CICERO

DE OFFICIIS
CICERO

DE OFFICIIS

TRANSLATED BY

GEORGE B. GARDINER
M.A., D.Sc.

METHUEN & CO.
36 ESSEX STREET, W.C.
LONDON
1899
PREFACE

In preparing this translation of the De Officiis I have consulted the best literature on the subject, but I am under special obligation to the editions of Müller (1882), Heine (1885), Stickney (1885), Dettweiler (1890), and Holden (1891). The metrical versions are taken from L'Estrange.

My best thanks are due to my old pupil, Mr. Hugh Gordon, for much valuable help.
INTRODUCTION

The *De Officiis* is a practical code of morals, a compendium of the duties of everyday life, intended for the instruction, and accommodated to the special circumstances, of young Romans of the governing class who were destined for a public career. As a summary of the duties of a gentleman addressed by a father to his son, it may be compared with Lord Chesterfield’s Letters, but it is written in a very different tone. Born in 65 B.C., Marcus served with some distinction under the successive republican commanders, and attained the dignity of consul. He inherited neither the ambition nor the energy of Cicero, and is best known as his father’s son. At the age of twenty he was sent to the “university” of Athens to complete his education under Cratippus, the head of the Peripatetic School. The irregularity of his life, which we may infer from the scant expressions of commendation contained in the work itself, and of which we have positive evidence in Cicero’s Letters, was a cause of anxiety to his father, and may have suggested the dedication if not the composition of this treatise on duty.
INTRODUCTION

The *De Officiis* is the last of the long series of philosophical works which Cicero gave to the world during the closing years of his life, when condemned to political inaction. After the final overthrow of the senatorial party, when the constitution of the republic was supplanted by the will of the "Democratic King" and little scope was left for individual effort, Cicero had voluntarily retired from the political arena, and lived for the most part in the country. With the assassination of Caesar in March 44 B.C. the hopes of his party rose for a moment only to be dashed to the ground by the intrigues of Antony. Cicero driven from Rome "by force and godless arms" was compelled to seek safety in flight, and wandered aimlessly for a great part of the year from one of his country seats to another. He was distracted. Death had robbed him of Tullia, the joy of his life, and he was now an exile from his beloved city. Once more he turns for consolation to active literary work, and in the composition of this hortatory treatise completes his patriotic design of transplanting philosophy from Athens to Rome and popularising its study among his countrymen. The events of the stormy year 44 are reflected in the acrimonious allusions to contemporary politics and the many imperfections of the work in thought and language.

Cicero had too much of the practical Roman
instinct to regard philosophy as an end in itself. To him it was a preparation for the active life of the orator and statesman, an occupation in his hours of leisure, a consolation in misfortune. Like many cultured Romans he was an Eclectic and sought for wisdom wherever it was to be found. In his scientific method he professed himself an adherent of the New Academy which denied the possibility of attaining absolute certainty in questions of speculative philosophy. His “scepticism,” however, far from being destructive, took a positive direction and sought to discover the greatest probability where certainty was impossible. He was less an agnostic than a seeker after truth. But his profession of the doctrines of the New Academy did not prevent him from embracing the ethical system of the Stoics to which he was strongly attracted by its practical tendency and its sublime principle of the sovereignty of virtue. Yet at times he rebels against some of their extreme doctrines. For example, the theory that the wise man is happy even when suffering pain and is quite independent of fortune appeared to him so contrary to all experience that here he rather leaned to the view of the Peripatetics who admitted that within certain limits external circumstances were necessary to happiness. In one thing he is consistent, his determined hostility to the egoistic and unsocial doctrines of the Epicureans which could hardly
INTRODUCTION

commend themselves to a genuine Roman who looked on devotion to the state as the first duty of man.

When first presented to the Romans in the second century B.C. Stoicism was stripped of many of its pedantic and impossible dogmas. "There is no happiness except virtue and no unhappiness except vice; virtue is a permanent condition which admits of no increase or decrease; the non-virtuous man is absolutely vicious; all sins are equally heinous"—principles such as these were found to be worthless when tested by the facts of everyday life. Take again the picture of the Stoic sage or saint: "He is a perfect man, absolutely virtuous, happy, self-sufficient and free. He is indifferent to fortune and misfortune, superior to fear and remorse, free from sorrow and excessive joy, and he maintains that immovable tranquillity of soul in which conformity with reason consists." The Stoics, if challenged, could not point to historical examples of their sage, and even Zeno himself was not so presumptuous as to claim the title. If the founder of the school despaired of attaining this lofty ideal, what hope was there for the ordinary man? One by one these purely academic and fantastic principles were abandoned, ignored, or modified, and the Stoic system became less of a science and more of a moral evangel accommodated to the facts of life and the frailties of erring mortals.
INTRODUCTION

The founder of this new Stoicism and its most eminent preacher in Rome was Panaetius of Rhodes, the friend of the younger Scipio and Laelius. If he taught the Romans philosophy he probably learned from them the practical wisdom which led him to mitigate the scientific severity of his school. In his philosophical method he had completely emancipated himself from his predecessors, and he so far departed from their ethical principles that they would hardly have allowed him the name of a Stoic. He maintained that without health, strength and the means of living, virtue was insufficient to make a man happy. While rejecting the doctrine of insensibility to pain, he did not altogether repudiate pleasure. He admitted that in certain circumstances promises are not binding. In a word, he relaxed the rigour of the Stoic system, adapted it to the circumstances of everyday life and abandoning its thorny dialectic, and forbidding technicalities, for the first time presented its doctrines in an elegant and attractive literary form.

It is on a lost treatise of Panaetius, "Concerning Moral Obligation," that the De Officiis is based. The work of Panaetius was divided into three books. The first treated of the duties derived from Honour, the second of those derived from Expediency, and the third, which was promised but never appeared, was to have dealt with the conflict
INTRODUCTION

between these two classes of duties. Cicero supplies the missing book, and adds two brief discussions on the conflict between two *honesta* and the conflict between two *utilia*. The dominant principle of the whole work is that Honour or Virtue alone is useful. After explaining in a short introduction his general plan and purpose Cicero treats in his first book of the duties derived from Honour as exhibited in the four cardinal virtues, Wisdom, Justice, Fortitude and Self-Command, and concludes with an estimate of their relative importance. The second book is devoted to the duties arising from Expediency. The introduction contains a vindication of the study of philosophy and of the principles of the New Academy. This is followed by a laboured demonstration of the obvious proposition that man is most useful to man. We obtain the help of men by inspiring love, respect and confidence, and by the exercise of liberality. The conflict between the different kinds of Expediency forms the subject of the last chapter. The third book deals with the conflict between Honour and Expediency. It opens with a famous passage in which Cicero compares his own conduct in retirement and solitude with that of Scipio Africanus. He then proves that it is only apparent and not real Expediency that is opposed to Honour, and lays down as a general rule for the determination of particular cases, that whatever is honourable is
INTRODUCTION

expedient, and that nothing can be expedient that is not honourable. Even the certainty of escaping detection should not prompt us to do wrong. Friendship and the public interest sometimes cause men to swerve from duty. Examples are then given of the conflict between apparent Expediency and Justice, Fortitude and Self-Command. Such is a brief outline of the contents of the treatise on Duty. Under this logical scheme Cicero discusses the multifarious problems that would naturally arise in the daily life of the jurist, the statesman, or the military commander, and illustrates his argument with copious examples contemporary and historical. The duties of an administrator, the obligations of belligerents, the conduct of a lawsuit, the laws of oratory, the art of conversation, the choice of a profession, the building of a house—the most diverse questions from the most important to the most trivial affecting the conduct of a Roman gentleman are here proposed and answered.

It would be interesting to know how much of the book is the intellectual property of Cicero and what belongs to Panaetius. Cicero expressly states that he does not slavishly follow Panaetius, but that he merely takes from him such materials as serve his purpose. But it is significant that where he professes complete independence and is thrown upon his own resources he utterly breaks down.
INTRODUCTION

The third book is little but a farrago of casuistic questions compiled from Posidonius and other Stoic writers, and it is disfigured by not a few defects in reasoning, while the two additions to the scheme of Panaetius are slight and perfunctory. We shall therefore not be far wrong if we assign to Panaetius the logical disposition of the first two books with its divisions and subdivisions, and the general course of the argument and even some of the illustrations, and this assumption is borne out by the fact that in certain passages of the *De Natura Deorum* Cicero closely adheres to his Greek original Philodemus. But many of the examples drawn from Roman life and history and the reflections suggested by them are obviously from the hand of Cicero, and some entire sections are so thoroughly Roman in character that they could not have been penned by a Greek writer. Thus we may safely assume that Cicero is the author of the chapter on the choice of a profession (i., 42), of the rules for obtaining glory (ii., 13,14), and of the passage (ii., 15-24) in which liberality, official purity and fair legislation are recommended as the best means of winning the favour of the people.

Since the invention of printing the *De Officiis* has passed through more than 250 editions, and it has been praised in extravagant terms by ancient and modern critics. The elder Pliny says it is a
book to be learned by heart. St. Ambrose based on it the first systematic exposition of Christian ethics. Melancthon described it as the most perfect treatise on morals in existence. Erasmus believed that its author must have been inspired. Frederick the Great, who pronounced it "the best book on morals that has been or can be written," commanded the philosopher Garve to translate it into German "that young people might get some idea of what it really meant." Curiously the Traité des Devoirs is still prescribed as a moral catechism to candidates for the baccalauréat ès lettres. Mommsen in a few truculent phrases dismisses Cicero's "philosophical library" as a complete failure.

What then is the value of the book that it has at all times been so popular? It may at once be conceded that as a scientific treatise the De Officiis has little merit. Composed in unfavourable circumstances by a philosophical dilettante it is superficial, defective in arrangement, and often disfigured by incoherence, obscurity, and repetition. On the other hand it is the serious effort of one of the best of the Romans to instruct and elevate his young countrymen in a time of political chaos and moral decadence. Here they could find what the ancient ceremonial religion of the Romans failed to supply, an exposition of the science of life, a treasury of precepts, replete with the wisdom of generations of thinkers, and enriched with the
INTRODUCTION

Illustrations and reflections of a statesman of ripe experience. If they looked in vain for profound speculation or scientific precision they at least found a lofty morality inculcated on every page in the eternal principle of the sovereignty of virtue. To the historian the book is of value as an important contribution to our knowledge of the moral development of the ancient Romans. The chief literary merit of this elegant transcript of Panaetius is that here the great master of Latin prose carried on his work of creating a philosophical language in which the highest Roman civilisation was diffused throughout the Latin-speaking world, and transmitted through the Middle Ages down to modern times to endure even now as a living force in every country where thoughtful men love to turn from the present and draw inspiration from the sources of European culture. The philosophy of Cicero may be but an echo of that of the great Greek thinkers; it has been largely superseded by the religious and ethical writings of modern literature; still it seems rash to brush aside as worthless a work which has left so distinct an impress on the mind of the world. Perhaps there is as much exaggeration in the blame of Mommsen as in the praise of Erasmus.
I.—1. My dear son, now that you have studied for a full year under Cratippus and in a city like Athens, you should be well equipped with the principles and doctrines of moral philosophy. A master of such power cannot fail to enrich your mind with ethical theories, while the cultured city in which you live will offer you many models for imitation. However, I have always found it best in my own case to combine the study of Latin and Greek in oratory as well as in philosophy, and I think it would be well for you to follow my example if you wish to be equally at home in the two languages. Here I flatter myself I have rendered good service to my countrymen, and it is gratifying to find that not only persons ignorant of Greek, but even educated men admit that I have done something towards developing their minds and forming their style. 2. You should therefore continue your studies under the first thinker of the age, and that you will certainly desire to do, so long as you are not dissatisfied with your progress. But in reading the exposition of my theories which differ little
from those of the Peripatetics (for we both claim to be followers of Socrates and Plato), whatever opinion you may form on the subject-matter—and you are free to judge for yourself—I am confident you will improve your Latin style. Still I would not have you think I say this in arrogance. I profess no monopoly in philosophical science, but I fancy I am within my rights in claiming as peculiarly my own a happy, perspicuous, and ornate style—the proper field of the orator, which I have cultivated all my life. 3. I urge you, therefore, my dear son, to read with care not only my orations but also my philosophical works which are now almost as numerous as the others. In the orations there is greater vigour, but the unimpassioned and temperate style of my essays is no less worthy of study.

I do not find that any Greek author has yet succeeded in elaborating at once the forensic and the calm philosophical style, with the possible exception of Demetrius of Phalerum, a keen logician and an orator who, though he lacks force, has the charm that marks the disciple of Theophrastus. What degree of perfection I myself have attained in these two styles let others judge; if I have failed, it is not for want of effort. 4. I indulge the fancy that Plato, had he chosen to practise oratory, would have made an impressive and eloquent pleader, and that if Demosthenes had followed up and published the doctrines he
learned from Plato he would have been distinguished for the elegance and splendour of his diction. I have the same opinion of Aristotle and Isocrates, but each of them took such delight in his own pursuit that he looked coldly on the pursuit of the other.

II.—When I came to choose out of the many things on which I had it in my mind to write to you, the theme of this, my first treatise, I selected what seemed to me best suited to your age and to my position as a father. Among all the elaborate and exhaustive discussions of philosophers on serious and important subjects it appears to me that nothing is more generally useful than the principles of duty they have given to the world. All our affairs, public or private, civil or domestic, our personal conduct, our social transactions, inevitably fall within the province of duty; in the observance of duty lies all that is honourable, and in the neglect of it all that is dishonourable. This is the common ground of all philosophers. Would any one assume the title who had no moral precepts to offer? Yet certain schools utterly distort our conception of duty by their definition of the greatest good and the greatest evil. He who severs the highest good from virtue and measures it by interest and not by honour, if he were true to his principles and did not at times yield to his better nature, could not cultivate friendship, justice or liberality; and no one can be brave who declares pain the greatest
evil, or temperate who maintains pleasure to be the highest good. 6. I have dealt with these propositions in another place although they are so obvious as to require no discussion. Now if these sects were only consistent they would not have a word to say on the subject of duty; indeed a system of moral principles permanent, invariable, and in harmony with nature, can only be established by those who maintain that honour should exclusively or mainly be pursued for its own sake. And so we find that this ethical teaching is peculiar to the Stoics, the Academics, and the Peripatetics, since the doctrines of Aristo, Pyrrho and Erillus have long since been exploded; yet even they would be entitled to treat of this question if they had recognised a difference in the value of things and given us some clue to duty. In the present inquiry, then, I shall mainly follow the Stoics. I shall not simply echo them, but, as my custom is, I shall use them as my sources, and exercise my own discretion in deciding how and what to borrow.

7. As duty is the subject of the whole of this treatise, it seems proper to begin with a definition of the term, a point which Panaetius has curiously omitted. The definition of terms must in fact form the basis of every scientific exposition if the scope of the argument is to be clearly understood.

III.—Every question of duty has two sides: the one relating to the sovereign good, the other to the
practical rules by which we may govern our conduct in every detail. The following are examples of our first class of questions. Are all duties perfect? Is one duty more important than another? and so forth. The rules of conduct are indeed related to the highest good, but the relation is not quite evident, because they bear more directly on the regulation of our daily life: these are the duties I purpose to expound in the present treatise. 8. Duties may also be divided into what are called the ordinary and the perfect. Perfect duty I think we might call the right since the Greeks call it κατόρθωμα, while they call ordinary duty καθήκον. Perfect duty they define as that which is right; ordinary duty as that for doing which an adequate reason can be given.

9. According to Panaetius, in forming a resolution we have three things to consider. Is the subject of deliberation honourable or dishonourable? This is a problem which often distracts our minds with contrary opinions. In the second place we cast about and reflect whether the thing will procure comfort and enjoyment, wealth and abundance, position and power, whereby we may profit ourselves and those who are dear to us. This second question turns entirely on expediency. The third is concerned with the conflict between the honourable and that which appears to be expedient. When interest drags us one way and honour calls us back,
the mind is bewildered and distracted with doubt. 10. In this classification two points are omitted, a serious defect in a logical division. We not only ask whether the contemplated act is honourable or dishonourable, but we seek to determine the degrees of honour and expediency. Consequently the triple division of Panaetius must be abandoned in favour of a division into five parts. I must first speak of the honourable under two heads, then similarly of the expedient, and finally of the conflict between them.

IV.—11. Animals of every species are endowed with the instinct of self-preservation which leads them to preserve life and limb, to avoid what seems hurtful, and to seek and provide the necessaries of life, such as food and shelter. The reproductive instinct and the love of offspring are also universal. But there is a wide gulf between man and beast. Swayed by sense alone, the beast lives in the present, heedless of the past, or future. But man endowed with reason perceives the connection of things, marks their causes and effects, traces their analogies, links the future with the past, and, surveying without effort the whole course of life, prepares what is needful for the journey. 12. Nature with the aid of reason likewise binds man to man, unites them by the bond of language and of social life, inspires them with a strong love of offspring, and impels them to multiply the occasions of meeting and consorting with their
fellow. These are the motives that incite a man to procure a comfortable livelihood not only for himself but for his wife and children and all whom he cherishes and is bound to support; and this responsibility rouses his energies and braces him for work.

13. The distinctive faculty of man is his eager desire to investigate the truth. Thus, when free from pressing duties and cares, we are eager to see or hear, or learn something new, and we think our happiness incomplete unless we study the mysteries and the marvels of the universe. From this it is evident that what is true, simple, and pure, is most in harmony with human nature. With the instinct of curiosity is allied the desire of independence; a well-constituted character will bow to no authority but that of a master or a just and legitimate ruler who aims at the public good: hence arises fortitude or indifference to the accidents of fortune.

14. How precious should we deem the gift of reason since man is the only living being that has a sense of order, decorum and moderation in word and deed. No other creature is touched by the beauty, grace and symmetry of visible objects; and the human mind transferring these conceptions from the material to the moral world recognises that this beauty, harmony and order are still more to be maintained in the sphere of purpose and of action; reason shuns all that is unbecoming or unmanly, all that is wanton in thought.
or deed. These are the constituent elements of the conception of honour which is the subject of our inquiry: honour even when cast into the shade loses none of its beauty; honour, I say, though praised by no one, is praiseworthy in itself.

V.—15. You have now before you, my dear Marcus, the very form, I may say, the face, of honour; and, as Plato says of Wisdom, could we but see it with our eyes, what a divine passion it would inspire! Honour springs from one of four sources. It consists in sagacity and the perception of the truth, or in the maintenance of human society, respect for the rights of others, and the faithful observance of contracts, or in the greatness and strength of a lofty and invincible spirit, or finally in that order and measure in word and deed which constitute temperance and self-command. The cardinal virtues are indeed inseparably connected, yet each of them is the source of definite classes of duties. Wisdom or prudence, for example, the first in our division, is concerned with the investigation and discovery of the truth; this is its peculiar function. 16. He is justly considered the wisest and the most prudent of men who penetrates furthest into the truth of things and has the keenest and swiftest eye to see and unfold their principles. Truth is therefore the material on which this virtue works, the sphere in which it moves. 17. The function of the other virtues is to provide and maintain all that is necessary
for our daily life, to strengthen the bonds of human society, and to evoke that great and noble spirit which enlarges our resources and secures advantages for ourselves and our kin, but is even more conspicuous by its indifference to these objects. Order, consistency, moderation and similar qualities fall under this category and are not so much speculative as active virtues; for it is by applying measure and law to the affairs of life that we shall best observe honour and decorum.

VI.—18. Of the four parts into which we have divided the conception of honour, the first, consisting in the investigation of the truth, touches human nature most nearly. We are all carried away by the passion for study and learning; here we think it noble to excel and count it an evil and a shame if we stumble or stray, if we are ignorant or credulous. In following this natural and noble instinct there are two errors to be avoided; in the first place we must not mistake the unknown for the known and blindly give it our assent; to escape this error, as all must wish to do, it is necessary to devote time and trouble to the consideration of every question. 19. In the second place it is wrong to waste our energies on dark, thorny, and barren studies. If we avoid these errors and bestow our toil and care on subjects that are honourable and worthy of study, we shall deserve nothing but praise. Thus Sulpicius was once distinguished in
astronomy as our contemporary Sextus Pompeius is in mathematics; many have made their name in logic, more in civil law; but though all these branches of knowledge are concerned with the investigation of the truth, it would be wrong to be diverted from active work by any such pursuit. The worth of virtue lies in action, yet we have many times of rest, permitting us to return to our favourite pursuits: and even without our effort, our beating, restless mind will keep us ever at study. Now every thought and operation of the mind is employed in deciding about things that concern our honour and happiness or in pursuing knowledge and learning. So much for the first source of duty.

VII.—20. Of the three remaining the most extensive in its scope is the principle which knits together human society and cements our common interests. It has two parts—justice, the brightest of the virtues, the touchstone of worth, and the cognate virtue of beneficence which may also be called kindness or liberality.

The first duty that justice enjoins is to do no violence except in self-defence, to create no privilege in public rights, and to keep for our private enjoyment only what is ours. 21. Private property has no place in the order of nature; it originates in ancient occupation, as when people take possession of vacant land, or in the right of conquest, or in a law, a con-
tract, an agreement, an allotment; hence we say the land of Arpinum belongs to the Arpinates, the Tusculan land to the Tusculans; and the delimitation of private estates follows the same principle. Now since by this partition the individual secures as personal property a part of that which at first belonged to all, he ought to rest content with his share: if he covets more, he breaks the laws of human society. 22. But since our life, to quote the noble words of Plato, has not been given to us for ourselves alone (for our country claims a share, our friends another), and since, as the Stoics hold, all the products of the earth are destined for our use and we are born to help one another, we should here take nature for our guide and contribute to the public good by the interchange of acts of kindness, now giving, now receiving, and ever eager to employ our talents, industry and resources in strengthening the bonds of human society. 23. The foundation of justice is good faith—in other words, consistency and truthfulness in regard to promises and compacts. Though it may seem rather forced, we make bold to follow the Stoics who are keen students of etymology and to assume that fides, faith, is so called because a promise fiat is fulfilled. There are two kinds of injustice: the positive injustice of the aggressor, and the negative injustice of neglecting to defend those who are wronged. To attack a man unjustly under
the influence of anger or some other passion is to lay hands upon a comrade; not to defend the oppressed and shield them from injustice, is as great a crime as to desert our parents, friends, or country. 24. Premeditated wrongs are often the result of apprehension, the aggressor fearing that he will be the victim if he does not strike the first blow. But it is chiefly for the purpose of satisfying some desire that men commit an injury; and the commonest motive is the love of money.

VIII.—25. In seeking riches, our object is to procure the necessities and the luxuries of life. But men of ambition look on money as a means of acquiring influence and of attaching others to their interests. Not long ago M. Crassus asserted that no man could aspire to political eminence unless he had a fortune on the interest of which he could support a whole army. Magnificence, luxury, elegance, and plenty are no less seductive. Such is the origin of the insatiable thirst for wealth. Not that we have any fault to find with the innocent accumulation of property; it is the unjust acquisition of it of which we must beware. 26. But the strongest temptation to forget the claims of justice is born of the passion for military and political distinction. Ennius says: "No holy bond, no faith is kept, if a kingdom is the prize," but his words have a wider application. Where the places are few and rivalry is keen the struggle
CICERO

often becomes so fierce that it is difficult to respect the sacred rights of society. Of this we have recently had proof in the audacity of C. Caesar who overthrew all the laws of heaven and earth to gain supreme power, the object of his mad ambition. Alas! it is just the stoutest hearts, the brightest intellects, that are fired with the passion for office and command, for power and glory. Let us then be all the more watchful not to commit the like excess. 27. But there is a great difference between a wrong committed under the influence of some brief and transient passion and one that is wilful and premeditated. A wrong committed under a sudden impulse is not so culpable as a wrong that is planned in cold blood. But I must now leave the subject of positive injustice.

IX.—28. In neglecting the duty of defending others, men are influenced by various motives. They are reluctant to make enemies: they grudge the trouble and expense; they are deterred by indifference, indolence, and apathy; or they are so fettered by their own pursuits and occupations as to abandon those whom it is their duty to protect. Perhaps Plato does not go far enough when he says that philosophers deserve to be called just, inasmuch as they are employed in the investigation of the truth and profess a sovereign contempt for those objects which most men pursue with ardour and for which they will even draw the sword and fight to the last. In wronging no one
they doubtless realise a negative kind of justice, but they fail in their duty when they become so absorbed in study as to abandon those whom they ought to defend. For the same reason he thinks they will not, except under pressure, participate in public affairs. It would be more natural if they came forward unsolicited. For even an action intrinsically right is only just in so far as it is voluntary. 29. Some men, from excessive devotion to their private affairs, or from a sort of misanthropy, say they prefer to mind their own business, and think that in so doing they wrong no one. They thus escape the one kind of injustice only to rush into the other; in fact they are traitors to society because they contribute nothing of their zeal, their energy, or their wealth, to the public good. Having now established the two kinds of injustice with their respective causes, and having determined the constituent elements of that virtue, we can readily decide, unless we are blinded by self-love, what is our duty in particular circumstances. 30. For it is difficult to meddle with other people's affairs, though our friend Chremes in Terence says: "Nothing is indifferent to me that touches man". It is no less true that we are most keenly alive to our own success and our own misfortune; the good and the evil that happen to others we see as it were across a wide gulf, and we cannot judge of our neighbours as we judge of ourselves. It is therefore a good rule never
to do a thing if we are in doubt whether it is right or wrong; righteousness shines with a lustre of its own; doubt is the symptom of a vicious purpose.

X.—31. But there are many occasions when actions that appear eminently worthy of the just man or the good man, as we commonly say, change their complexion and present a different aspect. It may at times be just not to return what is entrusted to our care, not to keep a promise, or to violate the laws of veracity and honour. In such cases we should go back to the principles which I laid down at the outset, as the foundations of justice: do evil to no man; work for the common good. When these principles are modified by circumstances, our duty likewise changes and is not fixed and invariable. 32. Thus the fulfilment of a promise or agreement may be prejudicial either to him to whom it was made or to him who made it. Take an instance from mythology. If Neptune had not kept faith with Theseus, Theseus would not have been bereft of his son Hippolytus. The third of his three wishes, we are told, was the death of Hippolytus; this he conceived in a fit of rage, and when it was fulfilled he was plunged in the deepest grief. If you promise a friend something which would be hurtful to him, your promise is not binding; or if the thing would do more harm to him than good to you, it is no breach of duty to prefer the greater to the lesser good. Suppose you arranged
to appear in court in support of a friend and meanwhile your son fell seriously ill, you would not be obliged to keep your promise; nay, your friend would be more culpable than you if he complained of being abandoned. Again it is obvious that we are not bound to fulfil promises extorted by fear or won from us by craft; indeed these obligations are in most cases cancelled by the decisions of the praetors, or by particular enactments. 33. A common form of injustice is chicanery, that is, an over-subtle, in fact a fraudulent construction of the law. Hence the hackneyed proverb: "The greatest right is the greatest wrong". Public men are often guilty of this offence. I shall illustrate what I mean by two examples. Once a general, having concluded a truce with the enemy for thirty days, ravaged his territory by night, because, he said, the truce applied to the day but not to the night. The conduct of a countryman of ours is equally discreditable; whether it was Q. Labeo or some one else I cannot tell, for I go merely by hearsay. The story is that he was appointed by the Senate arbitrator on a boundary question between the Nolans and the Neapolitans, and on reaching the spot advised the parties separately not to be greedy or grasping and rather to retire than to push forward. They consented, and a belt of neutral land was left between them. So he fixed their frontiers in accordance with their own sug-
gestion, the unclaimed tract he awarded to the Roman people. This surely is deceit and not arbitration. It should be a lesson to us to avoid such despicable trickery.

XI.—We have also our duties towards those by whom we have been wronged; for retribution and punishment have their limits. Perhaps it would suffice if the aggressor repented the injury he had done. His expression of regret would keep him from repeating the offence and would deter others from injustice. 34. In national affairs the laws of war must be strictly observed. There are two methods of settling a dispute, discussion and force; the one is characteristic of man, the other of beasts; it is only when we cannot employ conciliation that we are justified in resorting to force. 35. Our one object in making war should be that we may live in peace unmolested; when victory is gained we should spare those who have not been cruel or barbarous. Our forefathers enfranchised the Tusculans, the Aequians, the Volscians, the Sabines, and the Hernicans, while they razed to the ground Carthage and Numantia. I wish they had spared Corinth, but I think they had some good reason for what they did, most probably the strength of the place which they feared might some day tempt the Corinthians to renew the war. In my opinion peace should be our constant aim if there is no danger of treachery. Had my voice been
heard, we should still possess, if not the best, at least some form of government, but now we have none. It is our duty not only to be merciful to the conquered, but, even though the battering-ram has shattered their walls, to shelter those who lay down their arms and seek the protection of the commander. Justice to our enemies was so scrupulously observed among our countrymen that those who accepted the submission of states or tribes conquered in war, became their patrons by ancient usage. 36. The laws of war are religiously recorded in the fetial code of the Roman people. International law teaches that a war is just only if it is duly declared after a formal demand for satisfaction has been made. (Popilius was governor of a province and the son of Cato was serving in his army as a recruit. Popilius having decided to disband the legion to which he belonged, discharged young Cato with the rest of the men. But he remained in the army from love of fighting; Cato then wrote to Popilius asking him to bind his son by a second military oath if he allowed him to continue in active service: because through voidance of the former oath he had no right to fight with the enemy. Such was the rigour then observed in the conduct of war.) 37. A letter is extant which Marcus Cato the elder wrote to his son Marcus while he was serving in Macedonia in the campaign against Perses. He had heard that his son had been discharged by
CICERO

the consul. He therefore warned him not to engage in battle because one who was not legally a soldier had no right to draw the sword against the enemy.

XII.—Here I would call attention to the euphemism by which hostis, a stranger, is substituted for perduellis, the strict term for an enemy under arms. Hostis in the olden time had the same sense as peregrinus has now. We have proof of this in two passages from the Twelve Tables: "or a day fixed cum hoste, with a stranger," and "against a stranger, adversus hostem the right of ownership is inalienable". I ask you, Could charity go further than to describe by so gentle a name the man with whom you are waging war? But the word is now so debased by usage that it has dropped the meaning of stranger and is restricted to the technical sense of an enemy under arms. 38. In every struggle for empire and glory we must be governed by the motives which I have just mentioned as the legitimate causes of war. Still the asperity of the conflict should be tempered by the noble motive of imperial glory. As in civil strife our attitude is different to a personal enemy and to a rival—with a rival the struggle is for office and position, with an enemy for life and honour—so with the Celtiberians and Cimbrians we fought as with personal enemies, not for empire but for existence; while it was for empire that we waged
war with the Carthaginians and with Pyrrhus. The Carthaginians were faithless and Hannibal was cruel, but our other enemies were more just. You may remember the noble words of Pyrrhus regarding the restoration of the prisoners of war:—

Let mercenaries truck and treat for gold;
Honour's a thing not to be bought or sold.
Courage and steel must end this glorious strife:
And in the case of victory or life,
Fortune's the judge. We'll take the chance of war:
And what brave man soever she shall spare
With life, depend upon't, I'll set him free:
Let him but own the gift to the great gods and me.

—a most princely sentiment, worthy of a scion of the line of Aeacus.

XIII.—39. Further, if individuals under stress of circumstances have made a promise to an enemy, even then they are bound to keep their word. In the First Punic War Regulus was captured by the Carthaginians and sent to Rome on parole to negotiate the exchange of prisoners of war. On his arrival he advised the senate not to give up the prisoners, and despite the efforts of his kinsmen and friends to keep him at home he preferred to return to his punishment rather than break his word pledged to the enemy. [40. In the Second Punic War, after the battle of Cannae, Hannibal sent to Rome ten Roman soldiers who bound themselves by an oath to come back if they did not procure the
ransom of the prisoners of war, but such of them as broke their obligation were kept disfranchised all their lives, and the like fate befell the man who had been the first to incur guilt by evading his oath. This man having quitted the camp with Hannibal's permission, returned soon after on the pretext that he had forgotten something. When he left the camp for the second time he fancied he was released from his oath, and so he was in the letter but not in the spirit. In every promise it is well to think of the meaning and not of the words. Our forefathers have set us an admirable example of justice to an enemy. A deserter having come from the camp of Pyrrhus and offered to the senate to poison the king, the senate and C. Fabricius delivered him up to Pyrrhus. In this way they refused to countenance a criminal attempt even on the life of a powerful aggressor.] 41. I have said enough on the duties of war. We should also remember that it behoves us to deal justly even with the humblest. Now there is no lot or position meaner than that of slaves; and we are wisely enjoined to treat them as we do hired labourers: if we exact work from them we should give them their due. Injustice fights with two weapons, force and fraud; fraud suggests the mean little fox; force, the lion. Both are unworthy of man, but fraud is the more detestable. The most criminal injustice is that of the hypocrite who hides
CICERO

an act of treachery under the cloak of virtue. But I must not enlarge.

XIV.—42. My next subject is beneficence or liber-
ality, the most human of all the virtues, but one which often demands the exercise of caution. We must give heed that our bounty is not injurious either to those whom we intend to benefit or to others, that it does not exceed our means, and that in each case it is proportioned to the worth of the recipient. This last principle is the foundation of justice, the standard by which all these acts of kindness must be measured. If we offer to another under the guise of kindness what will do him harm, we are not to be accounted beneficent or liberal men but dangerous hypocrites; and if we harm one man in order to be liberal to another we are quite as unjust as if we were to appropriate our neighbour’s goods. 43. Many men, however, especially if they are ambitious of honour and glory, lavish on one the spoils of another, ex-
pecting to obtain credit as benefactors, if only they enrich their friends by fair means or by foul. Such conduct is absolutely opposed to duty. Let us there-
fore remember to practise that kind of liberality which will be beneficial to our friends and injurious to no one. Neither Sulla nor C. Caesar deserves to be called liberal for transferring property from its right-
ful owners into the hands of strangers. For without justice there is no liberality.
44. The second precaution of which I spoke is that our bounty should not exceed our means. Those who seek to be more generous than their circumstances permit, offend in two ways. First they wrong their kin by making over to strangers the wealth which in justice they should rather give or bequeath to those of their own blood. In the second place the passion for plunder and dishonest gain is almost inseparable from this foolish generosity which must ever replenish the source of bounty. It is also manifest that the conduct of men who are not really generous but only ambitious of the name often springs from vainglory rather than from a pure motive. Such hypocrisy, I hold, savours more of deceit than of liberality or honour.

45. My third rule is that we should carefully weigh the merits of those whom we intend to benefit. Let us look to the character of the recipient, his disposition towards us, our common interests and social relations, and the obligations under which we lie to him; if he unites all these claims on our kindness, we cannot look for more; if some are lacking, the number and importance of the others must turn the scale.

XV.—46. As those with whom we live are neither perfect nor ideally wise, and as we may consider ourselves fortunate if we find in them even a shadow of
virtue, it is evident that we should neglect no one who exhibits the slightest trace of worth, and should respect and cherish other men in proportion as they are adorned with these gentler virtues, moderation, self-command, and this very justice of which I have spoken so much. The spirit of fortitude is generally too impetuous in the good man who has not attained moral perfection and ideal wisdom; it is the gentler virtues that seem to be more within his reach. So much for the character of the recipient of our bounty.

47. As to the affection he may cherish towards us, our first duty is to be kindest to him who loves us best; but we should not test his love, as youths would do, by its passionate fervour but rather by its strength and constancy. If, however, we are debtors, and our duty is not to bestow but to requite a favour, it behoves us to give the greater diligence; for no duty is more imperative than gratitude. 48. But if, as Hesiod enjoins, we ought to give back with interest, if possible, what we have borrowed, how should we answer the challenge of kindness? Must we not imitate those fertile lands which yield even more than they receive? For if we do not grudge to serve those from whom we look for recompense, with what zeal should we not requite favours already received? Liberality is of two kinds; it gives and it returns; it is in our own power to give or not to give, but to requite a favour is for the good man a sacred obliga-
CICERO

tion provided he can do so without injustice. 49. It is necessary, however, to discriminate between benefits received; and it is clear that the greatest benefit deserves the greatest gratitude. But we must always think of the spirit, the devotion and the affection that have prompted the deed. Many blind and thoughtless men are carried away by a morbid philanthropy or by fits of generosity as sudden as the wind. But benefits conferred with judgment, deliberation, and consistency, stand upon a higher plane. Whether we bestow or requite a favour, duty requires, if other things are equal, that we should first help those who need our help most; but that is not the way of the world. For men are most eager to serve one from whom they expect the greatest reward even though he needs no help.

XVI.—50. The surest means of strengthening the bonds of society is to bestow the greatest kindness on those who are nearest to us. Let us go to the root of the matter and seek in nature the first beginnings of society. The first is seen in the brotherhood of the entire human race. The bonds of connection are thought and speech, the instruments of teaching and learning, of communication, discussion, and reasoning, which unite man to man and bind them together by a kind of natural league. Nothing lifts us so far above the brutes; in some animals we recognise courage, as in the horse and the lion, yet, as
animals have neither thought nor speech, we never ascribe to them justice, equity or goodness. 

