν καὶ ὑσφράωνται, ἐκ τούτων δὲ γύνοιτο μνήμης καὶ δόξα, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης λα- βοῦσα τὸ ἱμερεῖν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην; καὶ αὐ τούτων τὰς φθορὰς σκοπῶν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν

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tε καὶ τὴν γῆν πάθη, τελευτῶν οὕτως ἐμαυτῷ ἔδοξα πρὸς ταύτην τὴν σκέψιν ἀφυτῆς εἶναι ὡς οὐδὲν χρήμα. τεκμήριον δὲ σοι ἐρώτικαν· ἐγὼ γὰρ καὶ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὡς γέ ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοκοι, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐνυφλάθην, ὡστε τοποθετῆται καὶ ταῦτα ἀπέμαθον καὶ ταῦτα διὰ τοῦ ὃμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τούτῳ γὰρ ὃμην πρὸ τοῦ παῦσα δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθέλει καὶ πίνειν ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν οὐτῶν ταῖς μὲν σαρχὶ σάρκες προσγενώτερα, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστὰ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τοὺς αὐτῶν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τα αὐτῶν οἶκεια ἐκάστοις προσγένεται, τότε δή τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὑπότερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γένεσθαι τὸν σιμκρὸν ἀνθρωπὸν μέγαν. οὕτως τότε ὃμην οὐ δοκῶ σοι μετρίας;

"Εμοιγε, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.

Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τάδε ἔτι. ὃμην γὰρ ἦν καὶ οἰκῆς μοι δοκεῖν, ὅποτε τις φανερῶ ἀνθρωπὸς παραστᾶ μέγας σιμκρὰ μείζων εἶναι αὐτῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ ἵππος ἱπποὺ· καὶ ἔτι γε τούτῳ ἐναργεστέρα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν ὀκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοὶς προσείναι, καὶ τὸ δίπτυχο τοῦ πηχαίον μείζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμῖσει αὐτῶν ὑπερέχειν.

Νῦν δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν;

Πόρρω ποιν, ἔφη, νὴ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἶκεσθαι περὶ τούτων τοῦ τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὃς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπειδὰν ἐνι τις προσθῇ ἐν, ἢ τὸ ἐν δ' προσετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστέθη, ἢ τὸ προστεθέν καὶ δ' προσετέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου τοῦ ἐτέρῳ δύο ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ δὲ μὲν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρίς ἄλλης ἡμ, ἐν ἄρα ἐκάτερον ἡμ, καὶ οὐκ ἤπνην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ'
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επιληπτικός ἅλληλος, αὕτη ἀρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἔγένετο τοῦ δύο
5 γενέσθαι, ὡς σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίου ἅλληλων τεθημαὶ. οὐδὲ
gε ὡς ἄν ὄντος ἐν διασχισθεῖ, δύναιτι ἐτί πεῖθεσθαι ὡς αὕτη
αὕτη αἰτία γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι ἡ παρ
7 γίγνεται ἡ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο γίγνεσθαι; τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι
συνήγετο πλησίον ἅλληλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἐτέρων ἐτέρω,
νῦν δ' ὅτι ἀπάγαται καὶ χωρίζεται ἐτέρων ἀφ' ἐτέρου. οὐδὲ
gε ὅτι ἐν γίγνεται ὡς ἐπίσταμαι, ἐτί πεῖθω ἐμαυτοῦ,
5 οὖν ἀλλο ὑπὲρ ἐνι τὸν ἐκ ἢπία ὅτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀπόλλυται ἡ
ἐστι, κατὰ τούτον τῶν τρόπων τῆς μεθόδου, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀλλῶν
τρόπων αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, τούτων δὲ οὐδαμὴ προσέλμαι.

Ἀλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτὲ ἐκ βιβλίου τυόσ, ὡς ἐφή, Ἀναξ-
c ἁγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἀρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὃ
dιακοσμοῦν τε καὶ πάντων αἰτίου, ταῦτῃ δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ἡσθη
τε καὶ ἐδοξεῖ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εἰ ἐκεῖν τὸ τῶν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων
αἰτίου, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἴ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔκει, τὸν γε νοῦν
5 κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἐκαστὸν τιθέναι ταῦτῃ δὴ
ἀν βέλτιστα ἐκχῇ εἰ ὦ τι τοῦ βούλαιτο τήν αἰτίαν εὐρέω
περὶ ἐκάστου ὅτι γίγνεται ἡ ἀπόλλυται ἡ ἐστὶ, τοῦτο δεῖ
περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐρέων, δὴ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐστιν ἡ
d ἀλλὸ ὅτι αὐτῶν πάσχειν ἡ ποιεῖν' ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου
οὕτως ἀλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώποι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκεῖ
νου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλλ' ἡ τὸ ἀριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον.
ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν τούτον καὶ τὸ χειρὸν εἰδέναι
5 τήν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπίστημιν περὶ αὐτῶν. ταῦτα δὴ
λογιζόμενοι ἄσμενοι θηρηκέναι ὁμιν διδάσκαλον τῆς αἰτίας
περὶ τῶν ὅτων κατὰ νοὺν ἐμαυτῷ, τῶν 'Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ
μοι φράσεων πρῶτων μὲν πότερον ἡ γῆ πλατεία ἢ ἐστὶν ἡ
e στρογγυλή, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσεις, ἐπεκδιαγγέλεσθαι τήν αἰτίαν

a 4 αὐτοῖς αἰτία T τοῦ δύο W : δύο B : δυοῖν T a 6 διχάσῃ W
a 7 ad om. T b 1 ἡ W : ἡ BT μὲν om. W b 2 τὸ πλῆσιον
et max τὸ ἐτέρω W : b 3 ὑφ' W b 5 ἐν λόγῳ B : εἶν
ἀλήθεια T ἡ γίγνεται W c 2 δὴ B Eus. : ἡδη T τε B
Eus. : om. T d 1 ὅπῃ ἡ Eus. e 8 αἰτῷ B² T W Eus. : αὐ-
tῶν B d 2 προσήκειν B² T W : προσήκει B W ἐκεῖνον B : om.
e 1 ὑπεκδιαγγεῖσαθαί W (et max e 4, b 3)
καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἀμειων καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἀμειων ἐν τοιαύτην εἶναι καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἀμειων ἐν αὐτὴν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἰ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνω, παρεσκευάσμην ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἀλλο εἶδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἥλιον οὕτω παρεσκευάσμην ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρών, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πὴ ποτὲ ταῦτ' ἀμειων ἔστω ἐκαστὸν καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχεω ἢ πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ψήνῃ, φάσκοντα γε ὅπως νοῦ αὐτὰ κεκοσμηθῇ, ἀλλὰ τωδ' αὐτοῖς αἰτίας ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχεω ἐστὶν ὡστερ ἕχειν. ἐκάστῳ ὅων αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινὴ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον ψῆμι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πάνω σπουδὴ λαβῶν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἶος τ' ἢ ἀνεγέργισκον, ἢ' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χείρον.

Ἀπὸ δὴ θαυμαστῆς ἐλπίδος, ὅ ἑταῖρε, ὕψωσεν περίμενος, ἐπειδὴ προῖμοι καὶ ἀναγινώσκων ὅρῳ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῦν οὔδὲν, ἵνα ὁμολογήσῃς ἔστώ· ἀναγινώσκων ὅρῳ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῦν οὔδὲν· ἵνα ἀναγινώσκων ὅρῳ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῦν οὔδὲν. ἐν αὐτῶν ἀμέσως ἐν τῷ πράγματα· ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν νῦν οὔδὲν. ἐν αὐτῶν ἀμέσως ἐν τῷ πράγματα· ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν νῦν οὔδὲν. ἐν αὐτῶν ἀμέσως ἐν τῷ πράγματα· ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν νῦν οὔδὲν.
τὰ νεύρα κάμπτεσθαι ποὺ ποιεῖ [οἷον τ᾽ εἶναι] ἐμὲ νῦν τὰ 5 μέλη, καὶ διὰ ταῦτη τὴν αἰτίαν συγκαμφθεῖς ἐνυάδε καθημαί: καὶ αὖ περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ύμῶν ἑτέρας τουαθάς αἰτίας λέγοι, φωνᾶς τε καὶ ἀερᾶς καὶ ἀκοὰς καὶ ἅλλα μυρία
e τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος, ἀμελήσας τὰς ὅς ἀλήθως αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι, ἐπειδῆ Ἡθναλοὶ ἑδοξε βέλτιον εἶναι ἔμοι καταψη-φίσασθαι, διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον αὐτ ἔδοκται ἐνυάδε καθῆσθαι, καὶ δικαίωταρον [παραμένεντα] υπέχειν τὴν δίκην 5 ὧν ἂν κελεύσαις· ἐπεὶ ἡ τῶν κύων, ὡς ἐγὼμεν, πάλαι ἂν
tαῦτα τὰ νεύρα καὶ τὰ ὡστα ἡ περὶ Μέγαρα ἡ Βουώτων ἡν, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου, εἰ μὴ δικαίωταρον ἔμην καὶ κάλλιον εἶναι πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν· τε καὶ ἀποδιδράσκειν υπέχειν τῇ πόλει δίκην ἧνῳ' ἂν τάττη. ἀλλ᾽ αἰτία μὲν 5 τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λῶν ἄτοπον· εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι ὃτι ἂνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὡστα καὶ νεύρα καὶ ὡσα ἅλλα ἔχω ὃν ὁνὸς τ᾽ ἡ ποιεῖν τὰ τὸ δοξάντα μοι, ἀλήθη ἂν λέγοι· ὡς μεντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποιω ὡ ποιω, καὶ ταῦτα ὡ ἀπάτω, ἀλλ᾽ ὅν 5 ποὺ τοῦ βελτίστου αἴρεσεν, πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ δραμὴμα εἰς τοῦ λόγου. τὸ [γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οἷον τ᾽ εἶναι] ὃτι ἂλλο μὲν τι ἔστι τὸ αἰτίων τῷ ὑπ᾽ ἀλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο ἂνευ ὡ τὸ αἰτίων οὐκ ἂν ποτ᾽ ἐη ἁίτιον· δὴ μὴν φαύνονται ἡηλαφάρτεσ]. ὃ 5 πολλοὶ ἄσσερεν ἐν σκότει ἀλλοτρίῳ ὄνοματι προσχρόμενοι  ὡς αἰτίοι αὐτό προσαγέροσκεν. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ μὲν τὶς [δὲν ἤ] περιτῆς τῇ γῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑμανοῦ μένει dart ποιεῖ τὴν γῆν, δὲ ἄσσερεν ἀράρων πλατεία βάθρον τὸν ἀερά ὑπερεβίει  
tὴν δὲ τοῦ ὅς οἶλον τε βέλτιστα αὐτὰ τεθήκαι ἡμῶν οὐτῶ 5 νῶν κείσαι, ταῦτην οὗτε ζητοῦσιν οὗτε τινὰ οἴκονται δαι- 
mονίαν ἵσχυν ἔχειν, ἅλλα ἡγοῦνται τοῦτον Ἀτανα ἂν ὡ 
πὸ οὐκηρότερον καὶ ἄθανατωτέρον καὶ μᾶλλον ἄπαντα

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συνέχοντα ἐξευρέω, καὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δὲν ἑυρέω, καὶ συνέχεω οὐδέν οἴνοτα. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν τὴς τοιαύτης αἴτιας ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχει μαθήτης ὅτου οὖν ἦδος ἂν ἰ ἱενολήμην ἐπειδὴ δὲ τούτης ἐστερήση καὶ οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἑυρέω οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου μαθεῖν οὖς τε ἐγενόμη, τῶν δεύτερων πλούν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς αἴτιας ζῆσιν ἡ πεπραγμάτευμαι βούλει δ σοι, ἐφ’ ὑποθήκαι, ὁ Κέβης;

Τυπροσώπος μὲν οὖν, ἐφ’ ὃς βούλομαι.

Ἐδοξεὶ τούτων μοι, ὃς ὁ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειρήκη τα ὑπά τα σκοτῶν, δεῖν εὐλαβηθήναι μὴ πάθομι οὔτε οἶ τὸν ὅλου ἐκλείποντα ταθεωροῦντες καὶ σκοπούμενοι πάσχουσιν· διαφθείρονται γάρ ποὺν οὐκοῦν τὰ ὄμματα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐν ὑσσαί ή την τοιοῦτον σκοπῶνται τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ. τοιοῦτον τι καὶ ἐγὼ διερπόμην, καὶ ἔδεισα μὴ παντάπασι τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθεὶς βλέπων πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ὀμμασὶ καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιχειρῶν ἀπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἐδοξεὶ δὴ μοι χρῆμα εἰς τῶν λόγων καταφυγώντα ἐν ἐκεῖνωσ σκοτεῖν τῶν ὑπότων τὴν ἄλθειαν. ἀνως μὲν οὖν ὃς εἰκάζω τρόπων τωὰ οὐκ έοκεῦν· οὐ γὰρ πάντω συγχωρώ τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενο τὰ ὑπά τά ἐκκόσι μᾶλλον σκοπεῖν ἡ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐργοῖς. ἀλλ’ οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γε ἀρμῆσαι, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ὅτι ἂν κρίων ἐρρωμενέστατον εἴναι, ὑ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὑπά τα, καὶ 5 περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων [ὁντων], ὃ δ’ ἂν μή, ὡς οὖν ἀληθῆ· βούλομαι δὲ σοι σαφεστέρων εἰπεῖν ὃ λέγω σῦμαι γάρ σε νῦν οὐ μανθάνειν.

Οὐ μά τὸν Δία, ἐφ’ ὁ Κέβης, οὐ σφόδρα.

'Αλλ’, ὃς ὁ δὲ, ὁδε λέγω, οὐδέν κακῶν, ἀλλ’ ἀπερ αἰεί b


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δὲ ἄλλως καὶ ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι λόγῳ ὀφείλει πέπαιμαι λέγων. ἔρχομαι [γὰρ] δὴ ἐπίχειρῶν σοι ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἴδος τῆς πεπραγμάτευμα, καὶ εἰμὲ τάλων ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνα

5 τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἄρχομαι ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνων, ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τὰλλα πάντα: ἃ εἰ μοι δίδωσι τε καὶ συγχωρεῖς εἰναι ταῦτα, ἔλπίζω σοι ἐκ τούτων τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρῆσαι ὡς ἀθάνατον [ἡ] ψυχή.

c Ἀλλά μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν 

φθάνοις περαίνων.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφης, τα ἔξης ἐκείνως ἐὰν σοι συνδοκῇ ὅσπερ ἐμοί. φανεται γὰρ μοι, εἰ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ 

5 τὸ καλὸν, οὐδὲ δὲ ἐν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκεῖνον τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω. τῇ τούδε αἰτίᾳ συγχωρεῖς;

Συγχωρῶ, ἔφη.

Οὐ τοῦτον, ἢ δ᾽ ὂς, ἐτὶ μαυθάνω οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας 

αἰτίας τὰς σοφὰς ταύτας γιγανόσκειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν τίς μοι λέγῃ 

d δι᾽ ὅτι καλὸν ἐστὶν ὅτιον ἢ θρώμα θανάτου ἢς ἡ σχῆμα ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιον τῶν τουστών, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἡ ἱαρέω ζώω, 

—ταραττομικῶν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πάσι—τοῦτο δέ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἰσως ευθεῖς ἢς παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ; ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλο τι 

5 τοιεΐν αὐτὸ καλὸν ἢ ἢ ἐκεῖνον τοῦ καλοῦ ἐτε [παρουσία] ἢς [κοινωνία] ἢς ὅτι δὴ καὶ ὅπως ἠ προσγενομένη ὅο γὰρ ἦτο 

toῦτο διαχυριζομαι, ἄλλ᾽ ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ [γίγνεται] καλά. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ ἀποκρύνασθαι καὶ ἄλλως καὶ τούτῳ ἐχόμενος 

e ἡγοῦμαι οὖν ἂν ποτὲ πεσεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀσφαλές εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ οὕτως ἄλλῳ ἀποκρύνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ [γίγνεται] καλά· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖς;
Δοκεῖ.
Καὶ μεγέθει ἄρα τά μεγάλα μεγάλα καὶ τά μειζῶν μειζῶν, καὶ συμκρότητι τά ἐλάττω ἐλάττων;

Ναῖ.
Οὐδὲ σὺ ἀρ’ ἄν ἀποδέχοι εἶ τίς τύμα φαίη ἔτερου ἐτέρου τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζων εἶναι, καὶ τὸν ἐλάττω τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἐλάττω, ἀλλὰ διαμαρτύροι ἄν ὅτι σὺ μὲν ὄυδὲν ἄλλῳ λέγεις ἢ ὅτι τὸ μείζων πάν ἐτέρου ὀυδενὶ ἄλλῳ μείζων ἄστω ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μείζων, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος, τὸ δὲ ἐλάττων ὀυδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἐλάττων ἢ συμκρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐλάττων, διὰ τὴν συμκρότητα, φοβοῦμενος οἴμαι μή τίς σοι ἐναντίον λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, ἐὰν τῇ κεφαλῇ μείζων τοιαφύτι ἐστιν καὶ ἐλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τῷ μείζων μείζων εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐλάττων ἐλαττοῦ, ἐπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ συμκράσι ὁμοίῳ τοῦ μείζων μείζων εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ συμκράσι ὁμοίῳ τῷ μέγαν τῷ εἶναι ἢ οὐκ ἄλλῳ φοβοῦμεν ταῦτα;

Καὶ ὁ Κέβης γελάσας, “Εγώγε, ἐφη.
Οὐκόν, ἢ ὅτι, τὰ δέκα ταύτω δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῦμεν ἄλλῳ λέγεις, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος; καὶ τὸ διήπτυχο τοῦ πνευματίου ἡμῖνει μείζων εἶναι ἄλλα οὐ μεγέθεις; διὸ αὐτὸς γάρ τοῦ φοβοῦ.

Πάνω γ’, ἐφη.
Τί δέ; ἐνι ἐνὸς προστεθέντος τῇ πρὸς θέσεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τῇ σχίσῃ οὐκ εὐλαβοῖς ἢ ἄν λέγεις; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοήσῃ ὅτι οὐκ οἴθα ἄλλως πῶς ἐκατον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχέσθαι τῆς ἱδίας οὕσιας ἐκάστοτε οὐ ἃν μετάσχης, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὐκ ἐσέθαι ἄλλῃ τῷ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἄλλ’ ἡ τῆς δύος μετασχέσεως, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τα μέλλοντα δύο ἐσέθαις καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἐν ἐσέθαις, τὰς δὲ σχὶσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψεῖς ἐφις ἃν χαίρεις, παρεῖσ.
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ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῖς σεαυτῷ σοφώτεροις: σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ἂν, τὸ

d λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν ἀπειράν, ἐχόμενος

έκεινου τοῦ ἄσφαλος τῆς ύποθέσεως, οὕτως ἀποκρίναις ἂν,

ei δὲ τις αὐτῆς τῆς ύποθέσεως ἔχοιτο, χαίρειν ἔφης ἂν καὶ

οὐκ ἀποκρίναις ἔως ἂν τὰ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης ὀρμηθένται σκέφαιο

5 εἰ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ὡς διαφωνεῖ: ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐκείνης

αὐτῆς δέοι σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαυτὸς ἄν διδοῖς, ἀλλὰν ἂ

ὑπόθεσιν ύποθέμενος ὡς τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστῃ φαίνοιτο,

e ἔως ἔπι τι ἰκανὸν ἐλθοῖς, ἃμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροι ὠστερ οἱ

ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε τῆς ἄρχης διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ

ἐκείνης ὀρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιο τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν;

ἐκείνους μὲν γὰρ ἵσως οὔδε εἰς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὔδε

5 φροντὶς: ἰκανὸν γὰρ ὅτι σοφίας ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκάντες ὡς

δύνασθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἄρέσκειν: σὺ δ’, εἴπερ εἰ τῶν φιλοσόφων,

102 οἴμαι ἂν ὃς ἔγω λέγω ποιοῖς.

'Αληθεῦστα, ἡφὶ, λέγεις, ὅ τε Συμμίσα ἂμα καὶ ὁ Κέβης.

EX. Νὴ Διά, ὁ Φαῖδων, εἰκότως γε’ θαυμαστῶς γὰρ

μοι δοκεῖ ὡς ἐναργῶς τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νῦν ἔχοντι εἴπειν

5 ἐκείνως ταῦτα.

ΦΑΙΔ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὃ 'Εχέκρατες, καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς

παροῦσι ἐδοξεῖν.

EX. Καὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν τοῖς ἀπούσι, τῶν δὲ ἀκούουσιν, ἀλλὰ

τίνα δὴ ἢ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα λεχθέντα;

10 ΦΑΙΔ. Ὡς μὲν ἐγώ οἴμαι, ἐπεὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτα συνεχώρηθη,

καὶ ἀμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἐκαστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων

tάλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῶν τοῦτων τῆς ἐπωνυμίαν Ἰσχεῖν,

tὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἱστάτα. Εἰ δὴ, ἢ δ’ ὅσ, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις,

ἀρ’ ὦχι, ὅταν Συμμίσα Σωκράτους φῆς μελζ’ εἶναι, Φαῖδωνος

5 δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις τότ’ εἶναι ἐν τῷ Συμμίσα ἀμφότερα, καὶ

μέγεθος καὶ σμικρότητα;

ο9 σεαυτῷ B TW: ἐαυτοὶ B
d1 σεαυτῷ B’ TW: ἐαυτοὶ B
d2 ἀποκρίνοντα pr. TW
d3 ἐφοίτο Madvig
d6 α Ὅ: δ’ T
e3 ὀρμημένων pr. T
e4 οὔδ’ εἰς B: οὔδεις TW b

B TW: δῶς B
e5 δῆμως

b5 τὸν’ B: τότε W: ταῦτ’ T
'Εγώγε.

'Αλλὰ γὰρ, ἡ δ’ ὅσι, ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τοῦ Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς θοις ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἄλληθές ἔχειν; οὐ γὰρ ποτὲ πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ, τῷ c Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει δ’ τὸναχάνει ἔχων’ οὕτω αὖ Σωκράτους ὑπερέχειν ὅτι Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος;

'Αληθῆ.

Οὐδὲ γε αὐτὸ Φαίδωνος ὑπερέχεσθαι τῷ ὅτι Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίαν σμικρότητα;

'Εστι ταῦτα.

Οὕτως ἄρα ὁ Σιμμίας ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ τὸ μέγας εἶναι, εὖ μεσῷ δὲν ἀμφοτέρως, τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς d σμικρότητος παρέχω ὑπέρεχον. Καὶ ἀμα μειδιάσας, Ἑουκα, ἐφη, καὶ συγγραφικῶς ἔρειν, ἀλλ’ οὐν ἔχει γε που ὃς λέγω. Συνέφη.

Λέγω δὴ τοῦτ’ ένεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοι ὅπερ ἐμοί. 5 ἐμοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος οὐδέποτ’ έθέλειν ἀμα μέγα καὶ σμικρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἦμων μέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σμικρὸν οὐδ’ έθέλειν ὑπερέχεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δυοῦν τὸ ἔτερον, ἡ φεύγει καὶ ὑπεκχώρει ὅταν αὐτῷ προσῆι τὸ ἐναπτον, τὸ σμικρὸν, ἡ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου e ἀπολολείναι, ὑπομένοι δὲ καὶ δεξαμένοι τὴν σμικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἔτερον ἢ ὅπερ ἦν. ὅσπερ ἐγὼ δεξαμένως καὶ ὑπομείνας τὴν σμικρότητα, καὶ ἐτι δὲν ὅσπερ εἰμί, [οὕτωs ὁ αὐτὸς σμικρός εἰμι] εἴκειν δὲ οὐ τετόλμηκεν μέγα δὲ 5 σμικρὸν εἶναι, ὡς δ’ αὐτῶς καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἦμων οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γλυγνεσθαι οὕδε εἶναι, οὐδ’ ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν τῶν

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103 ἐναντίων, ἢτι ὃν ὅπερ ἦν, ἀμα τούναντιον γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ εἴναι ἄλλ' ἦτοι ἀπέρχεται ἡ ἀπόλυται ἐν τούτῳ τῷ παθήματι.

Παντάπασιν, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεται μοι.

Καὶ τις εἴπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας—ὀστίς ὁ ἦν, οὐ 5 σαφῶς μέμνημαι.—Πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦμιν λόγοις αὐτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνι λεγομένων ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττουνος τὸ μείζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων; νῦν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ.

10 ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλῶν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας,

b Ἀνδρικῶς, ἐφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι εὐνοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε. τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πράγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δὲ, ὅτι αὐτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ

5 ἂν ποτὲ γένοιτο, οὕτω τὸ ἐν ἢμῖν οὕτω [ἐν τῇ φύσει] τότε μὲν γὰρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἑχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὕτη τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἑκείνων αὐτῶν δὲν ἐνότων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὑομαζόμενα μενα: αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνα οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ φαμέν ἑθελήσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. Καὶ ἄμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβηςτα ἐπευ, Ἄρα μή που, ὦ Κέβης, ἐφη, [καὶ σε τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν δὲν ὄφειπεν;]

2 ὁμίθι, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτως έχως καίτοι οὕτω λέγω ὅσι οὐ πολλὰ με ταράττει.

Συνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὁς, ἀπλῶς τούτῳ, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἐαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι.

Παντάπασις, ἐφη.

ὃ 8 ἂν ὃν ὥν ὧν W: αὐτῷ B et γρ. W a 5 ἢμῖν W: ἢμῖν B T a 11 παραβαλῶν W b 5 ποτὲ om. T c 2 πρὸς B: elis B² T W c 3 ἐφη ὁ Κέβης W: οὕτω διδάσκεις B T W 0 5 οὕτως αὖ W T: ο ὡς αὖ B T et γρ. W καίτοι οὕτω B²: καὶ τοιοῦτο τι B T W α 8 ἔσεσθαι ante ἐαυτῷ T
"Ετι δή μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα συνομολογῆσεις. τὸ
θερμὸν τῷ καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν;

"Εγὼ γε.

"Αρ' ὀπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ;

Μᾶ Δή' οὐκ ἔγγυε.

'Αλλ' ἐτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἐτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ
ψυχρόν;

Ναι.

'Αλλὰ τόδε γ' οἴμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ' οὐσιν 5
dεξαμένην τὸ θερμὸν, ὡσπερ εἰς τοὺς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν,
ἐτὶ ἐσεθαί ὀπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος
tοῦ θερμοῦ ἡ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀπολείπεσαι.

Πάνω γε.

Καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὐτοὺς θερμὸν τὸν ψυχρὸν [αὐτῷ] ᾗ 10
ὑπεξέμεναι ἡ ἀπολείπεσαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμῆσειν δεξα-
μενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἐτὶ εἶναι ὀπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρὸν.

'Αληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

"Εστών ἄρα, ἢ δ' ὅς, περὶ ἕμα τῶν τοιούτων, ὡστε μὴ
μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν
ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλο τὸ ἐςτὶ μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει
dὲ τὴν ἐκεῖνον μορφὴν ἂεὶ, ὅταν περ ἦ. ἐτὶ δὲ ἐν τόδε 5
ἰσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὁ λέγων τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἂεὶ που
dεὶ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνει ὀπερ νῦν λέγομεν ἡ οὐ;

Πάνω γε.

"Αρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων—τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ—ἳ καὶ ἀλλο
tὸ ἐςτὶ μὲν οὐχ ὀπερ τὸ περιττόν, ὅμως δὲ δεὶ αὐτὸ 104
μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν ἂεὶ διὰ τὸ οὕτω
περικεῖται ὡστε τοῦ περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσαι; λέγω
δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἶον καὶ ἡ τριάς πέτοις καὶ ἀλλὰ πολλα.

σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἄρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὐτῆς 5

ο13 χιόνα B: χιόν T
d5 χιόνα γ' W: χιόνα B T
d6 πρό-
σθεν T: ἐμπρόσθεν B
d8 αὐτῷ TW: αὐτὸ B
d9-ii πάνω...

ἀπολείπεισαι om. T
d11 τολμῆσειν B T W:

e5 τώδε T: τούτο B
οὐκ ἂν ἦν ὃπερ τὸ περιττόν ἂν ἔστη περιττός· καὶ αὕτω ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν ἂν ἔστη περιττός· καὶ αὕτω ὅπερ ἦν [tà] τέτταρα καὶ ἄπασ δέ έτερος αὕτως τού ἀριθμοῦ ἂν συγχωρεῖς ἢ ὃν;

5 Πάντα γὰρ οὖν; ἔφη.

'Ο τούνων, ἔφη, Βούλωμαι δηλάδε, ἀθρεῖ. ἔστω δὲ τόδε, ὅτι φαίνεται οὐ μόνον ἐκεῖνα τὰ ἐναντία ἄλλα ὄν ἐκείνα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσα οὖν ὄντ' ἄλλοις ἐναντία ἔχει ἂεί τάναντια, οὐδὲ ταύτα ἐοικε δεχομένους ἐκείνην τὴν ἱδέαν ἢ ἂν τῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁσπερ ἐναντία ἤ, ἂλλ' ἐπιούσῃς αὐτῆς ἥτοι ἀπολλόμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα. ἢ οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολείπομεν πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι οὐν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομενεῖ ἓτε τρία ὅπερ ἄρτια γενέσθαι;

5 Όὐδὲ μήν, ἢ δ' ὅσ, ἐναντίον γέ ἐστι διὰ τριάδι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Οὐκ ἄρα μόνον τὰ εἰδὴ τὰ ἐναντία οὖν ὑπομένοι επιόντα ἄλλα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλ' ἀτα τὰ ἐναντία σε ὑπομένοι επιόντα.

10 Ἀληθεύστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Βούλεις οὖν, ἢ δ' ὅσ, ἔὰν οἶολ τ' ὅμεν, ὄρισόμεθα ὅποια ταύτα ἐστιν;

Πάνω γέ.

15 'Αρ' ὀὖν, ἔφη, ὧ Kέβης, τάδε ἐφ' ἂν, ὅ ὅτι ἂν κατάσχη μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ἱδέαν αὐτὸ ἵσχεω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίον αὐτῷ ἂεί τινος;

Πῶς λέγεις;
"Ωσπέρ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν. οἴσθα γὰρ δήπον ὅτι ἂν ἦ τῶν 5 τριῶν ἴδεα κατάσχει, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τρισὶν εἶναι ἄλλα καὶ περιττοῖς.

Πάνω γε.
"Επὶ τὸ τοιούτου δή, φαμέν, ἡ ἑναντία ἴδεα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ ἢ ἄν τούτῳ ἀπεργάζηται οὐδέποτε ἃν ἔλθοι.
Οὐ γάρ.
Εἰργάζετο δὲ γε ἡ περιττή;
Ναί.
"Ἐπὶ τὰ τρία ἀρα ἡ τοῦ ἄρτιον;
Ναί.
"Επὶ τὰ τρία ἀρα ἡ τοῦ ἄρτιον ἴδεα οὐδέποτε ἦξει.
Οὐ δήτα.
"Ἀμοιρα δὴ τοῦ ἄρτιον τὰ τρία.
"Ἀμοιρα.
"Ἀνάρτιος ἀρα ἡ τριάς.
Ναί.
"Ὁ τούτων ἐλεγον ὀρίσασθαι, ποιὰ οὐκ ἑναντία τωι ὡντα ὁμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτῷ, τὸ ἑναντίον—οἶον νῦν ἡ τριάς τῷ ἄρτιῳ οὕκ οὔσα ἑναντία οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον αὐτῷ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἑναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυᾶς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τῷ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα—ἀλλ᾽ ὁρα δὴ εἰ 105 οὕτως ὄρθις, μη μόνον τὸ ἑναντίον τὸ ἑναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἄλλα καὶ ἐκεῖνο, δὴ ἐπιφέρῃ τὶ ἑναντίον ἐκεῖνο, ἔφ᾽ ὦτι ἄν αὐτῷ ὃς, αὐτῷ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τῇ τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἑναντιότητα µηδέποτε δέξασθαι. πάλιν δὲ ἀναμιμήσκοις οὐ 5 γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν. τὰ πέντε τήν τοῦ ἄρτιον οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τήν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ ἑναντίου, ὁμως δὲ τήν
πλάτωνος

β τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται: οὐδὲ δὴ τοῦ ἡμῶλιον οὐδὲ ταλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἡμῖν, τὴν τοῦ ἄλοι, καὶ τριτιμόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴπερ ἔπη τε καὶ συνδοκεί σοι οὕτως.

Πάνω σφόνδρα καὶ συνδοκεί, ἐφη, καὶ ἐπομαι.

5 Πάλιν δὴ μοι, ἐφη, ἐξ ἀρχής λέγε. καὶ μὴ μοι δ ἄν ἔρωτῶ ἀποκρίνω, ἀλλὰ μμούμενος ἔμε. λέγω δὴ παρ' ἧν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἁσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἁσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἐρωτὸς με ὃ ἂν τί ἔν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἁσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ὃ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ὃ ἂν πῦρ: οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρη ὃ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἔρω ὃτι ὃ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν πυρετὸς: οὐδ' ὃ ἂν ἀρίθμῳ τί ἐγγένηται περιττός ἔσται, οὐκ ἔρῳ ὃ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μονάς, καὶ ταλλὰ οὕτως. ἀλλ' ὃρα εἰ ἤδη ἰκανός οἴσθ' ὅτι βούλομαι.

'Αλλὰ πάνω ἰκανῶς, ἐφη.

Ἀποκρίνων δὴ, ἡ δ' ὡς, ὃ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι ζῶν

10 ἔσται;

'Ωλ' ἂν ψυχή, ἐφη.

d Οὐκοῦν ἂει τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐχὶ; ἡ δ' ὡς.

Ψυχὴ ᾧρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτῇ κατάσχῃ, ἂεὶ ἤκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο

φέρονσα ζωήν;

5 Ἡκεὶ μεντοι, ἐφη.

Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῇ ἐναυτῶν ἂν οὕδεν;

'Εστιν, ἐφη.

Τί;
Θάνατος.
Ούκοιν ψυχή τὸ ἐναντίον ὁ αὐτή ἐπιφέρει ἄει οὔ μή ποτε δέχηται, ὅσ ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὁμολόγηται;
Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἐφη ὁ Κέβης.
Τι οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίον ἰδέαν τι νυνὴ ὀνομάζομεν;
'Ἀνάρτιον, ἐφη. 15
Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ δ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται;
'Ἀμουσον, ἐφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.
Εἰεν οὖν τὸν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται τί καλοῦμεν;
'Ἀθάνατον, ἐφη.
Οὔκοιν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον;
Οὐ. 5
'Ἀθάνατον ἀρα ψυχή.
'Ἀθάνατον.
Εἰεν, ἐφη τοῦτο μὲν ὅτι ἀποδεδείχθαι φῶμεν; ἥ πῶς δοκεῖ;
Καὶ μάλα γε ικανῶς, ὁ Σώκρατες.
Τι οὖν, ὃ οὖς, ὁ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαίον ἣν ἀνωλέθροφ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρο ἢν ἢν; 106
Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;
Οὔκοιν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἀθερμὸν ἀναγκαίον ἢν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι,
ὅποτε τοῖς ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπάγου, ὑπεξῆς ἢν ἡ χιών οὐσα
σῶς καὶ ἀτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἀπωλετὸ γε, οὐδ' αὐτ' ὑπομενοῦσα εὐδεξάτω ἄν ἐν τὴν θερμότητα.
'Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη, λέγεις.
'Ὡς δ' αὐτῶς ομαι κἂν εἰ τὸ ἁψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἢν,
ὅποτε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρὸν τι ἐπήξει, οὔτορ' ἄν ἀπεσβένυμι
οὐδ' ἀπωλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶς ἄν ἀπελθῶν ψεκτο. 10
'Ανάγκη, ἐφη.

b Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄδε, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη περὶ τοῦ θανάτου εἰπεῖν; εἰ μὲν τὸ θάνατον καὶ ἀνωλέθρον ἔστω, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὤταν θάνατος ἐπὶ αὐτῇ ἦ, ἀπολλυσθαί θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται οὐδ' ἔσται τεθνηκὼς.

5 ὡσπερ τὰ τρία οὐκ ἔστα, ἔφαμεν, ἄρτιον, οὐδὲ γ' αὐ τὸ περιττόν, οὐδὲ δὴ πῦρ ψυχρόν, οὐδὲ γε ἦ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερ-μότης. "'Αλλὰ τι καλὸν;" φαίη ἄν τις, "ἄρτιον μὲν τὸ περιττόν μὴ γλύρεσθαι ἐπιόντος τοῦ ἄρτιον, ὡσπερ ὀμολογη-ταί, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄντ' ἐκεῖνον ἄρτιον γεγονέναι;"

tῇ τάντα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν διαμαχέσασθαι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόλλυται τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνωλέθρον ἔστω. ἔπει εἰ τοῦτο ὀμολογητό ημῶν, ῥαδίως ἂν διεμαχόμεθα ὅτι ἐπελ-

5 θάντος τοῦ ἄρτιον τὸ περιττόν καὶ τὰ τρία οἰχεῖται ἀπιόντα· καὶ περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν οὐτῶς ἂν διεμαχό-

μεθα. ἢ οὔ;

Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ θανάτου, εἰ μὲν ημῶν ὀμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνωλέθρον εἶναι, ψυχῇ ἂν εἰ [πρὸς τῷ θανάτος εἶναι]

d καὶ ἀνωλέθρος· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἄλλου ἂν δεόι λόγου.

'Αλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖ, ἐφη, τούτου γε ἐνεκα· σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν τι ἄλλο φθοράν μὴ δεχοῖτο, εἰ τὸ γε θανάτον ἄδιδον ὃν φθοράν δέξεται.

5 οὶ δὲ γε θεοὶ οἴμαι, ἐφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἴδος καὶ εἰ τι ἄλλο θανάτον ἔστω, παρὰ πάντων ὃν ὀμολογηθῇ μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Παρὰ πάντων μέντοι νη Δί', ἐφη, ἀνθρώπων τέ γε καὶ ἐτί μάλλον, ὡς ἐγκοίμαι, παρὰ θεῶν.

e Ὄποτε δὲ τὸ θανάτου καὶ ἀδιάφθορον ἔστω, ἄλλο

τι ψυχή ἢ, εἰ ἀθάνατος τυγχάνει οὔσα, καὶ ἀνώλεθρος ἂν εἴη;

Πολλῆς ἀνάγκης.

'Επιόντος ἄρα θανάτου ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν τὸ μὲν θνητόν, ὃς ἐσκευή, αὐτῷ ἀποθητεύει, τὸ δὲ ἄθανατον σῶν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον οἶχεται ἀπίαν, ὑπεκχωρήσαν τῷ θανάτῳ.

Φαίνεται.

Παντὸς μᾶλλον ἄρα, ἐφί, ὁ Κέβθης, ψυχή ἄθανατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, καὶ τῷ ὅτι ἐσοῦνται ἦμων αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν 'Αιδοῦ.

Οὐκούν ἐγγυργε, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐφί, ἐξὼ παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν ὅτι ἀπίστευν τοῖς λόγοις. ἀλλ' εἰ δὴ τι Συμμίας διδ.getElementsByName ζητεῖ λέγειν, εὐπροκυμάτους ὅσον οὐδὲ οἷδα εἰς δυσταδὸ τις ἄλλον καὶρὸν ἀναβάλλοτον τῷ τὸν ὅτι παρόντα, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων θυσίαν ἢ τι εἰπέτω ἢ ἀκούσαί.

'Αλλὰ μήν, ἢ δ' ὁς ὁ Συμμίας, οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἐξὼ ἐτι ὅτι ἀπιστῶ ἐκ γε τῶν λεγομένων ὑπὸ μέντοι τοῦ μεγέθους περὶ ὅν οἱ λόγοι εἶσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀναγκάζομαι ἀπίστευν ἐτι ἐξων παρ' ἐμαυτῷ περὶ τῶν εἰρρημένων.

Οὐ μονον γ', ἐφθή, ὁ Συμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα τε εὐ λέγεις καὶ τᾶς γε ὑποθέσεις τᾶς πρῶτας, καὶ εἰ 5 πισταὶ ὑμῖν ἐσιν, δυσφωπὸς ἀποφύγεις σαφέστεραν· καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὸς ἰκανῶς διέληστε, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἀκολουθήσετε τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ ὅσον ὄντων μάλιστα ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπακολουθήσαν καὶ τούτο αὐτῷ σαφές γένηται, οὔδεν ζητήσετε περαιτέρω.

'Ἀληθῆ, ἐφθή, λέγεις.

'Αλλὰ τόδε γ', ἐφί, ὁ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθήναι, ὅτι, C εἶπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄθανατος, ἐπιμελεῖσας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπέρ τοῦ

ἐζ ψυχή B T Stob.: ἦ ψυχή W ἦ B: post τι Stob.: om. Τ
χρόνου τοῦτον μόνον ἐν  ὃ καλοῦμεν τὸ ξῆν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦ
παιτός, καὶ ὁ κόσμους νῦν ἐκαὶ καὶ ὁδειεῖν ἂν δειὸς εἶναι,
5 εἰ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσῃ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἢν ὁ θάνατος τοῦ παιτός
ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἐρμαυν ἄν ἢν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε
σώματος ἀμ' ἀπηλλάθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς
ψυχῆς νῦν δ' ἐπειδὴ ἠθάνατος ἥρατεται ὁ δεδεμένῳ ἄν
d εἰ ἄυτη ἄλλη ἀποφυγῆ κακῶν ὑπὲρ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὃς
βελτίστην τε καὶ φρονιματάτην γενέσθαι. οὕδεν γὰρ ἄλλο
ἐχουσα εἰς" Αἴενον ἡ ψυχή ἐρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ
τροφῆς, ἀ δ' ἣ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὡφελεῖν ἡ βλάπτειν τὸν
5 τελευτησάκια τιθε ἐν ἄρχῃ τῆς ἐκείσε πορείας. λέγεται
δὲ οὕτως, ὡς ἄρα τελευτησάκια ἐκαστὸν ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων,
όπερ ἰσαμεῖ ἐπισκεφτεῖ ὡς ἡ τις τῶν τόπων, οἱ δὲ τοὺς συλλεγέντας διαδικασμένους εἰς "Αἴενον
e πορεύεσθαι μετά ἡγεμόνος ἐκείνου ἢ δ' προστέτακται τοὺς
ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε πορεύσαι] τυχόντας δὲ ἐκεῖ δὲν δὴ τιχεῖν
καὶ μείνατο τὸν ἅρμην χρῶνον ἄλλος δευρο πάλιν ἡγεμόνοι
κομίζει ἐν πολλάς χρῶνοι καὶ μακράς περιόδους. ἐςτι δὲ
ἄρα ἡ πορεία οὗ δὲν ὁ Αἰσχύλου Τῆλεφος λέγει: ἐκείνος
108 μὲν γὰρ ἀπλὴν οἷμον φθεὶν εἰς "Αἴενον πέρεις, ἡ δ' οὔτε
ἀπλὴ οἷεὶ μία φαῖνεται μοι εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀν ἡγεμόνοιν
ἔδειν οὐ γὰρ, ποῦ τοι τὸν ἀν διαμάρτοι οὐδαμὸς μᾶς ὁδὸν
οὖσης. νῦν δὲ ἐσοκε σχίσεις τε καὶ τριῶνς πολλὰς ἔχειν:
5 ἀπὸ τῶν θυσίων τε καὶ νομίμων τῶν ἐνθάδε τεκμαιρόμενος
λέγω. ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἐπεταί τε
καὶ οὖκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα: ἡ δ' ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος
ἐχοντα, ὅτερ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθείν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκείνοι πολυν

e 5 ἀμελήσῃ B T Iambl. Stob.: ἀμελήσῃ B² W o 6 ἀν B T
Iambl.: om. T Stob. κακῶις] κακῶς Stob. d 4 μέγιστα λέγεται
B: λέγεται μέγιστα T W Iambl. Stob. d 7 ὁσπερ... οὕτως] ὁσπερ
... οὕτως Stob. a 2 ἐνθένδε B Stob.: ἐνθάδε T πορεύσαι B
Stob.: πορεύεσθαι T ἐκεῖ δὲν T: ἐκείνων ἀν B: ἐκείνων Stob. ἀδὴ
Stob.: δὲ B T W a a ὁδὲ] ὁδὲι Stob. ἀν B Stob.: om. T
sed add. post ἐδει a 3 ὁδὲ B T Stob.: ὁδὲ B² W ἀναφέροι B:
ἀμαρτό T W Stob. a 4 τρίῳδους Olympia. Proclus: περίῳδους B T
Stob. a 5 τυσίῳ T W Stob.: ἅτως B et γρ. W t a 6 ὁδὲ
B² T W Stob.: om. B a 8 ἐμπροσθεὶν B Stob.: πρῶσθεν T
χρόνων ἐπτομημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὅρατον τόπου, πολλὰ δ' ἀντιτείνασα καὶ πολλὰ παθοῦσα, βίας καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαιμόνιος οὕτως ἀγομένη | ἀφικουμένη δὲ ὅθιπερ αἱ ἄλλαι, τὴν μὲν ἀκάθαρτον καὶ τι πεποιηκυίαν τοιοῦτον, ἡ φώνων ἄδικων ἡμμένη ἡ ἄλλ' ἀττά τοιαῦτα 5 εἰργασμένην, ἀ τοῦτων ἀδελφά τε καὶ ἀδελφῶν ψυχῶν ἐργα τυγχάνει οὕτα, ταὐτὴν μὲν ἀπας φεύγει τε καὶ ὑπεκτρέπεται καὶ οὕτε συνέμπορος οὕτε ἡγεμῶν ἐθέλει γλυκεσθαι, αὐτῆ δὲ, πλανάται ἐν πάσῃ ἐχομένη ἀπορίᾳ ἦσαν ἄν ἡ τις c χρόνωι γέννων, ἄν ἐλθόντων ὑπ' ἀνάγκης φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτῆ προέρχονται οὐχισών ἡ δὲ καθαρὰς τε καὶ μετρίως τὸν βίον διεξέλθοντα, καὶ συνεμπόρων καὶ ἡγεμόνων θεῶν τυχοῦσα, ἤκησεν τὸν αὐτῆ ἐκάστη τόπον προσήκουτα. εἰςὶν 5 δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ θαναμαστοὶ τῆς γῆς τόποι, καὶ αὐτῇ οὕτε οἷα οὕτε ὅση δοξάζεται ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ γῆς εἰσωθότων λέγειν, ὡς ἐγώ ὑπὸ τινῶς πέπεισμαι.

Καὶ ὁ Συμμίας, Πῶς ταῦτα, ἐφή, λέγεις, δ' Ὑσκρατεῖ; δ' περὶ γὰρ τοῦ γῆς καὶ αὐτὸς πολλὰ δὴ ἀκύκλῳ, οὗ μέντοι ταῦτα δ' σὲ πείθει· ἥδεως οὖν ἄν ἀκούσαμι.

'Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὁ Συμμία, οὐχ ἡ Γλαύκου τέχνη γέ μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι διηγήσασθαι ἡ γ' ἑστὼς· ὥς μέντοι ἀληθῆ, 5 χαλεπῶτερον μοι φαίνεται ἡ κατὰ τὴν Γλαύκου τέχνην, καὶ ἀμα μὲν ἐγὼ ἵππων οὐδ' ἂν οἶδος τε εἶν, ἀμα δὲ, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὃ ἐμός, ὁ Συμμία, τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖν. τὴν μέντοι ἅδεαν τῆς γῆς οἰλαν πέπεισμαι εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς τόπους αὐτῆς οὐδὲν με κωλύει ὁ λέγειν.

'Ἀλλ', ἐφή ὁ Συμμίας, καὶ ταῦτα ἀρκεῖ.
Πέπεισμα τοίνυν, ἡ δ’ ὅσι, ἢγὼ ὡς πρῶτον μέν, εἰ ἔστιν.
5 εν μέσῳ τῷ ὀφρανῷ περιφερής οὕσα, μηθὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε
109 ἀέρος πρὸς τὸ μή πεσεῖν μήτε ἄλλης ἀνάγκης μηθείμας
tοιαύτης, ἄλλα ἰκανὴν εἶναι αὐτὴν ἵσχεν τὴν ὀμοιότητα
tοῦ ὀφρανοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐαντῷ πάντῃ καὶ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν
ἰσορροπίαν· ἰσορροποῦν γὰρ πράγμα ὀμοιόν τώδε ἐν μέσῳ
5 τεθεὶν οὔχ ἔξει μάλλον οὐδ’ ἠττὸν οὐδαμόσε κλιθῆναι,
ὅμοιος δ’ ἔχον ἀκλινές μενεί. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν, ἡ δ’ ὅσι,
tούτο πέπεισμαι.

Καὶ ὅρθως γε, ἐφῆ ὁ Σωμίας.

Εὕτε τοίνυν, ἐφῆ πάμμεγά τι εἶναι αὐτῷ, καὶ ἡμᾶς οἰκεῖν
b τούς μέχρι Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν ἀπὸ Φάσιδος ἐν σμικρῷ
tων μορίῳ, ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἡ βατράχων περὶ
tὴν θάλασσαν οἰκονύμενα, καὶ ἄλλους ἄλλοθι πολλοὺς ἐν
πολλοῖσι τοιούτοις τόποις οἰκείων. εἶναι γὰρ πανταχῇ περὶ
5 τῆς γῆς πολλὰ κοίλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ καὶ τὰς ἱδέας καὶ τὰ
μεγέθη, εἰς δ’ συνερρυσκόμειν τὸ τε ὅπωρ καὶ τὴν ὄμιχλῆν
καὶ τὸν ἀέρα· αὐτὴν δὲ τῇ γῆς καθαρῶν καὶ καθαροὶ κεύθαι
τῷ ὀφρανῷ ἐν δύτην ἑστὶ τὰ ἀστρα, δὴ δὴ ἀλθέων ὑμομάξειν
φον. τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα εἰσοδῶν λέγειν· ὃδ’
ὑποστάθμην ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ συρρεῖν ἢ εἰς τὰ κοίλα τῆς
gῆς. ἡμᾶς οὖν οἰκονύμενα εἰς τοὺς κοίλους αὐτῆς λειτθέναι
καὶ οἴεσθαι ἄνω ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς οἰκεῖων, ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ τίς ἐν
5 μέσῳ τῷ πυθμένι τοῦ πελάγους οἰκῶν οὐκοῦτο τε ἐπὶ τῆς
θαλάσσης οἰκεῖων καὶ διὰ τοῦ ὄδον ὁμοὺ τὸν ἦλιον καὶ τὰ
ἅλλα ἀστρα τὴν θάλασσαν ἡγοῦτο ὀφρανόν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ

βραδυτήτα τε καὶ ἀσθενεῖαν μηθεπόποτε ἐπὶ τὰ ἁκρα τῆς
θαλάσσης ἀφιγμένοις μηδὲ ἑωρακός εἶν, ἐκδε καὶ ἀνακύψαι
ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον, ὡς καθαράτερος
καὶ καλλίων τυγχάνει ἦν τοῦ παρὰ σφίσα, μηδὲ ἄλλου

ταύτων δὴ τούτο καὶ ἡμᾶς 5
πεπονθέναι οἰκούντας γὰρ ἐν τοίς κολῷ τῆς γῆς οἰεσθαὶ ἐπάνω αὐτῆς οἴκειν, καὶ τὸν ἄερα οὐρανοῦ καλεῖν, ὡς δὲ τούτοι οὐρανοῦ ὄντος τὰ ἀστρα χωροῦντα: τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταύ-
τῶν, ὅπ' ἄσθενες καὶ βραδυτῆτοι σοῦ οὖν τε εἶναι ἡμᾶς ε
διεξελθεῖν ἐπὶ έσχατον τὸν ἄερα: ἐπεὶ, εἰ τις [αὐτοῦ ἐπ'] ἀκρα
ἐλθοὶ ἡ πτηνὸς γενόμενοι ἀνάπτυκτοι, κατιδεῖν (ἂν) ἀνακυ-
ψαυτα, ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἐκ τῆς βαλάττης ἵχθυες ἀνακυ-
πτοντες ὄρατε πέμπατε τὰ ἐνθάδε, οὕτως ἀν τινα καὶ τὰ ἐκεῖ κατιδεῖν, 5
καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἵκανή εἰθ ἀνασχέσθαι θεωροῦσα, γνώσεις ἄν
ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἄληθῶς οὐρανός καὶ τὸ ἄληθινον φῶς
καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς γῆ. ἥδε μὲν γὰρ ἡ γῆ καὶ οἱ λῖθοι καὶ
ἀπας ὁ τόπος ὁ ἐνθάδε διεφθαρμένα ἐστίν καὶ καταβεβρω-
μένα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τῇ βαλάττῃ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀλμής, καὶ οὔτε
φύεται ἄξιον λόγου οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ βαλάττῃ, οὔτε τέλειον ὡς
ἐπος ἐπείν οὐδέν ἐστι, σήμερος δὲ καὶ ἄμοι καὶ πηλὸς 5
ἀμήχανος καὶ βόρβοροι ἔστις, ὅποι ἀν καὶ [ἡ] γῆ ἢ κα
πρὸς τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν κάλλη κρύσεσθαι οὔδ' ὀποστιών ἄξια.
ἐκεῖνα δὲ αὐ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν πολὺ ἀν ἐτί πλέον φανεῖ δια-
φέρειν: εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ μέδιον λέγειν καλῶν, ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὡ
Σιμμίλα, οἷα τυγχάνει τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ὑπὸ τῷ οὐρανῷ ὄντα.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἐφες ὁ Σιμμίλας, ὡ Σῶκρατες, ἡμεῖς γε τοῦτο
τοῦ μύθου ἡδέως ἀν ἀκούσαμεν.