51. Such is the universal brotherhood of mankind. Here the common right to all those things which nature has destined for the common use of man must be kept inviolate; and while property assigned by statute or by civil law must be held under the conditions established by these laws, we may learn from the Greek proverb, "among friends all things in common," how to regard all other property. The goods common to all men are, I think, defined in the words of Ennius, which though restricted by him to one instance are generally true:

To put a wandering traveller in's way,
Is but to light one candle with another:
I've ne'er the less, for what I give.

This one example teaches us to grant even to a stranger what it costs us nothing to give. 52. Hence the common maxims: "Keep no one from a running stream"; "Let any one who pleases take a light from your fire"; "Give honest advice to a man in doubt," things which we receive with profit and give without loss. Therefore while we enjoy these blessings we must always contribute to the common weal. But since the resources of individuals are limited and the number of the needy is infinite, we must think of the standard of Ennius: "None the less it shines for him," and so regulate this general liberality that we may
continue to have the means of being generous to our friends.

XVII.—53. Human society may embrace a wider or a narrower circle. Apart from the tie of our common humanity, there is the closer alliance of those who belong to the same nation or tribe and speak the same language. This is a strong bond of union. A more intimate relationship subsists between members of the same state. Fellow-citizens have many things in common; the forum, the sanctuaries, colonnades and streets, laws and privileges, the courts of law, the right of suffrage, social and friendly ties, and the many reciprocal relations of commerce. Still closer is the union of kinsmen; it is human society in miniature. 54. As all living creatures are endowed with the reproductive instinct, the first bond of union is that between husband and wife, next that between their children; then comes the unit of the family and community of goods. Here we find the germ of the city, the nursery, I may say, of the state. Next in order are the relations of brothers and sisters and of first cousins and their children who, cramped in the one home, go forth as it were to found new colonies. Marriages, with their relationships, follow and kinsmen multiply. In this propagation and its aftergrowth states have their origin. For the ties of common blood unite men in kindness and love. 55. It is a great thing to have one family history, a
common worship, and a common tomb. But when good men of like character are joined in friendship, there we find the noblest and the strongest union. Honour, on which I love to dwell, attracts us even in others and kindles a fellow-feeling for those whose character it adorns. 56. Of all the virtues justice and liberality have the greatest charm, the greatest power to excite our love for those in whom they seem to reside; and the strongest bond of affection is the moral sympathy which unites the good. When two men have the same tastes and the same desires, each loves his neighbour as himself, and the ideal of Pythagoras is realised; the two friends become one. Another strong bond of sympathy is the interchange of services; so long as they are mutual and acceptable, they bind us together in a lasting alliance.

57. Now if you survey in your mind all the social relations, you will find that none is more important, none closer, than that which links each one of us with the state. We love our parents, we love our children, our kinsmen, and friends, but all our loves are lost in love of country. Who would not die for her sake if by his death he could do her good? All the more execrable are the fiends who have mangled her body with every outrage, who have laboured and still are labouring to compass her ruin. 58. But if we compare and contrast the rival claims to our friendly offices, we must assign the first rank to our
country and our parents to whom we owe so many benefits; the next to our children and our whole household, who look to us alone and have no other refuge. Next in order are those kinsmen with whom we live in harmony, and with whom we are so often united by common interests. It is they who have the strongest claim on us for material help; but close intimacy, the interchange of thought and speech, of exhortation, consolation, even of rebuke—these things thrive best in the soil of friendship, and the happiest friendship is that which is cemented by moral sympathy.

XVIII.—59. In apportioning all these services we shall have to consider what each man needs most and what he can or cannot procure without our aid. Thus it will often be found that the claims of necessity are stronger than the claims of kin, and that our duty to one man is more pressing than our duty to another; you would sooner help your neighbour to gather in his corn than your brother or your friend; but if a case were on trial, you would rather plead for a kinsman or a friend than for a neighbour. Such are the circumstances we must keep in view in all our moral calculations if we would be good accountants of duty, skilled in adding and subtracting, in striking a balance, and finding what is due to this one and to that. 60. Physicians, generals and orators, however proficient in the rules of their art,
achieve no great success unless they unite theory with practice; so there is no lack of precepts on duty such as I now lay down, but it is experience and practice above all that are required in a matter so important. Perhaps I have said enough to show how honour, the source of duty, originates in the rights and obligations of human society. 61. Of the four cardinal virtues from which honour and duty are derived it is evident that the most imposing in the eyes of the world is fortitude, that great and sublime spirit which scorns the chances of life. So, upon occasion, it is taunts like these that first come to our lips.

Young men in show, but wenches in your hearts:
While Cloelia plays the brave and acts your parts,
You’re for exploits that cost no sweat, nor blood.

So, when we contemplate the brave and noble deeds of some great spirit, we instinctively grow eloquent in their praise. Valour affords a field for eloquence in Marathon, Salamis, Plataeae, Thermopylae and Leuctra; valour animated our own Cocles, the Decii, Cn. and P. Scipio, M. Marcellus, and others without number, and valour has made of the Roman people a nation of heroes. The military costume which adorns almost all our statues is a further proof of our passion for glory in war.

XIX.—62. But if this high spirit which shines in toil and danger is divorced from justice and fights
for private ends, and not for the public good, it is anything but a virtue: it is a brutal vice, repulsive to all our finer feelings. Fortitude is therefore admirably defined by the Stoics as the virtue which fights for equity, and no one ever acquired true glory whose reputation for fortitude was founded on craft and cunning, for there can be no honour without justice.

63. Plato has a fine reflection on this subject: "Knowledge without justice is to be accounted cunning rather than wisdom, and even intrepidity, if prompted by personal ambition, and not by public spirit, does not deserve the name of fortitude: audacity is its name". I maintain then that fortitude or strength of character must be joined with goodness and candour, love of truth and hatred of deceit: qualities which are the very marrow of justice. 64. Unhappily this elevation or greatness of mind is the soil in which obstinacy and the inordinate love of pre-eminence most readily take root. Plato tells us that the Lacedaemonians as a nation are consumed with the passion for victory; so it is with the man of strong character, his ambition is to rule, nay, to rule alone. But it is difficult for those who covet such pre-eminence to maintain that fair spirit which is essential to justice. Thus it happens that men of ambition neither listen to reason nor bow to public and legitimate authority, but chiefly resort to cor-
ruption and intrigue in order to obtain supreme power and to be masters by force rather than equals by law. But the greater the difficulty the greater the glory. For in every circumstance of life justice must be respected. 65. It follows that the title of brave and magnanimous men belongs not to those who commit but to those who repel injustice. The true fortitude of the sage places honour, which above all things it instinctively pursues, not in glory but in conduct, and aspires to be first in deed rather than in name. For the slave of the capricious and ignorant mob cannot be reckoned a man of power. Yet it is the loftiest spirits that are most easily led into temptation by the passion for glory: but now we are on slippery ground, for where will you find the man who does not aspire to glory as the natural reward of the hardships he has undergone and the perils he has encountered?

XX.—66. Fortitude has two characteristics. The first is indifference to outward circumstances. It is founded on the conviction that nothing is worthy of the admiration, the desire, or the effort of man except what is honourable and decorous and that he must surrender neither to his fellow-men, to passion, nor to fortune. The second, the natural outcome of this moral temperament, is the ability to perform actions which are not only great and useful, but arduous, laborious, and fraught with danger to life
and all that makes life worth living. 67. Of the two parts of fortitude the latter is brilliant and imposing, as well as useful, but the former embodies the principle which makes great men and noble spirits that laugh at fortune. To regard honour as the only good and to be free from passion are the two fruits of this virtue. It is a mark of moral courage to make light of those objects which dazzle the world, and steadily to despise them on fixed and settled principles, but it demands a character not less strong and stable to bear the bitter sorrows of life and the countless blows of fortune without departing from our natural tranquility or sacrificing the dignity of the sage. 68. Further, it would be inconsistent to master fear but be mastered by desire, to conquer hardship but be conquered by pleasure. Let us guard against these errors and above all shun the love of money, for there is no surer sign of a narrow, grovelling spirit, just as there is nothing more honourable or noble than to despise what fortune refuses and to devote what she bestows to beneficence and liberality. As I said above, we ought to beware of the passion for glory, for it robs us of liberty, which brave men should pursue with all their might, and we should not seek command or rather upon occasion decline it or lay it down. 69. Again, we must put away every emotion—desire, fear, grief, joy, anger—in order that we may enjoy the tranquillity and composure of mind which brings
in its train moral stability and self-respect. It is the love of this tranquillity that has led so many men in all ages to withdraw from public affairs and take refuge in a life of leisure. Among the number have been illustrious philosophers of the first rank and grave and earnest men who could not bear the ways of the people or their rulers. Some of these spent their lives in the country finding pleasure in the management of their property. 70. They aspired to the independence of kings, who suffer no want, bow to no authority, and enjoy liberty, or the privilege of living as you please.

XXI.—This then is the common object of ambitious statesmen and men of leisure; statesmen expect to attain it by acquiring great wealth, men of leisure by contenting themselves with their own means, however small. Neither view is to be condemned, but the life of the retired man is easier and safer for himself, less dangerous and oppressive to others, while the career of the politician who devotes himself to the conduct of important affairs is more fruitful to the world and is the highway to eminence and distinction. 71. I should therefore be disposed to excuse the political inaction of men of genius who consecrate their lives to study and of those who through ill-health or some more serious cause withdraw from public life, leaving to others the opportunity and the credit of government. But
CICERO

when men without such excuse profess to scorn the commands and offices which dazzle the world, their conduct deserves nothing but censure. In so far as they despise glory and count it as naught we are bound to sympathise with their views; but it really seems as if they shrank from toil and trouble and the supposed discredit of political failure. Some men are inconsistent in opposite circumstances; they rigorously despise pleasure, in pain they are over-sensitive, they scorn glory, but are crushed by disgrace, and even in their inconsistency they are inconsistent. 72. But the born administrator should without hesitation seek for office and assume the direction of public affairs; otherwise government becomes impossible and there is no field for the display of fortitude. Now magnanimity and contempt of fortune, tranquillity and composure of mind, are not less necessary, perhaps even more necessary, to statesmen than to philosophers, if they are to be free from anxiety and to live a staid and well-balanced life. 73. This is easier for philosophers; their life is less exposed to the blows of fortune; they have fewer wants; and in adversity they have not so far to fall. Statesmen are naturally agitated by stronger emotions than private citizens and they are more ambitious of success. Thus they have all the more need to exercise fortitude which frees the mind from care. On entering political life a man should not
only consider the honourable nature of the work, but also his ability to perform it; and in this self-examination he must guard against the groundless despair of the coward and the excessive confidence of the man of ambition. In a word, whatever we undertake, the most thorough preparation is necessary.

XXII.—74. I wish here to correct the prevailing prejudice that the work of the soldier is more important than the work of the statesman. Many men seek occasions for war in order to gratify their ambition; and the tendency is most conspicuous in men of strong character and great intellect, especially if they have a genius and a passion for warfare. But if we weigh the matter well, we shall find that many civil transactions have surpassed in importance and celebrity the operations of war. 75. Though the deeds of Themistocles are justly extolled, though his name is more illustrious than that of Solon, and though Salamis is cited as witness to the brilliant victory which eclipses the wisdom of Solon in founding the Areopagus, yet the work of the law-giver must be reckoned not less glorious than that of the commander. Salamis was a momentary advantage to the state, the Areopagus a benefit which will endure for ever; for it is this council that has preserved the laws of the Athenians and their time-honoured institutions. Themistocles can point to no instance in which he served the Areopagus, while the Areopa-
gus can boast of rendering aid to Themistocles; for the war was directed by the wisdom of that council which Solon had established. 76. The same may be said of Pausanias and Lysander. Though they extended the limits of the Lacedaemonian empire, their exploits are nowise to be compared with the legislation and the constitution of Lycurgus. Why, it was to him they owed the discipline and courage of their men. To tell the truth, I never thought M. Scaurus inferior to Marius when I was a boy, nor Q. Catulus to Cn. Pompeius at the time when I was engaged in public affairs; an army in the field is nothing without wisdom at home. Scipio Africanus, who was equally remarkable as a man and as a soldier, rendered no greater service to his country by the destruction of Numantia than his contemporary P. Nasica who though not invested with official authority put to death Ti. Gracchus. The conduct of Nasica does not belong exclusively to the province of civil affairs—for an act of violence borders on warfare—still it was a political, not a military measure. 77. That is a fine sentiment though I hear it is constantly assailed by traitors who bear me a grudge:—

Let swordsmen to the gown give place,
And crown the orator with bays.

Not to mention other examples, when I was at the helm of state, did not the sword yield to the garb

150204
CICERO

of peace? Never was our country menaced by more serious danger, never did she enjoy more profound repose: and it was through my vigilant policy that the sword slipped from the traitor’s hands and fell to the ground as if by magic. When was such an exploit performed in war? Where will you find a triumph to compare with mine? 78. I speak thus frankly, my dear son, because I know that my self-complacency will be pardoned by one who is destined to inherit my glory and follow my example. Why, the great Cn. Pompeius, a hero crowned with the laurels of victory, publicly paid me the compliment that in vain would he have won his third triumph had not my efforts preserved our city, the scene of its celebration. There is then a civic fortitude which is not inferior to the prowess of the soldier, and demands even greater energy and self-sacrifice.

XXIII.—79. That moral dignity, which we find in a noble and lofty spirit, depends, it is true, on force of mind, not on bodily strength; yet we must so train and school the body that it may obey our judgment and reason, whether we are discharging public functions or enduring hardships. The moral dignity, I say, which is the subject of our inquiry, consists exclusively in thought and reflection; and thus the ministers who govern the republic perform as important work as the generals who command her armies. It is by the policy of statesmen that war has often
been averted, brought to a close, or even declared; the third Punic War, for instance, was undertaken on the advice of M. Cato, and even after his death it was affected by his powerful influence. 80. Accordingly in settling a dispute the skill of the diplomatist is to be preferred to the valour of the soldier, but we should adopt this principle not through fear of war but on the ground of public expediency, and should only take up arms when it is evident that peace is the one object we pursue. Again, the strong and resolute man is not shaken by misfortune; he is never disconcerted or thrown off his balance, but at all times retains his presence of mind, his judgment, and his reason. 81. Such are the marks of personal courage. But the man of great intellect anticipates the future, calculates the chances for good or for evil, decides how to meet every contingency, and is never reduced to the necessity of saying: "That is not what I expected". These are the features by which we recognise a great and sublime spirit, confident in its own prudence and wisdom. But to rush into battle blindfold and fight the enemy hand to hand is barbarous and brutal; nevertheless, when stress of circumstances demands it, we must draw the sword and choose death before slavery and shame.

XXIV.—82. To pass to the destruction and spoliation of cities we should here avoid recklessness and cruelty. In times of disorder, too, the brave man will
punish the leaders and spare the people and in every conjuncture will cleave to what is right and honourable. I have said that some men prefer the valour of the soldier to the wisdom of the statesman, so you will find many to whom a dangerous and feverish policy is more dazzling and impressive than calm and well-considered counsels. 83. We should never incur the imputation of cowardice by fleeing from danger, while we should avoid the other extreme of rushing into danger, which is the height of folly. It is therefore necessary in perilous enterprises to follow the practice of physicians who treat mild cases with gentle measures and only apply desperate remedies to desperate diseases. It is mad to pray for a storm when the sea is calm, but wise, when it comes, to meet it with every precaution (so it is wrong to court danger, but right to face it boldly), especially if you have more to gain by decisive action than you would lose by remaining in suspense. Now great enterprises are fraught with danger partly to those who undertake them, partly to the state, and in carrying them out some men risk their lives, others their reputation and the goodwill of their fellow-citizens. We should therefore be more willing to endanger our own interests than the welfare of our country and to stake our honour and glory more readily than other advantages. 84. History presents many examples of men who, though ready to lavish
wealth and even life for their country, turned a deaf ear to her prayers when she called for the slightest sacrifice of their glory. Callicratidas, the Lacedaemonian commander in the Peloponnesian war, performed many brilliant exploits, but at last threw away all he had won by rejecting the proposal that he should withdraw his squadron from Arginusae and not engage the Athenians. "If the Lacedaemonians lose this fleet," he replied, "they can build another, but for me flight means disgrace." The reverse at Arginusae was unimportant. But that was a fatal blow which Cleombrotus dealt to the Lacedaemonian empire when through fear of public opinion he rashly fought with Epaminondas. How much wiser the conduct of Q. Maximus of whom Ennius says:—

Fabius was slow but sure, and his delay
Restored the tottering state. Now 'twas his way
To mind his business, not what people said:
He lived a great man, but he's greater dead.

Errors such as these should also be avoided in political life. There are actually men who through fear of unpopularity will not dare to express their opinions, however excellent.

XXV.—85. Our statesmen will do well to remember these two precepts of Plato's. Forgetting personal interest they should aim at the public advantage and make that the object of all their efforts; again, they should care for the whole body politic and not abandon
one part while protecting another. The government of a country resembles the charge of a minor. It must be conducted for the advantage of the governed, not of the governors. To promote the welfare of one section of the citizens and neglect another is to bring upon the state the curse of revolution and civil strife. What is the result? We have a democratic and an aristocratic party, but a national party hardly exists. 86. This factious spirit it was that caused such bitter feuds at Athens and in our own republic fanned the flames of sedition and destructive civil wars. From such disasters a brave and earnest citizen worthy of supreme political power will turn with detestation. Indifferent to influence and power he will give his undivided energies to the public service and will impartially promote the interests of every class and the good of the whole nation. He will never employ false charges to expose any man to hatred or unpopularity, but will cleave to justice and honour, and rather than abandon his principles will suffer the heaviest loss and brave even death itself. 87. There is nothing more deplorable than the passion for popularity and the struggle for office. Plato has a fine simile on this subject. "Competitors for the public administration," he says, "are like sailors fighting for the helm." In another place he enjoins us not to regard our political opponents with the same hostility as men who take up arms against

42
our country. I may cite as an example the rivalry of P. Africanus and Q. Metellus which was never embittered by personal rancour. 88. I have no patience with those who would have us cherish bitter animosity against our rivals as if that were a mark of fortitude. No, there is nothing more praiseworthy, nothing more becoming in a great and noble character than a forgiving, forbearing spirit. In a free country, where all enjoy equal rights, if we cultivate a gracious manner it should be united with the power to disguise our feelings, for, if we are ruffled by an ill-timed visit or an impudent request, we may fall a prey to a churlish temper injurious to ourselves and offensive to others. But if the public interests are at stake this gentleness and mercy are only to be commended when they are accompanied with sternness without which government is impossible. In administering punishment and reproof it behoves us to abstain from insult and to seek the public advantage and not our personal satisfaction. 89. Again, we should never impose a penalty disproportioned to the offence or for the same crime punish one and let another go unchallenged. Above all, when we inflict punishment, let us put away anger; he who approaches the task in an angry spirit will never observe the happy mean between excess and defect, that cardinal principle of the Peripatetics, which they would be right in preaching if they did not praise
anger and tell us that nature has bestowed it for some good end. No, in all circumstances let us repudiate this passion and pray that our rulers may resemble the laws which punish not in anger but in justice.

XXVI.—90. Moreover when fortune smiles and everything is going to our heart's desire, it is our duty to abstain from pride, disdain and arrogance. It is as sure a sign of weakness to be spoiled by success as to be crushed by misfortune, and it is a golden rule in every situation of life to keep our balance and wear an even look and the same unruffled brow. Such we learn from history was the character of Socrates and of C. Laelius. Philip of Macedon, we are told, was inferior to his son in heroism and glory but surpassed him in condescension and sympathy. The father was always noble, the son was often mean; hence the maxim seems true: "The higher you rise, the more lowly must you be". Panaetius records a favourite simile of his friend and pupil Africanus: "When horses grow wild and mettlesome after constant charges in the field of battle, their owners hand them to the horse-breaker to make them more tractable; so presumptuous men who turn restive in prosperity should be taken to the manège of reason and philosophy to learn the frailty of human things and the fickleness of fortune". 91. It is above all in the height of our success that we
CICERO

should consult our friends and bow to their authority. At such a season too it is well to beware of the flatterer and close our ears to his seductive words. We are all so well pleased with ourselves that we accept praise as our due; hence the countless blunders of men who, puffed up with vanity, fall a prey to the greatest delusions and bring upon themselves contempt and ridicule. 92. But enough of this subject. To recapitulate, the public administration is so extensive in its range and embraces such a multitude of interests that statesmen unquestionably perform the most important work in the world and that which demands the greatest fortitude. But it cannot be denied that in all ages many private men of strong character have carried on important researches or pursued great objects without quitting their own sphere. Midway between philosophers and statesmen there is another class who take delight in the management of their own affairs, never adding to their fortune by unscrupulous means nor refusing, in case of need, to aid their kinsmen, their friends, or their country. Property should be acquired by no dishonest or odious methods; it should be increased by thought, care and thrift; and it should benefit the greatest possible number provided they are worthy, and minister less to excess and luxury than to liberality and beneficence. By following these principles we may lead a lofty, dignified, and
CICERO

independent life, uniting candour with good faith and goodwill to all men.

XXVII.—93. It remains to discuss the last part of honour. This comprises considerate feeling and the virtue of self-command or moderation, which lends a sort of lustre to our life, subdues our passions and regulates our conduct. It further includes the virtue which we may call in Latin decorum; the Greeks call it πρεπον. Decorum is really inseparable from honour. 94. Indeed the two notions are coextensive and the difference between them is more easily felt than explained. For decorum, whatever it may be, always presupposes honour. It is therefore found not only in the present division of honour, but also in the three preceding. It is decorous to think and speak wisely, to act deliberately, and in everything to see and uphold the truth; on the other hand, it is just as indecorous to be led astray and wander stumbling in the dark, as to go crazy and lose one's reason. All just acts are decorous, while unjust acts are at once dishonourable and indecorous. The same thing is true of fortitude. To act in a manly and courageous spirit is decorous and worthy of a man, to do otherwise is at once dishonourable and indecorous. 95. The decorum of which I speak is thus related to honour as a whole, and the relation is so manifest that no abstruse process of reasoning is required to discover it. In the
whole of virtue we feel there is something decorous; and if we separate these two conceptions, the distinction is more theoretical than real. As bodily grace and beauty are inseparable from health, so decorum is merged in virtue though the two conceptions may be severed in thought. 96. There are two kinds of decorum; the one is general and is associated with honour as a whole, the other is special and belongs to particular virtues. General decorum is commonly defined as that which harmonises with the characteristic excellence of man which distinguishes him from all other living creatures; and special decorum as that which so befits our nature as to invest moderation and temperance with an indefinable charm.

XXVIII.—97. That this is the notion of decorum may be inferred from the laws of dramatic propriety. These are fully treated in other works, but I will here remark that poets observe these laws when they make each personage act and speak in accordance with his character. For example, we should be shocked if Aeacus or Minos said, "let them hate, so they fear," or, "the father is the grave of his own children," because we know that they were just men: but in the mouth of Atreus these words call forth applause, because they are appropriate to his part. It rests with the poet to decide what is proper to each character by the part he plays. As for man, Nature herself has assigned to him a part far transcending
CICERO

that of other living creatures. 98. If the poet has to invest his varied personages with their appropriate attributes, and to clothe even vice in its peculiar garb, we, whom Nature has placed upon the stage of life to exhibit strength of character, moderation, self-command and sympathy, we, whom she teaches to bethink us of our duties to our fellow-men, cannot fail to see the extent and importance of the general decorum which is inseparable from honour as a whole, and of the special decorum which is displayed in each particular virtue. As bodily beauty attracts the eye by the symmetry of the limbs and charms us by the graceful harmony of all the parts, so the decorum which shines in our conduct engages the esteem of society by the order, consistency and restraint which it imposes on all our words and deeds. 99. We therefore owe a certain deference to all men, especially to the good. For indifference to public opinion is a mark not only of presumption but of utter depravity. In our social relations there is a difference between justice and sympathy. Not to wrong our fellow-men is the function of justice: that of sympathy is not to wound their feelings; herein the power of decorum is most conspicuous. The nature of that virtue should, I think, be clear from the foregoing exposition. 100. The duty derived from decorum conducts us in the first place to harmony with nature and the faithful observance of her laws.
CICERO

If we take nature for our guide we shall never go astray, but resolutely follow Prudence, that is true insight and wisdom, Justice, the principle of human society, and Fortitude or moral strength. But it is in Temperance, the division of Honour now under discussion, that the force of decorum is most conspicuous; for neither the gestures of the body nor the emotions of the mind can be called decorous unless they are in harmony with Nature. 101. The soul is swayed by two forces: the one is appetite, called by the Greeks ἀρέτη, which hurries us this way and that, the other reason, which teaches us what to do and what to avoid. It follows that reason must command and appetite obey.

XXIX.—Our conduct should be wholly free from thoughtless precipitation, and for every action we should be able to furnish a reasonable motive; that is as nearly as possible the definition of duty. 102. To this end it is necessary to bring the appetites under the sway of reason; they must neither be so impetuous as to run away from reason nor so lazy and sluggish as to lag behind her, but should be calm and free from passion: thus will consistency and moderation shine forth in all their glory. If through desire or fear the appetites run riot and become too restive to be controlled by reason, they clearly overstep the bounds of moderation. For when they cast off the yoke and revolt against their
natural mistress, they not only unsettle the soul, but disfigure the body. Just look at the face of a man agitated by anger, desire, or fear, or intoxicated with pleasure; what a change in his look, his voice, his gestures and his whole aspect. 103. To return to the conception of the duty under discussion, it is manifest that we must curb and calm our appetites and stir ourselves up to be diligent and watchful lest we grow reckless and let our lives drift without thought or care. Surely Nature never intended us for sport or jest so much as for purposes more serious and noble, and for an earnest life. Sport and jest have their own place like sleep and other kinds of repose, but we must first meet the claims of serious and important work. Wit should be neither extravagant nor immoderate but refined and elegant. As we do not allow children absolute freedom in their play but only such freedom as comports with good conduct, so even in a jest there should be some spark of virtue. 104. Jests are of two kinds: some are low, wanton, wicked, obscene; others elegant, polished, graceful. Elegant witticisms abound not only in Plautus and the Old Attic Comedy but also in the pages of the Socratic philosophers, and we possess many happy sayings of the kind such as the ἀποφθέγματα collected by Cato the Elder. It is easy to distinguish the refined from the vulgar jest. At the proper season, when the mind is free, an elegant
sally is worthy of a great man, but coarse thoughts expressed in coarse words are only fit for a slave. Sport as well as wit has its limits which we should never transgress lest we be carried away by passion and lapse into some deed of shame. Our "Cam-
pus" and the chase furnish examples of noble pastimes.

XXX.—105. In every question of duty it is im-
portant to remember how far the nature of man transcends the nature of the brutes. The brutes are susceptible only of sensual pleasure, and at that they rush in full career; but the mind of man is nourished by study and thought, is ever seeking or doing, and is charmed with the pleasures of seeing and hearing. Why, if a man is at all prone to sensual pleasure, without descending, as some men do, to the level of the brutes, and is caught in the toils of vice, for very shame he hides and cloaks his passion. 106. Hence it is evident that sensual pleasure is un-
worthy of the dignity of man and that we must scorn and cast it from us; but if we do yield to passion let us take heed that we use some measure in our indulgence. Therefore in the food we eat and the care we bestow on the body we should aim at health and strength and not at sensual pleasure. We have only to reflect on the excellence and dignity of human nature to feel how base it is to languish in luxury and pamper ourselves in voluptuous ease, and
how noble it is to lead a frugal, temperate, well-disciplined life.

107. In the next place observe that Nature has invested us with two characters. The one is universal, inasmuch as all men participate in reason and in that excellence which lifts humanity above the brute creation. This is the one source of honour and decorum and of the very idea of right and wrong. The other character is individual. Great as are the diversities in the constitution of the body—one man is a swift runner, another a strong wrestler; one has a stately, another a graceful figure—the diversities of character are greater still. 108. L. Crassus and L. Philippus possessed great wit, Caesar, the son of Lucius, even greater, but his was more laboured; on the other hand, their contemporaries, young M. Drusus and M. Scaurus, were remarkable for their gravity and C. Laelius for his vivacity, while his friend Scipio united a loftier ambition with a more solemn demeanour. Among the Greeks, we are told, Socrates had a winning, playful, sprightly manner, and his discourse was full of that roguish humour which the Greeks call irony; Pythagoras and Pericles on the other hand had not a spark of gaiety and yet attained commanding influence. Among the Punic leaders Hannibal was as shrewd as Q. Maximus among our own; both had the gift of silence and the art of hiding their own stratagems and stealing a march on
the enemy. For such qualities the Greeks assign
the palm to Themistocles and Jason of Pherae, and
we have a remarkable instance of astuteness in the
artifice of Solon, who feigned madness in order to
save his life and benefit his country. 109. In con-
trast with these are the men of frank and open char-
acter, who love the truth, hate deceit, and set their
face against craft and treachery; others again, like
Sulla and M. Crassus, would stoop to anything and
cringe to any man, if only they could gain their
object. Thus the artful diplomacy of the Laced-
aemonian Lysander formed a strong contrast with
the character of Callieratidas, his immediate suc-
cessor in the office of admiral. Further, we know of
eminent men who were remarkable for their conde-
sension. I may cite as examples Catulus and his
son, and Q. Mucius and Mancia. Old men have
told me the same thing of Nasica, but they said
that his father, who punished the frantic schemes
of Ti. Gracchus, had no such gracious manner and
rose to greatness and celebrity for that very reason.
Besides these there are countless varieties of char-
acter, none of which is to be condemned, though
they all differ from one another.

XXXI.—110. The surest means of observing the
decorum which is the object of this inquiry is to be
resolute in cleaving to our own native qualities, pro-
vided they be not vicious. Without violating the
universal laws of human nature we should follow the bent of our own character, and, leaving to other men careers more brilliant and imposing, determine our pursuits by the standard of our own aptitudes. It is vain to fight against the conditions of our existence and strive after the impossible. Thus the conception of decorum emerges into clearer light; for, according to the adage, nothing is decorous if it thwarts Minerva—in other words, if it is in direct opposition to our natural genius. 111. If there be such a thing as decorum at all, it is nothing but the balance of the whole conduct and of particular acts, and how can this be maintained if we copy the nature of others to the neglect of our own? For, as we ought to use our mother tongue which everybody understands in order to escape the well-deserved ridicule which some incur by foisting in Greek phrases, so we should introduce no discord either into particular actions or into our conduct as a whole. 112. This diversity of character is sometimes so imperious that in the same circumstances suicide is for one man a duty, for another a crime. Was not M. Cato in the same position as those who surrendered to Caesar in Africa? Yet they might have been condemned if they had slain themselves, because their life had been less austere, their characters more pliant; but Cato, whom Nature had endowed with incredible resolution which he had fortified by unswerving unity of purpose,
CICERO

Cato, who had continued steadfast in every design and every enterprise, had no choice but to die rather than behold the face of the tyrant. 113. What miseries Ulysses suffered in his weary wanderings! Think how he stooped to be the slave of women (if Circe and Calypso deserve the name), and set himself to speak pleasant things to every man he met! Nay, in his own home he brooked the reproaches of slaves and handmaids in order to reach at last the goal of his desires. Ajax, on the contrary, with his proud spirit, would have died a thousand deaths rather than suffer such indignity. These considerations teach us that every one should appraise and regulate his own character without trying if another man’s will fit him: that fits a man best which is most his own. 114. Let each one then study his own nature and be a strict judge of his merits and defects. We ought surely to have as much sense as actors who choose not the best pieces but those most suited to their powers. An actor with a fine voice appears in the Epigoni or the Medus, another will choose the Melanippe or the Clytemnaestra to exhibit his action; Rupilius, whom I remember, always played in the Antiopa, Aesop rarely in the Ajax. I ask you, if an actor observes this decorum on the stage, shall a wise man neglect it in the drama of life? Our aptitudes, I repeat, will be our best guide in choosing a career. But, if fate should ever thrust us aside into some
uncongenial occupation, we should grudge no pains, thought or effort to acquit ourselves, if not with distinction, at least without discredit, and rather endeavour to avoid defects than to attain to virtues which nature has placed beyond our reach.

XXXII.—115. To these two characters may be added a third which fate or chance imposes on us: there is indeed a fourth which we deliberately assume. Royalty and command, rank and office, wealth and influence, and the opposite conditions, depend on fortune or on circumstances: but the part that we are to play in the world is the result of our own free choice. 116. Thus one man turns to philosophy, another to civil law, a third to eloquence, and we have even our favourite virtues. But those whose fathers or ancestors have distinguished themselves in some particular sphere commonly strive to carry on the noble traditions of their family. Thus Q. Mucius, the son of Publius, was an eminent jurist, and Africanus, the son of Paulus, a great general. Some men superadd distinction of their own to that which they have inherited from their fathers. The same Africanus crowned his martial glory with the renown of the orator, and Timotheus, the son of Conon, who, as a soldier, was not inferior to his father, enhanced his reputation by his ability and culture. Other men quit the beaten track and follow a path of their own, and here aspiring men of
humble origin achieve the greatest success. 117. These are the considerations we must keep in view while investigating the nature of decorum; but first of all we have to decide what we are to do and what manner of men we wish to be—the most difficult problem in the world. For it is in early youth when the judgment is most feeble that each one adopts the profession that attracts him most. He is thus committed to some definite course of life before he is fit to judge which is the best. 118. According to Prodicus, as cited by Xenophon, Hercules in his early youth, the period set apart by nature for choosing a path of life, went out to a lonely spot and sitting down there with two paths in view, the path of Pleasure and the path of Virtue, for a long time earnestly deliberated which it was better to follow. This may have happened to Hercules "sprung from the seed of Jove," but for us it is impossible. For we all copy the models we happen to choose and feel constrained to adopt their tastes and pursuits. But for the most part we are so imbued with the principles of our parents that we naturally fall into their manners and customs. Some men are swept away by the current of popular opinion, and the ideals of the multitude are their highest ambition; others, whether through good fortune or natural ability, pursue the right path without parental instruction.

XXXIII.—119. It rarely happens that men who
possess eminent ability or extraordinary learning or culture, or even unite these two advantages, have the leisure to deliberate on the choice of a career. The question turns on the disposition and capacity of the individual. I have already said that we must study our own nature in order to discover what is decorous in particular actions; how much more imperative is such a precaution when we are ordering our whole life, if we desire to maintain a consistent character and never falter in our duty. 120. In this inquiry Fortune next to Nature has the most powerful influence. They both demand our attention but Nature has the stronger claim; she is in truth so much more firm and steadfast, that in conflict with Fortune she is like a goddess contending with a mortal. If, then, a man has chosen some mode of life adapted to his nature—I mean his better nature—let him persevere, for that is his duty, unless he find that he has blundered in his choice. If he has erred—and error is possible—he must change his habits and pursuits. If circumstances favour, the change will be attended with less trouble and discomfort: otherwise, he must retrace his steps with care and caution, as wise men hold that when a friend has lost his charm and forfeited our esteem the bonds of affection should be gradually untied rather than suddenly cut asunder. 121. His career once altered, he should endeavour to show that he
CICERO

has acted with wisdom. I said above that we ought to follow the example of our forefathers. The rule has two exceptions. Never copy their vices; and never seek to emulate their virtues, if Nature has placed them beyond your reach. Thus the son of the elder Africanus was too infirm to rival his glory, while the son of Paulus whom he adopted walked in his father's footsteps. If then you have not the talent to become a pleader, a statesman, or a general, you should at least practise the virtues that lie within your powers, such as justice, honour, liberality, moderation, self-command; and thus your defects will be less conspicuous. The noblest heritage, the richest patrimony a father can bequeath to his children is a reputation for virtue and noble deeds. To tarnish his good name is a sin and a crime.

XXXIV.—122. Since our duties vary at every stage of life, and some are peculiar to the young, others to the old, it is necessary to explain the distinction in a few words. It behoves a young man to respect his elders and choose the best and most trusted among them to uphold him with their counsel and authority; for the folly of youth must needs be ordered and directed by the wisdom of age. Above all the young should be restrained from passion, and their bodies and minds inured to toil and endurance, that they may be ready one day to put forth their energies in the duties of war and of peace. Even
when they unbend and give themselves to enjoyment they should guard against excess and remember the dictates of modesty: and the task will be more easy if in pleasure as in business they do not shun the company of men of riper years. 123. Old men, on the other hand, as they become less capable of physical exertion, should redouble their intellectual activity, and their principal occupation should be to assist the young, their friends, and above all their country, with their wisdom and sagacity. There is nothing they should guard against so much as languor and sloth. Luxury, which is shameful at every period of life, makes old age hideous. If it is united with sensuality, the evil is two-fold. Age thus brings disgrace on itself and aggravates the shameless licence of the young. 124. It may not be irrelevant to speak of the duties of magistrates, of private citizens, and of foreigners. It is incumbent on the magistrate to realise that he represents the state and that he is bound to uphold its dignity and credit, to guard the constitution, and to dispense justice with an even hand, remembering that these things are sacred trusts committed to his charge. It behoves a private citizen to live on equal terms with his fellows, and not to cringe and grovel or to hold his head too high, and in public affairs to support a peaceful and honourable policy. Such are the qualities we look for in the model citizen. 125. As for the foreigner
and the resident alien, it is his duty to mind his own affairs, and not to pry into the affairs of others or meddle in the politics of a country with which he has no concern. These are substantially the duties that we shall find to be incumbent on us when we inquire what is decorous and what is appropriate to particular characters, circumstances, and periods of life. In every purpose and in every action there is nothing more decorous than a steady and consistent demeanour.

XXXV.—126. The second kind of decorum is seen in our words and deeds and in the aspect of the body whether in motion or at rest. It consists of beauty, harmony, and taste, conceptions more easily understood than expressed. These three qualities again connote the desire to please those with whom we live and the wider circle of our fellow-citizens. I will therefore say a few words on this subject. In the first place, observe the care which Nature herself has bestowed on the construction of our body. She displays to view the face and all those parts the sight of which is decent, but has covered up and concealed the organs designed for the natural functions as unsightly and offensive. 127. Here our sense of shame follows the subtle contrivance of Nature. Following her example all healthy-minded men conceal these organs and their functions, and it is even thought indecent to mention things which are not
CICERO

wrong provided they be done in secret. It is only
the publicity of these acts and obscenity of language
that constitute immodesty. 128. I have no patience
with the cynics or their Stoic rivals who sneer at
modesty and scout the idea that it is right to speak
of actions that are immoral, but outrageous to
mention others that are innocent in themselves.
Robbery, theft, adultery, are wrong, but it is not
indecent to speak of them; it is right to beget
children, but obscene to mention it; with these
and similar arguments they attack the principle of
modesty. As for us, we ought to follow Nature and
shun everything that shocks the eye or the ear.
Whether we stand or walk, whether we sit or lie,
our whole demeanour and all our looks and gestures
should be governed by decorum. 129. Here there
are two extremes to be avoided, effeminate languor
and boorish coarseness. We cannot admit that the
laws of decorum are binding on the actor and the
orator, but are indifferent to us. Theatrical tradition
has carried the laws of modesty so far that an actor
never appears on the stage without a girdle for fear
of exposing his person and shocking the spectators.
In our country it is not the custom for an adult son
to bathe with his father or a father-in-law with a son-
in-law. It is our duty, I repeat, to obey these laws
of modesty especially as Nature herself is our teacher
and guide.

62
There are two kinds of beauty. The first is grace, the attribute of woman; the second is dignity, the attribute of man. Therefore shun all foppery and affectation. If our manners recall the palaestra or the stage they will be offensive and ridiculous; they are only admired when they are simple and natural. The beauty of the face depends on the complexion, and the complexion is the result of exercise. The care of our person should not be carried to the extreme of obtrusive refinement; it will suffice if we are free from rough and unmannerly neglect. The same principle applies to our dress; here, as in most things, moderation is best.

When we are out walking we must not be so slow and languid as to suggest a religious procession nor must we hurry so fast as to put ourselves out of breath and disturb our looks and features; for these are sure symptoms of want of balance. Still more earnestly should we endeavour to keep our emotions in their natural state of repose; and we shall succeed in the effort if we are proof against excitement and depression and intent on the maintenance of decorum.

The operations of the mind are of two kinds; some are connected with thought, others with appetite. Thought is employed in the discovery of truth, appetite impels to action. Let us strive then to employ our thoughts on the noblest objects and to bring our appetites under the sway of reason.
XXXVII.—Speech is a great power in the world. It is of two kinds, formal discourse and conversation. Formal discourse is appropriate to judicial argument and to political and deliberative orations; conversation finds its natural place in social gatherings, learned discussions, and in friendly reunions and banquets. There is a science of rhetoric, and I am inclined to think a science of conversation possible though none exists. The demand for masters creates the supply, and though the world is full of students of rhetoric, there are neither students nor masters of conversation. Still the rules of rhetoric are equally applicable to conversation. 133. Since the voice is the organ of speech, we should try to make it clear and pleasant. These qualities, it is true, are natural gifts, but the first may be improved by practice, the second by the imitation of calm and articulate speakers. There was nothing about the two Catuli to make you think they possessed a fine literary sense; for the culture they had was nothing extraordinary, and yet it was thought they spoke Latin with the greatest purity. Their pronunciation was agreeable, the sounds were neither mouthed nor minced, obscure nor affected; and they spoke without effort, yet without monotony or excessive modulation. The diction of L. Crassus was more copious and not less brilliant, but the eloquence of the Catuli ranked as high as his. In wit and humour Caesar,
the brother of the elder Catulus, was the first speaker of his time; even at the bar his easy conversational style surpassed the laboured speeches of his rivals. If, then, we aim at decorum in everything we do, we should strive to perfect ourselves in all these qualities. 134. Forming our conversation on the admirable model of the disciples of Socrates, let us put forward our opinions in an easy tentative way and not without a spice of humour. Above all, we should never monopolise the conversation, but allow everyone in turn to have his fair share. First of all it is necessary to consider the subject, and, whether it be grave or gay, let our language correspond. Again it is important not to betray any defect of character, such as the malice of the slanderer who delights in attacking the absent either in jest or with the serious purpose of covering them with abuse and contumely. 135. Conversation generally turns upon family affairs, politics or learning and culture. These are the subjects to which we must endeavour to bring it back if it has drifted into another channel, but we must always study the company; for tastes differ, and nothing pleases all men at all times or to the same degree. It is well to mark the moment when the subject palls and to end as we began with tact.

XXXVIII.—136. The sound principle, that in all our conduct we should be free from passion or wild irrational feeling, ought naturally to govern our con-
CICERO

conversation. Let us betray no symptom of anger, or intense feeling, or of apathy, listlessness, or similar defects, and endeavour to exhibit respect and consideration for those with whom we converse. If at times reproof is required, it may be necessary to speak in a louder tone and in stronger language and to assume the appearance of anger. But like the cautery and the lance, that is an extreme measure which we should seldom and reluctantly employ and only as a last resource. Anger itself we must put far away, for with it we can do nothing right or well-advised. 137. Often it will suffice to administer a gentle, but calm, reproof and to exhibit sternness without insolence. Nay more, let us show that even the severity of our censure is only intended for the good of the offender. Again, in the quarrels we have with our bitterest enemies, it is proper to stifle our feelings and maintain our composure whatever insults may be offered to us. If we are under the dominion of excitement we lose our balance and forfeit the respect of the company. Another offence against decorum is to boast of oneself, especially without ground, and to expose oneself to derision by playing the "Braggart Captain".

XXXIX.—138. Since I am discussing decorum in all its phases—that is at least my purpose—I must also explain what kind of house I consider appropriate for an eminent public man. As a house is built for use the plan should correspond; but at the same
time comfort and elegance ought to be studied. Cn. Octavius, the first consul of that name, distinguished himself by building on the Palatine a splendid and imposing mansion. All Rome rushed to see it, and it was thought to have won for its obscure owner the votes which raised him to the consulate. Scaurus demolished the house and built with the materials a wing to his own. Thus Octavius was the first of his family to confer upon his house the honour of the consulate, while Scaurus, the son of a great and illustrious man, enlarged the house but brought to it not only political defeat but also disgrace and misfortune. 139. The house should not constitute, though it may enhance, the dignity of the master; let the master honour the house, not the house the master; and as in all things we should think of others as well as of ourselves, a distinguished citizen must have a spacious mansion in which to receive his numerous guests and crowds of men of every condition. A palace only brings dishonour if solitude reigns in its noble halls which once were full of life in the days of another master. How grievous to hear the passers-by exclaim: "Here's the old house, but where's the old master?" and this, alas, is but too true of many houses in these times. 140. Guard against extravagance and excessive display, especially if you are building a house for yourself. The mere example is mischievous. For men love to copy the
foibles of the great. How few have rivalled the virtue of Lucullus, how many the splendour of his mansions! Never go to excess, but let moderation be your guide not only in your house but in regard to all the necessities and comforts of life. But I must pass from this subject.

141. Whatever you undertake, there are three rules to be observed. In the first place, it is necessary to subject appetite to reason, for that is the surest means of fulfilling your duty; again, you must estimate the importance of the object you wish to accomplish that the effort you bestow upon it may be neither greater nor less than the case demands. Finally, observe moderation in all that concerns the aspect and dignity of a gentleman; and moderation is best attained by observing that decorum of which we have been speaking and never transgressing its limits. But the most important of these three rules is to subject appetite to reason.

XL.—142. I have next to treat of order and opportunity in our actions. These two duties are comprehended in the science which the Greeks call \( \varepsilon \nu \tau \alpha \xi \iota \), not the \( \varepsilon \nu \tau \alpha \xi \iota \)a which we translate "modestia," a term connoting "modus" or moderation, but the \( \varepsilon \nu \tau \alpha \xi \iota \) by which we understand the observance of order. \( \varepsilon \nu \tau \alpha \xi \iota \)a in this sense which we may also call "modestia," is defined by the Stoics as the science of accurately disposing our words and deeds. Thus
order and disposition appear to have the same sense: for they define order as the disposition of things in their fit and proper places. By the place of an action they mean its fitness in point of time; it is called in Greek ἐνκαυρία in Latin occasio. Consequently "modestia" in this sense is the science of doing the right thing at the right time. 143. Prudence, of which I spoke at the outset, may also be defined in the same way: but it is self-command, temperance, and similar virtues that concern us here. The constituent parts of prudence were described in their proper place; here I have to state the elements of those virtues which have detained us so long, I mean the virtues which relate to sympathy and the approbation of those with whom we live. 144. We must therefore apply such order to all our actions that they may harmonise and balance like the parts of a well-ordered discourse. How shameful and scandalous it is to interrupt a serious conversation with frivolous after-dinner talk. You may remember the happy rejoinder of Pericles. He and Sophocles, as colleagues in command, had met for the transaction of common business; just then a handsome boy passed, and Sophocles exclaimed: "What a comely youth, Pericles!" Pericles replied: "A general should control his eyes as well as his hands". Yet, if Sophocles had said this at an inspection of athletes, there would have been no fault to find. Such is the importance
of time and place. If a man while travelling or taking a walk should rehearse a case he is going to plead or become absorbed in some other subject, no one would blame him, but if he did this in society he would be considered ill-bred, because ignorant of the art of timing his actions. 145. Flagrant breaches of manners, such as singing in the forum or similar eccentricities, are so obvious as to require no special reproof or precept; but petty faults which often pass unheeded call for greater vigilance. As an expert detects in the lyre or the pipe the slightest deviation from the true tone, so in our life we should avoid discord with the greater diligence, since the harmony of our actions is more noble and more beautiful than the harmony of sounds.

XLI.—146. As a musical ear detects the slightest variations of tone in the pipe, so the keen and vigilant observer of moral defects will often draw important conclusions from trifling circumstances. If we watch the glance of the eye, the expansion or contraction of the eyebrows, the marks of sorrow or joy, laughter, speech or silence, the raising or lowering of the voice, and other things of the kind, we shall easily judge whether they are decorous or jar with duty and nature. And it will not be unprofitable to study the expression of the emotions in others, that we may ourselves avoid what we find to be indecorous in them. Alas, we see the sins of others better than
CICERO

our own! This is why a master most easily corrects his pupils by mimicking their defects. 147. In a moral dilemma it is prudent to consult philosophers or even sagacious men of the world and to ask their advice on particular points of duty. For most men drift with the current of their instinct. But we must consider not only what our adviser says but also what he thinks and what are his grounds for thinking as he does. Painters, sculptors, and even poets like to submit their works to the criticism of the public in order to correct what the majority condemn, and they endeavour by themselves and with the aid of others to find where the defect lies; in like manner we must often follow the opinion of others, whether we act or refrain, alter or correct. 148. Tradition and civil institutions are precepts in themselves, so that special precepts are unnecessary for the actions which they govern, and it would be a mistake to suppose that we may claim the right of a Socrates or an Aristippus to act or speak in defiance of usage and convention: eccentricity is the privilege of genius. As for the doctrine of the Cynics, it must be absolutely scouted as inimical to modesty, without which there can be nothing right or honourable. 149. Further, it is our duty to respect those patriotic citizens who have proved their strength in great and noble works, and have loyally served their country, and to honour them
as much as if they were invested with some public office or military command. It is our duty to reverence old age, to defer to the magistrates, and to make a distinction in our treatment of countrymen and foreigners, and in the case of foreigners to consider whether they have come in a private or a public capacity. Finally and in a word, let us respect, uphold, and maintain the great family of the human race.

XLII.—150. Public opinion divides the trades and professions into the liberal and the vulgar. We condemn the odious occupation of the collector of customs and the usurer, and the base and menial work of unskilled labourers, for the very wages the labourer receives are a badge of slavery. Equally contemptible is the business of the retail dealer, for he cannot succeed unless he is dishonest, and dishonesty is the most shameful thing in the world. The work of the mechanic is also degrading; there is nothing noble about a workshop. The least respectable of all trades are those which minister to pleasure, as Terence tells us, "fishmongers, butchers, cooks, sausage-makers". Add to these, if you like, perfumers, dancers, and the actors of the ludus talaris. 151. But the learned professions, such as medicine, architecture, and the higher education, from which society derives the greatest benefit, are considered honourable occupations for those to whose
social position they are appropriate. Business on a small scale is despicable; but if it is extensive and imports commodities in large quantities from all the world, and distributes them honestly, it is not so very discreditable; nay, if the merchant satiated, or rather satisfied, with the fortune he has made, retires from the harbour and steps into an estate, as once he returned to harbour from the sea, he deserves, I think, the highest respect. But of all sources of wealth farming is the best, the most agreeable, the most profitable, the most noble. I have spoken of the subject at length in my Cato Major from which you may supplement this chapter.

XLIII.—152. I think I have said enough to show how our duties are derived from the four divisions of honour. But it is often necessary to compare and contrast two honourable courses in order to estimate their relative importance—a point omitted by Panaetius. Honour in its widest sense springs from four sources: prudence, fellow-feeling, fortitude, and temperance, and it is often necessary to compare these virtues in order to determine our duty. 153. Now it is admitted that the duties which are founded on the social instinct are more in harmony with nature than those which are derived from prudence, and this opinion may be confirmed by the following instance. If it were given to a sage to live in perfect affluence and ease absorbed in the study of the
highest problems of philosophy, life would be a burden to him, were he condemned to isolation and never saw the face of man. The first of all the virtues is speculative wisdom which the Greeks call σοφία. We attach a different sense to φρόνησις or practical wisdom, which is the science of distinguishing what to pursue and what to avoid. But that which I called the highest wisdom is the science of things divine and human, and it is concerned with the relations of men with each other and with the gods. If that is the noblest virtue, which it certainly is, then the duty connected with the social instinct necessarily takes precedence of all others. Moreover the study and contemplation of the universe would seem stunted and imperfect if it did not result in action. Action is chiefly employed in protecting the interests of our fellow-men; it is therefore indispensable to society: and consequently holds a higher rank than mere speculation. 154. Such is the opinion of the noblest men and it is attested by their conduct. Who, I ask, could be so rapt in the investigation of the mysteries of the universe, so absorbed in the contemplation of the most sublime objects, that if suddenly apprised that his country, his father, or his friend, was in danger or distress, he would not abandon all his studies and fly to the rescue, even if he imagined he could number the stars and measure the immensity
of space? 155. From these arguments it is manifest that the duties prescribed by justice are superior to those which are connected with abstract studies, for they concern the welfare of humanity which should be nearest to the heart of every man.

XLIV.—Nevertheless many men have devoted their lives to speculation without renouncing the duty of promoting the interests of society. Philosophers teach men to be good citizens and benefactors of their country. Thus Epaminondas of Thebes was the pupil of Lysis the Pythagorean, and Dio of Syracuse the pupil of Plato, and I could cite many instances of the kind; and any service I myself may have rendered to my country I ascribe to those masters who trained and equipped me for public life. 156. The influence of these great men, whether moral or intellectual, is not conveyed by the living voice alone; it is transmitted to posterity in their written works. They neglect no subject that bears on legislation, morality, or political science; indeed it may be said that it is to our affairs they devote their leisure. Thus we see that even scholars and philosophers apply their wisdom and insight principally to the advantage of their fellow-men. Hence it follows that eloquence united with wisdom is a more precious gift than the highest wisdom devoid of eloquence, because reflection is centred in itself, while eloquence
embraces those with whom we are united by common interests. 157. As bees do not swarm for the purpose of making the comb, but make the comb because they are gregarious by nature, so human beings, endowed with a still stronger social instinct, think and act in sympathy. Speculation would therefore seem forlorn and barren of useful results if it were not conjoined with the social virtue which works for the maintenance of society, that is, the great brotherhood of the human race. The same may be said of fortitude. If it had no relation to human society it would be but a brutal and savage thing. From this we conclude that the social virtues are superior to merely speculative studies. 158. The theory is false, that society owes its existence to necessity, or the inability of man to satisfy his natural wants without the aid of others, that, if everything essential to a life of comfort were supplied to us as if by a magic wand, every man of intellect would retire from active work and devote his undivided energies to study and learning. Far from that, he would shrink from isolation and look for some one to join in his pursuits, his desire would be to teach and learn, to hear and speak. Consequently every duty tending to the preservation of society is to be preferred to that which consists in abstract study.

XLV.—159. It may be necessary to inquire
CICERO

whether this sense of interdependence, which is the deepest feeling in our nature, should also be preferred in every case to moderation and self-command. I think not. For some things are so repulsive, others so criminal, that a wise man could never do them even to save his country. Posidonius enumerates many crimes of the kind, but they are either so atrocious or so obscene that it seems wrong even to mention them. No one, I repeat, will commit such crimes for the sake of his country; nor will his country demand such a sacrifice. But the case is simplified by the fact that circumstances cannot arise in which the state will profit by the dishonour of a wise man. 160. We may therefore regard it as settled, that in discriminating between several duties we should give the preference to those which are connected with the social instinct. Moreover, knowledge and prudence will result in deliberate action. Consequently deliberate action stands on a higher plane than prudence without action. So much for this subject. I have now cleared the ground so that it should not be difficult to discover which duty is to be preferred in particular circumstances. Even in our social relations some duties are more important than others. We are beholden first to the immortal gods, next to our country, then to our parents, and finally to the rest of men in a descending scale. 161. This short discussion may suffice to show that men are often
in doubt not only whether an action is right or wrong, but which of two honourable courses has the higher moral worth. This subject, as I said, has been omitted by Panaetius. But I must now proceed.
SECOND BOOK

1.—1. I think, Marcus, I have fully explained in the preceding book how all our duties are derived from honour, or rather from virtue in its widest sense. I have now to treat of the duties which pertain to influence and wealth and the necessities and comforts of life. (In dealing with these subjects, as I have said, we are often met with the question: what is expedient, what inexpedient, and how we can settle the degrees of expediency.) I now proceed to speak of these duties, but I shall first say a few words in vindication of my method and design.

2. Though my works have inspired many with the love of reading and even of writing, I sometimes fear that certain worthy people detest the very idea of philosophy and wonder that I spend so much time and trouble on it. So long as our country was governed on constitutional principles I consecrated to her service all my efforts and all my thoughts. But when she fell under the rule of a despot and no scope was left for statesmanship or personal influence, and finally when I had parted with my distinguished
colleagues in the government, I did not surrender to melancholy, which would have overwhelmed me had I not struggled against it, nor on the other hand to sensual pleasure unworthy of a philosopher. 3. It would have been well if our republic had been firmly established on its new foundation and if we had not fallen into the hands of a party whose cry is not for reform but for revolution. I should then have devoted more attention to public speaking than to writing, as my custom was while the republic still endured, and I should not have composed a moral treatise like the present but committed my orations to writing as I have often done ere now. But when the republic, the centre of all my care, thought and effort, was now no more, my voice, alas, was silenced in the forum and the senate. 4. Still my mind could not be idle; I therefore thought that my noblest consolation in trouble was to return to philosophy, the study of my early youth. As a young man I had given much time to the subject for the purpose of improving my mind; but when I took office and threw myself heart and soul into the public administration, I could only devote to study the leisure that remained after I had served my friends and my country; and that was entirely spent in reading; I had no time to write. II.—5. Yet despite the greatest misfortunes I flatter myself I have done some good in writing on subjects of profound interest.
CICERO

hardly known among our countrymen. What, in Heaven's name, is more desirable than wisdom, what more excellent, what is better for man or more worthy of his nature? Those who aspire to it are called philosophers, and philosophy, when translated, means nothing else than the love of wisdom. Now, according to the definition of the ancient philosophers wisdom is the science of things divine and human and the causes on which they depend. If there is any man who blames the love of such a study I hardly see what he can find to praise. 6. Do you look for amusement or relaxation? Then what can compare with the pursuits of those who are always examining some subject or other that makes for a good and happy life? Do you think of character and virtue, then this is the method of attaining them or there is none. To assert that, though there is invariably a science of things even of small importance, there is no science of the highest of all, is to speak without due reflection and to blunder in a matter of the greatest gravity. Besides, if there is a science of virtue, where is it to be found if you leave these studies out of the question? But that is a point which I discuss with greater care in exhortations to the study of philosophy such as are contained in another of my works. All that I wished to explain here was my motive in resorting to this particular pursuit after I was stripped of my public functions.

6 81
7.—Even philosophers and scholars challenge me with the question, whether as a sceptic I am quite consistent in expounding as I do the principles of duty, or indeed of any other subject. I wish they really understood the doctrines of our school. It is not our opinion that the mind wanders in the dark and has no fixed principles. What sort of reasoning, nay, what sort of life would be possible if all the principles of thought and action were abolished? That is not a fair picture of us; we only differ from other schools in describing things as probable or improbable which they call certain or uncertain. 8. What should prevent me from embracing any theory that appears to me probable and rejecting the contrary; why should I not avoid dogmatism and presumption which are so remote from the true spirit of philosophy? All opinions, moreover, are contested by our school on the ground that this very probability could not emerge without a comparative estimate of the conflicting arguments. This whole question is, I think, pretty thoroughly explained in my Academics. As for you, my dear son, though you are engaged in the study of an ancient and celebrated system of philosophy under the guidance of Cratippus, a worthy rival of the founders of his school, yet I did not wish you to remain ignorant of our doctrines which are so closely allied to yours. But I must proceed.

III.—9. I have now laid down five principles for
CICERO

the investigation of duty. Two of these have to do with decorum and honour, two with external advantages, such as wealth, position and influence, while the fifth holds the balance when the others seem to conflict. I have finished the subject of honour and I hope it is now clear to you. I have next to deal with what is commonly called the expedient. In regard to this word the popular mind has stumbled and gone astray. By degrees it has come to the point of separating honour from expediency and assuming that honour was possible apart from expediency and expediency apart from honour, an error fraught with the most disastrous consequences to society.

10. Certain philosophers of the highest authority make a theoretical distinction between these three conceptions though in themselves they are inseparable, but I confess they do it on strict and conscientious principles. (They hold that whatever is just is likewise expedient and that what is honourable is also just; consequently whatever is honourable is at the same time expedient.) Unable to grasp this distinction men often admire the adroit and crafty, and identify wisdom with cunning. But they must be disabused of this error and brought round to the hope and the conviction that they can attain their objects by honourable designs and just conduct instead of by craft and cunning.

11.—Now the things that tend to the maintenance
of human life are partly inanimate, such as gold, silver, plants and the like, and partly living beings with their characteristic instincts and appetites. Of living beings some are rational, some irrational. The latter class includes horses, cattle and the other tame animals which serve by their labour to supply the wants and maintain the life of man. Rational beings are divided into two classes, gods and men. The gods are appeased by a pious and holy life; next to the gods men are most useful to one another. 12. A similar division may be made of things that are hurtful to man. But, as the gods are supposed to do no harm, philosophers leave them out of account and hold that man is the worst enemy of man. Even the advantages derived from inanimate things of which I have spoken are for the most part procured by our own energies and we should neither have possessed them without the application of labour and skill, nor enjoyed them without the aid of our fellow-men. Medicine, navigation, agriculture and the ingathering and storing of corn and other produce would not have been possible but for human agency. 13. This is no less true of the exportation of superfluities and the importation of necessities. In like manner the stones necessary for our use would not be quarried, nor iron, copper, gold and silver dug from the bowels of the earth without the labour of man's hand. IV.—What other power, I ask, could in the beginning have
furnished the human race with dwellings to protect them from cold and mitigate the discomforts of heat, or how could these dwellings have been restored after the ravages of storm, earthquake or time, had not men learned to look to one another for assistance? 14. Think, too, of aqueducts, canals, irrigation works, breakwaters, artificial harbours; is it not to the hand of man that we owe them all? From these and many other cases it is manifest that without human skill and energy we could never have enjoyed the benefits and advantages which are derived from things without life. Again, without man's help how could animals be utilised and made to serve our convenience? As men were the first to discover the utility of the various animals, so at this day without their agency we could not pasture, break in, or protect animals or turn them to account at the proper season, nor could we kill noxious animals and capture those that are of use. 15. Why should I enumerate the multitude of arts without which life would hardly have deserved the name? Where could the sick find relief or the strong amusement, how could comfort or even existence be possible, unless we had so many arts to minister to our wants? These are the sources of civilisation which separates mankind by so wide a gulf from the savage state of the brutes. It was the concourse of men that made it possible to build and people cities: then laws and customs were
established, rights were fairly apportioned, and a
definite social system was adopted: gentleness and
modesty followed: life became more secure; we gave
and we received, and by such exchange of possessions
and advantages we succeeded in supplying all our
wants.

V.—16. I have dwelt on this subject longer than
is necessary. Is not the truth self-evident on which
Panaetius expatiates that no general in the field,
no statesman at home, could have performed great
or useful actions without the zealous support of
other men? He cites Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus,
Agesilaus, Alexander, and asserts that without assis-
tance they could not have achieved so great success.
But in so obvious a case testimony is superfluous.
Moreover, as we derive great advantages from the
cooperation and sympathy of our fellow-men, so
there is no calamity too terrible for one man to
bring upon another. There is extant a book on
the destruction of human life by the great and
eloquent Peripatetic Dicaearchus. After enumerat-
ing the different causes of death, such as inundation,
epidemic, desolation, the sudden irruption of wild
beasts which appearing in vast numbers have some-
times swept away entire tribes, he proves by com-
parison how many more men have been destroyed
by the violence of their fellows, that is, by war or
revolution, than by all other calamities put together.
17. Now as it is incontestable that men do the greatest good and the greatest harm to one another, I maintain that it is the peculiar function of virtue to win the hearts of men and attach them to our interests. It is the business of the mechanical occupations to utilise inanimate things and to employ and manage the lower animals for the benefit of man, in like manner we can only enlist in our cause the prompt and ready service of our fellow-men if we surpass them in wisdom and virtue. 18. Indeed virtue as a whole may be said to centre in three things. The first is to discover the essential nature of everything, its relations, consequences, origin, and cause; the second to restrain the passions or πάθη as the Greeks call them, and to subject the appetites, which they call ὀρεξεῖς, to the control of reason; the third is to deal with those who surround us in a moderate and sagacious spirit in order that with their support we may satisfy our natural wants in the fullest measure, repel attack, and visit our aggressors with such retribution as justice and humanity permit.

VI.—19. I shall presently explain the means of winning and retaining the devotion of our fellow-men, but I must preface my explanation with another remark. The powerful influence which fortune wields for good or for evil is obvious to all. If she sends a favouring breeze we are wafted to the
desired haven, if an adverse blast we are dashed upon the rocks. It is rarely that fortune assails us with the hurricanes, tempests, shipwrecks, catastrophes and conflagrations of the material world, or the stings, bites, and attacks of beasts. 20. These, I say, are exceptional calamities. But the destruction of armies, as of three which perished in recent times and many others, the defeat of generals, like that which but yesterday befel a great and remarkable man, the hatred of the populace, a frequent cause of the banishment, degradation or voluntary exile of patriotic citizens, and on the other hand prosperity, civil and military distinctions, victories—all these things, whether good or evil, depend indeed on fortune but are ultimately determined by human agency. The influence of fortune being clearly understood, I go on to explain the means of winning the devotion of men and enlisting it in our service. If this chapter prove tedious, consider the importance of the result and then it may even seem too short. 21. In contributing to the material or social advancement of others, men are influenced by various motives. They are prompted by kindness when they have reason to love a man or by respect if they admire his character and think him worthy of the most brilliant success; or they trust a man and believe he has their welfare at heart, or sometimes they dread his power or they look for some advan-
tage, as kings or demagogues do, when they display their munificence, or finally they are tempted by bribery, the basest motive of all and the most degrading both to those who are swayed by it and to those who employ it as their instrument. 22. It is a bad case when money takes the place of moral influence. Nevertheless it is sometimes an indispensable auxiliary, but before describing how it is to be employed, I shall first speak of the means which are more closely allied to virtue. Various motives induce men to submit to the rule and authority of another. They are moved by affection, gratitude, respect for high rank, the hope of advantage, the fear of coercion; or they are tempted by the prospect of reward and by fair promises, and in the last place they are openly bribed as we have often seen in our own republic.

VII. — 23. Of all the means of maintaining power, love is the best, the worst fear. The words of Ennius are admirable: "He that is feared is hated, and they that hate a man wish him dead".

That no power can withstand the hatred of the people, we lately realised as perhaps no generation before us. Its fatal effect is seen not only in the tragic end of the tyrant whose yoke our land endured, nay to this hour endures even after his death, but in the fate of all despots who seldom escape the assassin’s hand. Fear is a poor guardian
of lasting power; love will keep it safe for ever. 24. Let tyrants exercise cruelty, as a master does towards his slaves when he cannot control them by other means: but for a citizen of a free state to equip himself with the weapons of intimidation is the height of madness. Though the constitution be crushed by the power of an individual, though the spirit of freedom be cowed, yet sooner or later they rise again and assert themselves in silent expressions of feeling or in the secret votes of the people. Freedom, if suppressed, only bites with keener fang. Let us then put away fear and cleave to love; love appeals to every heart, it is the surest means of gaining safety, influence and power; in a word, it is the key to success both in private and in public life. For men involuntarily fear those whom they intimidate. 25. With what agonies of terror must not the famous Dionysius the elder have been racked who dreading the barber’s razor used to singe his hair with a burning coal! Think of the life Alexander of Pherae must have led! Historians tell us that he was devoted to his wife Thebe. Nevertheless on visiting her in her room after dinner he would actually bid a barbarian tattooed like a Thracian march before him with drawn sword. He also sent in advance some of his attendants to search her wardrobe and see that no weapon was concealed among her clothes. Unhappy man, to think a
branded barbarian more faithful than his own wife. He was not mistaken, for on the suspicion of infidelity she slew him with her own hand. Indeed no empire, however powerful, can long sustain the pressure of fear. 26. I may cite the fate of Phalaris whose infamous cruelty is without parallel in the history of the world. He did not fall by treachery like Alexander, whose fate I have just told; he was not slain by a handful of conspirators like our own last tyrant, but the people of Agrigentum rose against him with one accord. And I need hardly remind you that the Macedonians one and all abandoned Demetrius and espoused the cause of Pyrrhus, and that when the rule of the Lacedaemonians became oppressive they were suddenly deserted by almost all their allies who stood by as passive spectators of the disaster of Leuctra. VIII.—Though I prefer to draw my illustrations from the history of foreign countries rather than from our own, I will permit myself this observation. So long as the empire of the Roman people was founded not on injustice but on beneficence, war was waged in the interests of the allies or in the defence of the empire, its conclusion was marked by acts of clemency or such a measure of severity as circumstances demanded; kings, civilised nations and barbarous tribes found in the senate a haven of refuge; and the loftiest ambition of our governors and generals was to defend our provinces
and allies by fair and honourable conduct. 27. Our government could therefore have been more truly described as a protectorate of the world, than as an empire founded on force. Even before the time of Sulla we were gradually losing hold of our habitual policy, but after his victory we parted with it altogether; for after the terrible atrocities which he perpetrated on Roman citizens, we ceased to regard anything as unjust to our allies. He tarnished a righteous cause by an unrighteous victory. Planting in the forum a spear, the emblem of public auction, he sold off the effects of wealthy but respectable people who were, to say the least, his fellow-citizens, and yet he had the effrontery to assert that he was only selling his booty. After him came another tyrant who, gaining in an unholy cause a victory still more shameful, was not content to confiscate the property of individual citizens but involved in one common calamity entire provinces and countries. 28. After he had oppressed and ruined foreign tribes, we saw him carry in triumph a model of Massilia as if to prove to the world the loss of our empire and celebrate the conquest of a city without whose aid our generals never once triumphed in their campaigns beyond the Alps. I should here have adduced many other crimes committed on our allies if the sun had ever shone on anything more shameful. But our punishment is deserved. For
unless we had suffered many crimes to go unpunished, never would one individual have attained such absolute power. Though the tyrant of our times has few heirs to his wealth there are many to succeed to his wicked ambition. 29. Never will the seeds of civil war fail, so long as villains remember having seen and hope to see once more that bloody spear which P. Sulla brandished when his kinsman was dictator and again raised thirty-six years later in a more accursed cause. Another Cornelius Sulla was a clerk under the former dictator and under the latter a city quaestor. When such rewards are held out, it is evident that civil wars will never cease. Only the walls of our city now remain and even they dread the last desperate stroke; the republic, alas, we have lost for ever. To return to my subject, we have brought these disasters on our heads because we wish to be feared rather than loved and respected. If such retribution befel the tyranny of the Roman people, what must individuals expect? But since it is manifest how powerful is the influence of kindness, how feeble that of fear, I have next to explain the easiest means of gaining the respect, the confidence and the affection which we wish to enjoy. 30. We do not all stand in the same need of affection; for our object in life must in each case determine whether we want many friends or should be satisfied with a few. Faithful, loving and admiring friends
CICERO

we certainly all require; it is the prime necessity of life. Here there is little difference between high and low, and both classes must cultivate friendship with almost equal zeal. 31. We may not all require in equal measure honour, fame and popularity, yet the possession of these advantages will be of particular value to us in the acquisition of friends.

IX.—I have spoken of friendship in another essay, entitled "Laelius". I have now to speak of glory. Though I have written a work in two books on the subject, I must glance at it here, because it is a valuable aid in the conduct of important affairs. Supreme and perfect glory consists of three things: the love, the confidence and the mingled admiration and respect of the people. To put it plainly and concisely, the affections of the people are won by almost the same means as those of individuals. But there is another avenue to the hearts of the multitude, another means of stealing into the affections of the people. 32. Of the three sentiments I have just mentioned let us first consider affection and its laws. Affection is chiefly won by acts of kindness; or it is excited by kind intentions even though the outcome be disappointing; again the hearts of the people are strongly influenced by the mere character and reputation for liberality, beneficence, justice, honesty, and all the noble qualities that go to form the gentleman. For as that which we call the
honourable and decorous is pleasing in itself, attracts
us by its inner nature and outward aspect, and is
most conspicuous in the virtues I have named, we
are compelled by Nature herself to esteem those in
whom we believe these virtues reside. These are the
most important causes of esteem; though I admit
there may be others of less consequence. 33. In
the next place, we shall obtain confidence, if we
are supposed to unite prudence and justice. We
trust in those who appear to have greater sagacity
and foresight than ourselves and greater skill in
unravelling difficulties and meeting emergencies;
that is what the world considers practical and
genuine prudence. We repose confidence in just,
honest, and worthy men provided there is no sus-
picion of craft or malice about them; and we think
ourselves justified in committing to them our lives,
our fortunes and our families. 34. Of these two
qualities justice inspires the greater confidence; of
itself it is sufficient without the aid of prudence,
but prudence without justice is of no avail. Take
from a man his reputation for probity, and he is
hated and suspected in proportion to his craft and
cunning. In a word, justice combined with prudence
will command all the confidence we can desire;
justice without prudence will also be effective, but
prudence will be impotent without the aid of justice.
X.—35. It may excite surprise that, despite the
unanimous opinion of philosophers and my own repeated contention that virtue is indivisible, I am now classifying its component parts on the assumption that justice can exist without prudence. My reply is that a degree of precision is employed in the exact investigation of abstract truth which is unnecessary in a treatise adapted throughout to the popular capacity. I therefore speak here like the people, calling one man brave, another good, a third prudent. In dealing with popular conceptions we have to use popular and familiar language. This was the practice of Panaetius. But I must return to my subject.