Λέγεται τοῖς ἐφη, ὡ ἐταύρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη 5
ἡ γῆ αὐτῇ ἰδεῖν, εἰ τις ἀνώθεν θεύτω, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυ-
τοι σφαῖρα, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὅποι καὶ τὰ
ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ἧσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφῆς

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c καταχράωνται. ἔκει δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἡ τούτων τὴν μὲν γάρ ἄλογον ἐνιαίον [καὶ] ἑαυτακτὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῆ τὴν δὲ ὀσθε λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραι,

5 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκεκριμένην ὁσάτως, καὶ ἐτὶ πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἡ ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐφαράκαμεν. καὶ γάρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοιλα αὐτῆς, ὑθατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἐκπλεα

d ὡστα, χρώματος τί εἴδος παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποικιλίᾳ, ὡστε ἐν τῷ αὐτῆς εἴδος συνεχὲς ποικίλον φαντάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὕση τοιαύτη ἀνα λόγον τὰ φυσικα φύσεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς

5 καρποὺς· καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ὅρη ὁσάτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνα τοῦν ἐνυφάν τὴν τε λειτυτήτα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίων. ὅν καὶ [εἰ] ἐνυφάντε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπάμενα μόρια, ἄρα διὰ τε καὶ λάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους

e καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα· ἔκει δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ τοιούτων εἶναι καὶ ἐτὶ τούτων καλλίων. τὸ δ' αὐτῶν τούτων εἶναι ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ λίθοι εἰς καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδησθέντες οὐδὲ διεφαρμένοι ὡσπερ οἱ ἐνυφάντε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνων καὶ ἀλμής ὑπὸ τῶν δειρὸ

5 συνερρήκοντων, ὃ καὶ λίθοι καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοίς ᾠρίοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἰσχῆ τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμήσθαι τούτοις τε ἀπασὶ καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἄργυρῳ καὶ

iii τοῖς ἀλλοῖς αὐ τοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανὴ γὰρ αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὅτα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὡστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι βέαμα εὐδαίμονων θεάτων. ζῶο δ' ἐπὶ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἄλλα το πολλὰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος, τοὺς μὲν ἐν

5 μεσογαλιὰ ὑκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἀδρέωσταπερ ἡμεῖς


περὶ τὴν βάλατταν, τοὺς δὲ ἐν νῆσοις ἀς περίρρεψ ὁ ἄρα
πρὸς τῇ ἡπείρῳ οὐσας καὶ ἐνι λόγῳ, ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὑδωρ τε
καὶ θάλαττα ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἥμετέραν χρείαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ
τῶν ἀέρα, δὲ ἡμῖν ἀήρ, ἐκεῖνος τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ὦρας
αὐτοῖς κράσῳ ἐχεω τοιαύτην ὄστε ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ
χρόνου τε ζῆν πολὺ πλεῖω τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ
φρονήσει καὶ πάντι τοὺς τοιούτους ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ
ἀποστάσει ὦπερ αἵρ τε ὦδατος ἀφεστήκεν καὶ αἴθηρ ἄρε
πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἀλησε τε καὶ ἕρᾳ αὐτοῖς
εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι ὅκητάς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ
μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας
γένεσθαι αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τῶν γιὰ ἡλιῶν καὶ σελήνην
c καὶ ἀστρα ὁράσαται ὧν αὐτῶν οὐ τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν
ἄλλην εὐδαίμονιαν τοῦτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

Καὶ ὅλῃ μὲν δὴ τὴν γῆν οὐσὶ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὰ περὶ
tὴν γῆν τόπους δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ εἶναι κατὰ τὰ ἐγκοιλα αὐτής
c θυγήθῳ περὶ ὅλῃ πολλοὺς, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἀνα-
πεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἡ ἐν ὃ θεοὶ οἰκούμεν, τοὺς δὲ βαθυ-
tέρους ὄντας τὸ χάσμα αὐτοὺς ἔλαττον ἐχεω τοῦ παρ’ ἡμῖν
tόπου, ἐστὶ δ’ οὐς καὶ βραχυτέρους τῷ βάθει τοῦ ἐνθάδε
εἶναι καὶ πλατυτέρους. τοῦτος δὲ πάντας ὑπὸ γῆν εῖς
ἀλλήλους συντερηθεῖαν τε πολλαξῆ καὶ κατὰ στενότερα καὶ
eὐρύτερα καὶ διεξόδους ἔχεω, ἢ πολὺ μὲν ὕδωρ βεῖν ἐξ
ἀλλήλων εἰς ἀλλήλους ὀστερ εἰς κρατήρας, καὶ αἰενῶν
5
ποταμῶν ἀμφιχανα μεγέθη ὑπὸ τὴν γῆν καὶ θερμῶν ὕδατων
καὶ ψυχρῶν, πολὺ δὲ πῦρ καὶ πυρὸς μεγάλους ποταμοὺς,
πολλοὺς δὲ ύγρό πηλοῦ καὶ καθαρωτέρους καὶ βορβορωδε-
στέρους, ὀστερ εἰς Σικελίαν οἱ πρὸ τοῦ ράκακος πηλοῦ ἐρέπτες
e
ποταμοὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὃ ρύαξ: ὅ ὁ δὴ καὶ ἐκάστους τοὺς τόπους

a 7 τε ομ. Stob. b 2 αὐτοῖς T Stob.: αὐτῆς B b 6 ἅληγ
B Stob.: ὕγ T et ut vid. Timaeus c 2 ὀράσατι B T: θεωρεῖσθαι
B 3 W c 3 τοῖς T Stob.: ομ. T d 1 οῖς B Stob.: οὗ
pr. T d 3 καλ κατὰ B T W: καὶ addubitavit Heindorf: καὶ τὰ
Stob. d 5 καλ T W Stob.: ἐξ in ras. B d 8 δὲ B T Stob.:
τε B 3 W καθαρωδεστέρου in marg. B 2 e 1 ἐν B Stob.: οἱ ἐν T

11*
πληρούσθαι, ὡς ἂν ἐκάστοις τύχῃ ἐκάστοτε ἡ περιπροθ γιγνο-
5 τινὰ ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τῇ γῇ. ἐστὶ δὲ ἅρα αὕτη ἢ αἰώρᾳ διὰ φύσιν
toa unde tive ἐν τι τῶν χασμάτων τῆς γῆς ἄλλος τε τῇ
112 μέγιστον τυχάνει δυ καὶ διαμπερης τετριμένου δι᾽ ὀλης τῆς
gῆς, τούτο ὀπερ Ἡμηρος εἰπε, λέγων αὐτὸ

τῇλε μάλ’, ἥξι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονὸς ἐστὶ βέθηρον·

5 δ καὶ ἄλλοθι καὶ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν Τάρ-
tarou κεκλήκασιν. εἷς γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ χάσμα συρρέοντι τε
πάντες οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πάλιν ἔκρεόσουσιν· γίγνονται
δὲ ἐκαστοὶ τοιοῦτοι [δι᾽] οἶς ἄν καὶ τῆς γῆς ἰδέων.] ἡ ἰδὲ
b αἰτία ἐστὶν τοῦ ἐκρεῖν τε ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἐισρεῖν πάντα τὰ
ῥεύματα, ὅτι πυθμένα οὐκ ἔχει οὐδὲ βάσιν τὸ ύγρὸν τούτο.
αἰωρεῖται δὴ καὶ κυμαίνει ἄνω καὶ κάτω, καὶ ὁ ἄγρ καὶ τὸ
πνεῦμα τὸ περί αὐτὸ ταύτων ποιεῖ· συνείπεται γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ
δτὸν [εἰς τὸ ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς] ὁρμήσῃ καὶ ὅταν εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ
tάδε, καὶ ὁσπέρ τῶν ἀναπνεοῦντων ἄει ἐκπνεύει τε καὶ ἀναπνεύ
ῥέου τὸ πνεῦμα, οὕτω καὶ ἐκεῖ συναισωροῦμεν τῷ ύγρῷ τὸ
πνεῦμα δεινοὺς τινας ἀνέμους καὶ ἀμηχάνους παρέχεται καὶ
c εἰσιδον καὶ ξίον. ὅταν τε οὖν ὕποκρωφησὶ τὸ ὄδωρ εἰς τὸν
tόπον τὸν ὅτι κατὼ καλοῦμεν, τοῖς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα τὰ ῥεύματα
[διὰ] τῆς γῆς εἰσρεῖ τε καὶ πληροὶ αὐτὰ ὀσπέρ οἱ ἐπαυ-
tλοῦντες· ὅταν τε αὕτῃ ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπολίπῃ, δεύρο δὲ ὁρμήσῃ,
5 τὰ ἐνθάδε πληροὶ αὕθις, τὰ δὲ πληρωθέντα ρεῖ διὰ τῶν
ὀχετῶν καὶ διὰ τῆς γῆς, καὶ εἰς τοὺς τόπους ἐκαστα ἀφικνοῦ-
μενα, εἰς οὖς ἐκαστοις ἁθοποίηται, θαλάττας τε καὶ λίμνας
καὶ ποταμοῦ καὶ κρήνας ποιεῖ· ἐντεύθεν δὲ πάλιν δυόμενα
d κατὰ τῆς γῆς, τὰ μὲν μακροτέρους τόπους περιελθόντα καὶ
πλεοὺς, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττως καὶ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν εἰς τὸν

ἐ 3, δ 5 Stob. : δν B T a 5 τε B T Stob. : om. W b 4 αὐτὸ
Heindorf: αὐτὸν B T Stob. c 1 δν B T Stob. : αὐτὸν τριμήσαν
B W e 3 διὰ B T : om. Stob. c 4 ἀπολείπῃ W c 6 καὶ
dia om. W c 7 εκάστως T Stob. : εκάστοις B ἁθοποίηται
Stob. : ἁθοποίηται B T : εἰδοποιεῖται W (sed δ s. v.) d 2 ἐλάττω W
βραχυτέρους B Stob. : βραδυτέρους T
Táρταρον ἐμβάλλει, τὰ μὲν πολὺ κατωτέρω (ἡ) ἦ ἐπηντλεῖτο, τὰ δὲ ὀλγοῦν πάντα δὲ ὑποκάτω εἰσρέι τῆς ἐκροῆς, καὶ ἕνα μὲν καταντικροῦ (ἡ) ἦ [εἰσρέι] ἐξέπεσεν, ἕνα δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος· ἔστι δὲ ἡ παντάπασιν κύκλῳ περιελθόντα, ἣ ἀπαξ ἢ καὶ πλεονάκις περιελιχθέντα περὶ τὴν γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ ὁφέις, εἰς τὸ ὄνυατον κάτω καθένα πάλιν ἐμβάλλει. οὐκ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου καθέναν, πέρα ὃ σφοντες γὰρ ἀμφοτέρους τοὺς ἰεύματο τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν γίγνεται μέρος.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ ἄλλα πολλὰ τε καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἰεύματα ἔστιν τυγχάνει δ’ ἀρα ὅτα ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πολλοῖς τέτταρ’ ἄπειρα, διὸ τὸ μὲν μέγιστον καὶ ἐξωτάτω ρέων περὶ κύκλῳ ὁ καλούμενος Ὁκανός ἐστιν, τούτου δὲ καταντικροῦ καὶ ἐναντίως ρέων Ἀχέρων, διὰ δὲ ἐρήμων τε τῶν μείζων ἄλλων καὶ δὴ καὶ ὑπὸ γῆν ρέων εἰς τὴν λίμνην ἀφικνεῖται τὴν Ἀχερουσίαν, οὐ αἱ τῶν τετελευθερώσων ψυχάι τῶν πολλῶν ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ τινας εἰμαρμένους χρόνους μελάσαι, αἱ μὲν μακροτέρους, αἱ δὲ βραχυτέρους, πάλιν ἐκτέμυσται εἰς τὰς τῶν ἁφῶν γενέσεις. τρίτος δὲ πολιμβὸς τούτων κατὰ μέσουν ἐκβάλλει, καὶ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐκβολῆς ἐκπίπτει εἰς τούτων μέγαν πυρὶ πολλῷ καμένου, καὶ λίμνην ποιεῖ μείζω τῆς παρ’ ἡμῖν θαλάττης, ξέουσαν ὦδας καὶ πηλοῦ· ἐνεπέφευγε δὲ χωρεὶ κύκλῳ θολερὸς καὶ πηλώδης, περιελιχθένιος δὲ τῇ γῇ ἄλλοστε τὰ ἀφικνεῖται καὶ παρ’ ἐσχάτα τῆς Ἀχερουσίαδος λίμνης, οὐ συμμειρουμένος τῷ ὦδαν· περιελιχθεῖς δὲ πολλάκις ὑπὸ γῆς ἐμβάλλει κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου ὤστος δ’ ἐστὶν δὲ ἐπονομάζονυν Πυριφλεγόντα, καὶ οἱ ῥώκες ἀπο-

σπάσματα ἀναφυσώσων ὅτι ἀν τὰχωσί τῆς γῆς. . τοῦτον δὲ αὖ κατανυκρῷ ὁ τέταρτος ἐκπήπτει εἰς τὸπον πρῶτον δεινῶν
tε καὶ ἄγρων, ὡς λέγειται, χρώμα δ' ἔχοντα ὄλων ὁν ὁ
c κυνάος, ὅν δὴ ἐπιονυμάζουσι Στύγιοι, καὶ τὴν λίμνην ἥν
ποτεὶ ὁ ποταμὸς ἐμβάλλων, Στύγια· ὁ δ' ἐμπεσῶν ἔνταῦθα
c καὶ δεινῶς δυνάμεις λαβὼν ἐν τῇ ὑδατί, δύς κατὰ τῆς γῆς,
περιελιττόμενος χωρεῖ ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέοντι καὶ
5 ἀπαντά ἐν τῇ Ἀχέροντι ἐναντίος ὡς εἶναι ἐναντίος καὶ οὐδὲ
τοῦτον ὑδρὸν οὐδενὶ μεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅντος κύκλῳ περιλ-
θῶν ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐναντίος τῷ Πυριφλεγέοντι
όνομα δὲ τοῦτο ἔστω, ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσιν, Κωκυτός.
d Τοῦτων δὲ οὕτως πεφυκότων, ἐπειδὰν ἀφικοῦνται οἱ τετε-
λευτηκότες εἰς τὸν τόπον οἱ ὁ δαίμων ἐκαστὸν κομίζει,
5 πρῶτον μὲν διεικάσαντο οἱ τε καλὸς καὶ ὁσίως βιώσαντες
c καὶ οἱ μὴ καὶ οἱ μὲν τοὺς ὀδύωσιν μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευ-
τέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, ἀναβάντες δὴ αὐτοὶς ὄχηματά
ἐστω, ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀφικοῦνται εἰς τὴν λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεὶ
οἰκούσι καὶ καθαίρομενοι τῶν τα ἀδικήματων διδόντες
5 δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἰ τίς τι ἡδίκηκεν, τῶν τα εὐεργεσιῶν
e τμᾶς φέρουνται κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκαστος· οἱ δ' ἀν τὸ
ἀνιάτωσ ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, η ἰερο-
σύλλας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας η φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρακόμους
πολλούς ἐξευγασμένοι η ἡλία διὰ τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὅντα,
5 τοῦτον δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῦρα ἐπεῖτε εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον;
ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαίνοσιν. οἱ δ' ἀν ἴδομα μὲν μεγάλα δὲ
dόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἀμαρτημάτα, οἴον πρὸς πατέρα η μη-
τέρα ὑπ' ὅργης βιαίων τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλουσιν αὐτοῖς
τοῦ ἀλλον βλον βιώσιν, ἡ ἀνδροφόνοι τουστῷ τῳ ἀλλω-
τρόπῳ γένωνται, τοῦτος δὲ ἐμπεσοῦν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον

b 6 ὅτι B T Stob.: ὅπου Eus.  b 7 a 8 B² T W Eus. Stob.: αὐτοὶ B-
c 7 ἐναντίος W Stob.  e 2 ὃ B² T W Eus. Stob.: om. B-
e 4 τυγχάνει τοιαῦτα W  a 3 τοῦτος B Stob.: τοῦτος T Eus.
Ανάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους ἐκβάλλει τὸ κῦμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόρους κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυρραλέω-
θοντας ἑπείδαιν δὲ φερόμενυ γένωται κατὰ τὴν λίμνην τὴν
Ἄχεροσιάδα, ἑντάθη βοῶσι τε καὶ καλοῦσι, οἱ μὲν οὖς ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ οὖς ὑβρισαν, καλέσαντες δ' ἱκετεύσουσι καὶ δέουται ἐάσαι σφᾶς ἐκβήναι εἰς τὴν λίμνην καὶ δέξασθαι, καὶ εἀν μὲν πελάσωσι, ἐκβαίνουσι τε καὶ λήγουσι τῶν
cακῶν, εἰ δὲ μῆ, φέρονται αὖθις εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον καὶ ἐκείθεν πάλιν εἰς τοὺς τοταμοῦς, καὶ ταῦτα πάσχουτε οὐ πρότερον παύονται πρὶν ἀν πελάσωσι οὖς ἢδίκησαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ δίκη ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτοὺς ἔταχθη. οἳ δὲ ἤν δόξασον διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ δόσιον βιώναι, οὕτωι εἰσὶν οἱ τῶν μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοι τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττό-
μενοι ὡσπερ δεσμωτηρίων, ἀνα δὲ οἱ τὴν καθαρὰν ὁίκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς οἰκίζομενοι τοῦτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ
φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ξῶσι τὸ
παράταν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τοῦτων
cαλλίους ἀφικνοῦται, ἃς οὔτε ράδιον δηλώσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος 5
ἰκανὸς ἐν τῷ παράντι ἀλλὰ τοῦτον ἢ ἡ ἔνεκα χρῆ ἢν διεληλύ-
θαμεν, ὡ Σιμμία, πᾶν ποιεῖν ὡστε ἄρετής καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν
tῷ βίῳ μετασχέων· καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δισυχρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ d
διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχουσι ἀνδρῷ· ὅτι μέντοι ἡ ταῦτ'
estin ἢ τοιαύτη ἀττα περὶ τᾶς ψυχᾶς ἡμῶν καὶ τᾶς οἰκήσεις, ἐπελεπτὸ ἀδάνατον γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὕσα, τοῦτο καὶ
πρέπει μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεύσαι οἰσμένῳ οὕτως 5
ἔχειν—καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κώδυνος—καὶ χρῆ τα τοιαύτα ὡσπερ ἐπάδεων ἐσταυρῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μικρὸν ἥκον.
αλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἑνεκα ταρρεῖν χρῆ περὶ τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ψυχῇ
e ἀνδρα ὡστὶς ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἰδιότατὰς τὰς περὶ τῷ
σῶμα καὶ τοὺς κόσμους εἰσα ἀρέιν, ὡς ἀλλοτρίους τε ὀντας, καὶ πλέον ἡτέρων ἡγησάμενοι ἀπεργήσεται, τὰς δὲ περὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐσποῦδασε τε καὶ κοσμήσας τὴν ψυχὴν
5 οὐκ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῆς κόσμῳ, σωφροσύνη τε καὶ
dικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἀληθεία, οὕτω
περιμενέει τὴν εἰς Ἀιδοῦ πορείαν [ὡς πορευόμενον ὅταν ἡ
εἰμαρμένη καλῆ], ὑμεῖς μὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ὦ Σωμία τε καὶ
Κέβης καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, εἰς αὐτὸς ἐν των χρώμι ἕκαστοι πορεύ-

5 Ταῦτα δὴ εἶπόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Κρίτων, Εἰρέν., ἐφη, ὦ
Σώκρατες· τί δὲ τούτοις ἡ ἐμοὶ ἐπιστάτειες ἡ περὶ τῶν
παῖδων ἡ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ, ὅτι ἂν σοι ποιοῦντες ἢμεῖς ἐν
χάριτι μάλιστα ποιοῦμεν;

"Απερ ἀεὶ λέγω, ἐφη, ὦ Κρίτων, οὐδὲν κανόνετον· ὅτι
ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς
καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτοῖς ἐν χάριτι ποιησετε άττ' ἂν ποιητε, καν μὴ

10 καὶ τα ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρώμι ἐμχ, οὐδὲ ἐαν πολλὰ ὀμολο-
c γήσητε ἐν τῷ παροῦτι καὶ σφόδρα, οὐδὲν πλέον ποιησετε.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς προδυμητῶμεθα, ἐφη, οὕτω ποιεῖν
θάπτομεν δὲ σε τίνα τρόπων;

"Ὅπως ἂν, ἐφη, βουλησθε, εαυτῷ γε λάβητε με καὶ

5 μὴ ἐκφύγων ὑμᾶς. Γελάσας δὲ ἁμα ἥσυχα καὶ πρὸς ἥμας
ἀποβλεψας εἶπεν· Οὐ πείθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, Κρίτωνα, ὡς

d 8 τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς W e 2 τε om. W a 7 δὴ BT: ἡ δ' B W b 2 ἐπιστάλλεις CoisL.: ἐπιστάλλεις T : ἐπιστάλλει B : ἐπιστάλλη B W b 4 ποιοῦμεν B W b 5 ἐφη λέγω W b 6 καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς om. T b 8 μὲν B : om. T W c 3 προβημι-

ἐγὼ εἰμι οὕτως Σωκράτης, ὁ ἐκείνῳ διαλεγόμενος καὶ διά-
τίττων ἐκαστοῦ τῶν λεγομένων, ἀλλ' οἶεταὶ με ἐκείνῳ εἰναι
ὅν ὦν ἐντέλει οὕτως ὑπεροῦν μεγαλόν, καὶ ἔφατα δὴ πῶς με ἐ
θάπτη. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ πάλιν πολὺν λόγον πεποίημαι, ὡς,
ἐπειδὲ πᾶτω τὸ φάρμακον, οὐκέτι ὡμῖν παραμεῖν, ἀλλ' ὁ
ιησοῦναι ἀπὸν εἰς μακρῶν δὴ τινας εὐδαιμονίας, ταύτα
μοι δοκῶ ἀυτῷ ἄλλως λέγειν, παραμυθοῦμεν ἂμα μὲν
ὕμας, ἀμα ὅς ἐμαντόν. ἐγγυήσασθε ὑμῖν μὲ πρὸς Κρίτωνα,
ἐφή, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐγνήθη ἦν οὕτως πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς
ἡγγατός οὕτως μὲν γὰρ ἦν παραμεῖνειν ὑμεῖς δὲ ἡ μὴν
μὴ παραμεῖνειν ἐγγυήσασθε ἐπειδὴ ἀποθάνα, ἀλλ' οἰησ-
σεθαὶ ἀπιόντα, ἰνα Κρίτων βάους φέρη, καὶ μὴ ὄρων μοῦ τὸ
ἐ σῶμα ἡ καυμένεον ἡ κατορθωμένον ἀγανακτῇ ὑπὲρ ἔμοι
ὡς δειμα πάχυνσας, μηδὲ λέγῃ ἐν τῇ ταφῇ ὡς ἡ προτεστάθη
Σωκράθη ἡ ἐκφέρει ἡ κατορθύτει. εὖ γὰρ λαθῆ, ἡ ὅς ὃς, ὁ
ἀριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ τρόπο
πλημμέλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακὸν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς. ἀλλὰ
θαρρεῖ τι χρῆ καὶ φάναι τοῦμον σῶμα βάπτειν, καὶ βάπτειν
οὕτως ὅπως ἐν σοὶ φιλοῦ ἢ καὶ μάλιστα ἡγή νομμον εἰναι.

Ταῦτ' εἰπὼν ἐκείνω τοῖς ἀνίστατοι εἰς οἰκεῖας τι σοὶ ὅμορ-
μενος, καὶ ὁ Κρίτων εἴπετο αὐτῷ, ἦμας ὅ ἐκείλευε περιμενῶν.

περιμενοῦμεν οὖν [πρὸς ἐμᾶς αὐτός] διαλεγομένου περὶ τῶν
εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνασκόπησεν, τοῦτ' ὅ αὐ τις συμφοράς
διεξιῶτες ὡς ἡμῖν [γεγονοῦσα εἰς] ἀτεχνώς ἡγομένου ὡς πάτρος
πατρὸς θερηθεῖσσες, διαζευξάοροι τὸν ἐπείτα μιὸν.

ἐπείδη ὁ δὲ λύσατο καὶ ἱερέθη παρ' αὐτὸν τὰ παιδία—δῶ ὁλὸς αὐτῶν ὑ

 UIImage.png

υεῖς συμφορος ἡμᾶς, ὅε δὲ μέγας—καὶ αἱ ὅικείαι γυναῖκές
ἀφίκουν ἐκείνω, ἐναντίον τοῦ Κρίτωνος διαλεκθεὶς τι καὶ
ἐπιστείλας ἄττα ἐβούλετο, τὸς μὲν γυναῖκας καὶ τὰ παιδία

θάπτει Τῠ. θάπτει Τῠ. θάπτει Τῠ. θάπτει Τῠ. θάπτει Τῠ. θάπτει Τῠ. θάπτει Τῠ.
5 ἀπείναι ἐκέλευσεν, αὐτὸς δὲ ἦκε παρ’ ἡμᾶς. καὶ ἦν ἡ ἡδὸν ἐγγὺς ἡλίου δυσμῶν· χρόνον γὰρ πολὺν διέτριβεν ἐνδο. ἐλθὼν δ’ ἐκαθέζετο λελουμένος καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἄττα μετὰ ταῦτα διελέγη, καὶ ἦκεν ὁ τῶν ἐνδεκα ὑπηρέτης καὶ στὰς c παρ’ αὐτόν, θ’ Σώκρατες, ἐφη, οὐ καταγγέλασα γε σου ὅπερ ἀλλως καταγιγνώσκα, ὅτι μοι χαλεπάνους καὶ κατα- ράντας ἐπειδὲν αὐτοὶς παραγγέλω πίνειν τὸ φάρμακον ἀναγκαζόντων τῶν ἀρχάντων. σὲ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἀλλως 5 ἐγνακα ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γενναίοτατον καὶ προτατον καὶ ἀριστον ἄνδρα ὑπὸ τῶν πώποτε δεῖρο ἀφικομένων, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν εὐ οἶδ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἐμοὶ χαλεπάνεις, γιγνώσκεις γὰρ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ ἐκεῖνος. νῦν οὖν, οἴς θὰ γὰρ ἡ ἡλιον d ἀγγέλλων, χαίρε τε καὶ πειρῶ ὡς δάστα φέρειν τὰ ἀναγκαία. Καὶ ἀμα δακρύσας μεταστρεφόμενος ἀπῆς.

Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἀναβλέψασ πρὸς αὐτόν. Καὶ σὺ, ἐφη, χαίρε, καὶ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ποιήσομεν. Καὶ ἀμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, 5 ὃς ἀστείος, ἐφη, ὁ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ παρὰ πάντα μοι τὸν χρόνον προῆρε καὶ διελέγετο ἐγίοτε καὶ ἦν ἄνδρων λάςτος, καὶ νῦν ὡς γενναίως με ἀποδικούει. ἀλλ’ ἄγε οὖ, ὁ Κρίτων, πειθαμέθα αὐτῷ καὶ ἐνεκάτω τις τὸ φάρμακον, εἰ τέτριπται εἰ δὲ μή, τρυπάτω ὁ ἄνθρωπος.

e Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων, Ἀλλ’ οἶμαι, ἐφη, ἐγγυς, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔτι ἡλιον εἶναι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὄρεστὶ καὶ οὕτω δεδυκέναι. καὶ ἀμα ἐγὼ οἶδα καὶ ἀλλους πάνυ ὄψθε πίνουτας, ἐπειδ’ παραγγελθή αὐτοῖς, δευτησάγας τε καὶ πίνουτας εὖ μάλα, καὶ συγγενο-

5 μένους γ’ ἐνίου ὡς ἄν τρυχωσω ἐπιθυμοιντες. ἀλλα μηδὲν ἐπέιγον ἐτι γαρ ἐγγυξε‘. Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, Εἰκότως γε, ἐφη, ὁ Κρίτων, ἐκεῖνοι τε ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, οὐς σὺ λέγεις—οἴονται γαρ κερδαίμενα ταῦτα ποιήσαις—καὶ ἐγγυς ταῦτα εἰκότως οὐ ποιῆσω· οὐδὲν γαρ

b 7 ἐκ τα B²T W: om. B e1 γε TW: om. B e3 παραγ-

οίμαι κερδανείν ὀλίγον ὕστερον πιὸν ἀλλὸ γε ἡ γέλωτα, ἢ ὑφόλησεν παρ’ ἐμαυτῷ, γλυκομένου τοῦ ζήν καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἐνύστος. ἀλλ’ ἤδε, ἐφή, πεῖδον καὶ μὴ ἀλλαξο ποιεῖ.

Καὶ ὁ Κρίτων ἀκοῦσας ἐνεύρετ’ τὸ παιδί πλησιον ἐστὰτι καὶ ὁ παῖς ἐξελθὼν καὶ συννύον χρόνον διαφύλαξε ἤκεν ἀγὼν 5 τὸν μέλλοντα δῶσει τὸ φάρμακον, ἐν κύκλι πέρασε πετρυμένον. ἦδον δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν ἀνθρωπόν, ἕτειν, ἐφῆ, ὁ βέλτιστε, σὺ γὰρ τούτων ἐπιστήμων, τὰ θρή ποιεῖν; ὁ οὖν ἀλλο, ἐφῆ, ἡ πίνουτα περιέναι, ἐσον ἂν σου βάρος ἐν τοῖς σκέλεσιν γένεται, ἐπειτὰ κατακεραυχαί καὶ οὕτως αὐτῷ ποιῆσε. Καὶ ἡμα ὀρέσε τὴν κύκλια τὸ Σωκράτει.

Καὶ δὲ λαβὼν καὶ μᾶλλο πλεο, ὁ Ἐχέρατες, οὔτε ἑράτωσαν οὔτε διαφήλεσαν οὔτε τὸν χρωμάτος οὔτε τοῦ προσ-ἀφοῦν, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ εἰσῆλθε προβλήματος πρὸς τὸν 5 ἀνθρωπόν, Τὰ λέγεις, ἐφῆ, περὶ τοῦτο τὸ πώματος πρὸς τὸ ἀποσπείτω τις: ἐξετίν ὁ οὖ; Τοσοῦτον, ἐφῆ, ὁ Σάκρατες, τρίβομεν ὅσον οἴμοθεα μέτρουν εἰναι πιεῖν.

Μανθάνω, ἢ ὁ ὁσ’ ἀλλ’ ἐχεχορήσαι γέ’ τοι τοῖς θεοῖς ἐξετίς σε καὶ χρῆ, τῆς μετοίκησις τῆς εὐθένδε εἴκοσι εὐνυχῆ γενέ-σθαι: ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ εἰξομαί τε καὶ γένοιτο ταύτη. Καὶ ἀμ’ εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπιστήμωμος καὶ μάλα εὐχερεῖς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξετίνει, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπισκιαῖον οἶοι τε 5 ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύνει, ὅς δὲ εἴδης πώς ὑπολάματα ταῦτα πετυχότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ’ ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστατῆ ἐχώρει τα δακρύα, ὡστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλασον, ἐμαυτῷ—οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἐκείνων γε, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ τύχης, οὕν ἀνδρός ἐταύρον ἐστερμένος εἶναι: ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἐτὶ πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ὁ ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἶοι τ’ ἦν κατέχει τὰ δακρύα, ἐξανέστη.

Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθέν χρόνῳ οὔδεν ἐπάνευο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλάων καὶ καὶ θης.
5 ἀγανακτῶν ὄνδενα οὕτων οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλήρ. 

γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους.

Εἰκείνος δὲ, Ὄλα, ἐφη, ποιεῖτε, ὁ Θυμίασιος. ἐγώ μέντοι

οὖν ἦκεστα τούτου ἔνεκα τᾶς γυναίκας ἀπεπέμψα, ἵνα μὴ

e τοιαύτα πλημμελοῦντι καὶ γάρ ἁκόκοι ὧτι ἐν εὐθυμίᾳ χρή

tελευτήσαν. ἀλλ' ἵσυχάν τε ἀγετε καὶ καρπερεῖτε.

Καὶ ἤμεις ἄκουσαντες Ἰοχύνθημεν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ

dακρύνεων. δὲ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρώνεσθαι ἐφη τὰ

5 σκέλη, κατεκλίθη ὑπέτοιοι—οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλεσαν ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς—

καὶ ἀμα ἐφάπτομένοι αὐτοῦ οὕτως ὁ δόσι τὸ πάρμακον,

διαλέιον εὐθέου ἐπέσκότη τοὺς πάλαι καὶ τὰ σκέλη,

κατείστα σφόδρα πίεσαν αὐτὸν τὸν πόδα ἥρετο εἰ αἰσθάνατο,

ο ὁ οὖν ἐφη. καὶ μετὰ τούτοι ἀδύσ τὰς κρύμας καὶ ἐπάνω

οὕτως ἤμειν ἐπεδέκιμυ ὧτι ψύχωσε τε καὶ πήγανο. καὶ

αὐτὸς ἤγετο καὶ ἐπείπ ὦτι, ἐπείδαι πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται

αὐτῷ, τότε οἰκήσεται.

5 Ἡθ οὖν σχέδων τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἤπρον ψυχόμενα,

καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενοι—ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γὰρ—ἐπεν—ὁ δὴ τελευ-

ταίον ἐφθεγξατο—Ω Κρίτων, ἐφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφελομέν,

ἐλεκτρυόνα. ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσσετε.

Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἐφη, ἐσται, ὁ Κρίτων: ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ τι ἄλλο

10 λέγεις.

Ταῦτα ἐρωμένου αὐτοῦ οὖν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὅλγον

χρόνων διαλυτῶν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐξεκαλύμεν

αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁς τὰ ὃματα ἐστησεν ἵδον δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέκλαβε

tὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς.

15 Ἡθ ἡ τελευτῇ, ὁ Ἐσέκρατες, τοῦ ἐσταλθοῦ ἡμῶν ἐγένετο,

ἀνδρός, ὡς ἤμεις φαίημεν ἄν, τῶν τότε δύσαμεν ἐπειράθηςε

ἀριστοῦ καὶ ἄλλος φρονιμωτάτος καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

d5 κατέκλασε Τ: κατέκλασε B ἐδ τε ΒΤ: γε W ἐπ.

έχομεν πρ. Τ 85 κατεκλίθη ΒΤW ἀς οὕτως ήμῶν B:

ἡμῶν οὕτως ἡμῶν Τ: οὕτως ήμῶν αὐτοῖς B'W πήγαντο B'TW

α.8 διαμελήσατε W α.9 ταῦτα ἐσται ἐφη Τ καὶ T

καὶ Τ
NOTES

Introductory dialogue in dramatic form, 57 a 1—59 c 7.

The scene is the Pythagorean σωφριων at Phlius. The only Pythagorean who speaks is Echecrates, but the presence of the others is implied (cp. especially 58 d 7 and 102 a 8). The time is not long after the death of Socrates; for the Pythagoreans have not yet heard any details. As Geddes first pointed out, it would be natural for Phaedo to visit the Pythagoreans of Phlius on his way home from Athens to Elis. It is not far off the road.

For the Pythagoreans of Phlius, cp. Diog. Laert. viii. 46 τελευταίαι γὰρ ἐγένοντο τῶν Πυθαγορείων, οἱς καὶ Ἀριστάξενος ἔδει. Ξενόφιλος τε ὁ Χαλκίδευς ἀπὸ Ἐράκης καὶ Φάντων ὁ Φιλάσιος καὶ Ἐχεκράτης καὶ Διακλῆς καὶ Πολύμναστος, Φιλάσιοι καὶ αὐτοί. ἦσαν δὲ ἀκροαταὶ Φιλολάου καὶ Εὐφίτου τῶν Ταραντίων (cp. E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 320).

Phlius lay in the upper valley of the Asopus (893 ft. above sea-level), where Argolis, Arcadia, and the territory of Sicyon meet. It was surrounded by mountains 4,000 to 5,000 feet high, ‘under whose immemorial shadow’ (δασκίας Φλειούντος ἐν ὀμνύγιοις ὄρεσιν, Pind. Nem. vi. 45) ‘the high discourse is supposed to be held’ (Geddes). The territory of Phlius, which was only a few miles square, consisted of a triangular valley with its apex to the north. ‘The town was on the eastern side of the valley and built in the form of an amphitheatre. A few ruins are still left. The people were Dorians and faithful allies of Sparta.

Tradition connected Pythagoras himself with the place (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 94, n. 1), and he is said to have assumed the name of φιλόσοφος for the first time there or in the neighbouring Sicyon (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 321, n. 2).

Phaedo of Elis is said (Diog. Laert. ii. 105) to have been a prisoner of war brought as a slave to Athens, where he attracted the notice of Socrates, who secured his liberation. At the time of
this dialogue he is quite a youth and still wears his hair long (89 b 5). At a later date he founded the school of Elis. We know nothing of his teaching; but, as the school of Eretria was an offshoot from that of Elis, and as both are commonly mentioned along with that of Megara, it is probable that he busied himself chiefly with the difficulties which beset early Logic. For us, as Wilamowitz says, he chiefly represents the conquest of the most unlikely parts of the Peloponnese by Athenian culture, which is the distinguishing feature of the fourth century B.C.

57 a 1 Ἀὐτὸς κτλ. We seem to be breaking in on a conversation already begun; for ἡκουσας has no expressed object. Perhaps Phaedo has already spoken of something Socrates said or did on the day of his death.

παρεγινυού: the verbs παρείναι and παραγίνεσθαι are specially used of being at hand to support any one in times of trouble or rejoicing. So in Lat. adesse alicui. We should say, 'Were you with Socrates?' Cp. also παρακαλεῖν, adovocare.

a 2 τὸ φάρμακον, sc. τὸ κόνινον. It is nowhere expressly stated in the Phaedo that it was hemlock; but that was the drug commonly employed, and the symptoms described at the end of the dialogue (ΠΠείς sqq.) correspond to those elsewhere ascribed to it. It has been doubted whether hemlock-juice would really produce these symptoms, but see Appendix I.

a 5 Τί... ἐστιν ἄττα: this is the regular construction (cp. 58 c 6), though in 102 a 9 we have τίνα... ἢ... τα... λεξέντα.

ὁ ἀνὴρ is an emphatic αὐτὸς or ἐκεῖνος. Cp. 85 c 8; 61 c 3, and note on 58 e 3 ἀνὴρ.

a 7 [τῶν πολιτῶν] Φλειασίων: Riddell (Dig. § 36) defends this by making Φλειασίων depend on οὐδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν, 'for neither of the Phliasians does any citizen,' which seems unnatural. Most editors bracket Φλειασίων, but I think v. Bamberg is right in suspecting rather τῶν πολιτῶν. In Stephanus of Byzantium and elsewhere we regularly find notices like Οἶνος· αἱ πολίται, Ολαῖοι· καὶ τὸ ἑθνικὸν ὁμοίως, and we can understand how, in the absence of capital letters, such an explanation might seem desirable. Further, the form Φλειάσιων is exceptional (cp. however Ἀμαγράσιοι), and Cicero tells us (ad Att. vi. 2) that he himself wrote Φλιαίντιι by mistake. A similar case
is possibly *Meno* 70 b 2 οἱ τοῦ σοῦ ἔταιρον [πόλιταί] λαρισσίοι. The absence of the article with the ἐθνικόν is normal, and the form Φλειάστοι (Φλιάστοι MSS.) is guaranteed by inscriptions and coins.

a 7 οὔδείς πάντι, ‘no one to speak of.’ The phrase does not necessarily mean ‘no one at all’, though it tends to acquire that sense. Cp. οὐ πάνν (Riddell, Dig. § 139) and the English ‘not very’. It is unnecessary to discuss, as most editors do, why communications between Athens and Phlius were interrupted. There is no statement that they were, and it must often have happened that no Phliasian had business in Athens and no Athenian at Phlius. There was, however, at least one such (58 a 3).

*ἐπιχωρίαζεν*. . . Ἀθήναζε: there seems to be no other instance of ἐπιχωρίαζεν in this sense. It usually means ‘to be native’, and is used of local dialects, customs, &c. Here apparently it is equivalent to ἐπίθημειν and takes the construction of that verb. Cp. *Parm.* 126 b 3 ἐπεδήμησα δεύο ἐκ Κλασσιείων.

b 1 *σαφὲς τι*: in such expressions *σαφὲς* means ‘sure’, ‘trustworthy’ (not ‘clear’). So *σαφὲς* φιλος, σαφὲς μάντις.

b 3 *εἴχεν, sc. ὀ ἄγγείλας*. He has not been mentioned, but he has been implied.

8 a 1 τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης: the normal construction would be τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκη (cp. 58 c 6 τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν θάνατον), but the prepositional phrase is influenced by ἐπίθεσθε. Heindorf compares *Xen.* *Cyr.* v. 3. 26 ἐπελ πύθαινά τὰ περὶ τοῦ φρουρίου, *Anab.* ii. 5. 37 ὅπως μάθη τὰ περὶ Προξένου.

a 4 *πολλῷ ὑστερον*: *Xen.* *Mem.* iv. 8. 2 ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν κρίσιν τριάκοντα ἡμέρας βιῶναι.

a 6 *Τύχη* has always the implication of *coincidence*, which is here made explicit by the cognate verb ἐτυχεῖν. In most of its uses, the meaning of τυχάνεν is best brought out in English by using the adverb ‘just’.

*ἐτυχεῖν . . . ἐστεμένη, ‘had just been crowned.’* The Ionic στέφειν is only used in a ritual sense in Attic prose. So, with mock solemnity, in *Rep.* 398 a 7 ἐρίῳ στέψαντες. The common word is στεφανοῦν.

a 8 *πέμποντων*. In the Bodleian (Clarke) MS. (B) Bishop Arethas, for whom the MS. was written, has added κατ’ ἑτος in his own hand (B²). These words are also found in the Vienna MS. (W). The correc-
tions of B² were taken throughout from a MS. very closely resembling W. The additional words may well be an ancient variant.

a 10 τὸ πλοῖον: i.e. the θεωρίς. For the Delian θεωρία, cp. Aristotle, 'Αθ. πολ. 56 καθιστηκαί δὲ καὶ (ὁ ἄρχων) εἰς Δήλων χορηγοὺς καὶ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ τριακοντορῷ τῷ τούτος ἱθόεις ἄγωντι. The seven youths and seven maids were technically called the ἱθεοί (masc. and comm. of παρθένοι). The story is told in Bacchylides xvi (xvii), a dithyramb entitled Ἦδεοι. Cp. also Plut. Thes. 23 τὸ δὲ πλοῖον ἐν ὦ μετὰ τῶν ἱθεῶν ἐπλευσε καὶ πάλιν ἐσώθη, τὴν τριακόντορον, ἄρχι τοῦ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως χρόνου διεφύλαττον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. Of course none of the original timbers were left, and Plutarch tells us the philosophers took it as their stock example in discussing the question of identity. Was it the same ship or not?

a 11 τοὺς "διὰ ἐπτὰ" ἔκεινος: this was also a traditional name. Cp. Bacchyl. xvi. (xvii.) Ι Κυκάντρωφα μὲν χαῖς μενέκτυτον | Θησέα διὰ ἐπτὰ τ' ἑλάσωσε ἐγονσα | κούρον τοῦ ἱδών | Κρητικῶν τάμες πέλαγος. In the Laws (706 b 7) Plato says it would have been better for the Athenians to lose πλευνάκες ἐπτὰ . . . παίδας than to become ναυτικοί.

b 2 θεωρίαι, 'pilgrimage', 'mission'. A θεωρίς is simply a 'spectator' (θεαφόρος, Dor. θεόρος), but the word was specialized in the meaning of an envoy sent by the State to the Great Games, to Delphi or to Delos. The θεωρίαι were λητουργίαι (cp. Dict. Ant., s.v. Θεωρία).

b 3 ἀπάξειν: the ἀπο- has the same force as in ἀποδιδόναι and ἀποφέρειν, that of rendering what is due. Cp. the technical ἀπάξειν τὸν φόρον, φόρον ἀπαγωγή, and Ditt. Syll. p. 43 τὴν ἀπαρχήν ἀπήγαγον.


b 7 δεῦρο, 'to Athens.' It is true that Phædo is speaking at Phlius, but he is quoting the Athenian νόμως.

b 8 ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γίγνεται, 'takes a long time.' This meaning of ἐν, which is not clearly explained in most grammars, is well brought out by an anecdote Plutarch tells of Zeuxis (Περὶ πολυμφίλιας 94 f): ὁ Ζεύξις αἰτιομένων αὐτῶν τινῶν ὅτι ξογραφεῖ βραδεός, ὤμολογῶ, εἰπεν, ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ γράφειν, καὶ γὰρ εἰς πολὺν.
atav τῆς στις ... ἀπολαβόντες, 'at times when the winds detain them' (synchronous aor. pcp.). The regular term for 'cut off', 'intercept', is ἀπολαμβάνειν, especially of ships 'detained' by contrary winds. Cp. Hdt. ii. 115 ἥν ἀνέμων ἤδη ἀπολαμβάνετε, Thuc. vii. 22 ἦν που ὑπὸ ἄπλοιας ἀπολαμβανόμεθα, Dem. Chers. 39 νόσῳ καὶ χείμαν καὶ πολέμου ἀποληφθέντος, Plato, Menex. 243 c 2 ἀπειλημένων ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ τῶν ναυ.}


c 1 αὐτοὺς: the Greek thinks of the crew rather than the ship. In Thucydides and elsewhere a plural pronoun often stands for πολίς, ναύς, and the like.

c 3 ἔτυχεν ... γεγονός, 'had just been done.' Cp. a 6 n.

c 6 τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θάνατον: cp. a 1 n.

tι ᾗν: cp. 57 a 5 n. W has τίνα here also, and B² corrects accordingly.

c 7 αἱ παραγενόμεναι: cp. 57 a 1 n. So παρεῖναι just below.

c 8 οὐκ εἶσαιν, 'would they not allow?' 'Did they not allow?' is οὐκ εἶσαιν. The difference between a negated imperfect and a negated aorist may generally be brought out in some such way as this.

οἱ ἄρχοντες, οἱ ἐνδεκα, as we shall see.

d 1 καὶ πολλοὶ γε, 'quite a number in fact.' There is something to be said, however, for the division indicated in some MSS., ΦΑΙ. Οὐδαμός. EX. Ἀλλὰ παρῆσαν τινες; ΦΑΙ. Καὶ πολλοί γε. Cp. Euthyphro 2 b ΣΩ. Οὔ γὰρ οὖν, ΕΥΘ. Ἀλλὰ σὲ ἄλλοις; ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε.

d 3 εἰ μὴ ... τυγχάναι αὕτα, 'unless you are engaged just now!'

d 5 τὸ μεμνήσθαι Σωκράτους: cp. Xen. Mem. iv. 1. ἦτε καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνον μεμνήσθαι μὴ παράνοια οὐ μικρὰ ὀφέλει (a characteristic Xenophontean touch) τοὺς εἰσωθάτας τε αὐτοῦ οὐσεῖναι καὶ ἀποδεχομένους ἐκεῖνον.

d 8 τοιαύτως ἑτέρους, 'just such others' (pred.), cp. 80 d 5, 'Well, you will find your hearers of the same mind.' The enthusiasm of the Pythagoreans for Socrates can hardly be an invention of Plato's. ὡς ... ἀκριβεστάτα, 'as minutely as you can.'

e 1 παραγενόμενος (synchronous aor. pcp.), cp. 57 a 1 n. and παρώντα just below.

e 2 αὕτε: the second αὕτε does not occur till 59 a 3 after this sentence has been resumed by διὰ δὴ ταύτα κτλ.

με ... εἰσήμε: we can say δέως, ἔλεος, ἔλπις εἰσέρχεται με, as here, or εἰσέρχεται μοι, as at 59 a 1.

e 3 ἀνήρ: cp. 57 a 5 n. The MSS. have nowhere preserved this form,
but write either ἀνήρ or ὁ ἀνήρ, though we see from examples in the oblique cases (e.g. 58 c 8; 61 c 3) that the article is required. The existence of the crasis is proved by the metre in Aristophanes.

e 3 καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ‘both in his bearing and his words’ (Church). Here εἰδαλμὼν ἐφαίνετο takes the construction of εἰδαλμῷζεν, for which see Crito 43 b 6 quoted in the next note. (The reading τῶν λόγων (TW) is better attested than τοῦ λόγου, which is a mere slip in B corrected by Arethas.)

e 4 ὥς ἄθεος ... ἐτελεύτα, ‘so fearlessly and nobly did he pass away.’ Such clauses are best regarded as dependent exclamations. Cp. Crito 43 b 6 πολλάκις ... σε ... εἰδαλμόνισα τοῦ τρόπου, ... ὡς βαθὺς αὐτῷ (sc. τὴν παρεστῶσαν συμφορὰν) φέρεις. Cp. below 89 a 2; 117 c 9.

e 5 ὡστε μοι ... παρίστασαί, ‘so that I was made to feel’, ‘so that I realized’. In the act. παριστάναι τι τινί is ‘to impress a thing on some one’s mind’. Cp. Dem. Cor. i ταύτῳ παραστήσαι τοὺς θεοὺς ὑμῖν, ‘that the gods may put it into your hearts,’ Mid. 72 τὸ δεῖν τὸ παραστήσαι τοῖς ἀκούοντων, ‘to make the audience realize the outrage.’ In the mid. we can say δόξα μοι παρίστασαί, ‘the belief impresses itself upon me,’ ‘the thought comes home to me’ (cp. 66 b 1), or the verb may be used impersonally as here and ALC. i 143 e 8 εἷς σοι αυτίκα μᾶλα παρεστάθη, ‘if it should come into your head.’

ἀνεν θεῖας μοίρας, lit. ‘without a divine dispensation’. The meaning is ‘Providence’ would watch over him on his way. The phrase θεῖα μοίρα is common in Plato and Xenophon as the religious equivalent of τύχη. Hdt. iii. 139 says θεῖα τύχα. Cp. Xen. Ἀρ. 32 ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ θεοφιλῶς μοίρας τευχηκέναι (Σωκράτης).

59 a 2 παρόντι πένθει, ‘one who takes part in a scene of mourning.’ The meaning of παρέιναι was so fixed in this connexion (57 a 1 n.) that no Greek would be tempted to take it as neuter in agreement with πένθει. It is dependent on εἰσείναι to be supplied from εἰσηγήται, and governs πένθει.

a 3 ὡστε αὖ: the first ὡστε is at 58 e 2.

ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ὄντων, ‘occupied with philosophy.’ Heindorf compares Xen. Cyr. iii. 1. 1 ὁ μὲν δὴ Κύρος ἐν τούτωι ἤν, iv. 3. 23 οἷς μὲν δὴ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἤσαν. See below 84 a 8 ἄρι ἐν τούτῳ (τῷ λογισμῷ) οὖσα.

a 4 τοιοῦτοι τνε, i.e. philosophical.
a 4 ἀτεχνῶς, 'just.' The phrase is equivalent to ἀτεχνῶς ἀτοπὸν τι ἐπάθον, for which cp. Symp. 198 c 2 ὡστε ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ 'Ομήρου ἐπετόνθη, Arist. Clouds 408 ν Ἔ ἐγὼ γοῦν ἀτεχνῶς ἐπάθον τούτι ποτὲ Διασίσαι. In this connexion the adverb means that the description of the πᾶθος is to be taken 'literally', as we say.

a 8 γελώντες... δακρύντες: the participles explain οὕτω, and are not dependent on διεκιμένα.

εἰσοτε δὲ: a variation of the usual τοτε δὲ. Cp. Theaet. 150 a 9 εἰσοτε μὲν... ἐστι δ' οτε..., Soph. 242 d 1 εἰσοτε... τοτε δὲ...

Plato avoids formal symmetry with μὲν and δὲ.

a 9 καὶ διαφερόντως, 'quite exceptionally' (καὶ as in καὶ μάλα). Cp. 61 e 1; 117 c 4.

Ἀπολλόδωρος is mentioned as a disciple in Ἀπολ. 34 a 2, and Plato has chosen him as the narrator of the Symposium. In that dialogue, the friend to whom he narrates it says (173 d 4) 'Αἰεὶ δήμος εἶ, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρε' ἀιεὶ γὰρ σαυτὸν τε κακηγορεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ δοκεῖσι μοι ἀτεχνῶς πάντας ἄθλιους ἥγεισθαι πλὴν Ἐακράτους, ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ ἀρξάμενοι. Xenophon mentions him along with Antisthenes (Met. iii. 11. 17) 'Ἀπολλόδωρῳ τε τόνδε καὶ 'Ἀντισθένην οὐδέποτε μου ἀπολείπεσθαι', so he seems to have belonged to the Cynic section of the Socratic circle, which agrees very well with the tendency to κακηγορία and with other traits mentioned in the Symposium. In the Xenophontean Ἀπολογία 28 we are told that he was ἐπιθυμητὴς μὲν ἴσχυρῶς οὕτῳ (Σωκράτους), ἄλλως δ' εὐήθης (naif, 'silly'). In most editions of the Symposium we read that he had the nickname (ἐπωνυμία) of μανκός (173 d 8), but μαλακός has better MS. authority and suits the context better. His friend says he does not know how Apollodorus got the name of 'soft'; for he is always savage with himself and every one but Socrates. Certainly his conduct here and at 117 d 3 is μαλακία rather than μανία.

b 6 τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, 'of native Athenians.' Cp. Prot. 315 b 2 ἢσαν δὲ τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χρόῳ (as opposed to the ἔνδοι, whom Protagoras brought in his train), Rep. 327 a 4 ἢ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομπῆ (as opposed to the Thracian procession).

b 7 Κριτοβούλος, son of Crito, was chiefly known for his beauty. In Xenophon's Symposium Socrates undertakes to prove himself to be more beautiful than Critobulus.

ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ: W adds the name Κρίτων, and so B²; but he was
so well known that this is unnecessary. Crito was of the same age and deme (Ἀλωπεκήδεν) as Socrates (Ἀρ. 33 d 9 ἡλικίωτης καὶ δημότης), and Plato has drawn a touching picture of his devotion here and in the Crito. We gather that he watched over his friend and master's worldly interests without fully understanding his philosophy.

b 7 Ἐρμογένης, brother of Callias son of Hipponicus, who had spent more money on 'sophists' than any man of his time (Ἀρ. 20 a 4), and in whose house the scene of the Protagoras is laid. Hermogenes is one of the speakers in the Cratylus, where the poverty into which he had fallen is alluded to (Crat. 384 c 5), and he is included in Xenophon's list of the inner Socratic circle (Mem. i. 2. 48). In Mem. ii. 10 Socrates persuades his friend Diodorus to assist him, and in iv. 8. 4 he is quoted as the authority for the trial of Socrates, which took place after Xenophon left Athens.

b 8 Ἐπιγένης: cp. Ἀρ. 33 e 2 Ἀντιφών ὁ Κηφισεύς οὗτος, Ἐπιγένης παῦρ. This Antiphon must not be confused with the orator, who was τῶν δήμων Ἀρμονίων. There is a conversation with Epigenes in Xen. Mem. iii. 12, where Socrates says to him ὡς ἰδωτικῶς ('in bad training') τὸ σῶμα ἔχεις, ὧν Ἐπιγένεις, and urges him to take more exercise.

Ἀισχύνης: i.e. Aeschines Socraticus, so called to distinguish him from the orator. Cp. Ἀρ. 33 e 1 Ἀυσανίας ὁ Σφῆττιος, Ἀισχύνου τοῦτο παῦρ. After the death of Socrates, he appears to have fallen into great poverty, but was given some place at the court of Dionysius II on the recommendation of Plato (or Aristippus). He was one of the most highly appreciated writers of Socratic dialogues. The Axioschus, the Eryxias, and the Περὶ ἀφετῆς were at one time ascribed to him and have been edited under his name, but are certainly of later date.

Ἀντιοθένης is the well-known founder of the Cynic school. The date of his birth is uncertain, but he certainly belonged to the generation before Plato. He is probably the source of a good many things in Xenophon's account of Socrates. It has been held in recent times that many of Plato's dialogues were directed against Antisthenes, and references to him have been discovered in a great many places. It is well, however, to be sceptical regarding these. We really know very little about Antisthenes, and it is not safe to
reconstruct him from doubtful allusions. So far as the *Phaedo* is concerned, we may be sure there are no attacks upon him in it, seeing that he is supposed to be present.

b 8 ἢν, 'there was also.' Though it is true—that compound verbs are repeated by the simple (60 b 3 n.), it is not necessary to take ἢν here as equivalent to παρῆν. Cp. *Prot.* 315 e 3 τοῦτο τ' ἢν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τὸ Ἀδειμάντω ἀμφότερος, *Rep.* 615 d 7 ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιώται τινες.

b 9 Κτήσιππος: in the *Euthydemus* he is called (273 a 7) νεανίσκος τίς Παιανέως, μάλα καλὸς τε κάγαθος τὴν φύσιν, δόσον μὴ υβρισθής διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι. He also appears in the *Lysis.*

Μνεύενος: the same after whom the *Menexenus* is called. He was son of Demopho and cousin of the Ctesippus just mentioned, as we learn from the *Lysis* (206 d 3), in which dialogue he plays a leading part as the young friend of Lysis. He must not be confused with his namesake, the son of Socrates (60 a 2 n.).

10 Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἤσθενε. Many strange things have been written about this simple statement. Of course, it is an advantage from a dramatic point of view for Plato to keep himself out of his dialogues; and, as a matter of fact, he only mentions his own name in two other places (*Apol.* 34 a 1 and 38 b 6). At the same time, it is hardly credible that he should represent himself as absent on this occasion unless he had actually been so. It has been said that, had Plato really been ill, he would have had no occasion to make the reservation implied by οἶμαι. He must have known whether he was ill or not. That is so; but it does not follow that *Phaedo* was equally well informed, and he is the speaker, not Plato.

c 1 Σιμμίας ... καὶ Κέβης. These are the chief interlocutors in the *Phaedo.* We shall see presently that they were disciples of Philolaus at Thebes, which, like Philius, was a city of refuge for the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 99). From the *Crito* (45 b 3) we learn that they had brought a sum of money from Thebes to aid the escape of Socrates, another case of Pythagorean devotion to him. It is all the more important to observe that Xenophon confirms this by including Simmias and Cebes in his list of true Socratics (*Mem.* i. 2. 48). Cp. also *Mem.* iii. 11. 17 (immediately after the mention of Antisthenes and Apollodorus) διὰ τί δὲ (οἴει) καὶ Κέβητα καὶ Σιμμίαν Θῆβήθεν παραγίγνεσθαι; It is probable that Σιμμίας is the
correct form of the name (from σιμός), but I have not ventured to introduce it.

C 2 Φαίδων: the MSS. vary between this form and Φαίδωνδης. Xenophon (Mem. i. 2. 48) mentions him along with Simmias and Cebes as a true Socratic, giving the correct Boeotian form of his name, Φαίδωνδος.

Εὐκλείδης: Euclides was the head of a philosophical school at Megara, which held a form of the Eleatic doctrine. He is also represented in the Theaetetus as devoted to the memory of Socrates.

Τερψίων. All we know of Terpsion is that he is associated with Euclides in the dramatic introduction to the Theaetetus, which serves to dedicate that dialogue to the Megarians just as the Phaedo is dedicated to the Pythagoreans.

C 3 Ἀριστίππος. Many anecdotes are told of Aristippus of Cyrene, which may be apocryphal, but agree in representing him as a versatile cosmopolitan (omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res, Horace, Ep. i. 17. 23). Many allusions to his doctrine have been found in Plato's writings; but the same caution applies here (cp. b 8 n.) as in the case of Antisthenes.

Κλεόμβροτος: Callimachus has an epigram (24) on Cleombrotus of Ambracia who threw himself into the sea after reading the Phaedo, and he has often been identified with the Cleombrotus mentioned here. Nothing, however, is known of him.