36. The third element of glory is, to be considered worthy of admiration and respect by our fellow-men. Men admire in general what appears to them great or what surpasses their ideas; and in particular they admire in any person the good qualities which they did not expect to find. Hence they worship and exalt to the skies those whom they believe to possess certain eminent and extraordinary virtues and regard with disdain and contempt those in whom they find no trace of ability, spirit, or energy. Not that they despise every one of whom they have a bad opinion. For when they find a man unscrupulous, slanderous, dishonest, and armed with all the weapons of injustice, they may not despise him but they think ill of him. Therefore, as I have said, their
contempt is directed against the good-for-nothing fellows of the proverb who have no capacity for work, no activity, no interest in anything. 37. On the other hand men worship those whom they consider pre-eminent in virtue, free from dishonour, and superior to the vices which others resist with difficulty. Those tempting tyrants, the pleasures of sense, tear most men away from virtue; and most men quail before the burning torch of pain: life and death, wealth and want, profoundly move the feelings of all the world. But when a man regards pleasure and pain alike with lofty indifference and throws himself with ardour into some great and noble cause, who would not admire the splendour and beauty of his character? XI.—38. This moral sublimity excites great admiration, but justice, the touchstone of worth, is rightly esteemed by the world as the noblest of all the virtues. For no one can be just who fears death, pain, exile and want, or who would sacrifice justice to escape these evils. Another admirable quality is indifference to money, and if we discover it in any one we think he has stood the ordeal of fire. Justice, then, fulfils the three fundamental conditions of glory; it procures affection, because it seeks the happiness of the greatest number, for the same reason it inspires confidence, and it awakens admiration because it regards with scorn and disdain the objects which most men passionately pursue.
39. In every walk of life we require the support of our fellow-men. Above all we must have friends to whom we may unbosom ourselves in familiar conversation, an advantage difficult to obtain, unless we are looked upon as honest men. Even the recluse and the man who lives a retired life in the country must have a character for justice; and that is all the more necessary as without such a character they can have no safeguards to protect them and will be exposed to a variety of wrongs. 40. Again, in buying and selling, hiring and letting, and in business transactions generally, justice is essential to success. In fact its influence is so powerful that even those who maintain themselves by wrong-doing and crime cannot live entirely without it. When a brigand takes anything from an accomplice by force or by fraud, his presence is no longer tolerated even in such a band of miscreants, and should the captain not distribute the spoil impartially, he would be killed or deserted by his comrades. Why, brigands are even said to have a code of laws which they must strictly observe. It was by his equitable distribution of the spoil that the Illyrian bandit Bardulis of whom we read in Theopompus gained so great power and the Lusitanian Viriathus even greater. For a long time Viriathus actually defied the armies and generals of Rome, till C. Laelius, surnamed the Wise, during his praetorship completely shattered the power of his
adversary and so quelled his spirit as to leave an easy victory to his successors. If then the influence of justice is so great as to establish and strengthen the power of brigands, how potent must it be in a well-ordered state under the shelter of the law and its tribunals. XII.—41. Like the ancient Medes of whom Herodotus speaks, I think our forefathers founded the kingly office and raised to the throne men of high character in order to enjoy a just form of government. When oppressed by the strong, the weak would appeal to one man of eminent virtue who shielded them from wrong and establishing justice on a firm foundation governed high and low alike with impartial sway. The origin of law was identical with that of monarchy. 42. Men in all ages have aspired to equality of rights, for without such equality there would be no rights. If they attained their object through the justice and virtue of one man, they were satisfied; if unsuccessful, they invented laws which were designed to speak to all men at all times in one and the same voice. It is therefore evident that the choice of rulers was determined by their reputation for justice. If with this virtue they united prudence nothing appeared unattainable under their rule. We should, therefore, diligently practise justice both for its own sake—otherwise it is no justice—and because it will enhance our honour and glory.
As there is a science of accumulating wealth and of so investing it that it may meet our current expenditure on the necessaries and the luxuries of life, so there must be a method of acquiring glory and turning it to account. 43. Yet Socrates has a fine observation that the straight road, "the short cut," to glory is to strive to be that for which one would wish to pass. It is a delusion to suppose that enduring glory can be founded on dissimulation, vain ostentation, and studied words and looks. True glory strikes root and spreads, everything unreal soon falls like the blossoms, a lie cannot last. I could cite many examples on the one side and the other, but for the sake of brevity I shall confine myself to one family. The fame of Tiberius Gracchus, the son of Publius, will live while the memory of Rome endures, but his sons were scouted by loyal citizens in their lifetime, and since their death they have been ranked among those whose murder was no crime. He who would obtain true glory must therefore perform the duties which justice enjoins. These I have described in the preceding book.

XIII.—44. The surest way of seeming what we are is to be what we wish to be thought. But some rules on the subject may not be out of place. If a young man has a career of fame and distinction before him, whether that depend on his father's name as in your case, Marcus, or on some lucky chance, the eyes of
the world are turned upon him, his life and character are scanned; there can be no obscurity for him, a flood of light is turned upon his every word and action. 45. But if his youth be passed in the shade because of his mean and obscure origin, as soon as he reaches manhood he must set his mind on some great object and pursue it with unswerving zeal; and he will be the more confirmed in his resolution since the world instead of being prejudiced against the young, actually favours them. For a young man the passport to popularity is military distinction, by which many of our people signalised themselves in the olden time when wars were almost incessant. Your early years, however, have fallen upon a war in which the one side was distinguished for excess of crime, the other for excess of misfortune. But when Pompey placed you in command of a squadron of cavalry, you earned the applause of the great man and his army by your skill in riding and in throwing the javelin and in your manly endurance of all the hardships of a soldier's life. Alas! your fame has perished with the republic. The present treatise, however, does not concern you personally, it deals with the subject in general: so I must proceed. 46. As the work of the mind far surpasses the work of the hands, so the objects to which we apply our intellect and reason are prized more highly than those which exercise the powers of the body alone. The highest recommendation then
that a young man can have is self-command, filial affection, and goodwill to his kindred. But the easiest road to favourable recognition is to attach himself to great, wise, and patriotic men, for such a connection creates the impression that one day he will rival the models whom he has chosen for imitation. 47. When P. Rutilius was a young man, the influence of the family of P. Mucius contributed to his reputation for integrity and legal skill. As for L. Crassus, even in his early youth he had not to look to others for help, but gained the highest renown by conducting that glorious prosecution which is known to all the world, and at an age when a man might make a reputation as a student, this second Demosthenes showed himself in the forum a master of an art which without discredit to himself he might still have been studying in private. XIV.—48. Discourse may be divided into two kinds. The one is conversation, the other sustained oratory. The latter, which we call eloquence, is doubtless a better field for distinction, but as a means of winning favour a courteous and affable manner can hardly be overrated. We still possess letters from Philip to Alexander, from Antipater to Cassander, and from Antigonus to Philip. These three princes, who are among the wisest in history, enjoin their sons to gain the affections of the people by words of kindness and to humour their soldiers by friendly recognition. But 102
an impassioned discourse will rouse the enthusiasm of an entire nation. An eloquent and judicious speaker is held in high admiration and is supposed to possess exceptional insight and sagacity. If an oration is at once dignified and moderate, nothing can excite greater admiration, especially if the speaker is a young man. Various careers are open to the orator, and in our own republic many young men have made a reputation by their speeches in the senate or before the people. But forensic oratory offers the best opportunity of distinction. It is of two kinds—the prosecution and the defence. Though the defence brings greater credit, the prosecution has often earned public approbation. I have just spoken of Crassus; M. Antonius in his youth was no less successful. It was in a prosecution too that the eloquent P. Sulpicius won his laurels when he put on trial that dangerous and turbulent citizen C. Norbanus. Still you should rarely come forward as a prosecutor, and only in the public interest like the orators I have cited, or for revenge like the two Luculli, or to protect the oppressed, as I protected the Sicilians, and Julius the Sardinians in the case of Albucius. It was in another prosecution, that of M. Aquilius, that L. Fufius proved his talent. This is a thing to be done only once or at any rate not often: if you are compelled to prosecute again and again, you must do it as an act of homage to the republic,
for it is never wrong to punish her enemies: but you must set a limit. Only a heartless or a brutal man would often seek to endanger the life or the civil status of his fellow-citizens. It is at once dangerous to the person of the pleader and a blot upon his name to earn the title of prosecutor: that was the fate of M. Brutus, a man of high birth, and son of the eminent jurist. 51. Make it a rule never to prefer a capital charge against an innocent man; it is always a crime. What is so barbarous as to turn to the ruin and destruction of good men the weapon of eloquence which Nature has given us for the defence and protection of our fellows? But while we must never accuse the innocent, we should not scruple on occasion to defend a guilty man, provided he is not a villain or a reprobate. This is a law of society; it is admitted by usage; it is human nature. A judge must in every suit cleave to the truth, a pleader may at times maintain what is plausible though not strictly true; still I should hesitate to record this opinion especially in a philosophical treatise, if I had not the authority of Panaetius, the strictest of the Stoics. It is always the defender who reaps the greatest glory and credit, especially if he succours the weak when they are deceived or oppressed by the strong. I myself have done that on many occasions; the most notable instance occurred in my youth when I defended Sex. Roscius of Ameria against the omni-
CICERO

potent Sulla. The oration, as you know, is published.

XV.—52. Having described the duties which a young man must perform in order to gain distinction I go on to speak of beneficence or liberality, which is of two sorts. It is shown in acts of kindness or in gifts of money. The latter is the easier method, especially for a rich man; but the former is more noble, more magnificent, more worthy of a gentleman. Both forms of beneficence imply a generous desire to oblige; money is withdrawn from the safe, while kindness is a draught on our energies; but bounty taken from our substance drains the very spring of generosity. Thus kindness kills kindness; for the more good you do, the less you can do. 53. If our beneficence consists in personal service, that is, in active work, the more benefits we confer, the more support shall we obtain from others in our generous efforts, and the habit of beneficence will make us more disposed and better qualified to bestow our favours. It is with justice that Philip in one of his letters reproves his son Alexander for courting the favour of the Macedonians by dispensing liberal gifts: "What in the world," he says, "led you to look for loyalty in those whom you corrupted with money? Are you really trying to make the Macedonians hope that you will one day be their attendant and purveyor instead of their king?" It was a good idea

105
to speak of the "attendant and purveyor" because Alexander's conduct was mean and unprincely, but it was better still to call bounty corruption; for he who takes a gift goes from bad to worse and always looks for more. 54. That was Philip's rebuke to his son but we may all take the lesson to heart. Benevolence, then, expressed in active service, is doubtless more honourable, besides it has a wider sphere, and affects a larger number for good, yet charity is sometimes a duty and we should not entirely repudiate this form of kindness. Let us therefore give of our substance to the deserving poor, but with thrift and moderation. For many have run through their patrimony by indiscreet giving. What folly to throw away the means of living as we please! Besides, robbery often follows profuse liberality. When the giver feels the pinch of want, he is forced to lay hands on the goods of others, and, though his kindness is intended to procure good-will, so far is he from winning the love of those to whom he gives that he incurs the hatred of those whom he despoils. 55. Therefore close not your purse so fast that it will not open to a generous impulse, nor open it so that it gapes to every passer-by, but set a limit, and let that limit be determined by your means. In a word, remember the saying so often repeated by our people that it has passed into a proverb: "Bounty is a bottomless pit". For what limit is possible when
we are pressed by a succession of beggars, the one more importunate than the other?

XVI.—There are two kinds of givers—the prodigal and the liberal. The prodigal squander their wealth on public feasts and doles, on gladiatorial shows, on plays and wild-beast fights, vanities the memory of which lives for a moment if it lives at all. 56. The liberal employ their means in ransoming prisoners from the hands of brigands, in paying the debts of friends, and in helping them to settle their daughters in life, or to make or enlarge their fortunes. I wonder then what came over Theophrastus when he wrote his book On Riches, which among many noble thoughts contains one absurd paradox. The author is never done praising the rich and elaborate appliances of public spectacles, and he considers it the highest privilege of wealth to be able to afford such expenditure. To my mind the form of liberality of which I have just given a few examples yields a greater and surer satisfaction. How much more true and telling are the words of Aristotle when he rebukes us because we see without surprise the vast sums that are squandered on the amusement of the people. I shall quote the passage. “If the inhabitants of a beleaguered town are reduced to buying a pint of water for a mina, at first the thing appears surprising and incredible, but, upon reflection, we make allowance for necessity; while these enormous sacrifices and
gigantic outlays excite but little wonder; yet in this case there is no necessity to relieve, no dignity to enhance, and the pleasure of the mob, which the most frivolous may enjoy, lasts but a brief space and even its memory perishes in the moment of satiety.” 57. His conclusion is excellent. “These amusements suit the taste of children, wenches, slaves, and slavish freemen, but can nowise find favour with the serious man who values things at their true worth.” I am well aware that ever since the good old times it has been the custom in our state to expect acts of munificence from eminent citizens in the course of their aedileship. P. Crassus who was as rich as his surname suggested performed with munificence the functions of that office, and not long after L. Crassus followed in his footsteps although he had for his colleague Q. Mucius, the most moderate of men: these were succeeded by C. Claudius, the son of Appius, the Luculli, Hortensius, Silanus and many others. But P. Lentulus during my consulate eclipsed all his predecessors; and Seaurus followed his example. The spectacles provided by my friend Pompey in his second consulate were also on a magnificent scale: but you know my views on the whole matter. XVII.—58. On the other hand we should avoid the suspicion of meanness. It was by declining the office of aedile that the wealthy Mamercus was defeated when he stood for the consulate. Public munificence is justified, if
it is demanded by the people and approved, though perhaps not desired, by honest citizens, and if it happens to be the best means of attaining some great advantage; only you must follow my example and never exceed your means. Orestes lately signalised himself in this manner by the open-air banquets which he gave as a tithe-offering. Again nobody blamed Marcus Seius for supplying corn to the people in time of dearth at one as the peck. By an outlay which was not serious in itself and which in any case was no disgrace to an aedile he succeeded in dissipating the strong and inveterate prejudice which had risen up against him. But the highest credit of all was recently obtained by my friend Milo who for the safety of the republic which was bound up with mine bought a band of gladiators and crushed all the frantic schemes of P. Clodius. Munificence, I repeat, is only justified by necessity or utility. 59. Even then moderation is the best rule. The able and illustrious L. Philippus, the son of Quintus, used to boast that he had attained to the highest offices without providing a single public spectacle. Cotta and Curio among others claimed the same merit and I myself may perhaps be excused if I refer to my own career with some measure of complacency. Considering the dignity of the offices to which, unlike all these statesmen, I was unanimously elected at the earliest legal date, the cost of my aedileship was quite in-
CICERO

significant. 60. Money is more wisely expended on the construction of fortifications, docks, harbours, aqueducts, and other works of public utility. I admit that gifts which are paid cash down, so to speak, yield greater pleasure at the moment; but public monuments are a source of more enduring gratitude. As for theatres, colonnades, and new temples, my respect for Pompey's memory restrains me from condemning them, but they are not approved by the most eminent philosophers, among others my authority Panaetius whom I have followed, though not slavishly, throughout this work, and Demetrius of Phalerum who denounces Pericles, the greatest Greek of his time, for squandering so much money on the magnificent Propylaea. I refer you to my De Republica where the subject is treated in detail. In conclusion the whole system of public benefactions is radically wrong, and even when they are justified they should be proportioned to our means and kept within the limits of moderation. XVIII.—61. In regard to the second kind of giving which springs from liberality our attitude must vary with circumstances. A man overwhelmed with calamity is in quite a different case from the man who is free from actual distress but seeks to better his condition. 62. Generosity will be more disposed to lend a helping hand to the unfortunate unless it happen that their misfortune is deserved. Yet when people ask our aid not in
order to escape from ruin but to rise to a higher level we should nowise be churlish; at the same time discrimination and care are necessary in selecting deserving cases. That is an excellent saying of Ennius: "A benefit misplaced turns to a crime". Service rendered to a good and grateful man has its reward not only from the recipient but from society at large. For liberality is best appreciated when directed with judgment, and people praise it with the more heart since the generosity of the great is like a city of refuge to which every one can fly. Let us therefore bestow as many benefits as possible and benefits of such a nature that their memory will go down to children and children's children and command their gratitude. All men detest ingratitude as a wrong done to themselves inasmuch as it discourages liberality and they regard the ingrate as the common enemy of the poor. A form of generosity advantageous to the state is the ransom of prisoners and the relief of the poor: at one time this was the distinctive virtue of our own order, as Crassus has proved by numerous examples in one of his orations. This common form of charity I much prefer to the lavish display of public spectacles. It befits the character of great and serious men while ostentatious munificence suggests the demagogue who tickles the susceptibilities of the capricious mob. It is well to be open-handed in giving and not to be hard in
exacting our due; and in all our dealings, whether buying or selling, hiring or letting, or fixing the boundaries of houses and lands, we should be fair and reasonable and ever ready to abate something of our lawful rights and to do whatever seems possible and even more to keep out of court. It is often profitable as well as generous to yield a point. At the same time it is our duty to guard our property, for it would be criminal to let it slip through our fingers. But we must never expose ourselves to the suspicion of meanness or greed. It is unquestionably the highest privilege of wealth to be able to do good without sacrificing our patrimony. Hospitality, another form of this virtue, is justly commended by Theophrastus. It is most graceful, I think, in men of distinction, to open their doors to illustrious guests, and it is an honour to the republic itself if foreigners resident in our city are hospitably entertained. Moreover, the social relations thus established will ensure the acquisition of influence and favour in foreign lands, a great advantage for those who seek political power by honourable means. Theophrastus relates that Cimon exercised hospitality at Athens even towards the people of his own ward: and that he gave orders to his bailiffs that every kindness should be shown to any man of Lacia who presented himself at his farm.

XIX.—65. Active benevolence as distinct from
CICERO

charity is bestowed on the community at large or on individual citizens. A generous disposition to place our legal skill at the service of the greatest number is a valuable means of advancing our power and influence. Our forefathers had many excellent usages but nothing does them greater honour than the respect in which they always held the study and interpretation of our admirable system of civil law. Up to these unsettled times this science remained in the exclusive possession of the most eminent citizens. But it has now shared the fate of our public honours and all the degrees of official preferment, and its glory is departed. This is the more deplorable since we still possess a jurist who is officially the equal of all his predecessors but quite their superior in legal learning. Such personal inter-position, I repeat, is alike valued by society and calculated to win the gratitude of our fellow-men.

66. Closely related to this branch of knowledge is the gift of eloquence which leads to greater popularity and distinction. What is more excellent than eloquence? Think of the admiration of the hearers, the eager hopes of the helpless clients and the gratitude that is earned in pleading their case. It was to eloquence, therefore, that our forefathers assigned the highest rank among the arts of peace. The orator, then, whose heart is in his work, and who readily follows the good old custom of pleading
CICERO

without remuneration, has a wide field for the exercise of his generous patronage. 67. This would have been the proper place to lament once more the decadence not to say the total extinction of eloquence, but I fear my complaint may be construed as selfish. How many great orators have we lost! How few of any promise remain! What a dearth there is of talent, what a plethora of presumption! It is not given to all or even to many to be great jurists or orators, but there are many other ways of helping our friends; we may get them promotion, recommend them to judges and magistrates, watch over their interests and procure them legal assistance both in and out of court. By services such as these we gain the greatest credit and find the most extensive sphere for our energies. 68. I need hardly warn you (the thing is so obvious) never to offend one man in helping another. We often injure others when it is against our duty or our interest: if, inadvertently, we are guilty of negligence; if, designedly, of indiscretion. If we involuntarily offend any one we should apologise to him as best we can, showing the necessity of acting as we did and the impossibility of acting otherwise, and we should try by other acts of kindness to repair the wrong we have done.

XX.—69. When we help any one, we think either of his character or his position. Now it is an easy as it is a trite remark that in bestowing a favour we look
CICERO

to a man's morals and not to his circumstances. That is all very well; but in doing a service would any one really prefer the cause of the friendless man, however worthy, to the favour of a man of wealth and influence? We are most inclined to help the man who offers the most prompt and speedy recompense. But let us open our eyes and look at the facts. No doubt our poor friend, if he is a worthy man, may at least be sensible of a favour even though he cannot return it. Some one has happily said that "money kept is not repaid, and money repaid is not kept; but that the sense of favour remains when the favour is repaid, and the favour is repaid when the sense of it remains". But the rich, the great, the prosperous will be obliged to no one: why, they fancy they confer a kindness in accepting the greatest favours, they even suspect ulterior motives, nay they would rather die than own a patron or take the name of client. 70. On the other hand, as the poor man feels that anything that is done for him is done out of regard for himself and not for his position, he studies to make his gratitude plain not only to his benefactor but to those from whom he expects help —and they are many—and far from exaggerating he depreciates any little service he may do in return. Again observe that if you plead the case of a rich and prosperous man he alone is grateful to you or at most his family; but if your client be honest and respect-
able though poor, all the worthy people of his class who form the mass of the community will look to you as a tower of defence. 71. I therefore think it better to bestow a favour on the good than on the rich. By all means let us do our duty to men of every rank, but, if we are in doubt, we cannot do better than follow the advice of Themistocles. Someone asked him whether he should give his daughter in marriage to a good man without means or to a rich man without character. "For my part," he replied, "I prefer a man without money to money without a man." In these days we are utterly demoralised by the worship of wealth; and after all what is it to you or me? It is perhaps a blessing to its possessor, but not always. Suppose it is: he may have more to spend, I admit, but for all that is he the better man? If, however, he is good as well as rich, his wealth should not induce us to serve him though it need not prevent us: in short, we should look to worth and not to wealth. My last rule on the subject of active kindness is, never strive to attain your object in defiance of right or in the cause of wrong. No reputation can endure that is not founded on justice, without which nothing can be worthy of praise.

XXI.—72. I now pass from the benefits which concern individuals to those which touch the state or the whole body of citizens. Of these public benefits some affect all the citizens indiscriminately, others
individuals alone; the latter are more highly prized. We should as far as possible consult the interests of both, but the service we render to individual citizens should always be useful or at least not prejudicial to the state. While C. Gracchus well-nigh drained the exchequer by the distribution of corn on a great scale, M. Octavius satisfied the wants of the masses by a moderate dole which was no great burden to the republic: the measure was therefore a blessing at once to the individual and to the community. 73. The first duty of a statesman is to provide for the security of private property and prevent it from being alienated by public authority. The tribune Philip set a pernicious example in proposing his agrarian law. When the bill was thrown out, he took his defeat with a good grace and displayed unusual moderation. But in his address to the people, the tone of which was fair on the whole, he committed a blunder when he said that there were not two thousand proprietors in Rome. The language is criminal and a direct incentive to socialism, the most pernicious system that can be conceived. Indeed it was principally for the protection of property that states and municipalities were first established. For though men are naturally gregarious, they first sought the protection of cities with a view to the security of their possessions. 74. Another duty of a statesman is to prevent the imposition of a property tax,
a measure which was often forced upon our ancestors by financial embarrassment and incessant wars; and to avert this evil he must lay his plans long beforehand. But if any state has to face the necessity of such a burden (I am speaking generally and I would rather forebode mischief to others than to ourselves), an effort should be made to convince the people that for their own safety they must bow to the inevitable. Again, a statesman must provide an abundant supply of the necessaries of life. It is needless to discuss the ways and means; they are obvious: suffice it to mention the subject.

75. In the public administration the chief thing is to avoid the faintest suspicion of cupidity. "Would to heaven," said C. Pontius, the Samnite, "it had been my fortune to be born in the days when the Romans began to accept bribes! I should not have let them rule very long." Verily, he must have waited many generations; for it is not long since this mischief befell our country. I am not sorry that Pontius lived then rather than now, if he really had so much power. Barely a hundred and ten years ago L. Piso brought forward the first law dealing with extortion. But since his time many measures have been passed, the one more stringent than the other; and when I think of the countless prosecutions and convictions that have occurred, of the terrible war that was kindled by those who feared a similar fate,
of the suppression of the law and its tribunals, and of the cruel spoliations of our allies, I cannot help exclaiming that we owe our power to the weakness of others and not to our own strength. XXII.—76. Panaetius praises Africanus for his purity in public life. The compliment is just, but that was not his greatest virtue. The merit of official purity was not confined to him, it was characteristic of his age. Paulus having captured the vast treasures of Macedonia so replenished the public coffers that the booty of one commander abolished the tax on property for all time to come; but he brought nothing to his own home except the glory of an immortal name. Africanus, following his father's example, was none the richer for the destruction of Carthage. Take, again, the case of L. Mummius, his colleague in the censorship. Was he one whit the richer for razing to the ground the richest city in the world? No, he preferred to embellish his country rather than his home. Yet in adorning Italy he appears to me to have adorned his home still more. 77. To return to my subject, no vice is more repulsive than cupidity, especially in eminent public men. It is infamous, outrageous, execrable to exploit the state. The Pythian Apollo, in predicting that Sparta would only perish through her own rapacity, must have addressed his oracular words to all wealthy nations as well as to the Lacedaemonians. For the politician, then, the
CICERO
easiest method of gaining popular esteem is to be pure and disinterested in his public conduct. 78. Demagogues who with their agrarian schemes drive the tenant from his home or propose the abolition of debts sap the very foundations of the commonwealth. Concord is impossible when one man is enriched at the expense of another, and equity is utterly abolished if the rights of property are not respected. The function, I repeat, of the state and the city, is to secure to the individual the free and undisturbed enjoyment of his property. 79. Besides, these revolutionists defeat their own object. The man who is robbed of his goods is their enemy, the man to whom they are given actually professes that he did not wish to receive them; in particular, the debtor hides his joy for fear of betraying his insolvency. On the other hand, the victim of injustice remembers the wrong and openly expresses his resentment, and even if those who gain by injustice outnumber those who lose, they are not necessarily stronger. Here the test is weight, not number. Where is the justice in handing over to a stranger an estate taken from one who has held it by a title established for years or perhaps generations? XXIII.—80. It was for iniquities of this kind that the Lacedaemonians banished the Ephor Lysander and put to death King Agis, an act without precedent in their history. Such furious discord ensued that tyrants
CICERO

sprang up, the nobles were expatriated and the state with its glorious constitution crumbled away. But in its downfall it was not alone; it dragged with it to destruction the rest of Greece, for the mischief beginning at Lacedaemon travelled like a plague farther and farther. To turn to our own history, need I remind you of the fate of the Gracchi, sons of the great Ti. Gracchus, and grandsons of Africanus, who perished in agrarian strife? 81. All honour to Aratus of Sicyon, who, when his native city had been fifty years in the hands of tyrants, set out from Sparta for Sicyon, stole into the city and took it by surprise. He crushed the tyrant Nicocles, recalled from exile six hundred of his countrymen who had been the wealthiest citizens in the state and by his advent set the republic free. But he found great difficulty in dealing with property and its occupancy. On the one hand he thought it most unjust that the restored exiles, whose property had been seized by others, should suffer from want, on the other it seemed hardly fair to disturb a tenure of fifty years' duration because in this long interval many of the holdings had passed by inheritance, purchase, or marriage, into innocent hands. He therefore decided that it was wrong to dispossess the occupants or to refuse compensation to the rightful owners. 82. Finding that money was necessary to settle the difficulty, he announced that he was going to Alexandria

121
and ordered that things should remain as they were until his return. So he hastened to the court of Ptolemy, an old friend of his family, the second king of Egypt after the foundation of Alexandria, explained to the wealthy monarch his desire to set his country free, and laid before him the position of affairs. Thus he easily succeeded in obtaining the grant of a large sum for his purpose. Returning with this to Sicyon, he formed a committee of fifteen eminent citizens with whom he investigated the rights of the actual and of the former occupants; he prevailed upon some on the one side to quit their holdings and accept an equivalent in money at a valuation and he convinced some on the other side that it would be more to their interest to take a fair price than to recover their lands. So he contrived to make peace and send away both parties satisfied.

83. Here was a great man! Would that we could claim him as our countryman! This is the model policy; it would have spared us these two dark scenes when the spear was planted in the forum and the goods of Roman citizens were brought to the hammer by the public crier. Not so our noble Greek; like a wise and great man he consulted the welfare of all without distinction. Thus it is the soundest policy and the truest patriotism not to sever the interests of our countrymen but to unite all under one impartial rule. Let each live in his
neighbour's house rent-free. Why so? After I have bought it, and built it, kept it up, and spent my money on it, do you mean to say that you are to have all the good of it in spite of me? What is that but robbing one man to give to another?

84. But what is the purpose of cancelling accounts? Is it not that you may buy a piece of land with my money, and you get the land while I lose my money?

XXIV.—Debt must be checked; it is a great public evil which may be met in many ways. But the debt once made, the debtor should not be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of the wealthy creditor. For nothing knits a state together like credit, and credit cannot exist unless the payment of debts is considered binding. Never was there a stronger movement for repudiation than in my consulate. Men of every rank and condition rose in arms to fight for the cause: but my vigorous resistance swept the plague for ever from our land. Debts were never greater, and never were they better or more readily discharged; for when the hope of spoliation was gone, the debtor was compelled to pay. The tyrant of our times, however, with no personal interest to serve, accomplished in the hour of triumph the designs which he had conceived in the days of his defeat. He loved sin so much that he sinned for the mere pleasure of it.

85. Statesmen, therefore, will do well to abstain
from a form of liberality which robs one man to enrich another. Their first care will be to secure the rights of property by the equity of the law and its tribunals. They will save the poor and weak from the snares that are laid for them, and the rich from the envy which would hinder them from keeping or recovering their own. Moreover, in peace and in war they will use every means to increase the power, the territory, and the revenue of the state. Such is the mission of our great men, such was the practice of our ancestors; and those who steadily perform the duties described will at once confer signal advantage on the community and acquire the greatest popularity and glory.

86. The Stoic philosopher, Antipater of Tyre, who recently died at Athens, holds that Panaetius has omitted from the rules of expediency the care of health and property: the great philosopher, I imagine, makes no mention of these duties, because they are obvious; they certainly are expedient. I will, however, say a few words on the subject. To preserve our health we must study our constitution, observe what is good or bad for us, be temperate in all our habits, abstain from sensual pleasure, and finally we may have recourse to medical skill. 87. Property should be acquired by honourable means and preserved and increased by care and thrift. Xenophon, the pupil of Socrates, has treated these questions most happily.
in his *Oeconomicus*, which I translated from Greek into Latin when I was just about your age. But the whole subject of making, investing, and, I wish I could have said, of spending money is more appropriately discussed by our worthy friends on "Change" than by philosophers of any sect. Still these questions deserve study; for they concern expediency, which is the subject of this book.

XXV.—88. It is often necessary to discover the various degrees of expediency in things. This, as I said, is the fourth head omitted by Panaetius. Physical are compared with external advantages, physical with each other, external with external. In comparing physical with external advantages one might say that he preferred health to riches (external advantages are contrasted with physical when, for instance, we say that we would rather be wealthy than possess the greatest physical strength); physical advantages are balanced thus: "I prefer good health to sensual pleasure, strength to agility"; finally, when we set the gifts of fortune one against another, glory may seem superior to wealth, a city income to a country income. 89. The saying of Cato the elder is an example of this kind of comparison. Some one asked him what was the best rule in farming. He replied, "Good pasture". The second? "Fair pasture." The third? "Poor pasture." The fourth? "Agriculture." The other continued his queries: "What of
usury?" Cato answered, "What of murder?" This example and many others that I could cite prove that actions are often compared in respect of expediency, and that this fourth division deserved a place in our moral inquiries. I pass to the other divisions of my subject.
THIRD BOOK

I.—1. My dear Marcus, the first Scipio Africanus was accustomed to say, as we learn from Cato, his contemporary, that he was never less idle than when idle, never less alone than when alone—a truly noble sentiment, worthy of a great and wise man. It proves to us that he was wont to think of public affairs in his hours of idleness and that even in solitude he would commune with himself so that he never was at rest and seldom craved for company. Idleness and solitude—those two things which bring weariness to others—were nothing but a spur to him. I wish I could honestly say the same of myself. But if I cannot emulate his lofty spirit, it is not for lack of good intention. Driven from political and forensic employment by force and godless arms I now lead a life of leisure. That is the cause of my leaving the city and travelling in the country where I often am alone. 2. But my leisure is not that of Africanus, nor my solitude his. It was in order to rest from the most honourable public duties that he
at times sought leisure and withdrew from the bustle of the crowd into the haven of solitude. But my leisure comes from lack of occupation, not from love of repose. Now that the senate is abolished and the law-courts effaced, what honourable employment can I find in the senate-house or the forum? 3. I who once lived in the greatest publicity, exposed to the gaze of my fellow-citizens, have now to shun the sight of the miscreants with whom the city swarms, and live as far as possible in concealment and often I am alone. But having been taught by philosophers not only to choose the lesser evil but even to extract whatever good is in it, I try to make the best of my life of retirement. Though it is hardly the peaceful repose that should have been in store for a man who once procured peace for his country, yet I will not stagnate in the isolation which necessity, not choice, has imposed upon me. 4. Africanus, I admit, attained a higher degree of merit. If he left behind him no written works, no product of his leisure, no fruit of his solitude, we must conclude that it was on account of his intellectual activity and the investigation of the problems which occupied his mind that he never felt idle or lonely. But I, who have not the strength of character to seek relief from solitude in silent contemplation, bring all my thoughts and efforts to bear upon my present literary work. Accordingly in the brief period that has elapsed since the downfall of
the republic I have written more than I did during the long years of her prosperity.

II.—5. The whole domain of philosophy, my dear son, is fertile and fruitful, no part of it is barren or waste; but there is no field in it more rich and productive than that of the moral duties from which we derive the principles of a consistent and honourable life. I feel sure that in the school of Cratippus, the first philosopher of the age, you listen with attention and profit to these valuable precepts. But I think it is well that they should be dinned into your ears at every turn, and that you should, if possible, hear nothing else. 6. These lessons should be laid to heart by all who intend to lead an honourable life, but perhaps by no one more than by you. For it is your duty to fulfil the sanguine anticipations of all that one day you will rival my energy, my eminence, and perhaps my renown. Moreover, you have incurred heavy obligations to Athens and Cratippus. You resorted to them to purchase as it were a store of good principles. What a discredit it would be to you to return empty-handed; what an affront to the high reputation of that city and your teacher! I would therefore have you strain every faculty and grudge no labour to ensure success—if study is not a pleasure rather than a labour—and never expose yourself to the imputation of having neglected the opportunities which my help has placed within your reach. But enough on this
point: for I have often written to you letters of encouragement. I now return to the last division of my subject.

7. The great moralist Panaetius, whose system I have adopted with slight modifications, proposed a triple classification of ethical problems. In the first place the question may be asked if the act under discussion is moral or immoral. Again, is it useful or prejudicial? Finally, if that which has the appearance of right clashes with what seems expedient, how are we to settle the difficulty? He treated two of these divisions in his first three books, and announced that he would speak of the third in its proper place, but he never fulfilled his promise. 8. This is the more astonishing as his pupil Posidonius informs us that Panaetius lived for thirty years after the publication of his book. I am no less surprised that Posidonius merely glances at the subject in one of his lectures, especially as he admits that it is the most important in the whole field of philosophy. 9. But I cannot accept the theory that Panaetius did not overlook but purposely omitted the subject, and that in no case should he have touched upon it, because the expedient can never come into conflict with the honourable. With regard to this assertion it may be open to doubt whether this question which forms the third division of Panaetius should have been included in his scheme.
or entirely omitted; certain it is, that he took it up and then abandoned it. If you have finished two-thirds of a subject, you necessarily have one-third left. Besides, at the end of his third book he promises to speak of it in the course of his inquiry.

10. We have in addition the valuable testimony of Posidonius, who tells us in one of his letters that P. Rutilius Rufus, another student of Panaetius, used to say that as no artist had been found to complete the Venus of Cos which Apelles had left unfinished, because any one who beheld the beautiful face despaired of painting a figure to match, so the treatise of Panaetius was so perfect that no one dared to supply what he had omitted.