C 4 ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ κτλ. In antiquity this was supposed to be an innuendo. Demetrius says (Περὶ ἐρμηνείας 288) that Socrates had been in prison for a number of days and they did not take the trouble to sail across, though they were not 200 stades from Athens. To make this more pointed, Cobet inserted οὐ before παρεγένετο, and took the clause as a question, which only proves that the innuendo is not very apparent in the text as it stands. We must be very careful in reading such covert meanings into Plato's words. Athenaeus (504 φ) makes it a grievance that he does not mention Xenophon here, though Xenophon had left Athens two years before. If the words Πλάτων δὲ οἴμαι ἡσθένει had been used of any one else, that would have been set down to malice. As we shall see, it had only become known the day before that the ship had returned from Delos, and we learn from the Crito (43 δ 3) that the news came from
Sunium where she had touched. Aristippus and Cleombrotus could hardly have heard this in time, if they were in Aegina. There is no evidence that they had been there during the whole of the thirty days, as Demetrius suggests.

Introductory Narrative.—The attitude of Socrates towards death (59 c 8—70 c 3).

(1) Preliminary Narrative (59 c 8—63 e 8).

18 τὴ...προτεραία: Attic usage seems to require either τῇ προτέρα ἥμερα or τῇ προτεραία. I have therefore followed Hermann in bracketing ἥμερα.

e 4 ὑπακούειν, ‘to answer the door.’ Cp. Crito 43 a 5 θαυμάζω ὅπως ἥθελησε σοι δ οὗ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.

eἰπεν περιμένειν, ‘told us to wait.’ T has ἐπιμένειν, which seems less suitable. It would mean ‘to stay as we were’ (Riddell, Dig. § 127).

e 5 ἐστὶν: we should expect πρὶν ἄν after πρότερον, but καὶ μὴ πρῶτερον παρῆκαν is merely a ‘polar’ antithesis placed διὰ μέσου and does not affect the construction.

e 6 οἱ ἔνδεικα: on the Eleven and their functions, see Arist. Ἀθ. πολ. 52, where we are told that the people elected them inter alia ἐπιμελησόμενοι τῶν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ.

e 7 ὅπως ἂν...τελευτᾷ, ‘are giving instructions for his death to-day.’ For this rare construction after verbs of commanding, where the dependent clause contains the substance of the order, cp. Gorg. 523 d 7 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ δὴ εἴρηται (‘instructions have been given’) τῷ Προμηθεί ὅπως ἄν παύῃ, Isaueus 7. 27 διεκελεύεσθ' ὅπως ἄν, εἰ τι πάθοι πρότερον, ἐγγράφωςι μὲ. The present τελευτᾷ (T) is more likely to have been altered to τελευτήσῃ (B) than vice versa.

οὐ πολὺν...χρόνον ἐπισχόν, lit. ‘after waiting (ἐπέχω intrans.) no long time’. Cf. 95 e 7 συχνῶν χρόνων ἐπισχόν. Similarly πιθέτων χρόνων, 118 11 ὁλίγων χρόνων διαλιπόν, ‘after a short interval.’

e 8 ἐκελεύει: W has ἐκελεύσεν (and so, accordingly, B), but this is less idiomatic. The English verbs ‘send’ and ‘bid’ refer to the starting of the action, but πείμπει and κελεύει operate throughout the action. ‘The thought follows the motion’ (Gildersleeve). The imperfect is therefore natural where we should expect the aorist.
It is for the same reason that πέμπειν can mean 'convey', 'escort', and κελέω, 'urge on', 'incite'.

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e 8 εἰσίντες: W has εἰσελθόντες (and so B²), but the present pcp. goes better with καταλαμβάνομεν. There were a number of them, so the action is resolved into successive parts ('as we entered, we found...').

καταλαμβάνομεν, 'we found.' When καταλαμβάνει is used in this sense, it takes the construction of verbs of knowing.

α 1 Ξανθίππην. There is no hint in the Phaedo, or anywhere else in Plato, that Xanthippe was a shrew. Xenophon makes her son Lamprocles say of her (Mem. ii. 2. 7) οἰδεῖς ἄν δύνασθαι αὐτὴς ἀνασχέσαι τὴν χαλεπότητα, and in Xen. Symb. 2. 10 Antisthenes says she was the most 'difficult' (χαλεπώτατη) of all wives, past, present, or future. The traditional stories about her appear to be of Cynic origin.

τὸ παιδίον. Socrates had three sons (Apol. 34 d 6 εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἡδη, δύο δὲ παιδία). The μειράκιον must be the Lamprocles mentioned by Xenophon (see last note). There was one called Sophroniscus after his paternal grandfather, so he would be the second. The child here mentioned must accordingly be Menexenus (not to be confused with Menexenus, son of Demopho, cp. 59 b 9 n.). It is worthy of note that the names Xanthippe and Lamprocles suggest aristocratic connexions, and possibly Lamprocles was called after his maternal grandfather (cp. Arist. Clouds 62 sqq.). Socrates was not always a poor man; for he had served as a hoplite, and in Apol. 23 b 9 he ascribes his poverty to his service of Apollo (ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν). This may explain the χαλεπότης of Xanthippe, if such there was.

α 3 ἀντιφήμησε ought to mean 'raised a cry of εὐφημεῖτε' ( bona verba, favete linguis), and that gives a perfectly good sense. The rule was ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρῆ τελευτῶν (ΠΠ 1 I), and εὐφημεῖτε was therefore a natural address to people approaching a scene of death. That she should use it and then break the εὐφημία herself is only human—and feminine. Byzantine scholars took, however, another view. In the recently discovered portion of the Lexicon of the Patriarch Photius (ninth cent. A.D.) we read ἀνευφήμησεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔθρημα (Reitzenstein, Anf. des Phot. p. 135), and the rest follow suit. It was explained καρ' ἀντίφρασιν, i.e. by a curious figure of
speech which consisted in saying the opposite of what you meant
(lucus a non lucendo). Very similar is Soph. Trach. 783 ἀπασ ἀνηνηφημησεν αἷμωγη λεῶς (where G. Hermann took the word in its
natural sense) and Eur. Or. 1335 ἐρ᾽ ἄξιοι τὰρ ἀνευφημὲι δόσος.
In both these cases death is imminent. It may be said that the
αἷμωγη itself is δόσφημαν, but that is not necessarily so; at any rate
ἐνυφήμας γάιως is quoted from Aeschylus (fr. 40 Sidgwick).

a 4 οἶα δὴ: these words might have been used even without εἰώθασιν,
in the sense of 'just like'. Cp. Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 2 οἶα δὴ παῖς ('just like
a boy'), Thuc. viii. 84. 3 οἶα δὴ ναϊταί.

a 5 ὡστᾶτον δή, 'so this is the last time that ...' Cp. 89 b 4 ἀβριον δή.

a 7 ἀπαγέτω τις αὐτὴν κτλ. With this reading (that of B: TW have
ταύτην) the words are kindly and considerate. Xanthippe had
apparently passed the night with Socrates and their child (at any rate
she was found there when the doors were opened), and it was only
right she should go home and rest. She is sent for again just before
the end to say farewell. I do not see any ground for the remarks
which some editors take occasion to make here on the Athenians'
treatment of their wives. Would it have been right to keep
Xanthippe there all day, in her overwrought condition, and allow her
to witness the actual agony? Some women would have insisted on
staying, but we can find no fault with the behaviour of Socrates
in the matter.

a 9 τυνες τῶν τοῦ Κρίτωνος, 'some of Crito’s people.'

b 1 κοπτομένην: the original meaning of κόπτεσθαι was 'to beat the
breasts', but it came to mean simply 'to lament' (cp. the κομμός
in tragedy). The history of the Lat. plango (whence planctus,
'plaint') is similar.

ἀνακαθίζομενος: the use of this verb in the medical writers shows
that the meaning is 'sitting up'. Cp. Hippocrates, Progn. 37
ἀνακαθίζειν βούλεσθαι τῶν νοσεόντα τῆς νόσου ἀκμαίουσιν πανηγόν. We
might expect ἐν τῇ κλίνῃ, but (ἐξεσθαί) καθίζεσθαι sometimes retain
the construction of (ἐξα) καθίζω, which are verbs of motion. The
variant ἐπὶ τὴν κλίνὴν (W and B) may be due to the idea that the
verb means residens, 'sitting down.' Wohlrab argues that Socrates
must have got up to welcome his friends, and adopts ἐπὶ accordingly;
but this would spoil the picture. We are led to understand
that he put his feet on the ground for the first time at 61 c 10. The
fetters had just been struck off, and at first he would be too stiff to get up.

b 2  

συνικάμψε: this verb is specially used of bending the joints. Cp. Arist. *Hist. An.* 502 b 11 πίθκος πόδας συγκάμπτει, ὥσπερ χεῖρας. It is opposed to ἐκτείνω. 

ἐξέτρυψε, 'rubbed down,' as with a towel. Athenaeus (409 e) quotes Philoxenos for ἐκτριμμα in the sense of χειρόμακτρον.

b 3  

πρίσσων: the compound verb is regularly repeated by the simple. Cp. 71 e 8 ἀνταπαδώσαμεν ... ἀποδώσαμεν, 84 c 7 διεξεναι ... διελθεῖν, 104 d 10 ἀπεργάζεται ... εἰργάζετο.

δὲ ἀτοσθὸν ... τ. the unemphatic τ. is often postponed by hyperbaton (Riddell, Dig. § 290 c).

b 4  

ὅς θαυμασίως πέφυκε πρόσ, 'how strangely it is related to —.' 

Relation is expressed by πεφυκέναι πρόσ ... , design or adaptation by πεφυκέναι ἐτι ... 

b 5  

τὸ ἀμα μὲν κτλ., 'to think that they will not —.' The exclamatory infinitive is often used after some expression of feeling (in the present case ὦς θαυμασίως) which it serves to justify. Cp. Eur. *Alc.* 832 ἄλλα σοῦ, τὸ μη φράσαι, 'Out on thee! to think thou diest not tell!'; *Med.* 1051 ἄλλα τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης, τὰ καὶ προέσθαι κτλ., Arist. *Clouds* 819 τῆς μορίας, τὸ Διὰ ναμίζειν ἄντα τήλικοντοι. This explanation, which is due to Riddell (Dig. § 85), makes it unnecessary to read τῷ with inferior MS. authority and Stobaeus.

b 6  

μὴ ἔθελεν: editors speak of personification and 'the lively fancy of the Greeks' here, but even we say 'won't' in such cases.

b 7  

σχέσθην τ. ... ἀεί, 'in almost every case.' The omission of ἀεί in B is probably accidental. The relativity of pain and pleasure is a Heraclitean doctrine, cp. fr. 104 Bywater νοούσαν ὑγιεῖν ἐποίησεν ἧδυ, κακῶν ἀγαθῶν, λιμὸς κόρον, κάματος ἀνάπαυσιν, and it is not, perhaps, fanciful to suppose that this is intended to prepare us for the Heraclitean arguments as to the relativity of life and death below (70 d 7 sqq.).

b 8  

ἐκ μᾶς κορυφῆς ἡμένων, 'fastened to (Greek says 'fastened from') a single head,' a grotesque imagination like those of Empedocles and of Aristophanes in the *Symposium*. B has συνημμένω, but that seems to be an anticipation of c 3 συνήψεν.

c 1  

Ἀλσωτος: Aesop was a Phrygian slave of whom many odd tales were told (cp. Wilamowitz-Marchant, *Greek Reader*, ii, p. 1), and
the Athenians attributed to him the beast-fables which play so large a part in all popular literature. The prose collection which has come down to us under the title of Αἰσχύλου μῦθοι is of Byzantine date; but many of the fables were well known from popular verses and Archilochus.

c 3 αὐτοῖς: this is rather neater than the variant αὐτῶν. 'He fastened their heads together for them.'

c 5 αὐτῷ μοι ἔσκευς, sc. ἐπακολούθειν. The clause ἐπειδὴ κτλ. is in apposition (asyneton explicativum), and the original statement is, as usual, restated more fully after the explanation (a b a).

c 6 ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ: cp. ὑπὸ τοῦ δέους, prae metu.

c 8 ὑπολαβὼν... ἵπτη, 'rejoined' (synchronous aor. pcp.). The meaning of ὑπολαμβάνειν is not 'to interrupt', but 'to rejoin' or 'retort'.

CP. Lat. suscipere (Aen. vi. 723 suscipit Anchises) and contrast παραλαμβάνειν (τὸν λόγον) excipere.

c 9 εὗ ἐποίησας ἀναμνῆσας μὲ, 'thank you for reminding me' (synchronous aor. pcp.). So Euthyd. 282 c 6 εὗ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας μὲ σκέφτεοσ πολλής. CP. Hdt. v. 24 εὗ ἐποίησας ἀπικόμενος, Eur. Med. 472 εὗ δ' ἐποίησας μολὼν.

d 1 ἑνέτεινας, 'setting to music.' CP. Prot. 326 b 1 ποιήματα... εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἑνέτεινοντες. This seems to come from the geometrical use of the term which we find in Meno 87 a 1 εἰ οἶνον τε εἰς τὸν κύκλον τὸν κύκλον... ἑνταπήναι, where it refers to the 'inscription' of rectangular figures in a circle (for which Euclid uses ἐγγράφειν). That in turn, like many geometrical terms (e. g. arc, chord, subtend, hypotenuse, cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 116 n. 1), comes from the use of ropes or strings in geometrical constructions. The Pythagoreans were much concerned with the inscription of polygons in circles and polyhedra in spheres (cp. 110 b 6 n.), and it was natural that the same word should be used of making words fit into a musical scheme. CP. also Phileb. 38 e 2 ἑνέτεινας εἰς φωνὴν of putting thought into words.

λόγους, 'tales.' This was the usual name (cp. Ar. Birds 651 ἐν Αἰσχύλου λόγοις, Herodotus ii. 134 Αἰσχύλου τοῦ λόγοποιοῦ); but, when it is important to mark their fictitious character, they are called μῦθοi and opposed to λόγοι (61 b 4). In Ionic μῦθος means the same as λόγος in Attic; the Ionic for 'fable' is αἴνος (cp. Archil. fr. 96 ἐρέω τιν ὑμῖν αἴνοι, εὐ Κηρυκίδη).
d 2 τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλων προοίμιον: Thucydides (iii. 104) gives this name to the Homeric 'Hymn' to Apollo. Properly speaking, προοίμιον are 'preludes' intended to attach the rhapsode's epic recitations to the praise of the god at whose πανήγυρις they were delivered. This instance shows that ἐντέλεως is 'setting to music', not merely 'versifying'; for no προοίμιον could have been in prose. In the Phaeodo, Socrates is represented throughout as the servant of Apollo (cp. esp. 85b4 sqq.). Apollo Hyperboreus of Delos was in a special sense the god of the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 97, n. 3), and there would be no difficulty in identifying him with the Pythian Apollo who had given the famous oracle, and to whose service, as we know from the Apology, Socrates regarded himself as consecrated. They were identified in the public religion of Athens (Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, iv, p. 110). Geddes's suggestions about 'the God of Day' must be rejected. Apollo was not a sun-god at this date (Farnell, ib., p. 136 sq.):

καὶ ἄλλοι τινες ... ἀτάρ καὶ ... So we find δεί μίν ... ἀτάρ καὶ νῦν (τότε) ... In these uses ἀτάρ καὶ ... is equivalent to καὶ ἄλα καὶ ...

d 3 Εὐμνος: from Ἀφόλ. 20 b 8 we learn that Evenus was a Parian who taught 'human goodness' for 5 minae. In Phaedr. 267 a 3 we are told that he invented certain rhetorical devices such as ὑποδήλωσις and παρίσπασις. Some said he even composed παράψομαι in metre μνήμης χάριν. He was also an elegiac poet.

πράγμα, 'the other day.' We know from the Apology 20 a 3 that Evenus was at Athens about the time of the trial of Socrates.

d 9 ἀντίτεχνος, 'competitor', 'rival'. So in Ar. Frogs 816 Euripides is the ἀντίτεχνος of Aeschylus.


ἀφοσιώμενος: the verb ἀφοσιοῦμαι means facio aliquid animi religione solvendi causa. Tr. 'to satisfy my conscience'.

e 3 εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις, 'on the chance that,' si forte. This use of πολλάκις is fairly common after εἰ (ὁδὼν) ἄρα and μή. Cp. 61 a 6.

ταύτην τὴν μουσικήν, 'music in the ordinary sense.' The pronoun οὗτος is often depreciatory like iste.

e 7 καὶ ἐργάζομαι, sc. μουσικὴν. As distinguished from ποιεῖν, 'compose,'
εργάζεσθαι means ‘to make a business of’, ‘practise’, and is regularly used of arts and trades (L. S., s. v. II. 5, 6).

2 8  παρακελεύσθαι hortari aliquem ut aliquid faciat; ἐπικελεύειν incitare facientem (Fischer). Comparatio autem ducta est ex pro-verbio currentem incitare (Wyttenbach). Cf. Xen. Cyr. vi. 3. 27 τοῖς ... τὸ δέον ποιοῦν ἐπικελεύειν.

a i άσπερ ... καὶ ἐμοὶ σὺτω: the simile brings out the meaning of ἐπικελεύειν and is therefore added appositively (asynedeton explicatiuvm), after which the original fact is more fully restated (a b a). For this regular Platonic structure, cp. 109 e 4 (Riddell, Dig. § 209).

diakaleuōμενοι: the proper meaning of diakaleuōsθαι is ‘to exhort one another’. Cp. Hdt. ix. 5 διακαλεουσαμένη δὲ γυνὴ γυνακί, but Plato often uses the word as equivalent to παρακελεύσθαι. Here, I think, it is merely employed for variety; it could hardly refer to the partisans of different runners exhorting their favourites.

a 3 φιλοσοφίας ... σύνης μεγάλης μουσικῆς: this is a distinctively Pythagorean doctrine. We have the authority of Aristoxenus for saying that the Pythagoreans used medicine to purge the body and music to purge the soul (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 107), and Aristotle's doctrine of the tragic κάθαρσις seems to be ultimately derived from this source. We shall see that philosophy is the true soul-purge, Strabo, who had access to Italiote and Siceliote historians now lost, says, in discussing the orgiastic dances of the Curetes (x. 468) καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μουσικήν ἐκάλεσεν ὁ Πλάτων, καὶ ἔτι πρὸτερον οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. Cp. also Rep. 548 b 8 τῆς ἀληθινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας, Laws 689 d 6 ἡ καλλιστή καὶ μεγίστη τῶν συμφωνίων ('harmonies') μεγίστη δικαίωτα ἀν λέγοιτο σοφία. This is quite different from the metaphor put into the mouth of Laches in Lach. 188 d 3. There the μουσικὸς ἀνήρ is he whose character is tuned in a noble key. Any educated Athenian might have said that; but here we have a definite doctrine, which is further developed in the sequel.

a 6 εἰ δέρα πολλάκις: cp. 60 e 3 n.

b i πειθόμενον: this was originally the reading of T and should, I think, be preferred to πειθόμενον if καὶ is deleted and the participle made dependent on ποιήσαντα. Tr. ‘by composing poems in obedience to the dream’. We often find καὶ interpolated between two
participles, one of which is subordinated to the other. It is omitted here by W, and Schanz had bracketed it without knowing this.

b 4 μῦθους ἄλλ' οὐ λόγους: cp. 6ο d Ἰ. n. Cp. Gorg. 523a 1 ἀκονε ἰ... λόγου, δὲ σὺ μὲν ἡγήσῃ μῦθον, ἰ... ἐγὼ δὲ λόγου, Prot. 324d 6 τοῦτο... πέρι... οἰκεῖ τι μῦθον σαί ἐρῶ ἄλλα λόγουν, Tim. 26ε 4 μὴ πλασθείνα μῦθων ἄλλ' ἀληθινῶν λόγουν. The distinction is almost the same as ours between 'fiction' and 'fact'.

b 5 καὶ αὐτῶς οὐκ ἦν: the construction ceases to be indirect, as ἐπειδὴ, not ἐνυποκεῖσθαι ἦν had preceded.

b 6 ἡμιστάμην, 'knew off by heart.' Cp. Prot. 339b 4 τοῦτο ἐπιστάσαι τὸ ἄγαμα; Gorg. 484b 10 τὸ γὰρ ἄγαμα οὐκ ἐπιστάσαι.

τοὺς Αἰσώπου: the antecedent is incorporated in the relative clause (Riddell, Dig. § 218).

b 7 οἷς πρῶτοι ἐνέτυχον: the clause οἷς πραξείρους εἶχον is restated after the explanation (α β α) (Riddell, Dig. § 218).

b 8 ἔρροσθαι, sc. φρίζε. 'Bid him farewell from me.' The regular word for delivering messages is φρίζειν, and ἔρρωσο (perf. imper. mid. of ἔρωσμι) means 'farewell' and was regularly used in ending letters, whence Lat. vale.

ἀν σωφρονη, 'if he is wise,' the regular phrase in this sense, σωφρονεῖν being used in its originally sense of σαφερε, 'to be in one's right mind.' The more common meaning of σωφρανεῖν is an extension of the idea of 'sanity' to a wider sphere.

ὡς τάχιστα: the omission of these words in T spoils the sense. Cp. Theaet. 176a 8 πειρασθαί χρῆ ἐνθένθε ἐκεῖσε ('from this world to the other') φεύγειν ὧν τάχιστα.

c 2 οἶνον: an exclamation, not a question. Cf. 117d 7 οἶα... ποιεῖτε.

c 3 πολλὰ... ἑπτετύχηκα, 'I have had many dealings with him.' Cp. Lach. 197d 3 ὃ δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, Crat. 396δ 5 ἐσθέν... πολλὰ αὐτῷ συνῆ, Parm. 126b 9 Πυθοδώρῳ... πολλὰ ἑπτετύχηκε.

c 4 σχεδόν: used as in the phrase σχεδόν (τι) οἶδα. Tr. 'I am pretty sure that —,'

ἐκών εἴναι: always with a negative, 'if he can (could) help it.'

c 6 οὐ ϕιλόσοφος: as addressed to Pythagoreans, the word has a special sense (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 321), that of a man who follows a certain 'way of life'. It is much as if we should ask: 'Is he not a religious man?''
c 8 ἐθελήσει, 'will be willing', 'will be ready', not 'will wish'.

The postulate τοῦ πράγματος, sc. φιλοσοφίας, regarded as an occupation. Cp. Ἀφόλ. 20 c 5 τὸ σῶν τί ἐστι πράγμα; The term is natural if we remember that 'philosophy' is a life.

d 7 Φιλολάος: Philolaus was one of the most distinguished of the later Pythagoreans, and had taken refuge at Thebes when the community was expelled from Magna Graecia (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 99). There seems to have been a regular σωφριον at Thebes as well as at Phlius. The Pythagorean Lysis was the teacher of Epaminondas.

d 8 οὐδὲν . . . σαφὲς, 'nothing certain' rather than 'nothing clear' (cp. 57 b 1 n.). We shall see that there were good reasons for the teaching of Philolaus about the soul being doubtful (86 b 6 n.). I do not think there is any reference to the Pythagoreans' custom of speaking δὲ οἰνομίτων, as Olympiodorus fancies.

l 10 φθινός οὐδέσι λέγειν, 'I don't mind telling you.'

e 1 καὶ μάλιστα, vel maxime. Cp. 59 a 9 n.

ἐκείσε . . . τῆς ἐκεί: the adverbs ἐνθαῦτε and ἐκεῖ are regularly used of 'this life and the next', 'this world and the other'. Cp. 64 a 1; 117 c 2. So Θεατ. 176 a 8 quoted in 61 b 8 n., and Aristophanes, Φρόγες 82 ὅ ἐνκολοὶ μὲν ἐνθαῦτε ἐνκολοὶ ὅ ἐκεῖ. There is no need to read τῆς ἐκείσε for τῆς ἐκεῖ, for ἀποδημία means a residence abroad as well as a journey abroad. Tr. 'our sojourn in the other world'.

e 2 μυθολογεῖν, 'to tell tales.' Socrates regards all definite statements with regard to the next life as μῦθοι. Cp. Ἀφόλ. 39 e 4 where he introduces what he has to say about it by οὐδὲν γὰρ καλοὶ διαμυθολογησαί πρὸς ἀλλήλους. The mortality of the soul is capable of scientific proof; the details of the ἀποδημία are not. Cp. below 110 b 1 n. and 114 d 1.

e 4 μέχρι ἡλιοῦ δυσμῶν: executions could not take place till sunset. Cp. 89 c 7 ἐστι φῶς ἐστιν, 116 e 1 ἐστι ἡλιοῦ εἰσάε ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρεσιν καὶ οὐτω δεδύκεναι.

e 6 νυνθή, 'just now,' i.e. 'a little ago' (διλέγον πρῶσθεν). In this sense, the grammarians accent as in the text, to distinguish the adverb from νῦν δή, 'now indeed', 'now at last' (cp. 107 c 4). As a rule the MSS. have νῦν δή in both senses.

e 7 ὅτε παρ' ἡμῖν διητατό: it appears from these words that Philolaus had left Thebes some time before 399 B.C. We hear of him at Tarentum (Taras), which was the chief seat of scientific Pythagoreanism.
in the fourth century B.C. The leading man then was Archytas (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 319).

As the construction of this sentence has been much disputed, I will first give what I take to be the right translation. This will be justified in the following notes, from which it will also appear how it differs from other interpretations. I render: 'I dare say, however, it will strike you as strange if this is the solitary case of a thing which admits of no distinctions—I mean, if it never turns out, as in other cases, that for man (that is at certain times and for certain men) it is better to die than to live—and, in such cases, I dare say it further strikes you as strange that it is not lawful for those for whom it is better to die to do this good office for themselves, but that they have to wait for some one else to do it for them.' This comes nearest to Bonitz's interpretation (Plat. Stud., ed. 3 (1886), pp. 315 sqq.), and I shall note specially the points in which it differs.

ei τοῦτο . . . ἀπλοῦν ἵστιν: I take this clause as the expression in a positive form of what is stated negatively in the next. If we must say what τοῦτο means, it will be τὸ βελτιόν εἶναι ζῆν ἰ τεθνάναι, but the pronoun is really anticipatory and only acquires a definite meaning as the sentence proceeds. Bonitz once took τοῦτο as meaning τὸ τεθνάναι, but in his latest discussion of the passage he substitutes τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι. I do not think it necessary to look backwards for a definite reference, and I think Bonitz does not do justice to the clearly marked antithesis of μόνον τὸν ἄλλον ἀπάντων and ἄσπερ καὶ τᾶλα. The ἄλλα must surely be the same in both clauses, and if so these must be positive and negative expressions of the same thought. I hold, with Bonitz, that the interpretation of most recent editors (τοῦτο = τὸ μὴ βελτιόν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐτὸν ἀποκτεινύναι) is untenable, if only because it gives an impossible meaning to ἀπλοῦν. Further, no one has suggested that the lawlessness of suicide is the only rule which is absolute, and the suggestion would be absurd. On the other hand, many people would say that life is always better than death. It may be added that τοῦτο is the proper anticipatory pronoun; it is constantly used praeparative, as the older grammars say.

τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων: Riddell, Dig. § 172.

ἀπλοῦν: that is ἀπλοῦν which has no διαφοραί (cp. Polit. 306 ε 3
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πότερον ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ τούτα, ἢ ... ὡς διαφοράν). It is what admits of no distinctions such as ἐστὶν ὃς καὶ οἷς. Cp. Symp. 183 d 4 σοῦ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶν ... αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἀνέθεῖον, ἀλλὰ καλῶς μὲν πρατήμενον καλῶν, οἰκρός δὲ αἰσχρόν, Phaedr. 244 a 5 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἢν ἀπλοῦν τὰ μανίαν κακῶν ἐναι (where Socrates immediately proceeds to enumerate the different kinds of madness), Prot. 331 b 8 οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ ... οὕτως ἀπλοῦν ἐναι ... ἀλλὰ τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι. This is the origin of the Aristotelian use of ἁπλῶς. Bonitz has shown once for all that ἁπλῶς does not mean simpliciter verum, as many editors say after Heindorf.

a 3 οὐδέποτε τυγχάνει ... βέλτιον ὃν: these words must be taken together, whether we add ὃν, as suggested by Heindorf, or not. It is, I think, safer to add it; for the certain instances of the poetical use of τυγχάνω without a participle come from later dialogues where poetical idioms are commoner.

τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, 'for man' generally. The dative is governed by βέλτιον, not by τυγχάνει, as some editors suppose.

a 4 ὡσπερ καὶ τάλλα, 'as other things do.' Olympiodorus rightly says: ἐπαμφοτεριζότων τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἄγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν δυναμένων εἰναι (the rest of his interpretation is wrong). The phrase is an abbreviation of some such clause as this: ὡσπερ ἐνιὸτε ἐνίοτε βέλτιον ὃν τυγχάνει νοσεῖν, πένεσθαι κτλ., ἡ ὑγιαίνει, πλαυτεῖν κτλ.

ἐστὶν ὃτε καὶ οἷς: i.e. ἐστὶν ὃτε καὶ ἐστὶν οἷς, ἐνιὸτε καὶ ἐνίοτε. Bonitz's proposal to delete the comma at τάλλα and take ὡσπερ καὶ τάλλα ἐστὶν ὃτε καὶ οἷς together is at first sight attractive. It gets rid of the pleonasm of ἐστὶν ὃτε after οὐδέποτε and the change from singular to plural involved in taking ἐστὶν οἷς with τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. These are not, however, insuperable difficulties, and I feel that the ellipse involved in ὡσπερ καὶ τάλλα is easier if it is total than if it is partial.

a 5 τεθνάω: in such phrases τεθνάω may properly be translated 'to die'; for ἀποθνῄσκειν lays stress on the process of dying, of which τεθνάω is the completion. The translation 'to be dead' is clearly inadmissible in such common phrases as πολλάκις, μυρίακις τεθνᾶω. Cp. also Crito 43 d 1 αὕτη ἀφικομένων (sc. τοῦ πλοίου) τεθνάω με, 52 c 6 οὕτω ἀγανακτῶν εἶ δέω τεθνάω σε, Αριστ. 30 c 1 οὗτ' εἰ μελλὼ πολλάκις τεθνᾶω, 38 e 4 πολύ μάλλον αἴρωμαι ὡς ἀπολογηθάμενος τεθνάω ἧ ἐκεῖνος ζήν, 39 e 3 οὕτω ἐρχομαι αἰ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ.


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tēbānai, 41 α 8 πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθιναί εἰ ταύτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ. So below 62 c 3 ὅτι βούλει αὐτὸ τεθιναί, 64 a 6; c 5, 67 e 2; 81 a 1. Cp. the similar use of ἀπολωλέναι and that of τεθνάτω in criminal law, and see Vahlen, Opuscula, ii. 211 on the whole subject.

a 8 ἵττω Ζεὺς: Schol. τὸ ἵττῳ ἐπιχωριάζοντος ἐστὶ. In Ar. Ach. 911 the Boeotian says ἵττῳ Δεὺς, 'let Zeus know' (ἵττῳ = Φίδτῳ = Ἀττ. Ἰστω), 'Zeus be my witness.' The meaning is much attenuated, and the French Parbleu! comes nearest to it. Epist. vii. 345 a 3 ἵττω Ζεὺς, φησίν ὁ Ἐθαῖως may or may not be a reminiscence of this passage. It is more likely that the phrase struck Athenian ears as a quaint one. The expletives of a language generally strike foreigners in this way.

a 9 φωνῇ, 'dialect.' Cp. Aφol. 17 d 5 and Crat. 398 d 8 ἐν τῇ 'Ἀττικῇ φωνῇ. So we say βουλταίζειν, δορίζειν, ἀληρίζειν, ἔπειζειν τῇ φωνῇ. In classical Greek διάλεκτος means 'conversation', 'manner of speech'. Aristotle uses it (Poet. 1458 b 32) for 'everyday language' as opposed to the diction of poetry. It only acquires the meaning of 'dialect' at a later date.

b 1 οὖτο γ’, 'put in that way.'

b 2 ἐξεί τινὰ λόγον: lit. 'it admits of something being said for it', i.e. 'is justifiable' or 'intelligible' (opp. ἄλογον ἐστὶν, 'it is unjustifiable'; 'inexplicable', syn. εὐλογὸν ἐστὶν). For the sense of ἐξείν cp. συγγνώμην ἐξεί, excusatio nem habet, 'it admits of excuse', 'is excusable'. The phrase is sometimes personal as in Aφol. 31 b 7 εἶχον ἀν τινὰ λόγον, 'my conduct would be intelligible,' 34 b 1 τάχ’ ἀν λόγον ἐξοιεῖν βοηθοῦντες, 'their conduct would be explicable.' That λόγος does not mean 'reason' in this phrase is shown by the words which immediately follow in the last of these passages: τίνα ἄλλον ἐξοιεῖν λόγον . . . ἄλλ’ ἦ τὸν ὄρθον τε καὶ δίκαιον; 'what explanation can be given except the straight and honest one?'

b 3 ἐν ἀπορρήτως, 'in a mystery.' Cp. Eur. Rhes. 943 μυστηρίων τε τῶν ἀπορρήτων φανῶ | ἐξείδειν Ὀρφείς. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is Orphic in origin (cp. 70 c 5 n.). There is not the slightest reason for doubting that Socrates held it, or that he derived it from this source (cp. Introd. XIII). At the same time, he always refers to the details of Orphic theology with a touch of ironical deference as here. Cp. below 69 c 4 n.

ἐν τινὶ φρουρᾷ, 'in ward.' This is Archer-Hind's translation, and
conveniently retains the ambiguity of the original, which was sometimes understood to mean (1) 'watch', and sometimes (2) 'prison'. Cicero took it in the first sense. Cp. de Senectute 20, vetatque Pythagoras iniussu imperatoris, id est dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere. In the Somnium Scipionis (3. 10) he uses the word custodia, clearly a translation of φρονᾶ: πις omnibus retinundus est animus in custodia corporis, nec iniussu eius a quo ille est vobis datus ex hominum vita migrandum est. Antiphon the Sophist, a contemporary of Socrates, says τὸ χιν ἐνθεὶ φρονᾶ ἐφημέρω, but that may be merely a simile like the Psalmist's 'watch in the night'. The Stoic formula that we must live ἓως ἄν ὁ θεὸς σμήνη τὸ ἄνωκλητικὸν (dum receptui canat) seems to be derived from an interpretation of this kind, and we must remember that φρονᾶ is the Peloponnesian word for στρατεία. The other view, however, that φρονᾶ means 'prison', is strongly supported by the Axiochus, an Academic dialogue of the third century B.C., where we read (365 ε 6) ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἔσμεν ψυχῆ, ζῶν ἀδάνατον ὡν θνητὸ καθεργ-μένον φρουρίῳ. There is no doubt that the Orphics did speak of the body as the prison of the soul. The Christian apologist Athenagoras says (Diels, Vors. 2 p. 245. 19) καὶ Φιλάλαος δὲ ὁπερ ἐν φρονᾷ πάντα ὕπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περιελήφθαι λέγων, with which we may compare Plato, Crat. 400 c 4 δοκοῦσι μέντα μοι μάλιστα θέσαιοι ὁ ἄμφι ο᾽ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ δύσμα (σώμα), ὃς δίκην διδοῦσιν τῆς ψυχῆς ὀν δὴ ἐνεκα διδὼσιν, τούτων δὲ περίβολον ἐχειν, ἵνα σφήνηα, δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα. Cp. also the use of ἐνδείσθαι 'to be imprisoned,' below 81 e 1 (ὡς ἄν) πάλιν ἐνδεδοσιν εἰς σώμα, 92 a 1 πρὶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐνδείθαι. So too Tim. 43 a 5 ἐνδεδοσιν εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σώμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον, 44 b 1 όταν (ψυχῇ) εἰς σώμα ἐνδείθη θυτών. Cp. also ἐνδεδεῖθαι in the fragment of Euxitheus quoted in the next note. The φρονᾶ in Gorg. 525 a 7 is the 'prison-house' of the other world, not the body.

καὶ οὗ δεῖ δὴ κτλ. The genuinely Pythagorean origin of this is vouched for by a passage from an unknown Pythagorean called Euxitheus, quoted by Athenaeus from the Peripatetic Clearchus (Diels, Vors. 2 p. 245. 8), Ἐξήθεσο ὁ Πυθαγορικός, ὁ Νίκιον, ὁς φησιν Κλέαρχος ὁ Πεπαθητικὸς ἐν δευτέρᾳ Βίον, ἔλεγεν ἐνδεδεῖθαι (cp. preceding note) τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ δεύτῳ βίῳ τὰς ἀπάντων ψυχὰς τιμορίας χάριν καὶ διείπασθαι τὸν θεὸν ὅσ, εἰ μὴ μενοὺς ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἔως ἄν ἐκὼν αὐτὸς λύσῃ, πλεῖος καὶ μείζων ἐμπεσοῦνται τότε λύμας διὸ πάντας 23
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εὐλαβομένουστηντάκυρίων (i.e., ἐσπεργῶν, ἐπιστατῶν) ἀνάτασιν ('threat') φοβείται τοῦ ξῆν ἐκόντας ἐκβήναι, μονὸν τε τὸν ἐν τῷ γῆρᾳ θάνατον ἀσπασίως προσέχοντα, πεπεισμένους τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῆς τῶν κυρίων γίγνεσθαι γνώμης. As C learchus of Soli wrote about 300 B.C., this fragment is almost certainly genuine.

b 5 μέγας, 'high.' Cp. Gorg. 493 c 3, where Socrates says of the most characteristic of the Orphic doctrines ταῦτ' ἐπιεικῶς μὲν ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τι ἄτοπα ('rather queer').

b 8 κτήματον, 'chattels.' The word is often used of flocks and herds, in which sense it is opposed to χρήματα. This doctrine of the divine herdsman appears more than once in Plato's later dialogues. Cp. esp. Laws 906 a 6 σύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοὶ τε ἁμα καὶ δαιμόνες, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ κτήμα (v. l. κτήματα) θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων. In describing the Saturnia regna he says (Polit. 271 e 5) θεὸς ἔνεμον αὐτῶς αὐτὸς ἐπιστατῶν, 'God was their shepherd and tended them himself.' Again, in Laws 902 b 8 we have θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματα φαμεν εἰναι πάντα ὅπως θυντα ζῷα, δοτηρ καὶ τῶν οὐρανοῦ ὄλον.—Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;—'Ἡδη τοῖνοι συμκρά ἡ μεγάλα τις φάτω ταύτα εἶναι τοῖς θεοῖς ουδετέρως γὰρ τοῖς κεκτημένοις ἡμᾶς (i.e. τοῖς δεσπόταις ἡμῶν) ἀμελεῖν ἀν εἰ ἐπὶ προσήκον, ἐπιμελεστάτως γε συσί καὶ ἀρίστους. The similarity of phrase here points to a common Orphic-Pythagorean origin for the two passages. Cp. also Critias 109 b 6 κατοικίσαντες, οἷον νομῆς τούμα, κτήματα καὶ θρέμματα ἐαυτῶν ἡμᾶς ἐτρέφον.

c 3 τεθνάαι: cp. 62 a 5 n.

c 7 πρὶν ... ἔπιτείμψῃ: it is easy to insert ἄν before ἀνάγκην with Heindorf, but it is more likely that this archaic and poetical construction is used to give solemnity to the sentence. Unless we are prepared to emend a large number of passages, we must admit that Plato sometimes used it to produce a particular effect. It is especially common in the solemn, formal diction of the Laws, cp. 872 e 10 οὐδὲ ἐκπληκτόν ἐθέλειν γίγνεσθαι τὸ μικρὸν πρὶν φῶνον φῶν ὁμαίῳ ὁμοιον ἡ δράσασα ψυχῇ τείχη.

c 10 ῥαδίως, 'lightly', 'without complaining', as in ῥαδίως φέρειν. Cp. 63 a 7.

d 2 εἰλόγως ἔξει: a frequent equivalent of εἰλογῶν ἔστι (cf. supra b 2). That which it is easy to explain or justify is εἰλογῶν.

θεῶν: the transition from the popular θεοὺς to the philosophic θεῶν seems quite unconscious.
14 toûs froumioptátous: in Plato froumios and sofós mean exactly the same thing. Aristotle distinguished froumios from sofía as practical from theoretical wisdom, a distinction which he shows to be in conformity with popular usage. See my edition of the Ethics, p. 261 sq.

15 épistatotwv ... épistatai: these are the regular terms in this connexion. Cp. Polit. 271e 5 theòs énemév autòνs autòs épistatówv.

16 oûk ëxei lógon, i.e. ἀλογόν ἐστι, oûk eulógos ëxei (cp. b 2 ; d 2).

aútòs: the shift from plural to singular is not uncommon. Cp. esp. 104 d l n.

2 παραμένειν, 'not to run away,' the regular opposite of ἀποδειδράσκειν.

4 oútos, 'putting it that way;' more often oútov y' as above b 1.

5 τοῦναντλον ... ἢ: we say 'opposite to'. We cannot always render ἢ by 'or' or 'than;' for its meaning is wider than either. Cp. especially the common διαφέρειν ἢ ...

6 ἀφρωνας: as froumios = sofós, so ἀφρων = ἀμαθής (ἀσοφός is not in ordinary use).

1 πραγματεία, 'diligence,' 'pains-taking,' the noun of πραγματεύομαι, which is equivalent to πράγματα ἔχω, 'take pains,' 'take trouble'. In late Greek πολυπραγμοσύνη is 'curiosity' in a good sense, and the meaning here is similar.

2 [δ] Kébhs: it is Plato's almost uniform practice to insert the article with proper names in the narrative (cp. τοῦ Kébhtos just above) and to omit it in the dialogue when directly reported (cp. Kébhs twice in the next speech, introduced by καὶ δ Ἀκμίας). See Beare in Hermathena, 1895, vol. ix, pp. 197 sqq. As δ was omitted by the first hand of T, I have ventured to bracket it.

λόγονς πινᾶς ἀνερευνεῦ, 'is always on the track of some argument.' Metaphors from hunting are often used by Socrates in speaking of arguments, and the λόγος is regularly the game which is hunted. Cp. μετιέναι τὸν λόγον (88 d 9 n.) and μέθοδος (79 ε 3 n.). This metaphor has survived in the word 'investigation'. (Cp. κατ' ἱχνη 115 b 9 n.)

οὗ πάνυ ... ἐθέλει, 'is not very ready to believe at once.' Note the interlaced order (a ἐ b a b); οὗ πάνυ belongs to ἐθέλει and εὐθέως to πείδεσθαι.

4 'Ἀλλά μὴν ... γε: the emphasis is on νῦν. 'Even I think that this time ('for once') there is something in what Cebes says.'
a 6 ὀς ἄληθῶς belongs to σὺφοι.  

a 7 ῥαδίως, 'lightly.' Cp. 62 c 10.

eis σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, 'to be aiming his words at you.' For an elaboration of the same metaphor, cp. Symp. 219 b 3 ταῦτα ... εἴπὼν καὶ ἄφεις ὁστερ βέλη, τετρόσθαι αὐτὸν ἡμῖν.

b 6 παρὰ θεοῦς ἄλλους, sc. τῶν χθονίων. Archer-Hind compares Λαως 959 b 4 παρὰ θεοῦς ἄλλους ἀπάνει δῶσοντα λόγον. Geddes refers to Aesch. Suppl. 230 κάκει δικαζεί τάμπλακήμαθ', ὅς λόγος, | Ζεὺς ἄλλος εἰν καμοῦσιν ύστατας δικας.

b 7 παρ’ άνθρώπους: who these were, appears from Αφόλ. 41 a 6, where Socrates mentions Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, and Homer (in that order) as persons whom one would give anything to meet after death.

c 1 οὐκ ἐν πάνι ... διοσκυρισαίμην: another touch of the Socratic irony which Plato has reproduced elsewhere. Cp. above 62 b 5 n., 114 d 1 n., and Meno 86 b 6, where, after explaining the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, Socrates says: καὶ τὰ μέν γε ἄλλα οὐκ ἐν πάνι ὑπὲρ τοῦ λόγου διοσκυρισαίμην, ὥστε δὲ κτλ.

C 2 ὅτι ... ἥμεν: the sentence begins as if it were to end ἥμεν ἐλπίζω (ἐλπίς is Orphic for 'faith' and quite in place here) εἴσ' ἵστε. Instead of that, it takes a fresh start at εἴσ' ἵστε, and the remainder of it is accommodated to the parenthesis καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐν πάνι διοσκυρισαίμην. In T and Stobaeus the construction is regularized by writing τά for ὅτι, but this looks suspiciously like an 'emendation'.

c 4 οὐχ ὑμως, non perinde (Heindorf), 'not to the same extent,' as if I were without this hope.

c 5 εἶναι τί: cp. 91 b 3 εἰ δὲ μηδέν ἐστι τελευτήσαντι.

C 6 πάλαι λέγεται: we must interpret this in the light of the παλαιὸς λόγος at 70 c 5, where the reference is certainly to Orphic doctrine. Such a belief as is here mentioned formed no part of ordinary Greek religion. According to that, only a few great sinners (Sisyphus, Tantalus, Ixion) were punished in the other world, while only a few favourites of heaven (Menelaus, Diomede, Achilles, and, in Athenian belief, Harmodius and Aristogiton) were carried off to the Isles of the Blessed.

C 8 αὐτῶς ἔχων, 'keeping to yourself' ('αὐτῶς h. l. est solus,' Heindorf).

d 1 κοινόν, 'to be shared' (as in κοινὸς 'Ερμῆς). Cp. Phaedr. 279 c 6 κοινά γὰρ τὰ τῶν φίλων, which is a Pythagorean rule.
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1.2 η ἀπολογία, 'the defence' (of which you spoke a little ago, 63 b).
   The article should be kept, though omitted in B.

1.3 πρῶτον δὲ κτλ. This interlude marks the end of the preliminary narrative.

1.4 πάλαι, 'for some time past.' The adverb does not necessarily refer to a long time.

1.5 Τί δὲ ... ἄλλο γε η ... 'Why, simply that ...' The first hand of B omits δὲ, but the weight of MS. authority is in its favour. Cp. Hipp. ma. 281 c 9 Τί δ' οἴει, ο Δόκρατες, ἄλλο γε η ...

1.8 προσφέρειν τῷ φάρμακῳ: as προσφέρειν means 'to apply', especially in a medical sense, the usual construction is that seen in Charm. 157 c 4 προσοίων τῷ φάρμακῳ τῇ κεφαλῇ.

1.9 εἶνος ἀναγκάζεσθαι κτλ. In Plut. Phocion 36 we have this story: Πεπωκότων δ' ἡδη πάντων, τὸ φάρμακον ἐπέλυσε, καὶ ὁ δημόσιος οὐκ ἔφη τρίψειν ἕτερον εἰ μὴ λάβων ἀδέκα δραχμάς, δοσον τὴν ὀλκήν ἀνείραι. χρόνον δὲ διαγενομένου καὶ διατριβής, ὁ Φοκίων καλέσας τώ τῶν φίλων καὶ εἰπών 'Η μηδὲ ἀποθανεῖν Ἀθήνηι δωρεάν ἔστιν, ἐκέλευσε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δοῦναι τῷ κερμάτιον. The suggestion has accordingly been made that the δημόσιος or δήμιος here was thinking less of Socrates than his own pocket.

1.3 έα ... χαίρειν αὐτόν, 'never mind him.' The phrases χαίρειν εὖν, and χαίρειν εἰτείν ('to bid farewell to') are used of dismissing anything from one's mind. Cp. 64 c 1; 65 c 7.

1.6 σχεδὸν μὲν τι ἡθή: σχεδὸν τι go together and μὲν is solitarium. Cp. Lach. 192 c 5 σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἴδα.

(2) The ἀπολογία of Socrates. The philosopher will not fear death; for his whole life has been a rehearsal of death. 63 e 8—69 e 5.

1.8 ἡ marks these words as a reference to 63 b 2 sqq.

1.9 τὸν λόγον ἀποδοθήναι, 'to render my account' (rationem reddere) to the persons who are entitled to demand it (λόγον ἀπαρτεῖν) and to get it (λόγον λαμβάνειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν) from me (παρ' εμοῦ). For the article τὸν cp. η ἀπολογία above d 2.

ἀνήρ ... διατρίψας, 'a man who has spent,' quite general, and only a more emphatic form of ὅ διατρίψας.

τῷ ἄντι: in his earlier dialogues Plato uses only τῷ ἄντι, in his latest only ὄντος. The dialogues in which both occur are Rep., Phaedr., Theaet. In Soph. there are twenty-one cases of ὄντως to
one of τῷ ὄντι. The absence of ὄντως from the Phaedo is one reason among others for dating it before the Republic.

e 10 ὀφρείν, 'not to fear', 'to have no fear of' (opp. δειέναι and φοβεῖσθαι). We have no single word for this in English. See 88 b 4 n.

64 a 1 ἑκεί: cp. διέ ἑ ἐ ἴ n.

a 4 ὁσι τυχάνουσιν ... ἀπτομένοι, 'all who really engage in'. So commonly ἀπετεθαί γεωμετρίας, μουσικῆς, γυμναστικῆς, 'to go in for'; 'to study'. For ὁρθῶς 'in the true sense of the word', cp. below 67 b 4 n.
a 5 λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι ... , 'it looks as if men did not know that —'. As the negative of verbs of knowing, λανθάνει may take ὅτι as well as a participial complement.

αὑτοῖ, 'of themselves', 'of their own accord'.

a 6 ἐπιτρεπθούσιν, 'practise.' Cp. Cicero, Tusc. i. 30 tota enim philo-

sophorum vita, ut ait idem (sc. Socrates), commentatio mortis est, ib. 31 secernere autem a corpore animum equid est quam 

mori discere? Seneca, Ep. xxvi egregia res est mortem condiscere 

... meditare mortem. The phrase meditatio mortis means the 

'practising' or 'rehearsal' of death; for meditatio is a translation 

of μελέτημα, 67 d 8.

ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι, 'dying' (the process) 'and death' (its 

completion). Cp. 62 a 5 ἐ.

a 9 ὅ ... προσπυμούντο: Plato often restates the first member of a 

period with emphasis at the end (Palindromia of the period, Schanz, 

Nov. Comm., p. 10). A good instance is Ἀρ. 27 d Οὐκοῦν ἑτερ 

dαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι ... ἐπειδὴπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι. As the first 

member here is προσπυμεῖσθαι ... μηδὲν ἄλλο ἦ ἡ τοῦτο, ὅ must be the 

object of προσπυμοῦντο, and not of ἀγανακτεῖν.

b 1 οὐ πάνυ ... γελασεῖοντα, 'not very inclined to laugh', 'in no 

laughing mood'. In prose only the participle of desideratives in 

-σεῖω is used, though Sophocles says τι δ' ἐργασείεις; (Philoct. 1001) 

and Euripides φευξείω (Herc. 628). Aristophanes has δρασεία in 

parody (Wasps 168).

b 2 ἄν ... δοκεῖν, 'would think.'

b 3 εἰρήθθαι goes closely with b 5 ὅτι. That the words καὶ συμφάναι 

... καὶ πάνυ are parenthetical is clear; for φημι and its compounds 

do not take ὅτι.
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3 τοὺς ... παρ' ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους: i.e. the Thebans (not the Athenians, as Schleiermacher held). Olympiodorus says εἰκότως: θηβαῖος γὰρ ἦν ὁ Σίμμιας, παρ' οἷς καὶ ἡ Βοιωτία ὄσ. That, however, is hardly adequate; for Simmias was not likely to share Athenian prejudice on this subject. More probably we have here a reflexion of the impression made by the Pythagorean refugees on the bon vivants of Thebes. The ψιλόσοφος would not appreciate Copaic eels and ducks. In any case, it is distinctly implied that the word ψιλόσοφος in its technical sense was well known at Thebes before the end of the fifth century, and this confirms the view that it was originally Pythagorean (E. Gr. Ph. ² p. 321 n. 2).

5 θανατῶν, 'are moribund,' 'are ripe for death.' The scholium is θανάτου ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, and late writers certainly use the word (or θανατίων) in this sense. But it is not the meaning required here, and a glance at the list in Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 153, will show that verbs in -άω (τιάω) express morbid states of body or mind, and are only occasionally and secondarily desiderative. Thus ναυτίων is not 'to long to go to sea,' but 'to have passengersickness,' i.e. 'to be sea-sick.' For the real meaning of οἱ πολλοὶ cp. below ἐγγὺς τι τέινει τοῦ τεθνάναι (65 a 6 π.). They think philosophers 'as good as dead,' and look upon them as 'living corpses' (cp. Sophocles quoted l. c.). They do not trouble about their desires. The picture of the pale-faced students in the φροντιστήριον of the Clouds is the best commentary on this popular impression' (Geddes). Cp. v. 103 τοὺς ὀξιριῶτας, τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους λέγεις, 504 ἡμιθνῆς γενήσομαι (if I become like Chaerephon).

σφᾶς, sc. τοὺς πολλοὺς.

6 τοῦτο πάσχειν, sc. τεθνάναι. 'It would serve them right.'

1 χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκεῖνος, 'dismissing them from our thoughts.' Tr. 'Never mind them, but let us discuss among ourselves.' Cp. 63 e 3 π.

2 ἡγούμεθα τι τοῦ θανάτων εἶναι: Socrates regularly begins a dialectical argument by asking whether we attach a definite meaning to the name of the thing under discussion. Cp. Gorg. 464 a 1 οὕτω τοῦ καλεῖς τι καὶ ψυχῆς, Prot. 358 d 5 καλεῖτέ τι δέος καὶ φόβου; Meno, 75 e 1 τελευτήρ καλεῖς τι; 76 a 1 ἐπίπεδον καλεῖς τι; so below 103 c 1 θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν;

4 ἄλλο τι ἃ ἀντικαίρον. Here the words have their full
sense; but, if we suppress the ἄρα μή which introduces them, we
see how ἄλλο τι ἦ came to be used as an interrogative = nonne.

C 5 τοῦτο: pred. 'that death is this', which is further explained by
χωρίς μὲν κτλ. The same definition is given in Gorg. 524 b 2 ὁ
θάνατος τυγχάνει ὁ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἣ δυνών πραγμάτων διά-
λυσις, τὴς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἄλληλων. Φορ τὸ τεθνάναι cp.
62 a 5 n.

C 6 αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, 'alone by itself.' The emphatic αὐτός often
acquires a shade of meaning which we can only render by 'alone'.
So ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρήναθαι, αὐτῶι γάρ ἐσμέν. Observe especially the
substitution of μόνην καθ' αὐτήν, 67 d 1.

C 8 ἄρα μή ... ἢ; 'surely it can be nothing else than this, can it?'
The interrogative form of the idiomatic 'μή in cautious assertions'
is very rare, and occurs only four times in Plato (Goodwin, M. T.,
§ 268).

C 10 Σκέψαι δὴ κτλ. Three arguments are given (1) the philosopher
holds bodily pleasures cheap, (2) the body impedes the search for
truth, (3) the things which the philosopher seeks to know cannot
be perceived by the bodily senses.

ἐὰν does not mean 'whether' like εἰ, but 'on the chance that',

D 3 οἶνος has become purely adverbial and always stands outside the
construction of the sentence. Cp. 73 d 3; 78 d 10; 83 c i.

D 6. Τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; 'what of the pleasures of love?'
Riddell (Dig. § 21) seems to be right in regarding this as a case
where τί δὲ stands for a sentence, or part of a sentence, unexpressed,
but hinted at in a following interrogation (here δοκεῖ σοι κτλ., d 8).
Cp. e.g. Phileb. 27 e 1 τί δὲ ὁ σῶς (βίος); ἐν τίνι γένει ... ὄρθως ἂν
τοτε λέγατο; and below 78 d io.

D 8 τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπεῖας, cultus corporis. We see here how
περὶ c. acc. comes to be used as equivalent to a genitive. So just
below, d 11.

D 9 ἐντίμους ᾧγείοναί, i.e. τιμῶν, 'to value', 'esteem', 'appreciate'
(τιμή, 'price'), opp. ἀπιμάζειν, 'to hold cheap.'
διαφερόντων, 'better than other people's.'

E 4 πραγματεία, 'business', 'concern', rather different from 63 a i
above.

65 a 5 ὁ μὴ δὲν ... μὴ δὲ μετέχει αὐτῶι, 'that, for the man to whom none
of these things is pleasant, and who takes no part in them.' The rule is that, when the second relative would be in a different case from the first, it is either omitted (cp. 8f b 5; 8a d 2) or replaced by a demonstrative. Not understanding the construction BTW give μετέχειν, but the true reading is preserved by Iamblichus (fourth cent. A.D.).

6  ἐγγὺς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι, 'that he runs death hard.' Cp. Rep. 548 d 8 ἐγγὺς τι αὐτῶν Γλαύκωνος τουτου τείνειν ἑνεκὰ γε φιλοσοφίας, Theaet. 169 a 9 σο δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. It seems to me that this 'objectless' use of τείνειν is derived from racing (τείνειν δρόμου, cursum tendere), and that the meaning is 'to run hard', 'to run close'. This view is confirmed by a comparison of Crat. 402 c 2 (ταῦτα) πρὸς τὰ τοῦ 'Ἡρακλείτου πάντα τείνειν with id. 409 a 7 τοῦτο ... φαίνεται τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν πτείειν, where πτείειν may very well mean πρεμερεῖν, 'to press hard.' The use of τείνειν in this sense, 'to hold one's course' in a certain direction, 'to be bound for,' 'tend' points to the same interpretation. So also ἐγγύς, ὑμαῖς τε ἐλαύνειν. For the thought, cp. Soph. Ant. 1165 τὰς γὰρ ἤδονας | ἀταν προδώσων ἄνδρες, οὗ τίθημ' ἐγώ | κενιὸν τοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἐμψυχον ἠγορᾶμαι νεκρόν. This is a good commentary on 64 b 6 ἄναρτοι.