III.—11. On these grounds there is no doubt about the intention of Panaetius; but it is perhaps open to question whether he would have been right in adding this third division to his moral investigations. For whether you maintain with the Stoics, that the honourable is the only good, or with your Peripatetics, that it is so great a good that all others if placed in the opposite scale have hardly an atom's weight, this at least is certain that the expedient can never clash with the honourable. Socrates, we are told, used to execrate those who first wantonly severed two conceptions so essentially inseparable; and the Stoics who have adopted his theory consider everything that is honourable expedient and nothing
expedient that is not honourable. 12. If Panaetius had maintained that virtue was to be cultivated only for the sake of the advantages which it brings, as certain philosophers make pleasure or exemption from pain the standard of happiness, he would have been free to assert that the expedient sometimes conflicts with the honourable. But as he holds that virtue is the only good and that whatever runs counter to it has only the semblance of expediency and can neither make life better by its presence nor worse by its absence, I think he would not have been justified in raising a class of questions involving the comparison of honour with apparent expediency. 13. For when the Stoics contend that the highest good is to live in conformity with nature, they mean, I suppose, that we are always to act in harmony with virtue and only to choose other things which are in accordance with nature if they are not incompatible with virtue. Such are the arguments that have led a certain school to think that the comparison of the honourable and the expedient was from the first illegitimate and that it was not a subject for didactic treatment. But honour in its philosophical or ideal sense is the exclusive possession of the wise and is inseparable from virtue. Men of imperfect wisdom may perhaps arrive at the semblance but never at the reality of perfect moral rectitude. 14. The duties now before us are those which the Stoics call the
ordinary duties; they are common to all and open to all, indeed they are often attained by natural goodness and progress in learning. As for the duty which they call right, it is absolute perfection complete in all its parts, and, as they also assert, accessible to none but the wise. 15. But an action which displays the characteristics of the ordinary duties seems to the vulgar abundantly perfect because they hardly ever see where it falls short of perfection, and as far as their intelligence goes they can trace no defect. The same thing happens every day in regard to poems, paintings, and other works of art. Ordinary people admire and praise works of no merit. There is, I suppose, something in them to catch the fancy of the vulgar, who are too ignorant to discover anything wrong. So when the connoisseur sets them right they readily waive their opinion. IV.—The duties under discussion in the present work are, in the language of the Stoics, the ordinary virtues which are not peculiar to the wise but common to mankind. 16. They are such as appeal to men of inbred virtue. When we point to the two Decii or the two Scipios as heroes, or to Fabricius as a just man, we do not adduce them as examples of the ideal fortitude or justice which we look for in the sage. Not one of them realises our conception of wisdom. Even such men as M. Cato, C. Laelius, or the famous Seven themselves were no
sages, although they had the reputation and the title. It was only through the constant practice of the ordinary duties that they wore the similitude and appearance of wisdom. 17. It is never right to compare ideal virtue with conflicting expediency nor external advantages with the ordinary virtue which is practised by those who wish to be accounted worthy people. But we should guard the honour which is within our capacity as jealously as the sage his true and genuine honour; otherwise the progress we may have made in the path of virtue cannot be maintained. I have said enough of those who earn the name of worthy men by the observance of duty. 18. Those, on the other hand, who weigh all things in the scales of self-interest and refuse to give the preponderance to honour, are accustomed in their calculations to compare the honourable with that which they suppose to be expedient. Not so the good man. I therefore think that in saying that people were accustomed to waver in this comparison Panaetius literally meant that that was their custom but not their duty. To compare the seemingly expedient with the honourable and hesitate for one moment in our choice is as clearly wrong as to prefer the one to the other. In what circumstances, then, is there room for doubt and deliberation? It is, I imagine, when a difficulty arises as to the quality of any action we may be considering. 19. For in
exceptional circumstances that which is commonly held to be wrong is found on reflection not to be wrong. I shall illustrate my meaning by a special case which, however, has a general bearing. There is no greater crime than to murder a fellow-man, especially a friend. Still who would say that he commits a crime who assassinates a tyrant, however close a friend? The people of Rome, I tell you, think it no crime, but the noblest of all noble deeds. Did expediency here triumph over virtue? No, virtue followed in the train of expediency.

If we would accurately determine the apparent conflict between what we call the expedient and that which we understand by the honourable, some criterion must be established to guide us in our comparison and save us from swerving from duty. 20. Now it will be found that this criterion is most in harmony with the system and principles of the Stoics. Though the old Academics and your Peripatetics, who once were a branch of the same sect, prefer the honourable to the expedient, I here follow the system of the Stoics because the principles of duty are more impressively expounded by a school which identifies honour and expediency than by those who hold that in special circumstances the honourable is not expedient nor the expedient honourable. Besides, our Academy grants us full permission and authority to maintain any theory that has the balance of
probability in its favour. But I return to our guiding principle.

V.—21. To rob your neighbour, or to aggrandise yourself at the cost of another is more repugnant to nature than death, want, pain, or any other evils, physical or external. In the first place, injustice is fatal to human fellowship and society. The disposition to plunder or wrong your neighbour for your own advantage involves the ruin of society which of all things is most in harmony with nature. 22. If each of our limbs were conscious and thought it might be stronger if it drew to itself the soundness of the next, the whole body could not but wither and die; in like manner, if each of us should seize the advantages of others and wrest from them all he could for his own profit, the union and brotherhood of mankind would inevitably be subverted. That a man should prefer to earn a living for himself rather than for his neighbour is not repugnant to the natural sense of justice: what nature does forbid is that he should despoil others in order to augment his own wealth and influence. 23. For it is ordained not only by the law of nature, or rather the law of nations, but also by the statutes of particular communities on which their constitution depends that no one shall be permitted to injure another for his own advantage. The maintenance of civic life is the end and aim of the laws, and any attempt to dissolve society
is repressed with fines, imprisonment, exile and death. In the second place, this principle is more clearly demonstrated by universal reason, which is the law at once of gods and men: and whosoever hearkens to her voice—or lives according to nature—will never covet his neighbour's goods, or appropriate what he has wrested from another. 24. For fortitude, magnanimity, courtesy, justice, liberality are much more in harmony with nature than pleasure or riches, or even life itself, which the great and lofty spirit will despise and count as naught in comparison with the common weal. (To despoil another in order to enrich oneself is more opposed to nature than death, pain, or any other evils of the kind.) 25. Further, it is more in accordance with nature to undergo the greatest toils and brave the greatest hardships in protecting or succouring the nations of the world, if that should be our fortune, and to emulate the famous Hercules, whom the legends of grateful posterity placed in the assembly of the gods, than to live in isolation, not only free from care, but revelling in pleasure, abounding in wealth, and excelling in beauty and strength. Of these two lives the best and noblest natures far prefer the first, and from this it follows that one who obeys nature will never harm his fellow-men. 26. In the next place, he who wrongs his neighbour from some selfish motive either imagines that he is not acting in defiance of nature
CICERO

or thinks that death, poverty, pain, even the loss of children, kinsmen and friends are more to be avoided than acts of injustice. If he thinks he does not infringe the laws of nature by injuring his fellows, how are you to argue with one who takes from man all that makes him man? But if he holds that injustice is indeed an evil to be shunned but that other evils are immeasurably greater, as death, want, pain, he is wrong and deceives himself in thinking that evils physical or external are more serious than moral evils. VI. — It should be the grand aim of every human being to make the interest of each the interest of all; where every man struggles for himself, there is an end to human fellowship. 27. Further, if nature ordains that one man shall help another, just because he is his fellow-man, it follows that according to nature the interests of individuals are identical with the interests of the community. If that is so, we are bound together by one and the same law of nature, and if that again is true, we are surely forbidden to do wrong to another. 28. The antecedent being true, the consequent is likewise true. It is absurd for people to say that they will not despoil a father or a brother for their own advantage but that fellow-citizens stand on quite a different footing. That is practically to assert that they are bound to their fellow-citizens neither by mutual obligations, social ties, nor common interests. But such a theory
tears in pieces the whole fabric of civil society. Others again who deny the rights of aliens while respecting those of their countrymen, destroy the universal brotherhood of mankind, which involves in its ruin beneficence, liberality, goodness and justice. To destroy these virtues is to sin against the immortal gods. It is to subvert that society which the gods established among men, of which the strongest bond is the conviction that it is more repugnant to nature to rob another for one's own good than to endure all evils external, physical, or even moral, so far as they are not concerned with justice; for justice is the sovereign-mistress and queen of all the virtues. 29. Perhaps the question may be asked: "If the sage were starving of hunger, would he not snatch a piece of bread from some good-for-nothing wretch?" (By no means. For the disposition not to injure any man for my own advantage is dearer to me than life.) Here is another question. If a righteous man were perishing of cold, would he not, if he could, rob a cruel and inhuman tyrant like Phalaris of his clothing? These are problems which it is easy to solve. 30. If you plundered a worthless man for your own advantage, it would be heartless and against the law of nature: but if you plundered him because your life, if prolonged, would be a benefit to your country and human society, the end would justify the means.

139
In other circumstances, a man should bear his own misfortune rather than trench upon the good fortune of another. Neither sickness nor want, nor any other evils of the kind are more opposed to nature than spoliation and cupidity, but neglect of the common interest is unnatural because unjust. 31. Accordingly the law of nature herself which preserves and maintains the common interests of men expressly ordains that the means of subsistence shall be transferred from the lazy and worthless man to the wise, righteous and brave citizen whose death would be a heavy loss to the common weal, but he must guard against the pride and conceit that would find in this an occasion for injustice. In this way he will always fulfil his duty if he promotes the interests of his fellow-men and of human society, if I may repeat once more the same old words. 32. The case of Phalaris is easily settled. There can be no such thing as fellowship with tyrants, nothing but bitter feud is possible: and it is not repugnant to nature to despoil, if you can, those whom it is a virtue to kill; nay, this pestilent and godless brood should be utterly banished from human society. For, as we amputate a limb in which the blood and the vital spirit have ceased to circulate, because it injures the rest of the body, so monsters, who, under human guise, conceal the cruelty and ferocity of a wild beast, should be severed from the common body of humanity. Such
is the nature of all inquiries which deal with duty as determined by circumstances.

VII.—33. These, I imagine, are the subjects which Panaetius would next have discussed, had not some accident or some other occupation frustrated his design. For the solution of such problems as I have mentioned you will find in the preceding books abundance of precepts to show what should be avoided as immoral and what is permitted as not being absolutely immoral. But as my work is now so well advanced that I am about to add the finishing stroke, I will here follow the example of mathematicians. As it is their practice not to demonstrate their propositions in full, but to assume certain truths as postulates in order to explain their meaning more easily, so I require you, my dear son, to admit, if you can, that nothing but honour is to be desired for its own sake. If Cratippus forbids, you will at least grant that in itself it is more desirable than anything in the world. Either principle is sufficient for my purpose. I sometimes find more probability in the one, sometimes in the other but elsewhere none. 34. In the first place I must explain in vindication of Panaetius that he did not mean that real expediency could in certain contingencies clash with the honourable—for that would have been against his principles—but only apparent expediency. Indeed he often declares that expediency and honour are one
and the same thing, and that never was a more deadly blow aimed at society than the mischievous theory which first severed these two conceptions. Accordingly in admitting this apparent but not actual opposition, it was not his intention that we should sometimes prefer the expedient to the honourable but that we should infallibly decide between them in the event of a possible conflict. I will now fill the gap without the help of any one, fighting my own battle, as the saying is. For among the theories published on this branch of the subject since the time of Panaetius, none that I have seen is at all satisfactory.

VIII.—35. When we meet with any thing that has some colour of expediency it necessarily makes a powerful impression upon us. But if on closer examination we find that it has some taint of wrong, we should not throw up expediency but rather conclude that expediency and wrong cannot coexist. If there is nothing so repugnant to nature as wrong—for nature demands what is right, what is in harmony with her, what is consistent with itself and abhors the contrary—and if there is nothing so conformable to nature as expediency, then assuredly expediency and wrong are incompatible. Again if we are born to virtue and virtue is, as Zeno holds, the only thing to be desired, or if, according to Aristotle, it at least absolutely outweighs everything in the world, it necessarily follows that honour is
the sole or the supreme good: now what is good is certainly expedient, consequently whatever is honourable is expedient. 36. So when the wicked in their folly snatch at something which seems expedient they straightway sever it from the honourable. Hence daggers, poisons, forged wills, thefts, peculations; hence the pillaging and plundering of allies and fellow-citizens; hence the passion for inordinate wealth and oppressive power, and finally the ambition to play the king in a free community, which is the most repulsive and atrocious crime that can be conceived. For the distorted vision of unprincipled men is so fixed upon material advantage that they never see the penalty of the laws which they often override, still less the penalty of dishonour which is the most cruel of all. 37. Away with these wicked and accursed waverers who cannot decide whether to pursue that which they know to be right or with open eyes to defile themselves with guilt; their vacillation, I hold, is criminal in itself even though they stop short of action. Never doubt, where doubt in itself is wrong. Further, the vain hope of escaping detection must be absolutely excluded from our calculations: for if we have made some little progress in philosophy we should be thoroughly convinced that it is wrong to do anything unjust, wanton, or intemperate, even if we could conceal our action from gods and men. IX.—38.
CICERO

It is in illustration of this truth that Plato brings the famous Gyges on the scene. Once after heavy rains the earth parted asunder. Gyges went down into the chasm, and, as the story goes, he perceived a bronze horse with doors in its flanks. On opening the doors he saw a human corpse of extraordinary size with a gold ring on one of the fingers. He pulled off the ring and put it on his own finger. This Gyges, who was one of the shepherds of the king, then rejoined the others who just then were met together. As often as he turned the bezel of the ring towards the palm of his hand he became invisible but continued to see what was going on around him: and when he turned the ring back to its proper place he became visible as before. Taking advantage of this magic virtue of the ring, Gyges deflowered the queen, slew with her aid his royal master and removed every one he suspected of opposing him, in all these crimes remaining invisible. Thus with the help of the ring he suddenly rose to be king of Lydia. Now if the wise man had this very ring he would not think himself more free to sin than if he had it not. The good man seeks to do what is right, not to hide what he does. 39. Commenting on this passage certain well-meaning but rather dull philosophers tell us that the story related by Plato was a mere fiction, as if that great man really maintained that the incident was either
actual or possible. The illustration of the ring is in fact an allegorical statement of the following case. Would you gratify your desire for riches, power, dominion, or sensual pleasure, if you had no fear of detection or even of suspicion, and were certain that the act would for ever be unknown to gods and men? Our worthy friends say the case is impossible. I quite admit it is, but I ask if that which they declare impossible were possible, what would they do? They stick to their point with right boorish obstinacy and maintain the thing is impossible because they don't know the meaning of the word "possible". When we ask them what they would do if they could escape detection we don't ask them if that is possible, we merely put them on the rack, so to speak. For if they replied that they would do what was best for themselves if assured of impunity, they would thereby admit their criminal intention; if they said they would not, they would grant that every shameful act must be shunned on its own account. But it is high time to return to the point.

X.—40. Many cases arise in which we are perplexed by the semblance of expediency. I do not refer to circumstances in which the question is raised whether honour should be sacrificed for some great advantage—for that would be sinful—but to those in which we ask whether an action that seems expedient may be performed without dishonour.
Brutus, for example, might have been accused of injustice for deposing from the consulate his colleague Collatinus who had been his confederate and adviser in the expulsion of the royal house. But the leading citizens having determined to sweep away the whole clan of Superbus, and to obliterate the name of the Tarquins and every vestige of royal power, this expedient and patriotic measure was so praiseworthy that even Collatinus was bound to recognise its justice. Expediency prevailed because it was united with honour, apart from which there could have been no expediency whatsoever.

41. The case of Romulus who founded our city was quite different. It was a bare show of expediency that influenced him. Thinking it more convenient to reign alone than to share the sovereignty, he slew his brother, disregarding the dictates of natural affection and human feeling in order to obtain an illusory advantage. He alleged in his defence the incident which happened at the building of the wall; but this attempt to justify his conduct was flimsy and inadequate in the extreme.

42. Quirinus, therefore, or Romulus, call him which you will, did wrong, be it said without offence. Still we should not throw away our advantages and surrender to others what we ourselves require, but our own interests should only be considered in so far as they do not prejudice the rights of others. Chrysippus remarks with
his usual sagacity: "As a man who runs a race should do his very best to win but should never foul his rival or push him off the course: so in the battle of life it is right for a man to pursue his own advantage but wrong to usurp the advantage of another".

43. It is chiefly in friendship that our conceptions of duty are unsettled, for it is at once contrary to duty to refuse a friend what justice permits and to grant him what she forbids. For all such cases a short and easy rule may be given. Honour, wealth, pleasure and other apparent advantages must never be preferred to friendship. On the other hand the righteous man will not betray his country, break his oath, or tarnish his honour for the sake of a friend even if he sits in judgment upon him. In assuming the character of a judge he lays aside that of a friend. He may be better pleased if his friend’s cause be just; he may, if the law permits, time the pleading of the cause to suit his friend’s convenience; beyond that he cannot go in yielding to the promptings of friendship. 44. Since he has to pronounce sentence on oath, he must bear in mind that he calls God to witness, that is, as I imagine, his own conscience, the most divine faculty that God has bestowed on man. It is a noble tradition, if we but observed it, to ask of the judge only what he can grant with a good conscience. Such a request, as I have just said, may be honourably
granted by a judge to his friend. If we were compelled to do everything our friends wanted, the relation between us would be more correctly termed conspiracy than friendship. 45. I am here speaking of ordinary friendships, for among ideally wise men no such contingency can arise. It is recorded that two Pythagoreans named Damon and Phintias were so attached to each other that, when one of them was condemned to death by the tyrant Dionysius and the day had been fixed for his execution, he applied for a few days’ respite to provide for the safe keeping of his family, while the other became bail for his appearance and pledged himself to die if his friend did not return. The condemned man came back by the appointed time and the tyrant in admiration of their fidelity begged to be admitted to their friendship. 46. In friendship, therefore, when that which seems expedient conflicts with that which is honourable, false expediency must give way and honour prevail; and when the requests of our friends cannot be honourably granted, conscience and honour must take precedence of friendship. In this way we shall arrive at that nice discrimination of duty which is the object of our inquiry.

XI.—False expediency is often the cause of political crimes such as our own people committed in destroying Corinth. The Athenians were still more cruel when they decreed that the Aeginetans
who were a strong naval power should have their thumbs cut off. They considered the step expedient because the proximity of Aegina was a standing menace to the Piraeus. Cruelty can never be expedient; nothing is so opposed to human nature, our infallible guide. 47. It is no less wrong to exclude aliens from a city or to drive them out as Pennus did in the last generation and Papius in this. It is quite proper that no one should be allowed to assume the privileges of a citizen who is not really a citizen, and a law to this effect was passed by two of our wisest consuls, Crassus and Scaevola: but to exclude foreigners altogether is clearly opposed to the dictates of humanity. On the other hand it is glorious to sacrifice to honour the mere semblance of public utility. Our history is rich in examples of this kind especially in the period of the Second Punic War. After the disaster of Cannae Rome exhibited greater courage than ever she did in the time of her prosperity. No face betrayed fear, no voice spoke for peace. Thus does the false glitter of expediency pale in the pure sunlight of honour. 48. Unable to resist the Persian invasion the Athenians resolved to abandon their city, place their families in safe keeping at Troezen, and to embark in their ships in order to defend the liberty of Greece. A man called Cyrsilus who urged them to remain in the
city and open the gates to Xerxes was stoned to death. His proposal, which seemed expedient, was quite the reverse, because it was opposed to honour. 

49. After his victory in the Persian War Themistocles stated in the national assembly that he had in view a scheme of public utility which it was impolitic to divulge and requested the people to appoint some one to whom he might make it known. Aristides was chosen, and Themistocles explained to him that, if by a coup de main they burned the Lacedaemonian fleet which was beached at Gytheum, they would inevitably shatter the power of the Lacedaemonians. Aristides then returned to the assembly where his appearance was eagerly awaited and reported that the plan of Themistocles was most expedient but far from honourable. The Athenians thought that what was wrong could not be expedient, and at the instance of Aristides rejected the project without even hearing what it was. They acted more nobly than we who grant immunity to pirates and burden our allies with taxes.

XII.—We shall therefore consider it as settled that what is wrong is not expedient even when it brings some supposed advantage; the mere thought that wrong is expedient is disastrous in itself. 50. But, as I have said, circumstances often arise in which expediency seems to clash with honour and we are obliged to consider whether the two are
absolutely opposed or may be reconciled. The following problem will illustrate my meaning. An honest man brings a large cargo of grain from Alexandria to Rhodes during a dearth when corn is selling at famine price. He knows that several merchants have sailed from Alexandria and on the passage he has seen their ships laden with grain steering for Rhodes. Shall he inform the Rhodians or keep his own counsel and sell his cargo at the highest possible price? We are imagining the case of a virtuous and honest man: we are studying the moral conflict of one who would not keep the Rhodians in ignorance if he thought it wrong, though he might be inclined to think that silence is right.

51. On such casuistic questions the views of the great and respected Stoic, Diogenes of Babylon, differ from those of his pupil Antipater, a man of the keenest intellect. Antipater holds that all the facts should be disclosed so that the buyer may be as fully informed as the seller; according to Diogenes the seller must state the defects of his goods only so far as the common law requires, he must be straightforward in all his dealings, but is entitled to take the highest price he can get. "I have imported and laid out my goods and I offer them as cheap as other people, perhaps cheaper, when I have a larger supply: whom do I wrong?" 52. Antipater argues on the other side: "What do you mean? It is your duty
CICERO
to promote the welfare of others and to make yourself useful to society. You are bound to obey the conditions of your existence and follow your natural instincts which ordain that your interest should be the interest of the community and *vice versa*. Will you then refuse to tell your fellow-men of the blessings and abundant supplies that are at hand?" Diogenes will perhaps reply in these terms: "Concealment is one thing, silence another, and I don't conceal anything from you now, if I don't tell you what is the nature of the gods or the highest good which it would be more useful to you to know than the low price of wheat. I am not obliged to tell you all that it would be for your advantage to know." 53. "Yes, you must," Antipater will say, "if you regard the natural bond of society, which knits men together." "I don't forget the claim of society," Diogenes will reply; "but surely it does not exclude the idea of private property. If it does, then selling is impossible, and we shall have to give everything away." XIII.—You observe that throughout this discussion they do not say, "However wrong this may be, I will do it, as it is expedient"; the one says it is expedient without being wrong; the other, it must not be done, because it is wrong. 54. Supposing an honest man is selling a house on account of certain defects known to him alone. It is believed to be healthy but is really unhealthy. Snakes appear in
all the bedrooms, the house is built of bad timber and is insecure, but nobody is aware of this except the owner: if he did not inform the purchaser and sold his house at a higher price than he expected, would his conduct, I ask, be unjust or wicked? "Of course it would," says Antipater. 55. "For what is the difference between refusing to set a man right who has lost his way, an act forbidden at Athens under pain of public execration, and letting a purchaser be carried away and blindly incur the heaviest loss? That is still worse than not showing a man the way: it is deliberately misleading your neighbour." Diogenes replies: "Nobody compelled you, nobody even pressed you to buy; the man put up for sale what he did not like and you bought what you liked. Those who advertise: 'For sale, an excellent and substantial country house,' are not considered dishonest even if it is neither excellent nor substantial, still less are those who don’t cry up their house. Where is there room for dishonesty on the part of the seller if the buyer is free to exercise his judgment? If you are not required to make good all you say, do you think you are responsible for what you don’t say? Now what is more foolish than for a seller to tell the defects of the article he is selling or more absurd than for a crier to proclaim by the proprietor's order: 'An unhealthy house to be sold'?" 56. It is in this way that in certain dubious cases the one side
CICERO

defends the honourable, while the other tells us that it is not only right to do what is expedient but actually wrong not to do it. Such is the apparent conflict that often arises between the expedient and the honourable. But I must give my own decision in these two cases; I stated the problems in order to solve them, and not simply to raise an inquiry.

57. Well, in my opinion, neither should the corn-dealer have kept anything back from the Rhodians, nor the man who was selling the house from the purchasers. For concealment does not consist merely in suppression but in keeping something you know from others for your own advantage when it is their interest to know it; and the nature of such dissimulation and the character of those who practise it are obvious. We certainly do not expect to find it in the open, straightforward, candid, just, or honest man but rather in the evasive, deep, crafty, designing, cunning, sly, confirmed rogue. What a calamity to have oneself called by all these opprobrious names!

XIV.—58. But if it is a fault to suppress the truth, what are we to think of those who employ downright falsehood? A Roman knight, called C. Canius, a man of considerable wit and culture, came to Syracuse where, as he used to say himself, his sole occupation would be to keep himself unoccupied. He often spoke of buying a little country place where he could invite his friends and enjoy himself.
without fear of intrusion. When his intention got abroad, a Syracusan banker, called Pythius, told him he owned a property of the kind; it was not for sale but Canius was welcome to the use of it and at the same time he asked him to dinner there the next day. Canius accepted the invitation. Pythius, whose position as a banker made him a favourite with all classes, sent for some fishermen, asked them to fish next day opposite his grounds and told them what to do. Canius arrived punctually. He found a sumptuous banquet provided by Pythius, and saw before him a large number of boats; the fishermen one by one brought the fish they had caught and threw them down at the feet of Pythius. Then Canius said, "Pray, Pythius, what's the reason of this? What's the meaning of all these fish and boats?" "That's natural enough; this is the place where the Syracusans get all their fish and water; the people here could never get on without this estate." Canius grows keen and presses him to sell the place. At first the banker raises difficulties. To make a long story short, Canius gains his point. In his infatuation the rich knight buys the grounds with all their appurtenances at the high price demanded by Pythius. The banker concludes and notes the bargain. Next day Canius invites his friends, he comes himself in good time, but there is no trace of a boat. He asks his next-door neighbour if the
CICERO

fishermen had a holiday that none of them were to be seen. "Not that I know of; but there is no fishing here and I could not imagine yesterday what had happened." 60. Canius fumed but was helpless. For my friend and colleague, C. Aquilius, had not yet published his forms of pleading in criminal fraud, and, when people asked him what was meant by fraud in his pleadings, he used to reply that it was professing one thing and practising another, a most brilliant and masterly definition. Pythius, then, and all whose deeds belie their words, are faithless, wicked, crafty. None of their actions can be expedient, they are so stained with vice.

XV.—61. But if the definition of Aquilius is correct, misrepresentation and concealment must be banished from the world; and the honest man will never employ either the one or the other for the purpose of driving a better bargain. Indeed, before the time of Aquilius this species of fraud was punished by statute. For example, the Twelve Tables dealt with offending guardians, and the Plaetorian Law with attempts to defraud minors. Apart from statute law, it is condemned by decisions in equity, in which the apt words are ex fide bona. In the other decisions the most significant words are, melius aequius in the case of arbitration about a wife's property, and in trusts ut inter bonos bene agier. Now, I ask you, do not the words melius aequius exclude the
possibility of fraud, or do the words *inter bonos bene agier* admit of craft or cunning? If criminal fraud according to Aquilius consists in misrepresentation, falsehood must be banished from commercial transactions. The vendor must not employ a mock-bidder to raise the price, nor the purchaser prejudice the sale by any trick, and when they state their terms they must state them once for all. 62. Q. Scaevola, the son of Publius, asked the exact price of an estate he wanted to buy. The seller told him. Scaevola said he thought it was worth more, and gave him 100,000 sesterces over and above what he asked. Everybody will say that Scaevola acted like an honest man, but that he was just as foolish as if he had sold the property for a lower price than he might have obtained for it. Here again is the mischievous doctrine which makes a distinction between goodness and wisdom. Hence the saying of Ennius: "The wise man is wise to no purpose who can make no profit of his wisdom". That is perfectly true, but unfortunately Ennius and I are not at one on the meaning of the word profit. 63. In the treatise on duty which Hecato of Rhodes, a disciple of Panaetius, dedicated to Q. Tubero, I remember a passage to the effect that "a wise man ought to improve his position without doing anything contrary to morals, laws, or customs. It is not for ourselves alone that we desire to be rich but for our
CICERO

children, our kinsmen, our friends, and above all for our country. For the wealth of the individual is the wealth of the community." This philosopher would never have approved of the act of Scaevola which I have just mentioned. In fact he confesses that where his own advantage is concerned he will shrink from nothing except what is forbidden by law. Such a man, I think, has no great claim on our respect or gratitude.

64. If, then, criminal fraud consists in misrepresentation and concealment, there are very few actions free from it; and, if by a good man we mean one who helps as many as he can and harms no one, it will certainly be hard to find him. Once more I say it is never expedient to do wrong because it is at all times base, but it is always expedient to be good because it is always honourable.

XVI.—65. In the law of real property our code ordains that the seller shall declare all the defects known to him. Whereas according to the Twelve Tables it sufficed to make good such defects as were expressly declared, and any one who did not own these defects, when questioned by the purchaser, incurred a double penalty, our judges have gone a step further and attached a penalty to the suppression of facts; they hold the seller responsible for any defect in the estate known to him but not expressly stated. 66. For instance, the augurs having to take the auspices on
the Capitol commanded Ti. Claudius Centumalus who had a house on the Caelian hill to pull down the parts of the building which were so high as to interfere with their observations. Claudius put the tenement up for sale and it was bought by P. Calpurnius Lanarius. The augurs served the same notice on the new proprietor. He complied; but having discovered that Claudius had advertised the house after the alterations had been ordered by the augurs he brought an action in equity for specific performance or for damages for breach of contract. M. Cato, the father of Cato our contemporary, pronounced judgment. Other men derive their titles from their fathers; in this case we must distinguish by the name of his son the man who gave to the world so brilliant a luminary. Cato then in the capacity of judge pronounced the following decision: "Since the vendor was aware of the order of the augurs and had not made it known, the loss ought to be made good to the purchaser". 67. Thus he ruled that the vendor was bound in equity to inform the purchaser of any defects of which he had knowledge. If his decision was good law, our corn-dealer and the man who sold the unhealthy house were alike wrong in withholding what they knew. The civil law cannot cover all such cases of suppression, but it is strictly enforced wherever it is applicable. Our relative, M. Marius Gratidianus, had sold back to C. Sergius Orata a house which he
had bought from him a few years before. The house was subject to an easement but Marius had not stated this in the conditions of sale. The case was taken to court. Crassus was counsel for Orata, Antonius for Gratidianus. Crassus laid stress on the law which holds the seller responsible for any defects known to him that he does not declare, Antonius maintained that equity was on his side, and that this burden must have been known to Sergius as he had previously sold the house in question; there was accordingly no reason for its being specified and since the purchaser was quite aware of the burdens to which the property was subject, he had not been deceived. 68. But you may wonder why I quote these cases. My object is to show that our ancestors did not approve of sharp practice.

XVII.—Justice and philosophy alike wage war with craft, but fight with different weapons. The sword of justice strikes where it can reach, but philosophy employs those finer weapons, the reason and the judgment. Now reason forbids every form of treachery, misrepresentation and deceit. It is surely treacherous to spread a net though you should not beat the covers or drive the game; for even if not pursued, animals will often rush into it of their own accord. Would you then advertise a house and put up a board as a kind of snare to catch some dupe? 69. I am quite aware that public opinion is so degene-
rate that conduct like that is not commonly accounted wrong and is not forbidden either by statute or by the civil law, still it is banned by the law of nature. I cannot too often repeat what I have said already so often that there exists a society of the widest possible extent embracing the whole human race, another more restricted composed of the people of one nation, and one still narrower formed by the inhabitants of one city. Our forefathers, therefore, established a distinction between the law of nations and the civil law: the civil law is not necessarily identical with the law of nations, but the law of nations is necessarily identical with the civil law. But we do not possess the real and life-like figure of true law and genuine justice; all that we have is the faint outline. Would to Heaven we followed even that, for it is taken from the perfect model presented by nature and truth! 70. How priceless are the words: "May I not be betrayed or beguiled through thee or through thy plighted word"! Here again are words of gold: "Act honestly like honest men without deceit". But what is meant by honest men? What is honesty? That is, I confess, a knotty point. Q. Scaevola, the high pontiff, used to attach the greatest importance to all arbitrations in which the reference was expressly ex fide bona. He considered that these words had an extensive application, being employed in cases of wardship, partner-
ships, trusts, commissions, purchases, sales, hiring, letting—in a word, in all the transactions of social life. He added that it required an able judge to decide the respective rights and obligations of the litigants, especially as most of these cases admitted of cross suits. 71. Away then with artifice and the kind of craft that poses as prudence but is utterly remote from it. For prudence has its sphere in the discrimination of what is good and what is bad; craft, on the other hand, if it is true that all that is base is bad, prefers what is bad to what is good. The civil law, which is derived from the natural, not only punishes craft and fraud in regard to real property, but forbids every form of dishonesty in the sale of slaves. The vendor, who is fixed with the knowledge of a slave’s health or any disposition he may have to run away or steal, is held responsible for his defects by the law of the aediles. Those who inherit slaves are in a different position. 72. From this it is evident that, as nature is the source of right, it is contrary to nature for any one to take advantage of the stupidity of his neighbour. Indeed there is no greater curse to society than craft which wears the mask of wisdom; in countless cases it is the cause of the apparent conflict between the expedient and the honourable. How few men, if assured of impunity and secrecy, could refrain from doing wrong?
With your permission, I will criticise one of those cases in which the mass of men see no particular harm. I am not going to speak at present of assassins, poisoners, will-forgers, thieves or peculators, who must be kept down with chains and confinement, not with mere talk and philosophical argument; but I wish to consider the conduct of those who pass in society for respectable men. A forged will, purporting to be that of the wealthy L. Minucius Basilus, was brought from Greece to Rome. To strengthen their position the forgers made M. Crassus and Q. Hortensius, two of the most influential men of the time, joint-heirs with themselves; the latter had some idea that the will was a forgery, but, being conscious of no guilt in the matter, they were not above taking a douceur procured by the villainy of others. I ask you, is this excuse sufficient to justify their conduct? I certainly don't think so, although I was the friend of Hortensius while he lived and am no enemy to Crassus now that he is dead and gone. 74. Basilus in his real will had bequeathed his name and his fortune to his nephew M. Satrius, the protector of Picenum and the Sabine land—what a stigma on our age!—and it was surely not right for men of position to keep the estate and leave to Satrius nothing but the name. If, as I explained in the first book, it is wrong not to prevent injustice
and avert it from our neighbours, what shall we say of the man who, far from repelling, actually abets it? To my mind it is not honourable to accept even a genuine legacy if it has been gained by designing flattery and insincere and hypocritical attentions. Still in such cases the expedient sometimes appears to differ from the honourable. 75. This theory, I say, is false; there is but one standard of expediency and honour, and the man who is not convinced of this is capable of every kind of craft and crime. If he reasons thus: “your plan is honourable, but mine is expedient,” he will not scruple to tear asunder things that nature has joined together, and he will fall into a heresy which is the source of every form of cunning, wickedness, and crime.

XIX.—If the honest man had only to snap his fingers in order to slip his name into the wills of rich men he would not abuse his magic power, even if he were certain of escaping suspicion. Why, had you given M. Crassus the chance of foisting his name into a will by sleight of hand although he was not the real heir, I tell you, he would have danced for joy in the forum. But the just man, the man whom we feel to be honest, will never rob another to enrich himself. If you are surprised at this, you must admit that you do not know what an honest man is. 76. You have only to develop an innate idea to make it instantly clear to yourself.
that the honest man is one who does all the good he can and harms no one except under provocation. I ask you, then, would a man do no harm who spirited away a true heir and stepped into his place? The objection may be raised: "Is he not then to do what would be advantageous and expedient?" By all means, but he must understand that nothing is expedient or advantageous that is unjust. Without this principle no one can be honest. When I was a boy I often heard my father say that the ex-consul C. Fimbria was judge in the case of M. Lutatius Pinthias, a Roman knight of irreproachable character, who had laid a judicial wager that he would prove he was a good man. Fimbria told him that he would never pronounce judgment in the case because he feared he might ruin the reputation of a man of recognised worth, if he decided against him, or might seem to have admitted the existence of a perfectly good man, when such a character really implied the performance of countless duties and the possession of countless merits. Now this ideally good man of whom even Fimbria, not to mention Socrates, had formed a conception will never consider anything expedient that is not honourable, and, far from doing, he will not dare to think of, anything that he could not publish to the world. What a scandal that philosophers should have their doubts where peasants have none! Is it not to peasants
that we owe the trite old proverb which they employ when they praise a man for his good faith and sterling worth?—"Why, you could safely play at odd and even with him in the dark"; and what is the point of the proverb but this, that nothing is expedient that is not decorous even if the object could be gained with impunity? 78. Don't you see it teaches the lesson that there is no excuse for Gyges, nor for the man to whom I just now fancifully ascribed the power of conjuring into his own net all the legacies in the world? For, as secrecy can never make a base action honourable, so an action in itself dishonourable can never become expedient; it is contrary to all the dictates of nature.