9 Τι δὲ κτλ. The second argument. The body impedes the search for truth.


3 καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ: this cannot, I think, refer to Parmenides and Empedocles, as Olympiodorus suggests and most editors repeat. They would hardly be spoken of as 'even the poets'. Epicharmus, whom he also mentions, is more possible (cp. fr. 249 νοῦς ὅρη καὶ νοῦς ὅκουειν τῆλα καφα καὶ τυφλά). More likely still, the reference is, as Olympiodorus also suggests, to Hom. Ἰ. v. 127 ὀχλὸν δ' αὖ τοι ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλον, ἣ πρὶν ἐπήνευ, ᾧ ἄρ' εὖ γιγνώσκης ἢμεν θεῶν ἡδὲ καὶ ἀνδρα. At any rate, the ὀχλὸς of this passage is often referred to by later Platonists as an allegory of the infirmity of sense-perception, and such allegorizing interpretation was already common in the fifth cent. B.C.

b 4 περὶ τὸ σῶμα, i. e. τοῦ σῶματος. Cp. 64 d 8 n.

b 5 σαφεῖς, 'trustworthy.' Cp. 57 b 1 n.

σχολή, νῖκ. Cp. our phrase 'It will take him all his time'.

32 ἐν τῷ λογίζομαι, 'in mathematical reasoning.' The primary sense
of the word is arithmetical ‘calculation’ (ψηφοις λογιζεσθαι), from which it was extended to geometrical demonstration, and finally to all exact and scientific reasoning. It is no paradox, but an obvious fact, that in mathematics the sense of sight only misleads, and yet we are sure that there we reach the truth. The sense of hearing is mentioned with reference to the science of ‘harmonics’, which was just the mathematical treatment of the octave, and is more exact than tuning ‘by ear’ can ever be. To take the stock instance, ‘the ear’ does not reveal to us the impossibility of dividing a tone into two equal semitones; we only discover that by means of τὰ λογιζεσθαί.

3 τῶν δυνῶν: the term τὰ δυνα is used very vaguely in Plato, and may generally be rendered ‘things’. Here, however, it is equivalent to τῶν ἀληθῶν. The verb εἶναι often means ‘to be true’, especially in Herodotus and Thucydides (cp. L. S., s. v. eἰμί A. III).


μηδέ τις ἡδονή, ‘nor any pleasure either.’ This is preferable to the μήτε τις ἡδονή of TW.

7 αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτὴν, ‘alone by itself.’ Cp. 64 c 6 n.

εἶσα χαίρεν, cp. 63 c 3 n.

9 τοῦ δύνατος, i.e. τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. Cp. above c 3 n.

11 καὶ ἐνταύθα, ‘in this case too,’ i.e. ἐν τῇ τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσει (65 a 9). The καὶ refers to πρῶτου μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις (64 c 8).

4 Τῇ δὲ δή τὰ τοιάδε κτλ. The third argument. The things the philosopher seeks to know are not perceptible by the bodily senses, but can only be apprehended by thought.

The present passage introduces us to what is generally called the ‘Theory of Ideas’. The name is unfortunate; for in English ‘idea’ means something which is ‘in the mind’, and an ‘idea’ is often opposed to a ‘reality’, whereas the ‘forms’ (μορφαί, εἴδη, ἰδέαι) are more real than anything else.

On the other hand, the ‘forms’ are not ‘things’ in time or space.

If we will only translate literally, and avoid loose ‘philosophical’ terminology, there is nothing in the doctrine here set forth which should be unintelligible to any one who understands a few propositions of Euclid and recognizes a standard of right conduct,
Let us begin with a mathematical instance. The geometer makes a number of statements about 'the triangle', as, for instance, that its interior angles are equal to two right angles, and we know that his statements are true. Of what is he speaking? Certainly not of any triangle which we can perceive by our senses (for all these are only approximately triangles), nor even of any we can imagine. He is speaking of what is 'just a triangle' (αὐτὸ τρίγωνον) and nothing more. Now, if geometry is true, that triangle must be the true triangle. It is from this consideration that the theory seems to have arisen.

The next step is to extend it to such things as 'right' (δίκαιον) and 'beautiful' (καλόν). We seem to be able to make true statements about these too; and, if so, it follows that τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ καλὸν must be real in the same sense as 'the triangle'. We have never had experience of a perfectly right action or a perfectly beautiful thing, yet we judge actions and things by their greater or less conformity to what is 'just right' (αὐτὸ δίκαιον) and 'just beautiful' (αὐτὸ καλὸν).

The 'forms', then, are what we really mean by 'triangle', 'right', 'beautiful', and it will be found helpful to think of them in the first place as meanings. There are, of course, further difficulties, but these can be dealt with as they arise. On the whole subject see A. E. Taylor, Plato, Chap. II.

4 φαμέν τι εἶναι . . . ἡ οὐδέν; 'Do we say there is such a thing . . . or not?' It is to be noticed that, in introducing the doctrine, Socrates says 'we', and Simmias, to whom it is apparently familiar, accepts it enthusiastically, also using the first person plural. The suggestion clearly is that Socrates and Simmias are using the language of a school to which both belong. The same phenomenon recurs whenever the doctrine is mentioned. Cp. E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 354 sq.

5 αὐτό, 'by itself.' In this technical sense αὐτό is a development of αὐτός, 'alone.' It has become almost adverbial, as we see from such expressions as αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή, αὐτὸ δίκαιοσύνη (Riddell, Dig. § 47). We come nearest the meaning by rendering it 'just'. The translation 'in itself' is highly misleading; for it suggests the modern doctrine that we cannot know the 'thing in itself', whereas the αὐτὸ τρίγωνον is just the only triangle we can know.
d 6 Φαμέν μέντοι νῆ Δία, 'I should think we do!' The particle μέντοι is used when the emphatic word of a question is repeated in an affirmative answer (cp. 81d 6; 93c 2), and may be further strengthened by νῆ Δία (cp. 68b 7; 73d 11). Olympiodorus gives us the orthodox Platonist interpretation of this remark: ὅ Σιμμιάς ἐστίμωσ συγκατατιθεν ('assents') τῷ περὶ τῶν ἱδεῶν λόγῳ ὡς συνήθης ('familiar') Πυθαγορεύως.

d 12 ὕψεις, ισχύως: the addition of medical εἰδη like health and strength is significant. It has quite recently become known that Philolaus played an important part in the history of medicine (E. Gr. Ph.3 p. 322). If medicine is a true science, its objects must be real like those of geometry.

d 13 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κτλ. The construction is καὶ εἰν λόγῳ περὶ τῆς αὐσίας τῶν ἄλλων ἄπαντων, i.e. τῶν ἄλλων ἄπαντων is governed by αὐσίας, which is governed by περὶ understood. Tr. 'And, to sum up, I am speaking of the reality of all the rest, i.e. of what each of them really is'.

εἰν λόγῳ: this phrase is not quite accurately rendered by 'in one word '; for λόγος does not mean 'a word', nor is there any Greek word for 'a word'. A λόγος is always a statement, and in the great majority of cases consists of several 'words'.

τῆς αὐσίας, 'the reality.' In this sense the term αὐσία was not familiar at Athens (where it meant 'property', 'estate'), and it is explained by δι τυγχάνει ἐκασταν ἢν, 'what a given thing really is' (cp. Meno 72b 1 μελίτης περὶ αὐσίας οτί ποι' ἐστίν). It was not, however, invented by Socrates, and still less by Plato. In Crat. 401c 3 we read δ ἡμεῖς "αὐσίαν" καλούμεν, εἰσών οἱ "ἐσσίαν" καλοῦσιν, οἱ δ' αὐτ "ἀσίαν", and we see from 401d 3 that Socrates there means τήν πάντων αὐσίαν, just as he does here. We could hardly be told more plainly that the term is Pythagorean. The fem. pcp. ἐσσα = αὐσα is genuine Doric, and ἐσσία is therefore a correct Doric form, while ὀσία, though only found now in pseudo-Pythagorean writings, may be justified by the Boeotian ὅσα.

e 3 αὐτὰ ἐκασταν, 'any given thing by itself,' generalizing αὐτὸ δίκαιον, αὐτὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ μέγεθος, &c. If we wish to know a thing, we must think 'just that', e.g. 'just the triangle', leaving out of account its material, colour, &c., and even its particular shape (equilateral, isosceles, or scalene).
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καθαρότατα, 'most cleanly.' To the mathematical mind irrelevancy suggests dirt. Later mathematicians speak of the 'elegance' of a demonstration in a similar sense.

αὐτῷ τῇ διανο/functions, 'with thought alone.'

μὴτε...παραπλῆμενος, 'without taking into account.' As τιθέναι is used of 'setting down' an item in an account, it is probable that παραπληθεῖν is here equivalent to ἀφονεῖν (cp. Hor. Carm. i. 9. 15 lucre appone), though I can find no exact parallel. The middle, as often, would give the sense 'setting down to his own account'. If this is correct, we must understand τῷ λογισμῷ from the context.

τῷ ὀφι: I have written τῷ for τῷ as being more idiomatic, and because B has a superfluous τῷ in the next line, which I take to be a correction of τῷ added after the wrong μὴτε.

εξέλκων, 'trailing after him.'

αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷν...αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ: thought 'alone by itself' apprehends its object 'alone by itself'. Cp. 64 c 6 n.

εἰλικρινεῖ...εἰλικρινῆς: Cicero (Off. i. 4) translates sincerum, Tertullian (de An. 41) germanum. The etymology is uncertain, but the meaning is 'unmixed', 'unadulterated'. Valckenaer (quoted by Stallbaum) says: propri signifiat volvendo s. volubili agitatione secretum, atque adeo cribro purgatum, and 'sifted clean' would certainly suit very well.

θηρεύειν: the favourite metaphor of Socrates. Cp. above 63 a 2 n., and 66 c 2 τῷ του ὄντος ὅρατα, 115 b 9 ὀσπερ κατ' ἵνη.

τῶν ὄντων, 'things,' apparently, but at a 8 τῳ ὄντος is 'the truth'.

ἐκ πάντων τοῦ ὁλου, as a conclusion from the three arguments just given.

παράστασθαι δόξαν, 'that a belief like this should be brought home to —.' Cp. 58 e 5 n.

γνησίως, 'genuinely,' much the same as ὅρθως (64 a 4; 67 e 4) and δικαίως (83 e 5).

ὡσπερ ἀπαντᾶς [τῖς], 'it looks as if a sort of by-way', 'a short cut as it were'. The weight of evidence is slightly against the addition of τῖς (W omits it in the text, and adds it in the margin); but, whether it is added or not, the phrase is the subject of κινδυνεύει (cp. Μενο 70 c 4 ὀσπερ αὐχύμος τῖς, 'a sort of drought'), and there is no reason for inserting ὁ δάνατος after it with Tournier. Further, the short cut is not death—the γνησίως φιλόσοφοι know there is no
thoroughfare that way—but the μελέτη θανάτου or philosophy itself. An ἀτραπός is properly a ‘track’ over hills or through woods (semita, sentier), which does not follow the turnings of the high road. The mountain-path taken by the Persians at Thermopylae is so called (Hdt. vii. 215, Thuc. iv. 36). There was a Pythagorean precept τὰς λεωφόρους μὴ βαδίζειν, ‘not to walk on highways,’ and Olympiodorus supposes a reference to this here. Though no doubt originally a mere taboo, it may quite possibly have received some such application as this by the end of the fifth century B.C. (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 105): The Pythagorean idea of the ‘Way’ (ὁδὸς βίου) would naturally suggest the idea of the Narrow Path.

b 4 ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς: as the metaphor of hunting dominates the whole passage (cp. 66 a 3 n. and c 2 τῇ τοῦ ὄντος θήραν), the meaning is really settled by Soph. Aε. 7 εὖ δὲ σ’ ἐκφέρει | κυνὸς Δακάινης ὅς τις εὐρίνος βάσις. ‘The by-way brings us on to the trail in our hunt after truth.’ It will be seen that the metaphor of the ἀτραπός gains very much when we bring it into close connexion with the hunt.

μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει: these words have been variously interpreted. There is no difficulty about ἐν τῇ σκέψει except that the phrase is superfluous. As to μετὰ τοῦ λόγου it must mean the same thing as μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ above (66 a 1). Schleiermacher transposed the words, placing them after ἐξωμεν, where they make excellent sense; but, on the whole, it seems more likely that they are a marginal note on ἐξωμεν which has got into the wrong place.

b 5 διὶ, ‘because.’

συμπεφυμένη: the word suggests the opposite of καθαρότατα (65 e 6).

b 7 μυρίας . . . ἀσχολίας, ‘countless distractions.’

c 2 τοῦ ὄντος: i.e. τοῦ ἀληθοῦς (cp. b 7).

c 3 εἰδώλων, ‘imagination.’

c 4 τὸ λεγόμενον, ‘as the saying is.’ This must refer to the phrase οὐδὲ φρονήσατε ἐγγίνεσθαι, ‘we don’t even get a chance of thinking for it.’ We do not know what quotation or proverb Socrates refers to.

ὁς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι, ‘in very truth.’ The two phrases are placed ἐκ ποραλλῆλου, as the grammarians say, and their effect is cumulative. Both (and in later dialogues ὄντως) are used to emphasize the 36
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appositeness of quotations. We also find ἄτεχνασ in the same sense. Cp. 90 c 4.

c 7 διὰ γὰρ κτλ. The same account of the origin of war is put into the mouth of Socrates in Rep. 373 e 6. The dialogue of the Republic is supposed to take place during the Peloponnesian War, and that of the Phaedo while the memory of it was still fresh, and it was clearly recognized, especially by opponents of the war like Aristophanes, that commercial interests had a great deal to do with it. (Cp. the Acharnians on the Megarian decree.)

d 3 τὸ δ’ ἐνθατον, 'and the worst of all is that —.' Cp. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ὅτι (followed also by γὰρ).


e 1 αὖτα τὰ πράγματα, 'things by themselves', 'just the things themselves'. There is no distinction between πράγματα and ὤντα.

e 3 φρονήσεως is assimilated in case to the preceding relative (Riddell, Dig. § 192). The phrase φρονήσεως ἐραστών is an explication of the name φιλόσοφοι.

e 4 ὅσο δ' λόγος στηρίζει, 'as the argument signifies.' This is the only rendering which will suit all the passages where this phrase occurs, so we must not think of the ἱερός λόγος here.

e 5 δυοίνθατερον: the regular way of introducing a dilemma.

a 4 διὶ μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη: cp. 64 e 1 καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν, 83 a 6 ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρήσθαι.

a 5 μὴ ἔναμπιμπλέμεθα, 'nor suffer the contagion of.' Cp. Thuc. ii. 51 (in the description of the Plague) ἔτερος ἀδ’ ἐτέρου θερμαίας ἀναιμππλέμενοι (one catching the infection from tending another’) ἀπερ πρόβατα ἔθνησκον. So also 83 d 10 τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα.

a 8 μετὰ τοιοῦτων: sc. καθαρῶν (Riddell, Dig. § 54). Some suppose this to be neuter and refer it to αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα or ὤντα, but it is far better to take it of the 'great company' of which Socrates speaks above (63 b 8). The καθαροί are in Orphic language 'the saints'.

b 1 τοῦτο δ’ ἐστιν ἵσως τὸ ἀληθὲς, 'and that, I take it, is the truth.' Cp. 66 b 7 φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθὲς. No real doubt is expressed by ἵσως. Cp. opinor.

b 2 μὴ οὖ... ὅ, 'I fear it is not.' For this characteristically
Platonic idiom (he has it thirty-five times) see Goodwin, *M. T.*, § 265.

b 4 τούς ἐρθός φιλομαθεῖς, equivalent to τούς γνησίως φιλοσόφους (cp. 66 b 2); for φιλομαθής is freely used as an equivalent of φιλοσόφος, and ὀρθῶς refers to the ὀρθότης δονομάτων. It means those who are φιλόσοφοι 'in the true sense of the word', those who 'have a right to the name'. So in 82 c 2 οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλόσοφοι are the same as οἱ δικαίως φιλομαθεῖς 83 e 5. For this sense of ὀρθῶς cp. Eur. *Aic.* 636 ὁκ ἦσθ' ἄρ' ὀρθῶς τούθε σῶματος πατήρ; *Hipp.* 1169 ὃς ἄρ' ἦσθ' ἐμὸς πατὴρ | ὀρθῶς, *Andron.* 376 οὖν ὃι τινες φιλοι | ὀρθῶς πεφύκασι (ὁ).

b 8 ἔλπις . . . κτῆσασθαι: the aor. inf. is preferred after ἔλπις ἔστω (cp. 68 a 1 ἔλπις ἔστω . . . τυχεῖν).

b 10 πραγματεία: cp. 64 e 4.

ήμων: i.e. the Socratic circle.

c 2 ἄλλῳ ἄνδρι, 'for any one else,' a more emphatic ἄλλῳ τινί.

c 5 Κάθαρσις: this is the central idea of Orphicism (cp. 61 a 3 n.).

The Pythagoreans seem to have added the practice of κάθαρσις by science to the original κάθαρσις by abstinence and the like (E. Gr. *Ph.* p. 107).

τοῦτο is the predicate, and is used praeparative. Cp. 62 a 2 n.

συμβαλεῖν is here personal. For the other construction cp. 74 a 2.

διπέρ πάλαι . . . λέγεται: this has not been said in the course of the present argument, and must, I think, be understood in the light of 63 c 6 διπέρ . . . πάλαι λέγεται and the πάλαις λόγος of 70 c 5. Cp. also 69 c 5 πάλαι αἰνίττησθαι. It seems to be the regular way of referring to the Orphic ἤρος λόγος, 'as is said by those of old in the Word' (cp. E. Gr. *Ph.* p. 146, n. 3).

c 6 τὸ χωρίζειν κτλ. As Wohlrab justly remarked, this is to be understood in the light of the account given in *Symp.* 174 c and 220 c of Socrates standing still and silent for hours at a time. The religious term for this was ἐκκοσταίως, 'stepping outside' the body.

dl 1 μόνῃ καθ' αὐτήν: syn. αὐτήν καθ' αὑτήν. Cp. 64 c 6 n.

διπέρ ἐκ δεσμῶν κτλ. There is considerable uncertainty about the reading. The commonest idiom is διπέρ ἐκ δεσμῶν τοῦ σώματος, but sometimes the preposition is repeated (cp. 82 e 3; 115 b 9).

In *Tim.* 79 a 3 we have διπέρ αἰλῶνος διὰ τοῦ σώματος.

dl 8 ὀρθῶς: cp. 67 b 4 n.
\[\text{e 3} \quad \text{Geloiôv' πως δ' ὦ; The MSS. have υ υ geloiôv; and give the words to Socrates, but we should then expect ἢ υ υ geloiôv; The Petrie papyrus has only room for seven letters, so I have deleted υ υ and given geloiôv to Simmias.}\]

\[\text{e 6} \quad \text{εἰ . . . διαβάλλοντα, ‘if they are at variance with’, ‘estranged from’ the body. The original sense of διαβάλλειν is ‘to set at variance’, εἰς ἔχθραν καθιστάναι.}\]

\[\text{e 8} \quad \text{εἰ φοβοῖντο: T omits εἰ, but its repetition is natural in a binary protasis like this, especially as there is a change of mood, and εἰ has a slightly different meaning in the two clauses.}\]

\[\text{e 9} \quad \text{εἰ μὴ . . . τιοιεν: this simply repeats εἰ φοβοῖντο in a negative form (a b a). Cp. Apol. 20 c σοῦ γε σοῦν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου . . . εἰ μὴ τι ἐπράττες ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ.}\]

\[\text{a 3} \quad \text{ἡ ἀνθρωπίνην μὲν κτλ. A good instance of the disjunctive question, in which two statements are bound together in a single interrogation to signify that they cannot or should not both be true at once. In such questions ἢρα (a 7) is regular in the second clause. We must subordinate the first to the second (‘Can it be that, whereas . . . ?’) or use two sentences. In Symp. 179 b sqq. Alcestis, Eurydice, and Patroclus are given as examples of ‘human loves’ whom men have gone to seek beyond the grave. Such loves are contrasted with the ‘divine beloved’ of which Socrates speaks in the Gorgias (482 a 4 φιλοσοφιὰν, τὰ ἐμὰ παιδικά).}\]

\[\text{a 5} \quad \text{μετελθεῖν, ‘to go in quest of.’ The MS. authority is in favour of ἐλθεῖν, but the μετελθεῖν of T is too good for a mere error.}\]

\[\text{a 7} \quad \text{φρονὴσως . . . ἐρῶν: syn. φιλόσοφος. Cp. 66 e 3 n.}\]

\[\text{b 2} \quad \text{οἴσωσι γε χρή, ‘I should think so! ’}\]

\[\text{b 4} \quad \text{μυθαμοῦ ἄλλωθι κτλ. It is noteworthy that the reading which the original scribe (B, not B') has added in the margin (with the monogram for γράφεται) is that of the Petrie papyrus, which was written within a hundred years of Plato's death. This shows how old some of those variants are.}\]

\[\text{b 5} \quad \text{ἵππερ ἄρτι ἐλέγον, sc. 67 e 9. The antecedent to the relative is the following question.}\]

\[\text{b 7} \quad \text{μέντοι νὴ Δία: cp. 65 d 6 n.}\]

\[\text{b 8} \quad \text{τοῦτο is used praeparative (cp. 62 a 2 n.) and refers to the relative clause ἕν ἐν ἰός κτλ. This construction is as old as Homer (Il. xiv. 81 βέλτερον ὃς φεύγων προφύγῃ κοκὼν ἢ ἥ ἄλῳ). Cp. Thuc. vi.}\]
14 τὸ καλὸς ἀρξαί τοῦτ' εἶναι δὲ ἀν τὴν πατρίδα ὄφελησθ', Xen. Oec. 4. 19 ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἥγαιμαι μέγα τεκμήριον ἀρχαντὸς ἀρετῆς εἶναι, ὥς ἄν ἐκόντες ἐπιτωμαί.

b 9 οὐκ ἂρ' ἦν: the use of the imperfect of something just realized was first explained by Heindorf in his note on this passage. With this imperfect ἂρ represents our 'So!' of surprise. 'So he isn't a philosopher after all!'

c 2 φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος: the tripartite division of the soul which plays so great a part in the Republic is here implied; for χρήματα are the object of ἐπιθυμία and τιμή of θυμός. We find φιλοχρήματος as a synonym of ἐπιθυμητικός in Rep. 436a1; 549b2; 580e2 ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκλήκαμεν ... καὶ φιλοχρήματον δὲ, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα ἀποτελοῦνται αἱ τιμῶσαι ἐπιθυμίαι, 581a5 τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος ... καλοῦντες φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδῆς ὁδὸς ἀν καλοῖμεν. So φιλότιμος is a regular synonym of θυμοειδῆς, e.g. 551a7 ἀντὶ δὲ φιλονικῶν καὶ φιλοτιμῶν ἀνδρῶν φιλοχρήμασται καὶ φιλοχρήματος τελευτῶντες ἐγένοντο. This somewhat primitive psychology is doubtless older than Socrates; for it stands in close relation to the Pythagorean doctrine of the 'Three Lives' (E. Gr. Ph.2 pp. 108, 109, n. 1). To Plato the soul is really one and indivisible, in spite of the use he makes of the older view. Cp. Galen, de Hipp. et Plat., p. 425 ὡς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνος φησιν ἐκείνου (Πυθαγόρου) πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι λέγων τὸ δόγμα, Πλάτωνα δὲ ἐξεργάσασθαι καὶ κατασκευάσαι τελεωτέρον αὐτῷ, ἄθ. 478 Ποσειδώνος δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόρας φησὶν, αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ Πυθαγόρα συγγράμματος οὕδενος εἰς ἥμας διασωζόμενον, τεκμαιρόμενος δὲ έξ ὕν ένιοι τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ γεγράφασιν. Iamblichus, ap. Stob. Ecl. i. p. 369 (Wachsmuth) Οἴ δὲ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀρχέτας καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν ψυχὴν τριμερῆ ἀποφαίνοντο, διαιροῦντες εἰς λογισμούν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαιν. Posidonius is not likely to have been mistaken on such a point.

τὰ ἄτερα ... ἀμφότερα: for the plural pronouns referring to a single fact see Riddell, Dig. § 42.

c 5 καὶ ἡ ὁνομαζομένη: this is more clearly expressed at c 8 ἢν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ ὁνομάζοντες.

c 6 τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένωσ: this is more explicit below, c II.

c 8 Οὐκοῦν is repeated by c 10 ἂρ' οὖ. ἢν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ κτλ. This is best explained by Laws 710 a 5 τὴν δημόδη γε (σωφροσύνη) ... καὶ οὐχ ἢν τις σεμνῶν ἄν λέγωι, φρόνησιν 40
We are not speaking here of courage and σωφροσύνη in the high Socratic sense in which they are identical with knowledge.

This verb suggests primarily the quickened heartbeat of fear or desire. Cp. Hom. Od. xxii. 298 φρένες ἐπτοήθησα, Sappho 2. 6 το μοι μᾶν | καρδιὰν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτύασεν.


There is no emphasis, and the meaning is merely ἓκαόστος, ὅταν τόχθ ν ὑπομένωσιν: the addition of such phrases is almost a mannerism. There is emphasis, and the meaning is merely ἓκαόστος, ὅταν τόχθ, 'on occasion.' Cp. Euthyphro 7 d 4 ἐχθρὸι ἄλληλοις γιγνόμεθα, ὅταν γιγνόμεθα.

There is the same tendency in English; cp. 'decent', 'respectable' as substitutes for 'good'.

The appositive structure is regular after τοῦτο πάσχειν. Cp. below 73 d 7 (Riddell, Dig. § 207). The regular opposite of σωφροσύνη (the virtue of moral sanity, for which English has no name) is ἀκολασία. The literal meaning of ἀκολαστός is 'unchastened'.

καίτοι φαμέν γε ... ἄλλ' ὄμως ... , 'we say, indeed ... but yet ...' For this combination of particles, which marks a concession afterwards partially retracted, cp. below e 7 and Euthyphro 3 c 2 καίτοι οὐδὲν ὃτι οὐκ ἄλθησε εἴρηκα ἐν προείπον, ἄλλ' ὄμως ...

συμβαίνει ... ὄμοιον, 'turns out in their case to be like this.' TW add εἴναι, but cp. Gorg. 479 c 8 συμβαίνεις μέγιστον κακῶν ἡ ἀδικία.

τὸ πάθος τὸ περὶ κτλ., 'the condition of —' (περὶ, c. acc. as a genitive equivalent).
e 5 ταύτην, islam.
   εὐθήθη, 'naive', 'unsophisticated', 'artless'. The Petrie papyrus reads ἄνδραποδώδη, but that seems to be an anticipatory recollection of 69 b 8.

69 a 6 μή...οὐχ αὐτῇ ἀργῷ, 'perhaps this is not —'. Cp. 67 b 2 n.
   πρὸς ἀρετήν, 'judged by the standard of goodness.' Cp. Isocr. 4. 76 οἴδε πρὸς ἀργύριον τὴν εὐθαμονιάν ἐκρινον (Riddell, Dig. § 128). We can hardly give πρὸς the same sense as in the next line; for there is no question of exchanging pleasures and pains for goodness. Goodness is the standard of value, and wisdom (φρόνησις) is the only currency in which it can be rightly estimated. Nor can πρὸς mean 'towards', 'in the direction of'. That interpretation is a survival from the time of the vulgate text, which omitted ἄλλαγή and had to be understood as ἦ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετήν (sc. ὀδός). The disappearance of ἄλλαγή from the text is an interesting study in corruption. B has ἄλλα, and T must have had the same; for it presents us with an erasure of four letters. The vulgate text came from a copy of T. W and Iamblichus preserve the word.

a 7 πρὸς ἡσυχάς, 'for pleasures,' contra voluptates.

a 8 μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω, i.e. greater pains and fears for less, and lesser pleasures for greater, e.g. the fear of slavery for the fear of death, the pleasures of the table for the pleasures of health.

a 9 ἄλλ᾽ ἔν, i.e. ἄλλα μὴ ἔν, the construction being carried on from a 6. Pleasures and pains are to be exchanged for wisdom, which alone makes goodness truly good. If we give up the pleasures of the table, not merely to enjoy the pleasures of health, but because they stand in the way of the acquisition of wisdom, we may be said to exchange them for wisdom, and that is true σωφροσύνη. So, if we only face death to escape slavery, that is mere popular courage. To put the thing in a modern way, this is a sort of ethical mono-metallism, wisdom being the gold standard of value.

b 1 καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα κτλ. I think it certain that this sentence is interpolated. The words τούτου μὲν πάντα clearly belong to ὅνουμεν τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα, and their meaning must be 'all things bought and sold for wisdom', but it is hardly credible that Plato should use ὅνουμεν as a passive, or that he should use πιπρασκόμενα at all. For ὄνεισθαι in a passive sense, the grammars can only quote Xen. Ep. 8. 2 ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐσνείτο, πειράσθαι ἐκελεύομεν εἰ δύνατο

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In the Protagoras Socrates shows that true courage only belongs to those who are ἀθανασίως μετ’ ἐπιστήμης. This is the way in which he interpreted the doctrine, which was common to him and to the ‘Sophists’, that Goodness is Knowledge. The distinction between ‘philosophic’ and ‘popular’ goodness came to be of great importance. Cp. my edition of Aristotle’s Ethics, pp. 65 sqq. (where, however, I have ascribed to Plato what I now see belongs to Socrates).

The verbs are virtual passives of προστιθέναι and ἀφαιρέων, ‘to add’ and ‘to subtract’. Cp. προσέχω, προσκείσθαι.

As the participle agrees with πάντα ταῦτα (b 1), i.e. pleasures, pains, &c., there is a slight anacoluthia in μὴ... η ἡ τωιαύτῃ ἄρετῃ. Socrates means ‘the goodness which depends upon the exchange of fears, pleasures, &c., for one another apart from wisdom’.

[Cæ] ἀλλαττόμενα: as καί is omitted in B, it is probably an interpolation arising from failure to see that χωρίζομενα is dependent on ἀλλαττόμενα (cp. 61 b 2 π.). The meaning will then be ‘exchanged for one another apart from wisdom’ (opp. μετὰ τούτου).

σκιαγραφία τις, ‘a sort of scene-painting’ (Cope). Cp. Photius σκιαγράφος ὁ νῦν σκηνογράφος. The term does not mean ‘a rough
sketch', but implies the use of painted shadows to produce the impression of solid relief on a flat surface. This art has two chief characteristics: (1) it is deceptive, cp. *Critias* 107 δικαίωσε σκιαγραφία... ἀσαφεῖ καὶ ἀπατηλῷ, (2) it only produces its effect from a distance. *Cp. Theaet.* 208 ε ἔτειδή ἔγγυς δοσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ λεγομένου, συνήμι νύδε σμικρὸν ἦσε δὲ ἀφειστὴκη πόροβαθεν, ἐφαίνετο τι μοι λέγεσθαι. The most instructive passage is *Rej.* 365 c 3 πρὸ ὑπαρ μὲν καὶ σχῆμα κύκλῳ περὶ ἐμαυτῶν σκιαγραφίαν ἁρετῆς περιγραπτέον, where the idea is that of a 'painted façade', on which columns, &c., are made to appear solid by skilful shading. *Cp. also Rep.* 583 b 5 and *Parm.* 165 c 7. When Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1414 a 8) compares the diction of the public speaker (δημηγορεῖς) λέεις to σκιαγραφία, he does not mean that it is 'sketchy', but that it requires the light and shade to be 'laid on thick'.

b 7 ἀνδραπωδόθης: so in *Rej.* 430 b 7 Socrates opposes true courage to τὴν... θηριώδη καὶ ἀνδραπωδόθη, and in *Phaedr.* 258 e 5 he says of bodily pleasures δικαίως ἀνδραπωδόθεις κέκληται, just because they imply preceding pain (τὸ προλυπηθήναι).

b 8 οὐδὲν ὑγιὴς... ἔχῳ, 'has nothing sound about it.' The word ὑγιής is used of earthen or metal vessels which have no crack or flaw (opp. σαθρός). The old variant ἐχοῦσα for ἔχῳ gives a smoother construction, but we may easily understand ἔ ὑπὸ thee in b 8. See Vahlen, *Opusc.* ii. 361.

τὸ 8 ἄληθὲς, 'the real thing', of which the σκιαγραφία gives a deceptive appearance.

c 1 καθαρσίς, 'purification.' *Cp. 61 a 3 n.* In Xen. *Symph.* i. 4 Callias son of Hipponicus uses the phrase ἀνδραστὶν ἐκκαθαρμένου τὰς ψυχὰς δοσπερ ἄμην in addressing Socrates, Critobulus, Hermogenes, Antisthenes, and Charmides. He seems to have heard something of Socrates' teaching on this point, unless he is merely drawing on the *Phaedo*.

c 2 καθαρμός: this is the specifically religious term for the initiatory ceremony of 'purification'. The religious poem of Empedocles was entitled καθαρμοῖ (E. Gr. Ph. 2 pp. 256 sqq.).

c 3 τὰς τελετὰς: the mystic 'initiations'. The context shows that the people referred to are the Ὀρφεοσελεσται.

c 4 οὖτοι, isti. The touch of ironical condescension is characteristically Socratic (cp. 62 b 5 n.). It is plain that Socrates did not
think much of the actual 'Orphoceléstai of his time, who are described in the Republic (364 e 3 sqq.) in terms which suggest the itinerant friars, pardoners, and traffickers in indulgences of the later Middle Ages.


c 5 αἰνίττεσθαι, 'to speak in riddles' (αἰνίγματα). The word is regularly used of allegorical statements. It comes from Ion. αἴνος, 'fable', 'riddle' (cp. 61 b 4 n.). For πάλαι cp. 67 c 5 n.

c 6 ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσται, 'will lie in the Slough.' Cp. Rep. 363 d 5 (of the Orpheotelestae) ὅπος δὲ ἀνωτέρω αὗτί καὶ ἀδίκους εἰς πηλόν τινα κατόρθωσιν ἐν "Αιδών. The βορφόρος is also referred to in Ar. Fros 145 εἶνα βορφόρον πολὺν | καὶ σκύρῳ δεινῶν ἐν δὲ τούτῳ κειμένου | εἶ ποιεῖν τις ἡδίκησε κτλ., and Olympiodorus is doubtless right in saying παρόδει ἔτειος 'Ορφικῶν. Heindorf quotes a saying of the Cynic Diogenes (Diog. Laert. vi. 39) γελοιοῖν εἰ Ἀγγείλαος μὲν καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἐν τῷ βορβόρῳ διάξοιν, εὐτελεῖς δὲ τινας μεμημένοι ἐν ταῖς μακάρων νήσοις ἔσονται. We must interpret Rep. 533 d 1 τῷ ἄντι ἐν βορφόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁμα καταραγγειμένον in the light of this:

c 8 ναρθηκόφωροι μὲν πολλοί: Plato often adapts the beginning of a verse to his own prose, preferring to slip into the verse rather than give a formal quotation. The original must have been πολλοί μὲν ναρθηκόφωροι. The νάρθηκε (ferula communis) was the plant of which the Dionysiac thyrse was made.

d 1 βάκχωι: the true worshippers were so called (cp. the Βάκχαι of Euripides). Schol. Ar. Knights 406 Βάκχωι οὐ τῶν Διάνουν ἐκάλουν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα τοὺς τελοῦντας τὸ ὀργα. See Farnell, Cults of the Greek States, vol. v, p. 151.

d 2 ὀρθῶς, 'in the true sense of the word.' Cp. 67 b 4 n.

ἀν [...] γενέσθαι, 'to become one of whom', 'to join whose number':

d 3 οὐδὲν ἀπελεύσων, 'I have left nothing undone.' The phrase states negatively what is positively stated by παντὶ τρόπῳ προσθύμηθην (cp. Μειο 77 a 3 προσθύμεια οὐδὲν ἀπολείψω), 'I have done my best in every way.'

d 5 καὶ τὶ ἤνωσαμεν: i.e. 'I and the rest of the band'. The shift from singular to plural is quite natural. To read ἤνωσάμεν with Heindorf
would make the plurals which follow (ἔλθόντες ... εἰσόμεθα) very awkward.

d 5  τὸ σαφές, 'for certain.' Cp. 57 b 1 n.

d 7  ταῦτ' ... ἀπολογόματι ὡς . . . , 'this is the defence I make to show that —.' Cp. 63 e 8.

d 8  τοῦς ἓναδέ δεσπότας: cp. 62 e 1; 63 a 6 sqq.

e 1  κάκει: cp. 64 a 1 n.

e 3  τοῖς δὲ . . . παρέχει: these words seem to have been interpolated here from 70 a 1. They break the sentence awkwardly and spoil the effect of the phrase when it comes in its proper place. Such things do not happen often in the text of Plato, but they happen sometimes.

(3) Cebes points out that all this implies the immortality of the soul, and asks that this should be established (69 e 6—70 c 3).

e 6  ὑπολαβὼν: cp. 60 c 8 n.

70 a 4  εὖθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη κτλ. Riddell (Dig. § 207) takes these words down to οὐδαμοί γ as explanatory of the preceding clause ('binary structure'). I have punctuated after a 4 σῶματος with Heindorf. Then καὶ will co-ordinate διαφθείρηται καὶ ἀπολλύται with οἴχηται, and ἐκβαίνονσα will belong only to the second clause. It is easy to 'understand' σῶματος with it.

a 5  ὁπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα: this is the belief assumed throughout the Homeric poems. The ψυχή is the 'ghost' which a man 'gives up', the breath which he 'expires' at death. For the καπνὸς cp. II. xxiii. 100 ψυχῆ δὲ κατὰ χθονὸς ἢντε καπνὸς | ὀξεῖο τετρήγυια, a verse selected for special reprobation by Socrates in the Republic (387 a 1).

a 6  οὖδὲν ἐτι οὐδαμῷ ὃ: Homer does not go so far as this; for even in the House of Hades there is a ψυχῆ καὶ εἴδωλον. But it might just as well be nothing and nowhere; for it is witless (ἀταρ φρένες οὐκ ἐν πάμπαν, II. xxiii. 104).

αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν συνηθροισμένη: cp. 67 c 8.

b 2  παραμυθίας, 'persuasion', 'reassurance'. Cp. Laws 720 a 1 παρα-μυθίας . . . καὶ πεἰδών. The original sense of παραμυθεῖσθαι is 'to talk over' (cp. παράφημι, παρείποι, παραπείδο) as in 83 a 3. The meanings 'encourage', 'console', as in 115 d 5, are secondary.

πίστεως, 'proof', not 'belief'.
b 3 ψυχή: there seems to be no rule for the addition or omission of the article with ψυχή. Where MSS. differ, the less commonplace use without the article is to be preferred.

δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν: even Homer allows that souls ‘are somewhere’ after death, but Cebes wishes to be assured that they are not merely ἀμεμνηκάρφνα (this is the point of δύναμιν ἔχει), of whom it can be said φρόνεσ ὡκ ἐνι πάμπαν. Here, then, φρόνησις is not equivalent to σοφία, but is used in its popular sense, answering to the Homeric φρόνεσ.

b 5 Ἀληθῇ, ἐφῇ, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης: for the interlaced order (a b a b) cp. 77 c 1; 78 a 10; 78 c 5; 82 c 9; 83 e 4 (Riddell, Dig. § 288).

b 6 διαμεθολογώμεν: cp. μυθολογεῖν, 61 e 2 n. The word is specially appropriate as introducing ἐὰν εἰκὸς κτλ.

c 1 κωμῳδοποίος: Aristophanes was not the only comic poet who made fun of Socrates. Eupolis said (fr. 352) Μισῶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Σωκράτη, τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην, ὅταν μὲν πεφροντικέν, ὅτοθεν δὲ καταφαγεῖν ἔχοι τούτου κατημέληκεν, a fragment preserved by Olympiodorus in his commentary on this passage. The charge of ἀδολεσχία (‘garrulity’) was commonly brought against all men of science by the practical Athenians and the comic poets who wrote to please them.

ἢ περὶ προσηκόντων, ‘about things which do not concern me’, ‘things I have nothing to do with’. For the position of the preposition see Riddell, Dig. § 298 and cp. 110 c 2.

**First Proof of Immortality (70 c 4—77 d 5).**

This proof is based upon two considerations (1) the doctrine of παλιγγενεσία, (2) the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις. Neither of these taken by itself furnishes a proof, though taken together they may be said to do so (77 c 7).

With regard to the proofs of immortality, it should be observed that the first two are successively abandoned as inadequate, while even the third is said to require further examination (107 b 5). The proof which satisfied Plato himself is not one of them (cp. 94 b 4 n.). Nevertheless each contributes something to our knowledge of the subject.
(1) The ancient doctrine of παλιγγενεσία is shown to rest on the law of ἀνταπόδοσις (70 c 4—72 c 1).

c 4 αὐτῷ, 'the matter.'

c 5 παλαιὸς ... λόγος: cp. the way in which the same Orphic doctrine is introduced in Μένος 81 a 5 ἄκηκοα γὰρ ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ γυναικῶν σοφῶν περὶ τὰ θεία πράγματα ... α 10 ὦ μὲν λέγοντες εἰσὶ τῶν ἑρέων τε καὶ τῶν ἱερείων ὅσοι μεμελήκε περὶ δν μεταχειρίζονται λόγον ὅντι τ' εἶναι διδόναι λέγει δὲ καὶ Πίνδαροι καὶ άλλοι πολλοί τῶν ποιητῶν ὅσοι θείοι εἰσίν, ᾧ δὲ λέγουσιν, ταυτὶ ἐστὶν ... φασὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι ἄθανατον, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾷ—δὴ ἀποθνῄσκειν καλοῦσι—τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, ἀπόλλυσθαι δ' οὐδέποτε. So Εἰσιτ. vii. 335 α 2 πείθεσθαι δὲ δυνῶς δεὶ χρῆ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τε καὶ ἱεροῖς λόγοις, δὴ δὴ μηνύουσιν ἡμῖν ἄθανατον ψυχὴν εἶναι κτλ. For παλαιὸς cp. 67 c 5 n. Herodotus (ii. 123) is mistaken in assigning an Egyptian origin to this doctrine (Ε. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 95).

c 6 ὃς εἰσὶν ἐνθένθε ἄφικομεναι ἐκεί, 'that they are in the other world, having come there from this.' There is no parallel to justify us in taking εἰσὶν ἄφικομεναι together as if it were εἰσὶν ἄφιγμέναι. Note the interlaced order (a b a b).

c 8 πάλιν γίγνεσθαι: the regular name for this doctrine in later writers is παλιγγενεσία. The word μετεμψύχωσις, though it has found its way into all modern languages, is quite inaccurate, and is not used before Graeco-Roman times, and then very seldom (Diodorus, Galen). Cp. Servius on Αἰν. iii. 68 non μετεμψύχωσιν sed παλιγγενεσίαν esse dicit (Pythagoras). Hippolytus, Clement, and other Christian writers say μετενσωμάτωσις ('reincarnation'), which is accurate but cumbersome.

d 2 τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι, 'of the truth of this.' For the neuter plural cp. Riddell, Dig. § 41.

d 7 κατὰ ἄνθρωπον: cp. Μένος 76 a 5 κατα γὰρ πάντες χήματος τούτο λέγω (Riddell, Dig. § 121). Originally κατὰ, c. gen., is quite neutral in meaning, especially in the phrase κατὰ πάντων (Isochr. 15. 189 ταῦτα ... κατὰ πασῶν λέγομεν τῶν τεχνῶν). From this use comes the Aristotelian κατηγορεῖν τι κατὰ τινός, 'to predicate something of anything,' and κατὰ ὅλον (Μένος 77 a 6), καθ' ὅλον, καθάλον.

e 1 ἄρ': indirect questions are not infrequently introduced by ἄρα.
Cp. *Lach.* 185 d 9 σκυπεῖν ἄρα... *Meno* 93 b 2 τὸδε σκεποῦμεν, ἄρα..., *Rep.* 526 c 9 σκεψάμεθα ἄρα... , and just below e 4.

1 οὕτως: this is explained by οὐκ ἄλλοθεν κτλ. Cp. 71 a 9. Socrates generalizes the Orphic doctrine that the living are born from the dead, and treats it as a case of the principle, maintained by Heraclitus, of the generation of opposites from opposites (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 186).

2 ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὑπὸ τοιούτον τι, ‘everything, that is, which has an opposite,’ equivalent to e 5 ὅσοις ἐστι τι ἐναντίον.

3 και ἄλλα δὴ μυρία κτλ. For this way of breaking off an enumeration cp. 73 d 10; 94 b 10 (Riddell, Dig. § 257).

5 ὅσοις... εὐτέρα: for the singular pronoun referring to the plural ὅσοις cp. 104 d 2 (αὐτῷ referring to ἄ).

13 δύο γενέσεις: if opposites arise from one another, it follows that between every pair of opposites (μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων) there must be two processes (γενέσεις), one by which A arises from B, another by which B arises from A.

3 αὐξήσει καὶ φθίσει, ‘increase and decrease.’ We see from this passage that much attention had already been given to accuracy of terminology.

6 διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, ‘decomposing and combining.’ These terms were used by the early natural philosophers to denote the analysis of compound bodies into their constituents, and the formation of compound bodies out of something more primitive, such as what were called at a later date elements (στοιχεία).

7 καὶ ἐλ μὰ κτλ. The attempt to construct an accurate terminology in any language is sure to reveal gaps. In the *Ethics* Aristotle often has to say that the mean, or one or other of the extremes, is ἀνώνυμον. Cp. Bywater on *Poet.* 1447 b 9.

9 συζυγίαν, ‘pair’ (originally of oxen or horses). The word may be applied, however, to a larger number of things than two. In grammar it is a ‘conjugation’, i.e. a class of verbs similarly inflected.

ιγὼ σοι, ἐφι, ἔρω, ὁ Σωκράτης: for the interlaced order (a b a b) cp. 70 b 5 n.

4 τοῖν περὶ ταύτα, i.e. τοῖν τούτων (περὶ c. acc. = gen.).

8 οὐκ ἀνταποδῶσομεν; ‘shall we not assign it an opposite process to balance it?’
NOTES

71  

Note 9  

χωλή, 'halt', 'lame in one foot'. Cp. the advice of Cimon μήτε τὴν Ἐλλάδα χωλήν, μήτε τὴν πόλιν ἐτερόζυγα περιμεθένην (Plut. Cim. 16).

Note 13  

ἀναβίωσκεθαί, 'to come to life again.' Sometimes the verb is transitive, 'to bring to life again' (e.g. Crito 48 c 5); but in that case the aorist is ἀναβιώσασθαί (not ἀναβιώναι), as below 89 b 10.

72 a 6  

ἔδοκεν: 70 d 2.

a 11  

ὑπόν πέτρως κτλ., 'that we were not wrong either — '. Cp. 63 b 8 ἤδικου ἄν, 'I should be wrong.'

a 12  

εἰ...μὴ...ἀνταποδιδοίη, 'unless there were a constant correspondence.' The verb is here intransitive, as below b 8. Cp. L. S. s. v. αποδίδωμι II.

b 1  

κύκλῳ περιλέινα; the κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως is Orphic. It was just from the Wheel of Birth that redemption (λύσις) was sought by means of purgatory observances (καθαρμαί). On one of the gold plates from Thurii (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 88) the ransomed soul says κύκλον δ' ἐξῆπταν βαρυπένθεως ἀργαλέως. Here, of course, the reference is to cyclical processes generally, but that is characteristic of the way in which a scientific sense is given to religious ideas throughout the passage.

b 2  

εὐθείᾳ τες, 'in a straight line.' A rectilinear process is only in one direction, a circular has two.

b 3  

καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι κτλ. The metaphor is taken from the δίαυλος, in which the runners turned round the καμπτῆρ and came back to the starting-point (Dict. Ant. s. v. Stadium, ii. 693 b). Cp. Aesch. Ag. 344 κάμψαν διαύλον βάτερον κόλον πάλιν.

b 9  

τελευτώντα...ἀποδείξετεν, 'would end by making Endymion seem a thing of naught (a 'bagatelle') by comparison.' This use of ἀποδείκνυμι is fully illustrated in Wytenbach's note. Cp. e.g. Plato, Phaedr. 278 c 6 λέγων αὕτω...τὰ γεγραμμένα φαύλα ἀποδείξαι, Epist. vii. 324 d 7 χρυσὸν ἀποδείξατα τήν ἐμπροσθεν πολιτείαν, 'making the previous constitution seem like gold by comparison.' Plut. C. Gracch. 1 ἀπεδείξε τοὺς ἄλλους ῥήτορας παίδων μηδὲν διαφέροντας, Plato, Epist. iv. 320 d 6 παρασκευάζου τὸν τε Δυνοῦργον ἐκείνων ἀρχαῖον ἀποδείξον καὶ τὸν Κύρος, 'to make them seem out of date by comparison.' Wytenbach shows too that λήρος is regularly used in such comparisons. Cp. e.g. Arist. Lys. 860 λήρος ἐστὶ τάλλα πρὸς Κυνήσταρν, Antiphanes fr. 232 ἄρ' ἐστὶ λήρος πάντα πρὸς τὸ χρυσίον; Xen. 50
An. vii. 7. 41 'Ἡρακλείδη λήπος πάντα ἐδόκει εἶναι πρὸς τὸ ἀργὺριον ἔχειν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου. The meaning is not 'to make the story of Endymion appear an idle tale', as most editors say. On the contrary, it would be all the more credible.

I οὐδ' ἄν φανοντο, 'he (note change of subject) would be nowhere,' an expression taken, like its English equivalent, from the race-course. Cp. Gorg. 456 b 8 οὐδ' ἄν φανήναι τὸν ἱατρὸν, 'the doctor would come in nowhere.' Dem. de Cor. 310 ἐν οἷς οὐδ' ἄν σφηνήγῃ γεγονός, οὐ πρῶτος, οὐ δεύτερος, οὐ τρίτος, οὐ τέταρτος, οὐ πέμπτος, οὐχ ἄκτος, οὐχ ὀποστοσοῦν.

3 καθεύδειν: just as τοῦτο πάσχει &c. are regularly followed by a clause in apposition (cp. 68 e 2 n.), so τοῦτο πάσχειν (πεπονθέναι) is regularly followed by an infinitive in apposition. Cp. 73 b 7; 74 a 6; 78 c 2. There is, therefore, no reason for deleting the word with Dobree.

4 τὸ τοῦ Ἀνάξαγόρου: cp. Anaxagoras fr. I ad init. Ὄμοι πάντα χρήματα ἢν (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 299). There is a similar jesting use of the phrase in Gorg. 465 d 3 τὸ τοῦ Ἀνάξαγόρου ἄν πολὺ ἢν . . . Ὄμοι ἄν πάντα χρήματα ἑφύρετο ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ.

1 ἐκ . . . τῶν ἄλλων, i.e. from some other source than the dead who were once alive.

18 ἐκ τῶν τεθνεῶτων κτλ. It is important to observe that in this passage οἱ τεθνεῶται are simply souls existing in the other world. They are certainly not dead bodies. All through this argument γένεσις means the union of soul to body and ἀνάρτος their separation.

21 καὶ τὰς μὲν γε κτλ. These words appear to repeat 63 c 6, where the statement is in place.

(2) The doctrine of ἀνάμμησις is shown to rest on the theory of Forms (72 e 3—77 a 5).

3 ὑπολαβόν: cp. 60 c 8 n.

καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνον . . . ἐ 6 καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον: the καὶ means 'as well as' according to the παλαιὸς λόγος of 70 c 5.

4 ὁν οὐ εἰσαγαγόν θαμᾶ λέγειν: it is surely very difficult to regard this definite statement as a fiction. The doctrine is also ascribed to Socrates in the Meno and the Phaedrus. It is to be noted, further, that Cebes speaks of it as one peculiar to Socrates, while Simmias
NOTES

1. εἰ τίς τι ἀναμνησθῇσθαι, 'if a man is to be reminded of a thing.' Cp. 72e 7 n.

2. τρόπος τοιοῦτῳ, 'in such a way as this.' Here τοιοῦτος refers forward, and the explanation of it is introduced by the question and answer 'What way do I mean? This.' For similar rhetorical interrogations see Riddell, Dig. § 325.

3. ή τίνα ἄλλην αἰσθήησιν λαβών, equivalent to ή τίνι ἄλλην αἰσθήησει αἰσθήμενος, but Plato avoids the juxtaposition of cognate words. The same phrase is used below 76 a 2.

4. μὴ μόνον ἔκεινον γνῷ κτλ., 'not only apprehends A, but also thinks of B.'

5. οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη: this is an important reservation. Certain things, notably opposites, must be known together or not at all (τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη). It proves nothing that odd reminds us of even, or that darkness reminds us of light; for in this case the knowledge of the one is ipso facto knowledge of the other.

6. τοῦτο: internal object of ἀνεμνήσθη (cp. 72 e 7 n.) and antecedent of οὗ, 'that he was reminded of that which he thought of (B).’ The words οὗ τὴν ἐννοιαν ἑλάβει refer to ἄλλα καὶ ἔτερον ἐννοίαν above.

7. δικαίως is used much like ὀρθῶς. Cp. 72 a 11 n.

8. τάσχοντι τοῦτο: followed as usual by a clause in apposition. Cp. 68 e 3 n.


10. τοῦτο: pred. 'and reminiscence is just this'. Cp. 75 d 10.


12. καὶ ἄλλα που μύρλα κτλ. Cp. 70 e 3 n.
73

μέντοι νη Δία: cp. 68 b 7 n.

5 ἤππον γεγραμμένον, 'a painted horse.' This is a more complex case. We are reminded of B not by A, but by an image of A, which we may call a.

9 αὐτὸν Σιμμίου: Simmias as opposed to the picture of Simmias. In this case we are reminded of A by a, or of B by b. This is the case described just below as ἀφ’ ὁμοίων, the two first being ἀπὸ ἁναμοίων. It is for the sake of this distinction that the point is elaborated.

4 a 6 ἐννοεῖν: in apposition to προσπάσχειν, cp. 72 c 3 n. When a man is reminded of A by a or of B by b, an additional thought necessarily presents itself to his mind, the thought of the presence or absence of any deficiency in the likeness of a or b to A or B. This thought is only forced upon us when we are reminded ἀφ’ ὁμοίων.

εἰτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο ... ἐκεῖνον ..., 'whether this (a or b) falls short in any respect of that of which he has been reminded by it (A or B).' The intransitive use of ἐλλείπειν was familiar in Pythagorean geometry. Cp. Proclus, in Eucl. I, p. 419 (Friedlein) ἐστὶ μὲν ἄρχαία, φασίν οἱ περὶ τῶν Εὐθυμον, καὶ τῆς τῶν Πυθαγορείων Μοίσεως εὐρήματα ταῦτα, ἤ τε παραβολή τῶν χωρίων καὶ ἡ ὑπερβολή καὶ ἡ ἐλλεῖψις. The use of the words parabola, hyperbola, and ellipse in Conic Sections comes from this, but Conics are post-Platonic.

9 φαμέν ποιν κτλ. Cp. 65 d 4 n.

We have seen already that the 'forms' (what we really mean when we speak of 'triangle', 'right', 'beautiful', &c.) are not perceptible by the senses, but can only be apprehended by thought.

We are now introduced to a second point in the theory. The 'forms' are τύπες (παραδείγματα) to which particular sensible things approximate more or less closely. A given triangle is never what we really mean by 'triangle', nor a right action what we really mean by right.

According to this view, particular sensible things are μὴματα or ἐλκόνες of the 'forms'. There is ample evidence that a doctrine like this was held by the later Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 353 sqq.).

τι εἶναι ἴσων ... αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον: we speak of sticks and stones being 'equal', but this is not the equality with which arithmetic and geometry deal. We only call them equal at all because they remind us of what we really mean by 'equal'. This is something
NOTES

different (ἐτερόν τι), 'over and above' all these things (παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα), which is 'just the equal' (αὐτὰ τὸ ἱσοῦ).

b 1 μίντιν νῆ Δι(α): cp. 65 d 6 n. Simmias was not familiar with the doctrine of Reminiscence, but now he feels at home once more.

b 2 αὐτὸ δ ἀστιν: W adds ἱσοῦ and so do the margins of B and T. It is, perhaps, unnecessary, but gives the full technical expression for this kind of reality, 'the what it is by itself', 'the just what it is'.

b 4 ἐκ ἠν ἠνδὴ ἠλέγαμεν: we certainly have an exact scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) of equality, but we have seen (65 d 9) that equality cannot be perceived by the senses. These, then, are not the source of our knowledge. Sensible objects only remind us of equality. But we cannot be reminded of a knowledge which we never possessed.

b 8 τῷ μὲν ... τῷ δ' οὖ: there is an ancient variant τῶτε (i.e. τοτὲ) μὲν ... τῶτε (i.e. τοτὲ) δ' οὖ. Either reading gives a good sense. Sticks and stones sometimes seem equal and sometimes unequal to the same persons, and they appear equal to one person, unequal to another. This shows that the 'really equal' (αὐτὸ δ ἀστιν ἱσοῦ) is something different.

c 1 αὐτὰ τὰ ἱσα: things that are 'just equal'. There is no difficulty about the plural. When Euclid says (Αξ. 1) Τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἱσα καὶ ἀλλὰ ὅλως ἄστιν ἱσα, he is not speaking of sticks or stones, but of αὐτὰ τὰ ἱσα. Cp. αὐτὰ τὰ ὑμων, Παρ. 129 b 1. The two angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are an instance of αὐτὰ τὰ ἱσα.

c 4 ταῦτα ... τὰ ἱσα: the sticks and stones mentioned above, not αὐτὰ τὰ ἱσα.

c 11 Οὐκαὶν ... ἀν μὲν οὖν: this step in the argument is not, perhaps, strictly necessary, and some critics would bracket the words. It must be observed, however, that they serve to make the proof that our knowledge of the equal is reminiscence clearer, by reminding us of the preceding discussion. The equality of sticks and stones must either be like or unlike real equality, but in either case it is different from it, and our conception of real equality therefore corresponds to the account already given of reminiscence. Socrates does not assume at this stage that the equality of sticks and stones is 'like' real equality. That is the next step in the argument.
c 13 ἕως ἄν . . : dummodo, 'so long as' . . . For the formula which follows cp. 73 c 6; 76 a 2.
d 2 αἰτῶ, 'the process in question.'
d 4 τι τοιοῦτον refers forward. The fact here noted indicates that we have to do with ἀνύμνητος ὀφ’ ὀμοίον. Cp. 74 a 5.
d 6 ἡ ἐνδείᾳ τι ἐκείνου . . ἡ ὀδήγει; 'do they fall short of it at all . . or not?'
For the rare use of εὐθείας as equivalent to ἐλλείπειν cp. Rep. 345 d 4 ἕως γ’ ἄν μηδεν ἐνδείη τοῦ ποιμενικὴ εἶναι, 529 d 1 τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν τολὺ ἐνδείην. There is no need, then, to read ἐκείνῳ with Madvig.
d 7 τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, 'in being such as the equal.' For the dative of that in which one is deficient cp. Thuc. ii. 87. 1 τῇ . . παρασκευῇ ἐνδείῃς ἐγένετα, Isocr. Paneg. 105 τοὺς ταῖς οὕσιν ἐνδεεστέρους. Owing to a misunderstanding of this construction late MSS. insert μὴ after τῷ, and various conjectures have been proposed by modern critics.
d 9 βούλεται . . εἶναι, 'aims at being:' The phrase is often used to express a tendency, especially by Aristotle.
e 1 [ἵσον]: this seems a clear case of an 'adscript' which has crept into the text. Though it is in W it is not translated in the version of Aristippus, who has simply tale esse quale illud.
e 2 φαυλότερον, 'inferior.'
e 3 ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἐκείνω, 'but of which it falls short.' The relative οὖ cannot be repeated after δ’, though αἰτῶ might have been added. Cp. 65 a 5 n.
e 9 Ἀναγκαῖον ἁρα . . προεδείναι: the point of the argument is that we could not judge the equality of sticks and stones to be defective unless we were in possession of a standard by which to judge them. Sensible things could never furnish us with such a standard, therefore we must have derived it from some other source.
5 a 2 ὀφείλεται: equivalent to βούλεται, 74 d 9.
a 7 ταῦτῶν δὲ κτλ., 'I count all these as the same thing' (for the purposes of the present argument, as appears from the reply). Cp. Meno 75 e 2 πάντα ταῦτα ταῦτῶν τι λέγω: ῥήσως δ’ ἄν ἡμῖν Πρόδικος διαφέροιτο.
a 11 Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ κτλ. It can only be from the senses that our judgement of the inferiority of sensible objects originates, and yet that judgement implies previous knowledge of the standard by which we judge them and find them inadequate.
1. τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεωιν, sc. ἵσα. The phrase is modelled on the common ἐν ὄφθαλμοις.

2. Εἰκινοῦ... τοῦ ὅ ἐστὶν ἴσον: for the terminology cp. 74 b 2 n. and below d 2 n.

3. Πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι κτλ. The reasoning is quite sound, as we shall see if we remember that we should never call sticks or stones equal at all, unless we knew clearly what we meant by equality.

4. τάλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι, 'make use of our other senses'; for τάλλα is internal accusative (Riddell, Dig. § 2).

5. τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων is substituted for τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεων under the influence of ἀνοίσεων. This is simply a case of the 'attraction' of prepositions with the article by verbs of motion. Cp. 76 d 9; 109 e 4.

6. ἀνοίσεων, 'to refer.' Reference to a standard is regularly expressed by ἀναφέρειν πρὸς... 'referre ad... Cp. 76 d 9.

7. ὅτι seems to be used as if ἀναφέροντες ἐννοήσετε had preceded instead of ἀνοίσεσσαν. Vahlen (i. 489) proposes to insert καὶ ἐννοῆσεν before ὅτι.

8. προβουμεταί, 'do their best,' a still more picturesque way of expressing tendency than βούλεται or ὁρέγεται above.

9. πάντα, sc. τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεωιν ἵσα.

10. γενόμενοι εἴθος, 'immediately upon birth.'

11. τὸ μείζον καὶ τὸ ἐλάττων: the knowledge of τὸ ἴσον implies these; for together they make up its opposite, τὸ ἄνισον, and τῶν ἐναντίων μιὰ ἐπιστήμη.

12. περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ κτλ. We see here how the theory originated in mathematics, and was thence transferred to what we call morals and aesthetics. The beautiful and the good resemble the equal in this, that they are nowhere perfectly realized.

13. οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα κτλ., 'on which we set the seal of αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι.' Here again we have 'we' in connexion with a technical term, and this implies the work of a school. Cp. 65 d 4 n. For the metaphor cp. Polit. 258 c 5 (τῇ πολιτικῇ) μίαν (ἰδέαν) ἐπισφραγίσασθαι, Philod. 26 d 1 ἐπισφραγισθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίον γενέι.

τὸ "αὐτὸ ὅ ἐστι", 'the just what it is': so I have ventured to
write for the τότο δ ἔστι of the MSS. Iamblichus has simply τὸ δ ἔστι, and it seems to me that τὸ must be right. The reading which I have given accounts sufficiently for the others. Most editors write τότο, δ ἔστι.

d 2 καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν κτλ.: i.e. διαλέγομεναι, for question and answer are the two sides of the Socratic dialectic. We see from 78 d i that this phrase also was technical in the Socratic school. Cp. Crítos 50 c 8 ἐπειδῆ καὶ εἰώθας χρὴθαι τῷ ἐρωτάν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Rep. 534 d 9 (διαλεκτικῇ) ἐξ ὧς ἐρωτάν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι οἶοι τ’ ἔσονται.

d 7 Εἰ... ἐκάστατε μὴ ἐπιλελῆσθεμα, 'unless we forget them on each occasion' of our birth. The doctrine of παλληγινεσία seems to be implied by ἐκάστατε and δὲι γίγνεσθαι ('to be born on each occasion') below. There would be no room for reminiscence unless birth involved forgetting. Heindorf proposed to insert γιγνόμενοι after ἐκάστατε to make this clear; but we may easily 'understand' it.

d 9 λαβάντα κτλ., 'having acquired knowledge of a thing, to have it and not to have lost it.' ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλεκέναι is an instance of 'polar expression'. Cp. 86 a 5 ἐτι εἶναι... καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι.

d 10 ἐπιστήμης ἀπασαλήν, 'loss of knowledge' (ἀπάλλυμι and ἀταβάλλω are synonyms in this sense). For other definitions of λήθη cp. Symp. 208 a 4 λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος, Philèb. 33 e 3 ἐτι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος.

e 2 Εἰ... γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, 'if we lost it in the process of birth.'

e 3 περὶ ἀντα: here ἀντα means simply 'the things in question'. Cp. 60 c 1; 76 c 2. There is no need to read ταῦτα with W; for the reference is plain.

e 4 πρῶν: the use of πρῶν as an adverb is almost unexampled in prose (except with the article).

e 5 οἶκειαν... ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν, 'to recover knowledge which is our own.' This is the real meaning of the whole doctrine, which can only be adequately expressed in a mystical form. The mystery of knowledge is the same as the mystery of love. It is a 'mystical union' with what at first seems alien (ἀλλότριον), but is in time recognized to be our very own.

e 7 ἀρθῶς: cp. 62 b 2 π.
These participles are subordinate to αἰσθάνεμον, 'whether by sight or hearing or any other sense.'

We must not, therefore, read παντές.

οὐδὲν ἄλλα ἦ, 'nothing but.' The phrase ἄλλα ἦ is used after negatives and treated as a single word (cp. 68 b 4). It is wrong to write ἄλλα (for ἄλλο) as is shown by 81 b 4 μηδὲν ἄλλο ... ἄλλα ἦ ...

δεῦναι λόγον, 'to give an account of it.' This is the mark of the διαλεκτικός. Cp. Ῥεφ. 534 b 3 ἐν διαλεκτικάν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς ἀληθείας (cp. 78 d 1); καὶ τὸν μη ἑχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἐν μη ἑχε λόγαν αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἑκεῖν;

δὲν νυν δὲι λέγειμεν, sc. τού ἰδον, τοῦ καλοῦ, τοῦ ἄγαθον, &c.

αὕριον τηνυκάδε, 'this time to-morrow.' It seems to me that, if Plato originated the theory, he could not possibly have put this statement into the mouth of Simmias. Cp. Prot. 336 b 8, where Alcibiades says τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἴος τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστασθαι λόγον τε δεῖναι καὶ δεξασθαι θαυμάζοιμ' ἐν εἰ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ παραχωρεῖ (Σωκράτης).

ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, 'in human form.' We see from the next words how close εἰδος in such phrases comes to the meaning of σῶμα. Cp. 73 a 1 π.

καὶ φρόνησιν εἴχον, 'and had intelligence.' For the sense of φρόνησις here cp. 70 b 4 π. The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις gives the first indication of the intelligence of the disembodied soul.

ἐν ποιῷ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; sc. ἐν τῷ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι. The interrogative ποιῷ is not a mere equivalent of τίν. It always expresses feeling of some sort, surprise, scorn, or incredulity. Here we may reproduce the effect by saying, 'And at what other time do we lose it, pray?'

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e 2 ὑπὸς ὅσπερ καὶ, 'in just the same way that', 'just as surely as'.

e 3 ταῦτα, sc. τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν.

There is no real difficulty in the fact that ταῦτα here and in the next line has a different reference from ταῦτα in e 2. The reference is quite plain in all three cases.


e 9 εἰς καλὸν: this phrase can hardly have any other than its usual meaning opportune. Cp. Μενο 89 ε 9 εἰς καλὸν ἡμῖν Ἁντωνος παρεκαβέζεται, Symp. 174 ε 5 εἰς καλὸν ἡκεῖς, and often. The phrase is purely adverbial, and it is not correct to say, with most editors, that it is explained by the words εἰς τὸ ὀμοίως εἶναι κτλ., which depend directly on καταφεύγει.

καταφεύγει, 'is taking refuge.' The λόγος or argument is over and over again spoken of as the thing hunted (cp. 63 a 2 n., and below 88 d 9 n.). I take the meaning to be that it has 'taken cover' very conveniently for us who are hunting it. From Ρεφ. 432 b sq. we see that the idea is that of a hare or other animal taking refuge in a bush (θάμνος), which the hunstmen surround so that it cannot escape (Adam's note in loc.). When the argument is proved, it is caught. Cp. Λύσις 218 c 4 ἐξαιρον, ὅσπερ θηρευτής τις, ἐξων ἀγαπητὸς οὐκ ἔθηρενόμην.

a 1 ὁμολογοῖ, 'in the same way', 'just as surely', equivalent to ὑπὸς ὅσπερ καὶ ... ὑπὸς καὶ above (76 e 2).

a 5 ἀποδείκται, 'the demonstration is adequate.' The words ἀμοιγυ δοκεῖ are parenthetical, and do not affect the construction. Cp. 108 d 8. The omission of δοκεῖ in TW is an attempt to normalize the construction. The answer shows that δοκεῖ is right; for it is the only word that can be supplied after Τι δὲ δὴ Κέβητι;

(3) The doctrines of παλιγγενεσίᾳ and ἀνάμνησις afford an incomplete demonstration until they are combined (77 a 6—77 d 5).

a 8 Ἰκανῖς, sc. ἀποδείκται. Simmias and Cebe point out, however, that the argument from ἀνάμνησις only proves the antenatal existence of the soul, not its survival after death. Socrates replies that we must take the argument from ἀνταπόδοσις and that from ἀνάμνησις together. At the same time, he admits that a more thorough discussion is required.
b 3 ἐνεστηκέν, 'there is still the objection.' This is originally an agonistic metaphor; for ἐνστήναι is 'to stand up to'. Cp. Lysias, 3. 8 εὖθὺς μὲ τοὺς ἐπεξεργασμένους ἐπείδη δὲ αὐτὸν ἵματαμ ἐνστάσει... Ισοκρ. 5. 39 ἐνστήναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις. Hence comes the technical use of ἐνστασις (instantia) in dialectics of an 'objection' to an argument (ἐπιξειρήμα). Plutarch uses the word for the tribunes' intercessio.

b 4 ὅπως μὴ... διασκεδάζωνται κτλ. For the use of ὅπως μὴ after verbs of fearing instead of μὴ cp. below 84 b 5. There are four or five instances of this construction in Plato. The verb is subjunctive and has long υ, but the termination should not be accented -υται as if it were contracted from -ὑται. It is really an older form of the subjunctive (Kühner-Blass, § 281. 3). So διασκεδάζωνω, 77 e 1, and the opt. πίγνυμι, 118 a 2.

b 6 ἄλλοθεν ποθεν, 'from some other source' than from the souls in the other world which have come there from this (the ἐνθέως ἀφικόμενα of 70 c 6). I formerly read ἀμόθεν ποθεν with Bekker; but, apart from the fact that the regular phrase is ἀμόθεν γέ ποθεν, I now think the meaning is settled by 72 d 1 ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων, where see note.

c 1 Εἰ λέγεις κτλ. For the interlaced order cp. 70 b 5 n.

c 5 τέλος... ἐξειν, i. e. τελεία ἐσεθαι, 'to be complete.' Cp. τέλος λομβάνειν, τέλος ἐπιθείναι, &c. In Greek philosophy the word τέλος always implies the idea of completion or full growth. An animal or plant τέλος ἐξει when its growth is complete, when it is full grown. B has ἐξειν for ἐξειν, which would be equally correct. It is impossible to draw any distinction between the two constructions. For the fut. inf. in this use cp. e. g. Rep. 567 b 8 εἰ μέλλει ἄρξειν.

c 7 καὶ νῦν, 'even as it is.' The sense of νῦn is the same as in the common νῦν δὲ... nunc vero...,' but, as it is.'

ἐνθέως... ἐπί τοῦτον, 'to combine the present argument (viz. that the soul exists and is conscious before our birth) with the argument we assented to before it.'

d 5 ὅπερ λέγετε, 'the point you mention.' This reading comes from a late MS. and is probably due to conjecture alone. It gives, however, a much better sense than the ὅπερ λέγεται of the oldest MSS., which is supposed to mean 'as is said', i. e. 'as I say'. We should
certainly expect ὃπερ λέγω in that sense, and the confusion of -τε and -τα is common; both being pronounced alike.

(4) Practical Application.—We must rid ourselves of the fear of death at all costs (77 d 5—78 b 4).

This digression (cp. 78 a 10) marks the end of the First Argument and leads up to the Second.

d 6 διαπραγματεύσασθαι, 'to discuss thoroughly.' Cp. below 95 e 9 and the use of πραγματεία above 63 a 1.

d 7 τὰ τῶν παιδῶν, 'as children do.' That the phrase does not necessarily mean 'as children say', is shown e. g. by Xen. Oec. 16. 7 ἀνεμώσασθην τὸ τῶν ἄλλων, which in the context must mean 'what fishermen do'.

e 1 διασκεδάστευσιν is probably subjunctive and to be pronounced with long u (cp. 77 b 4 n.). The indicative would not be so appropriate; for the fear refers to the future. If the verbs were indicative, we should have to render 'lest the wind puffs it away and scatters it' on each occasion when it issues from the body.

e 2 ἐν μεγάλῳ τῶν πνεύματι, 'in a high wind,' the regular phrase. So μέγας πνεῖ o ἀνεμός. This clause is, of course, a humorous addition to the theory.

e 3 ὡς δεδιότων, sc. ἡμῶν, in spite of the fact that strict grammar would require δεδιότας in agreement with ἡμᾶς, the unexpressed object of ἀναπηδεῖν. The genitive absolute is often used in this way. Cp. Riddell, Dig. § 274.

e 4 μᾶλλον ἰδέ, vel potius, 'or rather,' the regular phrase in introducing a correction.

μη belongs to δεδιότων, but is anticipated for emphasis. A striking instance of this is Crito 47 d 9 πειθόμενοι μὴ τῇ τῶν ἑπαίων ἔδει.

e 5 ἐν ἡμῖν, 'in us.' It is necessary to state this, as it has been suggested that the words mean 'among us' and refer to Apollodorus! This makes nonsense of the passage. The 'child in us' is often referred to by later Platonist writers like Porphyry, Themistius, and Simplicius (cp. Wytenbach's note).

δοτε differs from ὡς as qui with the subjunctive from quĭ with the indicative. Its use here is justified by the preceding τις.

e 6 περάδε μεταπέθετον was conjectured by Heindorf, and is now known
to be the reading of W. It is far better than the πειρόμεθα πείθειν of BT; for it resumes πειρό ἀναπείθειν above with a slight variation which is quite in Plato's manner.

e 7 τὰ μορμολύκεια, 'bugbears.' Μορμῶ (whose full name was Μορμολύκη) was a she-goblin used, like Ἀκκω, Ἐμπονίαι, and Λάμια to frighten naughty children. Cp. Theocritus xv. 40 οὐκ ἄξω τυ, τέκνοι, Μορμῶ, δάκνει ἰππος, Xen. Hell. iv. 17 φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς πετλαστάς, ὁσπερ μαρμόνας παιδάρια, Lucian, Philops. 2 παιδων ἑτὶ τὴν Μορμῶ καὶ τὴν Λάμιαν δεδιότων. According to the Platonic Lexicon of Timaeus, μορμολύκεια were mak:ς, τὰ φοβερὰ τοῖς παιοὶ προσωπεία. The verb μορμολύττεσθαι is used in Crito 46c4 and Gorg. 473 d 3.

e 8 ἐπάθειν, incantare, 'to sing charms' (carmina, ἐπῳδαί). Socrates makes an elaborate use of this idea in Charm. 155 esq., cp. esp. 157 a 3 θεραπεύσεισθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφη (Σαλμοξίς), ζ μακάριε, ἐπῳδαίς τισιν, τόσο δ' ἐπῳδάς ταῦτας τοὺς τόγην εἶναι τοὺς καλοὺς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιουτών τοὺς τόγην ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίνεσθαι, ἢ ἔγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης ῥαδίων ἡδὴ εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σῶματι πορίζειν. The ascription of this to the Thracian Zalmoxis shows it to be Pythagorean; for Herodotus tells us (iv. 95) that Zalmoxis (or Zamolxis) had been a slave of Pythagoras (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 93), and it goes well with what we know of the Pythagorean musical καθάρας (cp. 61 a 3 n.). Socrates also used the term in connexion with his μουντική (Theaet. 149 d 1).

e 9 ἦσος δὲν ἐξεπαιδήσητε, 'till you have charmed it out of him.' This is another conjecture of Heindorf's which has been confirmed by fuller knowledge of the MSS.; for it is actually found in a Vienna MS. and virtually in TW. The reading of B is ἐξίσωστοι, and it appears from the margin of W that this was an ancient variant. It cannot, of course, be passive; but we might supply τοι as its subject. 'One must sing charms... till one has healed him.'

78 a 3 Πάλλη... Ἕλλας, wide enough, for instance, to include Southern Italy, where the Pythagoreans were once more becoming powerful. For this use of πολλῷ cp. the Homeric πόλλῇ γαῖα, πολλῇ χώρῃ (II. xxiii. 520), Thuc. vii. 13. 3 πολλῇ δ' Ἑικελία, Theocr. xxii. 156 πολλῇ τοι Ἐπάρτῃ, πολλῇ δ' ἐπίπλατος Ἡλισ.

a 4 τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων γένη: Socrates is no doubt thinking primarily of Thracians and Phrygians. The Orphic 'orgia' came from the
former, the Corybantic ‘purifications’ from the latter. Plato regarded the distinction between Hellenes and barbarians as an unscientific division of mankind (Polit. 262 d 1 sqq.), but it was revived by Aristotle.

a 6 eis ὅσι ἄν εὐκαρπὸτερον: this is the reading of T and seems far better than the variant eis ὅσι ἀναγκαίοτερον. The corruption is an extremely easy one, and the omission of ἄν in the variant is, to say the least of it, hard to justify, while the insertion of ἄν after ὅσι would spoil the rhythm. Of course εὐκαρπὸτερον is the comparative adjective, not the adjective.

a 7 καὶ αὑτοὺς μετ’ ἀλλήλων, ‘by yourselves too’ (as well as by questioning Hellenes and barbarians), ‘along with one another’ (for joint search is the true Socratic method). We cannot take μετ’ ἀλλήλων to mean ‘among yourselves’ as some do. Apart from the unheard-of sense thus given to μετά c. gen., the pronoun ἀλλήλων excludes such a rendering. We should have had ἄν ἡμῖν αὑτοῖς.

a 8 ἵσος γὰρ ἄν κτλ. The usual hint that Orpheotelestae and Corybantic καθαρταί are not to be taken too seriously. Cp. 69 c 4 n.

a 10 ταῦτα . . . ὑπάρξει, ‘that shall be done’, ‘you may count on that’.

For the interlaced order cp. 70 b 5 n.

Second Proof of Immortality (78 b 4—84 b 8).

This proof is based, not upon ancient doctrines, but on a consideration of the soul’s own nature, which is shown to resemble that of the eternal forms. From this we may infer that, like them, it is indissoluble.

b 5 οὐτοῦ is an emphatic ἀλλήλων.

b 6 τὸ διασκεδάζωσθαι is better attested than the τοῦ διασκεδάζωσθαί of B. We have seen (72 c 3 n.) that τοῦτο πᾶσχειν takes an infinitive in apposition. The article is added in this case because τὸ πᾶθος precedes.

b 7 καὶ τῷ ποιῷ τινὶ (οὗ): some of the early editors deleted καὶ τῷ ποιῷ τινὶ as a tautology; but the pronoun ποτέρον in b 8 shows that two kinds of things have been distinguished. We must therefore add οὗ with Heindorf, though it appears in no MS. and Olympiodorus did not read it; for he tries to get rid of the tautology by taking the first τῷ ποιῷ τινὶ of things and the second of persons.
Only that is dissoluble which is composite, and the things which are constant and invariable are not composite. Further, the things which are constant and invariable are invisible. We have to ask, then, whether the soul belongs to the class of invisible, constant and invariable, non-composite things, or to that of visible, variable, composite, and therefore dissoluble things (78 c 1—80 c 1).

τὸ... σωνθέτω δοντι φύσει: if we take these words together with Wytenbach, they add a fresh touch to τὸ σωνθέτων. That suggests an artificial combination; this refers to what is essentially and from the nature of the case composite. The addition of the participle δοντι indicates that this is the construction and makes it very unnatural to take φύσει προσήκει together, as many editors do.

tοῦτο πάσχειν, διαφεβήναι: cp. 72 c 3 n. The verbs σωνθέτων, 'compound,' διαφεβήν, 'divide,' are the regular opposites.

tαύτη ἡπερ σωνθέτη: e.g., if it is a compound of the four 'elements,' it will be divided into these.

κατὰ ταύτα καὶ ὁσαυτως, 'constant and invariable.' We see that this is the sense from the ἄλλος ἄλλος, which is the opposite of ὁσαυτως, and μηδέποτε κατὰ ταύτα, which is opposed to κατὰ ταύτα. Cp. d 2 ; 80 b 2.

tὰ δὲ ἄλλος ἄλλος: the familiarity of the term may excuse the ellipse of ἐχοντα and make it unnecessary to read ἂ for τά with Heindorf.

ταύτα δὲ σύνθετα: for the resumptive demonstrative with δὲ cp. e.g. Lach. 194 d 2 ἃ δὲ ἁμαθής, ταύτα δὲ κακός. So below 80 d 8 ; 81 b 8 ; πις c 5.

ἡ οὐσία ἂς λόγον διδομέν τοὐ εἶναι, 'the reality the being of which we give account of.' The hyperbaton of διδομέν has misled the commentators here. We must take λόγον τοῦ εἶναι together as equivalent to λόγον τῆς οὗσιας or 'definition,' and as governing the genitive ἂς. For λόγος τῆς οὗσιας cp. Rep. 534 b 3 ἂ καὶ διαλεκτικῶν καλεῖς τῶν λόγων ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὗσιας; The meaning, then, is simply 'the reality which we define'. When we define 'triangle',
it is not this or that triangle, but \( \alpha v t d \ \delta \ \varepsilon s t i \ \tau r i g w o n, \) 'just what is triangle,' that finds expression in our definition.

d 1 \( k a l \ \varepsilon r a t o n t e s \ k a l \ \dot{a} p o k r u \nu m e n o i, \) i. e. \( d i a l e g \nu m e n o i, \) cp. 75 d 2 n. In the dialectic process it is by question and answer that definitions are reached. When we ask \( \tau i \ \varepsilon s t i; \) the answer is a \( \lambda \delta g o s \ \tau \ddot{h} s \) \( o \nu s i a s. \)

d 3 \( a v t d \ \dot{e} k a s t o n \ \delta \ \varepsilon s t i n, \) 'what any given thing itself is' or 'is by itself', 'just what a given thing is'. Cp. 74 b 2 n.

d 4 \( \tau d \ \dot{o} n, \) 'the real,' is added to suggest the opposition of \( \dot{e} i n a i \) and \( g \gamma n e s t a i. \)

d 5 \( \mu o n o e i d e s \ \dot{d} n \ a v t d \ \kappa a \theta\) \( a v t d, \) 'being uniform if taken alone by itself.' I regard \( a v t d \ \kappa a \theta\) \( a v t d\) as a reservation here. The triangle, for instance, has more than one \( \dot{e} i d o s. \) There are equilateral, isosceles, and scalene triangles. But none of these \( \dot{e} i d \eta \) enter into the definition of the triangle simply as such.

d 10 \( T i \ \delta e \ \tau o n \ \pi o l l \dot{a} w \ \kappa \lambda \lambda. \) (Riddell, Dig. § 27), 'what of the many beautiful things?' as opposed to \( \tau d \ \alpha v t d \ \delta \ \varepsilon s t i \ k a l \dot{a} w. \) It is clear that we cannot retain both \( k a l \dot{a} w\) here and \( \dot{h} k a l \dot{a} w\) in e 1, and most editors bracket the former. This, however, commits us to the view that there are \( \dot{e} i d \eta\) of men, horses, and clothes, which is a point that has not been referred to, and which raises certain difficulties which do not concern us here. It is hard to believe that \( i m \dot{a} t i a\) would have been mentioned at all except as an instance of \( \tau d \ \pi o l l \dot{a} w \ k a l \dot{a}. \) I therefore take \( T i \ \delta e \ \tau o n \ \pi o l l \dot{a} w \ k a l \dot{a} w \ldots \ \dot{h} \ \iota o w\) together, and regard 'people, horses, and clothes' as examples of the first, just as 'sticks and stones' might be given as examples of the second. It is only as instances of \( k a l \dot{a}\) that people, horses, and clothes can be said to be \( \dot{o} m \dot{a} n u m a \ \tau d \ \k a l \dot{a}\) (cp. e 2 n.).

e 1 \( \tau o i o u t o n: \) i. e. \( k a l \dot{a} w. \) This, I take it, has caused the interpolation of \( \dot{h} k a l \dot{a} w.\)

e 2 \( \pi a n t o n \ \tau o n \ \dot{e} k e i n o s \ \dot{o} m o n \nu m o w, \) 'all the (other) things (besides \( k a l \dot{a}\) and \( i s o w\) which bear the same name as those,' i. e. as \( a v t d \dot{o} n \ \dot{e} k a s t o n \ \delta \ \varepsilon s t i. \) For this way of expressing the relationship between \( \tau d \ \pi o l l \dot{a} w \ \dot{e} k a s t a\) and \( a v t d \ \delta \ \varepsilon s t i n \ \dot{e} k a s t o n\) cp. Parm. 133 d 2 \( \tau d \) \ldots \ \pi a p\ \dot{h} \mu i n \ \tau a u t a \ \dot{o} m \dot{a} n u m a \ \dot{o} n t a \ \dot{e} k e i n o s. \) Observe the tendency to use \( \tau a u t a\) of the 'many' and \( \dot{e} k e i n a\) of the 'ideas'.

\( \tau a n \ \tau o i o n t o n \ \dot{e} k e i n o s, \) 'just the opposite to these,' i. e. to \( a v t d \ \tau d \ k a l \dot{a} w, \) &c. What we call 'beautiful things' or 'equal things' are 67 F 2
constant neither to themselves nor to one another. As we have seen (74 b 8), they do not appear beautiful or equal to different people, or even to the same person at different times.

τὸ τῆς διανοας λογισμῷ, 'by thinking.' There is no distinction here between διανοα and νοῦς. The phrase means thinking generally as opposed to sense-perception.

ἄδη, 'invisible.' The correct form was first made known by the Flinders Petrie papyrus, and has since been found to be the reading of the first hand of T and of W. Cp. the Homeric ἀδήλος, ἄινος, ἄδυνας. The reading of B, followed by nearly all MSS. and editions, is ἄειδη, which could only mean 'formless', 'unsightly', and is quite inappropriate.

Θώμεν αὐν βουλεί κτλ. Olympiodorus distinguishes three ἐπιχειρήματα intended to prove that the soul is more like the indissoluble than the body: (1) ἐκ τοῦ δοράτου αὐτῆς, (2) ἐκ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ αὐτῆς, (3) ἐκ τοῦ δεσπόζεων τοῦ σώματος. The first ἐπιχειρήμα begins here.

δύο εἰδή τῶν οντών, 'two types of things.' It is important to observe that the word ἔντα is used of both. It means 'things' in the widest and vaguest sense. Of course, strictly speaking, visible things are not οντῶς ἔντα and the things invisible are not 'things' at all.

ἄλλα τι, nonne, just like ἄλλα τι ἦ... above (70 c 9). The words have become phraseological, but their original sense ('anything else') is so far felt that the affirmative answer is given by Οἶδεν ἄλλο.

φαμεν ἄν εἶναι: this seems better than the equally well attested φαμεν ἄν εἶναι. In the direct speech ὑμουτέρον ἄν ἦν would be quite natural.

τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσει, sc. ὑπάτα καὶ μή. It is left open for us to say that in some sense we may 'see' these things πρὶν ἐν ἀνθρωπείᾳ εἴδει γενέσθαι or after the soul has left its human body. Such a beatific vision is described in the Phaedrus, but belongs to another aspect of the theory than that dwelt upon in the Phaedo.

Ὁχ ὄρατον. 'Αἰσθή ἀρά; cp. 105 d 15 'Ἀνάρτητον. The inference from 'not visible' to 'invisible' seemed more necessary to the Greeks than to us.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόσε κτλ. The second ἐπιχειρήμα (cp. a 6 n.). The soul can apprehend the invariable best apart from the body.
c 2 πάλαι, 'some time ago,' i.e. 65 b i sqq. For the meaning of πάλαι cp. 63 d 5 n.

c 8 τοιούτων, sc. πλανομένων καὶ ἐν τοραχῇ ὄντων (Riddell, Dig. § 54). The soul fluctuates and is confused because it is in contact with objects which are fluctuating and confused.

d 3 συγγενῆς οὖσα: we have seen already that reality is αἰκεῖον to the soul (75 e 5), and this has been reinforced by the consideration that it is more alike to the invisible than the visible.

d 4 καὶ ἔξι αὐτῇ, sc. μετ' ἕκεινον γίγνεσθαι.

d 5 καὶ περὶ ἑκεῖνα . . . ἔχει, 'and remains ever constant in relation to them.'

d 6 τοιούτων: i.e. κατὰ ταύτα ὠσαύτως ἐχόντων. τότο . . . τὸ πάθημα, 'this condition,' i.e. a constant relation to constant objects.

e 3 ταύτης τῆς μεθόδου, 'this line of argument.' The verb μετέρχομαι (88 d 9) and its substantive μέθοδος furnish another illustration of the metaphor from hunting. The literal sense of μετένοι is 'to go after', 'to follow up', especially of going in pursuit of game. As the λόγος is the game in the θήρα τοῦ ὄντος, the phrase μετέναι τὸν λόγον is natural.

dλω καὶ παντὶ: the usual phrase is δλω καὶ παντὶ διαφέρειν, 'to be totally different.' Here it is used of likeness.

e 8 "Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τὰ τὴν κτῆμα. The third ἐπιχείρημα (a 6 n.). The soul rules over the body. This is the argument which comes nearest to Plato's own proof of immortality.

a 4 οἶον ἀρχειν . . . πεφυκέναι, 'to be by nature such as to rule and lead,' 'to be naturally adapted for rule and leadership'. For this use of οἶον cp. 83 d 9; 94 e 4; 98 c 8. We must 'understand' οἶον again with ἀρχεσθαι.

d 10 εἰ . . . τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, 'whether this is our conclusion.' The results of a dialectical discussion are technically called τὰ συμβαίνοντα, and it is in the light of these that the ὑπόθεσις with which it starts must be examined. If an impossibility συμβαίνει, the ὑπόθεσις must be given up.

v 3 διαλόγιστον εἶναι ψυχῇ, sc. συμβαίνει. The verb συμβαίνει in this sense is generally used personally; cp. 67 c 5 κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἃρα αὖ τοῦτο συμβαίνει . . .; so there is no need to read ψυχῆν. The impersonal construction also occurs; cp. 74 a 2 ἄρ' αὖν αὖ . . . συμβαίνει

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τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι κτλ. There is no anacoluthon; for the prospective τάδε above is merely shorthand for τῷ θείῳ ὁμοίωτατον εἶναι ψυχῆ, τῷ ἀνανάτῳ ὁμοίωτατον εἶναι ψυχῆ, &c.

b 4 ἀνοητός: a play on words is involved in making this the opposite of νοητός, for ἀνοητός properly means 'senseless', 'foolish'. The true opposite of νοητός, 'intelligible', 'object of thought', is ἀισθητός, 'sensible', 'object of sense'.

b 6 οὐχ οὖν ὁταν ἐξελιν 'to show that it is not so.' This meaning would be equally well expressed by ὡς which is an ancient variant and well attested. Schanz’s ἦ, however, has the advantage of explaining the readings of B (ἡ) and W (ἡ). Cp. Theaet. 184 c 4 ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἰτοι ὑμίν ὅρθη.

b 10 ἔγγυς τῷ τούτων: a hint that this argument is not quite conclusive. The soul has only been shown to resemble the indissoluble.

(2) Practical Application.—We must purify our souls and purge it of the corporeal (80 c 2—84 b 8).

c 3 ἐν ὀρατῷ κέλευξαν, 'situated in the visible region.' Ast quaintly interprets: 'lying in a visible thing,' i.e. a coffin or tomb.

c 4 καὶ διαπνευσθαι is so well attested that its omission in B must be a slip. I cannot see that it is an inappropriate word to use of a dead body.

c 5 ἐπιεικῶς συχνῶν ὡς χρόνων, 'a fairly long time.' Cp. Crito 43 a 10 ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι.

c 6 ἐπιμένει, 'remains as it is' (dist. περιμένει, 'waits'). Cp. 59 e 4 n. ἐὰν μὲν τις καὶ ..., 'indeed, even if a man ...' For the hyperbaton of καὶ Schmidt compares Prot. 323 b 3 ἐὰν τίνα καὶ εἰδῶν ὅτι διδύκας ἐστίν. The μὲν ('indeed') is solitarium as in Prot. 361 e 3 τῶν μὲν τῆλεοτοτῶν καὶ πάνω (however it may be with others). The meaning, then, is that even if a man dies with his body in good condition, it lasts quite a long time. Of course a healthy body decomposes more rapidly than an old and withered one.

χαριέντως ἔχων, equivalent to καλῶς or εὖ ἔχων. We find μετρίως and ἐπιεικῶς used in the same sense. Cp. 68 e 2 n. There is no suggestion of 'gracefulness', but only of εὐεξία or 'good condition'.

c 7 ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὁρᾷ, 'at a fine season of the year' (τοιαύτῃ standing for καλῇ implied in χαριέντως, Riddell, Dig. § 54). Decomposition is more rapid in summer than in winter. Most recent editors understand the phrase to mean 'in the bloom of youth'; but (1) ἐν

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d within τοιαύτη would be sufficient for this. Cp. *Meno* 76 b 8; *Phaedr.* 240 d 7; *Rep.* 474 d 4; and (2) when ἄρα is mentioned in connexion with death, it means not 'youthful bloom', but 'a ripe old age'. Cp. e.g. Eur. *Phoen.* 968 αὐτὸς δ', ἐν ἄραι γὰρ ἵσταμαι βίου, ἵνα ἄρη ἐτοιμος. On the other hand, one who dies in early youth (and in that sense ἐν ἄρα) is said to die πρὸ ἄρας or ἄ幽. The latter word is common in sepulchral inscriptions.

c 7 καὶ πάνυ μάλα, sc. συχνὸν χρόνον, 'for quite a long time.'

συμπετόν, 'reduced to bones and muscle', 'emaciated'. This clause justifies the preceding ἐὰν μὲν τὶς κτλ. An emaciated body remains almost entire for an inconceivable time, and even a body in good condition lasts quite a long time. For συμπέπτειν cp. Hdt. iii. 52 ἀντίπραγι συμπεπτωκότα. In the medical writers σύμπητωσις is technical for emaciation.

c 8 καὶ ταριχευθὼν: there is nothing unnatural in Socrates' frequent references to Egypt, which was always an object of interest to the Greeks. Socrates must have known many men who had fought there in 460 b.c. This passage has strangely been supposed to prove Plato's Egyptian journey.

c 9 ὀλυγον ὀλον μὲνει, sc. τὸ σῶμα, 'remains all but entire.'

d 1 καὶ ἄν σματη, sc. τὸ (ἄλλο) σῶμα.

νέφρα, 'sinews.' Cp. below 98 c 7 n.

d 5 ἄρα, scilicet. The particle indicates that we have to do with an argumentum ex contrario (cp. 68 a 3 n.) put in the form of a question. 'Are we to say, then, that the soul . . . ?'

τοιούτων . . . ἐπερον, 'just like itself' (cp. 58 d 8 n.), not equivalent to ἄδη, for that is expressly mentioned besides. The meaning is that expressed throughout the preceding argument by δμωνον.

d 6 εἰς 'Αιδῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς, 'to the House of Hades in the true sense of the word.' This refers to the commonly accepted etymology of the word, for which cp. *Crat.* 404 b 1 καὶ τὸ γε ὅνομα ὁ 'Αιδῆς' . . . τόλλοι δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄιδους (sic BT) ἐπωνομάσθαι. The denial of the etymology here shows that (rightly or wrongly) it was commonly accepted.

d 7 τὸν ἐγαθόν καὶ φρόνυμον θεόν: in the mystic theology Hades of Zeus Chthonios is called Eubouleus, and Eubouleus is also found (e.g. at Eleusis and on the Orphic gold plates of Southern Italy) as an independent god. I suspect that Socrates is here alluding to this sacred name.
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d 8 αὐτὴ δὲ δὴ resumes ἦ δὲ ψυχῆ ἀρα after the parenthesis.

e 2 ἐὰν μὲν κτλ. The protasis is interrupted at e 5 and resumed by 81 a 4 οὔτω μὲν ἔχουσα. Then ἐὰν μὲν is answered by 81 b 1 ἐὰν δὲ γε.

e 3 κοινωνουσα : imperfect participle.

e 4 ἔχουσα εἶναι, 'so far as it could help it' (61 c 4 n.). The reservation is the same as that implied in ὦτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη 67 a 4.

e 6 τὸ δὲ: this is the reading of the Petrie papyrus, and is more likely to have been altered than the τοῦτο δὲ of the MSS.

81 a 1 τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥαδίως, 'practising death without complaining.' Most editors emend or delete ῥαδίως, which is found not only in all MSS. and citations, but also in the Petrie papyrus. The use of the perfect infinitive need cause no difficulty; for it is often used of the moment of death which completes the process of τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν (62 a 5 n.). Vahlen (Opusc. ii. 213) proposes to construe ῥαδίως with μελετῶσα, but there has been no question of complaining about the practice of death, while we have had ῥαδίως ἀν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν (62 c 10) and ῥαδίως ἀπαλλάττωσα αὐτῶν (63 a 7) explained just below by οὔτω ῥαδίως φέρεις. The opposite is ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνῄσκοντας (62 e 6). All these passages are quoted by Vahlen himself.

a 8 κατὰ τῶν μεμημένων, 'of the initiated.' Cp. 70 d 7 n. This resembles the fairly common use of κατὰ c. gen. with ἔπαινος, ἐγκώμιον, and the like.

a 9 διάγουσα: after ἀπηλλαγμένη we expect διαγνόσις, which Heindorf proposed to read. It would be easier to write ἀπηλλαγμένη, for there is no reason why the grammatical construction of ὑπάρχει should be kept up. The general sense of the sentence suggests the nominative.

b 3 ἐρῶσα, sc. αὐτοῦ.

γοητευομένη is read by T as well as by the papyrus. It is not easy to decide between it and the equally well attested γεγοητευ-μένη.

τε is connective here. This is a poetical usage, and becomes increasingly frequent in Plato's later style. For a striking instance from his middle period cp. Phaedr. 267 a 6 Τευσίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε.

b 4 δοκεῖν, 'to think': cp. 64 b 2.

b 5 ἀλλ' ἡ ...: cp. 68 b 4 n.; 76 a 6 n.

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b 5 ου: the relative cannot be repeated in a different case (cp. 65a5n.), so the ο and ὧ which are logically required as the sentence proceeds, are simply omitted.

b 7 φιλοσοφία αιρετῶν: Stallbaum compares Tim. 29 a 6 λόγῳ καὶ φρονήσει περιληπτῶν.

b 8 τούτο δέ . . . cp. 78 e 8 n.

c 4 διειλημμένη, 'broken up by', 'patched with the corporeal'. The meaning of διαλαμβάνειν is best seen from πο δέ 7. As applied to colours, it means 'to pick out', distinguere, as in a quilt or tartan. Cp. Milton, Comus 453-75.

c 6 σύμφυτον: though σύμφυτος and σύμφυς usually mean 'congenital', that sense is excluded by ἐνεποίησε. We also find both words in the sense of 'grown together' (from συμφύναι, 'to coalesce'), and this must be the meaning here. We also find σύμφυσις as a medical term, especially of bones.

d 1 κυλινδημένη, 'haunting.' I have not ventured to write καλωδιομένη, though Cobet says (N. L. p. 637) 'Platonica sunt καλωδείσθαι ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ, ἐν πάθῳ ἀμαθίᾳ, et odiose ἐν δικαστηρίοις καλωδεῖται, quem-admodum quis proprie ἐν ηλιόφυτον ἐνθάρρων dicitur καλωδεῖσθαι'. Very like the present use of the word is Rep. 479 d 4 μετάξι ποιν καλωδείται τοῦ τε μη ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρων. The suggestion is that of a restless spirit which cannot tear itself away from the body. Cicero, Somn. Sci. 9 says circum terram ἵπσαν volubantur of such souls.

d 4 διό καὶ ὀρώνται, 'which is just why they are visible.' There is a touch of Socratic playfulness in this theory. If the soul is invisible, we must give some such account of ghosts as this.

d 6 Εἰκός μέντα: cp. 65 d 6 n.

οὐ . . . ἄλλα . . ., a common formula in Plato. The γε belongs to καὶ.

d 8 τροφῆς, practically equivalent here to διάτης, 'way of life.' Cp. 84 b 4 ; 107 d 4.

e 2 ἐνδούντα: cp. 82 e 2 n. For similar doctrine see Phaedr. 249, Rep. 618 a, 620 sq., Tim. 42 b, 91 sq.

e 3 ήθη: we can say 'bad characters' for people who have bad characters, though we should hardly use the word of the lower animals. Very similar to the English use are Rep. 496 b 2 γενναῖον καλ εὖ τελεμμένον ήθος, 503 c 9 τὰ βέβαια ταύτα ήθη quoted by Bywater on Ar. Poet. 1454 a 23.
καὶ μὴ διηλαβθημένοισ: an instance of 'polar expression'; for διελαβθείσθαι means 'to avoid carefully' or 'scrupulously' (εὐλαβῶς).

η ἄν... ίω, 'the way they would take,' a variation for οἷο, which some late MSS. unnecessarily read.

ἀκαστὰ, 'each class.' Note how the gender is varied (1) τούς... προτετμηκότος, (2) τὰς τοιαύτας (sc. ψυχὰς), (3) ἐκαστὰ.

καὶ τούτων: i.e. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. There are degrees of happiness even among souls which are not wholly purified.

τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν, 'popular goodness, the goodness of the good citizen.' This is related to philosophical goodness just as true belief is related to science. Socrates admits the relative value of both. For the phraseology cp. _Rep._ 619 c 7 ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεληφάτα. Here πολιτικὴ means 'belonging to citizens' (cp. _Gorg._ 452 e 4), not 'political'.

τοιοῦτον κτλ., 'a race civilized and tame like themselves.' The regular opposite of ἡμερος is ἀγριος, and both words are used of men, animals, and plants. They mean 'civilized', 'tame', 'cultivated', as opposed to 'savage', 'wild'.

ἀνδρας μετρίους, 'good men,' though of course only in the popular sense. We might have had ἐπιεικεῖς or σπουδαῖοι with the same meaning. _Cp._ 68 e 2 n.

μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι... ἀλλ' ἦ τέ φιλομαθὲι: the tendency to 'polar expression' here asserts itself at the expense of logic. The sentence ends as if οἴδενι had preceded. We must remember that φιλόσοφος and φιλομαθής are synonyms (_Rep._ 376 b 8 Ἀλλὰ μὲντοι... τὸ γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ φιλόσοφον ταῦταν;). For ἀλλ' ἦ _cp._ 68 b 4 n.

οἱ ἄρθως φιλόσοφοι: _cp._ 67 b 4 n.

αἰκαφθορίαν, 'waste of substance.'

οἱ... φιλοχρήμαται are contrasted with οἱ φιλαρχοὶ τε καὶ φιλότιμοι just below. Here once more we have the Pythagorean doctrine of the tripartite soul and the 'Three Lives'. _Cp._ 68 c 1 n.

ἐπιτρία emphasizes the preceding participles.

μέντοι μὲ Δλα: _cp._ 65 d 6 n.

σώματι πλάττοντες ᾽ὁσι: most editors suspect πλάττοντες, and it has been emended in various ways. The true interpretation, however, was given by Vahlen long ago (_cp._ _Opusc._ i. 83). He pointed out that πλάττειν is used much in the same sense as θεραπεύειν in
64 d 8 and 81 b 2, and compared Rep. 377 c 3 καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς· αὐτῶν τοῖς μήδοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερεῖν, to which passage may be added Tim. 88 c 3 τῶν τε αὖ σῶμα ἐπιμελῶς πλάττοντα. Cp. also Plut. El didakτόν ἡ ἀρετή; 439 f ἄσσερ αἱ τίθεαι ταῖς χεραῖς σῶμα πλάττοντων καὶ Coriolanus 32. Vahlen holds further that σώματι is governed by ζωῖν, and that the meaning is 'live for the body, moulding it into shape', though the only example of ζωῖν c. dat. in this sense which he quotes is in [Dem.] 7. 17 Φίλιππως ζωντες καὶ οὐ τῇ ἀειτῶν πατρίδοι. Perhaps Eur. Ion 646 ἐὰν δ' ἐμαυτᾶς ζωῖν μὲ may be added. If this is not accepted, I would rather read σώματα with TW than have recourse to conjecture. The σώματι of B is, however, the difficultior lectio, and I believe Vahlen's interpretation to be right. His discussion (loc. cit.) of the use of particles with an object to be understood from the context should be read.

13  χαίρειν εἰπώντες, 'dismissing from their thoughts.' Cp. 63 e 3 n.

16  τῇ ἐκεῖνης λύσεΐ: this, as well as καθαρρός, is Orphic. Olympiodorus quotes some Orphic verses, which at least contain some old ideas: "Ὀργα ἐκτελέσουσι, λύσιν προγόνων ἀθεμίστων | μαίμουνοι, σὺ δὲ τοῖς ἐχών κράτος αὐς κ' ἐβέλησα | λύσεις ἐκ τε πάνων χαλεπῶν καὶ ἀπείρων οἰότρον.

e 1  παραλαβοῦσα, 'taking in hand,' as a doctor takes his patient in hand for treatment. The vb. παραλαμβάνειν is technical in this sense, especially of teachers taking pupils. Cp. Rep. 541 a 1 τοὺς δὲ παίδας αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες.

e 2  διαδεδεμένην: cp. 62 b 3 n. It is noteworthy that Socrates now adopts and expounds the very doctrine which he had put aside as 'too high'; for the εἰργμὸς is clearly the φραυρά. The reason is that he is now able to give a more scientific account of it.

e 4  κυλινδομένην: cp. 81 d 1 n. Here the word means simply 'wallowing'. Cp. Polit. 309 a 5 τοὺς ... ἐν ἀμαθία ... καὶ ταπεινωτῆτι πολλῇ κυλινδομένους, Theaet. 172 c 8 οἶ ἐν δικαστηρίοις ... κυλινδομένου.

e 5  τὴν δεινότητα, 'the cleverness', 'the ingenuity'. So far as I can see, none of the editors take the word in this sense; but surely the point is just that the prison-house is ingeniously contrived so as to make the prisoner co-operate in his own imprisonment.

81 d' εἰσθήμερα ἐστὶν, sc. ὁ εἰργμός, 'that it is effected by means
of desire,' i.e. 'that it has desire as its instrument.' As we shall see, pleasures and pains, with which ἐπιθυμία is concerned, are the agents by which the soul is imprisoned (83 d 4; 84 a 4).

e 6 ὧς ἄν ... ἐκ τοῦ. This is an extremely rare construction in Attic prose, the nearest parallel being Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 8 καὶ διδάσκα τοῖς τροίτοις δακτύλους ὁχύνοντες τὴν φιάλην καὶ προσφέρουσιν, ὧς ἄν ἐνδοίεν τὸ ἐκπώμα εὐληπτότατα τῷ μέλλοντι πίνειν. It is equivalent in sense to ὅπως c. fut. ind. after verbs of 'ways and means' (the idea of contrivance being implied in δεινότητα). In other words, ὧς is a relative adverb of manner, and ἄν is to be taken closely with the optative. Tr. 'so as best to secure the prisoner's co-operation in his own imprisonment'.

83 a 1 τῶν δεδομένων: the MSS. have τῶν, but Heindorf's τοῦ restores the normal construction of συλλαμβάνειν, 'to co-operate' (dat. of the person with whom, gen. of the thing in which). Cp. Eur. Med. 946 συλλήψομαι δὲ τοῦδε σοι κάγῳ πόνου, Xen. Mem. ii. 2.12 ἵνα ... ἄγαθον σοι γίγνεται συλλήψεως, ib. 7. 32 ἄγαθὴ συλλήψεως τῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόνων.

a 2 οὗτο ... ἔχουσαν go together, 'in this state.'

a 3 παραμυθεῖται: cp. 70 b 2 n.

b 1 ὅτι ἄν ... τῶν ἄντων: here it is once more implied that both the objects of sense and the objects of thought are ἄντων. Cp. 79 a 6.

b 2 δὲ ἄλλων, opp. αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτήν, and virtually equivalent to διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

ἐν ἄλλων ἄν ἄλλο, opp. αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ, 'that which varies in varying conditions,' as opposed to τὸ δὲ ὧσαύτως ἔχου.

b 6 οὗτως emphasizes the preceding participles. Tr. 'It is just because she does not think it right to ... that she ...'

b 7 καὶ φόβων is omitted by T, the Petrie papyrus, and Iamblichus. It looks as if it had been inserted to make this clause symmetrical with the next, in which ἡ λυπηθῇ appears to have been inserted for a similar reason. Plato avoids exact symmetry of this sort, though his editors, ancient and modern, often foist it on him.

b 9 τοσοῦτον, here practically 'so small'.

c 1 ὁν: Iamblichus has ὧς, which would be more regular, but is to be rejected for that very reason. The partitive genitive is used as if only οἰδέν, not οἰδὲν τοσοῦτον, preceded.

c 3 καὶ οὐ λογίζεται αὐτῷ, 'and does not take it into account.'

c 5 ἀναγκάζεται ἀμα τε ... καὶ ... : the emphasis falls on ἄμα. A 76
belief in the reality of its object must arise simultaneously with any strong feeling of pleasure or pain. We have really to deal, therefore, with a wrong view as to what is real, which is another way of saying that goodness is knowledge.

c 8 (τά) seems necessary and could easily have been dropped by haplography after μάλιστα.

d 4 ἀναπλέα, 'with a rivet,' like Κράτος and Βία in the Prometheus, as Geddes suggests. It is pleasure and pain that rivet the fetters of the bodily prison-house.

d 9 οὖν: cp. 80 a 4 n.

καθαρός: Heindorf conjectured καθαρός, comparing 67 a 7; 80 e 2; 82 c 1; but the Petrie papyrus confirms the adverb.

d 10 ἀνάπλεα, 'contaminated,' 'tainted.' Cf. 67 a 5 n., and Symp. 211 εἰλικρινές, καθαρόν, ἄμεικτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάπλεον σαρκῶν τε ἄνθρωπων καὶ χρωμάτων. The feminine form is Ionic.

e 1 ἐμφύσεσθαι: cp. Tim. 42 a 3 ὅπτε δή σώμασιν ἐμφυτευθεῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης (ψυχαί).

e 5 οἱ δικαίως φιλοσαφεῖς, synonymous with οἱ ὁρθῶς φιλόσοφοι, 'those who deserve the name of philosophers.' Cp. 67 b 4 n.

e 6 κόσμοι, equivalent to σώφρονες. Cp. 68 e 2 n.

οὐχ ὤν ... ἐνεκά φασιν, 'not for the reason given by the mass of men' (cp. 82 c 5 sqq.). It is not necessary to discuss the precise nature of the ellipse here; for the meaning is plain. The Petrie papyrus omits φασιν, as Hermann originally proposed to do. This is the only case where it confirms a modern conjecture.

84 a 2 οὐ γὰρ, 'No, indeed.' It is better to punctuate after γὰρ than to take οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ together with the older editors and Riddell (Dig. § 156).

a 3 τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφιάν κτλ. We must subordinate and say 'that, while it is philosophy's business to release the soul, the soul should hand itself over to pleasures and pains to fasten its chains once more'.

a 4 αὐτῆς, 'of itself', 'of its own accord'. Cp. 64 a 5.

παραδιδόναι (cp. 82 c 4) is the correlative of παραλαμβάνειν (82 e 1 n.). Once more pleasures and pains are represented as the agents of the soul's imprisonment. The εἰργός is δὶ' ἐπιθυμίας (82 e 5).

a 5 ἐγκαταθέν, sc. τῷ σώματι. Cp. 62 b 3 n.

ἀνήνυτον ἐργον ... μεταξεριζόμενης, 'to engage in the endless task
of a Penelope handling her web in the opposite way.’ The vulgate μεταχειρίζομενη is a late conjecture and has nothing to commend it. I formerly read μεταχειρίζομενη with Peipers, which is certainly better (cp. R. G. Bury in Class. Rev. xx, p. 13). But μεταχειρίζομενη is the reading of BTW, attested by the Petrie papyrus and Iamblichus, and would not be a natural mistake. It would be safer to write τινός for τινά if any change were required; but the web is the real point of the metaphor, and the indefinite pronoun may attach itself to λεστόν for that reason.

a 7 τούτων, sc. τῶν ἐπίθυμων.

a 8 ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα: cp. 59 a 3 n.

tο ἄδεξαστον, ‘what is not the object of belief (δόξα),’ but of knowledge. The word is found only here in this sense. Cp. the similar use of ἀνόητον above 80 b 4.

b 3 ἀπηλλαξθαί, sc. οὔτεί, not οὔτεί δεῖν, as is shown by the nominative ἀφικομένη. The soul believes that after death she is done with all human ills.

b 4 οὐδὲν δεῖνων μὴ φοβηθῇ, ‘there is no danger of her fearing.’ Cp. Αριστ. 28 b 1 οὐδὲν δὲ δεῖνων μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῆ, ‘there is no fear of my being the last’, Gorg. 520 d 5 οὐδὲν δεῖνων αὐτῷ μῆποτε ἀδικηθῇ, Rep. 465 b 8 οὐδὲν δεῖνων μὴ ποτε . . . διχοστατής.

b 5 [ταύτα δ’ έπετθέωσασα]: I take this to be an explanation of, or more probably an ancient variant for, ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς. To change δ’ into γ’ with Stephanus and most editors is to hide the wound, not to heal it.

δημος μή . . . : cp. 77 b 4 π.

b 6 ἐν τῷ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος: i.e. ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος (70 a 2). The whole clause refers back to what Cebes said at 70 a.

Narrative interlude. Socrates is as ready as ever to hear objections to what he says (84 c 1—85 b 9).