XX.—79. But, it may be said, no wonder people go astray where there are great prizes to gain. After holding the office of praetor Marius had remained in the background for more than seven years and had but faint hopes of attaining the consulate; indeed it looked as if he would never stand for it. About this time he was sent to Rome by Q. Metellus, a great man and a worthy citizen, under whom he served as adjutant. He there accused his general before the people of protracting the war for his own purposes and promised that, if they made him consul, he would in a short time deliver Jugurtha alive or dead into the hands of the Roman people. He succeeded, it is true, in becoming consul, but in discrediting by
a false charge a worthy and respected citizen whose adjutant and envoy he was he swerved from the path of honour and justice. 80. Our kinsman Marius, I mean Gratidianus, was no better. During his praetorship he was guilty of an act unworthy of an honest man. The tribunes of the people had invited the board of praetors to co-operate with them in fixing the standard of the currency by a joint resolution; for at that date the value of money fluctuated so much that no one knew what he was worth. They drew up an edict together determining the penalties and the judicial procedure and arranged to mount the Rostra all together in the afternoon. The others went their several ways, but Marius proceeded straight from the tribunes’ benches to the Rostra and there proclaimed alone the edict which they had agreed to proclaim in common. This ruse actually procured for him great popularity. In all the streets statues were raised in his honour and incense and tapers were burnt before them. In a word, he became the idol of the multitude. 81. Our moral calculations are sometimes disturbed by circumstances like these in which the offence against justice appears trifling in comparison with the accruing advantage. Thus in the case before us Marius did not think it very wrong to anticipate his colleagues and the tribunes in winning the favour of the people, but he considered it most advantageous to secure by
that means his election to the consulate which was then the object of his ambition. For all cases there is but one rule which I desire to impress on you: an act which is thought expedient must not be wrong; if it is wrong, it must not be thought expedient. I ask you, then, can we pronounce either the one Marius or the other a good man? Sift and search your mind to see what idea and conception of a good man it contains, and then answer this question. Can a good man consistently lie or calumniate, outwit, and deceive others for his own advantage? Assuredly not. Is any object so important, any advantage so desirable, that you would sacrifice for its sake the glorious title of an honest man? What good could you get from your so-called expediency to compensate for the loss you would suffer if it filched from you your good name and robbed you of honour and justice? As well become a beast outright as conceal its ferocity under human guise.

XXI.—What shall we say of those who ignore what is right and honourable if only they acquire power? Are they not on a level with him who actually chose for his father-in-law a man through whose shameless conduct he might strengthen his own position. It seemed to him advantageous to establish his own influence on the discredit of his neighbour. He did not see how dishonourable his conduct was and how unjust to his country.
As for his father-in-law, he was always quoting two Greek verses from the Phoenissae which I shall translate as well as I can. My rendering may be awkward, but it will at least give the sense:

"To get a crown, a man would break a trust,
If break'st at all, everywhere else be just."

How infamous to make a single exception in favour of the greatest of all crimes! 83. Why stop short at trifles such as ill-gotten legacies, and dishonest purchases and sales? Here you have a man who aspired to be king of the Roman people and master of the world and succeeded. If you call such an ambition honourable, you are out of your senses: for you tacitly approve of the extinction of law and liberty and applaud the hideous and accursed crime of trampling them in the dust. If any one admits that it is not honourable to wield the sceptre in a state which once was free and still deserves her freedom, and yet asserts that for the tyrant it is good, what remonstrance, nay, what reproach is strong enough to uproot from his mind so fatal an error? Immortal gods! can the foul and abominable crime of treason to one's country bring good to any one though the traitor be hailed as Father by the citizens whom he has crushed? Honour, I say, is the only standard of expediency; the words are different, the things are the same. 84. To the vulgar mind there is no happier lot than that of a
king; but, when I put the theory to a practical test, I find that the power of a usurper is the greatest possible curse. What advantage is it to be a prey to sorrow and care, to tremble day and night, and to live a life beset with snares and dangers? Accius says: "Many are hostile and faithless to the throne, few are friendly". To what throne? To the rightful heirs of Tantalus and Pelops. As for the tyrant who crushed the Roman people with their own army and enslaved a free republic, the mistress of the world, what shall we say of the number of his enemies? 85. Think of his guilt-stained conscience, his heart torn with remorse! Can life be worth living to a man who holds it on such terms that he who robs him of it is destined to win the greatest gratitude and glory? If this, which seems the greatest advantage in the world, is no advantage at all, because it is attended with dishonour and infamy, you should now be fully convinced that nothing is expedient that is not honourable.

XXII.—86. This principle has been acknowledged on many occasions in our history, but was never so strongly attested as in the war with Pyrrhus by the Roman senate and C. Fabricius who was then in his second consulate. Pyrrhus was the aggressor. We were fighting for the ascendancy with a chivalrous and powerful prince. A deserter came from his camp to that of Fabricius and offered for a reward
to return to the camp of Pyrrhus as secretly as he had come and poison the king. Fabricius ordered him to be taken back to Pyrrhus, and his conduct was applauded by the senate. Now, if we merely look to the appearance, the popular conception of expediency, it would doubtless have been an advantage to be relieved of a difficult war and a formidable adversary through the agency of a single deserter; but what a shame, what a scandal to conquer not by courage but by crime a prince with whom the contest was for glory. 87. Which then was the more expedient course either for Fabricius, the Roman Aristides, or for our senate, which never divorced its interest from its honour, to fight the enemy with the sword or with poison? If glory is our motive in aspiring to empire, let us abstain from crime which is incompatible with glory: but if power is our sole object, purchased at whatever price, it can never be a blessing if coupled with dishonour. There was no advantage, therefore, in the proposal made by L. Philippus, the son of Quintus, that the states which Sulla, in pursuance of a decree of the senate, had freed from taxation on the receipt of an indemnity, should again be made tributary without repayment of the sum they had given for exemption. The senate followed his advice. What a disgrace to our empire! Why, pirates have more honour than the senate. "Yes, but that increased
our revenue; it was, therefore, expedient.” How long will people persist in saying that anything is expedient that is not honourable? An empire should be upheld by an honourable name and the loyalty of her allies; how then can she profit by hatred and infamy? On this subject I have often disagreed with my friend Cato. It seemed to me that he was too stubborn a champion of the treasury and the public revenue. He made no concessions to the farmers of the revenue and few to the allies, while I held that we should be generous to the latter and deal with the former as we commonly do with our own tenants, especially as the harmony of the orders was essential to the national welfare. Curio was equally wrong. Though he admitted that the cause of the colonies beyond the Po was just, he always made the reservation, “The public interest must prevail”! He should rather have proved that their cause was not just because it was not advantageous to the republic, than admitted its justice while denying its expediency.

XXIII.—89. The sixth book of Hecato’s Duties is full of questions of casuistry such as these: “At a time of extreme dearth is it right for a good man not to supply food to his slaves?” He argues both sides of the question and comes to the conclusion that expediency, as he conceives it, rather than human sympathy is the standard of duty. Here is another
problem. "If a ship is out at sea and it is necessary to jettison part of the cargo, should one sacrifice a valuable horse rather than a cheap slave?" In this case self-interest pulls the one way and human feeling the other. "If a fool seizes a plank from a wreck, shall a wise man, if he can, twist it out of his hands?" "No," says Hecato; "it would be unjust." "But what would you say of the shipowner? Is he entitled to seize the plank on the plea that it belongs to him?" "He has no more right to do that than to throw a passenger overboard in deep water because the ship is his. For until she reaches the port for which she is chartered the ship does not belong to the owner but to the passengers." 90. "Suppose a ship is wrecked and there is but one plank for two equally wise people, are they both to seize it or is the one to yield it to the other?" "Of course it must be given up to the one whose life is more valuable to himself or to the community." "What if their lives be equally valuable?" "In that case there must be no contention, the one must yield to the other as if he lost in a game of chance or in playing at odd and even." "If a man should rob a temple, or drive a mine into the public treasury, should his son report him to the magistrates?" "No, that would be a crime; he must even defend his father should he be publicly accused." "Is not the duty we owe to our country paramount to every other?" "Yes, but it is good
CICERO

for our country herself to have citizens true to their parents.” “If a man aspires to tyrannical power and attempts to betray his country, shall his son remain silent?” “No, he must plead with his father, and if he fails, he must rebuke and even threaten him, and finally, if the ruin of his country is imminent, he must prefer her safety to that of his father.”

Another question. “If a wise man by an oversight takes false money for good and discovers his mistake, is it allowable for him in paying his debts to pass it off as good?” Diogenes says “Yes”; Antipater “No”; I prefer the latter view. “If a man had wine for sale which he knew to be unsound, should he tell his customers?” Diogenes thinks it is not necessary, Antipater mainains that an honest man should. These are, so to speak, the disputed points of law among the Stoics. “In selling a slave ought we to state his defects—I do not mean those defects, the concealment of which would cancel the transac-
tion according to the civil law—but the disposition to lie, gamble, steal or tipple?” Antipater thinks we should, Diogenes we should not. “If a man should sell gold by mistake for brass, should an honest man tell him it is gold, or take for one denarius what is worth a thousand?” It should now be clear to you what are my own views on these problems and wherein the two philosophers I have named differ in theirs.

174
XXIV.—Are bargains and promises always binding which in the language of the praetors have been made without force or fraud? One man gives another a drug for dropsy, stipulating that if cured, he is never to use the drug again. The patient recovers, but some years after he takes the same trouble and cannot obtain permission from the other to use the drug again. What should he do? As it is unfeeling in his friend to refuse a concession which would cost him nothing, the invalid is justified in looking to his own life and the preservation of his health. 93. A wise man is to be made heir to a fortune of one hundred million sesterces; but the testator requires him before entering upon the inheritance to dance publicly in the forum in broad daylight. Rather than lose the inheritance the wise man has accepted the condition. Is he to keep his promise or not? I wish he had never made it; that, I think, would have been the dignified course. But since he has given his word, if he thinks it degrading to dance in the forum, it will be more honourable for him to break his promise and renounce the inheritance, unless he should happen to devote the money to the relief of his country in some great crisis when his public spirit would excuse even the act of dancing. XXV.—94. No more binding are promises which are not useful even to those to whom they have been made, To draw my illustrations once
more from mythology, Phoebus having promised his son Phaëthon to gratify all his desires, Phaëthon asked leave to mount his father's chariot; his wish was granted, but before the journey ended he was consumed by a thunder-bolt. How much better if his father had not kept his promise. Take again the promise which Theseus exacted from Neptune. The god having given him the choice of three things, Theseus desired the death of his son Hippolytus whom he suspected of incest with his stepmother; his desire was granted and Theseus was plunged in the deepest grief. 95. What shall we say of Agamemnon who vowed to Diana the fairest thing that came into being that year within his realm. There was nothing fairer than Iphigenia and he sacrificed her. He ought rather to have broken his promise than committed so foul a crime. It is our duty therefore in some cases not to fulfil a promise and in others not to restore what has been entrusted to our keeping. If some one in his right mind gave you a sword to keep, and asked it back when mad, it would be a sin to restore and a duty not to restore it. If a man who had deposited a sum of money with you should make war on your country, would you restore his deposit? I should say no; you would be acting against the interests of your country which should be dearer to you than anything in the world. 96. Thus many
actions which appear essentially moral, in certain circumstances completely change their character. To keep a promise, stand to a bargain, return a deposit, are acts which cease to be moral when they lose their expediency. I think I have now said enough about those acts which, under the mask of wisdom, appear to be expedient but are really opposed to justice.

Having in my first book derived all our duties from the four sources of honour, I shall here follow the same order in showing how contrary to virtue are things which have only the semblance of expediency. I have already spoken of prudence and of cunning, its counterfeit, and likewise of justice and its constant attendant, expediency. There remain therefore two sources of honour, the one of which manifests itself in greatness and sublimity of character, and the other in the moulding and governing of the mind by moderation and self-command.

XXVI.—97. To escape from military service it seemed expedient to Ulysses to feign madness. Such at least is the account of the tragic poets. Homer, our best authority, breathes not a word of suspicion against him. His purpose was not honourable, but, it may be said, it was expedient for Ulysses to remain at Ithaca, and to reign there and live a peaceful life with his parents and his
wife and son. What glory, think you, gained in daily toils and dangers can compare with such tranquillity? Tranquillity like that, I tell you, is mean and contemptible; as it is not honourable, it ceases, I think, to be expedient. 98. What would the world have said of Ulysses, if he had persevered in his deceit, when despite his glorious exploits in war, he is thus taunted by Ajax:—

He that contrived the oath, and made us take it,
Was th' only man, himself, you know, that brake it
Playing th' mad, driv'ling fool, under that blind
To sleep in a whole skin, and stay behind:
And the bold cheat had past, without all doubt,
But for sly Palamede that found it out.

99. Believe me, it was better for him to fight with the foe and battle with the billows, as he did, than to desert the Greeks who were banded together as one man to make war on the barbarians. Let us turn from fables and foreign instances to real events in our own history. In his second consulate M. Atilius Regulus was treacherously captured by the forces of the Lacedaemonian Xanthippus who held command under Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal. He was then despatched to our senate and was bound by an oath to return to Carthage unless he procured the exchange of certain Punic prisoners of high rank. When he came to Rome, it was apparently his interest to remain in his own country, to live at home with his wife and children, and to maintain his consular
CICERO

rank, regarding the reverse he had suffered as the common fortune of war; but, as the event proves, he considered the expediency of such a course illusory. Who denies that these are great advantages? No one, think you? XXVII.—100. Yes, magnanimity and fortitude; surely you do not want more weighty authorities? For it is the peculiar function of these virtues to fear nothing, to scorn all the accidents of fortune, and to think nothing insupportable that can happen to man. What then did he do? He came into the senate, explained the object of his mission, but refused to express his opinion, holding that his rights as a senator were suspended so long as he was bound by the oath sworn to his enemies. More than that—but some one may say, "What a fool to quarrel with his own interests!"—he denied the expediency of restoring the prisoners, a body of gallant young officers in exchange for a decrepit old man. His force of character triumphed, the prisoners were retained, and he returned to Carthage; love of country and love of kin could not hold him. Yet he well knew he was going to meet a cruel enemy and exquisite tortures. But he respected the sanctity of his oath, happier far in the agonies of sleeplessness with which he was tortured to death than if he had grown old at home, a runaway prisoner of war, a perjured consul. 101. "Still he acted like a fool in proposing that the prisoners should not be restored and actually dissuad-
ing his countrymen from restoring them." In what sense like a fool if his policy was advantageous to his country? Can that which is disadvantageous to the state be profitable to any citizen? XXVIII.—To sever expediency from honour is to overthrow the foundations of nature. We all strive after self-interest and are hurried towards it by an irresistible impulse. Is there any one who flees from his own interest, or rather does not pursue it with the greatest ardour? But as we can find it only in what is praiseworthy, decorous, and honourable, we consider these qualities the first and highest blessings, and expediency not so much an ornament as a necessary principle of life. 102. It may be said, "After all, what is there in an oath? Do we really fear the wrath of Jove? No, all schools of philosophy, whether they maintain that God does nothing and troubles no one, or that He is ever working and toiling, agree in the opinion that He is never angry and harms no one. Besides, what greater evil could the wrath of Jove have inflicted on Regulus than he brought upon himself? The fear of the gods, then, had not the power to annul so great an advantage. Or did he fear to act basely? In the first place, "of two evils we should choose the least". Surely there is not so much evil in the baseness you speak of as in the tortures he had to endure. Well might he have used the words of Accius: 'Hast thou broken thy word? To a faithless man I neither
have given nor do give it'—a noble sentiment though uttered by an accursed tyrant.” 103. These critics further say that as we maintain that some things seem expedient which are not, so they maintain that some things seem honourable which are not: “for example, this very act of giving oneself up to certain torture in order to keep an oath is apparently honourable but is really not honourable, because an oath extorted by an enemy was not binding”. They add that whatever is highly expedient thereby becomes honourable, even though it did not seem honourable before. These are substantially the arguments against Regulus. Let us examine them in detail.

XXIX.—104. “There was nothing to fear from Jupiter. He is wont neither to be wroth nor to do harm.” This argument is just as valid against any oath as against that of Regulus; and in the case of an oath we should think of its significance rather than its terrors. An oath is in fact a solemn affirmation: now what we positively promise, as if taking Heaven to witness, that we must keep. If that is true, the question does not concern the wrath of the gods (for there is no such thing), but the obligations of justice and honour. You may remember the noble words of Ennius:—

O holy Faith! the tie o' th' gods;
And fit to have thy mansion in their blest abodes.

He who violates his oath, violates the goddess of
CICERO

Honour to whom, as we learn from a speech of Cato’s, our ancestors assigned a place on the Capitol near Jove, the Best, the Greatest. 105. “Besides, even the wrath of Jove could not have done greater harm to Regulus than he brought upon himself.”

Quite so, if pain were the only evil. But philosophers of the highest authority assert, that, far from being the greatest evil, it is no evil at all. In support of their doctrine we have in Regulus no mean witness, nay, I take it, a witness of great weight, whose testimony I pray you not to challenge. Can we desire a stronger witness than an eminent Roman, who, to be true to his duty, voluntarily submitted to torture? As to the argument, “the least of evils,” in other words, dishonour before misfortune, I ask you, is there any greater evil than dishonour? If we are shocked by bodily deformity, what must we think of the hideous deformity of a depraved mind? 106.

Our more rigorous moralists, therefore, go so far as to assert that dishonour is the only evil; while the more indulgent do not shrink from calling it the greatest evil of all. As to the sentiment, “I have neither given, nor do I give, my faith to a faithless man,” it was properly expressed by the poet because he had to accommodate his language to the character of Atreus. But if our friends assume that a promise pledged to the faithless is null and void, I am afraid they are merely seeking to screen their own perjury.

182
107. Even war has its laws and it is often our duty to keep an oath sworn to an enemy. An oath is binding if in taking it we fully realise and admit our responsibility; otherwise, it is no perjury to break it. Thus you could refuse a pirate the price fixed for your ransom. Here it would be no crime even to break an oath. A pirate is not recognised as a public enemy, he is the common foe of all men. With him we can have no promises, no oaths that are mutually binding. 108. Perjury does not consist in swearing falsely but in not fulfilling what you have sworn upon soul and conscience, as our formula expresses it. Euripides has cleverly said: "I swore with my tongue, not with my heart". Regulus had no right to violate by perjury an agreement concluded in time of war with a regular and accredited enemy. With such an enemy we have in common the whole fetial law and many mutual obligations. Were it not so, the senate would never have given up to the enemy in chains so many distinguished men. XXX.—

109. T. Veturius and P. Postumius in their second consulate were delivered up to the Samnites, because after the reverse at Caudium they had suffered our legions to pass under the yoke and had concluded peace without the authority of the people and the senate. In order to annul the treaty with the Samnites we surrendered at the same time Ti. Numicius and Q. Maelius, the tribunes of the people,
by whose advice peace had been concluded; and the resolution was actually proposed and advocated by Postumius who was himself to be surrendered. Many years later his example was followed by C. Mancinus who had made a treaty with the Numantines without warrant from the senate. With a view to his own surrender he spoke in favour of the bill which L. Furius and Sextus Atilius submitted to the people in pursuance of a decree of the senate: the bill was passed and he was given up to the enemy. Macinus acted more honourably than Q. Pompeius who in similar circumstances procured by his entreaties the rejection of the law. In his case apparent expediency triumphed over honour, in the others honour eclipsed the false show of expediency.

110. "But an oath extorted by force should not have been fulfilled." As if a man of courage could be forced. "Why, then, did he come to the senate, especially as he intended to oppose the restitution of the prisoners?" That is to make a fault of his chief merit. Not content with forming a decision in his own mind, he pressed it on the senate: which, but for his powerful influence, would doubtless have restored the prisoners to the Carthaginians; and Regulus would then have remained in safety in his native land. But, as such a course did not seem advantageous to his country, he believed that honour required him to declare his conviction
and go to meet his fate. As to their assertion, that what is highly expedient thereby becomes honourable, they should rather have said, it is, not becomes, honourable. For nothing is expedient that is not at the same time honourable, nor honourable because it is expedient; it is expedient because it is honourable. Among all the instances of heroism with which our history abounds it would be difficult to point to one more remarkable or more worthy of praise than the conduct of Regulus.

XXXI.—111. Of all his claims to glory, that which alone commands our admiration is his voting for the detention of the prisoners. It seems remarkable to us now that he returned to Carthage; in those days he could not have done otherwise. The credit therefore belongs to the age and not to the man. For our forefathers regarded an oath as the strictest possible obligation. We have proof of this in the laws of the Twelve Tables, in the "sacred" laws, in treaties which oblige us to act honourably even towards an enemy, and in the investigations and awards of the censors who were never so scrupulous as when they gave judgment concerning an oath.

112. M. Pomponius, a tribune of the people, impeached the dictator L. Manlius, the son of Aulus, for having exceeded his term of office by several days, and further charged him with banishing from society his son Titus, afterwards surnamed Torquatus,
and ordering him to live in the country. When the young lad heard that his father was in trouble, he hurried to Rome, we are told, and went at daybreak to the house of Pomponius. His visit was announced, and the tribune, supposing that he had come in anger with some fresh charge against his father, rose from his bed and admitted the youth to a private interview. The moment he entered he drew his sword and swore that he would kill the tribune on the spot if he did not promise on his word of honour not to accuse his father. Pomponius in terror gave his oath: he then reported the matter to the people, explained to them why he was compelled to drop the prosecution, and left Manlius unmolested. Such was the power of an oath in those days. This is the same T. Manlius who, challenged by a Gaul on the banks of the Anio, slew his enemy, stripped him of his collar, and thus gained his surname. In his third consulate he completely routed the Latins at Veseris. He was truly a great man, and he showed himself as inexorable to his son as he had been indulgent to his father.

XXXII.—113. If we are to praise Regulus for fulfilling his oath, we must for the same reason condemn the ten Romans who were sent by Hannibal after the battle of Cannae to negotiate with the senate an exchange of prisoners, if they really broke the oath they had taken to return in case
of failure to the camp held by the Carthaginians. Historians, however, are not agreed as to the facts. Polybius, a high authority, tells us that nine of the ten noble envoys came back unsuccessful, and that only one remained at Rome. This man satisfied his conscience by returning to the camp just after leaving it, on the plea that he had forgotten something. He was wrong; deceit aggravates, does not undo perjury. This was only a foolish trick, a perverse imitation of prudence. The senate therefore decreed that the cunning rogue should be taken in chains to Hannibal. 114. The most important point was this: the eight thousand prisoners in the hands of Hannibal had not been taken in battle nor had they fled in fear of death but had been left in the camp by the consuls Paulus and Varro. The senate, however, refused to ransom them, though it could have been done at small expense; they wished to impress on our soldiers that they must conquer or die. Polybius adds that Hannibal's courage failed when he heard the tidings and saw that even amid disaster the Roman senate and people showed so lofty a spirit. Thus does honour triumph in the conflict with seeming expediency. 115. C. Acilius on the other hand, who wrote a history of Rome in Greek, affirms that not one but several of the prisoners returned to the camp to release themselves from their oath by
the same dishonest means and that they were branded by the censors with every mark of shame. But enough on this point. It is clear that mean and cowardly actions, such as that of Regulus would have been, if in dealing with the prisoners he had put his own interest before that of his country or preferred to remain at home, it is clear, I say, that actions that betoken a crushed and craven spirit are not expedient because they are criminal, shameful, dishonourable.

XXXIII.—116. I have still to deal with my fourth division, which comprises decorum, moderation, self-control, sobriety and temperance. Surely nothing can be expedient that is opposed to this galaxy of virtues? Yet the disciples of Aristippus who are known as the Cyrenaics and the philosophers whom we call Annicerians find in pleasure the only good and maintain that virtue is praiseworthy only because it is productive of pleasure. These philosophers are now neglected, but Epicurus, the founder and champion of a similar system, is still a living force. Against such enemies we must fight with "horse and foot," as the saying is, if we are determined to defend and maintain the honourable. 117. For if Metrodorus is right in asserting that all our interests and all our happiness may be reduced to the possession of a sound constitution and the certainty of keeping it, this sovereign expediency, as they consider it, will
assuredly be opposed to honour. Now, I ask you first, what place can prudence have in his system? Will she have to hunt for sweet things on every side? A sorry plight indeed for virtue to be the slave of pleasure! What then is to be the function of prudence? The judicious choice of pleasures? Grant that there is nothing so delightful, can we imagine anything more degrading? Again in a system which looks upon pain as the greatest evil, what room will there be for fortitude, which is but another name for indifference to pain and hardship? For though Epicurus in many passages actually speaks out rather bravely on the subject of pain, we should not think of what he says but of what it is consistent for him to say after making pleasure the greatest good, and pain the greatest evil. It would be interesting to hear him on self-command and temperance; he has indeed many scattered remarks on the subject, but, as the proverb has it, "they don't hold water". What right has he to praise temperance when he finds the highest good in pleasure? For temperance is the enemy of the passions, and the passions are hounds upon the track of pleasure. With these three virtues they manage to shuffle with considerable skill. They represent prudence as the science of providing pleasure and keeping away pain. Fortitude they despatch in a summary way, saying it is the means of despising death and enduring pain. With
temperance they have their own troubles, but they get out of the difficulty by saying there is no higher pleasure than exemption from pain. As for justice and all the social virtues, they totter or rather lie prostrate. Kindness, liberality, courtesy, even friendship, disappear if not cultivated for their own sake, but tried by the standard of pleasure or utility. Let us sum up in a few words. 119. As I have shown that expediency is worthless if opposed to honour, so I maintain that pleasure and honour are incompatible. I therefore think that Callipho and Dinomachus deserve the greater censure for supposing they could settle the controversy by coupling pleasure with honour. As well couple man and beast. Honour will not suffer such a union, she spurns and rejects it. The sovereign good, which must be simple, cannot be compounded of contradictory qualities. 120. But the question is a large one and I have discussed it at length in another place. To return to my subject, I have already shown pretty fully the means of settling possible conflicts between false expediency and honour. If it is asserted that even pleasure has some colour of expediency, I reply that it can have nothing in common with honour. If we must make some concession to pleasure, I will admit that it is perhaps a sort of seasoning to life but never that it has any real expediency.

121. The gift I now send you, dear Marcus, is,
in my opinion, a valuable one; for you its worth will depend on the spirit in which you receive it. You will at least admit these three books as guests among the notes of Cratippus. Had I not been recalled in unmistakable tones by my country when on my way to Athens, you would sometimes have heard me as well as your master. I would therefore ask you to give all the time you can to these volumes which like a messenger convey my words to you; your time is in your own hands. If I find you take pleasure in this branch of knowledge, I shall speak to you of it soon, I hope, in person; till then, in writing. Farewell, my dear son; be assured of my love: but I will love you still more if you take delight in these lessons and precepts.
A CATALOGUE OF BOOKS
AND ANNOUNCEMENTS OF
METHUEN AND COMPANY
PUBLISHERS: LONDON
36 ESSEX STREET
W.C.

CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FORTHCOMING BOOKS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POETRY</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELLES LETTRES, ANTHOLOGIES, ETC.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLUSTRATED BOOKS</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORY</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAVEL, ADVENTURE AND TOPOGRAPHY</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL AND MILITARY</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL LITERATURE</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHILOSOPHY</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEOLOGY</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FICTION</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOOKS FOR BOYS AND GIRLS</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PEACOCK LIBRARY</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIVERSITY EXTENSION SERIES</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL QUESTIONS OF TO-DAY</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSICAL TRANSLATIONS</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATIONAL BOOKS</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FEBRUARY 1899
MESSRS. METHUEN'S  
ANNOUNCEMENTS  

Travel and Adventure

THE HIGHEST ANDES. By E. A. FITZGERALD. With 40 Illustrations, 10 of which are Photogravures, and a Large Map. Royal 8vo. 30s. net.

Also, a Small Edition on Handmade Paper, limited to 50 Copies, 4to. £5. 5s.

A narrative of the highest climb yet accomplished. The illustrations have been reproduced with the greatest care, and the book, in addition to its adventurous interest, contains appendices of great scientific value.

ROUND THE WORLD ON A WHEEL. By JOHN FOSTER FRASER. With 100 Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 6s.

The narrative of a bicycle ride right round the world, which covered over 19,000 miles and occupied 774 days. The book is full of adventure and incident, and contains as much matter as the ordinary book of travel published at six times the price.

THE HEART OF ASIA. By F. H. SKRINE and E. D. ROSS. With Maps and many Illustrations. Large crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

This is an account, historical, political, economical, and descriptive of Russian Central Asia. The first part of the work contains a concise history of Turkestan, etc. from the earliest times. No such history has hitherto appeared in any European language, and many untranslated Oriental works have been put under contribution by Professor Ross. In the second part Mr. Skrine gives a complete account of Russian Central Asia, with all the latest statistics. Great attention has been paid to the production of accurate maps, and the information contained in this part of the book may be regarded as semi-official.

THROUGH ASIA. By SVEN HEDIN. With 300 Illustrations from Photographs and Sketches by the Author, and 3 Maps. Two volumes. Royal 8vo. 30s. net.

Extracts from reviews of this great book, which The Times has called 'one of the greatest books of the century,' will be found on p. 15.


Extracts from reviews of this remarkable book will be found on page 15.

THREE YEARS IN SAVAGE AFRICA. By LIONEL DECLE. With 100 Illustrations and 5 Maps. Second and cheaper Edition. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

THE CAROLINE ISLANDS. By F. W. CHRISTIAN. With many Illustrations and Maps. Large crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

This book contains a history and complete description of these islands—their physical features, fauna, flora; the habits, and religious beliefs of the inhabitants. It is the result of many years' residence among the natives, and is the only worthy work on the subject.
History and Biography

THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF SIR JOHN EVERETT MILLAIS, President of the Royal Academy. By his Son, J. G. Millais. With nearly 300 Illustrations, of which 10 are in photogravure. Two volumes. Royal 8vo. 32s. net.

A limited edition will also be printed. This will contain 22 of Millais' great paintings reproduced in photogravure, with a case containing an extra set of these Photogravures pulled on India paper. The price of this edition will be £4, 4s. net.

In these two magnificent volumes is contained the authoritative biography of the most distinguished and popular painter of the last half of the century. They contain the story of his extraordinary boyhood, of his early struggles and triumphs, of the founding of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, now first given to the world in authentic detail, of the painting of most of his famous pictures, of his friendships with many of the most distinguished men of the day in art, letters, and politics, of his home life, and of his sporting tastes. There are a large number of letters to his wife describing the circumstances under which his pictures were painted, letters from Her Majesty the Queen, Lord Beaconsfield, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Watts, Sir William Harcourt, Lord Rosebery, Lord Leighton, etc., etc. Among them are several illustrated letters from Landseer, Leech, Du Maurier, and Mike Halliday. The last letter that Lord Beaconsfield wrote before his death is reproduced in facsimile. Sir William Harcourt contributes his reminiscences of Millais, and Mr. Val Prinsep has written a long and most interesting chapter to the same purpose.

Not the least attractive and remarkable feature of this book will be the magnificence of its illustrations. No more complete representation of the art any painter has ever been produced on the same scale. The owners of Sir John Millais' most famous pictures and their copyrights have generously given their consent to their reproduction in his biography, and, in addition to those pictures with which the public is familiar, over two hundred pictures and sketches which have never been reproduced before, and which, in all probability, will never be seen again by the general public, will appear in these pages. The early chapters contain sketches made by Millais at the age of seven. There follow some exquisite drawings made by him during his Pre-Raphaelite period, a large number of sketches and studies made for his great pictures, water colour sketches, pen-and-ink sketches, and drawings, humorous and serious. There are ten portraits of Millais himself, including two by Mr. Watts and Sir Edward Burne Jones. There is a portrait of Dickens, taken after death, and a sketch of D. G. Rossetti. Thus the book will be not only a biography of high interest and an important contribution to the history of English art, but in the best sense of the word, a beautiful picture book.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE.
By EDWARD GIBBON. A New Edition, edited with Notes, Appendices, and Maps by J. B. BURY, LL.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin. In Seven Volumes. Demy 8vo, gilt top. 8s. 6d. each. Crown 8vo. 6s. each. Vol. VII.
The concluding Volume of this Edition.

EVAGRIUS. Edited by Professor LÉON PARMENTIER of Liége and M. BIDEZ of Gand. Demy 8vo. 1os. 6d. [Byzantine Texts.

THE HISTORY OF PSELLUS. By C. SATHAS. Demy 8vo. [Byzantine Texts.
A CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF ROME. By T. M. Taylor, M.A., Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, Senior Chancellor's Medallist for Classics, Porson University Scholar, etc., etc. *Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.*

An account of the origin and growth of the Roman Institutions, and a discussion of the various political movements in Rome from the earliest times to the death of Augustus.

A HISTORY OF EGYPT, FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY. Edited by W. M. Flinders Petrie, D.C.L., LL.D., Professor of Egyptology at University College. Fully Illustrated. *In Six Volumes. Crown 8vo. 6s. each.*

Vol. IV. THE EGYPT OF THE PTOLEMIKES. J. P. MAHAFFY.

Vol. V. ROMAN EGYPT. J. G. MILNE.

ANNALS OF SHREWSBURY SCHOOL. By G. W. Fisher, M.A., Assistant Master. With Numerous Illustrations. *Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.*

THE HISTORY OF THE MIDLAND RAILWAY. By Clement Stretton. With many Illustrations. *Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.* Uniform with Mr. Grinling’s 'History of the Great Northern Railway.'

A HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF CYPRUS. By John Hackett, M.A. *Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d.*

Theology


An attempt to popularise the recent additions to our knowledge of St. Paul as a missionary, a statesman and an ethical teacher.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOKS OF THE BIBLE. By W. H. Bennett, M.A., and W. F. Adeney, M.A. *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

Oxford Commentaries.

General Editor, Walter Lock, D.D., Warden of Keble College Dean Ireland’s Professor of Exegesis in the University of Oxford.

Messrs. Methuen propose to issue a series of Commentaries upon such Books of the Bible as still seem to need further explanation.

The object of each Commentary is primarily exegetical, to interpret the author's meaning to the present generation. The editors will not deal, except very subordinately, with questions of textual criticism or philology; but taking the English text in the Revised Version as their basis, they will try to combine a hearty acceptance of critical principles
with loyalty to the Catholic Faith. It is hoped that in this way the series may be of use both to theological students and to the clergy, and also to the growing number of educated laymen and laywomen who wish to read the Bible intelligently and reverently.


**The Churchman’s Bible.**

General Editor, J. H. Burn, B.D., Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Aberdeen.

Messrs. Methuen propose to issue a series of expositions upon most of the books of the Bible. The volumes will be practical and devotional rather than critical in their purpose, and the text of the authorised version will be explained in sections or paragraphs, which will correspond as far as possible with the divisions of the Church Lectionary.

The volumes will be produced in a very handy and tasteful form, and may be obtained in cloth or leather bindings.

The first volume will be:

**THE EPISTLE OF ST. PAUL TO THE GALATIANS.**

Explained by A. W. Robinson, B.D., Vicar of All Hallows, Barking. *Fcap. 8vo. 2s. Leather, 3s. net.*

**Handbooks of Theology.**

General Editor, A. Robertson, D.D., Principal of King’s College, London.

**AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE CREEDS.** By A. E. Burn, Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Lichfield. *Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.*

**The Library of Devotion.**

*Pott 8vo. Cloth 2s.; leather 2s. 6d. net.*

**NEW VOLUMES.**

A SERIOUS CALL TO A DEVOUT AND HOLY LIFE.

By William Law. Edited, with an Introduction by C. Bigg, D.D., late Student of Christ Church.

This is a reprint, word for word and line for line, of the *Editio Princeps.*


This is edited on the same scale as ‘The Christian Year.’ Dr. Lock has corrected the printed text by collating it with the ms. in the Keble College Library, and has added an Introduction, and an analysis and explanatory notes to each of the more difficult poems.
General Literature

The Arden Shakespeare.

General Editor, Edward Dowden, Litt. D.

Messrs. Methuen have in preparation an Edition of Shakespeare in single Plays. Each play will be edited with a full Introduction, Notes on the text, and a Commentary at the foot of the page.

The first volume will be:

HAMLET. Edited by Edward Dowden. Demy 8vo. 2s. 6d.

The Novels of Charles Dickens.

Crown 8vo. Each Volume, cloth 3s., leather 4s. net.

Messrs. Methuen have in preparation an edition of those novels of Charles Dickens which have now passed out of copyright. Mr. George Gissing, whose critical study of Dickens is both sympathetic and acute, has written an Introduction to each of the books, and a very attractive feature of this edition will be the illustrations of the old houses, inns, and buildings, which Dickens described, and which have now in many instances disappeared under the touch of modern civilisation. Another valuable feature will be a series of topographical notes to each book by Mr. F. G. Kitton. The books will be produced with the greatest care as to printing, paper and binding.

The first volumes will be:

THE PICKWICK PAPERS. With Illustrations by E. H. New. Two Volumes.

NICHOLAS NICKLEBY. With Illustrations by R. J. Williams. Two Volumes.

BLEAK HOUSE. With Illustrations by Beatrice Alcock. Two Volumes.

OLIVER TWIST. With Illustrations by E. H. New. Two Volumes.

The Little Library.

Pott 8vo. Each Volume, cloth 2s.; leather 2s. 6d. net.

Messrs. Methuen intend to produce a series of small books under the above title, containing some of the famous books in English and other literatures, in the domains of fiction, poetry, and belles lettres. The series will also contain several volumes of selections in prose and verse.

The books will be edited with the most sympathetic and scholarly care. Each one will contain an Introduction which will give (1) a short biography of the author, (2) a critical estimate of the book, (3) short bibliographical details. Where they are necessary, short notes will be added at the foot of the page.

The Little Library will ultimately contain complete sets of the novels of W. M. Thackeray, Jane Austen, the sisters Bronté, Mrs. Gaskell and
others. It will also contain the best work of many other novelists whose names are household words.