This long interlude marks off the first part of the dialogue from the second, in which more serious objections have to be faced than those of όι πολλοί. There are scientific objections too.

c 2 πρὸς τῷ . . . λόγῳ ἵν, ‘was absorbed in the foregoing argument.’ Cp. Phaedr. 249 c 5 πρὸς γὰρ ἐκείνους ἐδε ἐστώ, d 1 πρὸς τῷ θείῳ νεγώ-μενος, Rep. 567 a 1 ἵνα . . . πρὸς τῷ καθ’ ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζονται εἴναι, Dem. 19. 127 δὸς πρὸς τῷ λήμματι.

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c 3 ὃς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, lit. 'as he appeared to look at', 'to judge from his appearance'. In this usage the exepicetic ἰδεῖν means much the same as τὴν ὄψιν. Cp. Tim. 52 εἰ παντοδαπὴν ἰδεῖν φαίνεσθαι, Eur. Her. 1002 εἰκόν, ὃς ὅραν ἐφαίνετο, Παλλάς.

c 4 σμικρὸν... διελεγέοθην, 'went on talking in a low voice' (not 'for a little'). The opposite of (σ')μικρὸν λέγειν, &c., is μέγα λέγειν, &c. 'to speak loud.'

c 6 ἐχει ὑποτιθα και ἀντιλαβάς: 'it admits of, suggests, gives room for many misgivings and is open to many forms of attack' (ἀντιλαβή, like ἀντιληψις, 87α 6, is a metaphor from wrestling, 'the opponent's grip').

d 3 εὑπορήσειν, 'that you will find a way out of your difficulty,' εὑπαρία being the opposite of ἀπαρία.

d 5 τάλαν, 'for some time.' Cp. 63 d 5 n.

e 2 μῆ... διάκειμαι of fear for something in the present, whereas d 7 μῆ... ἦ refers to the future, 'lest it should prove to be'. It is incorrect to say that the present indicative implies certainty.


a 1 κάλλιστα: this is Blomfield's correction of the MS. μάλιστα, and is now known to be the reading of W, though the first hand has written καὶ μάλιστα above the line. We cannot defend μάλιστα by interpreting it as 'loudest'. That would be μέγιστον, which I had conjectured before the reading of W was known.

a 2 τῶν θεῶν: Apollo, as we presently learn, and, in particular, Apollo Hyperboreus who, as I have shown in E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 97, n. 3, was the chief god of the Pythagoreans (cp. 60 d 2 n.). Aristophanes too was aware that the swans sang to Apollo. Cp. Birds 769 τοῦδε κύκνοι... συμμυγὴ βαίνῃ, ὅμοι πτεροίς κρέκοντες, ίάκχον 'Ἀπάλλω... ἀχθον ἐφεξάμεναι παρ' 'Ἐξρον παταμών.

a 3 τὸ αὐτῶν δῖος τοῦ θανάτου, 'their own fear of death.' (Some editors wrongly take τοῦ θανάτου with καταφείδονται.)

a 5 ἐξαδειν, 'to sing a song of departure.' There is some reason to
believe that the last song of the chorus was spoken of as τὰ ἕξωδικά as well as τὸ ἕξιδιον. The scholiast on Ar. Ἡσαῦς 270 says so, though the text is generally emended to τὰ ἕξωδικά, and Plotinus, Ἐφ. 6. 9. 8 (p. 1404. 10) says οἷον χορὸς ἑξιδιῶν. Cp. Polyb. xxxi. 20. 1 μάθην ἐξῆσας τὸ κύκνιον, Plut. Ἱμπτ. 161 c (of Arion) ἐξῆσαι δὲ καὶ τὸν βίον τελευτῶν, καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι κατὰ τοῦτο τῶν κύκνων ἄγεννέστερος.

a 7 ἦ τε ἄνθισιν καὶ χελαθίον καὶ ὅ ἐποψ (note how Plato avoids the formalism of the article, Riddell, Dig. § 237). These are the three birds of Attic legend, Procne, Philomela, and Tereus. Procne, not 'Philomel', is the nightingale in Athenian legend.

b 3 διαφέροντος ἦ, 'in a higher degree than,' cp. below 95 c 3. The construction διαφέρειν ἦ is as regular as διαφέρειν c. gen.

b 5 τερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ: we know from the Ἀπολογία that Socrates regarded himself as consecrated to Apollo by the answer given to Chaerephon at Delphi. The view that Plato invented this does not merit discussion. With the expression ὁμόδουλος cp. Ἀρ. 23 c 1 διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

b 6 οὐ χεῖρον... ἐχεῖν, 'that I possess the art in no inferior degree', 'that I am not worse provided than they are with the gift of prophecy at my Master's hands'. Cp. Hdt. iii. 130 φλαύρως ἐχεῖν τὴν τέχνην.

b 8 τοῦτον γ' ἐνεκά, 'so far as that is concerned.' Cp. 106 d 2.

b 9 Ἀθηναίων: the absence of the article is normal, and the position of the word suggests the official style.

The Objections of Simmias and Cebes (85 b 10—95 e 6).

(1) The Objection of Simmias (85 b 10—86 d 4).

c 3 τὸ μὲν σαφῆς εἶδαί, 'sure knowledge.' As we have seen (62 b 5), Plato represents Socrates as speaking with a certain reserve as to the details of the doctrine.

c 4 μὴ ὦχι... καὶ μὴ...: the negatives are not co-ordinate. The first is dependent on μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἄνδρός (which implies a negative and therefore takes μὴ ὦχι). The second merely introduces a negative statement of παντὶ τρόπῳ ἔλεγχειν. Tr. 'To fail to test them in every way without desisting till one is utterly exhausted by examining them on every side, shows a very poor spirit'.
c 7 ἡ μαθὲν...ἥ εὐρέων, 'either to learn (from another) or find out (for oneself).’ This contrast had an almost proverbial currency. Cp. Soph. fr. 731 τὰ μὲν διδακτὰ μαθάνω, τὰ δ’ εὐρετὰ | ζητῶ τὰ δ’ εὐκτὰ παρὰ θεῶν ἡγησάμην. So below 99 c 8.

c 8 εἰ ταῦτα ἄδωνατον: cp. Parm. 160 a 2 ταῦτα δὲ ἄδωνατον ἐφάνη.

d 3 λόγον θείον τινός: this must refer to the Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine of the soul. It is quite in keeping with all we can make out as to the history of Pythagoreanism that Simmias and Cebes should feel regretfully that they can no longer accept the λόγος of their society. We are just about to learn that they had adopted a view of the soul which was wholly inconsistent with it. I assume that Heindorf is right in deleting ἦ; for otherwise the whole phrase must go. The conjunction ἦ is never used to introduce an explanation. Even, however, if ἦ λόγον θείον τινός is an adscript, or a question asked by some reader, it gives a perfectly correct explanation of the meaning, as is shown by c 9 τῶν ἄνθρωπινών λόγων.

d 7 πρὸς ἐμαυτόν: cp. 95 e 7 πρὸς ἐμαυτόν τι σκεψάμενος.

e 3 ἐρωτε, sc. αὐ φαίνεται ἰκανῶς εἰρησθαί.

περὶ ἀρμονιάς, ‘with regard to the tuning of a lyre and its strings.’ It is important to remember here that ἀρμονία does not mean what we call ‘harmony’. It has its literal sense of ‘tuning’ in a certain key or mode, from which its other senses, ‘scale’ and ‘octave’, are easily derived. What we call ‘harmony’ is in Greek συμφωνία. Cp. 86 a 1 ἐν τῇ ἤμοσμένῃ λόρᾳ, ‘in the tuned lyre.’

a 3 κατὰξι φερεῖ to the framework of the lyre, διατίμῃ and διαρρήξῃ ('cut and break') to the strings. Schanz (Stud. p. 36) regards διατίμῃ as an adscript to διαρρήξῃ. It is true that in a 7 we have only διερρογμῖνων and not διαστερημένων, but that is just Plato's way of avoiding formal symmetry.

a 6 αὐθεντία...ἀν εἰ: Bekker brackets ἄν, which restores the normal construction on the assumption that εἰ is indirect speech for ἐστὶ. But the direct speech might very well be ἄν εἰ, which would remain unchanged in oratio obliqua.

b 2 ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη...εἰναι: the original protasis εἰ τις διαχωρίζετο
... *ως κτλ.* is resumed, but in *oratio recta*, as is natural after the parenthesis. Of course, *φαίη* still depends upon *εί* in a 4, but has no effect upon the construction. It is the parenthetical *φησίν, inquit*, adapted to the construction of the long protasis. We might write *ἀλλὰ (φαίη) ἀνάγκη κτέ.*

5 καὶ γὰρ ὑπ’ κτλ.: Simmias here interrupts himself. He thinks he may as well drop the imaginary *τις* and state plainly that the comparison of the soul to a ἀρμονία is their own doctrine. The hesitation with which he does so is responsible for the cumbrousness of the sentence, and is the natural consequence of the feelings which he expressed in the interlude.

καὶ αὐτῶν σε κτλ.: it is assumed that Socrates is familiar with the recent developments of Pythagoreanism, though he may not accept them.

6 ὑπολομβάνομεν: who are ‘we’ this time? Most editors suppose that no particular school is meant, and that the theory under discussion was simply a popular belief. This is most improbable. It has all the marks of being a medical theory, and we now know that Philolaus was a medical writer (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 322). Further, the doctrine was held at a later date by Aristoxenus, who was acquainted with the last of the Pythagoreans (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 320), who were disciples of Philolaus like Simmias. We shall see below (88 d 3) that Echecrates, another disciple of Philolaus, had accepted it too. I have pointed out elsewhere (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 339 sqq.) how such a doctrine would naturally arise from the attempt to adapt Pythagoreanism to the views of the Sicilian school of medicine, which were based on the Empedoclean doctrine of the four ‘elements’ identified with the ‘opposites’ hot and cold, wet and dry (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 235). Further confirmation of this view will be found in the following notes. Aristotle says (*De An.* A. 4. 407 b 27 καὶ ἀλλή δὲ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς, πιθανὴ μὲν πολλὰς συνειδήσεις ἂττον τῶν λεγομένων, λόγους δὲ ὁπερ εὐθὺς δεδωκάτα καὶ τοῖς ἐν κοινῷ γνωμένοις λόγοις (i. e. dialectical discussions) ἀρμονίαν γὰρ τινα αὐτὴν λέγουσιν καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρμονίαν κράσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκείσθαι εἰς ἐναντίων.

7 ὁπερ ἐντειμίνου κτλ. The body is thought of as an instrument tuned to a certain pitch, the opposites hot and cold, wet and dry taking the place of high and low (*-animationis καὶ βαρύς*) in music.
NOTES

b 8 καὶ συνεχομένου, 'and held together.' It is the presence of the opposites hot and cold, wet and dry which keeps the body together, so long as neither opposite prevails unduly over the other (cp. Zeno, ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 29 καὶ ψυχήν κράμα υπάρχειν ἐκ τῶν προερημένων (the four opposites) κατά μηδενὸς τούτων ἐπικράτησιν).

ὑπὸ θερμοῦ κτλ. This was the characteristic doctrine of the Sicilian school. Cp. Anon. Lond. xx. 25 (from Meno's Ἰατρικά) Φιλιστίων δ' οίκται ἐκ τεττάρων ἰδεῶν συνεστάναι ἡμᾶς, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐκ τεττάρων στοιχείων πυρός, ἄερος, ὠδατος, γῆς. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἐκάστου δυνάμεως, τοῦ μὲν πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν, τοῦ δὲ ἄερος τὸ ψυχρόν, τοῦ δὲ ὠδατος τὸ ὕγρον, τῆς δὲ γῆς τὸ ἔρημον. Cp. the speech of the physician Eryximachus in Symp. 186 δ ἔστι δὲ ἐχθρόσ τὰ ἐναντιῶτα, ψυχρὸν θερμῶν, πυκνῶν γλυκεῖ, ἕρημον δύρης ... τούτους ἐπιστηθεὶς ἐρωτα ἐμποίησαι καὶ ὁμοίων ὃ ἣμετέρος πρόγονος Ἀσκληπιόδ ... σύνεσθησν τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην.

b 9 κρασίν, temperaturam. The word was properly used of the mixture of wine and water in the κρασίν in certain fixed proportions. This seems to have been an earlier way of describing what the later Pythagoreans called a ἀρμονία. Parmenides (fr. 16) already speaks of the κρασίς μελέων, and Diogenes Laertius ix. 29 ascribes the theory to Zeno (cp. above b 8 π). The whole doctrine of the 'temperaments' is a development of this. Eryximachus (Symp. 188 a 1) uses both terms in connexion with climate (ἡ τῶν ὄρων τοῦ ἐναντιοῦ σύστασις) which is good ἐπειδὰν ... πρὸς ἄλληλα ... τὰ τέ θερμὰ καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ ἔρημα καὶ δύρα ... ἀρμονίαν καὶ κρασίν λάβῃ σάφρονα.

c 2 εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει κτλ., 'if then our soul is just a tuning.' After the explanation given in the last parenthesis, the protasis is resumed (hence οὖν) in another form. For the present εἰ τις διωχυρίζωτο κτλ. is dropped.

c 3 ὅταν χαλασθῇ: χαλάν is a regular synonym of ἀνιέτω, relaxare, to loosen a string. The opposite is ἐπιτείνειν, intendere.

c 6 ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις, 'in musical notes.' In Attic the word φθόγγος is practically confined to the meanings 'note' (whether in music or the notes of birds) and 'accent'.

d 1 ὅρα οὖν: this introduces the apodosis, which also contains, in the words εὰν τις ἀξιοί, a reminiscence of the original protasis εἰ τις διωχυρίζοιτο.
b 5  ἀνθρώπου ὕφαντον πρεσβύτου, simply 'an old weaver'. It is idiomatic to add ἀνθρώπως to the names of trades. In Scots we might say a 'webster body'.

b 6  ὅτι σὺκ ἀπόλωλεν κτλ., 'that the man is not dead, but is safe and sound somewhere.' Of course this is not supposed to be an argument for the continued existence of the weaver's soul, but is meant to disprove the fact of his death in the ordinary sense of the word. The weaver corresponds to the soul, and the garment to the body.

b 7  σῶς: all MSS. have ἱσως, but it is difficult to reject Forster's correction σῶς in view of the next line and c 5 below.

αὐτὸς ὑφηγάμενος: this touch is not necessary to the argument, nor indeed is it strictly necessary that the old man should be a weaver at all; but Cebes has in view a theory of the soul weaving the body as its garment, which is pretty nearly the opposite of the view that it is the ᾱρμονία or κράσις of the elementary opposites. The latter makes the soul a resultant of the bodily organization, the former makes it the organizing principle. The view that the body is the garment of the soul is primitive (cp. the Orphic χιτῶν, and Empedocles, fr. 126 Diels σαρκῶν ἀλλόγνωτι περιστέλλουσα χιτῶν, E. Gr. Ph.² p. 258, n. 1); but the theory of Simmias is essentially Heraclitean. Such eclecticism was characteristic of the time.

c 1  ἀπιστοίη is Heindorf's correction of the MS. ἀπιστῶν, which seems to involve an incredible anacoluthon; seeing that ἀνερωτῇ must have the τἰς in b 4, not that in b 8, for its subject.

c 3  τίνος strikes me as a not very successful attempt at botching the sentence after ἀπιστοίη had been corrupted into ἀπιστῶν. The argument surely requires that the person asked, not 'some one', should give the answer, and we can easily supply αὐτῷ from the context.

c 6  τὸ δὲ(ἐ), 'whereas,' cum tamen. This is a fairly common Platonic idiom (cp. 109 d 8), though it can hardly be said that it has been satisfactorily explained.

c 7  πᾶς [γὰρ] ἀν ἀπολλάβῃ, 'any one would retort,' rather than 'every one would understand'. The γὰρ is more likely to have been inserted in B than dropped in TW. The asyndeton is quite correct.

ὅτι εἴηθες λέγει κτλ., 'that this is a silly argument.' The verb is used twice over in order to make the construction personal.
c 8 *óutos, iste, 'this weaver of yours.'

d 4 *ψυχή πρὸς σῶμα, 'the relation of soul to body will admit of the same comparison.'


d 7 *ἀν φαίη: cp. 87 a 7 π.

d 8 *εἰ γὰρ ἴδει κτλ., 'for, even if the body is in a state of flux and is perishing while the man is still living, yet the soul always weaves afresh the web that is worn out.' This is a parenthesis intended to justify the statement that each soul wears out many bodies. The optative is regular in the parentheses of indirect speech, and *ἄλλα means *at. For the theory (which is just that of modern physiology) cp. Tim. 43 a 4 τὰς τῆς ἀθανάτου *ψυχῆς περιόδους ἐνέδουν εἰς ἐπίρρυτον σῶμα καὶ ἀπόρρυτον. It is essentially Heraclitean (E. Gr. Ph. 2 pp. 161 sqq.).

e 3 *τυχέν ... ἔχουσαν, 'it must have at the time.'

e 4 *τὴν φῶσιν τῆς ἀσθενεῖας, 'its natural weakness.' Such words as *φῶσι are often used with the genitive to form a mere periphrasis for the noun which they govern, but their proper meaning may emerge more or less, as here.

e 5 *ἐπιδεικνύοι ... διοίκετο: the construction reverts to d 5 *μέτρι* ἄν μοι φαίνομεν λέγειν, ὡς ... All this is still the speech of *ἄπιστῶν. There is a much stronger instance of an oblique optative with nothing to depend on below 95 d 3.

8 a 1 *εἰ γὰρ τις κτλ. These words are addressed, not (as Heindorf and Stallbaum thought) by Cebes to Simmias, but by the supposed objector to Cebes. 'Even if,' he says, 'we were to make a still greater concession to the man who uses this argument (τῷ λέγοντι) than the concession which you (Cebes) mention' (above 87 a 1 sqq.).

a 6 *αὐτό, 'the thing in question,' i.e. the soul. Cp. below 109 a 9.

a 7 *ψυχὴ (τὴν ψυχὴν W) is added for clearness after γιγνομένην. The more regular construction would be to say either *αὐτὴν or γιγνόμενην.

a 8 *μηκέτι συγχωρέι: these words continue the protasis and still depend on *εἰ, 88 a 1. 'If, having granted this, he were to stop short of making the further admission that . . .'

πονεῖν was technical for *λυπεῖσθαι in fifth-century philosophy. Cp. Anaxagoras (quoted in Aristotle's Ethics 1154 b 7) ὅτι πονεῖ τὰ ζῶν.
Dramatic Interlude. *The effect of the objections* (88 c 1—89 a 8).

The importance of this break in the argument is marked by the fact that it takes us back to Phlius and Echecrates, and that the dramatic form is resumed. It has to be shown that current Pythagorean views about the soul are inadequate and that we must go deeper.

c 4 *eis ἀμπτίαν καταβάλειν:* cp. *Phileb.* 15 e 4 *eis ἀπορίαν αὐτῶν ... καταβάλλων.*

οὗ μένον τοῖς ... ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ ... *The change of construction is characteristic.*

c 6 *μὴ ... εἰμεν ... ἢ:* the change of mood is due to the fact that the first verb refers to the present, the second to the future. The opt. *μὴ εἰμεν* is the indirect form of *μὴ ... ἐσμεν,* while *μὴ ... ἢ* means ‘lest they should prove to be’. The subj. here might also have become opt., but this would have obscured the difference of meaning. For other instances cp. Riddell, Dig. § 89.

d 1 *ἐπέρχεται,* ‘it is borne in upon me.’

d 2 *ὡς ... ἄν:* exclamations, like interrogations, may be conveyed by a participial phrase.

d 4 *ἀντιλαμβάνεται:* this is a different application of the metaphor from wrestling, explained 84 c 6 n. *Cp. Parm.* 130 e 2 *οὗ οὐ καὶ τὸν ἀντεὶληπταὶ φιλοσοφία ὡς ἐτί ἀντιλήψεται.*

d 9 *μετήλθε τὸν λόγον:* *cp. 76 e 9 n.* *The λόγος* is the game which is hunted. *So Meno* 74 d 3 *εἰ οὐν ὁσπερ ἐγώ μετήλθε τὸν λόγον,* *Soph.* 252 b 8 *ἐρι τοῖς ἄν ... καταγελαστότατα μετώπων τὸν λόγον.* That this is the meaning appears from the equivalent phrase *διόσκεω τὸν λόγον Theaet.* 166 d 8.
is internal object of ἄχθομενος.

Here we have a different, but almost equally common, metaphor.

In Timaeus, ἀγαμένων: Plato often uses ἄγαμαι of the effect produced on Socrates by his interlocutors.

**Protreptic interlude (89a 9—91c 5).** A Warning against μυσολογία.

This is imitated in Xenophon's *Apology* 28 τοῦ δὲ λέγεται καταψήσαντα αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰπεῖν κτλ. In Xenophon, however, it is the head of Apollodorus that Socrates strokes. This is pointless; for he would hardly wear his hair long like the youthful Phaedo. It appears from the following words that Socrates wishes to see how Phaedo will look with his hair cropped as a sign of mourning.

*’Αλλὰ τι; ‘What then?’* Heindorf shows from Aristophanes that this was a regular colloquial formula.

The metaphor here implied is the same as in βοηθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ, 88 e 2.

It... με διαφεύγου: here we have the other metaphor, the hunting of the λόγοι.

The proverb is more fully explained in *Euthyd*. 297 c 1 τῶν Ἡρακλήσ: the poetical form (cp. Soph. *Trach.* 476) is purposely
used to suggest a poetical reminiscence (Vahlen, *Opusc.* i, p. 485).

d 1 μεσόλογοι, 'haters of discourses' or 'arguments' (not 'reason'), as appears from d 3 λόγους µεσόλογοι. Minucius Felix, *Octav.* xiv. 4, quoted by Geddes, translates quite correctly *igitur nobis providendum est ne odio identidem sermonum omnium laboremus.


d 5 ἄνευ τέχνης: the meaning of this is made clear by e 5 ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰνθρώπεια.

e 2 οὖδενός οὖδέν υγίες: cp. 90 c 3, Ar. *Plut.* 362 ὃς οὐδέν ἀτεχνώς υγίες ἐστιν οὐδένος. So *Cra* 440 c 6 καὶ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄντων καταγιγώσκειν ὃς οὐδέν υγίες οὖνδένος. For the meaning of υγίες cp. 69 b 8 π.

a 1 σφύδρα qualifies χρηστούς καὶ πονηροὺς, not ὀλίγους, as is shown by a 4 τῶν σφύδρα σμικρῶν καὶ μεγάλων.

a 8 τὰ . . . ἀκρα τῶν ἐσχάτων: the ἐσχάτα are opposed to τὰ μεταξὺ, and the ἄκρα are the extremes of these.

b 2 φανήσαι: cp. 72 c 1 π.

b 4 ταύτη μὲν οὐχ . . . ἄλλ' ἵκεν, ἓ . . ., 'that is not the point of comparison but this . . .'

b 7 τῆς περὶ τούς λόγους τέχνης: the term Logic (λογική, sc. τέχνη) originated from phrases like this, though neither ἵ λογικὴ nor τὰ λογικὰ are used till a far later date. Logic is thought of here as an art of dealing with arguments, just as the art of life (ἵ περὶ τὰ ἄνθρωπεια τέχνη 89 e 5) teaches us to deal with men.

b 8 ὃν, 'being so.' We cannot take ὃν here as equivalent to 'being true' with some editors. If anything, it is ψευδός that must be supplied.

b 9 καὶ μάλιστα 87 ἢ κτλ. The protasis which began at b 6 ἐπειδὰν is forgotten and never resumed.

οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίπαντες: the true originator of ἀντιλογικοὶ λόγοι was Zeno of Elea, who was some twenty years older than Socrates (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 358). From quite another point of view Protagoras maintained δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ ἄπαντος πράγματος, ἀντικειμένους ἄλληλοις, οἷς καὶ συνηρώτα, πρῶτος τούτο πράξα (Diog. Laert. ix. 51). Cp. 101 e 2.

c 4 ἀτεχνῶς ὀστερ ἐν Εὐριτῷ: the current in the Euripus was said to change its direction seven times a day (Strabo ix. 403). In reality
the παλίρρωτα is more irregular, being partly tidal and partly due to seiches. Cp. Pauly-Wissowa, vi, col. 1283. The current is strong enough to stop a steamer. For ἀτεχνῶς introducing such expressions cp. 59 a 4 n.

c 5 ἀνω κάτω στρέφεται κτλ. The language of this sentence is just that which is elsewhere used of the followers of Heraclitus (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 417 n. 3). Cp. Crat. 440 c 6 αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἀντων καταγγέλσκειν ὡς σύδεν ὑμῖς σύδενός, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὅσπερ κεράμια ἔμε, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὅσπερ αἱ κατάρροι νοσάντες ἀνθρωποὶ σῶς οἰσθαί καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακείσθαι, ὅποι βεῦματός τε καὶ κατάρρου πάντα χρήματα ἐξεσθαί. Now, in the Theaetetus Plato makes Socrates say that Protagoras justified his πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπος by basing it on the doctrine of Heraclitus. It seems, then, that Protagoras is mainly intended here. It is certain, at any rate, that Plato would not have made Socrates refer in this way either to Antisthenes or Euclides; for both are supposed to be present.

c 9 δὴ τινος: the particle δὴ follows the interrogative τις but precedes the indefinite τις. Cp. 107 d 7; 108 c 1; 115 d 4.

d 1 ἐπιτα marks inconsistency or inconsequence by emphasizing the preceding participle.

d 9 μὴ παρίωμεν, 'let us not admit' (from παρίημι).

e 2 πολύ μᾶλλον: we must supply ἐννοῶμεν or some such word from the context.

γ 2 a 2 οἱ πάνω ἀπαίδευτοι: here we have the beginnings of the characteristic Aristotelian use of ἀπαίδευσια for ignorance of Logic. Aristotle applies the word to the followers of Antisthenes (Met. Z. 3. 1045 b 24 αἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ αἱ αὐτῶς ἀπαίδευτοι), but no such reference is admissible here. Cp. 90 c 5 n.

a 3 φιλονίκως: the MSS., as usual, have -ει- for -ι-, but it is very doubtful whether there ever was such a word as φιλονίκως, 'strife-loving,' and Plato certainly derives φιλονικος from νίκη in Rep. 58r b 2 (see Adam, in loc.). In every passage where the word occurs in Plato the meaning 'victory-loving' is appropriate. Here the sense is clearly to be arguing for victory rather than truth.

a 5 καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔθεντο, 'what they themselves have laid down,' their own θέσεις.
NOTES

a 8 ei μὴ εἰπὴ πάρεργον, 'except incidentally.' Cp. Polit. 286d 5 πλὴν
ei (ei μὴ Τ) πάρεργον τι.

b 1 ὁς πλεονεκτικῶς: Socrates playfully suggests that he is taking an
unfair advantage. It is 'Heads I win; tails you lose.'

b 3 ἀλλ' οὖν... γε, 'at any rate.' The emphatic word is placed
between ἀλλ' οὖν and γε in this combination.

b 4 ἤττον... ὀδυράμενοι, 'I shall be less likely to distress the
company by lamentations.'

b 5 ἀνοια, 'folly.' Most editors follow Stephanus in reading ἀγνοια,
apparently without MS. authority. B has διάνοια, a mistake due to
the resemblance of Α and Δ. Schanz's ἡ δὲ δὴ ἀγνοια implies a much
less likely corruption.

c 3 εὐλαβοῦμενοι is omitted in B, but this may be an accident.

c 5 τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλείπων: cp. the description of the oratory of
Pericles by Eupolis (fr. 94 Kock) οὕτως ἐκήλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ἰδιτόρων |
τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειψε τοῖς ἄκρομένοις.

Reply to the objection of Simmias (91c 6—95a 3).

The objection of Simmias is fully dealt with, but that of Cebes is
found to raise a larger question, and leads up to the Third Proof of
Immortality.

c 7 Σιμμιας μὲν γὰρ κτλ. The two views are resumed and carefully
distinguished. There is (1) the view that the soul is the ἀρμονία of
the body and must therefore perish even before the body, and
(2) the view that the soul weaves for itself many bodies, but perishes
with, or even before, the last of them.

c 8 ὃμως... ὅν, 'in spite of its being.' The adv. ὃμως is 'attracted'
by the participle.

d 1 ἐν ἀρμονίας εἴδει οὖν, a periphrasis which only differs from ἀρμονία
οὖν by being more emphatic. Cp. above 87e 4 τὴν φύσιν τῆς
ἀθένειας.

d 3 τὸδε ἔθηλον παντὶ, sc. φύσιν to be supplied from συγχρόων.

d 7 ἀπολλύμενον οὐδὲν παύεται, 'is unceasingly perishing.' Cp. 87d 8
ei γὰρ ρέοι τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἀπολλύμενο ἐτί ξύντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Dis-
tinguish οὐδὲν παύεται, finem nullum facit, from οὐ παύεται.

92 a 1 ἐνδεδήναι: cp. 62b 3n.

a 5 ἀλλο ποτὲ τι: I now observe that Heindorf suggested this read-
ing, though he did not print it in his text.
NOTES

a 6 'Αλλὰ ἀνάγκη κτλ. It is shown first that the view of the soul as a ἀρμονία is inconsistent with the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις which Simmias accepts. A ἀρμονία could exist before the body of which it is the attunement just as little as it could survive it. This brings out the fundamental inconsistency of the later Pythagorean doctrine.

b 1 σαυτοῦ λέγοντος: for the phrase cp. 92 e 2; 96 e 7. It is mere superstition to read αὐτοῦ because B has αὐτοὺ.

b 4 συμβαλλεῖ: the regular term for the consequences of a ὑπόθεσις. Cp. d 6 n.

b 5 εἴδος τε καὶ σῶμα: the two terms are synonymous. Cp. 73 a 1 n.

b 8 φ ἀπεικάζεις: i.e. οἷον φ ἀπεικάζεις, 'like the thing you are comparing it to.' Cp. Rep. 349 d 10 τοιούτος ἢρα ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἰστερ ἐστίν;
will be sufficient to say here that it is a statement of which the truth is postulated and from which we deduce its consequences (τὰ συμβαίνουσα). The phrase literally means 'the argument proceeded (ὁ λόγος . . . εἰρηται) by means of a hypothesis worthy of acceptance'.

d7  ἀξίας ἀποδέξασθαι: we are not told here, nor were we told above, why the hypothesis in question is worthy of acceptance. We only know that Cebeus and Simmias accepted it at once. The position of the argument, then, is this: Simmias declares that he cannot give up the doctrine that μάθησις is ἀνάμνησις so long as he accepts the hypothesis, and this he will not give up.

ἐρρήθη γάρ ποιν κτλ. The ὑπόθεσις is given formally above 76 d 7 εἰ . . . ἔστιν δ ἄριστον ἀεὶ, καλῶν τε τί καὶ ἄγαθων καὶ πάσα ἡ τοιαύτη αὐτικία . . . Now it has been shown that we refer all our sensations to this standard, and that this means that our soul already possesses it and rediscovers it in the process of learning. From this it followed in turn that our soul must have existed before entering into a human body. These steps have been rigorously demonstrated (ικανός ἀποδέκειται), and therefore, so long as we accept the ὑπόθεσις, we must accept the conclusion.

d8  ἄσπερ αὐτῆς ἔστιν κτλ.: i.e. the pre-existence of the soul is as certain as the fact that the reality which bears the name of τὸ ἐστὶ belongs to it (cp. 76 e 1 ὑπάρχονταν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὐσίαν). This is the interpretation of Wytenbach and Heindorf. Most recent editors adopt Mudge's emendation ἄσπερ αὐτῆ ἔστιν κτλ. That would, no doubt, give a correct sense ('as certainly as the reality itself which bears the name of ἐστὶ exists'), and would even be a more accurate statement of the ultimate ὑπόθεσις. But αὐτῆς ἔστιν serves to remind us of the point on which the whole argument turns, namely that this οὐσία is really the soul's original possession, and that what we call learning is really ὀκείαν ἑπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνει (75 e 5). For the form of expression cp. Theaet. 160 c 7 τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεὶ ἔστιν (ἡ ἐμὴ αὐτοθεσίας).

e1  ταύτην, sc. τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. There is no doubt about the conclusion (τὸ συμβαίνον) being correctly demonstrated; what Simmias says here is that he firmly believes himself to be justified (ὁρθὸς) in accepting the ὑπόθεσις which forms the major premise.

e 4  Τι δὲ . . . τῆς; the following argument proceeds on independent
lines, and is based upon the nature of ἀρμονία itself. Socrates first gets Cebes to make two admissions. These are (1) that every ἀρμονία is determined by its component elements, (2) that no ἀρμονία admits of degrees.

e 4 δοκεῖ σα κτλ. The first ὀμολόγημα (92 e 4—93 a 10). Every ἀρμονία is determined by its component elements. The note which anything will give out depends entirely upon what it is made of. It does not lead; it follows.

3 a 8 Παλλοῦ . . . δεῖ: the subject is ἀρμονία.

ἐναντία... κινηθῆναι... ἢ φθεγγασθαί, 'to move (vibrate) or give out a sound in opposition to its parts,' i.e. to the tension and relaxation which produces it, as explained below 94 c 3.

a 11 Τί δε; κτλ. The second ὀμολόγημα (93 a 11—b 7). No ἀρμονία admits of degree. A string is either in tune or it is not. To use the language of the Φιλέδος, ἀρμονία is a form of πέρας and does not admit τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἢττον.

σύντως... ὃς ἂν ἀρμασθῇ, 'just as it is tuned,' i.e. according as it is tuned to the fourth (διὰ τεσσάρων), the fifth (διὰ πέντε), or the octave (διὰ πασῶν). Modern editors suppose the meaning to be just the opposite and vainly try to explain in what sense one ἀρμονία can be more a ἀρμονία than another; but the meaning is stated quite clearly below 93 d 2. Olympiodorus, representing the school tradition, is quite explicit: ὑποσίδεται ὑ τ ἐναι ἀρμονίαν ἀρμονίας πλέω μηδὲ ἑλάττω, ἄλλα μηδὲ μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἢττον.

a 14 μᾶλλον... καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον: Olympiodorus refers the first term to pitch (ἐπίτασις and ἀνεος) and the second to the intervals. If a string is in tune it cannot be made more in tune by tightening or loosening. Nor is it correct to say that the octave is more of a ἀρμονία than the fifth or the fifth than the fourth.

b 1 εἰπὲρ ἐνδέχεται τοῦτο γίνεσθαι, 'supposing this possible,' a plain indication that it is not possible. Socrates is only explaining what would be implied in saying that one ἀρμονία is more a ἀρμονία than another. It would mean that it was more tuned, which is absurd; for, as we learn from Ref. 349 e 11 the musician, in tuning a lyre, will not be willing μουσικῷ ἀνδρῶς ἐν τῇ ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χορδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἄξιοῦν πλέον ἑχεῖν.

b 2 ήττων τε καὶ ἑλάττων: some inferior MSS. read ἢττων τε, which is more symmetrical, but the evidence is against it.

95
b 4 Ἡ οὖν κτλ. That being so, we must further admit that, if the soul is a ἀρμονία, no soul can be more or less a soul than another. Socrates does not express a view one way or the other on this point. He only wishes an admission from Simmias that, on his ἱπποδησις, it must be so.

'εστὶ... ἄστε... So below 103 e 2. Cp. Lat. est ut.

b 5 μᾶλλον ἔτεραν ἔτερας: some editors bracket μᾶλλον here, and it is in a sense redundant. We may say that it is more fully expressed by the words ἐτί πλέον... ἔτερον.

b 8 Φέρε δὴ κτλ. Socrates now proceeds to make use of the two ὀμολογήματα, but in the reverse order. We have seen that, if the soul is a ἀρμονία, no soul can be more or less a soul than another, i.e. more or less a ἀρμονία. But goodness is also a ἀρμονία, and souls differ in that one is better than another, which would imply that one ἀρμονία is more or less of a ἀρμονία than another, which is absurd.

c 3 τι... ὅντα; 'being what?' We can say τι ἐστι ταῦτα; and the question may be asked by a participle in Greek. We must render 'What will he say that these things are which are in our souls?' (εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς go together).

c 6 τὴν μὲν ἡμῶνθαί κτλ. Are we to say that both the good and the bad soul are ἀρμονίαι, but that the good soul also has a ἀρμονία and is in tune, while the bad soul has none and is out of tune? If we say that the soul is a tuning, we shall have to say that a tuning may be tuned or untuned.

d 2 τοῦτο δ' ἐστι τὸ ὀμολογημα, 'this is just our admission.' Here we have an explicit statement that our admission was that no ἀρμονία can be more or less a ἀρμονία than another. Editors who do not see this are obliged to bracket ἀρμονίαιs in d 4, or to explain it unnaturally as 'the particular harmony which is the soul'.

d 6 τὴν δὲ γε, sc. ἀρμονίαν. The application of this to ψυχή only begins at d 12. The point here made depends on 93 a 14, where it was shown that being more or less tuned would involve being more or less a ἀρμονία, which is absurd.

d 9 ἐστὶν ὅτι πλέον... μετέχει; 'does it partake more in —?' Here ὅτι is acc. neut. of ὅτις. Cp. e 7 ἄρ' ἄν τι πλέον κακίας... μετέχει; 'it is the right account of the
matter,' 'to put the matter correctly.' If the soul is a ἀρμονία, no soul can be better than another (for no ἀρμονία can be more in tune than another). Indeed, no soul can be bad at all (for no ἀρμονία can be out of tune).

a 12 πάσχειν ἰν ταύτα, 'Do you think this would happen to our argument if our ὑπόθεσις were right?' Here the συμβαίναντα are inadmissible, and therefore the ὑπόθεσις is destroyed (ἀναφείται). For the use of πάσχειν in dialectic cp. Part. 128 d 4 ταύτα βουλό-μενα δηλοῦν, ὡς ἕτε γελοιότερα πάσχαι ἰν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, ἐν πολλά ἑστιν, ἢ ἦ τοῦ ἐν εἴναι.

b 4 Τὶ δὲ; Socrates now takes up the first of the two ὁμολογήματα and tests the hypothesis by it. It is the soul which rules the body, whereas a ἀρμονία is dependent upon that of which it is the ἀρμονία (93 a 6).

c 3 ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν: 92 e 4. μῆτορ ἰν . . . c 6 οὐσία ἰν . . . Both negatives are legitimate after ὁμολογεῖν. Here they are alternated for variety.

c 4 οἷς ἐπιτείνατο καὶ χαλάτα . . . ἐκεῖνα: equivalent to ταῖς ἐπιτάσεσιν καὶ χαλάσεσιν . . . ἐκεῖνον, οἷς representing τούτοις ἃ, where ἃ is internal accusative. This is a favourite construction with Demo- sthenes (cp. Shilleto on de Fals. Leg. 415), but is not common in Plato. Observe that χαλάν is equivalent to ἀνέναι (remittere) the usual opposite of ἐπιτείνειν (intendere).

c 5 ψάλλωντο is the reading of Stobaeus and seemingly of T before correction. As ψάλλειν is the proper word for striking strings, it is very appropriate here. The vulgar reading πάλλωντο is supposed to refer to vibrations. The verb is used of 'brandishing' weapons and shaking lots, and in the passive of the heart 'quaking', but never of strings or instruments.

d 5 ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις . . . διαλεγομένη: the comma after νουθετοῦσα is due to Hermann and makes the construction more regular. It is to be observed, however, that such a construction as τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νουθετοῦσα, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις is not indefensible.

d 6 ἐν 'Ὀθωνσεῖα: Od. xx. 17. The passage is quoted in a similar connexion in Rep. 390 d 4; 441 b 6.

e 5 ἦ καθ' ἀρμονίαν: in such phrases καθά means 'in a line with', 'on the level of'. Tr. 'far too divine a thing to be compared with a ἀρμονία.' Aristotle made use of the preceding argument in his

Reply to the Objection of Cebes begun, but broken off (95 a 4–e 6).

95 a 4 Εἶνε δὴ κτλ. Socrates now goes back to the objection of Cebes. The transition is effected by means of a pleasantry about Harmonia of Thebes (Θηβαίκης, not Θηβαίας, for the κτητικόν, not the ἐθνικόν, is used with names of women). She has become fairly propitious, and we must now tackle Cadmus (who married Harmonia in the Theban legend), i.e. the objection of Cebes. There is no need to seek a deeper meaning in the words.

a 8 θαναμαστώς . . . διὰ are to be taken together. Cp. τι 102 a 4.

a 9 ὅτε: Forster's conjecture ὅτε (or, as I prefer to write in accordance with ancient practice, ἤδε) is attractive, but it is hard to account for the ὅτε of all MSS. unless it is original. Linde proposes ἦ γε ἡπόρει.

b 1 τί . . . χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ: cp. Theaet. 165 b 7 τι γὰρ χρῆσθαι ἀφύκτω ἐρωτήματι;

b 5 μὴ μέγα λέγε, 'do not boast.' Cp. μέγα φρονεῖν, 'to be proud' (the other sense 'do not speak loud' is less appropriate here). Cp. Hipp. ma. 295 a 7 Ἄ μὴ μέγα . . . λέγε. Eur. Her. 1244 ἵσχε στόμα, ὡς μὴ μέγα λέγων μείζον πάθος.

b 6 βασκανία, 'malign influence,' lit. fascination of the 'evil eye', to the effects of which those who boast of their luck are specially exposed.

περιτρέψῃ, 'turn to flight,' keeps up the metaphor of ἐφοδος above.

b 7 Ὁμηρικὸς ἐγγὺς ἱόντες, 'coming to close quarters.' The metaphor is kept up. Homer nowhere uses the phrase ἐγγὺς ἱόντες, and Herwerden would read ἄσσων ἱόντες, but Ὁμηρικὸς may mean 'like Homeric warriors', not 'in Homeric phrase'.

b 8 τὸ κεφάλαιον, 'the sum and substance.' The word is derived from the ancient practice of writing the sum of an addition at the top. Cp. Lat. summa (sc. linea).

c 7 ἄθανασίαν μὲν μὴ, ὅτι δὲ . . . 'not immortality, but only that—.'

d 3 ᾠδὴ . . . ἀπολλύοντο: the optatives are due to the indirect speech.
though there is no principal verb with ὅτι (or ὅς) on which they can be said to depend. They cannot, as some editors say, depend on c 7 φῆς, for φῶναι only takes acc. c. inf. Cp. above 87 e 5 n, where also the optatives occur after a clause introduced by ἀλλὰ γάρ. Riddell, Dig. § 282.

d 7 εἰ μὴ... εἰν: the simplest explanation of this optative is to regard τῷ μὴ εἶδον as equivalent to εἰ μὴ εἰδεῖν.

Narrative Interlude. The origin of the new Method (95 e 7—102 a 2).

e 8 Οὐ φαύλον πράγμα, 'no light matter,' 'no easy task.' Cp. L. S. s. v. Ι. 1.

e 9 Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθόρας τὴν αἰτίαν, 'the cause of coming into being, and ceasing to be.' Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθόρας is the title of one of Aristotle's most important treatises, best known by the scholastic name De generatione et corruptione. Περὶ c. gen. is used instead of the simple gen. or Περὶ c. acc. under the influence of the verb διαπραγματεύσασθαι. Cp. 96 e 6; 97 c 6; 97 d 2; 98 d 6, and 58 a 1 n.

a 2 τὰ γε ἔμα τάθη, 'my own experiences.' It has been strangely supposed—so unwilling are interpreters to take the Phaedo in its plain sense—that these are either Plato's own experiences or 'an ideal sketch of the history of the mind in the search for truth.' Besides the general considerations stated in the Introduction, there is this special point to be noted, that the questions raised are exactly such as were discussed in the middle of the fifth century B.C., when Socrates was young, and that they correspond closely with the caricature of Aristophanes in the Clouds, which was produced in 423 B.C., when Plato was a baby. By the time of Plato's youth quite another set of questions had come to the front at Athens.

a 8 Περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν: this is the oldest name for what we call 'natural science' (cf. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 14 n. 2). Heraclitus (fr. 17) said that Pythagoras had pursued ἱστορία further than other men, and it appears that even geometry was called by this name in the Pythagorean school (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 107 n. 1). The restriction of the term to what we call 'history' is due to the fact that Herodotus followed his predecessors in calling his work ἱστορία, and his pre-
deceivers belonged to Miletus, where all science went by that name (E. Gr. Ph. 3 p. 28). The term 'Natural History' partly preserves the ancient sense of the word, a circumstance due to the title of Aristotle's Περὶ τὰ ζῴα ἱστορίας (Historia Animalium).

a 8 ὑπερήφανος agrees with σοφία or ἱστορία and εἶδεν α is added to it epexegetically. Heindorf compares Gorg. 462 c 8 οὐκοῦν καλὸν σω̣ ̣ δοκεῖ ἡ ῥητορική εἶναι, χαριζεῖσθαι οἶον τ' εἶναι ἀνθρώπους; The ὑπερήφανος of Eusebius and Stobaeus would simplify the construction, but the evidence is against it.

b i ἄνω κάτω: we say 'backwards and forwards'. Cp. 90 c 5 and Gorg. 481 d 7 ἄνω καὶ κάτω μετοβαλλομένον.

b 3 ὡς τινες ἔλεγον. This is the doctrine of Archelaus, the disciple of Anaxagoras, and, according to a statement already known to Theophrastus, the teacher of Socrates (cp. Phys. Op. fr. 4 'Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος δ καὶ Σωκράτης συγγεγονέας φασίν, Ἀναξαγόρου γενομένο μαθητή, Diels, Vors. 2 323, 34; 324, 26). The following are the relevant quotations and rest ultimately on the authority of Theophrastus. Hippolytus, Ref. i. 9, 2 εἶναι δ' ἀρχήν τῆς κινήσεως (τὸ) ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀπ' ἄλληλων τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἦδ. i. 9. 5 περὶ δὲ ζῶν φησίν ὅτι θερμανομένης τῆς γῆς τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ κάτω μέρει, ὅπως τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν ἐμίσγετο, ἀνεφάνετο τά τε ἄλλα ζῶν πολλά καὶ ἀνθρώποι, ἀπαντα τὴν αὐτὴν διέκοσθαν ἔχοντα ἐκ τῆς Λίυος τρεφόμενα. Diog. Laert. ii. 17 γεννᾶσθαι δὲ φησι τὰ ζῶα ἐκ θερμῆς τῆς γῆς καὶ Λίου παραπλησίαν γάλακτι ἀνθρώπων ἀνείσθη. This last touch explains the reference to putrefaction (σηπεδῶν). As Forster already pointed out, early medical theory made πέψις, cibi concoctio, a form of σῆπις, and Galen says (in Hippiocr. Aρθ. vi. 1) παλαιὰ τίς ἦν συνθεῖσα τοῖς τοῖς ἀνθράσιν ἄσηρτα καλεῖν ἀπερ ἡμεῖς ἀπετα λέγομεν. Now Aristotle criticizes Empedocles for applying the σῆπις theory to milk. Cp. Gen. An. 777 a 7 τὸ γὰρ γάλα πεπεμμένον αἰμα ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διεθαρμένον, Ἐμπεδόκλης δ' ἢ οὖν ὄρθως ὑπελάμβανεν ἢ οὖν εὐ μετήνεγκε ( 'used a bad metaphor') ποιήσας ὁς τὸ γάλα ὑπετέν ἐν ὕδατι τοι τέκτην ὕπελειτο λευκῷ. σαρπότης γὰρ καὶ πέψις ἐναντίον, τὸ δὲ πώς σαρπότης τίς ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ γάλα τῶν πεπεμμένων. The meaning is, then, that the warm and cold gave rise by putrefaction (σηπεδῶν) to a milky slime (Λίους) by which the first animals were nourished. We are thus able to give συντρέφεται its natural sense. It is significant that Socrates should mention the theory of Archelaus first.
b 4 δ' φρονοῦμεν, 'what we think with.' The question of the 'seat of the soul' or sensorium was keenly debated in the first half of the fifth century B.C. The views that the soul is blood or breath are primitive, but both had just been revived as scientific theories. Empedocles had said (fr. 105 Diels) ἀιμα γὰρ ἀνθρώπως περικάρδιων ἐστι νόημα, and he was the founder of the Sicilian school of medicine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 288 n. 3). The doctrine that the soul is air was as old as Anaximenes, but had just been revived by Diogenes of Apollonia (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 414), and is attributed in the Clouds (230) to Socrates. The Heracliteans at Ephesus of course maintained their master's view that the soul was fire.

b 5 δ' ἐγκέφαλος κτλ. The credit of being the first to see that the brain was the seat of consciousness belongs to Alcmaeon of Croton (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 224), and the same view was upheld in the fifth century B.C. by Hippocrates and his school. It is one of the strangest facts in the history of science that Aristotle, followed by the Stoics, should have gone back to the primitive view that the heart was the seat of sensation.

b 7 γίγνεσθαι: the optative is due to the general sense of indirect speech.

b 8 κατὰ τὰτα: equivalent to αὐτός.

γίγνεσθαι: note ἐστιν (b 5)... γίγνεται (b 7)... γίγνεσθαι (b 8), 'a gradual transition from the direct to the most pronounced form of the indirect speech' (Geddes).

ἐπιστήμην: Diels (Vors.² 102, 18) attributes to Alcmaeon this explanation of knowledge as arising from memory and belief 'when they have reached a state of quiescence'. We seem to have an echo of it in Aristotle An. Post. B. 19. 100 a 3 sqq. ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίγνεται μνήμη, ... ἐκ δὲ μνήμης ἐμπειρία, ... ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἡρμηνεύων τοῦ καθολοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ... τέχνης ἀρχῇ καὶ ἐπιστήμης. From Gorg. 448 c 4 sqq. we learn that Polus of Agrigentum derived τέχνη from ἐμπειρία. There is no reason for doubting that the distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα is pre-Platonic. It is alluded to by Isocrates in Helena 5 ὁτι πάλιν κρειττάν ἐστὶ περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπιμετωκος δοξάζειν ή περὶ τῶν ἀρχηγῶν ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστάσεσθαι, and Blass dates the Helena before 390 B.C. Antisthenes is said to have written four books Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης (Diog. Laert. vi. 17).

b 9 τὰ περὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν (i.e. τοῦ οὐρανοῦ)... πάθη: it is highly
characteristic of the middle of the fifth century B.C. that the theory of τὰ μετέωρα is mentioned last and in a somewhat perfunctory way. For the time, the rise of medicine had brought biological and psychological questions to the front, while astronomy and cosmology remained stationary in eastern Hellas until new life was given them by the Pythagoreans. The state of science here indicated is quite unlike any we know to have existed either at an earlier or a later date. It belongs solely to the period to which it is here attributed, a period which I have endeavoured to characterize in E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 405, 406.

c 2 ὅσ oὐδὲν χρῆμα: the Ionic χρῆμα only survives in Attic in a few phrases like this (L. S. s. v. II. 3) The Athenians only used freely the plural χρήματα, and that in the sense of ‘property’. Cp. Laws 640 c 5 ὅσ oὐδὲνι γε πράγματι.

c 5 ἐτυφλώθην (sc. ταύτα): cp. Soph. O. T. 389 τὴν τέχνην δ' ἐξή τυφλόσ.

c 6 ᾧ πρὸ τοῦ ὅμιλν εἰδέναι repeats c 4 ἀ καὶ πρότερον κτλ. (a b a).

c 6 ἐπειδὰν γὰρ κτλ.: this refers to another great question of the time. Socrates means that his former beliefs were upset by the question of Anaxagoras (fr. 10) πῶς γὰρ ἄν ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γίνοιτο θρίξ καὶ σάρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός; This led to the doctrine that there were portions of everything in everything. Cp. also Aët. i. 3. 5 (Dox. 279 a) ἐδοκεὶ αὕτῳ ἀπορώτατον εἶναι πῶς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος δύναται τι γίνεσθαι ἠ φθείρεσθαι εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. τροφὴν γοῦν προσφερόμεθα ἀπλὴν καὶ μονοειδή, ἄρτον καὶ ἄρτωρ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τρέφεται θρίξ φλέψ ἀρτηρία σάρξ νεῦρα ὅστα καὶ τὰ λουπᾶ μόρια. τοῦτων οὖν γινομένων, ἀμολογητέον ἐστῖν ὅτι ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τῇ προσφερομένῃ πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων πάντα αὐξέται. (Cp. E. Gr. Ph.² p. 303.)

c 6 μετρίως, i. q. καλῶς. Cp. 68 e 2 n.

d 8 ὅμιλν γὰρ κτλ. This refers to another set of questions, which stand in a close relation to Zeno’s criticism of the Pythagoreans. Roughly, we may say that the difficulty here touched upon is the nature of the unit, whether in measuring, weighing, or numbering.

e 1 αὐτῷ τῇ κεφαλῇ, ‘just by the head.’ This is an example of a popular unit of measurement. Cp. Π. iii. 193 μεῖν μὲν κεφαλῆ 'Αγαμέμνωνος.

e 3 προσέναι (TW) is virtual passive of προσθεῖναι, which is the reading of B. That is a natural slip.
e 6  ρεπὶ τούτων... τὴν αἰτίαν: cp. 95 e 9 n.
e 8  ἐπειδὰν ἐνὶ τις προσφή ἐν κτλ. The difficulty here is what is meant
by the addition of units. How can it be that when one is added to
one the result is two? How can either the original one or the one
which is added to it become two; or how can the one which is
added and the one which is added to it become two? The nature
of the unit involved real difficulties which we need not discuss here;
it is more important for our purpose to observe that in the Par-
menides Plato actually represents the young Socrates as discussing
such subjects with Parmenides and Zeno. The two dialogues
confirm each other in the most remarkable way; for here too we
are dealing with the youth of Socrates.

7 a 2  εἰ δὲ μὲν... ἐπεὶ δ’... Another instance of the disjunctive
hypothetical sentence (cp. 68 a 3 n.) What causes surprise is that
the two things should be true at the same time.
a 4  αὕτη, ‘this,’ sc. τὰ πλησιάσας ἄλλας, but assimilated in gender
to the predicate αἰτία, and further explained by ἢ σύνοδος κτλ.
a 5  ἢ σύνοδος τοῦ... τεθήναι, ‘the coming together which consists
in their juxtaposition.’

οὖθε γε ὡς... πεθεσθαί ὡς... The repetition of ὡς is a collo-
quialism. We are still dealing here with the difficulty of conceiving
a unit. In the Republic (525 d 8 sqq.) Socrates refers to the same
difficulty, but he is not troubled by it, for he has come to see that
the unit is an object of thought and not of sense. Plato can hardly
have felt it seriously at any time.
b 4  δι’ ὅτι ἐν γίγνεται, ‘how a unit comes into being at all.’ Cp.
Arist. Met. M. 6. 1080 b 20 ὅπως δὲ τὰ πρῶτα ἐν συνέστη ἔχον μέγεθος,
ἀπαρεῖν ἐαίκασιν (οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι).
b 6  τρόπον τῆς μεθόδου, ‘method of investigation.’ The noun μέθοδος
by itself came to bear this meaning, as ‘method’ always does in our
usage.
b 7  αὐτὸς εἰκῇ φύρω, ‘I make up a confused jumble of my own.’
There can be no doubt that φύρεσι is ‘to make a mess’ (cp. 101 e 1),
and εἰκῇ, temere, emphasizes that meaning. Cp. Aesch. P. V. 450
ἔφυραν εἰκῇ πάντα. Of course, Socrates has not the slightest doubt
of the superiority of his new method, and this description is only
a piece of characteristic εἰρωνεία.
b 8  τινὸς, ... ἀναγιγνώσκοντος: it is natural to think of the Anaxa-
gorean Archelaus, who was said to be the teacher of Socrates (cp. 96 b 3 n.).

The actual words of Anaxagoras were (fr. 12 Diels) ἀναφέρεται οὐδὲν ὡς ὑπὸν καὶ τὸν ὄμοιον μὲν ἔστιν, καὶ ὅποια ἔστιν, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς. The familiar πάντα χρήματα ἃν ἄμων, εἶτα, νοῦς ἐξαίτη αὐτὰ διεκόσμησεν (Diog. Laert. ii. 6) is not a quotation, but a summary of the doctrine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 299, n. 1).

c 7 περὶ ἑκάστου: cp. 95 e 9 n.

d 2 περὶ αὐτοῦ ἰκεῖνον: de illo ipso, sc. περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον. I formerly bracketed ἰκεῖνον, which rests only on the authority of B; but Vahlen has since shown (Opusc. ii. 558 sqq.) that αὐτοῦ ἰκεῖνον is too idiomatic to be a mistake.

d 7 κατὰ νοῦν ἔμαντό, 'to my mind,' as we say. I cannot believe that this common phrase involves any reference to the νοῦς of Anaxagoras. Such a joke would be very frigid.

d 8 πλατεία ... ἥ στρογγυλή: this was still a living problem in the days when Socrates was young, but not later. The doctrine that the earth is spherical was Pythagorean; the Ionian cosmologists (including Anaxagoras himself and Archelaus) held it was flat, with the single exception of Anaximander, who regarded it as cylindrical.

e 3 ἐν μέσῳ: so far as we can tell, this was not only the doctrine of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, but also of the early Pythagoreans. It is important to observe that the geocentric theory marked a great advance in its day as compared, e. g., with the belief of Thales that the earth was a disk floating on the water (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 32). Plato does not commit the anachronism of making Socrates refer to the later Pythagorean doctrine that the earth revolved with the planets round the Central Fire (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 344 sqq.). That was familiar enough in the fourth century B. C., but would have been out of place here.