Each book will have a portrait or frontispiece in photogravure, and the volumes will be produced with great care in a style uniform with that of 'The Library of Devotion.'

The first volumes will be:

**A LITTLE BOOK OF ENGLISH LYRICS.**

**PRIDE AND PREJUDICE.** By **JANE AUSTEN.** With an Introduction by **E. V. LUCAS.** *Two Volumes.*

** VANITY FAIR.** By **W. M. THACKERAY.** With an Introduction by **S. GWYNN.** *Three Volumes.*

**EOTHEN.** By **A. W. KINGLAKE.** With an Introduction.

**CRANFORD.** By **MRS. GASKELL.** With an Introduction by **E. V. LUCAS.**

**JANE EYRE.** By **CHARLOTTE BRONTÉ.** With an Introduction by **R. BAYNE.** *Two Volumes.*

**The Little Guides.**

*Pott 8vo, cloth 3s.; leather 3s. 6d. net.*

**NEW VOLUME.**

**SHAKESPEARE'S COUNTRY.** By **B. C. WINDLE, M.A.** Illustrated by **E. H. NEW.**

Uniform with Mr. Wells' 'Oxford' and Mr. Thomson's 'Cambridge.'

**Fiction**

**A NEW DEPARTURE IN PUBLISHING.**

Messrs. Methuen contemplate a very interesting experiment in publishing. They are about to issue at Sixpence, under the general title of 'Methuen's Library of Fiction,' stories by some of the best known writers of the day. A few books will be reprints, but most will be new works hitherto unpublished in book form.

A considerable number of Sixpenny Editions of old books have already been issued by various publishers, but in no case has the work of an author of high repute been published in the first instance at that price. This Messrs. Methuen will attempt, and the first book thus published will be by E. W. Hornung. Mr. Robert Barr and Mr. Cuthliffe Hyne will follow, and later will be published books by Mr. Baring Gould and others. In some cases the same book will be published simultaneously both at Sixpence and at a higher price. Messrs. Methuen recognise the inevitable tendencies of an age of cheap literature. The theatre has its stalls and its pit, the railway its first and its third classes: so the novelist
may well have a double audience, and while the wealthy will still pay Six Shillings for their novels, those of limited means will be able to purchase the same book in a decent but less luxurious form.

A NEW NOVEL. By E. W. HORNUNG. *Demy 8vo. 6d.*

**JENNY BAXTER.** By Robert Barr. *Demy 8vo. 6d.*

**THE COUNTESS TEKLA.** By Robert Barr, Author of *The Mutable Many.* *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

A romance of adventure.

**THE CAPSINA.** By E. F. BENSON, Author of *Dodo.* With Illustrations by G. P. JACOMB-HOOD. *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

**THE HUMAN BOY.** By EDEN PHILPOTTS, Author of *Children of the Mist.* *Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.*

A series of studies of the English schoolboy, the result of keen observation, and of a most engaging wit.

**ANNE MAULEVERER.** By Mrs. Caffyn (Iota). Author of *The Yellow Aster.* *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

**RACHEL.** By JANE HELEN FINDLATER, Author of *The Green Graves of Balgowrie.* *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

**BETTY MUSGRAVE.** By MARY FINDLATER, Author of *Over the Hills.* *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

**THE PATH OF A STAR.** By SARA JEANETTE DUNCAN, Author of *A Voyage of Consolation.* *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

**THE AMATEUR CRACKSMAN.** By E. W. HORNUNG, Author of *Young Blood.* *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

**THE PATHS OF THE PRUDENT.** By J. S. FLETCHER, Author of *When Charles I. was King.* *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

**GILES INGILBY.** By W. E. NORRIS. *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

**ROSE A CHARLITTE.** By MARSHALL SAUNDERS. *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

A romantic story of Acadie.

**ADRIAN ROME.** By E. DOWSON and A. MOORE, Authors of *A Comedy of Masks.* *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

**THINGS THAT HAVE HAPPENED.** By DOROTHEA GERARD, Author of *Lady Baby,* *Orthodox,* etc. *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

**LONE PINE.** By R. B. TOWNSHEND. *Crown 8vo. 6s.*

A romance of Mexican life.

**TALES OF NORTHUMBRIA.** By HOWARD PEASE. *Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.*
Rudyard Kipling. BARRACK-ROOM BALLADS. By Rudyard Kipling. 47th Thousand. Crown 8vo. 6s.
'Mr. Kipling's verse is strong, vivid, full of character.... Unmistakeable genius rings in every line.'—Times.
The ballads teem with imagination, they palpitate with emotion. We read them with laughter and tears; the metres throb in our pulses, the cunningly ordered words tingle with life; and if this be not poetry, what is?'—Fall Mall Gazette.

Rudyard Kipling. THE SEVEN SEAS. By Rudyard Kipling. 41st Thousand. Cr. 8vo. Buckram, gilt top. 6s.
The new poems of Mr. Rudyard Kipling have all the spirit and swing of their predecessors. Patriotism is the solid concrete foundation on which Mr. Kipling has built the whole of his work.—Times.
The Empire has found a singer; it is no depreciation of the songs to say that statesmen may have, one way or other, to take account of them.—Manchester Guardian.
'Animated through and through with indubitable genius.'—Daily Telegraph.

"Q." POEMS AND BALLADS. By "Q." Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.
'This work has just the faint, ineffable touch and glow that make poetry.'—Speaker.


'Everywhere Mr. Mackay displays himself the master of a style marked by all the characteristics of the best rhetoric.'—Globe.

The greatest world-poem of the nineteenth century next to "Faust." It is in the same set with "Agamemnon," with "Lear," with the literature that we now instinctively regard as high and holy.'—Daily Chronicle.

"A. G." VERSES TO ORDER. By "A. G." Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. net.
'A capital specimen of light academic poetry.'—St. James's Gazette.

James Williams. VENTURES IN VERSE. By James Williams, Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.
'In matter and manner the book is admirable.'—Glasgow Herald.

J. G. Cordery. THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER. A Translation by J. G. Cordery. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
'A spirited, accurate, and scholarly piece of work.'—Glasgow Herald.
Belles Lettres, Anthologies, etc.


'A fascinating book.'—Standard.

'Full of charm and brightness.'—Spectator.

'A gift almost priceless.'—Speaker.

'Unique in Literature.'—Daily Chronicle.

G. Wyndham. THE POEMS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by GEORGE WYNDHAM, M.P. Demy 8vo. Buckram, gilt top. 10s. 6d.

This edition contains the 'Venus,' 'Lucrece,' and Sonnets, and is prefaced with an elaborate introduction of over 140 pp.

'One of the most serious contributions to Shakespearian criticism that have been published for some time.'—Times.

'A scholarly and interesting contribution to literature.'—Literature.

'We have no hesitation in describing Mr. George Wyndham's introduction as a masterly piece of criticism, and all who love our Elizabethan literature will find a very garden of delight in it.'—Spectator.

'Mr. Wyndham's notes are admirable, even indispensable.'—Westminster Gazette.

W. E. Henley. ENGLISH LYRICS. Selected and Edited by W. E. HENLEY. Crown 8vo. Buckram, gilt top. 6s.

'It is a body of choice and lovely poetry.—Birmingham Gazette.


'Quite delightful. A greater treat for those not well acquainted with pre-Restoration prose could not be imagined.'—Athenæum.


'A charming selection, which maintains a lofty standard of excellence.'—Times.


W. B. Yeats. AN ANTHOLOGY OF IRISH VERSE. Edited by W. B. YEATS. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

'An attractive and catholic selection.'—Times.

G. W. Steevens. MONOLOGUES OF THE DEAD. By G. W. STEEVENS. Foolscap 8vo. 3s. 6d.

'The effect is sometimes splendid, sometimes bizarre, but always amazingly clever.'—Pall Mall Gazette.

W. M. Dixon. A PRIMER OF TENNYSON. By W. M. DIXON, M.A. Cr. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

'Much sound and well-expressed criticism. The bibliography is a boon.'—Speaker.

W. A. Craigie. A PRIMER OF BURNS. By W. A. CRAIGIE. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

'A valuable addition to the literature of the poet.'—Times.

L. Magnus. A PRIMER OF WORDSWORTH. By LAURIE MAGNUS. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

'A valuable contribution to Wordsworthian literature.'—Literature.

Sterne. THE LIFE AND OPINIONS OF TRISTRAM SHANDY. By LAWRENCE STERNE. With an Introduction by CHARLES WHIBLEY, and a Portrait. 2 vols. 7s.

'Very dainty volumes are these: the paper, type, and light-green binding are all very agreeable to the eye.'—Globe.

Congreve. THE COMEDIES OF WILLIAM CONGREVE. With an Introduction by G. S. STREET, and a Portrait. 2 vols. 7s.

Morier. THE ADVENTURES OF HAJJI BABA OF ISPHAHAN. By JAMES MORIER. With an Introduction by E. G. Browne, M.A., and a Portrait. 2 vols. 7s.
Illustrated Books


G. D. Bedford. NURSERY RHYMES. With many Coloured Pictures by G. D. Bedford. Super Royal 8vo. 5s. ‘An excellent selection of the best known rhymes, with beautifully coloured pictures exquisitely printed.’—Pall Mall Gazette.


F. Langbridge. BALLADS OF THE BRAVE; Poems of Chivalry, Enterprise, Courage, and Constancy. Edited by Rev. F. Langbridge. Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d. School Edition. 2s. 6d. ‘A very happy conception happily carried out. These “Ballads of the Brave” are intended to suit the real tastes of boys, and will suit the taste of the great majority.’—Spectator. ‘The book is full of splendid things.’—World.


H. C. Beeching. A BOOK OF CHRISTMAS VERSE. Edited by H. C. Beeching, M.A., and Illustrated by Walter Crane. Cr. 8vo, gilt top. 3s. 6d. An anthology which, from its unity of aim and high poetic excellence, has a better right to exist than most of its fellows.’—Guardian.

History

Gibbon. THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE. By Edward Gibbon. A New Edition, Edited with Notes, Appendices, and Maps, by J. B. Bury, LL.D., Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin. In Seven Volumes. Demy 8vo. Gilt top. 8s. 6d. each. Also Cr. 8vo. 6s,
The time has certainly arrived for a new edition of Gibbon's great work. Professor Bury is the right man to undertake this task. His learning is amazing, both in extent and accuracy. The book is issued in a handy form, and at a moderate price, and it is admirably printed.—*Times*.

This edition is a marvel of erudition and critical skill, and it is the very minimum of praise to predict that the seven volumes of it will supersede Dean Milman's as the standard edition of our great historical classic.—*Glasgow Herald*.

At last there is an adequate modern edition of Gibbon. The best edition the nineteenth century could produce.—*Manchester Guardian*.

Flinders Petrie, A HISTORY OF EGYPT, FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY. Edited by W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE, D.C.L., LL.D., Professor of Egyptology at University College. *Fully Illustrated.* In Six Volumes. Cr. 8vo. 6s. each.


A history written in the spirit of scientific precision so worthily represented by Dr. Petrie and his school cannot but promote sound and accurate study; and supply a vacant place in the English literature of Egyptology.—*Times*.

Flinders Petrie, RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE IN ANCIENT EGYPT. By W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE, D.C.L., LL.D. *Fully Illustrated.* Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

The lectures will afford a fund of valuable information for students of ancient ethics.—*Manchester Guardian*.

Flinders Petrie, SYRIA AND EGYPT, FROM THE TELL EL AMARNA TABLETS. By W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE, D.C.L., LL.D. *Crown 8vo.* 2s. 6d.

A marvellous record. The addition made to our knowledge is nothing short of amazing.—*Times*.

Flinders Petrie, EGYPTIAN TALES. Edited by W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE. Illustrated by TRISTRAM ELLIS. In Two Volumes. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d. each.

Invaluable as a picture of life in Palestine and Egypt.—*Daily News*.

Flinders Petrie, EGYPTIAN DECORATIVE ART. By W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE. With 120 Illustrations. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

In these lectures he displays rare skill in elucidating the development of decorative art in Egypt.—*Times*.


The book is based throughout upon a thorough study of the original sources, and will be an indispensable aid to all students of mediaeval history.—*Athenaeum*.

The whole art of war in its historic evolution has never been treated on such an ample and comprehensive scale, and we question if any recent contribution to the exact history of the world has possessed more enduring value.—*Daily Chronicle*.


A most splendid and fascinating book on a subject of undying interest. The great feature of the book is the use the author has made of the existing portraits of the Caesars and the admirable critical subtlety he has exhibited in dealing with this line of research. It is brilliantly written, and the illustrations are supplied on a scale of profuse magnificence.—*Daily Chronicle*.

F. W. Maitland, CANON LAW IN ENGLAND. By F. W. MAITLAND, LL.D., Downing Professor of the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge. *Royal 8vo.* 7s. 6d.

Professor Maitland has put students of English law under a fresh debt. These essays are landmarks in the study of the history of Canon Law.—*Times*.

H. E. Egerton. A HISTORY OF BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY. By H. E. Egerton, M.A. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d.

'A. W. 'It is a good book, distinguished by accuracy in detail, clear arrangement of facts, and a broad grasp of principles.'—Manchester Guardian.

'... Able, impartial, clear. ... A most valuable volume.'—Athenæum.

Albert Sorel. THE EASTERN QUESTION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. By Albert Sorel, of the French Academy. Translated by F. C. Bramwell, M.A., with an Introduction by C. R. L. Fletcher, Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. With a Map. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

'The author's insight into the character and motives of the leading actors in the drama gives the work an interest uncommon in books based on similar material.'—Scotsman.


Admirably written, and crammed with interesting facts.'—Daily Mail.

'The only adequate history of a great English railway company.'—Times.

'Mr. Grinling has done for a Railway what Macaulay did for English History.'—The Engineer.

W. Sterry. ANNALS OF ETON COLLEGE. By W. Sterry, M.A. With numerous Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d.

'A treasury of quaint and interesting reading. Mr. Sterry has by his skill and vivacity given these records new life.'—Academy.

'A most attractive and admirably illustrated account.'—Daily Chronicle.

J. Sargeaunt. ANNALS OF WESTMINSTER SCHOOL. By J. Sargeaunt, M.A., Assistant Master. With numerous Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d.

A. Clark. THE COLLEGES OF OXFORD: Their History and their Traditions. By Members of the University. Edited by A. Clark, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Lincoln College. 8vo. 12s. 6d.

'A work which will be appealed to for many years as the standard book.'—Athenæum.

Perrens. THE HISTORY OF FLORENCE FROM 1434 TO 1492. By F. T. Perrens. 8vo. 12s. 6d.

A history of the domination of Cosimo, Piero, and Lorenzo de Medicis.


This book is intended for the Middle and Upper Forms of Public Schools and for Pass Students at the Universities. It contains copious Tables, etc.

'An original work written on an original plan, and with uncommon freshness and vigour.'—Speaker.

O. Browning. A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ITALY, A.D. 1250-1530. By Oscar Browning, Fellow and Tutor of King's College, Cambridge. In Two Volumes. Cr. 8vo. 5s. each.


'Mr. Browning is to be congratulated on the production of a work of immense labour and learning.'—Westminster Gazette.

O'Grady. THE STORY OF IRELAND. By Standish O'Grady, Author of 'Finn and his Companions.' Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.
Biography

'The best biography of Napoleon in our tongue, nor have the French as good a biographer of their hero. A book very nearly as good as Southey's "Life of Nelson."—Manchester Guardian.
'The main feature of this gorgeous volume is its great wealth of beautiful photogravures and finely-executed wood engravings, constituting a complete pictorial chronicle of Napoleon I.'s personal history from the days of his early childhood at Ajaccio to the date of his second interment.'—Daily Telegraph.
'Nearly all the illustrations are real contributions to history.'—Westminster Gazette.

P. H. Colomb. MEMOIRS OF ADMIRAL SIR A. COOPER KEY. By Admiral P. H. COLOMB. With a Portrait. Demy 8vo. 16s.
'An interesting and adequate biography of one who for a quarter of a century had a prominent part in the administration of the Navy. The whole book, in fact, is one of the greatest interest—peculiarly so, it may be, to the naval officer, but also to the average taxpayer and the reading public.'—Times.

Morris Fuller. THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF JOHN DAVENANT, D.D. (1571-1641), Bishop of Salisbury. By MORRIS FULLER, B.D. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.

J. M. Rigg. ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION. By J. M. RIGG. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d.
'Mr. Rigg has told the story of the life with scholarly ability, and has contributed an interesting chapter to the history of the Norman period.'—Daily Chronicle.

F. W. Joyce. THE LIFE OF SIR FREDERICK GORE OUSELEY. By F. W. JOYCE, M.A. 7s. 6d.
'This book has been undertaken in quite the right spirit, and written with sympathy, insight, and considerable literary skill.'—Times.

'No more magnificent volumes have been published for a long time.'—Times.
'It is long since we had a biography with such delights of substance and of form. Such a book is a pleasure for the day, and a joy for ever.'—Daily Chronicle.

G. Waldstein. JOHN RUSKIN, By CHARLES WALDSTEIN, M.A. With a Photogravure Portrait, Post 8vo.
5s.
'A thoughtful and well-written criticism of Ruskin's teaching.'—Daily Chronicle.

'A polished gem of biography, superior in its kind to any attempt that has been made of recent years in England. Madame Darmesteter has indeed written for English readers "The Life of Ernest Renan."—Athenaum.
'It is interpenetrated with the dignity and charm, the mild, bright, classical grace of form and treatment that Renan himself so loved; and it fulfils to the utmost the delicate and difficult achievement it sets out to accomplish.'—Academy.

W. H. Hutton. THE LIFE OF SIR THOMAS MORE. By W. H. HUTTON, M.A. With Portraits, Cr. 8vo. 5s.
The book lays good claim to high rank among our biographies. It is excellently even lovingly written.'—Scotsman.
'An excellent monograph.'—Times.
Travel, Adventure and Topography

**Sven Hedin. THROUGH ASIA.** By Sven Hedin, Gold Medallist of the Royal Geographical Society. With 300 Illustrations from Sketches and Photographs by the Author, and Maps. 2 vols. Royal 8vo. 36s. net.

One of the greatest books of the kind issued during the century. It is impossible to give an adequate idea of the richness of the contents of this book, nor of its abounding attractions as a story of travel unsurpassed in geographical and human interest. Much of it is a revelation. Altogether the work is one which in solidity, novelty, and interest must take a first rank among publications of this class. — *Times.*

In these magnificent volumes we have the most important contribution to Central Asian geography made for many years. Intensely interesting as a tale of travel. — *Spectator.*

'The whole story of the desert adventure is worthy to be added to the classics of its kind.' — *World.*

'These volumes are of absorbing and fascinating interest, their matter is wonderful, and Dr. Hedin's style is surcharged with strong and alluring personality. No romance exceeds in its intense and thrilling interest this story.' — *Birmingham Post.*

One of the most remarkable books of travel of the century.' — *Daily Chronicle.*

'Profoundly interesting. — *Academy.*

'A memorable book, gigantic of design, magnificent in execution, and without doubt one of the outstanding travel-volumes of the century.' — *Black and White.*

'Let any one who is desirous to learn about the wonderful continent of Asia as no one else can teach him, buy and read this work.' — *Vanity Fair.*

---


'The book is full of interesting matter—a tale of brave deeds simply told; abundantly illustrated with prints and maps.' — *Standard.*

'His book will take its place among the permanent literature of Arctic exploration.' — *Times.*

'It yields neither in interest nor in ability to Nansen's 'Farthest North,' while its results are no less valuable.' — *Glasgow Herald.*

'Crowded with adventures and intensely interesting' — *World.*

'An exciting and thoroughly well-arranged book.' — *St. James's Gazette.*

---

**G. S. Robertson. CHITRAL: THE STORY OF A MINOR SIEGE.** By Sir G. S. Robertson, K.C.S.I. With numerous Illustrations and a Map. Second Edition. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.

'It is difficult to imagine the kind of person who could read this brilliant book without emotion. The story remains immortal—a testimony imperishable. We are face to face with a great book.' — *Illustrated London News.*

'A book which the Elizabethans would have thought wonderful. More thrilling, more piquant, and more human than any novel.' — *Newcastle Chronicle.*

'One of the most stirring military narratives written in our time.' — *Times.*

'A masterpiece of narrative.' — *Daily Chronicle.*

'As fascinating as Sir Walter Scott's best fiction.' — *Daily Telegraph.*

'Full of dashing feats of courage as any romance.' — *Pall Mall Gazette.*

'Not since the appearance of Lord Roberts's "Forty-one Years" have we had a record of Indian warfare which can be compared with this glowing and moving story.' — *Daily Mail.*

'The enthusiastic admiration of the reader cannot fail to be aroused.' — *Morning Post.*

'A classic of frontier literature.' — *Scotsman.*

'Any one proud of his name as Englishman may read in these stirring chapters abundant justification for his pride.' — *Globe.*

'A very fascinating, a singularly delightful book.' — *Glasgow Herald.*

'A noble story, nobly told.' — *Punch.*

'Every page is quick with heroism.' — *Outlook.*

---

**H. H. Johnston. BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA.** By Sir H. H. Johnston, K.C.B. With nearly Two Hundred Illustrations, and Six

'A fascinating book, written with equal skill and charm—the work at once of a literary artist and of a man of action who is singularly wise, brave, and experienced. It abounds in admirable sketches from pencil.'—Westminster Gazette.

'A delightful book... collecting within the covers of a single volume all that is known of this part of our African domains. The voluminous appendices are of extreme value.'—Manchester Guardian.

L. Decle. THREE YEARS IN SAVAGE AFRICA. By LIONEL DECLE. With 100 Illustrations and 5 Maps. Second Edition. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

'A fine, full book.'— Pall Mall Gazette.

'Abounding in thrilling adventures.'—Daily Telegraph.

'Its bright pages give a better general survey of Africa from the Cape to the Equator than any single volume that has yet been published.'—Times.

'A delightful book.'—Academy.

'Unquestionably one of the most interesting books of travel which have recently appeared.'—Standard.

A. Hulme Beaman. TWENTY YEARS IN THE NEAR EAST. By A. HULME BEAMAN. Demy 8vo. With Portrait. 10s. 6d.

'One of the most entertaining books that we have had in our hands for a long time. It is unconventional in a high degree; it is written with sagacious humour; it is full of adventures and anecdotes.'—Daily Chronicle.

'Packed with incident and eminently readable.'—Critic.

Henri of Orleans. FROM TONKIN TO INDIA. By PRINCE HENRI OF ORLEANS. Translated by HAMLEY BENT, M.A. With 100 Illustrations and a Map. Cr. 4to, gilt top. 25s.


'A compact, faithful, most readable record of the campaign.'—Daily News.


'A straightforward account of a great deal of plucky work.'—Times.

S. L. Hinde. THE FALL OF THE CONGO ARABS. By S. L. HINDE. With Plans, etc. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d.

A. St. H. Gibbons. EXPLORATION AND HUNTING IN CENTRAL AFRICA. By Major A. ST. H. GIBBONS. With full-page Illustrations by C. WHYMPER, and Maps. Demy 8vo. 15s.

'His book is a grand record of quiet, unassuming, tactful resolution. His adventures were as various as his sporting exploits were exciting.'—Times.

E. H. Alderson. WITH THE MASHONALAND FIELD FORCE, 1896. By Lieut.-Colonel ALDERSON. With numerous Illustrations and Plans. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.

'A clear, vigorous, and soldier-like narrative.'—Scotsman.

Seymour Vandeleur. CAMPAIGNING ON THE UPPER NILE AND NIGER. By Lieut. SEYmour VANDeleur. With an Introduction by Sir G. GOLDIE, K.C.M.G. With 4 Maps, Illustrations, and Plans. Large Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.

'Upon the African question there is no book procurable which contains so much of value as this one.'—Guardian.


'An admirable book, and a really valuable treatise on frontier war.'—Athenaeum.

'A most interesting as well as a lucidly and modestly written book.'—Spectator.

'One of the most valuable contributions to our store of Imperial literature that has been published for a very long time.'—Pall Mall Gazette.

W. Crooke. THE NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES OF INDIA: THEIR ETHNOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATION. By W. Crooke. With Maps and Illustrations. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d.
'A carefully and well-written account of one of the most important provinces of the Empire. Mr. Crooke deals with the land in its physical aspect, the province under Hindoo and Mussulman rule, under British rule, its ethnology and sociology, its religious and social life, the land and its settlement, and the native peasant. The illustrations are good, and the map is excellent.'—Manchester Guardian.

A. Boisragon. THE BENIN SACRIFICES. By Captain Boisragon. Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
'If the story had been written four hundred years ago it would be read to-day as an English classic.'—Scotsman.

'Forms a valuable chapter of what has now become quite a large and important branch of antiquarian research.'—Times.

W. Kinnaird Rose. WITH THE GREEKS IN THESSALY. By W. KINNAIRD ROSE, Reuter's Correspondent, With Plans and 23 Illustrations. Crown 8vo. 6s.

W. B. Worsfold. SOUTH AFRICA. By W. B. WORSFOLD, M.A. With a Map. Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'A monumental work compressed into a very moderate compass.'—World.

Naval and Military

G. W. Steevens. NAVAL POLICY: By G. W. Steevens. Demy 8vo. 6s.
This book is a description of the British and other more important navies of the world, with a sketch of the lines on which our naval policy might possibly be developed. 'An extremely able and interesting work.'—Daily Chronicle.

'We read it from cover to cover at a sitting, and those who go to it for a lively and brisk picture of the past, with all its faults and its grandeur, will not be disappointed. The historian is endowed with literary skill and style.'—Standard.

C. Cooper King. THE STORY OF THE BRITISH ARMY. By Colonel Cooper King. Illustrated. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d.

"Admirable and well-told stories of our naval history."—*Army and Navy Gazette.*
A brave, inspiring book."—*Black and White.*

'A book which we should like to see in the hands of every boy in the country.'—*St. James's Gazette.*
'A really good book.'—*Saturday Review.*

'A brilliant essay—simple, sound, and thorough.'—*Daily Chronicle.*

'Mr. George has undertaken a very useful task—that of making military affairs intelligible and instructive to non-military readers—and has executed it with a large measure of success.'—*Times.*

---

**General Literature**

"Old Country Life," as healthy wholesome reading, full of breezy life and movement, full of quaint stories vigorously told, will not be excelled by any book to be published throughout the year. Sound, hearty, and English to the core.'—*World.*

The chapters are delightfully fresh, very informing, and lightened by many a good story. A delightful fireside companion.'—*St. James's Gazette.*

'A collection of exciting and entertaining chapters. Delightful reading.'—*Times.*


S. Baring Gould. **A GARLAND OF COUNTRY SONG:** English Folk Songs with their Traditional Melodies. Collected and arranged by S. Baring Gould and H. F. Sheppard. Demy 4to. 6s.

'A rich collection of humour, pathos, grace, and poetic fancy.'—*Saturday Review.*


'This book is an admirable record.'—*Daily Chronicle.*

V. Zenker. ANARCHISM. By E. V. Zenker. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d.

'Herr Zenker has succeeded in producing a careful and critical history of the growth of Anarchist theory. He is to be congratulated upon a really interesting work.'—Literature.


'Full of useful information with plenty of good stories.'—Truth.

'Without this book the golfer's library will be incomplete.'— Pall Mall Gazette.

'It will charm all golfers.'—Times.

J. Wells. OXFORD AND OXFORD LIFE. By Members of the University. Edited by J. Wells, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Wadham College. Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

'We congratulate Mr. Wells on the production of a readable and intelligent account of Oxford as it is at the present time, written by persons who are possessed of a close acquaintance with the system and life of the University.'—Athenaeum.

J. Wells. OXFORD AND ITS COLLEGES. By J. Wells, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Wadham College. Illustrated by E. H. New. Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 3s. Leather. 3s. 6d. net.

'An admirable and accurate little treatise, attractively illustrated.'—World.

'A luminous and tasteful little volume. —Daily Chronicle.

'Exactly what the intelligent visitor wants.'—Glasgow Herald.

A. H. Thompson. CAMBRIDGE AND ITS COLLEGES. By A. Hamilton Thompson. With Illustrations by E. H. New. Pott 8vo. 3s. Leather. 3s. 6d. net.

This book is uniform with Mr. Wells' very successful book, 'Oxford and its Colleges.'

'It is brightly written and learned, and is just such a book as a cultured visitor needs.'— Scotsman.

'A very neat and tasteful little volume, intelligently condensing all available information.'—Literature.

C. G. Robertson. VOCEs ACADEmIÆ. By C. Grant Robertson, M.A., Fellow of All Souls, Oxford. With a Frontispiece. Pott 8vo. 3s. 6d.

'Decidedly clever and amusing.'—Athenaeum.

'A clever and entertaining little book.'—Pall Mall Gazette.

Rosemary Cotes. DANTE'S GARDEN. By Rosemary Cotes. With a Frontispiece. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

'A charming collection of legends of the flowers mentioned by Dante.'—Academy.

Clifford Harrison. READING AND READERS. By Clifford Harrison. Fcp. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

'We recommend schoolmasters to examine its merits, for it is at school that readers are made.'—Academy.

'An extremely sensible little book.'—Manchester Guardian.


'An exceedingly useful handbook: a careful and well-arranged study.'—Times.


'This work should be in the possession of every musician and amateur. A concise and lucid history and a very valuable work for reference.'—Athenaeum.

E. M. Bowden. THE EXAMPLE OF BUDDHA: Being Quotations from Buddhist Literature for each Day in the Year. Compiled by E. M. Bowden. Third Edition. 8mo. 2s. 6d.
Science and Technology

Freudenreich. DAIRY BACTERIOLOGY. A Short Manual for the Use of Students. By Dr. Ed. von Freudenreich, Translated by J. R. Ainsworth Davis, M.A. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

Chalmers Mitchell. OUTLINES OF BIOLOGY. By P. Chalmers Mitchell, M.A. Illustrated. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
A text-book designed to cover the new Schedule issued by the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons.

'A work much in advance of any book in the language treating of this group of organisms. Indispensable to every student of the Myxogastres.'—Nature.

Stephenson and Suddards. ORNAMENTAL DESIGN FOR WOVEN FABRICS. By C. Stephenson, of the Technical College, Bradford, and F. Suddards, of The Yorkshire College, Leeds. With 65 full-page plates. Demy 8vo. 7s. 6d.
'The book is very ably done, displaying an intimate knowledge of principles, good taste, and the faculty of clear exposition.'—Yorkshire Post.

TEXTBOOKS OF TECHNOLOGY.
Edited by PROFESSORS GARNETT and WERTHEIMER.

HOW TO MAKE A DRESS. By J. A. E. Wood. Illustrated. Cr. 8vo. 1s. 6d.
A text-book for students preparing for the City and Guilds examination, based on the syllabus. The diagrams are numerous.
'Though primarily intended for students, Miss Wood's dainty little manual may be consulted with advantage by any girls who want to make their own frocks. The directions are simple and clear, and the diagrams very helpful.'—Literature.

CARPENTRY AND JOINERY. By F. C. Webber. With many Illustrations. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
'An admirable elementary text-book on the subject.'—Builder.

PRACTICAL MECHANICS. By SIDNEY H. WELLS. With 75 Illustrations and Diagrams. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Philosophy

'The most important contribution to English philosophy since the publication of Mr. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality."—Glasgow Herald.
'A brilliantly written volume.'—Times.

W. H. Fairbrother. THE PHILOSOPHY OF T. H. GREEN. By W. H. Fairbrother, M.A. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
'In every way an admirable book.'—Glasgow Herald.

'A clever and stimulating book.'—Manchester Guardian.

'A scholarly analysis of the religious ceremonies, beliefs, and superstitions of ancient Rome, conducted in the new light of comparative anthropology.'—Times.
Theology

S. R. Driver. SERMONS ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH THE OLD TESTAMENT. By S. R. Driver, D.D., Canon of Christ Church, Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Oxford. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
A welcome companion to the author's famous "Introduction."—Guardian.

T. K. Cheyne. FOUNDERS OF OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM. By T. K. Cheyne, D.D., Oriel Professor at Oxford. Large Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
A historical sketch of O. T. Criticism.

H. Rashdall. DOCTRINE AND DEVELOPMENT. By Hastings Rashdall, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
An attempt to translate into the language of modern thought some of the leading ideas of Christian Theology and Ethics.—Scotsman.

H. H. Henson. APOSTOLIC CHRISTIANITY: As Illustrated by the Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians. By H. H. Henson, M.A., Fellow of All Souls', Oxford. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
A worthy contribution towards some solution of the great religious problems of the present day.—Scotsman.

H. H. Henson. DISCIPLINE AND LAW. By H. Hensley Henson, B.D., Fellow of All Souls', Oxford. Fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
An admirable little volume of Lent addresses.—Guardian.

H. H. Henson. LIGHT AND LEAVEN: HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL SERMONS. By H. H. Henson, M.A. Crown 8vo. 6s.
They are always reasonable as well as vigorous.—Scotsman.

The work of an honest, fearless, and sound critic, and an excellent guide in a small compass to the books of the Bible.—Manchester Guardian.

A volume of sermons preached before the University of Cambridge by various preachers, including the late Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop Westcott.

William Harrison. CLOVELLY SERMONS. By William Harrison, M.A., late Rector of Clovelly. With a Preface by 'Lucas Malet.' CR. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
A volume of Sermons by a son-in-law of Charles Kingsley.

Cecilia Robinson. THE MINISTRY OF DEACONESSES. By Deaconness Cecilia Robinson. With an Introduction by the Lord Bishop of Winchester. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
A learned and interesting book, combining with no ordinary skill the authority of learned research with the practical utility of a descriptive manual.—Scotsman.

E. B. Layard. RELIGION IN BOYHOOD. Notes on the Religious Training of Boys. By E. B. Layard, M.A. 18mo. 1s.

W. Yorke Fausset. THE DE CATECHIZANDIS RUDIBUS OF ST. AUGUSTINE. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, etc., by W. Yorke Fausset, M.A. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d.

A small volume of devotions at the Holy Communion, especially adapted to the needs of servers and those who do not communicate.
À Kempis. THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. By THOMAS À KEMPIS. With an Introduction by DEAN FARRAR. Illustrated by C. M. GERE, and printed in black and red. Second Edition. Pcp. 8vo. Huck-ram. 35. 6d. Padded morocco. 5s. 'Amongst all the innumerable English editions of the "Imitation," there can have been few which were prettier than this one, printed in strong and handsome type, with all the glory of red initials.'—Glasgow Herald.

J. Keble. THE CHRISTIAN YEAR. By JOHN KEBLE. With an Introduction and Notes by W. LOCK, D.D., Warden of Keble College, Ireland Professor at Oxford. Illus- by R. ANNING BELL. Second Edition. Peap. 8vo. Buck-ram. 35. 6d. Padded morocco. 5s. 'The present edition is annotated with all the care and insight to be expected from Mr. Lock. The progress and circumstances of its composition are detailed in the Introduction. There is an interesting Appendix on the mss. of the "Christian Year," and another giving the order in which the poems were written. A "Short Analysis of the Thought" is prefixed to each, and any difficulty in the text is explained in a note.'—Guardian.

Handbooks of Theology.

General Editor, A. ROBERTSON, D.D., Principal of King's College, London.

THE XXXIX. ARTICLES OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND. Edited with an Introduction by E. C. S. GIBSON, D.D., Vicar of Leeds, late Principal of Wells Theological College. Second and Cheaper Edition in One Volume. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. 'Dr. Gibson is a master of clear and orderly exposition. And he has in a high degree a quality very necessary, but rarely found, in commentators on this topic, that of absolute fairness. His book is pre-eminently honest.'—Times.

'We welcome with the utmost satisfaction a new, cheaper, and more convenient edition of Dr. Gibson's book. It was greatly wanted. Dr. Gibson has given theological students just what they want, and we should like to think that it was in the hands of every candidate for orders.'—Guardian.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF RELIGION. By F. B. JEVONS, M.A., Litt.D., Prin- cipal of Bishop Hatfield's Hall. Demy 8vo. 10s. 6d. 'Dr. Jevons has written a notable work, which we can strongly recommend to the serious attention of theologians and anthropologists.'—Manchester Guar- dian.

'The merit of this book lies in the penetration, the singular acuteness and force of the author's judgment. He is at once critical and luminous, at once just and suggestive. A comprehensive and thorough book.'—Birmingham Post.


'A clear and remarkably full account of the main currents of speculation. Scholarly precision ... genuine tolerance ... intense interest in his subject—are Mr. Ottley's merits.'—Guardian.

The Churchman's Library.

Edited by J. H. BURN, B.D.

THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH CHRISTIANITY. By W. E. COL- LINS, M.A., Professor of Ecclesiastical History at King's College, London. With Map. Cr. 8vo. 3s. 6d. An investigation in detail, based upon original authorities, of the beginnings of the English Church, with a careful account of earlier Celtic Christianity. 'An excellent example of thorough and fresh historical work.'—Guardian.

SOME NEW TESTAMENT PRO- BLEMS. By ARTHUR WRIGHT, Fellow of Queen's College, Cam- bridge. Crown 8vo. 6s.

'The translation is an excellent piece of English, and the introduction is a masterly exposition. We augur well of a series which begins so satisfactorily.'—Times.


'The volume is very prettily bound and printed, and may fairly claim to be an advance on any previous editions.'—Guardian.

THE IMITATION OF CHRIST. A Revised Translation, with an Introduction, by C. Bigg, D.D., late Student of Christ Church.

A practically new translation of this book, which the reader has, almost for the first time, exactly in the shape in which it left the hands of the author.

'The text is at once scholarly in its faithful reproduction in English of the sonorous Church Latin in which the original is composed, and popular.'—Scotsman.

'A beautiful and scholarly production.'—Speaker.

'A nearer approach to the original than has yet existed in English.'—Academy.


'It is probably the best book of its kind. It deserves high commendation.'—Church Gazette.

Leaders of Religion

Edited by H. C. Beeching, M.A. With Portraits, Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

A series of short biographies of the most prominent leaders of religious life and thought of all ages and countries.

The following are ready—

CARDINAL NEWMAN By R. H. Hutton.
JOHN WESLEY. By J. H. Over-ton, M.A.
BISHOP WILBERFORCE. By G. W. Daniell, M.A.
CARDINAL MANNING. By A. W. Hutton, M.A.
CHARLES SIMEON. By H. C. G. Moule, D.D.

JOHN KEBLE. By Walter Lock, D.D.
THOMAS CHALMERS. By Mrs. Oliphant.
LANCELOT ANDREWES. By R. L. Ottley, M.A.
AUGUSTINE OF CANTERBURY. By E. L. Cutts, D.D.
WILLIAM LAUD. By W. H. Hutton, B.D.
JOHN KNOX. By F. MacCunn.
JOHN HOWE. By R. F. Horton, D.D.
BISHOP KEN. By F. A. Clarke, M.A.

GEORGE FOX, THE QUAKER. By T. Hodgkin, D.C.L.
JOHN DONNE. By Augustus Jessopp, D.D.
THOMAS CRANMER. By A. J. Mason.

Other volumes will be announced in due course.

**Fiction**

**SIX SHILLING NOVELS**

Marie Corelli's Novels

*Large crown 8vo. 6s. each.*

A ROMANCE OF TWO WORLDS. *Eighteenth Edition.*
VENDETTA. *Fourteenth Edition.*
THELMA. *Twentieth Edition.*
THE SOUL OF LILITH. *Ninth Edition.*
WORMWOOD. *Eighth Edition.*

'The tender reverence of the treatment and the imaginative beauty of the writing have reconciled us to the daring of the conception, and the conviction is forced on us that even so exalted a subject cannot be made too familiar to us, provided it be presented in the true spirit of Christian faith. The amplifications of the Scripture narrative are often conceived with high poetical insight, and this "Dream of the World's Tragedy" is a lofty and not inadequate paraphrase of the supreme climax of the inspired narrative.—*Dublin Review.*


'A very powerful piece of work. . . . The conception is magnificent, and is likely to win an abiding place within the memory of man. . . . The author has immense command of language, and a limitless audacity. . . . This interesting and remarkable romance will live long after much of the ephemeral literature of the day is forgotten. . . . A literary phenomenon . . . novel, and even sublime.'—W. T. Stead in the *Review of Reviews.*

**Anthony Hope’s Novels**

*Crown 8vo. 6s. each.*


'A very remarkable book, deserving of critical analysis impossible within our limit; brilliant, but not superficial; well considered, but not elaborated: constructed with the proverbial art that conceals, but yet allows itself to be enjoyed by readers to whom fine literary method is a keen pleasure.'—*The World.*

A CHANGE OF AIR. *Fifth Edition.*

'A graceful, vivacious comedy, true to human nature. The characters are traced with a masterly hand.'—*Times.*

A MAN OF MARK. *Fourth Edition.*

'Of all Mr. Hope's books, "A Man of Mark" is the one which best compares with "The Prisoner of Zenda."'—National Observer.


'It is a perfectly enchanting story of love and chivalry, and pure romance. The Count is the most constant, desperate, and modest and tender of lovers, a peerless gentleman, an intrepid fighter, a faithful friend, and a magnanimous foe.'—*Guardian.*


'The tale is thoroughly fresh, quick with vitality, stirring the blood.'—*St. James's Gazette.*
A story of adventure, every page of which is palpitating with action."—Spectator.

"From cover to cover "Phroso" not only engages the attention, but carries the reader in little whirls of delight from adventure to adventure."—Academy.

""Simon Dale" is one of the best historical romances that have been written for a long while."—St. James's Gazette.

"A brilliant novel. The story is rapid and most excellently told. As for the hero, he is a perfect hero of romance "—Athenaum.

"There is searching analysis of human nature, with a most ingeniously constructed plot. Mr. Hope has drawn the contrasts of his women with marvellous subtlety and delicacy."—Times.

Gilbert Parker's Novels
Crown Svo. 6s. each.

PIERRE AND HIS PEOPLE.
Fifth Edition.
"Stories happily conceived and finely executed. There is strength and genius in Mr. Parker's style."—Daily Telegraph.

"A splendid study of character."—Athenaum.

"But little behind anything that has been done by any writer of our time."—Pall Mall Gazette.

"A very striking and admirable novel."—St. James's Gazette.

THE TRANSLATION OF A SAVAGE.
The plot is original and one difficult to work out; but Mr. Parker has done it with great skill and delicacy. The reader who is not interested in this original, fresh, and well-told tale must be a dull person indeed."—Daily Chronicle.

"A rousing and dramatic tale. A book like this, in which swords flash, great surprises are undertaken, and daring deeds done, in which men and women live and love in the old passionate way, is a joy inexpressible."—Daily Chronicle.

"Here we find romance—real, breathing, living romance. The character of Valmond is drawn unerringly. The book must be read, we may say re-read, for any one thoroughly to appreciate Mr. Parker's delicate touch and innate sympathy with humanity."—Pall Mall Gazette.

"The present book is full of fine and moving stories of the great North, and it will add to Mr. Parker's already high reputation."—Glasgow Herald.

"The best thing he has done; one of the best things that any one has done lately."—St. James's Gazette.

"Mr. Parker seems to become stronger and easier with every serious novel that he attempts. He shows the matured power which his former novels have led us to expect, and has produced a really fine historical novel."—Athenaum.


"One of the strongest stories of historical interest and adventure that we have read for many a day. . . . A notable and successful book."—Spectator.

THE POMP OF THE LAVILETTES. Second Edition. 3s. 6d.
"Living, breathing romance, genuine and unforced pathos, and a deeper and more subtle knowledge of human nature than Mr. Parker has ever displayed before. It is, in a word, the work of a true artist."—Pall Mall Gazette.

"Mr. Gilbert Parker has a master's hand in weaving the threads of romantic fiction. There is scarcely a single character which does not convince us."—Daily Chronicle.

"Such a splendid story, so splendidly told, will be read with avidity, and will add new honour even to Mr. Parker's reputation."—St. James's Gazette.
No one who takes a pleasure in literature but will read Mr. Gilbert Parker's latest romance with keen enjoyment. The mere writing is so good as to be a delight in itself, apart altogether from the interest of the tale."—Pall Mall Gazette.

'Nothing more vigorous or more human has come from Mr. Gilbert Parker than this novel. It has all the graphic power of his last book, with truer feeling for the romance, both of human life and wild nature. There is no character without its unique and picturesque interest. Mr. Parker's style, especially his descriptive style, has in this book, perhaps even more than elsewhere, aptness and vitality.'—Literature.

S. Baring Gould's Novels

Crown 8vo. 6s. each.

'To say that a book is by the author of "Mehalah" is to imply that it contains a story cast on strong lines, containing dramatic possibilities, vivid and sympathetic descriptions of Nature, and a wealth of ingenious imagery.'—Speaker.

'That whatever Mr. Baring Gould writes is well worth reading, is a conclusion that may be very generally accepted. His views of life are fresh and vigorous, his language pointed and characteristic, the incidents of which he makes use are striking and original, his characters are life-like, and though somewhat exceptional people, are drawn and coloured with artistic force. Add to this that his descriptions of scenes and scenery are painted with the loving eyes and skilful hands of a master of his art, that he is always fresh and never dull, and it is no wonder that readers have gained confidence in his power of amusing and satisfying them, and that year by year his popularity widens.'—Court Circular.

ARMINELL. Fourth Edition.
URITH. Fifth Edition.
KITTY ALONE. Fifth Edition.


'The book is far and away the best view that has been vouchsafed us behind the scenes of the consulting-room.'—Illustrated London News.


'A book of which we have read every word for the sheer pleasure of reading, and which we put down with a pang.'—Westminster Gazette.


Lucas Malet. THE CARISSIMA. By Lucas Malet, Author of 'The
Wages of Sin,' etc. Third Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s.

George Gissing. THE TOWN TRAVELLER. By GEORGE GISSING, Author of 'Demos,' 'In the Year of Jubilee,' etc. Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.

‘Not only a story with a happy ending, but one which is in the main suffused with cheerfulness, and occasionally mounts to the plane of positive hilarity.’—Spectator.

‘An admirable novel.’—Truth.

‘It is a bright and witty book above all things. Polly Sparkes is a splendid bit of work. A book which contains Polly, the glorious row in the lodging-house, and such a brisk plot, moving so smartly, lightly, and easily, will not detract from Mr. Gissing’s reputation.’—Pall Mall Gazette.

‘The spirit of Dickens is in it; his delight in good nature, his understanding of the feelings.’—Bookman.


‘Full of gallantry and pathos, of the clash of arms, and brightened by episodes of humour and love...’—Westminster Gazette.

S. R. Crockett. THE STANDARD BEARER. By S. R. Crockett. Crown 8vo. 6s.

‘A delightful tale in his best style.’—Speaker.

‘Mr. Crockett at his best.’—Literature.

‘Enjoyable and of absorbing interest.’—Scotsman.

Arthur Morrison. TALES OF MEAN STREETS. By ARTHUR MORRISON. Fifth Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.

‘Told with consummate art and extraordinary detail. In the true humanity of the book lies its justification, the permanence of its interest, and its indubitable triumph.’—Athenæum.

‘A great book. The author’s method is amazingly effective, and produces a thrilling sense of reality. The writer lays upon us a master hand. The book is simply appalling and irresistible in its interest. It is humorous also; without humour it would not make the mark it is certain to make.’—World.


‘The book is a masterpiece.’—Pall Mall Gazette.

‘Told with great vigour and powerful simplicity.’—Athenæum.


‘The story is a very beautiful one, exquisitely told.’—Speaker.

Emily Lawless. HURRISH. By the Honble. EMILY LAWLESS. Author of 'Maelcho,' etc. Fifth Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.


‘There is no keener pleasure in life than the recognition of genius. A piece of work of the first order, which we do not hesitate to describe as one of the most remarkable literary achievements of this generation.’—Manchester Guardian.

Emily Lawless. TRAITS AND CONFIDENCES. By the Honble. EMILY LAWLESS. Crown 8vo. 6s.

‘A very charming little volume. A book which cannot be read without pleasure and profit, written in excellent English, full of delicate spirit, and a keen appreciation of nature, human and inanimate.’—Pall Mall Gazette.


‘Vivid and singularly real.’—Scotsman.

Jane Barlow. FROM THE EAST UNTO THE WEST. By JANE BARLOW, Author of 'Irish Idylls.' etc. Crown 8vo. 6s.

‘The genial humour and never-failing sympathy recommend the book to those who like healthy fiction.’—Scotsman.

J. H. Findlater. THE GREEN GRAVES OF BALGOWRIE. By

'A powerful and vivid story.'—*Standard.*

'A beautiful story, sad and strange as truth itself.'—*Vanity Fair.*

'A very charming and pathetic tale.'—*Pall Mall Gazette.*

'A singularly original, clever, and beautiful story.'—*Guardian.*

'Reveals to us a new writer of undoubted faculty and reserve force.'—*Spectator.*

'An exquisite idyll, delicate, affecting, and beautiful.'—*Black and White.*

J. H. FINDLATER. *A DAUGHTER OF STRIFE. By JANE HELEN FINDLATER. Crown 8vo. 6s.*

'A story of strong human interest.'—*Scotsman.*

'Her thought has solidity and maturity.'—*Daily Mail.*

Mary Findlater. *OVER THE HILLS. By MARY FINDLATER. Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.*

'A strong and fascinating piece of work.'—*Scotsman.*

'A charming romance, and full of incident. The book is fresh and strong.'—*Speaker.*

'Will make the author's name loved in many a household.'—*Literary World.*

'A strong and wise book of deep insight and unflinching truth.'—*Birmingham Post.*


'Of breathless interest.'—*British Weekly.*

' Weird, thrilling, strikingly graphic.'—*Punch.*

'This fine romance of dogs and men.'—*Outlook.*

'We admire this book extremely for its originality, for its virile and expressive English, above all for its grit. The book is to our mind the most powerful of its class that we have read. It is one to read with admiration and to praise with enthusiasm.'—*Bookman.*

'It is a fine, open-air, blood-stirring book, to be enjoyed by every man and woman to whom a dog is dear.'—*Literature.*


'Mrs. Croker excels in the admirably simple, easy, and direct flow of her narrative, the briskness of her dialogue, and the geniality of her portraiture.'—*Spectator.*

All the characters, indeed, are drawn with clearness and certainty; and it would be hard to name any quality essential to first-class work which is lacking from this book.'—*Saturday Review.*


'They are the impressions of a very striking imagination, which, it would seem, has a great deal within its reach.'—*Saturday Review.*


' Weird and mysterious, they seem to hold the reader as by a magic spell.'—*Scotsman.*

'No volume has appeared for a long time so likely to give equal pleasure to the simplest reader and to the most fastidious critic.'—*Academy.*


'Humour, pure and spontaneous and irresistible.'—*Daily Mail.*

'A most delightfully bright book.'—*Daily Telegraph.*

'Eminently amusing and entertaining.'—*Outlook.*

'The dialogue is full of wit.'—*Globe.*

'Laughter lurks in every page.'—*Daily News.*

C. F. Keary. *THE JOURNALIST. By C. F. KEARY. Cr. 8vo. 6s.*

'An excellently written story, told with a sobriety and restrained force which are worthy of all praise.'—*Standard.*

'It is rare indeed to find such poetical sympathy with Nature joined to close study of character and singularly truthful dialogue: but then “The Journalist” is altogether a rare book.'—*Athenaum.*

'Full of intellectual vigour.'—*St. James's Gazette.*


'A delightfully witty sketch of society.'—*Spectator.*

'A perpetual feast of epigram and paradox.'—*Speaker.*

'An excellent piece of romantic literature; a very graceful and moving story. We are struck with the close observation of life in Greece.'—Saturday Review.

'Full of fire, earnestness, and beauty.'—The World.

'An original and vigorous historical romance.'—Morning Post.

Mrs. Oliphant. SIR ROBERT'S FORTUNE. By Mrs. OLIPHANT. Crown 8vo. 6s.

'Full of her own peculiar charm of style and character-painting.'—Pall Mall Gazette.


'An intellectually satisfactory and morally bracing novel.'—Daily Telegraph.


'An intellectually satisfactory and morally bracing novel.'—Daily Telegraph.


'Mr. Norris has drawn a really fine character in the Duke.'—Athenaum.


'A budget of good fiction of which no one will tire.'—Scotsman.

W. E. Norris. CLARISMA FURIOUSA. By W. E. NORTHERN. Cr. 8vo. 6s.

'As a story it is admirable, as a jeu d'esprit it is capital, as a lay sermon studded with gems of wit and wisdom it is a model.'—The World.


Robert Barr. IN THE MIDST OF ALARMS. By ROBERT BARR. Third Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.

'A book which has abundantly satisfied us by it's capital humour.'—Daily Chronicle.

'Mr. Barr has achieved a triumph.'—Pall Mall Gazette.


'Very much the best novel that Mr. Barr has yet given us. There is much insight in it, and much excellent humour.'—Daily Chronicle.

Andrew Balfour. BY STROKE OF SWORD. By ANDREW BALFOUR. Illustrated by W. CUBITT COOKE. Fourth Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.

'A banquet of good things.'—Academy.

'A recital of thrilling interest, told with unflagging vigour.'—Globe.

'An unusually excellent example of a semi-historic romance.'—World.

Andrew Balfour. TO ARMS! By ANDREW BALFOUR, Author of 'By Stroke of Sword.' Illustrated. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 6s.

'The marvellous perils through which Allan passes are told in powerful and lively fashion.'—Pall Mall Gazette.

'A fine story finely told.'—Vanity Fair.


'An unquestionably interesting book. It contains one character, at least, who has in him the root of immortality.'—Pall Mall Gazette.

J. Maclaren Cobban. WILT THOU HAVE THIS WOMAN? By J. MACLAREN COBBAN, Author of 'The King of Andaman.' Cr. 8vo. 6s.

J. Maclaren Cobban. THE ANGEL OF THE COVENANT. By J. MACLAREN COBBAN. Cr. 8vo. 6s.

'Mr. Cobban has achieved a work of such rare distinction that there is nothing comparable with it in recent Scottish romance. It is a great historical picture, in which fact and fancy are welded together in a fine realisation of the spirit of the times.'—Pall Mall Gazette.
R. N. Stephens. AN ENEMY TO THE KING. By R. N. STEPHENS. Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'It is full of movement, and the movement is always buoyant.'—Scotsman.
'A stirring story with plenty of movement.'—Black and White.

M. E. Francis. MISS ERIN. By M. E. FRANCIS, Author of 'In a Northern Village.' Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'A clever and charming story.'—Scotsman.
'Perfectly delightful.'—Daily Mail.
'An excellently fancied love tale.'—Athenæum.

Robert Hitchens. BYEWAYS. By ROBERT HITCHENS, Author of 'Flames, etc.' Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'A very high artistic instinct and striking command of language raise Mr. Hitchens' work far above the rest.'—Pall Mall Gazette.
'The work is undeniably that of a man of striking imagination.'—Daily News.

Percy White. A PASSIONATE PILGRIM. By PERCY WHITE, Author of 'Mr. Bailey-Martin.' Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'A work which it is not hyperbole to describe as of rare excellence.'—Pall Mall Gazette.
'The clever book of a shrewd and clever author.'—Athenæum.

Mrs. Alan Brodrick. ANANIAS. By the Hon. MRS. ALAN BRODRICK. Crown 8vo. 6s.

Mrs. Orpen. CORRAGEEN IN '98. By MRS. ORPEN. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'An admirable piece of literary work.'—Scotsman.
'A vivid picture of the terrible times of 1798.'—Lloyd's.
'An able story, well worth reading, and evidently the work of a careful and thoughtful writer.'—Scotsman.

J. Keighley Snowden. THE PLUNDER PIT. By J. KEIGHLEY SNOWDEN. Crown 8vo. 6s.
'As original in style and plot as in its title.'—Truth.

W. Pett Ridge. SECRETARY TO BAYNE, M.P. By W. PETT RIDGE. Crown 8vo. 6s.
'Sparkling, vivacious, adventurous.—St. James's Gazette.
'Ingenious, amusing, and especially smart.'—World.

J. S. Fletcher. THE BUILDERS. By J. S. FLETCHER, Author of 'When Charles I. was King.' Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'Replete with delightful descriptions.'—Vanity Fair.
'The background of country life has never been sketched more realistically.'—World.

J. B. Burton. IN THE DAY OF ADVERSITY. By J. BLOUNDELLE-BURTON. Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'Unusually interesting and full of highly dramatic situations.'—Guardian.

'A fine, manly, spirited piece of work.'—World.

J. B. Burton. THE CLASH OF ARMS. By J. BLOUNDELLE-BURTON. Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'A brave story—brave in deed, brave in word, brave in thought.'—St. James's Gazette.

J. B. Burton. ACROSS THE SALT SEAS. By J. BLOUNDELLE-BURTON. Crown 8vo. 6s.
'The very essence of the true romantic spirit.'—Truth.
'An ingenious and exciting story.'—Manchester Guardian.
'Singularly well written.'—Athenæum.

R. Murray Gilchrist. WILLOW-BRAKE. By R. MURRAY GILCHRIST. Crown 8vo. 6s.
'Full of the fragrance of village life.'—Academy.
'Good and interesting throughout.'—Guardian.
'It is a singularly pleasing and eminently wholesome volume, with a decidedly charming note of pathos at various points.'—Athenæum.

W. C. Scully. THE WHITE HECATOMB. By W. C. SCULLY, Author of 'Kafir Stories.' Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'Reveals a marvellously intimate understanding of the Kafir mind.'—African Critic.

W. C. Scully. BETWEEN SUN AND SAND. By W. C. SCULLY,
Author of 'The White Hecatomb.'
Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'The style is generally admirable, the dialogue not seldom brilliant, the situations surprising in their freshness and originality.'—Saturday Review.

M. M. Dowie. THE CROOK OF THE BOUGH. By MÉNIE MURIEL DOWIE. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'An exceptionally clever and well-written book.'—Daily Telegraph.
'An excellent story with shrewd humour and bright writing. The author is delightfully witty.'—Pall Mall Gazette.
'Strong, suggestive, and witty.'—Daily News.

Julian Corbett. A BUSINESS IN GREAT WATERS. By JULIAN CORBETT. Second Edition. Cr. 8vo. 6s.

L. Cope Cornford. CAPTAIN JACOBUS: A ROMANCE OF THE ROAD. By L.COPE CORNFORD. Illustrated. Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'An exceptionally good story of adventure and character.'—World.

L. Cope Cornford. SONS OF ADVERSITY. By L. COPE CORNFORD, Author of 'Captain Jacobus.' Cr. 8vo. 6s.
'A very stirring and spirited sketch of the spacious times of Queen Elizabeth.'—Pall Mall Gazette.
'Packed with incident.'—Outlook.

OTHER SIX-SHILLING NOVELS
Crown 8vo.

THE KING OF ALBERIA. By LAURA DAMTREY.
THE DAUGHTER OF ALOUETTE. By MARY A. OWEN.
CHILDREN OF THIS WORLD. By ELLEN F. PINSENT.
AN ELECTRIC SPARK. By G. MANVILLE FENN.
UNDER SHADOW OF THE MISSION. By L. S. McChesney.
THE SPECULATORS. By J. F. BREWER.
THE SPIRIT OF STORM. By RONALD ROSS.
THE QUEENSBERBY CUP. By CLIVE P. WOLLEY.

A HOME IN INVERESK. By T. L. PATON.
MISS ARMSTRONG'S AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES. By JOHN DAVIDSON.
DR. CONGALTON'S LEGACY. By HENRY JOHNSTON.
TIME AND THE WOMAN. By RICHARD PRYCE.
THIS MAN'S DOMINION. By the Author of 'A High Little World.'
DIogenes of London. By H. B. MARRIOTT WATSON.
THE STONE DRAGON. By MURRAY GILCHRIST.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A VICAR'S WIFE</th>
<th>BY EVELYN DICKINSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE SINGER OF MARLY</td>
<td>BY I. M. BOOTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN THE GREAT DEEP</td>
<td>BY J. A. BOLTON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE FALL OF THE SPARROW</td>
<td>BY J. M. WARDLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A CAVALIER'S LADY</td>
<td>BY MRS. DICKER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE PRODIGALS</td>
<td>BY MRS. OLIPHANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A HANDFUL OF EXOTICS</td>
<td>BY S. GORDON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN OD FROM</td>
<td>BY MRS. OLIPHANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A MAN WITH BLACK EYELASHES</td>
<td>BY H. A. KENNEDY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SQUARE OF WANDLES</td>
<td>BY H. WORLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE(reordered)</td>
<td>BY MRS. OLIPHANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A CAVALIER'S LADY</td>
<td>BY MRS. OLIPHANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE MOVING FINGER</td>
<td>BY MRS. OLIPHANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE KLOOF BRIDE</td>
<td>BY R. E. THOMSON, A. B.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Books for Boys and Girls

A Series of Books by well-known Authors, well illustrated.

THREE-AND-SIXPENCE EACH

THE ICELANDER'S SWORD. By S. Baring Gould.
TWO LITTLE CHILDREN AND CHING. By Edith E. Cuthell.
ONLY A GUARD-ROOM DOG. By Edith E. Cuthell.
MASTER ROCKAFELLAR'S VOYAGE. By W. Clark Russell.

THE DOCTOR OF THE JULIET. By Harry Collingwood.
ADVENTURES IN WALLYPUG LAND. By G. E. Farrow. 5s.

The Peacock Library

A Series of Books for Girls by well-known Authors, handsomely bound, and well illustrated.

THREE-AND-SIXPENCE EACH

A PINCH OF EXPERIENCE. By L. B. Walford.
THE RED GRANGE. By Mrs. Molesworth.
THE SECRET OF MADAME DE MONLUC. By the Author of 'Mdle. Mori.'
OUT OF THE FASHION. By L. T. Meade.
IZATION. By L. T. Meade.

A GIRL OF THE PEOPLE. By L. T. Meade.
HEPSY GIPSY. By L. T. Meade.
2s. 6d.
THE HONORABLE MISS. By L. T. Meade.
MY LAND OF BEULAH. By Mrs. Leith Adams.
University Extension Series

A series of books on historical, literary, and scientific subjects, suitable for extension students and home-reading circles. Each volume is complete in itself, and the subjects are treated by competent writers in a broad and philosophic spirit.

Edited by J. E. SYMES, M.A.,
Principal of University College, Nottingham.

*Crown 8vo. Price (with some exceptions) 2s. 6d.*

The following volumes are ready:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PROBLEMS OF POVERTY: An Inquiry into the Industrial Conditions of the Poor</td>
<td>J. A. Hobson, M.A.</td>
<td>Published by Methuen, Third Edition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTORIAN POETS</td>
<td>A. Sharp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE FRENCH REVOLUTION</td>
<td>J. E. Symes, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE EVOLUTION OF PLANT LIFE: Lower Forms</td>
<td>G. Massee</td>
<td>Illustrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR AND WATER</td>
<td>V. B. Lewes, M.A.</td>
<td>Illustrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE CHEMISTRY OF LIFE AND HEALTH</td>
<td>C. W. Kimmins, M.A.</td>
<td>Illustrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE MECHANICS OF DAILY LIFE</td>
<td>V. P. Sells, M.A.</td>
<td>Illustrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGLISH SOCIAL REFORMERS</td>
<td>H. de B. Gibbins, D.Litt., M.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGLISH TRADE AND FINANCE IN THE SEVENTeenth CENTURY</td>
<td>W. A. S. Hewins, B.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE CHEMISTRY OF FIRE</td>
<td>M. M. Pattison Muir, M.A.</td>
<td>Illustrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE VAULT OF HEAVEN</td>
<td>R. A. Gregory</td>
<td>With numerous Illustrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A MANUAL OF ELECTRICAL SCIENCE</td>
<td>G. J. Burch, M.A.</td>
<td>With numerous Illustrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE EARTH</td>
<td>Evan Small</td>
<td>Illustrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSECT LIFE</td>
<td>W. F. Theobald, M.A.</td>
<td>Illustrated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGLISH POETRY FROM BLAKE TO BROWNING</td>
<td>W. M. Dixon, M.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>E. Jenks, M.A., Professor of Law at University College, Liverpool.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE GREEK VIEW OF LIFE</td>
<td>G. L. Dickinson</td>
<td>Fellow of King's College, Cambridge.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Social Questions of To-day
Edited by H. De B. Gibbins, D.Litt., M.A.

Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

A series of volumes upon those topics of social, economic, and industrial interest that are at the present moment foremost in the public mind. Each volume of the series is written by an author who is an acknowledged authority upon the subject with which he deals.

The following Volumes of the Series are ready:

MUTUAL THRIFT. By Rev. J. Frome Wilkinson, M.A.
THE ALIEN INVASION. By W. H. Wilkins, B.A.
THE RURAL EXODUS. By P. Anderson Graham.
LAND NATIONALIZATION. By Harold Cox, B.A.
TRUSTS, POOLS AND CORNERS. By J. Stephen Jeans.
THE FACTORY SYSTEM. By R. W. Cooke-Taylor.

The State and Its Children. By Gertrude Tuckwell.
Women's Work. By Lady Dilke, Miss Bulley, and Miss Whitley.
Socialism and Modern Thought. By M. Kaufmann.
The Housing of the Working Classes. By E. Bowmaker.
The Problem of the Unemployed. By J. A. Hobson, B.A.
Workhouses and Pauperism. By Louisa Twining.
University and Social Settlements. By W. Reason, M.A.

Classical Translations

Edited by H. F. Fox, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Brasenose College, Oxford.

Aeschylus—Agamemnon, Choephoroe, Eumenides. Translated by Lewis Campbell, LL.D., late Professor of Greek at St. Andrews. 5s.
Cicero—De Oratore I. Translated by E. N. P. Moor, M.A. 3s. 6d.

Cicero—Select Orations (Pro Milone, Pro Murena, Philippic III., In Catilinam). Translated by H. E. D. Blakiston, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford. 5s.
Cicero—De Natura Deorum. Trans-
lated by F. Brooks, M.A., late Scholar of Balliol College, Oxford. 3s. 6d.

HORACE: THE ODES AND EPODES. Translated by A. Godley, M.A., Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. 2s.


Educational Books

CLASSICAL

PLAUTI BACCHIDES. Edited with Introduction, Commentary, and Critical Notes by J. McCOH, M.A. Fcap. 40. 12s. 6d.

The notes are copious, and contain a great deal of information that is good and useful.—Classical Review.

PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLATION. By E. C. Marchant, M.A., Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge; and A. M. Cook, M.A., late Scholar of Wadham College, Oxford; Assistant Masters at St. Paul's School. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

'A capital selection, and of more variety and value than such books usually are.'—Athenaeum.

'A judiciously compiled book which will be found widely convenient.'—Schoolmaster.

'We know no book of this class better fitted for use in the higher forms of schools.'—Guardian.

TACITI AGRICOLA. With Introduction, Notes, Map, etc. By R. F. Davis, M.A., Assistant Master at Weymouth College. Crown 8vo. 2s.

TACITI GERMANIA. By the same Editor. Crown 8vo. 2s.

HERODOTUS: EASY SELECTIONS. With Vocabulary. By A. C. LidDELL, M.A. Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.

SELECTIONS FROM THE ODYSSEY. By E. D. Stone, M.A., late Assistant Master at Eton. Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.

PLAUTUS: THE CAPTIVI. Adapted for Lower Forms by J. H. FreeSE, M.A., late Fellow of St. John's, Cambridge. 1s. 6d.

DEMOSTHENES AGAINST CONON AND CALLICLES. Edited with Notes and Vocabulary, by F. Darwin Swift, M.A., formerly Scholar of Queen's College, Oxford. Fcap. 8vo. 2s.

EXERCISES IN LATIN ACCIDENCE. By S. E. WinBolt, Assistant Master in Christ's Hospital. Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d.

An elementary book adapted for Lower Forms to accompany the shorter Latin primer.

'Accurate and well arranged.'—Athenaeum.

NOTES ON GREEK AND LATIN SYNTAX. By G. Buckland Green, M.A., Assistant Master at Edinburgh Academy, late Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

Notes and explanations on the chief difficulties of Greek and Latin Syntax, with numerous passages for exercise.

GERMAN

A COMPANION GERMAN GRAMMAR. By H. de B. Gibbins, D.Litt., M.A., Assistant Master at Nottingham High School. Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d.

GERMAN PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLATION. By E. McQueen Gray. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

ELEMENTARY LIGHT. By R. E.

ENGLISH RECORDS. A Companion to the History of England. By H. E. MALDEN, M.A. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.

A book which aims at concentrating information upon dates, genealogy, officials, constitutional documents, etc., which is usually found scattered in different volumes.

THE ENGLISH CITIZEN: HIS RIGHTS AND DUTIES. By H. E. MALDEN, M.A. 1s. 6d.

A DIGEST OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. By JOHNSON BARKER, B.A. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

A CLASS-BOOK OF DICTATION PASSAGES. By W. WILLIAMSON, M.A. Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d.

TEST CARDS IN EUCLID AND ALGEBRA. By D. S. CALDERWOOD, Headmaster of the Normal School, Edinburgh. In three packets of 40, with Answers. 1s.

'They bear all the marks of having been prepared by a teacher of experience who knows the value of careful grading and constant repetition. Sums are specially inserted to meet all likely difficulties.' — Glasgow Herald.

METHUEN'S COMMERCIAL SERIES

Edited by H. DE B. GIBBINS, D.Litt., M.A.

BRITISH COMMERCE AND COLONIES FROM ELIZABETH TO VICTORIA. By H. DE B. GIBBINS, D.Litt., M.A. Third Edition. 2s.

COMMERCIAL EXAMINATION PAPERS. By H. DE B. GIBBINS, D.Litt., M.A. 1s. 6d.

THE ECONOMICS OF COMMERCE. By H. DE B. GIBBINS, D.Litt., M.A. 1s. 6d.

FRENCH COMMERCIAL CORRESPONDENCE. By S. E. BALLY, Master at the Manchester Grammar School. Second Edition. 2s.

GERMAN COMMERCIAL CORRESPONDENCE. By S. E. BALLY. 2s. 6d.

A FRENCH COMMERCIAL READER. By S. E. BALLY. 2s.

COMMERCIAL GEOGRAPHY, with special reference to the British Empire. By L. W. LYDE, M.A. Second Edition. 2s.

A PRIMER OF BUSINESS. By S. JACKSON, M.A. Second Edition. 1s. 6d.

COMMERCIAL ARITHMETIC. By F. G. TAYLOR, M.A. Second Edition. 1s. 6d.

PRÉCIS WRITING AND OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE. By E. E. WHITFIELD, M.A. 2s.

A GUIDE TO PROFESSIONS AND BUSINESS. By HENRY JONES. 1s. 6d.
WORKS BY A. M. M. STEDMAN, M.A.


FIRST LATIN READER. With Notes adapted to the Shorter Latin Primer and Vocabulary. Fourth Edition revised. 18mo. 1s. 6d.

EASY SELECTIONS FROM CÆSAR. Part I. The Helvetian War. Second Edition. 18mo. 1s.

EASY SELECTIONS FROM LIVY. Part I. The Kings of Rome. i8mo. is. 6d.

EASY LATIN PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLATION. Sixth Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.


EASY LATIN EXERCISES ON THE SYNTAX OF THE SHORTER AND REVISED LATIN PRIMER. With Vocabulary. Seventh and cheaper Edition, re-written. Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d. Issued with the consent of Dr. Kennedy.

THE LATIN COMPOUND SENTENCE: Rules and Exercises. Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d. With Vocabulary. 2s.

NOTANDA QUAE DAM: Miscellaneous Latin Exercises on Common Rules and Idioms. Third Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d. With Vocabulary. 2s.

LATIN VOCABULARIES FOR REPETITION: Arranged according to Subjects. Seventh Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.

A VOCABULARY OF LATIN IDIOMS. 18mo. Second Edition. 1s.

STEPS TO GREEK. 18mo. 1s.

A SHORTER GREEK PRIMER. Crown 8vo. 1s. 6d.

EASY GREEK PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLATION. Third Edition Revised. Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.

GREEK VOCABULARIES FOR REPETITION. Arranged according to Subjects. Second Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.

GREEK TESTAMENT SELECTIONS. For the use of Schools. Third Edition. With Introduction, Notes, and Vocabulary. Fcap. 8vo. 2s. 6d.

STEPS TO FRENCH. Fourth Edition. 18mo. 8d.


EASY FRENCH PASSAGES FOR UNSEEN TRANSLATION. Third Edition revised. Fcap. 8vo. 1s. 6d.

EASY FRENCH EXERCISES ON ELEMENTARY SYNTAX. With Vocabulary. Second Edition. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. Key 3s. net.

FRENCH VOCABULARIES FOR REPETITION: Arranged according to Subjects. Seventh Edition. Fcap. 8vo. 1s.

SCHOOL EXAMINATION SERIES

EDITED BY A. M. M. STEDMAN, M.A. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.

FRENCH EXAMINATION PAPERS IN MISCELLANEOUS GRAMMAR AND IDIOMS. By A. M. M. Stedman, M.A. Ninth Edition.

A Key, issued to Tutors and Private Students only, to be had on application to the Publishers.


LATIN EXAMINATION PAPERS IN MISCELLANEOUS GRAMMAR AND IDIOMS. By A. M. M. Stedman, M.A. Ninth Edition.

Key (Third Edition) issued as above. 6s. net.
GREEK EXAMINATION PAPERS

Key (Second Edition) issued as above. 6s. net.


Key (Second Edition) issued as above. 6s. net.


SCIENCE EXAMINATION PAPERS. By R. E. Steel, M.A., F.C.S. In two vols.
Part I. Chemistry; Part II. Physics.


Key (Second Edition) issued as above. 7s. net.