96 a 1 ποθεσθαμένος: this is now known to be the reading of T as well as of Eusebius. B has ὑποθήμενος, which cannot be right, and the ὑποθεσθαμένος of W looks like an emendation of this.

a 4 τάχους ... πρὸς ἀλληλα, 'their relative velocity.' τροπών, 'turnings.' This refers to the annual movement of the sun from the 'tropic' of Capricorn to that of Cancer and back again, which is the cause of summer and winter. The Greeks gave
the name of *trpectral* to what the Romans, from a slightly different point of view, called *solstitia*.

a 6 *ἀ πάσχει*: symmetry would require the addition of *καὶ ποιεῖ*, but Plato avoids such symmetry.

b 1 *ἐκάστῳ ... καὶ κανὴ πᾶσι, 'to each individually and to all collectively.'

b 3 *οὐκ ἐν ἀπεδομήν πολλοῦ, 'I would not have sold for a large sum.'

b 7 *φύσιμαν φερόμενον*: this is a slight variation on the usual phrase *ἀπ' ἐλπίδος κατέβησαν, κατέπεσον, ‘I was dashed down from my hope’ (cp. *Euthyphro* 15e 5 ἀπ' ἐλπίδος μὲ καταβάλλων μεγάλης). Socrates speaks as if he had been cast down from Olympus like another Hephaestus (*πᾶν δ' ἡμαρ φερόμην, II. i. 592*).

b 8 *ἀνδρά, 'a man.' The word expresses strong feeling, here disappointment. Wytenbach compares Soph. *Aias* 1142 ἡδηποτ' εἴδον ἄνδρ' ἐγώ γλῶσσην θρασύν, 1150 ἐγὼ δὲ γ' ἄνδρ' ὅπωτα μωρία πλέων (cp. Arist. *Ach. 1128*).

b 9 *τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον*: Plato expresses the same feeling in his own person in *Laws* 967 b 4 καὶ τινες ἐτάλμον τοῦτο γε αὐτὸ παρακινδυνεῖν καὶ τότε, λέγοντες ὅς νοῦς εἶν ὁ διακεκοσμηκὼς πάνθ' ὅσα κατ' οὐρανόν, οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ ... ἀπανθ' ὡς εἶπεν ἔρατο ἀνέτρεψαν πάλιν κτλ. Xenophon (*Mem. iv. 7. 6*) preserves a faint echo of this criticism of Anaxagoras. Aristotle (*Met. A. 985 a 18*) simply repeats it (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 309 sq.).

b 9 *οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτιώμενον, sc. τὸν νοῦν, 'nor ascribing to it any causality.' For the double acc. cp. Dem. *Phorm. 25 τίν' ἄν εἰς τὸν αἰτίαν αἰτιασάμενον ... δικάζω; Antipho, I. 29 ἀ ἐπαιτιῶμαι τὴν γυναίκα ταύτην. Aristotle (loc. cit.) says πάντα μᾶλλον αἰτιάται τῶν γνωμομένων ἢ νοὺν.


b 9 *διαφυάς ἔχει, 'are jointed.' The *diaφυάι* are the same thing as the *συμβολαί* (d 3), looked at from another point of view. Cicero, *de Nat. D.* ii. 139 says *commissurae.*
συγκαμφθέως: cp. 60 b 2.


d 7 φοινός τε κτλ. Cp. e.g. Diogenes of Apollonia (Diels, Vors. 9 p. 332, 14) ταύ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς φωνῆς τυπτομένου καὶ κινομένου (τὴν ἀκοήν γώνοθα).

e 4 παραμέναντα, 'not running away.' We have no English word for παραμένειν, any more than for διαρρέω (cp. 63 e 10 n.). It is the negative of ἀποδιδράσκω (99 a 3). Cp. ii 5 d 9.

e 5 νὶ τὸν κόνα: such euphemisms seem to occur in all languages. Cp. παρθένει! ecod! It is true that in Gorg. 482 b 5 Socrates says μὰ τὸν κόνα τὸν Ἀγνωστὴν θέλω (Anubis), but that seems to be only a passing jest. A euphemistic oath of this kind was called Πασάπαντες ὁμολογεῖ (Suid. s. v.).

99 a 1 περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βασιλείας: cp. Crito 53 b 4 where it is suggested that Socrates might escape ἢ Ὑβατε ἢ Μέγαρα. He would have found friends in both places, as we know. This whole passage is reminiscent of the Crito.

a 8 καὶ ταῦτα νῦν πράττον, 'and that too though I act from intelligence,' as was admitted above, 98 c 4. The MSS. have πράττω, but Heindorf's πράττων is a great improvement and gives καὶ ταῦτα its proper idiomatic force.

b 2 τὸ γάρ μη... οἶνον τ' εἰναι κτλ. is another instance of the exclamatory infinitive justifying a strong expression of feeling. Cp. 60 b 5 n. and Symp. 177 c 1 τὸ οὖν ταὐτότων μὲν περὶ παλλὴν σταυρὴν παύςασθαι, Ἐρωτα δὲ μηδένα τω ἀνθρώπων τεταλμηκέναι... ἄξιος ὑμιῆσαι.

b 3 ἄνευ οὗ: here we see the beginning of the technical term ὅθεν (or ὅτι) οὐκ ἄνευ, the condition sine qua non. Such causes are called συναιτία in the Timaeus. Cp. 46 c 7 Ταῦτ' οὖν πάντα ἐστίν τῶν συναιτίων οἷς θεὸς ὑπηρετούσιν χρῆται, τὴν τοῦ ἄριστου κατὰ τὸ δυνατῶν ἱδέαν ἀποτελέων δοξάζεται δὲ ὑπὰ τῶν πλείστων οὖ συναιτία ἀλλὰ αἶτια εἶναι τῶν πάντων κτλ.


b 5 ἀλλοτρίῳ ὑνόματι, 'by a name that does not belong to them,' which is not their ὀνόματι ὄνομα. The vulgate ἀματι cannot be defended, though it is the reading also of BW.

b 6 αὔτό repeats δ (cp. 104 d 2 n.).
Once more we have the scientific problems of the middle of the fifth century. The first theory is that the earth does not fall because of the rapidity of the revolution of the heavens. This was the western theory, and was originated by Empedocles, who supported it by the experiment of swinging a cup full of water rapidly round (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 274). Cp. Arist. de Caelo 295 a 16 ό δ' ὄσπερ ἔμπεδοκλῆς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ φοράν κύκλῳ περιβέουσιν καὶ θάττων φερομένην τῇ τῆς γῆς φοράν καλλέων, καθάπερ τὸ ἐν τοῖς κυνάδωι ὕδωρ καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο κύκλῳ τοῦ κυνάδου φερομένου πολλάκις κάτω τοῦ χαλκοῦ γινόμενον ὅμως οὗ φέρεται κάτω πεφυκός φέρεσθαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. The vortex theory of Leucippus was more subtle than this (E. Gr. Ph.³ p. 399) and is not referred to here. In Clouds 379 Aristophanes makes fun of the ἀλέθεροι Δίνοις who has taken the place of Zeus.

But τοῦ οὐρανοῦ μένειν: these words are to be taken together, as Geddes says (after Hermann) and μένειν is a virtual passive, 'is kept in its place by the heavens.'

This is the eastern theory, which originated with Anaximenes and was still upheld by Anaxagoras and Democritus. As Aristotle tells us (de Caelo 294 b 14), they said τὸ πλάτος αἵμαν εἶναι . . . τοῦ μένειν αὐτήν· οὗ γὰρ τέμνειν ἀλλ' ἐπισωματίζειν τὸν ἄρα τὸν κάτωθεν. Its breadth prevents it from cutting the air beneath it, and it lies on it 'like a lid' (πῶμα). It is absurd to suppose that Plato was ever troubled by crude notions of this kind, and even Socrates must soon have learnt better from his Pythagorean friends. Everything points to the Periclean age and no later date.

καρδόπωρ, 'a kneading-trough'. This, however, does not seem to be a very appropriate image, and I believe we should read καρδοσίφω from Hesychius Καρδόσιον. τῆς καρδόσου τὸ πῶμα, 'the lid of a kneading-trough'; cp. Aristotle's ἐπισωματίζειν quoted above. The discussion of the word κάρδοσος in Arist. Clouds 670 has another bearing. It refers to the speculations of Protagoras about grammatical gender.

Constr. τὴν δὲ τοῦ κτλ. Constr. τὴν δὲ δύναμιν τοῦ οὔτω νῦν (αὐτά) κείσθαι ὡς οἶνον τε βέλτιστα αὐτά τεθῆναι. As we see from the following words, δύναμιν has its full meaning. The fact that they are in the best possible place is regarded as a force which keeps them there.
That being so, ταύτην (τὴν δίναμιν) is the subject of δαιμονίαν ἵσχυν ἐχειν.

c 3 τούτου ... ἰσχυρότερον, 'an Atlas stronger than this one' (τούτου is masc.).

c 5 ὁσ ἀληθῶς τὸ ἄγαθὸν καὶ δέον: I think these words must be taken together; for ὁσ ἀληθῶς is often used to call attention to an etymology (cp. 80 d 6 κ.), and here τὸ δέον, 'the fitting,' is taken as 'the binding'. The hyperbaton is of a normal type. For the etymology itself cp. Crat. 418 e 7 ἄγαθον γὰρ ἱδέα οὖσα (‘being a form of good’) τὸ δέον φαίνεται δεσμός εἶναι καὶ κόλυμα φορᾶς.

c 9 τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν: the paroemiographers say this expression is used ἐπὶ τῶν ἄσφαλῶν τι πραττόντων, καθόσον οἱ διαμαρτύρτες κατὰ τὸν πρώτερον πλοῦν ἄσφαλῶς παρασκευάζονται τὸν δεύτερον. According to this, the reference would be rather to a less adventurous than to a 'second-best' course. See, however, Eustathius in Od. p. 1453, 20 δεύτερος πλοῖος λέγεται ὅτε ἀπουχῶν τις ὁρίου κόπας πλέη κατὰ Παναγίαν. Cp. also Cic. Tusc. iv. 5, 'where pandere vela orationis is opposed to the slower method of proceeding, viz. dialectoricum remis' (Geddes). In any case, Socrates does not believe for a moment that the method he is about to describe is a pis allor or 'make shift.' The phrase is ironical like εἰκῇ φύρῳ above. Cp. Goodrich in Class. Rev. xvii, pp. 381 sqq. and xviii, pp. 5 sqq., with whose interpretation I find myself in substantial agreement.

d 1 ἥ πεπραγμάτευμα: these words depend on ἐπιδείξειν ποιήσωμαι and govern τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν.

d 5 τὰ ὄντα like τὰ πράγματα just below (e 3) are 'things' in the ordinary sense of the word. It seems to me quite impossible that these terms should be applied to the ὄντως ὄντα, τὰ ὁσ ἀληθῶς ὄντα. They must be the same as τὰ ὄντα in 97 d 7 τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων, that is, the things of the visible world. It is quite true that Plato makes Socrates use the expression τὸ ὄν for τὸ ὄντως ὄν, but I know of no place in which he is made to use τὰ ὄντα simpliciter of the εἴδη. Further, the whole point of the passage is that Socrates had become exhausted by the study of physical science, and what he calls the δεύτερος πλοῦς is, we shall see, nothing else than the so-called 'Theory of Ideas.'

τὸν ἥλιον ἐκλείποντα, 'the sun during an eclipse.' This is a mere illustration. Socrates keeps up the irony of the phrase δεύτερος
πλούς by suggesting that his eyes are too weak to contemplate the things of the visible world. He had to look at them in a reflection, he says.

e 3 τοῖς ὀμασὶ καὶ ἐκάστῃ τῶν αἰσθήσεων: this makes it quite clear that ἥ ὄντα, ἡ πράγματα are the things of sense.

e 5 εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα, 'taking refuge in the study of propositions' or 'judgements', or 'definitions'. It is not easy to translate λόγους here; but at least it is highly misleading to speak of 'concepts' (Begriffe), nor is there any justification in Plato's writings for contrasting Socratic λόγοι with Platonic εἴδη. It is just in λόγου that the εἴδη manifest themselves, and what Socrates really means is that, before we can give an intelligible answer to the question 'what causes A to be B', we must ask what we mean by saying 'A is B'. So far from being a δεύτερος πλοῦς, this is really a 'previous question.'

b 1 οὐδὲν καίνον: if Plato had been the real author of the 'Theory of

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Ideas’, and if, as is commonly believed, it was propounded for
the first time in the Phaedo, this sentence would be a pure
mystification.

b 2 οὐδὲν πέταμαι. ‘Οὐ παύεται et οὐδὲν παύεται sic differunt ut
Latine: finem non facit et finem nullum facit,’ Cobet Nov.
Lect. p. 500.

b 3 ἐρχομαι . . . ἐπιχειρῶν . . . ἐπίδειξαθαί, ‘I am going to try to show’.
In this construction ἐρχομαι usually takes a future participle; but,
as Heindorf says, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐπίδειξαθαί is ‘instar futuri ἐπιδειξό-
μενος’.

τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος, ‘the sort of causation I have worked out’.
A phrase like this shows how far εἶδος is from being a technical
term. When Socrates wishes to be technical, he speaks of the ‘just
what it is’ (τὸ αὐτὸ δ ἐστὶ).

b 4 ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα: cp. 76 d 8 ἀ βρυλοῦμεν ἄεί. Here once
more the doctrine of εἶδη is assumed to be well known and generally
accepted. What is new is the application of it, the method of
ἐπώθεσις and deduction. This time it is Cebes who assents to the
discipline without hesitation; last time it was Simmias.

b 8 τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπίδειξεν καὶ ἀνευρήσεων ὃς: there is a curious and
characteristic interlacing of words here (a b a b); for τὴν αἰτίαν
ἀνευρήσεων and ἐπίδειξεν ὃς would naturally go together. Riddell,
Dig. § 308 classes this under the head of Hysteron proteron.

c 1 ὅς διδόντος σοι κτλ., ‘You may take it that I grant you this, so
lose no time in drawing your conclusion.’ Cp. Symph. 185 e 4 οὐκ
ἀν ψάνοις λέγων.

c 3 Σκότηα. . . ἐὰν . . . Cp. 64 c 10 n.

c 5 οὐδὲ δ’ ἐν is more emphatic than δ’ οὐδέν.

ἡ διότι μετέχει κ.τ.λ. If we say that a, a, a are beautiful, that
implies (1) that ‘beautiful’ has a meaning quite apart from any
particular instance of beautiful things, and (2) that this meaning
(A) is somehow ‘partaken in’ by the particular instances a, a, a.
These have a meaning in common, and their relation to it is
expressed in the relation of subject to predicate. This too Cebes
admits at once.

d 1 χρώμα εὐανθῆς ἔχων, ‘because it has a bright colour’. The parti-
ciple explains δ’ ὅτι, which is the indirect form of διὰ τι; The adjective
εὐανθῆς is common in Hippocrates, especially of the bright red colour

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of blood, &c. As applied to colour, ἀνθός is 'bloom', 'brightness', and is sometimes almost synonymous with χρώμα. Cp. Rep. 429 d 8 and 557 c 5 with Adam's notes. The point is that it is meaningless to say α, α, α are A because they are x, y, z, unless we have first shown that x, y, z necessarily 'partake in' A.

d 3 ἀπλώς καὶ ἀτέχνως καὶ ἡσύχας as opposed to the σοφία αἰτία mentioned above. The irony of 97 b 7 εἰκῇ φύρω is here kept up, and this should warn us against taking the expression δεύτερος πλοῦς as seriously meant. (Distinguish ἀτέχνως from ἀτεχνός.)

d 5 εἰτε παρουσία κτλ. The precise nature of the relation between predicate and subject may be expressed in various more or less figurative ways. We may say that the predicate is 'present to' the subject, or that the subject 'partakes' in the common nature of the predicate. Socrates will not bind himself to any of these ways of putting it; he only insists that, however we may express it, it is beauty that makes things beautiful.

d 6 δπη δῇ καὶ ὅτως κ.τ.λ. These words are an echo of the formula used in the public prayers, for which cp. Crat. 400 e 1 ὀσπερ εἰς ταῖς εὐχαίς ὑμῶν ἐστίν ἡμῖν εὐχεσθαι, ἀοινίες τε καὶ ὅποθεν χαῖρομον ὄνομαξόμενοι, ταύτα, καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς (sc. τοὺς θεοὺς) καλεῖν. It seems to me, therefore, that Wytenbach's suggestion, προσαγορευμένη for προσαγορευνη, must certainly be right, though he did not adopt it himself. The manuscript προσαγορευνη goes well enough with παρουσία, but not with the other terms. The whole question is one of names; for Socrates has no doubt as to the fact. Plato elsewhere represents him as making use of this formula. Cp. Prot. 358 a 7 εἰτε γὰρ ἦδον εἰτε τετράων λέγεις... εἰτε ὅποθεν καὶ ὅτως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαύτα ὄνομαξον, Phileb. 12 c 3 τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, δπη ἐκείνη ψιλον, ταύτη προσαγορεύω. So Tim. 28 b 2 ὃ δὴ πᾶς οὖρανός ἦ κόσμος ἦ καὶ ἄλλο ὅτι ποτῇ ὄνομαξόμενος μάλιστ' ἄν δέχατο, τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ὄνομάσθω, Laws 872 d 7 ὃ γὰρ δὴ μύδος ἦ λόγος ἦ ὅτι χρῆ προσαγορευέων αὐτῶν. The formula arose from fear that the gods should be addressed by the wrong name. Cp. Aesch. Ag. 160 Ζεὺς, ὅστις ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ τόδ' αὐτῷ φιλον κεκλη-μένον, τοῦτο μὲν προσενεύει. This connexion is made quite clear in the passage from the Philebus quoted above, which is introduced by the words Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέον... ἄει πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὄνοματα οὐκ ἐστὶ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου.

d 6 οὐ γὰρ ἐτι κτλ., 'I do not go so far as to insist on that'. Cp. 111
Aristotle *Met.* A. 6, 987 b 13 τὴν μὲν ταῖς γε μεθέξειν ἢ τὴν μίμησιν, ἢτις ἀν εἶν τὸν εἴδων, αφείσαν (sc. οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων) ἐν κωφός ἐπιτείνει, i. e. 'they left it as a point for dialectical inquiry' (for this meaning of ἐν κωφός cp. de *An.* A. 4. 407 b 29 quoted in 86 b 6 n.). I think Aristotle is referring to the present passage. He is quite clear about the Pythagorean origin of the theory.

d 8 [γίγνεται] is omitted both here and below e 3 by B; and W, which inserts it in e 3, has it in a different place from T. Most likely, then, it is an interpolation, and the formula τὸ καλὸν τὰ καλὰ καλὰ is much neater without it.

d 9 τοῦτον ἔχομενος, 'holding to this.' *Cp.* 101 d 1 ἔχομενος ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τὸς ὑποθέσεως.

101 a 5 φοβομένοις οἷμαι κτλ. The *Euthydemus* shows that Socrates is making no extravagant supposition in suggesting that the ἀντιλογικός might make such criticisms as (1) if A is taller than B 'by a head', B is also smaller than A 'by a head', therefore the same thing is the cause of greatness and smallness, and (2) that a head, being small, cannot be the cause of greatness.

a 6 ἐναντίον λόγος: for the personification of the λόγος cp. 87 a 8 n.

b 1 τέρας, 'a portent.' The word seems to have been common in dialectic as equivalent to ἄτοπον or διώματον. *Cp.* 106 d 5 καὶ τὰ τέρας λέγεις εἰ . . . , *Parm.* 129 b 2 τέρας ἀν οἶμαι ἢν, *Theaet.* 163 d 6 τέρας γὰρ ἀν εἶν ὃ λέγεις, *Phil.* 14 e 3 τέρατα διηνάγκασται φάναι.

b 9 τὴν πρόθεσιν . . . c τὴν σχίσαν: addition of unit to unit or division of the unit into fractions. *Cp.* above 96 e 7 sqq.

c 2 ἄλλως πῶς . . . ἢ μετασχῶν κτλ., 'otherwise than by participation in the proper reality of any given form (ἐκάστου) in which it participates.' The theory is thus summed up by Aristotle, *de Gen. et Corr.* 335 b 9 ἀλλ' ὁι μὲν Ἰκανὴν φύσιν αἰτιαν εἶναι πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι τὴν τῶν εἴδων φύσιν, διόπερ ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδων Σωκράτης καὶ γὰρ ἑκείνοις, ἐπιτιμήσεις τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁς ὀδύν εἰρηκόν, ὑποτίθεται ὅτι ἐστὶ τῶν ἀντιών τὰ μὲν εἶδη, τὰ δὲ μεθεκτικὰ τῶν εἴδων· καὶ ὅτι εἶπεν μὲν ἐκαστὸν λέγεται κατὰ τὸ εἶδος, γίγνεσθαι δὲ κατὰ τὴν μετάληψιν, καὶ φθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἀποβολὴν. Observe that Aristotle does not ascribe this theory to Plato, but to 'Socrates in the *Phaedo*.'

c 4 ἐν τούτοις, 'in the cases just mentioned.'

c 5 μετάσχειν, ἢ q. μέθεξιν. The form seems to occur here only.

c 8 κομψεῖας: Wytenbach points out that Socrates has in mind the
words of Euripides' *Antiope* which Plato makes him quote in *Gorg.* 486 c 6, ἀλλοις τὰ κομψά ταύτ᾽ ἄφεις (σοφίσματα). It is part of the irony that the plain man's way of speaking is described as a 'subtlety', while the new theory of predication is called artless and naïve.

c 9 δεδώσ... τὴν σαντού σκιάν: Aristophanes is said to have used this expression in the *Babylonians*. It probably (like our phrase take umbrage) referred originally to horses shying at their shadows. We have to go warily with so many ἀντίλογοι lying in wait for us.

d 1 ἐχόμενος ἐκεῖνον κτλ., 'holding fast to the safe support of the ἰπόθεσις' (cp. 100 d 9), which is regarded as a staff (Ar. Ach. 682 ὀἱς Ποσειδῶν ἀσφάλειος ἑστὶν ἡ βικτηρία).

d 3 εἰ δὲ τις κτλ. It does not seem possible to take ἐχεσθαι here in the sense of 'attack', and Madvig's conjecture ἐφοίτα is the reverse of convincing. It does, however, seem possible to render 'if any one fastens on' or 'sticks to the ἰπόθεσις', that is, if he refuses to consider the συμβαίνουσα till the ἰπόθεσις has been completely established. The method of Socrates is different. He first considers the συμβαίνουσα to see whether they involve any contradiction or absurdity. If they do, the hypothesis is ἵπσο ἑκτὸς destroyed. If the συμβαίνουσα are not contradictory or absurd, the ἰπόθεσις is not indeed established, but it has been verified, so far as it can be, by its application. When we have seen that the axioms of geometry lead to no contradictions or absurdities in their application, they are at least relatively established. Cp. Meno 86 e 2 συγχωρητοῦσαν ἐξ ἰπόθεσεως αὐτῷ σκοπεῖσθαι. For the terminology of the method cp. Parm. 135 e 9 εἰ ἐστὶν ἐκατον ('a given thing') ἰπονιθέμενον σκοπεῖν τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ἰπόθεσεως. Cp. e.g. the example immediately after (a 5) εἰ πολλὰ ἐστὶ (the ἰπόθεσις), τί χρῆ συμβαίνειν κτλ. The method of experimental science is the same. The ἰπόθεσις is first tested by seeing whether it is verified or not in particular instances; the deduction of the ἰπόθεσις from a higher one is another matter, which must be kept distinct.

d 4 ἐώς ἄν κτλ. It is doubtful whether ἄν can ever be retained with the opt. in oratio obliqua, though there are several examples in our texts (G. M. T. § 702). The better explanation is that given in L. & S: (s. ν. ἐώς I. c) that 'ἄν ... is added to the Optat. (not to ἐώς) if the
event is represented as conditional’. In that case, the real construction is ἐως...σκέψαμεν ἂν, and ἂν is anticipated. Cp. Isocrates, 17. 15 μαστιγών...ἐσεὶ ἂν τάληθε δὰξειν αὐτοὶς λέγειν. The meaning, then, will be ‘till you have a chance of considering’.

d 4 τὰ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης ὑμηθέντα: i.e. τὰ συμβαίνοντα. In e 2 below the phrase is τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὑμηθένων, and those who regard the sentence as spurious hold that the aorist participle is incorrect. But (1) the aorist is appropriate, because it is only after the consequences have been drawn that we can compare them with one another, and (2) it is more likely that Plato himself should vary the tense than that an interpolator should do so.

d 5 εἰ...διαφωνεῖ: Jackson holds that this clause is inconsistent with the account of the method given at 100 a 4 ἂ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ ταῦτα συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀλήθη ἀυτὰ κτλ., but that is a different stage in the process. We first posit as true whatever agrees with the ὑπόθεσις, and then we test the hypothesis by considering whether the things thus posited agree with one another.

ἐπειδή δὲ κτλ. Socrates recognizes that the ὑπόθεσις is not established by the process described so far. That can only be done by subsuming it under some higher ὑπόθεσις, and that in turn under a higher, till we come to one which is unassailable. This is the process described at greater length in Rep. 533 c 7 sqq.


e 1 ἐπὶ τικανόν: i.e. to an ἀρχή which no one will question. This is not necessarily an ἀρχή ἄνυπαθης (Rep. 510 b 7). A ὑπάθεσις may be, humanly speaking, adequate without that (cp. below 107 b 9).

ἀυτ ἂν φύραο, ‘you will not jumble the two things together.’ Though the middle does not appear to occur elsewhere, φύραοθαί τῶν λόγων, ‘to jumble one’s argument,’ seems very natural Greek, and it is hardly necessary to read φύραι. Otherwise we must take φύραι as passive, comparing Gorg. 465 c 4 φύραιναι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ...σοφισταὶ καὶ ρήτορες.

δοσπερ οἱ ἀντίλογοκοι: Socrates is no doubt thinking of the attacks on mathematics made by Protagoras and others. When we study geometry, we must accept its fundamental ὑποθέσεις; the question of their validity is a different one altogether, and one with which the
geometry as such has nothing to do. Only hopeless confusion can result from mixing up the two things.

e 2 ἐκεῖ ἄρχης, 'your starting-point,' i.e. the ὑπόθεσις. Though ἄρχης is sometimes used of an ultimate ἄρχης as opposed to an ὑπόθεσις, it can be used of any starting-point whatsoever. When we are discussing the συμβαίνοντα, we take the ὑπόθεσις as our ἄρχης and decline to give any account of it.

e 5 ικανόν ... ὑπὸ σοφίας κτλ., 'their cleverness enables them ...' There is a slight redundance in the use of δύνασθαι after ικανοί, but it is easily paralleled. They can make a mess of everything without disturbing their own self-complacency.

a 3 Νὴ Δία κτλ. The distinction which Socrates has just made appeals at once to a Pythagorean mathematician. We are taken back to Phlius for the last time, in order that the next stage of the argument may have its full weight.

"Third Proof of Immortality (102a 10—107 b 10).

The first two proofs were based upon analogy. They both depended upon the Doctrine of Forms; but in neither was Immortality deduced from that doctrine. The Third Proof is intended to be such a deduction.

b 2 τάλλα : i.e. particular things.

τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἵσχειν, 'are called after them.' This is how Socrates expresses the 'extension' of a class as opposed to its 'intension.'

Cp. Parm. 130 e 5 δοκεῖ σοι ... εἶναι εἶδη ἀττα, δὴ τάδε τὰ άλλα μεταλαμβαίνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἵσχειν. Cp. 78 e 2 πάντων τῶν ἐκείνων ὁμονύμων.

b 8 Ἄλλα γὰρ κτλ. The notion here formulated is that of the essential attribute. We say, indeed, as a façon de parler (τοῖς ρήμασι) that Simmias is greater than Socrates; but it is not quā Simmias or quā Socrates that they stand in this relation, but only in so far as greatness and smallness can be predicated of them. The emphatic words are περικέναι and τυγχάνειν ἵσχων. The first expresses participation in an ἐίδος which belongs φύσει to the subject, the latter participation in an ἐίδος which belongs to the subject as a matter of fact, but not essentially. The sentence is anacoluthic; for the subject τὸ ... ὑπέρχειν is dropped and a new subject τὰ ἄληθες is substituted.

10 ἐπωνυμίαν ἵσχε ... εἶναι, 'has the name of being.' Heindorf
quotes Hdt. ii. 44 ἧπον ἰπακλέος ἐπωνυμίην ἐχοντος Θασίον εἶναι. So often ὄνομαζεν εἶναι.

C I ὑπέχων τοῦ μὲν κτλ., 'submitting his smallness to the greatness of A (Phaedo) to be surpassed by it, and presenting his own greatness to B (Socrates) as something surpassing his smallness.' The reading ὑπέχων is not merely a conjecture of Madvig's, as even the most recent editors say, but the best attested MS. reading (TW). The meaning of ὑπέχων is much the same as that of παρέχειν, and it takes the same construction, the epexegetic infinitive active (ὑπερέχειν), which we express by a passive. Cp. Gorg. 497 b 9 ὑπόσχες Σωκράτει εἶξελέγχαι.

d 2 'Εσκα... συγγραφικῶς ἔρειν, 'it looks as if I were about to acquire a prose style.' Wyttenbach took συγγραφικῶς as referring to the language in which Ψηφίαμορα were drafted, comparing Gorg. 451 b 7 ὄσπερ αἰ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ συγγραφώμενοι. Heindorf derived it from συγγραφή, a 'bond' or 'indenture', and thought of legal phraseology. On the whole, it seems to me more likely that there is a reference to the balanced antitheses of Gorgias and his followers, of which the preceding sentence certainly reminds one. The word συγγραφικῶς only occurs in late writers, but there it is the adjective of συγγραφεῖός and always refers to prose style. This interpretation makes the fut. inf. ἔρειν more natural than the others.

d 7 τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος: the form of greatness, so far as it 'is present' in us or we 'participate' in it.

d 9 ὕστερῳ τῷ ἐπετοικ ἐκτ. This alternative is important for the argument, and the terminology should be noticed. If any form is 'in' a given thing, that thing will not admit (δέχεσθαι) any form which is opposed to it. The original form will either (1) withdraw from (or 'evacuate') the thing, or (2) perish. The metaphors are military throughout this discussion.

e 2 ὑπομένων δὲ κτλ. These words explain the following. 'It refuses to be something other than it was by holding its ground and admitting smallness.' Here ὑπομένειν 'to hold one's ground' is used as the opposite of ὑπεκχωρεῖν 'to get out of the way', 'to withdraw in favour of' (its opposite).

e 3 ὄσπερ ἐγώ κτλ. Socrates can 'admit' either greatness or smallness without ceasing to be Socrates; but the greatness which is 'in' Socrates cannot 'admit' smallness.
e 5 tetôlðµικεν seems to be suggested by the military metaphor.

1.1 ev τούτω τῷ παθήματι, 'when this happens to it,' i.e. when it is attacked by its opposite.

a 4 ou σαφῶς μέμνημαι is probably nothing more than a touch of realism. We need not look for covert meanings.

a 5 ev tois próstheν ... λόγων: 70 d 7 sqq.

ηµῖν is the reading of W, but υµῖν (BT) is also possible.

a 8 aυτῇ εἶναι, 'to be this,' a change of construction from τὸ μεύζων γέγνεθαι. Both the personal and the impersonal construction are admissible with ὁμολογεῖτα.

II παραβαλλών τὴν κεφαλήν, 'turning his head' as one naturally would to a new speaker (not 'bending').

b 3 τὸ ἐναντίου πράγμα: i.e. the thing in which there is an opposite form. It is a cold thing that becomes hot and a hot thing that becomes cold; hot does not become cold, or cold hot. In the previous illustration Socrates is the σμικρὸν πράγμα which may become μέγα, though smallness cannot admit greatness.

b 5 τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει (sc. ἐναντίων) is the opposite form αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό as opposed to τὸ ἐν ἡµῖν which is chosen as an instance of the form so far as it is 'in' a thing. For this way of speaking of the εἴδη cp. Rep. 597 b 5 where the 'ideal bed' is spoken of as ἐν τῇ φύσει ὁδός, and Parm. 132 d 1 τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὧσπερ παραδείγματα ἔσταναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτως ἐσκέναι. All Greek thinkers use the word φύσις of that which they regard as most real. The Ionians meant by it the primary substance (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 13); Socrates means by it the world of εἴδη.

b 6 τῶν ἐχοντων τῷ ἐναντίᾳ: a clearer expression for τῶν ἐναντίων πραγμάτων.

b 7 τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ: cp. 102 b 2.

b 8 ἄν ἐνόησων: governed by τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν (not gen. abs.).

c i γένοιτι ἄλλῃ λόγῳ, 'becoming one another', 'turning into one another'.

c 5 Oίδ'S αὐτο κτλ. On previous occasions (77 a 8; 86 e 5) we have heard of the doubts of Cebes, but 'he does not feel his doubts return on this point' (Geddes).

καίτοι οὔτε λέγω κτλ. Here we have another hint that the doctrine is not fully worked out. Cp. above 100 d 5 and below 107 b 5.
We now advance beyond the merely tautological judgements with which we have been dealing hitherto, to judgements of which the subject is a thing and the predicate a form. We have seen that hot will not admit cold or cold heat; we go on to show that fire will not admit cold, nor snow heat. We advance from the judgement 'A excludes B' to 'a excludes B'.

It will be found helpful to keep this simple instance in mind all through the following passage.

\[\text{\textit{\text{διπερ} is regularly used to express identity. A is not identical with a nor B with b.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{\text{εστιν ... ὡστε: cp. 93 b 4 n.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{\text{τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄνοματος, 'its own name,' the name of the \textit{eidos}, e.g. hot or cold (αξιοῦσθαι, 'to be entitled to').}}\]

\[\text{\textit{\text{ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι, sc. ἀξιοῦσθαι αὐτοῦ, i.e. τοῦ ὄνοματος τοῦ εἴδους, e.g. fire and snow; for fire is always hot and snow is always cold.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{\text{τὴν ἐκεῖνον μορφὴν: i.e. τὴν ἐκεῖνον ἱδέαν, τὸ ἐκεῖνου εἴδος. The three words are synonyms. Observe how the doctrine is formulated. There are things, not identical with the form, which have the form as an inseparable predicate (ἀεί, ὁτανπερ ἦ).}}\]

\[\text{\textit{\text{δει ... τυχάνειν, i.e. ἀξιοῦται.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{\text{διπερ νῦν λέγομεν, sc. τὸ περιττόν.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{\text{μετὰ τοῦ ἐαυτοῦ ὄνοματος, 'along with its own name,' whatever that may be. In addition to its own name we must also call it odd (τοῦ τοῦ καλεῖν, sc. περιττόν) because it is essentially (φύσει, cp. πεφυκέναι) odd.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{\text{λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι κτλ., 'I mean by the case mentioned (αὐτό) such a case as that of the number three,' which is not only entitled to the name 'three', but also, and essentially, to the name 'odd'. Similarly fire is not only entitled to the name 'fire', but also, and essentially, to the name 'hot'.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{\text{ὀντος οὐχ διπερ κτλ. Most editors adopt Heindorf's conjecture oντερ for διπερ, which is demanded by grammar; for διπερ ought to be followed by ἡ τριάς (sc. ἐστίν). On the other hand, it may be urged that διπερ was so common in geometry, especially to express ratios, that it may hardly have been felt to be declarable. It is a symbol like: or =, and nothing more.}}\]

\[\text{\textit{\text{ὁ ἡμισερ τοῦ ἄρθρου ἄπας, 'one whole half of the numerical series.' For ὁ ἡμισερ instead of τὸ ἡμισερ see L. & S. s v. I. 2, and, for}}\]
the expression, *Theaet.* 147 e 5 ὑὲν ἄρμιθον πάντα δίχα διελάβαμεν ('we divided into two equal parts').

b 2 ὁ ἕτερος ... στίχος, 'the other row' or 'series'.

b 10 ἐπιαύτης ... c 2 ὑπομείναι: the military metaphors are still kept up.  
*Cp. 102 d 9 n.*

c 1 ἀπολλύμενα ᾧ ὑπεκφρόντα, as if dependent on φαίνεται, b 7, the intervening εἰκή being ignored. We are now able to say that things which have opposite forms as their inseparable predicate refuse to admit the form opposite to that which is 'in' them, but either perish or withdraw at its approach. The simplest instance is that of snow which is not opposite to heat, but melts at its approach.

d 1 τάδε ... ἄ κτλ. We are not defining a class of εἰδή, but a class of things (c 8 ἄλλ' ἄττα) which are not αὕτα ἑναυτία to the 'attacking' form. It has not been suggested in any way that fire and snow are εἰδή, and it seems improbable that they are so regarded. On the other hand, 'three,' which, for the purposes of the present argument, is quite on a level with fire and snow, is spoken of (d 5) as an ἑδία. It is this uncertainty which creates all the difficulties of the present passage. That, however, is not surprising; for, in the *Parmenides,* Plato represents Socrates as hesitating on this very point, and as doubtful whether he ought to speak of an εἰδὸς of 'man, fire, or water'. This, however, does not affect the argument. We need only speak of 'things' without deciding whether they are 'forms' or not.

ἄ δτι ἄν κατάσχη κτλ. Things which, though not themselves opposite to a given thing, do not withstand its attack, are 'those which, if one of them has taken possession of anything, it compels it not only to assume its own form, but also in every case that of something opposite to it' (i.e. to the attacking form). The illustration given just below makes it quite clear that this is the meaning, though the pronouns are a little puzzling, and will be dealt with in separate notes. The verb κατέχειν keeps up the military metaphor; for to 'occupy' a position is χωρίαν κατέχειν.

d 2 τὴν αὕτου ἑδίαν, sc. τὴν ταύ κατασχόντος. There is nothing abnormal in the shift from plural (ἄ) to singular in a case like this. After an indefinite plural some such subject as 'any one of them' is often to be supplied, and κατάσχη is felt to be singular in meaning as well.
as in form, as is shown by ὅτι ἔν and αὐτό, whereas at d 5 we have ἀν κατάσχη duly followed by αὐτοῖς. For the change of number cp. also 70 e 5 n. and ἱλασμόν 667 b 5. δεὶ τόδε ... ὑπάρχειν ἀπασιν ὅσα ἐσσυμπαρέπεται τις χάρις, ἃ ταῦτα αὐτό μόνον (sc. τὴν χάριν) αὑτοῦ τὸ σπουδαιότατον εἶναι κτλ.

d 2  αὐτό refers to ὅτι ἔν κατάσχη, the thing occupied. For the slight pleonasm cp. 99 b 6; c 8. The meaning is fixed by d 6 ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς referring to ἀν ... κατάσχη.

d 3  αὐτό is omitted by most editors, but the meaning of ἐναντίον is by no means clear without a dative. If we remember once more that we are defining a class of things which do not hold their ground before the onset of an opposite, it is not difficult to interpret αὐτό as 'the opposite in question' implied in τὰ ἐναντία σοῦ ὑπαγένει ἐπιώντα above. This is also borne out by the illustration given below. It is the form of the odd which prevents the approach of the even to three, just as it is the form of cold which prevents the approach of heat to snow. (Cp. below e 9 τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον δεὶ αὐτό ἐπιφέρει. This last passage is strongly against the reading δεὶ for δεὶ, which I regard as a mere corruption (ἈΕΙ, ΔΕΙ).

d 12  ἡ περίττή, sc. μορφή. There does not seem to be any other instance of this brachylogy. The normal use is seen just below in ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίον.

e 5  Ἀνάρτης ἄρα. The precise point of this step in the argument only emerges at 105 d 13 sqq. The term περίττος, 'odd,' does not at first seem parallel to a term like ἀνθάνατος. As Wohlrab says, the point would not require to be made in German; for in that language the odd is called das Ungerade.

e 7  ὁρίσασθαι: W has ὁρίσασθαι δεῖν, which gives the meaning, but is probably due to interpolation. Tr. 'What I said we were to define'.

ποιὰ κτλ. Fire, for instance, is not opposite to cold nor snow to heat, yet fire will not admit cold, nor will snow admit heat.

e 8  αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον. It is plain from αὐτὸ δέχεται in the next line that αὐτό must refer to the same thing as τῷ, and, in that case, τὸ ἐναντίον can only be added if we suppose τῷ to mean virtually τῶν ἐναντίων τῷ, 'one of a pair of opposites,' and take αὐτό as 'the opposite in question'. I cannot attach any appropriate sense to the vulgate αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον, which ought to mean 'what is actually
opposite to it', which would imply e.g. that snow will not admit the cold. The same objection applies to the variant αὐτῷ τὸ ἑναντίον adopted by Schleiermacher and Stallbaum. Wytenbach proposed either to delete τὸ ἑναντίον or to read τὸ οὕκ ἑναντίον. The former proposal would simplify the sentence; the latter shows that he understood it.

e 8 νῦν, 'in the present case.'
e 10 ἐπιφέρει is another military metaphor (cp. ἐπιφέρειν πόλεμον, bellum inferre, ὀπλα ἐπιφέρειν &c.). Tr. 'it always brings into the field its opposite', i.e. τὸ περιττὸν. It is very important to notice that ἐπιφέρειν is always used of the thing 'attacked', while ἑπιέναι and κατέχειν are used of the thing which 'attacks' it. Ἐπιφέρειν refers to the means of defence. It is, we may say, τὸ ἄμυνόμενον which ἑναντίον τι ἐπιφέρει τῷ ἑπιόμενῳ. Further, ἑπιέναι is not the same thing as κατέχειν, which implies a successful ἔφοδος.

η δυᾶς τῷ περιττῷ, sc. τὸ ἑναντίον ἐπιφέρει, i.e. τὸ ἄρτιον.

a 1 ἄλλα ὅρα κτλ. ἄλλα resumes after the parenthesis with a slight anacoluthon.

a 2 μὴ μόνον κτλ. Taking the same instance as before, not only does cold refuse to admit its opposite, heat, but so does snow, which always brings cold (which is the opposite of heat) into the field against it in self-defence.

a 3 ἄλλα καὶ ἐκεῖνο κτλ. All editors seem to take ἐκεῖνο as subject of δέξασθαι and antecedent to δ ἄν ἐπιφέρῃ, but that leads to great difficulties, the chief of which are that we have to refer ἐκεῖνο to something other than ἐκεῖνο and to take ἐφ' ἄτι δ ἄν αὐτό ἤγ of the thing which is being attacked instead of the attacking form. Riddell (Dig. § 19) took ἐκεῖνα (sc. ὀριζη) as an accusative pronoun in apposition to what follows. I prefer to take it as the object of δέξασθαι and closely with ἐφ' ἄτι δ ἄν αὐτό ἤγ. The subject of δέξασθαι will then be δ ἄν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἑναντιον ἐκεῖνῳ. Then αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον repeats δ ἄν ἐπιφέρῃ κτλ. and τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερόμενον ἑναντιότητα repeats ἐκεῖνο. We have thus an instance of interlaced order (a b a b) which is, I take it, what Socrates means by speaking συγγραφικῶς.

a 5 οὐ ... χέρον, 'it is just as well.'


a 7 τὸ δεπλάσιον, in apposition to τὰ δέκα, 'which is the double of five,' and therefore an even number.
a 8 τούτο μὲν οὖν κτλ. I formerly inserted ošk before ἐναρτῖον with
most editors, but this leaves καὶ and the concessive μὲν οὖν without
any meaning. I now interpret: 'It is quite true that this (the
double) is itself opposite to another thing (viz. the single, τὸ ἀπλοῦν);
but at the same time it will also refuse to admit the form of the odd'
to which it is not itself opposite). The reason is, of course, that τὸ
dιπλάσιον always ἑπιφέρει τὸ ἄρτιον, brings the even into the field to
resist the attack of the odd; for all doubles are even numbers. It
goes without saying that it will not admit τὸ ἀπλοῦν which is its own
opposite.

b 1 οὔδε δὴ κτλ. The almost accidental mention of double and single
suggests another opposition, that of integral and fractional. With
Heindorf, I take the construction to be οὔδε δὴ τὸ ἡμύλλον (3) οὔδε
tάλλα τὰ τοιάτα, τὸ ἡμύσυ (1/2) καὶ τριμυσόμοιον αὖ (1/2) και τάντα τὰ
tοιαύτα (δέχεται) τὴν τοῦ ἀλοῦ (ἰδέαν). If we observe the slight colloquial
hyperbaton of τὴν τοῦ ἀλοῦ, there is no need to interpret τὸ ἡμύσυ in
an artificial way (as 'fractions whose denominator is 2', like 3/2 and 1/2)
or to delete it. No given fraction is itself opposite to τὸ ἀλοῦ, but
they all 'bring into the field' τὴν τοῦ μορίου ἱδέα in self-defence
against the attack of τὸ ἀλοῦ.

b 5 δὲ ἐν ἐρωτῶ, 'in the terms of my question' (Church). The
readings of the MSS. vary considerably, but the meaning is clear
from the sequel.

b 6 λέγω δὴ κτλ., 'I say this because, as a result of our present
argument, I see another possibility of safety over and above (παρ') that
safe answer I spoke of at first' (1οο d 8).

b 9 φ' δὲ τι κτλ., 'what must be present in anything, in its body (i.e.
in a thing's body'), to make it warm?' The text is not quite cer-
tain, and it would no doubt be simpler to omit εὖ τῷ with Stephanus,
thus making the construction the same as in c 3. It is possible,
however, to understand εὖ τῷ σώματι as a further explanation of
φ' δὲ ἐγγένεται, so I have let it stand.

c 1 τὴν ἀμαθῆ, 'foolish.' Cp. 1οο d 3. The irony is kept up.

c 2 κομψότερον: κομψός is the urbane equivalent of σοφός, and ἀμαθῆ
is the regular opposite of σοφός (cp. 1οο c 8). We are taking a step
towards the κομψεῖαι which we deprecated before. ἐκ τῶν νῦν: cp. b 7.

φ' δὲ πῦρ. It is safe to say this because θερμότης is an inseparable
predicate of πῦρ, and so the presence of fire is a sufficient αἰτία of
bodily heat. This does not mean in the least that fire is the only such cause, as appears clearly from the other instances. There are other causes of disease than fever, and other odd numbers than the number one (ἡ μονάς).

Precedingly we could only say that participation in the form of life was the cause of life; but, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων, we may substitute ψυχή for ζωή, just as we may substitute πῦρ, πυρετός, μονάς for θερμήτης, νάσος, περιττήτης. There is not a word about the soul being itself a form or εἰδώς, nor is such an assumption required. The soul may perfectly well be said to 'occupy' the body without being itself an ἰδέα. It is a simple military metaphor (cp. 104 δ 1 π.), and implies no metaphysical theory.

The point is that, though ψυχή itself is not opposite to anything, it always 'brings into the field' something which has an opposite, namely life. We may say, then, that soul will not admit that opposite (i.e. death), but must either withdraw before it or perish.

The point here is mainly verbal. It has to be shown that what does not admit δάνατος may be called ἀδάνατος.

ἀμούσον ... τὸ δὲ ἄδικον stands for τὸ μὲν ἄμοσον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον by an idiom of which Plato is specially fond. Cp. Prot. 330 α 3 ἀλλα, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο, Theaet. 181 δ 5 δόο δή λέγω ... εἰδή κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ φοράν, Rep. 455 ε 6 γυνὴ ἱστρική, ἡ δ' οὖ, καὶ μονοκή, ἡ δ' ἀμοσοσ φυσει.

It has been proved that the soul will not admit death; but we have still to deal with two possible alternatives; for it may either 'withdraw' or 'perish'. This alternative actually exists in all other cases; but in the case of τὸ ἀδάνατον the second is excluded; for τὸ ἀδάνατον is ἵπσον factō ἀνόλεθρον. Therefore the soul must 'withdraw' at the approach of death.

The interposition of the subject is unusual, but cp. 106 ε 1. There is no contradiction in saying that 'the uneven' is perishable. If there were, three would be imperishable because it may be substituted for 'the uneven'.

tὸ ἄθερμον, though the reading rests only on the authority of the corrector of Τ, must be right (θερμῶν BTW Stob.). The word is coined, like ἀνάρτιος, to furnish a parallel to ἀδάνατος. Snow is to τὸ ἄθερμον as soul is to τὸ ἀδάνατον.
a 4 ἐπάγοι: another military metaphor.

a 8 τὸ ἄψυκτον: Wyettenbach conjectured ἄψυχρον to correspond with ἄθερμον, but ἄψυκτον, 'what cannot be cooled,' is a better parallel in sense, if not in form, to ἀδάνατον.

c 1 αὐτοῦ, sc. τοῦ περίπτου: ἄντ' ἐκείνου, sc. ἀντὶ τοῦ περίπτου.

d 2 τοῦτον γε ἐνεκα: cp. 85 b 8.

d 3 μὴ δέχοιτο: I can find no parallel to this use of μή. There are instances of μή with the potential optative in interrogations introduced by πῶς or τίνα τρόπου. We might have had πῶς ἂν . . . μὴ δέχοιτο; 'how could anything else avoid receiving?' and this is virtually what the sentence means (G. M. T. § 292).

107 a 5 ἄναβάλλοιτο is an instance of the optative without ἂν often found after such phrases as (οὐκ) ἔσθ' ἄστις . . ., (οὐκ) ἔσθ' ὅπως.

b 6 ἐπισκεπτέα σαφέστερον, if the text is sound, is a very striking anacoluthon due to the parenthesis. This sentence is just like the reference to the μακροτέρα ὁδὸς in Rep. 435 d and the μακροτέρα περιόδος, ib. 504 b. It is clear that the πρῶτα ὑποθέσεις which are to be re-examined are just those mentioned above, 100 b 5, that is to say, the 'Theory of Ideas' in the form in which it is presented to us in the Phaedo. Whether Socrates was conscious that the theory required revision, I am not prepared to say; but it is clear that Plato was. The re-examination of these ὑποθέσεις is to be found chiefly in the Parmenides and the Sophist, both dialogues in which Socrates does not lead the discussion.

b 9 τοῦτο αὐτό, viz. that you have followed up the argument as far as is humanly possible. If you make sure (σαφές) of this, you need seek no further. The argument ends with a fresh confession of the weakness of human arguments. Cp. 85 c 1 sqq.

οὔδὲν ἐπιτήστε περατέρω: cp. Tim. 29 c 8 ἀγαπᾶν χρή, μεμνημένους ὅσον λέγων ἐγὼ ὑμεῖς τε οἱ κρατεῖντο ἀνθρωπίνην ἔχομεν, ὥστε περὶ τοῦτον τὸν εἰκότα μὴθον ἀποδεχομένου πρέπει τοῦτον μηδὲν ἐτί πέρα ἄλλων.

The conclusion of the whole matter. The Myth (107 c 1—115 a 8).

c 2 ἐπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀδάνατος κτλ. Cp. Rep. 608 c 9 Τί οὐν; σει ἀδανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσοῦτον δεῖν χρόνον ἐπουδακέναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ υπὲρ τοῦ παντός;
c 3 ἐν δὲ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζήν, 'for which what is called life lasts.' For this way of speaking cp. II. xi. 757 καὶ ᾿Αλησίον ἐνθα καλώνη | κέκληται. Wytenbach quotes several poetical parallels and Xen. Hell. v. i. 10 ἐνθα ἡ Τριτυργία καλεῖται.

c 4 νῦν δὴ, nunc demum. Cp. 61 e 6 n.

c 6 ἔρμαυν, 'a godsend,' Schol. τῷ ἀπροσδόκητον κέρδος. The word was properly used of treasure-trove ('windfall,' auubaine), which was sacred to Hermes. Cp. Symp. 217 a 3 ἔρμαυν ἥγησάμην εἶναι καὶ εὐτύχημα ἐρῶν θαυμαστῶν and the expression κοινὸς ἕρμης, 'Shares!' (Jebb on Theophrastus, Characters, xxvi. 18).

c 8 νῦν δὲ, 'but, as it is ...'

d 4 τροφῆς: cp. 81 d 8 n.

λέγεται, sc. ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, in the mystic doctrine. Cp. 67 c 5 n.

d 6 ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων: cp. for the mystic doctrine of the guardian δαίμων Menander (fr. 550 Kock) ᾿Απαντὶ δαίμων ἀνάρχει συμπαρίσταται καὶ εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγῷ τοῦ βίου. The idea that the δαίμων has a soul allotted to it as its portion appears in the Epitaphios of Lysis. 78 τε δαίμων ὁ τὴν ἡμετέραν μοῖραν εἰληξός, and Theocritus iv. 40 ἀλαὶ τῷ σκληρῷ μάλα δαίμονος ἰδίῳ με λελόγχει. It was doubtless the common view, but is denied by Socrates in the Myth of Er (Rep. 617 e 1), where the προφήτης says: οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμονα ληξεῖται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρήσεσθε.

d 7 εἰς δὴ τὰν τόπον κτλ. We learn what the place was from Gorg. 524 a 1 οὕτα οὖν ... δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι. The 'meadow' of Judgement is Orphic. Note the use of δὴ τις in allusion to something mysterious. Cp. 108 c 1; 115 d 4. So δὲ δὴ, 107 e 1, 2. All through this passage δὴ is used to suggest something known to the speaker and to those whom he addresses, but of which they shrink from speaking.

d 8 διαδικασάμενος κτλ. In Rep. 614 c 4 we read that the Judges, ἑπειδὴ διαδικάσεως, bade the righteous proceed to the right upwards and the wicked to the left downwards. The active is used of the judges and the middle of the parties who submit their claims to judgement (cp. 113 d 3). The meaning cannot be, as has been suggested, 'when they have received their various sentences,' for that would require the passive, and διαδικάζεσθαι always means 'to submit rival claims to a court'.
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NOTES

e 1 τούς ἐνθέντες: cp. 76 d 8 n.
e 2 ἐν δὴ τυχεῖν: cp. d 7 n. I have adopted δὴ from Stobaeus rather than the MS. δεί, which reads awkwardly. Cp. Crat. 400 c 5 ὡς δικήν διδοῦσιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν δὴ ἑνεκα διδωσιν (referring to the Orphic doctrine).
e 4 ἐν πολλαῖς...περίοδοισ (ἐν of the time a thing takes cp. 58 b 8 n.). In Rep. 615 a 2 we have a χιλιετῆς πορεία, consisting of ten περίοδοι of a hundred years each. In the Phaedrus (249 a) the περίοδοι are longer.
e 5 ὁ Ἀισχυλός Τήλεφος. The references to this quotation in other writers seem to be derived from the present passage, not from the original play.
108 a 4 σχέσεις τε καὶ τριόδους, ‘partings of the way and bifurcations.’ The reading τριόδους was that of Proclus and Olympiodorus and is much better than the MS. περίοδους, which is probably due to περίοδοι in e 4. It is the only reading which gives a proper sense to the next clause (see next note), and goes much better with σχέσεις. Cp. also Gorg. 524 a 2 ἐν τῷ λειμῶν, ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἦς φέρετον τῷ ὀδῷ, ἤ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἢ δὲ εἰς Τάρταρον. Virgil, Aen. vi. 540 Hic locus est partes ubi se via findit in ambas.
a 5 θυσιῶν is better attested (TW Stob.) than the ὄσιῶν of B, though that is an ancient variant (γρ. W). The MS. of Proclus, in Remp. (85. 6 Kroll), has οὐσιῶν, which explains the corruption (Θ for Θ). The reading θυσιῶν alone fits the explanation of Olympiodorus, ὅπο τῶν ἐν τριόδους τιμῶν τῆς Ἐκάτης (cp. last note). The sacrifices to Hecate (Trivia) at the meeting of three ways are well attested, and Socrates means that these shadow forth the τριόδος in the other world.
a 7 οὔκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παράντα: i.e. the purified soul is familiar with the region through which it must travel.
a 8 ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν: 81 c 10.
περὶ ἐκένο (sc. τὸ σώμα) ἐπτιτημίνη, ‘in eager longing for’. The verb πτοεῖσθαι always refers to fluttering or palpitation of the heart, often, as here, caused by desire. For desire of the corporeal in a disembodied soul cp. 81 e 1.
b 4 ἀδίπερ: Cobet proposed ἀτερ, but cp. Π 3 a 2 οὐ...ἀδικεύονται (where, however, Schanz reads οἴ). The poetical form is not out of place here.
ToiovTov: i.e. ἀκάθαρτον.

The word is poetical, like the use of the simple ἐμπορος for 'wayfarer'.

αὐτῇ, 'by itself', 'alone'.

The χρόνοι are the περίοδοι. Cp. Prot. 320 a 7 πρὶν ἐξ μὴνας γεγονέναι.

δὴ τινες: cp. 107 d 7 n.

Aristophanes mentions a περίοδος containing the whole earth as among the furniture of the φανταστήριον (Clouds 206). In this passage, as we shall see, Socrates abandons the central doctrine of Ionic geography.

It is best not to inquire too curiously who this was. It was not Archelaus; for he believed the earth to be a flat disk hollow in the centre. It was not Anaximander; for he regarded the earth as cylindrical. It was not a Pythagorean; for the 'hollows' are distinctively Ionian. The influence of Empedocles on the details of the description is well marked. Such an attempt to reconcile opposing views may well have been made at Athens during the second half of the fifth century B.C., but hardly at any other time or anywhere else. Personally, I am quite willing to believe that the theory is that of Socrates himself. It can scarcely have been seriously entertained by Plato at the time he wrote the Phaedo; but it continued to have great influence. The cosmology of Posidonius, as we know it from the Περί κόσμου wrongly included in the Aristotelian corpus, is based upon that of the Phaedo, and it was in substance the cosmology of Posidonius which ultimately prevailed over the more scientific doctrines of the Academy, and dominated European thought till the time of Copernicus. The leading thought is that, if the earth is spherical, there must be other οἰκομέναι than the one we know; for our οἰκομένη is but a small portion of the surface of the sphere.
Eusebius has ὑφίστα, so perhaps we should read ὑφίστα for ὑφίστα with Heindorf, who shows that later writers quote the proverb in this form. The paroemiographers give several explanations of it, the simplest of which is that it comes ὑπὸ Γλαύκον Ἐπικοίνων ὡς πρῶτον κόλλησιν ἐφεύρε σιδήρου (cp. Hdt. i. 25). I believe, however, that the more complicated explanation is right, and that the reference is to a working model of the 'harmony of the spheres' originally designed by Hippasus, for which see Appendix II.

Not a, but anacoluthon.

e 5. ἦν μέγα ... ἔριφης οὐσία: the original Pythagorean doctrine (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 345). Note the propriety with which ὑφιστά is used for 'the world', i.e. everything contained within the heavens (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 31). Plato does not commit the anachronism of making Socrates adopt the later Pythagorean view, that the earth revolves round the Central Fire (E. Gr. Ph.² pp. 344 sqq.).

a 2. τὴν ὁμοιότητα, 'its equiformity.' This is another instance of historical accuracy in terminology; for the terms ὁμοιον and ὁμοιότης were originally employed where ἰσος and ἰσόντης would have been used later. Cp. Proclus' Commentary on the First Book of Euclid, p. 250. 22 Friedlein λέγεται γὰρ ὅτι πρῶτος ἐκεῖνοι (Θαλῆς') ἐπιστῆσαν καὶ εἰπέν ῥα παντὸς ἴσος ἡ τὰ σφαίρα, ἐν ἑσσάει γεννάται ἰσαὶ ἰσόν (Eucl. i. 5), ἀρχαίοις ἀναρχόντων δὲ τὰ ἵσος ὁμοιόν προσερχέται. Just as what we call equal angles were called similar angles, so a sphere was said to be 'similar every way.' Aristotle ascribes both the theory and the use of the term ὁμοιότης to Anaximander (de Coelo 295 b 11 ἐστὶ δὲ τινὲς οἱ διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἡμῶν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν γῆν) μένειν, ὡσπερ τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἀναξιμάνδρος' μᾶλλον μὲν γὰρ οὐκέτι ὁμοὶ ἡ κατὰ ἐς τὰ πλάσμα φέρεσθαι προσήκει τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἰδρυμένου καὶ ὁμοὶως πρὸς τὸ ἐξχατα ἔχον, ἀμα δ' ὁμόνωτον εἰς τὰναντία ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κινήσιν διδόντ' εἰς ἄνάγκης μένειν. It is quite wrong to take ὁμοιότης as referring to homogeneity of substance or density. As we shall see, the world is not homogeneous in substance at all.

a 3. τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς τὴν ἵσορροπίαν, 'the equilibrium of the earth itself.'
Anaximander's cylindrical earth could hardly be called ἵσσαρροπον like the Pythagorean spherical earth in the centre of a spherical world (αἰθρανός).

α 6 ὄμοιος... ἔχον is equivalent to ὄμοιον ἄν (πάντη). Cp. Aristotle loc. cit. (a 2 n.) ὄμοιος πρὸς τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχον.

α 8 Καὶ ἄρθος γε. The ready assent of Simmias marks the doctrine, so far, as Pythagorean.

α 9 πάρμεναὶ τι εἶναι is a direct contradiction of Archelaus, who said κείσθαι δὲ ἐν μέσῳ (την γῆν) αὑδέν μέρος αὕσαν, ὅς εἰσεῖν, τοῦ παντός (Hippolytus, Ref. i. 9. 3).


β 1 τὸν μὲχρι κτλ. The Pillars of Herakles are well known as the boundary of the οἰκουμένη on the west, and Aeschylus spoke of the Phasis as the boundary of Europe and Asia (fr. 185) διδύμων χθονὸς Ἑβρῶτης | μέγαν ἕδ᾽ Ἀσίας τερμάνα Φάσιν), cp. Hdt. iv. 45. So Eur. Hípp. 3 ὥσαι τε Πάντων τερμόνων τ᾽ Ἀτλαντικῶν ἐναντίον εἰσο.

β 2 περὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἀκούνται, 'dwelling round the Mediterranean (the θάλαττα κατ᾽ ἔξοχην) like frogs or ants round a swamp.' (Cp. Et. M. τέλματος πτηλόθης ὕδωρ ἔχον.)

β 3 καὶ ἄλλοις ἀλλοιτι κτλ. As Wytenbach saw, this part of the theory comes from Anaxagoras (and Archelaus). Cp. Hippolytus, Ref. i. 8. 9 εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὴν (τὴν γῆν) κολλήν καὶ ἔχειν ὕδωρ ἐν τοῖς κολλώμασιν ('Ἀναξαγόρας φησίν), ib. 9. 4 λίμνην γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον (τὴν γῆν), ἀτε κύκλῳ μὲν αὕσαν ὑψηλῆν, μέσαν δὲ κολλήν ('Ἀρχέλαος φησίν), a view which is obviously a generalization from the Mediterranean basin. Here it is combined with the theory of a spherical earth (Anaxagoras and Archelaus believed in a flat earth), and it is assumed that there are several such basins with water in the middle and inhabited land round them. According to Posidonius, too, there were many οἰκουμέναι, but they were islands, not hollows.

β 6 τὸ τε ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν ὄμιλην καὶ τὸν ἄρα. Here again Plato correctly represents fifth-century science, according to which water is condensed air, mist being the intermediate state between them (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 79, n. 1). The discovery of atmospheric air as a body different from mist was due to Empedocles (ib. p. 263) and Anaxagoras (ib. p. 309); but it appears that the Pythagoreans adhered to the older view. Cp. Τίμ. 58 d 1 ἄρας (γένη) τὸ μὲν εὐαγγέλτατον ἐπίκλην αἴθρη καλούμενος, ὅ δὲ θαλερώτατος ὄμιλη τε καὶ σκότος.
NOTES

b 7 αὐτὴν... τὴν γῆν: the true surface of the earth (called below 'the true earth'), as opposed to the basins or 'hollows'. It rises above the mist and 'air'. It is clear that we are to suppose considerable distances between the basins.

b 8 αἰθέρα: αἰθήρ is properly the sky regarded as made of blue fire. This, as we see from the passage of the *Timaeus* quoted in the last note, was supposed to be air still further rarefied. It is the intermediary between fire and air, as ὀμίχλη is that between air and water.

c 1 τοὺς πολλοὺς κτλ. This implies that Socrates knows the divergent views of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the former of whom gave the name αἰθήρ to atmospheric air (E. Gr. Ph.² p. 263 sq.), while the latter used it of fire (ib. p. 312 n. 1).

tὸν περὶ τὰ τοιάυτα εἰωθότων λέγειν: I do not know any other instance of περὶ c. acc. after λέγειν in Plato (Gorg. 490 c 8 is not one; for πλέον ἔχειν is 'understood' and λέγεις is parenthetical). I am inclined to think the words εἰωθότων λέγειν have been wrongly added from 108 c 7. For the resulting phrase cp. *Phaedr.* 272 c 7 ὁν (λόγον) τὸν περὶ ταύτα τινων ἀκήκοα, ib. 273 a 5 τοῖς περὶ ταύτα.

c 2 ὑποστάθην, 'sediment,' lit. 'lees' (τρυγία, τρύξ Hesych.). Note that air, mist, and water are the sediment of the αἰθήρ.

d 4 παρὰ σφίσι: Socrates is thinking of a whole people dwelling at the bottom of the sea. This is not inconsistent with εἶ τις above (c 4); for εἶ τις is continued by a plural oftener than not.

d 7 διὰ τοῦτον, sc. διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος.

d 8 τὸ δὲ εἶναι ταῦταν, 'whereas it is just the same thing' with us as with the imaginary dwellers at the bottom of the sea. For τὸ δὲ cp. 87 c 6 n. I see no reason to suspect the text. The *asynedeton explicatum* is quite in order; for εἶναι ταῦταν is explanatory of ταῦταν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμᾶς πεπονθέναι (cp. 72 c 3 n.).

e 2 ἐν' ἀκρα: the surface of the 'air' is parallel to that of the sea (d 1).

e 3 κατίδειν (ἀν): the δῆ of Eusebius is probably a trace of the lost ἄν (ΑΝ, ΔΗ), which might easily be dropped by haplography.

e 4 ἀνακυπτοντες: cp. *Phaedr.* 249 c 3 (ψυχή) ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ δῦνος. The position of the attributive participle outside the article and its noun is normal when there is another attribute. Cp. Phil. 21 c 2 τῆς ἐν τῷ παραχρήμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης.
NOTES.

e 5 οὕτως ἄν τινα ... καταδείκνυ is a good instance of a form of 'binary structure', noted by Riddell (Dig. § 209), in which 'the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it' (a b a).

e 7 ο ἀληθῶς ... τὸ ἀληθεύον ... ἢ ὁς ἀληθῶς: observe how Plato varies the expression.

io a r θδε ... η γῇ 'this earth of ours,' i.e. the hollow in which we dwell and which we take to be the surface of the earth.

a 5 σήραγγες, σήραγξ, ὑφαλος πέτра ἤγγματα ἔχουσα, Hesych., Suid.

a 6 οπου ἄν καὶ [η]. γῇ ὧν 'wherever there is earth,' to mix with the water. Though there is no good authority for the omission of η, it is certainly better away.

a 8 ἔκανα, the things above on the true earth which are in turn (a) as superior to what we have as those are to the things in the sea.

b r ει γάρ· δή ... καλῶν is far the best attested reading, though B omits καλῶν and alters δή to δεί. Olympiodorus apparently had δεί and καλῶν, for he finds it necessary to explain why the μῦθος is called beautiful. It is to be observed that a μῦθος is only in place where we cannot apply the strictly scientific method. There is nothing 'mythical' about the εἰδη, but all we call 'natural science' is necessarily so, as is explained at the beginning of the Timaeus. It is, at best, a 'probable tale'. Cp. Taylor, Plato, pp. 50-2.

b 6 η γῇ αὐτῇ, 'the true earth.'

δισεπερ αἰ δωδεκάκυτοι σφαῖραι, 'like balls made of twelve pieces of leather.' This is an allusion to the Pythagorean theory of the dodecahedron, which was of special significance as the solid which most nearly approaches the sphere (Gr. Ph. 2 p. 341 sq.). To make a ball, we take twelve pieces of leather, each of which is a regular pentagon. If the material were not flexible, we should have a regular dodecahedron; as it is flexible, we get a ball. This has nothing to do with the twelve signs of the zodiac, as modern editors incorrectly say. Cp. Tim. 55 c 4 ἐτι δὲ οὕτως συντάσεως μιᾶς περιττήσ (a fifth regular solid besides the pyramid or tetrahedron, the cube, and the icosahedron), ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν δ θεὸς αὐτῇ κατεχρήσατο ἐκείνο διαζωγραφών ('when he painted it,' see next note). The author of the Timaeus Locrus is perfectly right in his paraphrase of this (98 e) τὸ δὲ δωδεκάδρον εἰκόνα τοῦ παντὸς ἐστάσατο, ἔγγυστα σφαῖρας ἔον. The whole matter is fully explained in Wytenbach's note,
from which it will be seen that it was clearly understood by Plutarch, Simplicius, and others. Proclus, in his *Commentary on the First Book of Euclid*, shows how the whole edifice of the *Elements* leads up to the inscription of the regular solids (κοσμικά or Πλατωνικά σχήματα) in the sphere.

b 7 ἥρμασιν διειλημμένη. The true earth is represented as a patchwork of different colours (for διειλημμένη cp. 81 c 4 n.). This must be the explanation of the words ἐκείνο διαζωγράφων, 'painting it in different colours' (cp. διαποικίλλω). Each of the twelve pentagons has its own colour.

b 8 δείγματα, 'samples.' In the same way our precious stones are 'pieces' (μορφα) of the stones of the true earth (below, d 8).

c 2 τολῷ ἐκ λαμπροτέρων: for the position of ἐκ cp. 70 c 1 n.

η τοῦτων: the case after η assimilated to that before η (Riddell, Dig. § 168). Cp. *Men* 83 c 8 ἀπὸ μείζονος . . . ἡ τοσαύτης γράμμας, *Laws* 892 b 1 οὐσίας γ' αὐτής (sc. ψυχῆς) πρεσβυτέρας ἡ σῶματος.

τὴν μὲν . . . , sc. γῆ, 'one portion of it,' one pentagon.

c 4 τὴν δὲ δοσὶ λευκή, 'all the part of it which is white.'

c 6 καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα κτλ. The meaning is that, as the basins or 'hollows' are full of 'air' and water, the surfaces of these produce the appearance of glistening patches among the other colours, so that the general appearance is that of a continuous (συνεχές) surface of various colours (πουκλον).

c 7 ἐκπλεα is quite a good word, and there is no need to read ἐμπλεα with inferior authorities.

d 3 ἀνά λόγον, 'proportionally.'

d 6 τὴν τε λειτουργα: so W. B makes the almost inevitable mistake τὴν τελείωσα, and so at first did T, but erased it in time.

d 7 ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα, 'the precious stones that are so highly prized in our world.' Prof. Ridgeway has some interesting observations on the relation between the Pythagorean solids and natural crystals in *Class. Rev.* x (1896) p. 92 sqq..

e 1 οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ, 'every one of them.' The phrase is regularly treated as a single word equivalent to πάντα. Hence the plural καλλίω.

e 3 οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένη κτλ. Another instance of interlaced order (a b a b); for ὡσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ἐν τῶν δεόρο συνεργηκότων go closely together, and ὑπὸ σηπεδίνου καὶ ἀλμῆς goes with διε-
The νυμφηκότα are water, mist, and air (cp. τοίς ἄλλοις). The νυμφηκότα are water, mist, and air.

To animals and plants besides.' Cp. Gorg. 473 c 7 ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξένων.

This is an attempt to fit the old idea of the Islands of the Blessed into the mythical landscape. Cp. Pindar, Ol. ii. 130 ἐνθα μακάρων | νάσος οἰκεινοίς | αὖρα περιπεσοίων, which is humourously paraphrased by ἀς περιπρείν τῶν ἄφρα, the air being the sea in which these islands are. But they are 'close to the mainland', otherwise we should see them from our hollow! The suggestion of Olympiodorus, that these men feed on the apples of the Hesperides, is therefore not so wide of the mark as might appear.

The ἀναίδου is 'climate'.

It is, therefore, wrong to read ὁσφρήσει with Heindorf. Cp. Rep. 367 c 7 οἶνον ὀρῶν, ἄκουειν, φρονεῖν.

This reading was adopted by Heindorf from the apographa. In the Lexicon of Timaeus we read ἐδος· το ἄγαλμα. καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ὃ ἑδρυται, and, as the word does not occur elsewhere in Plato, this may indicate that Timaeus read it here, but ἀληθήι seems better. Cp. Livy, xxxv. 5 i in fano luceo.

Like φάτης and κληθῶν, φήμη is used of omens conveyed by the hearing of significant words. Virg. Aen. vii. 90 Et variás auditiones, fruiturque deorum | colloquio.

Not in dreams or visions, as some say. The point is just that they see the gods with their waking senses.

Here πρὸς αὐτούς (τοὺς θεοὺς) belongs to συννοείς and αὐτοὺς (τοὺς ἀνθρώποις) to γίγνεται (a b b a).

This is an astronomer's vision of blessedness.
c 6 τούς μὲν κτλ. Three sorts of τόποι are enumerated (1) deeper and broader (than the Mediterranean basin), (2) deeper and narrower, (3) shallower and broader. The fourth possibility, shallower and narrower, is not mentioned. Plato does not care for symmetry of this kind.

c 8 αὐτοὺς: Heindorf read αὐτῶν from inferior MSS., and I formerly conjectured αὐτό. No change, however, is necessary. For the pleonasm cp. Riddell, Dig. § 223. It assists the shift from ἄντας to ἕχειν.

d 2 ὑπὸ γῆ... συνυπερήθησαν, 'are connected by subterranean openings.' This seems to come from Diogenes of Apollonia. Cp. Seneca, Nat. Quaest. iv. 2. 28 sunt enim perforata omnia et invicem pervia. The geological conformation of the country made such views seen very credible in Greece.

d 5 ἄσπερ εἰς κρατήρας: cp. Soph. Oed. Col. 1593 κοίλου πέλας κρατήρος ('near the basin in the rock', Jebb). A scholium on this passage of Sophocles runs: τοῦ μυχοῦ τὰ γὰρ κοίλα αὐτῶν ἐκαλουν ἐκ μεταφορᾶς ὤθεν καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ Αἴτνῃ κοιλώματα κρατήρες καλοῦνται. Cp. such names as 'The Devil's Punchbowl' in English. It is easier to understand how the crater of a volcano got its name, if we may trust this scholium, and the rocky basins fit in very well with the present context.

e 1 ἐν Σικελίᾳ κτλ. This seems to come from the Sicilian Empedocles, who explained the hot springs of his native island by comparing them to pipes used for heating warm baths (E. Gr. Ph.2 p. 277). The ῥύαξ is the lava-stream. Cp. Thuc. iii. 116 ἐρρύη δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐσφοῖν τὸ ῥύαξ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐκ τῆς Αἴτνης.

e 3 ὡς ἄν: the MSS. have ἄν ἄν, but Stallbaum's conjecture ὡς ἄν is now confirmed by Stobaeus.

e 4 τοῦτο δὲ πάντα κτλ. The theory is thus stated in Aristotle's Meteoro-logiká, 355 b 32 sqq. τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ Φαῖδων γεγραμμένον περὶ τέ τῶν ποταμῶν καὶ τῆς βαλαττηθεῖσας ἀδύνατον ἐστιν. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπαντᾶ μὲν εἰς ἀληθὴ συνυπερήθησαν ὑπὸ γῆν, ἄρχῃ δὲ πάντων εἰς καὶ πηγῆ τῶν ὑδάτων ὁ καλούμενος Τάρταρος, περὶ τὸ μέσον ὑστὸς τὶ πλῆθος, ἢσ' ὡς καὶ τὰ ῥέοντα καὶ τὰ μῆ́ ῥέοντα ἀναδίδουσι πάντα. τὴν δ' ἐπίφθειν ποιεῖν ἐφ' ἐκαστὰ τῶν ῥεμάτων διὰ τὸ σαλεύειν ἀεὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὴν ἄρχῃν οὖν ἕχειν γὰρ ἐδοξασθεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ περὶ τὸ μέσον εἰλείσθαι (Ἰ. Ἀλεσθαὶ, 'oscillate') κινούμενον δ' ἅνω καὶ κάτω ποιεῖν τὴν ἑπίθυμην τῶν ῥεμάτων. τὰ δὲ πυλαχυν ὡς λιμνάζειν, οἶναν καὶ τὴν παρ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τάλασσαν, πάντα δὲ
πάλιν κύκλῳ περιάγειν εἰς τὴν ἀρχήν, δὴν ἥρξαντο ἰπὶ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ
catὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τόσα, τὰ δὲ καὶ καταντικρὸ τῇ βέβει τῆς ἐκροῆς, αἰῶν εἰ μὲν
ἀρξαντο κάτωθεν, ἄνωθεν εἰς βάλλειν. εἰναι δὲ μέχρι τοῦ μέσου τῆν κάθεσιν
τὸ γὰρ λοιπὸν πρὸς ἀνατες ἢδη πάσιν εἰναι τὴν φοράν. τοὺς δὲ χυμοὺς καὶ
τὰς χρῶς ἵσχειν τὸ ὀδωρ δὲ ὦια ἂν τύχωσι βέοντα γῆς.

4  ἀστερ παιδραν τινά (cp. 66 b 4 n.), 'a sort of see-saw,' ἀντιταλάντωσις
Olympiodorus, cp. French balancement from bilancem. The term
αιώρησις, gestatio, was familiar in medical practice, where it was
used of any exercise in which the body is at rest, sailing, driving, &c.
(cp. Tim. 89 a 7), and αἰώρα meant a 'swing' or 'hammock' (Laws
789 d 3). Aristotle's paraphrase has διὰ τὸ συλέων. The whole
description shows that a sort of pulsation, like the systole and
diastole of the heart, is intended. The theory is, in fact, an instance
of the analogy between the microcosm and the macrocosm (E. Gr.
Ph. 3 p. 79), and depends specially on the Empedoclean view of the
close connexion between respiration and the circulation of the
blood (E. Gr. Ph. 2 p. 253).

12 a 1  διαμπέρες τετρήμενον, 'perforated right through.' Tartarus has
another opening antipodal to that first mentioned. We are not
told that it is a straight tunnel, but that seems likely, and we
shall see that it passes through the centre of the earth. So, too,
Dante's Hell is a chasm bored right through the earth (Inferno,
xxxiv, sub fin., Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 101).

ζέρεθρον, was the special name for the singular "Katavothra" of
Arcadia' (Geddes). Cp. Strabo, p. 389 τῶν βερέθρων, ἄ καλοῦσιν οἱ
Ἀρκάδες ζέρεθρα, τυφλῶν ἄντων καὶ μὴ δεχομένων ἀπέρασιν. The whole
account of Stymphalus, from which this is taken, is very suggestive
of the present passage.

a 4  ἀλλοθε: II. viii. 481.

a 7  δι' οἰκας ἄν ... γῆς: Aristotle (l. c. sub fin.) specifies taste and
colour as the characteristics the rivers derive from the earth they
flow through.

b 2  πυθμένα ... βάσιν: Aristotle (loc. cit.) says ἐδραν. There is no
bottom at the centre of the earth. 'On comprendra la pensée de
Platon en se rappelant que théoriquement une pierre jetée dans
un puits traversant la terre selon un diamètre irait indéfiniment
d'une extrémité à l'autre' (Couvreur). We must keep in mind

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throughout this passage that everything falls to the earth's centre. The impetus (ὀρμή) of the water takes it past the centre every time, but it falls back again, and so on indefinitely.

b 3 αἰωρεῖται δὴ κτλ. Aristotle (loc. cit.) says 'ελεῖν ἐκλείσθαι, for which we must read ἔλεισθαι, the proper word for oscillatory or pendulum motion. (Cp. Tim. 40 b 8, where I take the meaning to be the same. E. Gr. Ph. 3 p. 346 sq.)

καὶ κυμαῖνει: the doxographical tradition connects this with the tides. Cp. Aëtius on the ebb and flow of the tides (Dox. p. 383) Πλάτων ἐπὶ τὴν αὔραν φέρεται τῶν ὑδάτων εἶναι γὰρ τινὰ φυσικὴν αὔραν διὰ τινος ἐγγείαν τρίχματος περιφέρουσαν τὴν παλίρροιαν, ὑφ' ἡς ἀντικυμάνεσθαι τὰ πελάγη. From this we may infer that there are two oscillations a day.

b 4 τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ, sc. τὸ περὶ τὸ υγρόν. The πνεύμα is mentioned because the whole theory is derived from that of respiration. Cp. the account of ἀνάπνοι ἐν Tim. 80 d 1 sqq., where much of the phraseology of the present passage recurs: τὸ τῆς ἀνάπνοῆς . . . γέγονεν . . . τέμυναντας μὲν τὰ σείτα τοῦ πυρός, αἰωρομένου δὲ ἐντὸς τὸ πνεύματι συνεπαμένου (cp. b 4), τὰς φλέβας . . . τῇ συναναρχῇ (cp. b 7) πληροῦντας τὸ . . . ἐπαντλεῖν (cp. c 3). Brunetto Latini 'speaks, very much in the same way as Plato does, of waters circulating in channels through the Earth, like blood through the veins of the body' (Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 103).

b 5 εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ ἐκεῖνα . . . εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ τὰδε, 'in the direction of the further side of the earth' (the antipodes), 'in the direction of the hither side'.

c 2 τὸν δὴ κατω καλοῦμενον: the words δὴ and καλοῦμενον are a protest against the popular view that the antipodes are 'down'. It is just to avoid this incorrectness that Socrates says τὰ ἐπὶ ἐκεῖνα, or τὰ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα.

τῶν κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα . . . εἰσρέιτι, 'the streams flow into the regions on the further side of the earth,' as opposed to τὰ ἐνθάδε. I apprehend that τῶν κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα must be explained in the same way as b 5 τὸ ἐπὶ ἐκεῖνα, and in that case τὰ βεῦματα must be the subject. Further, if we omit διὰ in c 3 with Stobaeus, we may take τῶν κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τῆς γῆς together. Even if we retain διὰ I have no doubt that we must 'understand' τῆς γῆς after τῶν κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνα. Cp. Aristotle's paraphrase (loc. cit. i 11. 4 π.) τὴν δὲ ἐπιρρουσὶν ποιεῖν ἐφ᾽ ἐκαστα τῶν βεν-
μάτων, where τῶν βευμάτων is governed by ἐπιρρυσιν, and ἐφ’ ἐκαστα means ἐπ’ ἐκείνα καὶ ἐπὶ τάδε.

c 3 ὁσπερ ὁι ἐπαντλοῦντες, sc. πληροῦσιν, 'like irrigators.' The word ἐπαντλεῖν is used of raising water to a height for purposes of irrigation (Dict. Ant. s. v. Antilia). No stress is to be laid on the particular process by which this is done; the point of the simile lies in the way the water rises to a point further from the centre (whether on this side of it or the other) and then flows off through the channels (ὁχετοί, τίνις) like irrigation waters.

c 4 ἐκεῖθεν...δεύορ, 'from the antipodes...towards us.'

c 6 εἰς τοὺς τόπους κτλ. All the streams are raised by the ἀλώρα above the centre (on either side) and are drained off to τόποι on the surface of the earth, from which they once more find their way back to Tartarus by subterranean channels.

c 7 ἐκάστοις ὀδοποιηταί, 'a way is made for each of them.' The simile of the irrigation-channels is kept up. The ὀδοποιηταί of W confirms the ὀδοποιηταί of Stobaeus, and T has ἐκάστοι as well as Stobaeus. The reading of B (εἰς οὐς ἐκάστους ὀδοποιηταί) is inferior to this.

d 3 Ἐξ ἀντε...: there is some doubt as to the necessity of inserting ἀντε here and in d 5. It seems safer, however, to insert it. In Symp. 173 a 6 B has ἀντε and TW ἄντε. In Crito 44 a BTW have ἄντε.

d 4 ὑποκάτω εἰσερχεται ἡ ἑκροθής, 'at a lower level than the point of issue' really means nearer the centre of the earth, not nearer the antipodes.

d 5 καταντεκρυ...κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος: Aristotle (loc. cit. III 4 n.) interprets these words by κατώσθεν and ἀνωθεν, by which he clearly means 'on the other side' and 'on this side of' the earth's centre. The choice of words is unfortunate (especially as he bases his criticism on them); for we have been warned (c 1) that to call the antipodes 'down' is only a popular way of speaking. In substance, however, Aristotle seems to me quite right in his interpretation. I do not see how κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος can mean 'on the same side of Tartarus', as many recent editors suppose. The phrase must surely be interpreted in the light of e 2 τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν...μέρος, which certainly refers to the sections of Tartarus on either side of the earth's centre. The difficulties which editors have raised about this interpretation are purely imaginary. So long as a stream falls
into Tartarus at a point nearer the earth’s centre than it issued
from it, it may correctly be said to fall into it ὑποκάτω τῆς ἑκροῖς,
quite irrespective of whether it debouches on this side of the earth’s
centre or on the other.

d 5 <ἡ> ἡ [ἐλορέ] ἐξέπεσεν, sc. ἐλορέ. If we omit ἐλορέ with Stobaeus
we can take ἡ (or ἡ ἡ) ἐξέπεσεν together as equivalent to τῆς ἑκροῖς.
It is important to observe that ἐκπίπτειν is the verb corresponding
to ἑκροῖ, and that the reference is to the point at which the stream
issues from Tartarus.

d 6 ἔστι δὲ & κτλ. We have had the case of streams which issue from
Tartarus in one hemisphere and fall into it in the other; we are now
told of streams which come back to the hemisphere in which they
started after circling round the other. They may even make this
circuit several times, but with each circuit they will be ‘lower’, i.e.
nearer the earth’s centre. Their course will therefore be a spiral, and
that is the point of περιπελαχθέντα ... ἀστερ ἡ ὀφέως, for ἐλιξ means
just ‘spiral’. As to περὶ τὴν γῆν it does not necessarily mean ‘round
(the outside of) the earth’. Cp. ΠΙΙ 3 Β 1 n.

d 8 καθένα is intransitive or rather ‘objectless’. Cp. Ar. Knights
430 ἐξείμι γὰρ σοὶ λαμπρὸς ἡδὴ καὶ μέγας καθεῖ (of a wind), and
ἀναγκαίειαι (sc. ἐαυτόν), ‘to condescend.’

e 1 ἐκατέρωσε μέχρι τοῦ μέσου, ‘in either direction as far as the
middle,’ that is to say, from either opening of Tartarus to its middle,
which coincides with the centre of the earth.

e 2 ἀναντες γὰρ κτλ., ‘for the part (of Tartarus) on either side (of the
centre) is uphill to both sets of streams,’ i.e. both to those which
fall into it καταντικρό ἡ ἡ ἐξέπεσεν and to those which fall into it
κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέρος. The πρός which B and W insert in different
places is probably due to an ancient variant πρόσαντες. How old
that variant must be is shown by the fact that Aristotle (loc. cit.)
has πρός ἀναντες. Heindorf conjectured πρώσω, and recent editors
follow him, but that is a non-Attic form and not used by Plato.

e 5 τυγχάνει δ’ ἀρα ὄντα κτλ. Cp. Od. xi. 157 μέσος γὰρ μεγάλοι
ποταμοί καὶ δεινὰ βέβηρα, Ἡ Ὀκεανὸς μὲν πρῶτα κτλ., ib. x. 513 ἦνα μὲν
eἰς Ἀχέρωντα Πυριφλεγέθων τε ἡρέουσι | Κωκυτός θ’, δ’ ἡ Στυγός ὕδατός
ἔστιν ἀπορροῖς.

e 6 ἐξωτάτω, ‘furthest from the centre.’

e 7 περὶ κύκλῳ, ‘round in a circle.’ There seems to be no doubt that
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περί can be used as an adverb in this phrase. Cp. Tim. 40 a 6 νείμας περί πάντα κύκλῳ τῶν οὐρανῶν, Laws 964 e 4 περί δὴν κύκλῳ τῆν πτιλων ὀρᾶν. The phrase is also found written in one word (v. L. & S. s. v. περίκυκλος) and this is how B writes it here. Perhaps Hermann is right in accenting περί to show that it is an adverb. We are not told that the λίμνη made by Oceanus is the Mediterranean, but that is doubtless so.

e 7 καταντικρύ, 'diametrically opposite,' i.e. on the opposite side of the centre of the earth (cp. ιπκδ 5 n.). Acheron is the antipodal counterpart of Oceanus, running in the opposite direction. It is fitting that the place of the dead should be in the other hemisphere. In the Axiocaus, an Academic dialogue of the third century B.C., we are told (371 b 2) that 'the gods below' took possession of τὸ ἐτέρον ἡμισφαῖρον.

a 1 ὑπὸ γῆν ἤλων: the Acherusian Lake is subterranean.


a 5 εἰς τὰς τῶν ἀφῶν γενέσεις, 'for the births of animals.' Cp. 81 e 2 sqq. τοῦτον κατὰ μέσον: i. e. at a point intermediate between Oceanus and Acheron. As Oceanus flows ἐξωτάτω, i. e. furthest from the centre (ιπκδ 6 n.), Acheron will branch off from Tartarus nearer the centre, but on the other side. The point intermediate between these ἐκβολαὶ will therefore be above the centre on the same side as Oceanus.

a 6 ἐκβάλλει, 'issues', 'branches off' (from Tartarus). The word is synonymous with ἐκπίπτει (ιπκδ 5 n.) and so is ἐκβολή with ἐκροή.

a 7 πυρὶ . . . καύμενον. It seems to me that this may have been suggested by the remarkable statements in the Περίπλουs of the Carthaginian Hanno (§§ ιι-14) about the regions blazing with fire which were seen on the voyage southward from Cape Verde to Sierra Leone. If so, Pyrophlegethon is doubtless the Senegal. The Περίπλουs, if genuine, would be well known in Sicily in the fifth century B.C.

b 1 περιελυττόμενος . . . τῆ γῆ is generally assumed to mean 'winding round the earth', whereas it is clear that, like Cocytus (c 3), Pyrophlegethon must go under the earth after leaving the λίμνη in order to reach the Acherusian Lake, which is certainly subter-
raranean. In the erroneous belief that Eusebius omits τὴ γῆ, most editors bracket the words; but this is quite unnecessary. They can quite well mean 'coiling itself round inside the earth' (ambire terram intus in ipsa, Stallbaum); cp. II. xxii. 95 ἐλισσόμενος περὶ χεῖρ of a serpent 'coiling himself round (the inside of) his nest' (Monro). Cπ. ΙΙΙ. d8 ὅσπερ οἱ ὅψεις.

b 3 οὐ συμμειγνύμενος τῷ θεατῷ: cp. ΙΙ. ii. 753 οὕδ᾽ ὅ γε (sc. Τιτορήσιος) Πηνειφ συμμιστείς ἀργυροδίνη, | ἀλλὰ τὲ μν καθύπερθεν ἐπιρρέει ἤντ᾽ ἐλαιον' ὅρκου γὰρ δεινοῦ Στυγὸς θεατός ἐστίν ἀπορρώξ.

b 4 κατωτέρω τοῦ Ταρτάρου, 'at a lower point in Tartarus,' i.e. nearer the earth's centre than the Acherusian Lake, which must itself be nearer the centre than the ἐκβολὴ of Pyriphlegethon, though on the opposite side.

b 6 ὅπη ἀν τὸ χωρί τῆς γῆς, 'at various points on the earth's surface.' This shows that Pyriphlegethon in its subterranean spiral course passes under Etna. For the ὑσκῆς cp. ΙΙΙ. e I n.

tοῦτον . . . καταντικρῆ: i.e. on the other side of the earth's centre, but nearer it than the ἐκβολὴ of Acheron, though further from it than the Acherusian Lake.

b 8 οὖν ὁ κνανός: it is not certain what substance is intended. In Theophrastus κνανός is lapis lazuli and that stone is probably meant here. In any case, we are to think of a bluish grey, steely colour, in strong contrast to the fiery plain of Pyriphlegethon.

c 1 ἐν δῆ, sc. τότον (not ποταμῶν). For δῆ cp. ΙΟΤ. e I n.

d 3 διειδικᾶσαντο: cp. ΙΟΤ. d 8 n.

βιώσαντες: the Ionic participle is in place in a solemn passage like this, though in 95 c 3 we have the Attic βιῶσα. Later, the Ionic form became trivial, as in the λαθὲ βιῶσας of Epicurus.

d 4 οὖ . . . ἐν δεξιῶσον, 'those who are found to have —,' a regular forensic expression.

μέσως, 'middlingly,' to be distinguished from μετρίως which stands for εὗ.

d 5 οὐ δῆ κτλ. Another allusive and mysterious δῆ (cp. ΙΟΤ. e I n.). The ἀχημάτα on which they embark must be boats of some kind. Charon's bark is familiar, but there are other boats of the dead besides that.

d 6 τὴν λίμνην, sc. τὴν Ἀχερουσίαδα.

d 7 καθαίρομενοι: Purgatory is an essentially Orphic idea. Cf. Suid. 140
NOTES

(σ. ν. 'Αχέρων) ὁ δὲ 'Αχέρων καθαραίῳ ἔσχε καὶ οὗ κολαστηρίῳ, ῥυπτῶν καὶ σμῆχουν τὰ ἀμαρτήματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων. They are purified by fire as well as by water.

d 7 διδόντες δίκαιος is subordinate to καθαράμεναι, 'purged by punishment.'

d 8 εὐεργεσίαν, 'good deeds,' seems to have been the regular word in this connexion (opp. ἄδικήματα). Cp. Rep. 615 b 6 εἰ τινας εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετήκοτε καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὁσίοι γεγονότες εἶν.

e 2 ἀνάτατος ἔχειν κτλ. The doctrine of the incurable sinners occurs also in the myths of the Gorgias (525 c sqq.) and the Republic (615 e sqq.). The rudiments of it are to be found in the picture of the three great sinners—Tantalus, Ixion, and Sisyphus—in the Νέκυια of the eleventh book of the Odyssey. From the Gorgias we learn that they are eternally punished as οὐκαθαρά.

7 σιδέρων πρὸς τὸ ὀσίως βιώναι, 'to have led exceptionally holy lives,' as contrasted with those who have lived μέσως (113 d 4). We must 'understand' ὥν or some such word with ὀσίως. For such an ellipse Stallbaum compares Euthyd. 281 a 5 τὸ ὀρθὸς (sc. χρῆσθαι) ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπεργαζομένη, Symp. 181 b 6 ἀμελεύοντες δὲ 141
Notes

For similar brachylogies designed to obviate the repetition of the same word cp. Prot. 325 b 3 σκέψαι ὦς θαυμα-
σίως γίγνονται οἱ ἁγαθοὶ (sc. ἁγαθοὶ), 344 e 1 τὸ δὲ κακῷ (κακῷ) ὦκ ἐγχω-
ρεῖ γενέσθαι, Meno 89 a 6 οὐκ ἄν ἐλεύ φύσει οἱ ἁγαθοὶ (sc. ἁγαθοὶ). The
προκεκρίσθαι added by Theodoret is an obvious interpolation.

c 2 ἐπὶ γῆς: i.e. on the ‘true earth’, the Earthly Paradise.

c 3 ἄνευ ... σωμάτων: cp. 76 c 12 χωρὶς σωμάτων. This is the state-
ment which brought upon Plato the condemnation of the Church
as being inconsistent with the resurrection of the body. Eusebius
has καμάτων for σωμάτων, which looks like a deliberate falsification.

c 4 ὁικήσεις ... τούτων καλλίων. ‘We are to think, perhaps, of the
natal stars of the Timaeus’ (Stewart, Myths of Plato, p. 109).
In any case, those alone reach the Celestial Paradise who have
undergone the philosophic κάθαρσις. The ordinary purgation is not
sufficient.

c 7 τὰν ποιεῖν, ‘to leave nothing undone.’ Cp. Gorg. 479 c 1 τὰν
ποιοῦσιν ὅστε δίκην μὴ διδόναι.

c 8 καλὸν ... τὸ ἄθλον: cr. Rep. 608 b 4 Μέγας ... ὁ ἁγόν, ... μέγας,
οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἃ κακὸν γενέσθαι, c 1 Καὶ μὴν ... τὰ γε
μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα άθλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν.

d 1 Τὸ μὲν οὖν κτλ. The difference between scientific knowledge and
a ‘probable tale’ is once more insisted on. For the expression cp.
63 c 1 sqq., 108 d 5 sqq., Meno 86 b 6 καὶ τὰ μὲν γε ἄλλα οἷκ ἄν πάνω
ὑπὲρ τού λόγου διαχυρισαίμην, ὥτι δὲ ... , περὶ τούτων πάνω ἄν διαμαχοῖμην.
Contrast d 4 ἐπείπερ ἄδανατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖνα (‘evidently is’).

d 5 πρέπειν, sc. διαχυρίζασθαι.

ἀξίων, sc. εἶναί, ‘that it is worth while to take the risk of thinking
it is so.’ Cp. 85 d 1.

d 7 ἐπάθειν: cp. 77 e 8.

e 3 πλέον θάτερον ... ἀπεργάζομαι, ‘to do more harm than good.’
The phrase occurs twice in the Euthydemus 280 e 5 πλέον γάρ του
οἵματι θάτερον ἐστιν, ἢν τις χρήται διέρων μὴ ὀρθῶς πράγματι ἢ ἢ ἐάν ὢ,
297 c 7 ὃ δὲ αἵτω ἱκανὸς ἐβούθησεν (sc. Ἰάλεως Ἰρακλεί), ὃ δὲ ἐμὸς Ἰάλεως
εἰ ἐλθοί, πλέον ἄν θάτερον ποιήσειν. Cp. also Isocr. Aeg. 25 τούτων
τῶν ταλαιπώρων οὖδεις τῶν συγγενῶν ... ἐπισκεψόμενος ἄφικε το, πλὴν τῆς
μητρὸς καὶ τῆς ἀδελφῆς, αἱ πλέον θάτερον ἐπαίσχομαι. I do not think
that, in these places, the meaning is ‘to make bad worse’ (Hein-
114 NOTES
dorf), or that ἰδέαρος has anything to do with Pythagorean views about 'the other'. We should hardly find the phrase in a private speech of Isocrates if it had. More likely it is a colloquialism like πλέον τι ποιεῖν, οὐδέν πλέον ποιεῖν.

a 2 ὡς . . . καλῷ: Hirschig for once seems to be justified in an ἀδέητησις. It is very difficult to believe that Plato should spoil the effect of his own words two lines below by anticipating them here.

a 5 φαίην ἂν ἀνήρ τραγικός, 'as the man in the play would say'. The phrase does not occur in any extant tragedy.

a 8 νεκρῶν λοίειν: for the construction cp. Meno 76 a 9 ἀνδρὶ πρεσβύτη πράγματα προστάτεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Practical Application. The real Socrates will not die (115 b 1—116 e 7).

b 2 ἐπιστέλλεις is the vox propria for the last wishes of the dying. Cp. 116 b 4.


C 1 οὐδὲν πλέον ποιήσετε, nil proficietis, 'you will do no good', 'it will profit nothing'.

C 6 Οἷς πείθω κτλ. Aelian, V. H. i. 16, has another version of this, which he is not likely to have composed himself: Καὶ πῶς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καλῶς Ἀπολλόδωρος δοξάζει, εἰ γε αὐτὸς πεπίστευκεν ὅτι μετὰ τὴν ἐξ Ἀθηναίων φιλοτησίαν καὶ τό τοῦ φαρμάκου πῶμα έτι άντος ὄφεται Σωκράτην; εἰ γάρ άλετοι τὸν οίλιον ἰστερὸν ἔρριμιένον εν ποσί καὶ κεισόμενον γ᾽ ἐμε εἶναι, δηλός έστι με οὐκ εἶδός. This may be a fragment of Aeschines or another.

C 7 οὕτω Σωκράτης, 'Socrates here.' The omission of ὥς is idiomatic when the pronoun is used δεικτικῶς.

D 1 πῶς με θάντη: indirect deliberative. Goodwin, M. T. § 677.

D 4 δὴ πίνας: once more the allusive and mysterious δὴ. Cp. 107 d 7 n.

D 5 ἄλλως λέγειν: cp. 76 e 4.

D 7 ἢν οὕτως . . . ἡγγαντα does not refer to the offer of Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, to become security for the fine of 30 minae which Socrates proposed in his ἀντίτιμησις (Apol. 38 b 6). We may infer from Crito 44 e 2 sqq. that Crito had further given security that Socrates would not run away (ἣ μὴν παραμενεῖν).
The ritual of laying out for burial and the carrying to the tomb are the regular parts of the ceremony before the actual burial. The middle voice of προτίθεναι is justified because people lay out 'their dead'. Cp. Eur. Alc. 663-4 καὶ θανόντα σε περιστέλουσι καὶ προβήσουσι νεκρῶν, Thuc. ii. 34. 2 τὰ μὲν ἀκόντα προτίθενται ... ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἡ ἐκφορά ... ἐνεκφέρει ... ὃ βουλόμενα.

5 εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο, 'so far as the thing itself (inaccurate language) goes'.

The Closing Scene (116 a 1—118 a 17).

116 a 2 ἀνίστατο εἶς: cp. Prot. 311 a 4 ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν. οἶκημα means 'a room'.

a 5 τοῦτο θ' αὖ, as if τοῦτο μὲν had preceded. Cp. the omission of ὃ μὲν, 105 εἶ 11.

b 1 δῶῳ γὰρ κτλ. Cp. 60 a 2 11.

b 2 αἰ οἴκεια γυναῖκες ... ἐκεῖναι is certainly the original reading and ἐκεῖναι is certainly the original reading and ἐκεῖναι is certainly the original reading and ἐκεῖναι is certainly the original reading and ἐκεῖναι (to be construed with διολεξθεῖσ) is apparently a conjecture. It seems to be implied that the women of Socrates' family were well known to Echecrates and his friends. In fact, ἐκεῖναι has much the same effect as the γυνώσκεις γὰρ with which Xanthippe is introduced (60 a 2). It is surely impossible to believe with some editors that Xanthippe is not included among the οἴκεια γυναῖκες. The mere fact that the youngest child is brought back seems to show that she is.

b 3 διολεξθεῖσ, sc. αὐτοῖς, i.e. τοῖς παιδίοις καὶ ταῖς γυναιξῖν. The vulgate reading ἐκεῖναι would imply that he had no last words for his sons.

b 6 χρόνον ... πολὺν κτλ. As the conversation recorded in the Phaedo began in the morning, and it is now close upon sunset on one of the longest days of the year, it is plain that Socrates spent several hours alone with the women and children. There is no trace of indifference to them. Cp. 60 a 7 11. Of course Phaedo can only narrate conversations at which he was present.

b 8 στὰς παρ' αὐτῶν, 'stepping up to him.'

c 5 ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, during the thirty days (cp. 58 a 4 11.) for which Socrates had been in prison.

d 6 ἀνδρῶν λαῷστος, 'the best of men.' In Attic λαῷστος is confined to a few phrases.
NOTES

7 ἀποδακρύει: cp. ιη7 c 8 ὀπέκλαον.
9 ὁ ἄνθρωπος. It is to be observed that the man who administers the hemlock-draught is not the same person as the officer of the Eleven. The seeds were pounded in a mortar to extract the juice. Cp. App. I.

1 ἐτί ἡλιον εἶναι κτλ., 'that there is still sunlight on the hilltops.' For this sense of ἡλιον cp. Hdt. viii. 23 ὧμα ἠλιφ σκέδασμεν. The meaning cannot be that the sun has not yet sunk behind Cithaeron; for Crito says ωμα. He means that, though no longer visible, it is still shining on the hilltops.

2 γέλωτα ὀφλήσειν παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, 'to make myself ridiculous in my own eyes.'


4 τῷ παιδὲ, 'to his servant.'

1 αὐτὸ ποιήσει, 'it will act of itself.' In the medical writers ποιεῖ is used technically of the action of drugs. Heindorf quotes Dioscorides i. 95 ποιεῖ πρὸς φάρμακα, 'it acts against poisons.'

3 καὶ μᾶλα ἦλεος, 'very cheerfully indeed.' For καὶ μᾶλα cp. 61 e 1 n. ἦλεος is the adverb.

4 οὐδὲ διαφθέρας: Plutarch uses φθέρειν and φθόρα of mixing colours (L. S. s. v.), and the expression employed here seems to be derived from that technical use. Cp. ll. xiii. 284 τοῦ δ' ἀγάθου οὖρ' ἄρ τρέπεται χρόνος κτλ.

5 ταυρηθὸν ὑποθλέψας. This does not seem to have anything to do with ταυροῦσθαι, ἄποταυροῦσθαι, which refer to the glare of an angry bull. An angry or threatening look would be quite out of the picture here. In Arist. frogs 804 ἐβλέψε γαυὴν ταυρηθὸν ἐγκύψα κάτω is, indeed, given as a sign that Aeschylus βαρέως φέρει, but ὑποθλέψας is quite different from ἐγκύψα κάτω, which suggests the bull about to toss. It means 'to look askance at'. (ὑπόδρα), and, from its use in Hippocrates and Aristotle (L. S. s. v.), we see that

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the original meaning was to look with the eyes half open. It is, then, a ‘mischievous look’ rather than a threatening one.

Perhaps Socrates thought of pouring a libation in honour of Anytus, just as Theramenes had toasted Critias in hemlock-juice. Cp. Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 56 καὶ ἔπειλ γε ἀποθη-σειν ἀναγκαζόμενος τὸ κώνειαν ἔπεις, τὸ λειπόμενου ἐφισαν ἀποκόσμαισχαντα εἰπείν αὐτὸν’ Κριτή τοῦτ’ ἔστω τῷ καλῷ. For the use of πρὸς cp. *Symp.* 174 b 1 πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἐθέλειν ἄν ἕναι ἄκλητος ἐπὶ δείπνον.

c 4 ἐπισχόμενος ... ἔξεπεν, ‘he held his breath and drank it to the last drop.’ Stallbaum shows that τίνειν ἐπισχόμενος was a standing phrase. Cp. e. g. Stesichorus fr. 7 Σκύφιον δὲ λαβὼν δέπας ἐμετρον ὥσ τριλάγγων | τί ἐπισχόμενος κτλ. The rendering ‘putting it to his lips’, though grammatically possible, does not seem strong enough for this and other passages where the phrase occurs, so I prefer K. F. Hermann’s interpretation. The sense assigned to ἐπισχό-μενος is not unlike that which it has in *Symp.* 216 a 7 ἐπισχόμενος τὰ ὅτα.

καὶ μάλα εἴχερὼς, ‘without the very least disgust’. As δυσχερῆ means ‘fastidious’ and δυσχεραίνων fastidīre, the meaning is that he drank the poison as if it was quite a pleasant drink.

c 5 ἔπιεκὼς, ‘fairly’, ‘pretty well’.

c 7 ἀστακτί: not in single drops, but in a flood. Cp. Soph. *Oed. Col.* 1251 ἀστακτί λείβων δάκρυν, 1646 ἀστακτί ... στένωντες. W has ἀσταλκτί, which would mean the same thing, and also preserves an ancient variant ἀβαστακτί, which would mean ‘unbearably’.

c 8 ἀπέκλαυον ἔμαυτόν, ‘I covered my face and wept for my loss.’

c 9 οὗτον ἄνδρος κτλ., ‘to think what a friend I was bereft of.’ This is another ‘dependent exclamation’. Cp. 58 e 4 n.

d 5 κατέκλασε, which Stephanus conjectured for κατεκλαυε, is actually the reading of T. Cp. Homer, *Od.* iv. 481 κατεκλάσθῃ φίλον ἔτορ, Plut. *Timoleon* 7 τὸ δὲ Τιμολέωντος ... πάθος ... κατέκλασε καὶ συνέ-τριψεν αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν.

e 1 ἐν ἐνυφμαί: cp. 60 a 3 n.

118 a 1 τὰς κόμης: cp. Arist. *Frogs* 123 ’Αλλ’ ἐστιν ἀπρασ ξύντομος τετριμμένη | ἂ διὰ θευίας.—’Αρα κόνειον λέγεις;— | Μάλιστά γε.— Ψυχράν γε καὶ δυσχείμερον’ | εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀποτήγυνυσι ταύτικήμα. a 2 θηγνυτο: cp. 77 b 4 n.

καὶ οὗτος ἦπτετο, ‘the man himself’ (not Socrates). It is im-
plied that the others had touched Socrates by the executioner's directions.

5 τὸ ἢτρον: ὁ μεταξὺ ὀμφαλοῦ τε καὶ αἱδοίου τόπος Τιμαίος, ἢτρον... Ἀττικῶς ὑπογόρτριον Ἑλληνικῶς Μοεῖς.

7 τῷ Ἀσκληπιῶν ὀρείλομεν ἀλεξτρονά: for the offering of a cock to Asklepios cp. Herondas iv. 11 ἔλεφ δεῦτε | τοῦ ἀλέκτορος τοῦθ' ὄντωι οἰκῆς τοίχων | κήρυκα θύω, τάπιδορπα δέξαισθε. Socrates hopes to awake cured like those who are healed by ἐγκοίμησις (incubatio) in the Asklepieion at Epidaurus.

16 ἡμῶι, 'we,' his disciples.

τῶν τότε, 'of the men of his time.' The phrase is regular in such appreciations. Stallbaum compares Hdt. i. 23 Ἄριονα... κιδαρεῖον τῶν τότε ἐόντων οὐδένος δεύτερον, Xen. An. ii. 20 κήρυκα ἄριστον τῶν τότε. Cp. Plato, Epist. vii. 324 d 8 φίλον ἄνδρα ἐμοὶ πρεσβύτερον Σωκράτη, δυν ἐγὼ σχεδον οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνοίμην εἰπὼν δικαιότατον εἶναι τῶν τότε.

17 καὶ ἄλλως, 'and in general.' The calm of the closing sentence is characteristically Attic. We find the same thing in tragedy and in the Orators.
DEATH BY HEMLOCK

It is expressly stated by Xenophon (Hell. ii. 3. 56) that Theramenes was put to death by a draught of κώνειον, and Plutarch says the same of Phocion (Phoc. 36). As described in the Phaedo, the drug acts by producing a gradual refrigeration proceeding from the feet upwards to the heart. Death ensues when the heart is affected, and is accompanied by a spasm or convulsion (ἐκανθθη, 118 a 12). The same symptoms are implied in the passage of Aristophanes (Frogs 123) quoted in the note on 118 a 1, where κώνειον is mentioned by name, and where we are told that it was pounded, as the drug referred to in the Phaedo also was (117 a 6). Pliny (Hist. Nat. xxv. 95) speaks of the vis refrigeratoria of the cicuta, and says that the juice was prepared from pounded seeds. It is to be noted further that wine was used as an antidote in cases of such poisoning. Pliny tells us this of cicuta (Hist. Nat. xiv. 7), and Plato himself implies the same of κώνειον in the Lysis. This agrees very well with the warning given to Socrates by the expert not to talk too much (Phaed. 63 d 5 sqq.). He explains that this will impede the action of the drug by heating him. Wine would act in the same way. There can be no doubt, then, that Socrates was poisoned by κώνειον, or that κώνειον is cicuta. That cicuta is ‘hemlock’ is shown by the use of the word in the Romance languages (Fr. ciguè).

In the face of all this, it is disturbing to be told, as we are by some authorities, that hemlock-juice would produce quite different symptoms. I cannot pronounce an opinion on that; but I have submitted the case to an eminent pharmacologist, my colleague Professor C. R. Marshall, who says that ‘as evidence against the view that Socrates died of conium poisoning I do not think the statements’ (of the authorities referred to) ‘worthy of serious consideration. Personally I am decidedly of opinion that his death

1 Lys. 219 e 2 οἶον ἐὰν ἀληθάνωτο αὐτῶν (τὸν ἤν) κώνειον πεπωκότα, ἀρα περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦ ἄν οἶον, εἰπερ τούτῳ ἡγοίτο τῶν ἤν σώσειν;
was due to conium. It is difficult to be absolutely positive on the point, as conium is somewhat peculiar in its action, and the symptoms produced vary with the dose and probably with the individual'. From this it appears that there is certainly no scientific ground for rejecting the philological evidence.

APPENDIX II

Γλαύκου τέχνη

The correct text of the scholium in Ven. T is as follows:

παροιμία ἦταν ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ βραδίως κατεργαζόμενων, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν πάνω ἐπιμελῶς καὶ ἐντέχνως εἰργασμένων. "Ἰππασος γὰρ τοὺς κατεσκεύασε χαλκοὺς τέταρτας δίσκους οὕτως, ὥστε τὰς μὲν διαμέτρους αὐτῶν ἑως ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πρῶτου δίσκου πάχος ἐπίτριτον μὲν εἶναι τοῦ δευτέρου, ἡμιδικον δὲ τοῦ τρίτου, διπλάσιον δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου, κρουσμένου δὲ τούτου επιτελεῖν συμφωνίαν τυν. καὶ λέγεται Γλαύκου ἰδανία τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν δίσκων φθάγγος πρῶτον ἐγχειρήσαι δι’ αὐτῶν χειρουργεῖσαι, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πραγματείας ἐτι καὶ ὅλων λέγεσθαι τὴν καλουμένην Γλαύκου τέχνην. μέμηται δὲ τούτων Ἀριστοξένους περὶ τῆς μοούσικῆς ἀκροάσεως, καὶ Νικοκήθης ἐν τῷ περὶ θεωρίας. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα τέχνη γραμμάτων, ἢν ἀνατιθέσαι Γλαύκα Σαμίῳ, ἢτ’ ἦς ἰσος καὶ ἡ παροιμία διεδάθη. οὕτως δὲ καὶ σιδήρου κάλλησιν εὑρεῖν, ὡς φησιν Ἡρόδωτος.

This comes from the paroemiographer Lucillus Tarrhaeus (cp. L. Cohn, Quellen der Platoscholien, pp. 836 sqq.), and the reference to Aristoxenuses takes us back to the time when there was a living Pythagorean tradition. Eusebius, c. Marc. i5 D (quoted by Heindorf), is fuller, and mentions some other versions. One says that Glaucus was drowned at sea (just like Hippasus!) before his invention was spread abroad; another agrees with the story in the scholium; a third refers to Glaucus of Samos and the ἀνάβημα at Delphi. The fourth is as follows: ἔτερος δὲ Γλαύκαν αὐτῶν ἀναθεῖναι τρίσοδα χαλκοὺν δημιουργήσαντα τοῖς παχέως τε (τοῖς παχέσιν ὡστε;) κρουσμένου τοῖς τε πόδας ἐφ’ ὧν βέβηκε καὶ τὸ ἄνω περικείμενον καὶ τὴν στεφάνην τὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ λέβητος καὶ τὰς βάσθους διὰ μέσου τεταγμέναις φθέγγεσθαι λύρας φωνῇ. If this is genuine tradition, as it appears to be, it is not without significance that Socrates should allude to a distinctively Pythagorean invention.

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